IR 05000440/2010008
| ML102110548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/2010 |
| From: | Billy Dickson Division of Reactor Safety III |
| To: | Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| EA-10-035, OI 3-2009-026 IR-10-008 | |
| Download: ML102110548 (14) | |
Text
July 30, 2010
SUBJECT:
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2010-008; RESULTS OF NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 3-2009-026 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Bezilla:
During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) radiation protection inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant in April 2009 the NRC learned of an incident on March 15, 2009, that involved a contract radiation protection technician that may have failed to follow established protocols associated with portal radiation monitor alarms when exiting the plant.
The incident was documented as an Unresolved Item in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000440/2009-003. The incident was subsequently the subject of an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) investigation.
The NRC completed a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the March 15, 2009, incident. That review included the results of the OI investigation, which was completed on February 25, 2010. The enclosed report documents our inspection and investigation results, which were discussed on July 16, 2010, with Mr. Tony Jardine and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The NRC reviewed selected procedures and records and interviewed personnel.
The NRC Office of Investigations concluded that the technician deliberately failed to follow the radiation protection procedure that governs portal radiation monitor use. In summary, the technician alarmed the personnel access facility portal radiation monitors on three separate instances the evening of March 15, 2009, did not notify the radiation protection organization, and then departed the site after the third unsuccessful attempt to clear the monitors. The RPT left the site without authorization from radiation protection supervision. The following day, low-level radioactive contamination was discovered on the technicians coat, shoes, and pants.
Because your staff failed to perform radiation surveys outside the radiologically controlled area, the NRC could not confirm whether radioactive contamination was spread offsite. However, the contamination levels on the technicians clothing were bounded by the alarm setpoint of the main radiologically controlled area egress portal monitors (which were reportedly used by the RPT but did not alarm) and surveys performed on the technicians clothing the following day. Radiologically controlled area portal monitors and those located at the personnel access facility were set to alarm well within industry standards. Based on the amount of radioactivity identified on the technician, we concluded that there was no health and safety impact to the public.
Based on the results of the inspection and the investigation by OI, and following consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, the NRC has determined that a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC=s Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html).
The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (NOV) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation is being cited in the Notice and a response is required because your staff failed to: (1) timely and appropriately respond to the incident; (2) adequately assess the potential for offsite contamination; and (3) take corrective action to ensure against recurrence.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Billy C. Dickson, Chief Plant Support Team Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosures:
1.
Inspection Report 05000440/2010008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION III==
Docket No:
50-440 License No:
NPF-58 Report No:
05000440/2010-008 Licensee:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location:
Perry, OH Dates:
Office of Investigations, Investigation Completed February 25, 2010; Follow-up Inspection Activities Completed July 16, 2010 Inspectors:
Wayne Slawinski, Senior Health Physicist
Martin Phalen, Senior Health Physicist Approved by:
Billy C. Dickson, Chief Plant Support Team Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Inspection Report (IR) 05000440/2010-008; July 16, 2010; Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1;
Results of NRC Investigation Report No. 3-2009-026.
This report documents the results of an NRC Office of Investigations investigation completed in February 2010, supplemented by regional inspector follow-up through July 16, 2010. One Cited Violation of NRC regulations was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings Cornerstones: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
- Severity Level IV. A willful violation was identified through an OI Investigation for the failure to comply with the procedure that governed portal radiation monitor usage.
Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician deliberately violated a radiation protection procedure when the technician exited the Perry site without authorization from radiation protection supervision following three consecutive portal monitor alarms at the personal access facility.
The significance of the violation was assessed using Traditional Enforcement because it was determined to be willful. A Severity Level IV violation was determined to be appropriate because the incident had more than minor safety significance given that the technician was radioactively contaminated and departed the site. The violation was cited since it was willful and because the licensee failed to: (1) timely and appropriately respond to the incident; (2) adequately assess the potential for offsite contamination; and (3) take corrective action to ensure against recurrence.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000440/2009003-07:
Employee Disregarded Portal Monitor Alarm Review of Office of Investigations Report No. 3-2009-026
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) report related to an Unresolved Item (URI) identified during a radiation protection (RP) baseline inspection conducted in April 2009. The URI stemmed from an incident that occurred on March 15, 2009, that involved the apparent failure of a contract radiation protection technician (RPT) to satisfy the RP procedure associated with portal radiation monitor alarms.
Following completion of the OI investigation, additional information was reviewed to assess the radiological significance of the incident, the licensees follow-up efforts and corrective actions.
b. Findings
Introduction:
A willful violation was identified through an OI investigation for the failure to comply with the procedure governing portal radiation monitor usage. The investigation determined that an RPT exited the Perry site without authorization from RP supervision following three consecutive portal radiation monitor alarms at the personal access facility (PAF).
Description:
During the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 refueling outage in March 2009 an RPT alarmed the portal radiation monitors located at the PAF (e.g., security guardhouse) and subsequently left the site without authorization from RP supervision.
The next day, some of the RPT's clothing was determined to be radioactively contaminated.
At the conclusion of the day-shift on March 15, 2009, the contract RPT attempted to leave the site following work within the radiologically controlled area (RCA). The RPT alarmed the PAF portal monitors on three separate instances the evening of March 15, 2009, and departed the site after the third unsuccessful attempt to clear the monitors. Following the first and second unsuccessful attempts, the RPT reported that he had returned to the main RCA egress area and used radiation monitoring equipment (small article monitor and hand-held friskers) without assistance from RP staff in an effort to determine the source of the portal monitor alarms. The RPT reportedly changed his trousers and self-monitored his shoes and shirt for contamination. According to the RPT, no contamination was identified. Following that, the RPT alarmed the PAF portal monitors a third time, but disregarded the alarm and left the Perry site. One or more plant staff witnessed the RPT leaving the site after alarming the portal monitor but the issue was not promptly reported to the RP organization.
The following morning, the site coordinator for contract RP personnel overheard Perry RP staff discuss the incident and initiated an investigation. The contractors investigation concluded that the RPT failed to follow the established protocol for reporting portal radiation monitor alarms and then left the Perry site without clearing a portal monitor. As a result of the RPTs actions, the contractor terminated the RPT from the Perry site on March 16, 2009. The investigation into the incident expanded, and the licensee became involved when the RPT alarmed the portal monitors as he was being escorted offsite by the site coordinator late in the day on March 16, 2009, nearly 24-hours after the RPT departed the site contaminated the day before. The licensee had minimal involvement in the follow-up of the incident until the portal monitors alarmed as the RPT was escorted offsite on March 16, 2009.
According to the testimony provided to OI, the licensees investigation disclosed low level contamination on the RPTs coat, shoes, and pants. According to that testimony, contamination levels of about 1000 - 3000 disintegrations per minute were identified on the RPTs shoes, and they were decontaminated and returned to the RPT. The other articles of clothing found contaminated were reportedly confiscated by the licensee and disposed as radioactive waste. The licensee maintained no record of the pant and shoe survey, no radiation survey of any associated areas nor was a radiological assessment documented. A survey of the RPTs coat which the licensee maintained showed contamination from cobalt-60/58 and manganese-54. A condition report generated by the contract site coordinator briefly described the incident; however, no corrective actions were documented other than the RPTs termination from the site.
Analysis:
The OI investigation completed February 25, 2010, concluded that the contract RPT deliberately violated the health physics procedure that governs portal radiation monitor usage. Failure to follow this procedure represents a performance deficiency. The issue had more than minor safety significance because the RPT was radioactively contaminated and departed the site. However, given the limited actual radiological significance, the violation was determined to be categorized at Severity Level IV. Traditional enforcement was applied because the violation was willful.
It was not known if contamination was spread offsite because the licensee did not conduct radiation surveys to assess that potential. According to the licensee, contamination was limited to the RPTs coat and was imbedded in the fibers of the coat and not removable. Based solely on that information, the licensee concluded that area and/or offsite surveys were not warranted to determine if contamination was spread outside the RCA. However, based on the transcribed testimonies, the NRC discovered that low levels of fixed contamination were also present on the RPT's pants, and low levels of potentially removable contamination were found on the RPT's shoes.
Consequently, the OI investigation may have disclosed information about this incident that was unknown to licensee management.
According to the testimonies regarding levels of contamination found after the RPT returned to the site, had that contamination been spread offsite from the RPTs shoes or clothing, it would likely not have been readily detectable by conventional means (e.g.,
portable hand-held frisker or Micro-R meter). The contamination levels on the RPT's clothing was bounded by the alarm setpoint of the main RCA egress portal monitors (which were reportedly used by the RPT but did not alarm) and surveys performed of the RPT's clothing the following day. Radiologically controlled area portal monitors and those located at the PAF were set to alarm at a level of 20 nanocuries (cobalt-60), well
within industry standards. Consequently, the inspectors determined that a measurable radiation dose to the public from any contamination that may have been spread offsite was unlikely. Therefore, in accordance to IMC 0609, Appendix D Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process this issue is of very low safety significance.
On the basis of the testimonies and subsequent follow-up inspection by regional health physics specialists, the NRC concluded that neither timely nor adequate radiological assessments were performed by the licensee to determine whether any contamination was spread outside the RCA. Also, adequate corrective actions were not taken. For example:
- The incident was witnessed by one or more plant staff the evening of March 15, 2009, but apparently not reported to the RP staff until the following day. The reporting problem impacted the timeliness of any radiological follow-up assessment.
- Initial follow-up of the incident was performed by the contractor with limited involvement of Perry RP staff until the RPT was being escorted offsite late in the day on March 16, 2009, and alarmed the portal monitors again.
- The licensee's radiological assessment failed to include area surveys outside the RCA such as the worker's vehicle, even though contamination was found on the worker's coat and reportedly also on the worker's shoes and pants.
- Records were not completed to document the licensees radiological assessment including whether any area contamination existed and the full extent of the worker's contamination.
The inspectors determined that no cross-cutting components applied to this issue, because the underlying performance issue was the same as the performance deficiency (Failure to follow procedure).
Enforcement:
Perry Technical Specification 5.4, AProcedures,@ requires that written procedures/instructions be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities provided in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Procedures specified in Regulatory Guide 1.33 include RP procedures for contamination control and for personnel monitoring.
Perry Procedure (Health Physics Instruction) HPI-E0007, APersonnel Decontamination,@
Revision 15 (effective April 24, 2008), implements Technical Specification 5.4 as provided in Regulatory Guide 1.33, in that, it provides instruction to RP staff for response to contamination alarms and consequently for contamination control.
Section 4.1.2 of Procedure HPI-E0007 requires that personnel must successfully pass a gamma contamination portal radiation monitor two times if an initial alarm is received to exit the radiologically controlled area or personnel access facility, unless authorized by RP supervision.
Contrary to the procedural requirements, on March 15, 2009, a contract RPT exited the Perry site following three consecutive portal monitor alarms at the personnel access facility without authorization from RP supervision (VIO 05000440/2010008-01).
As summarized in the Analysis section above, the violation was categorized as a Severity Level IV Violation of the health physics procedure, which dictates portal monitor response. This Unresolved Item is closed.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
On July 16, 2010, Messrs. Phalen and Slawinski presented the inspection results to Mr. Jardine and other members of the licensees staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- P. McNulty, Radiation Protection Manager
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
- 05000440/2010008-01 VIO Deliberate Failure to Follow Portal Monitor Use Procedure (Section 40A5)
Closed
- 05000440/2009003-07 URI Employee Disregarded Portal Monitor Alarm.