ML111010411

Final Operating Exam (Sections a, B, and C) (Folder 3)

ML111010411
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	01/24/2011
From:	Entergy Nuclear Generation Co
To:	NRC Region 1
Hansell S
Shared Package
ML102210114	List: IR 05000293/2011301 ML102780057 ML110450647 ML110620474 ML110620479 ML111010402 ML111010406 ML111010409 ML111010411 ML111870176 ML111870178
References
TAC U01833
Download: ML111010411 (241)

Text

PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO .ADMIN JPM C001 TITLE: Perform a Short Form Heat Balance Comparison OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A

• PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required for NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: Perform a Short Form Heat Balance TASK Attachment 4 of PNPS 2.1.10 is completed with no errors.

STANDARD:

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&A RATING:

Perform a Short Form Heat Balance 356-01-07-004 2.1.7 - Ability to evaluate 4.4 Comparison plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation

REFERENCES:

1. PNPS 2.1.10 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. IC-30 set at about 95% power (Recirc Speeds at 70.8%)

2. Turn OFF EPIC displays GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Steam Tables

2. Calculator CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant was at approximately 80% power.

• The plant process computer has been out of service for 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

• An OPER-20 is in progress lAW PNPS 2.1.10 Section 7.5

• PNPS Section 7.4 has been completed

• The RE and Nuclear Computer Applications are attempting to restart the process computer.

• The previous Short Form Heat Balance was performed one hour ago.

INITIATING CUE:

Perform a Short Form Heat Balance lAW PNPS 2.1.10 Att.4.

PERFORMANCE:

EXAMINER NOTE: Provide candidate with the previously completed Short Form Heat Balance NOTE: If the candidate notices the higher Indicated reactor power on the APRMs or Generator output and asks about these indications report that rising APRMs and Generator output have been noticed and that is why the Heat Balance is required to validate these indications.

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step Operator reviews the applicable sections of the procedure.

I Standard Reviews the following in PI\IPS 2.1.10:

• Precautions and Limitations I

• Section 7.5 reviewed i

• AttA i I

I Comments Results SAT D UNSAT D

2. Procedure Step 1Fills out date/time and performed by on Attachment 4.

Standard . Date/time and performed by recorded on Attachment 4.

J Comments I I Results SAT UNSAT I I

3. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Flow A from FI-640-24A on Panel C905.

i i

Standard FI-640-24A reading recorded.

I Comments Approximately 3.75 Mlb/hi I

Results SAT UNSAT I .~

I D I I

i 4. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Flow B from FI-640-24B on Panel C90S.

Standard FI-640-24B reading recorded.

Comments Approximately 3.85 Mlb/hr.

Results SAT UNSAT r 1 I I

5. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Temperature A from TR-3496A on Panel C1.

Standard TR-3496A reading recorded (RED pen).

Comments Approximately 360°F.

I Results I SAT UNSAT I D D

6. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Temperature B from TR-3496B on Panel C1.

Standard TR-3496B reading recorded (BLUE pen).

Comments Approximately 360°F.

Results I

SAT D UNSAT D

7.

PrOOedlre Step Calculate Total Feedwater flow by adding the A and B Feedwater Flows.

Stamfard Total Feedwater flow calculated.

' . i

...... ~'."

,**:;:*:)C~"

APProximately 7.6 Mlb/hr.

Results SA I

UNSAT D

8. Procedure Step Average the A and B Feedwater Temperatures loops together.

Standard Average Feedwater temperature calculated.

I Comments Approximately 360°F.

Results SAT r UN SAT r l I

I~~.*..** . :"".'

."""'" i: . ';; .. , Using steam tables, determine Feedwater enthalpy.

Standard Feedwater enthalpy is recorded .

.'7 Cue

".  ;/*~ts

... H1 310°F,. 332 BTU/lb* I Results SAT I I UNSAT r I

10. 'Pro~Step Determine Core Thermal Power 7.6 X (1189.6 - 332) + 9.02 = 1918  !

...... . I 3.413

$tllnd""ct Core Thermal Power is calculated at approximately 1918 MWth C~t$ the oaIoulatedCore Thermal Power depends on how the candidate reads Feedwater Flow Indications assuming a one division range of the meter scale.

'. Core Thermal Power should be In a range between approximately

.' 1892 and 1942MWth Rs&t11tC SAT I I UNSAT D

Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated STOP TIME:

INITIAL CONOrnONS:

• The plant was at approximately 80% power.

• The plant process computer has been out of service for 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

• An OPER-20 is in progress lAW PNPS 2.1.10 Section 7.5

• PNPS Section 7.4 has been completed

• The RE and Nuclear Computer Applications are attempting to restart the process computer

• The previous Short Form Heat Balance was performed one hour ago INITIATING CUE:

Perform a Short Form Heat Balance lAW PNPS 2.1.10 Att.4.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM C002 TITLE: Operator License Status Verification OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: ---------------------

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required for NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: Given a table containing watch standing, medical and, requal training information for 3 operators, determine if the requirements for maintaining an active license have been met TASK Determines that 2 of 3 operators have failed to meet 10 CFR 55 and utility STANDARD: requirements for maintaining an active license.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant Simulate Simulator/Classroom x Classroom Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM C002 1 February 2011

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&A RATING:

Operator License Status XXXX 2.1.4 - Knowledge of 3.3 Verification individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

REFERENCES:

1. 10CFR55.53

2. PNPS 1.3.34 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS: N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: N/A CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are within the body of this document.

INI1"IAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant is operating at 100% power.

• Today is January 20,2011.

• You are the RO.

• You must leave shift.

• Three replacement operators are available.

INITIATING CUE:

Using the given information on Handout #1, determine which of the three operators, if any, are qualified to relieve you lAW procedural requirements of PNPS 1.3.34, Operations Administrative Policies and Processes.

Record your findings on Handout #2.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM C002 2 February 2011

PERFORMANCE:

EXAMINER NOTE: Provide candidate with Handout #1 START TIME:

aOl:lHCElDle sections of the' procedures.

of the operators in accordance with the below key Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated Answer Key If No. whatrequl,ement Is not bel . ,mel.

Does not have a medical exam within the* past! years NO License has expired (>6 yrs 01 Does not meet the required number of hours performing NO dutl. . as a licensed operator for the last quarter (Because Work Control hours do NOT count - This reason Is NOT Crltlca VES NIA PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM C002 3 February 2011

HANDOUT #1 RO#1 RO#2 Hours Performing Operator Duties in Last Quarter Hours Performing Operator Duties in Last Quarter

. 10/16/10: 0700 - 1900 - ATC 11/21/10: 0700 - 1900 - Work Control 10/17/10: 0700 1900 ECCS Operator 11/30/10: 0700 - 1900 - ATC 10/25/10: 0700 - 1900 - ATC 12/14/10: 0700 - 1900 - ECCS Operator 11/5/10: 0700 - 1900 - Work Control 12/15/10: 0700 - 1900 Work Control 11/6/10: 0700 - 1900 - BOP 12/24/10: 0700 - 1900 - BOP 11/7/10: 0700 - 1900 - BOP 12/25/10: 0700 - 1900 - BOP 12/4/10: 0700 - 1900 - ATC 12/26/10: 0700 1900 - Work Control 12/5/10: 0700 1900 - Work Control Date of Most Recent Medical Exam - 12/10/2008 Date of Most Recent Medical Exam - 2/14/2009 License Issue Date 1/16/2005 License Issue Date - 3/27/2005 RO#3 Hours Performing Operator Duties in Last Quarter 10/6/10: 0700 - 1900 - BOP 11/8/10: 0700 - 1900 - ATC 11/9/10: 0700 - 1900 - ECCS Operator 11/15/10: 0700 - 1900 - Work Control 12/1/10: 0700 - 1900 - BOP 12/21/10: 0700 - 1900 - BOP Date of Most Recent Medical Exam - 6/5/2009 I

License Issue Date - 5/10/2005 PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM C002 4 February 2011

HANDOUT #2 Qualified for Relief? I'f No, what requirement(s)

(Yes/No) is/are not being met.

RO#1 RO#2 RO#3 PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM C002 5 February 2011

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant is operating at 100% power.

• Today is January 20,2011.

• You are the RD.

• You must leave shift.

• Three replacement operators are available.

INITIATING CUE:

Using the given information, determine which of the three operators, if any, are qualified to relieve you lAW PNPS 1.3.34, Operations Administrative Policies and Processes.

Record your findings on Handout #2.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM C002 6 February 2011

Pilgrim NRC 2011 RO ADMIN JPM EC TITLE: Identify the tagging/clearance pOints for a shaft seal replacement on the "E" RBCCW pump OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: - - -

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: I ....

. ....ime (min): N/A Actual Time (min):

I N/A I

PERFORMANCE TIME: ime (min): 30 Actual Time (min):

I JPM RESLILTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED:

SYNOPSIS: Candidate must use plant prints to determine the blocking points for a shaft seal replacement on the liE" RBCCW pump, and then determine the position of the blocking point and the type of clearance tag required.

TASK Identify the blocking points, tag type and sequence for a clearance for a shaft seal STANDARD: replacement on the "E" RBCCW pump EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator/Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

NRC 2011 RO ADMIN JPM EC 1 February 2011

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&ARATING:

CONDUCT EQUIPMENT TAGOUTS 299-03-01-012 2.2.13, Knowledge RO 4.1 SRO 4.3 CLEARANCE AND SWITCHING. of tagging and clearance procedures.

REFERENCES:

RBCCW P &10 M-215, Sheet 2 EN-OP-102-02, Fleet Tagging Assessments EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging SIMULATOR CONDITIONS: None None GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

Ensure RBCCW P&IDs are available CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at rated power. A tagouVclearance is required for maintenance work to replace the mechanical shaft seal on the HE" RBCCW pump INITIATING CUE:

Identify the components required to be tagged, the type of tags and the position of clearance pOints required for a shaft seal replacement on the HE" RBCCW pump NRC 2011 RO ADMIN JPM EC 2 February 2011

PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Reference P&ID M-215,  !

Standard Candidate determines correct P&ID and reviews it to determine the blocking points for the E RBCCW Pump.

Comments l

Results SAT D UNSAT I I

2. Pr~Step: Identifies isolations necessary to replace the seal on the E RBCCW Pump

. From EN-OP-102; and P&ID M-215 Using controlled documents, determine hazardous energy sources and isolations necessary to provide a safe work boundary for each work actiVity.

Stlf1dard See attached key C'*'~'" ..... "ems' Results SAT D UNSAT D

3. PfaIIMIure;Step: Identifies valves necessary to open to replace the seal on the E RBCCW Pump

[1] From EN-OP-102; Isolation Boundaries - Those components (isolation valves, vents, drains, electrical breakers, fuses, and/or switches, for example.) that are required to be pOSitioned to provide eqUipment protection and personnel safety during work actMty/procedural performance. One vent or drain should normally be tagged open to depressurize systems and to prevent it from re pressurizing .

. ......... . , Itfmdard S_attached ke~

Corftffl$nts SAT Ftesults D UNSAT D

NRC 2011 RO ADMIN JPM EC 3 February 2011

4. .......1d'St.~ Identifies the type of tags required to replace the seal on the E RBCCW Pump Standard See attached key Comme Aesults SAT D UNSAT D

Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated KEY Com anent Ta T e Position 1.'RIeOW'PumpE Suction Valve 30-HO-46 Danger Closed RED 2; Pump Et>ischarge Valve 30-HO-49 Danger Closed RED

3. RBCCW Pump E Discharge PI-4004 Root Valve Caution - Open/Close as 30-HO-240E Yellow necessary to vent/drain NOTE: This isolation point is NOT required but may be chosen.

4. RII60W Pump E Discharge Casing Vent Valve CAUTION Open 30-HO-S2 Yellow OR DANGER Red Pump E (P-202E) Power Supply AUX Danger Off (Removed or Red OPEN itumpE (P-202E) Control Switch Danger Pull To Lock Red STOP TIME: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

NRC 2011 RO ADMIN ..IPM EC 4 February 2011

HANDOUT r---_ _ _ _ _ _ C_o_m-'-p_o"_e_"_t_______-+-_T_a9' p_e--+__P_o_s~

.....---T-"-y.......

i i I  !

i I

I I

i i I I I

I

,..----...... I I

Stop time: _ _ _ _ __

NRC 2011 RO ADMIN JPM EC 5 February 2011

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at rated power. A tagout/clearance is required for maintenance work to replace the mechanical shaft seal on the liE" RBCCW pump INITIATING CUE:

Identify the components required to be tagged, the type of tags and the position of clearance points required for a shaft seal replacement on the liE" RBCCW pump NRC 2011 RO ADMIN JPM EC 6 February 2011

Pilgrim 2011 NRC RO Admin JPM RC TITLE: Determine personnel available to perform a High Rad Area task OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED:

SYNOPSIS: Candidate will determine the appropriate individual(s) to perform the task lAW EP-IP-440, the reasons for those selections and exclusions and whether an Extended Exposure authorization is required.

TASK Candidate will determine the appropriate individual(s) to perform the task lAW STANDARD: EP-IP-440 and the reasons for those selections and exclusions.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator/Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

Pilgrim 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM RC 1 February 2011

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&ARATING:

Determine personnel available to XXX 2.3.4 - Knowledge of 3.2 perform a High Rad Area task radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 20.1206 EP-IP-440 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

Calculator CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. An event has occurred at the plant and the E-Plan has been entered.

2. A RCIC steam leak into the Reactor Building cannot be isolated without manually shutting the MO 1301-61 RCIC Steam Admission valve.

3. Radiation levels at the valve are 15 R/hr.

4. Rad Pro has determined the following:

A. Time to complete the task for an experienced Licensed Reactor Operator will be 12 minutes.

B. Time to complete the task for a recently Licensed Reactor Operator will be 25 minutes

5. Four (4) individuals are available to perform the task.

• Worker A is a volunteer who is an experienced Licensed Reactor Operator and has previously received a Planned Special Exposure of 1R at a.nother facility this year. This individual has also received a dose of 1200 mR this year at Pilgrim

• Worker B is a volunteer who is an experienced Licensed Reactor Operator and is a declared pregnant adult worker and has received a dose of 15 mR this year at Pilgrim

• Worker C is a volunteer who is an experienced Ucensed Reactor Operator that has received a dose of 1200 mR this year at Pilgrim, as well as a dose of 2400 mR during this event on another task.

• Worker D is a volunteer who is a recently Licensed Reactor Operator that has received a dose of 1400 mR this year at Pilgrim Pilgrim 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM RC 2 February 2011

INITIATING CUE:

1. Determine the worker(s) available to perform the task lAW EPIP-440, Emergency Exposure Controls, WITHOUT exceeding Emergency Exposure Limit AND why you chose the worker(s).

2. Determine the reason why you would not choose any particular worker to perform the task.

(Assume that dose rates remain at the level noted above throughout the task and it is completed.)

Pilgrim 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM RC 3 February 2011

START TIME:

1. L p~o.~ce_d_u_re Step Operator will review the task conditions and obtain EP-IP-440 J tl--*-------= ~t_a_nd_a~~ I op_e-,-ra-,-t_or_r_e_Vi_ew_s_th_e_t_as_k_c_on_di~o_n_s_a~_d_o_bt~i:S_~:~I:~~~ __~ ~=J COJllmert!s Provide the candidate with? copy of EP-IP-440 if requested I

L-L__

r-I Results SAT 0 _._..

UNSAT 0

__.___~._~._.~_.~_._.____J I'

~rator determines the worker that may be assigned to perform the 10k

\Al1"\1~WtAII"G may be chosen for reasons noted:

A may b, assigned to the task.

• indMduafwUl result .in the lowest total dose for the job of 3R.

)( 15 R/hr = 3R) and will not exceed Emergency Exposure Limit of 5 Afor this event.

AiPl8ftlrMKI* SpecIal: ExJ*IUFe*t8.ICCounted for separately from

.,.. . .Ild.td dUri.,.anyotherplanMd special exposure and year 10 .eexp08ur. Ie not Included during Emergency Conditione.

UNSAT Pilgrim 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM RC 4 February 2011

1\;Op._~detenTfines worker(s) that may be NOT be assigned to perform the

" ...n .... TF_ reasonS")

reasons noted:

Worker B may NOT be a§igned to the task because she is a declared pr",nant adult and can not receive emergency exposure during emergency

~es.

1:'WOrKl!Jf' C may not be assigned to the task.

ChoOsillfthis im:iividual will result in a total dose to this person during this evt.mt of 5.4R. (0.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> X.15 R/hr = 3R plus the additional dose of 2.4R in performing. another task during this event.)

Worker 0 may NOT be assigned to the task.

Choosing this individual will result in a total dose of 3.75R for the task. (0.42

~X 15~/hr =6.25R farthls task.).

D D Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated STOP TIME:

Pilgrim 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM RC 5 February 2011

HANDOUT INITIAL CONDITIONS:

4. An event has occurred at the plant and the E-Plan Ilas been entered.

5. A RCIC steam leak into the Reactor Building cannot be isolated without manually shutting the MO 1301-61 RCIC Steam Admission valve.

6. Radiation levels at the valve are 15 R/hr.

4. Rad Pro has determined the following:

A. Time to complete the task for an experienced Licensed Reactor Operator will be 12 minutes.

C. Time to complete the task for a recently Licensed Reactor Operator will be 25 minutes

6. Four (4) individuals are available to perform the task.

• Worker A is a volunteer who is an experienced Licensed Reactor Operator and has previously received a Planned Special Exposure of 1R at another facility this year. This individual has also received a dose of 1200 mR this year at Pilgrim

• Worker B is a volunteer who is an experienced Licensed Reactor Operator and is a declared pregnant adult worker and has received a dose of 15 mR this year at Pilgrim

• Worker C is a volunteer who is an experienced Licensed Reactor Operator that has received a dose of 1200 mR this year at Pilgrim, as well as a dose of 2400 mR during this event on another task.

• Worker D is a volunteer who is a recently Licensed Reactor Operator that has received a dose of 1400 mR this year at Pilgrim INITIATING CUE:

1. Determine the worker(s) available to perform the task lAW EPIP-440, Emergency Exposure Controls, WITHOUT exceeding Emergency Exposure Limit AND why you chose the worker(s).

2. Determine the reason why you would not choose any particular worker to perform the task.

(Assume that dose rates remain at the level noted above throughout the task and it is completed.)

Pilgrim 2011 NRC RO ADMIN JPM RC 6 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC SRO ADMIN JPM C001 TITLE: Perform a Short Form Heat Balance Comparison OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: _______________ EVALUATORSIGNATURE: _____________

F'nc.;;:..: TIME FRAME: Tf;uired Time (~i~): - N/Al Actual Time (min): ~,. N/~

,1'-_

PERFORMANCE TIME:

_ _ _ _ _ _~_~ _

Average Time (min): ~ ~ Actu;1 Time (min):

____'__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'-___---'-._ _ _ _ ~________ ___1 __________ j JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required for NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: Perform a Short Form Heat Balance Comparison and determine that reactor power has changed then take the corrective action.

TASK Attachment 4 of PNPS 2.1.10 is completed with no errors. A power reduction is STANDARD: required based on data comparison which indicates a power change greater than 10%.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&A RATING:

Perform a Short Form Heat Balance 356-01-07 -004 2.1.7 - Ability to evaluate 4A Comparison plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation

REFERENCES:

1. PNPS 2.1.10 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. IC 30, set at about 95% power (Recirc Speeds at 70.8%)

2. A completed Short Form Heat Balance with MWth indicating about 290 MWth lower than the current conditions.

3. The thermal power difference between the handout and the current conditions must be greater than 10%.

4. Turn OFF EPIC displays GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Steam Tables

2. Calculator CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant was at approximately 80% power.

• The plant process computer has been out of service for 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

• An OPER-20 is in progress lAW PNPS 2.1.10 Section 7.5

• PNPS Section 7A has been completed

• The RE and Nuclear Computer Applications are attempting to restart the process computer.

• The previous Short Form Heat Balance was performed one hour ago.

INITIATING CUE:

Perform a Short Form Heat Balance lAW PNPS 2.1.10 AttA and take actions as specified in Section 7.5 of PNPS 2.1.10, Computer Data and Alarms.

EXAMINER NOTE: Provide candidate with the previously completed Short Form Heat Balance

PERFORMANCE:

NOTE: If the candidate notices the higher indicated reactor power on the APRMs or Generator output and asks about these Indications report that rising APRMs and Generator output have been noticed and that is why the Heat Balance is required to validate these indications.

START'rlME:

1. Procedure Step Operator reviews the applicable sections of the procedure.

Standard Reviews the following in PNPS 2.1.10:

• Precautions and Limitations

• Section 7.5 reviewed

• AttA Comments Results SAT D UNSAT D

2. Procedure Step Fills out date/time and performed by on Attachment 4. I Standard Date/time and performed by recorded on Attachment 4.

Comments Results SAT UNSAT I I I D

3. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Flow A from FI-640-24A on Panel C9OS.

Standard FI-640-24A reading recorded.

Comments Approximately 3.75 Mlb/hr.

Results SAT LlNSAT i D I I

4. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Flow B from FI-640-24B on Panel C90S.

Standard FI-640-24B reading recorded.

Comments Approximately 3.85 Mlb/hr Results SAT UNSAT D I I

5. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Temperature A from TR-3496A on Panel C1.

Standard TR-3496A reading recorded (RED pen).

Comments Approximately 360°F.

Results SAT UNSAT I I D I I

6. Procedure Step Find and record reading for Feedwater Temperature B from TR-3496B on Panel C1.

Standard TR-3496B reading recorded (BLUE pen).

Comments Approximately 360°F.

Results SAT D UNSAT I I

.p ***Cafcutate Total Feedwaterflow by adding the A and B Feedwater Flows.

T"'aterflow calculated.

UNSAT D

8. Procedure Step Average the A and B Feedwater Temperatures loops together.

i Standard Average Feedwater temperature calculated.

I i

Comments Approximately 360°F.

Results SAT I I UNSAT I I i

~ng _am tables, determtne Feedwater enthalpy.

Feedwater enthalpy is recorded.

UNSAT De1temttneCore Thermal Power 7.6 X (1189.6 ~ 332) + 9.02 = 1918 3.413 Thermal Power is calculated at approximately 1918 MWth

.".....latetCICOr. Thermal Power depends on how the eandldate

.iP.","1t1' Flowlndlcatl..... anumIn, a one division rante of the UNSAT

~,~oml.r~~8 data obtained above with the previously provided Short Form Balance. Baseline data will showthat CTP was 1628 MWth iii~I01tl.r_ data and determines that reactor power change greater than 10%

ha&~ped which requires lowering reactor power with recirc flow. PNPS

. *p7.'&II1(e)

'.~'Hm the candidate compares the Short Form Heat Balance just completed

_mat the provided form, they should note the increase in core thermal power. A recommendation must be made for a reduction in power lAW PHPS8tep 7.5[2](b).4)

In this situation, lAW STEP 7.5(2)(b)(4), a >10% power change has occurred od tt1erefore'apower reduction is required.

J~18 -1828= 290), 290MWtH change is >10% change. A 10% change WUI~ .have been 162.8 MWth.

Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated STOP TIME:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant was at approximately 80% power.

• The plant process computer has been out of service for 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

• An OPER*20 is in progress lAW PNPS 2.1.10 Section 7.5

• PNPS Section 7.4 has been completed

• The RE and Nuclear Computer Applications are attempting to restart the process computer

• The previous Short Form Heat Balance was performed one hour ago INITIATING CUE:

Perform a Short Form Heat Balance lAW PNPS 2.1.10 Att.4 and take actions as specified in Section 7.5 of PNPS 2.1.10, Computer Data and Alarms. Here is the previous hours heat balance which did not deviate from the initial baseline data.

HANDOUT ATTACHMENT 4 Sheet 1 of 1 SHORT fORM HEAT BALANCE Date/Time _Today_l_" HOUf Ago_ __

Performed By __SXD_ _ _ _ _ _ __

OPERATING DATA:

Item Panel Instrument Reading Units (I) Feedwater Flow A C905 FI-640-24A 3.10 Mib/hr Feedwater Flow B C905 FI-640-24B 3.23 Mlblhr feedwate" Temp A C1 TR-3496A 345 of

@ Feedvlater Temp B C1 TR-3496B 345 ~F CALCULATION:

The circled numbers are item numbers; Le., Total Feedwater Flmv is equal to Item (Feedwater Flow A) plus Item ,~) (Feedwater Flow B).

T etal Feedwater Flow: +@ 3.10 + 3.2J = 6.33 Mlblhr Ave. Feedwater Temp: 1f2(@+ @) .5 (34!:; +3450) =345 OF Feedwater Enthalpy: Stm. Tables, @ 3165 Btullb Core Thermal PO'#er: X (1189.6 - tJ)) + 9.02 =

3.4 13 6.33 XE6 X (1189.6 - 316.5)13.4 13 + 9.02 =1628.3 MWth Comments:

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM C002 TITLE: Perform a Review of the Control Room Daily Logs OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

• CRITICAL TIME FRAIl~:;:: Required Time (min): I N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): ual Time (min):

I JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required fm NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: Perform a Review of the Control Room Daily Logs TASK Attachment 1 of PNPS 2.1.15 is reviewed with OOS items identified, TS/FSAR STANDARD: applicability determined and other notifications made as required EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant Simulate Simulator X Classroom Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: ~---------------------- Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM C002 1 February 2011

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&A RATING:

Perform a Review of the Control XX 2.1.18 - Ability to make 3.8 Room Daily Logs clear, accurate and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports.

REFERENCES:

1. PNPS 2.1.15, Att.1 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. None required GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

Partially completed Att.1 of PNPS 2.1.15 - Daily Log Tests Tech Specs FSAR Section 10.8 CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDn"IONS:

• The plant is at approximately 100% power.

INITIATING CUE:

Perform a review of the Attachment 1 of the Control Room Daily Logs beginning at Daily Log Test #8. When the review is completed through Daily Log Test #37, inform the examiner of findings and any Technical Specification, FSAR and/or procedural required actions, if any, from your review.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM C002 2 February 2011

PERFORMANCE:

EXAMINER NOTE: Provide candidate with the Handout - Partially completed Att.1 of PNPS 2.1.15 - Daily Log Tests DO NOT PROVIDE FSAR SECTION UNLESS REQUESTED START TIME:

1. '<~:aep Dally Log Test #1 a (Step 2) - Sheet 21 of 66

~es th. Aecirc Flow Converter readings are not within 6% as required

-determines that a work request must be issued.

IIUie candidate states*that they must initiate a work request state. "Another operator will issue the work requesf'.

If the operator reports that they are notifying the Shift Manager. as the Shift Manager reply, "I understand. Determine required T.S., FSAR and/or procedural requirements".

UNSAT NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM C002 3 February 2011

Baity log Test #31 - Sheet 41 of 66 tdentifles that boron concentration is OOS LOW - (Step 1. - 8.16%)

determines that TS 3.4.A. applies and that concentration must be restored to within limits WIthin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

AIao,natifies Chemistry.

The notification to Chemistry is NOT CRITICAL for this step. The TS appttcation Is critical The candidate ma reference TS 3.4.C which refers to T8 3A.A.

SAT UNSAT

3. ~. Step 9lilyLog Test #35 - Sheet 45 of 66

'$umlllfidentifies that FireWater Storage tank Levets are OOS LOW. Refers to FSAA Section 10.8.4.2.1 sAd determines that levels must be restored WIthin 7 days.

FSAR Section if requested.

UNSAT D

Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated STOP TIME:

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM C002 4 February 2011

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at approximately 100% power.

INITIATING CUE:

Perform a review of the Attachment 1 of the Control Room Daily Logs beginning at Daily Log Test #8. When the review is completed through Daily Log Test #37, inform the examiner of findings and required actions, if any, from your review.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM C002 5 February 2011

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EC TITLE: Analyze a Solomon case from 3D Monicore and determine the appropriate action.

OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A I Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15

• Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required for NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: With the plant operating in the Buffer Zone on the Pilgrim Power/Flow Map analyze a Solomon case from 3D Monicore and determine the appropriate action.

TASK Following a dual Recirculation Pump runback the candidate will review a Solomon STANDARD: Case and determine that the Hot Channel Decay Ratio is higher than allowable, then determine power must be lowered using the RPR array instruction sheet.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate Simulator x Classroom Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EC 1 February 2011

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&ARATING:

3D Monicore review 2.2.38 - Knowledge of 4.5 conditions and limitations in the facility license.

REFERENCES:

1. PNPS 2.4.20, Reactor Recirculation System Speed or Flow Control System Malfunction

2. Solomon Case

3. PNPS 2.1 .14, Station Power Changes

4. PNPS 2.4.165 Reactor Core Instability SIMULATOR CONDITIONS: N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

Solomon Stability Evaluation Report (attached)

CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical steps are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• Both Recirculation Pumps have run back due to a 'flow control system malfunction

• The plant has entered PNPS 2.4.20 and Immediate actions completed including the lock up of both Recirculation Pump Scoop Tubes

• Maintenance has requested that Recirculation Pump speed NOT be changed.

• Reactor operation is in the Buffer Zone

• Operation is above the 60% Rod Line

• There are no LPRM alarms

• There are no APRM or LPRM oscillations occurring

• A Solomon Case has been printed and will be provided INITIATING CUE:

Evaluate plant conditions in accordance with PNPS 2.4.20, and determine required actions, if any.

Examiner Note: provide the candidate with the Solomon Case Handout NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EC 2 February 2011

PERFORMANCE:

Examiner Note: Provide Solomon Stability Evaluation (attached).

START TIME:

1. Performance Step Reviews 2.4.20 Reactor Recirculation System Speed or Flow Control System Malfunction, step 4.0 [1] (a) 4.0 SUBSEqUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

[1J ASSESS operating conoitions by plotting power versus core flow on the Pilgrim PoweriFlow Map.

(a) !f operating in a region of instability (Exclusion Region or Buffer Zone), !l:it!l REFER TO PNPS 2,4,165 8.t!Q PERFORM CONCURRENTLY.

[NRC GL.94-02 (ElWROG-9407811 Standard Operator reviews 2.4.20 -step 4.0 [1] (a) and enters 2.4.165 Reactor Core Instability step 4.0 [4]

Comment Results SAT D UNSAT D

2. Performance Step Enters and Reviews 2.4.165 - Reactor Core Instability step 4.0

[4]

[5] JE operating in the Buffer Zone AtiI2. SOLOMON is available, (a) II:iiJi DEMAND a SOLOMON case from 3D Monicore AUQ. VERIFY the following:

Core Decay Ratio (DR) is <: 0,70, Hot Channel Decay Ratio is" 0,55.

Standard Operator reviews 2.4.165 - Reactor Core Instability step 4.0 [4]

and obtains and the Solomon Case Cue Comment:

Results SAT D UNSAT D

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN "IPM EC 3 February 2011

Reviews the Solomon Case Printout (a) II::IE.t:l DEMAND a SOLOMON case from 3D Monicore At:U:!. VERIFY the following:

• Core Decay Ratio (DR) is < 0.70.

• Hot Channel Decay Ratio is <. 0.55.

(b) 1E the Core Decay Ratio (DR) is ::: 0.70.Q.B. the Hot Channel Decay Ratio is 0.55, I!:iEt! IMMEDIATELY EXIT the Buffer Zone by either:

• Raising core flow, unless restricted by another Off-Normal Operating Procedure.

• Inserting control rods in accordance with PNPS 2.1.14 Section 7.9.

Operator reviews the Solomon Case and determines that Core Decay Ratlo Is <0.70 and Hot Channel Decay Ratlo is >0.55 and theoperetor must immediately exit the Buffer Zone.

The oritical/portion of this step Is determining the Hot Channel DeeayRatio Is greater than the allowable value.

UNSAT D

4. Performance Step Enters and Reviews 2.1.14 Station Power Changes section 7.9 7.9 POWER DECREASE EFFECTED BY RPR ARRAY/ROPS

[1] WHEN power reduction below that achieved by executing Section 7.11 is required, THEN PERFORM the following steps until the desired power level is attained:

Standard Candidate may go to section 7.11 to determine the correct actions.

Comment Candidate may know that 2.1.14, Section 7.11 is for lowering power using recirculation flow and not required and skip the next step Results SAT UNSAT NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN ..IPM EC 4 February 2011

5. Performance Step Reviews 2.1.14 Station Power Changes section 7.11, Power Reductions during Abnormal Conditions.

Standard Identifies that 7.11, Power Reductions during Abnormal Conditions, does not apply since flow has already been lowered and operation is above the 60% Rod Line.

Comment Results SAT UNSAT D

Enters and Reviews 2.1.14 - Station Power Changes section 7.9 Greater than or equal to 60% load line (1) VERIFY/REDUCE total core flow to achieve as close to. but less than 43 Mlblhr.

(2) This method shall only be utilized during events that require rapid power reduction, when directed by Off-Normal Procedures, or as directed by the SMleRS, OTHERWISE, REDUCE power in accordance with Step 7,9[1](b), "ROPS",

(3) INSERT control rods as specified by the RPR array instruction sheet, as required, to the desired load line (REFER TO PNPS 9.13),

Identifies that that core flOw is less than 43 Mtb/hr by reviewing the power flow map (Att 1A of the procedure) Also determines tbat2.4.16S requires immediate exit from the Buffer Zone and

. inserts control rods. as specified ,by the APR array instruction

• Itt_t.

SAT D UNSAT Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated STOP TIME:

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EC 5 February 2011

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• Both Recirculation Pumps have run back due to a flow control system malfunction

• The plant has entered 2.4.20 and Immediate actions completed including the lock up of both Recirculation Pump Scoop Tubes

• Maintenance has requested that Recirculation Pump speed NOT be changed.

• Reactor operation is in the Buffer Zone

• Operation is above the 60% Rod Line

• There are no LPRM alarms

• There are no APRM or LPRM oscillations occurring

• A Solomon Case has been printed INITIATING CUE:

Determine the required action(s), if any.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EC 6 February 2011

PLANT NAME: PILGRIM CYCLE 18 PAGE 1 OF2 SOLOMON STABILITY EVALUATION REPORT XX-JAN-201112:00 CALCULATE XX-JAN-2011 12:01 PRINTED CORE DECAY RATIO 0.69 CASE ID FMLDll01018120004 HOT CHANNEL DECAY RATIO = 0.60 RESTART FMLDl101018110004 CORE POWER MWT = 912 LOAD LINE

SUMMARY

CORE FLOW MLB/HR = 29.643 CORE POWER 44.9%

CORE FLOW 42.0%

INITIATED BY: 3D MONICORE LOAD LINE 80%

CORRECTION FACTORS: MFLCPR= 1.001 MFLPD=: 0,999 MAPRAT= 0.999 zpp= 3.25 f OPTION: ARTS 2 LOOPS ON MANUAL FLOW MCPRLIM= 1.5.10 FCBB= N/A VALUE LOCATION MFLCPR 0.880 23-26 MFLPD 0.676 25-32-17 MAP RAT 0.704 23-26-18 PC RAT 0.994 27-20-17 STABILITY ANALYSIS TYPE: OFFICIAL SEQ.A2 C=MFLCPR D=MFLPD M=MAPRAT P=PCRAT '" MULTIPLE CORE AVE AXIAL 51 NOTCH RELPW LOC 00 0.187 24 47 02 0.138 L 04 0.802 43 08 06 0.936 08 1.058 39 00 00 10 1.108 L 12 1.136 35 00 00 14 1.189 D 16 1.168 31 18 1.195 L 20 1.311 27 08 08 22 1.315

'" 24 1.328 23 26 1.320 L P 28 1.246 19 00 00 30 1.193 32 1.177 15 34 1.121 L 36 1.055 11 08 38 1.021 40 0.959 07 42 0.858 L 44 0.730 03 46 0.269 L

02 06 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 CORE AVERAGE RADIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION RING # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 RELPW 1.269 1.449 1.372 1,274 1.305 1.171 0.466 NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EC 7 February 2011

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM RC TITLE: Determine the ODCM requirements for both Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring Systems inoperable.

OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required for' NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: Candidate will determine the actions required when both channels of the Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System become inoperable the ODCM TASK With Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System "AU RM-1705-32A out of service the STANDARD: control room will must determine the ODCM 3.1 requirements when the "B" monitor becomes inoperable. This includes that grab samples are taken, that auxiliary sampling equipment is operable and flow rates are estimated.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate Simulator x Classroom Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM RC 1 February 2011

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&A RATING:

Determine and apply ODCM 2.3.11 - Ability to 4.3 requirements control radiation releases.

REFERENCES:

aDCM Section 3.1 and 3.3 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. None CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical steps are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant is at 100% power

• Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System "An RM-1705-32A became inoperable due to a vacuum pump failure at 20:00 yesterday.

INITIATING CUE:

As the SM you have just been told that the vacuum pump on the "B" Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System, RM-1705-32B failed. Determine the ODCM 3.1 requirements for continued operation including the times when actions must occur.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM RC 2 February 2011

START TIME:

1. Performance Step Obtain and review ODCM Section 3.1.2, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Standard Obtains and reviews aDCM Section 3.1.2, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Comment Results SAT UNSAT

2. Performance Step Determines from aDeM Table 3.1-2 past 2 that the minimum number of Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System channels is NOT met.

Standard Determines from ODCM Table 3.1*2 past 2 that the minimum of one channel of the Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System channels is required, with both "A" and "B" inoperable there are no channels available.

Comment Results SAT UNSAT D NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM RC 3 February 2011

3. Performance Step Evaluates how the instrument inoperability effects the five required functions of the Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System are inoperable.

Standard Determines from aDCM Table 3.1-2 part 2 that all five functions of the Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System are inoperable. That notes (1) (2) and (3) are applicable.

Comment Results SAT D UNSAT D

4. P~.nce Step Action 1. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE reqUirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and these samples analyzed for activity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

~ard Determines that grab samples must be taken within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and analyzed for activity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Comment Results SAT D UNSAT D NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN "IPM RC 4 February 2011

5. PerfOrmance Step Action 2. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided samples are continuously collected wit auxiliary sampling equipment as required in table 4.3 1.

w Standard: Candidate goes to Table 4.3~1 and determines the following continuous sampling is required:

• Weekly Charcoal Sample for Iw131

• Weekly Particulate Sample for Principal Gamma Emitters

• Monthly Composite Particulate Sample for Gross Alpha

• Quarterly Composite Particulate Sample for Sr-89, Sr-90

• Continuous Noble Gas Monitor for Noble Gas Gross Gamma Comment:

Results SAT D UNSAT

6. Performance Step Action 3. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Standard Determines that the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Comment Results SAT D UNSAT D

Terminating Cue Determines that grab samples are taken, that auxiliary sampling equipment is operable and flow rates are estimated.

STOP TIME:

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM RC 5 February 2011

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant is at 100% power

• Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System "AU RM-1705-32A became inoperable due to a vacuum pump failure at 20:00 yesterday.

INITIATING CUE:

As the SM you have just been told that the vacuum pump on the "B" Reactor Building Effluent Monitoring System, RM-1705-32B failed. Determine the aDCM 3.1 requirements for continued operation including the times when actions must occur.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM RC 6 February 2011

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #2 TITLE: Evaluate Plant Event and Determine Appropriate EAL Classification (Scenario #2)

OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE "riME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required for NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: Evaluate Plant Event and Determine Appropriate EAL Classification TASK Candidate will review the plant events and conditions at the end of NRC Scenario #2 STANDARD: and determine the Emergency Classification as a Site Area Emergency due to EAL:

2.3.1.3, Reactor power> 3% and boron injection into the RPV intentionally initiated.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant Simulate X Simulator OR X Classroom Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&A RATING:

Evaluate Plant Event and Determine XXXX 2.4.41 - Knowledge of 4.6 Appropriate EAL Classification the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #2 1 February 2011

REFERENCES:

EALs SIMULATOR CONDITIONS: N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

EAL Chart CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical steps are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant was operating at 90% power

• A Recirc pump outboard seal failure occurred and the pump was tripped and isolated

• The other recirc pump tripped

• The reactor was scrammed and several control rods failed to insert

• Boron was injected to the vessel

• EOP-3 was entered due to Suppression Pool Temperature >80°F

• Injection to the RPV was terminated and prevented lAW EOPs

• All Control Rods were inserted using methods in PNPS 5.3.23 INITIATING CUE:

Determine the EAL classification based on the scenario events.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #2 2 February 2011

PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

Performance Step: 1 Review scenario events Standard: Operator scenario events Comment:

Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated STOP TIME: _ _

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #2 3 February 2011

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant was operating at 90% power

• A Recirc pump outboard seal failure occurred and the pump was tripped and isolated

• The other recirc pump tripped

• The reactor was scrammed and several control rods failed to insert

• Boron was injected to the vessel

• EOP-3 was entered due to Suppression Pool Temperature >80°F

• Injection to the RPV was terminated and prevented lAW EOPs

• All Control Rods were inserted using methods in PNPS 5.3.23 INITIATING CUE:

Determine the EAL classification based on the scenario events.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #2 4 February 2011

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #3 TITLE: Evaluate Plant Event and Determine Appropriate EAL Classification (Scenario #3)

OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: SAT UNSAT (Circle one)

COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Not Required for NRC JPMs SYNOPSIS: Evaluate Plant Event and Determine Appropriate EAL Classification TASK Candidate will review the plant events and conditions at the end of NRC Scenario #3 STANDARD: and determine the Emergency Classification as a Site Area Emergency due to EAL 3.4.1.3: Torus bottom pressure cannot be maintained below the "Pressure Suppression Pressure" (PSP) EOP Figure 6.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate X Simulator OR X Classroom Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&A: K&ARATING:

Evaluate Plant Event and Determine XXXX 2.4.41 Knowledge of 4.6 Appropriate EAL Classification the emergency action level thresholds and NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP Scenario #3 1 February 2011 2011

classifications.

REFERENCES:

EALs SIMULATOR CONDITIONS: N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

EAL Chart CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical steps are within the body of this document.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant was operating at 90% power

• An SRV stuck and a manual scram was inserted

• All Control Rods inserted Full In

• EOP-3 was entered due to High Suppression Pool temperature

• Torus Bottom pressure exceeded 16 psig

• Drywell Sprays could not maintain containmemt pressure below the PSP curve

• An Emergency Depressurization was performed INITIATING CUE:

Determine the EAL classification based on the scenario events.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #3 2 February 2011 2011

PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

Performance Step: 1 Review scenario events Standard: Operator scenario events Comment:

'Sfte NeaErn. . . .

be~'_,

EOPFiijU"i~. '.

Terminating Cue: ONCE candidate discusses their findings the JPM can be terminated STOP TIME: _ __

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN ...IPM EP - Scenario #3 3 February 2011 2011

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant was operating at 90% power

• An SRV stuck and a manual scram was inserted

• All Control Rods inserted Full In

• EOP-3 was entered due to High Suppression Pool temperature

• Torus Bottom pressure exceeded 16 psig

• Drywell Sprays could not maintain containment pressure below the PSP curve

• An Emergency Depressurization was performed INITIATING CUE:

Determine the EAL classification based on the scenario events.

NRC 2011 SRO ADMIN JPM EP - Scenario #3 4 February 2011 2011

PILGRIM 201"1 NRC JPM S-1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

TITLE: CONTROL ROD EXCERCISING lAW 8.3.2 CALTERNATE PATH)

OPERATOR: DATE: ____________________

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 20 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: The reactor is at power. The weekly control rod exercising in accordance with procedure 8.3.2 is required. When a coupling check is performed on a rod being withdrawn, the rod will go into an overtravel condition. The operator is expected to recouple the rod per off-normal procedure 2.4.11. The JPM will end when the rod is recoupled.

TASK Control rod exercising will be performed lAW procedure 8.3.2, Station Power STANDARD: Changes. When an uncoupled rod is discovered the rod will be recoupled lAW off normal procedure 2.4.11. There shall be no failure of critical elements EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 -1

PILGRIM 201"1 NRC JPM 8-1 REVISION LOG ision Number Date Description I 1 08/19/10 Revised a control rod movement JPM to reflect new format and different procedure for 2011 LOT NRC Exam PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-1 -2

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-1 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&ARATING:

RESPOND TO A DRIFTING 201-04-01-010 201002 201002 CONTROL ROD

REFERENCES:

2.4.11, Rev 21 8.3.2, Rev 54 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. Initialize the simulator to an Exam full power IC 30 and start Lesson Plan 30. Perform the following:

2. Verify control rods 14-51 and 18-51 are at position 48 and that 18-51 will be uncoupled, by inserting malfunction RD10, Rod Uncoupled when it is exercised.

3. Condition RD10 to DELETE when the "right dig if' on the 4-rod display for control rod 18-51 is TRUE for position 4.

GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Printout of the current Control Rod positions (00-3)

2. Applicable sections of 8.3.2 filled out; Section 7 and 8 (check the Normal Surveillance box)

3. 8.3.2, Attachments 1, 2, 3, and 5 (Multiple copies of Att.3)

CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-1 -3

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin."

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: CONTROL ROD EXCERCISING lAW 8.3.2 a) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) The reactor is at 100 % power.

ii) Weekly Control Rod exercising shall be performed lAW procedure 8.3.2, Section 8.1.

Starting with control rod 14-51, proceeding to 18-51 then working across the top of the core from the left to the right continuing down each subsequent row of control rods.

iii) Reactor Engineering has directed that single notch exercising is required for this surveillance.

iv) Reactor Engineering has determined there are no control rods that have demonstrated excessive movement speeds.

v) Sections 7.0 and 8.0 of 8.3.2 already been completed.

vi) A current control rod printout has just been printed vii) A Reactivity Manager has been stationed and reactivity brief conducted.

viii) An operator (state the individual's/evaluator's name) has been assigned to verify control rod withdraw.

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have. (Step 1 of the JPM has answers to some anticipated questions. Refer to step 1 as necessary.)

INITIATING CUE:

• "[State the operator's name], commence the weekly control rod exercising lAW procedure 8.3.2, Section 8.1."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 -4

PILGRIM 201*1 NRC JPM S-1 PERFORMANCE:

Notes This task is covered in procedure 8.3.2 and 2.4.11 All controls associated with this JPM are located on C905.

All critical steps must be performed in order written unless otherwise noted START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Obtains procedure 8.3.2 and goes to section 4.1 Control Rod Exercise at 1

power. Reviews procedure: I Standard Obtains current revision of PNPS 8.3.2 and enters section 4.1, reviews procedure Cue Notes I i Results SAT D UNSAT D

1

2. Procedure Step: [2] PRIOR to rod exercise, OBTAIN a control rod printout [Format 500 or 3D MonicorE Control Rod Position Log (F9 key)].

Standard Operator obtains control rod printout of Control Rod Positions.

i I

Cue Role playas second operator and provide a control rod printout of the current Control Rod Positions Notes Printout of the current Control Rod Positions was made prior to starting the JPM.

i Results SAT D I I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 -5

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-1

3. Procedure Step: [3] ENSURE a second licensed Reactor Operator is stationed at Panel C905 to verify proper control rod movement.

Standard Operator verifies a second operator is available at the C905 Panel as a verifier.

Cue State you will act as second operator and perform verifications Role playas verifier, read from the sequence sheet and communicate to the operator the following:

- rod number

- initial rod position

- final rod position.

Notes These steps are to be repeated prior to each rod withdrawn.

I Results SAT D UNSAT D

4. Procedure Step: [4] ENSURE the Rod Select Power Switch is ON.

Standard Operator verifies Rod Select Power switch is in the ON position.

Cue Notes Results SAT D UNSAT I I

5. Procedure Step:  !

NOTES

1. Attachments 1 and 2 are provided as placekeeping aids for Control Room Operators.

Use of either Attachments 1 and/or 2 is at the discretion of the CRS. Neither Attachment is required to be maintained with the completed copy of this Procedure.

2. If the selected rod does not withdraw using normal drive water differential pressure, then elevating drive water differential pressure is preferred to "double clutching" the rod. Refer to PNPS 2.4.11.1 Attachment 1, This will lessen the potential for a rod mispositioning.

3. At the discretion of the SM/CRS, control rods may be exercised in sequence provided that the core conditions and limitations "fJ",... ifii:u by Reactor En\:l''''''''\:1 are met.

Standard Operator may select to use Attachments 1 and 2 during this evolution.

The order of control rod selection for testing was stated in the initial conditions.

Cue Notes I I Results SAT I I UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 -6

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-1

6. Procedure Step: CAUTIONS

1. For control rods that have previously demonstrated excessive movement speeds and have the potential to "double notch", it is permissible to reduce the CRD System drive water differential pressure setpoint to 200 psid as indicated by dPI-340-4 In order to mitigate the possibility of a mlspositlonlng event. The CRD System drive water differential pressure setpolnt shall be returned to 250 psld immediately following the movement of the control rod In question to its intended position.

2. During the control rod exercise, only the control rods specified by Reactor Engineering on Attachment 6 are to be left inserted one notch.

Standard Operator recalls from the initial conditions that there are NO control rods that have demonstrated excessive movement speeds.

Cue Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D

7. Procedure Step: [5] EXERCISE the fully withdrawn, operable control rods as follows:

(a) VERIFY OR ADJUST MO-302-8 to obtain a CRD drive water differential pressure setpoint as indicated on dPI-340-4 of:

• 200 psid for control rods that have previously demonstrated excessive:

movement speeds.  !

OR

• 250 psid for all other control rods .

Standard Operator maintains CRD Drive pressure at 250 psid.

Cue i

Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D i PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 -7

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-1 s'~ *PWMtJllre8tep: (b) INSERT the rod to be exercised to position 46 or, as evaluated by Reactor Engineering, to position 44 in accordance with Attachment 1 Step (1).

From Attachment 1:

a. MOMENTARILY TURN the ROD CONTROL switch to the "ROD OUT NOTCH" position

!tiQ. RELEASE the control switch.

b. OBSERVE the control rod IS latched in an even-numbered positi,on and that it is in the latched position before the SETTLE light goes off.

c. IF performing two notch exercise, OBSERVE control rod movement AND IF movement speed appears fast, AOJ UST MO-302-B to obtain a CRD drive water differential setpoint as indicated on dPI-340-4 of 200 psid.

d. If the control rod is at position 48, I.I:15!i PERFORM a control rod coupling check in accordance with Attachment 2.

e. !E. performing two notch exercise in accordance with base document Step 8.2[6](b), REPEAT Steps [3](b)(1)a and b above.

~aId Operator selects Control Rod 14-51 and inserts the control rod to position 46 and observes the SETTLE light OFF.

Cue Rote playas verifier "i*:

Not.

~ults SAT D UNSAT D

9;, RroOeCkn

.," ".' , . ",.p.. . ** (d) WITHDRAW the rod to position 48 unless otherwise instructed by Reactor Engineering. Rod withdrawal to be in accordance with Attachment 1 Steps [3)(a) and [3](b)(1).

"'.rd Qperatorwithdraws Control Rod 14-51 to position 48 and observes the SETTLE light OFF.

CUe Role playas verifier,

' .. , This step Is redundant to the step in PNPS 8.3.2 Attachment 1 Results SAT D UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 -8

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-1 til, " . . .r.:IIep: (e) PERFORM a control rod coupling test in accordance with Attachment 2 (PNPS 2.2.88 Section 7'.6). [SR4.3.B.1.3]

Verifies (a) Position indication on the four rod display momentarily goes "BLACK/BLACK" and returns to indicate position 48.

(b) The FULL OUT red indicating light on the futl core display wU! momentarily go off and then re-illuminate.

(c) Alarm "ROO OVERTRAVEL" (C90SL-B3) does NOT actuate, Standard Operator may either attempt to withdraw Control Rod 14-51 or attempt a continuous control rod withdrawal from position 48.

Verifies coupling check is satisfactory:

Cue , Role playas verifier I

NOleI i

"AesttltS SAT D UNSAT I I

11. Procedure Step: [6] INITIAL (two persons' initials required) the appropriate square on the Control Rod Exercise Signoff Sheet (Attachment 3). These initials indicate that the control rod has been placed in its correct position.

Standard Operator initials Attachment 3 for Control Rod 14-51 .

Cue i Role playas verifier and also initial Control Rod that candidate initialed.

i Notes I

Results SAT D UNSAT D

i 12. Procedure Step: [7] !E. the coupling test was satisfied, INITIAL the appropriate square on the Control ROd~~

Coupling Test Signoff Sheet (Attachment 5). A second person's verification is require if the coupling test will be used to support the implementation of an alternate BPWS

• sequence for shutdown.

Standard Operator initials Attachment 5 for Control Rod 14-51.

Cue Role playas verifier and also initial Control Rod that candidate initialed.

Notes I

Results SAT D UNSAT I J PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 -9

PILGRIM 201"1 NRC JPM S-1

18. ~.""'.,"'p: (b) INSERT the rod to be exercised to position 46 or, as evaluated by Reactor Engineering, to position 44 in accordance with Attachment 1 Step [1].

From Attachment 1 :

a. MOMENTARILY TURN the ROD CONTROL switch to the "ROD OUT NOTCH" position Af:!Q. RELEASE the control switch.

"" b. OBSERVE the control rod is latched in an even-numbered position and that it is in the latched position before the SETTLE light goes off.

c. IF performing t\vo notch exercise, OBSERVE control rod movement AND IF movement speed appears fast, ADJ UST MO-302-8 to obtain a CRD drive ".,'ater differential setpoint as indicated on dPI-340-4 of 200 psid.

',. [;

d. if the control rod is at position 48, ll:i&.t:l PERFORM a control rod coupling check in accordance with Attachment 2.

e. IF performing t\vo notch exercise in accordance with base document Step 8.2[6](b), REPEAT Steps [3](b)(1)a and b above .

Operator selects Control Rod 18-51 and inserts the control rod to position 46

.' .and observes the SETTLE light OFF Cue Role playas verifier

Notes Ae$ults SAT D UNSAT I I

14. P. . . . . . . .p: (d) WITHDRAW the rod to position 48 unless otherwise instructed by Reactor Eng ineering. Rod withdrawal to be in accordance with Attachment 1 Steps [3](a) and [3](b)( 1).

~rd Operator withdraws Control Rod 18-51 to position 48 and observes the

< SETTLE Ught OFF Que..... Role playas verifier,

\' ..';,

Notfi Thl$ step is redundant to the step in PNPS 8.3.2, Attachment 1 i Rlluftl SAT D UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 - 10

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1

15.: . . . p~ . .: (e) PERFORM a control rod coupling test in accordance with Attachment 2 (PNPS 2.2.88 Section 7.6). (SR4.3.B.1.3]

Verifies (a) Position indication on the four rod display momentarily goes "BLACK/BLACK" and returns to indicate position 48.

(b) The FULL OUT red indicating light on the full core display will momentarily go off and then re*illuminate.

(c) Alarm "ROD OVERTRAVEL" (C905L*B3) does NOT actuate.

Standard Operator may either attempt to withdraw Control Rod 18-51 or attempt a continuous control rod withdrawal from position 48.

Verifies acknowledges (C905L-B3), ROD OVERTRAVEL alarming and observes blank position indication for Control Rod 18-51, determines coupling check is Unsatisfactory and Control Rod 18-51 is uncoupled Announces control rod overtravel and rod drift alarms and refers to ARPs.

.... Cue Role playas verifier I

_sutts SAT D UNSAT D

! 16. Procedure Step: [4] IF any control rod coupling test has failed, THEN REFER TO PNPS 2.4.11, "Control Rod Positioning Malfunctions",

Standard Operator refers to PNPS 2.4.11, Attachment 1 Cue Notes I I Results SAT D I I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 - 11

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-1 11, j~l.p: (a) ATTEMPT TO RECOUPLE the drive by inserting it two notches.

Standard Operator selects Control Rod 18-51 and inserts the control rod to position 46, waits for settle step then inserts the control rod to position 44.

i Cue Role playas verifier Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D I

18. P. . . .ur. . .p: (b) WITHDRAW the rod by notching it out.

S~ Operator withdraws Control Rod 18-51 to position 46, waits for settle step then withdraws the control rod to position 48. I Cue Role pfay as verifier j .,

j,'

Notes Resul*' SAT D UNSAT I J 1'. ~edurep: (c) ~ the drive is withdrawn to position 48, I!::I.5.ti PERFORM a rod coupling check in accordance with Attachment 5.

[1 J PERFORM a control rod coupling check as follows:

(a) With a control rod at position 48, PERFORM the following:

(1 ) SELECTIVERIFY SELECTED the control rod for coupling test.

I (2) ATTEMPT TO NOTCH WITHDRAW QB CONTINUOUSLY WITHDRAW i

, the selected control rod from position 48.

Stedard Operator may either attempt to withdraw Control Rod 18-51 or attempt a continuous control rod withdrawal from position 48.

Verifies coupling check is satisfactory:

Cue Role pfay as verifier Notes Resuk$' SAT I D UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-1 - 12

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1

! 20. Procedure Step: (d) !E. the drive has recoupled, THEN RESET the "ROD DRIFT" (C905L-A3) alarm AND RETURN TO normal operation.

Standard Operator resets "ROD DRIFT" and verifies Rod Drift Annunciator clears then returns to the performance of Control Rod ExercisinQ per PNPS 8.3.2 Cue Notes i

Results SAT D UNSAT I I I

21. Procedure Step: [6] INITIAL (two persons' initiclls required) the appropriate square on the Control Rod EXercise Signoff Sheet (Attachment 3). These initials indicate that the control rod has been placed in its correct position.

Standard Operator initials Attachment 3 for Control Rod 18-51.

Cue Role playas verifier and also initial Control Rod that candidate initialed.

Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D

22. Procedure Step: [7] IF the coupling test was satisfied, INITIAL the appropriate square on the Control Rod Coupling Test Signoff Sheet (Attachment 5). A second person's verification is require if the coupling test will be used to support the implementation of an alternate BPWS sequence for shutdown.

Standard Operator initials Attachment 5 for Control Rod 18-51 .

Cue Role playas verifier and also initial Control Rod that candidate initialed.

Inform the operator that this ,JPM is completed. I Notes Results SAT D I I Cue: This completes this JPM.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 - 13

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. 1\10 actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered ..IPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 - 14

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-1 JPM COMMEt--lT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 - 15

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The reactor is at 100 % power.

• Weekly Control Rod exercising shall be performed lAW procedure 8.3.2, Section 8.1. Starting with control rod 14-51, proceeding to 18-51 then working across the top of the core from the left to the right continuing down each subsequent row of control rods.

• Reactor Engineering has directed that single notch exercising is required for this surveillance.

• Reactor Engineering has determined there are no control rods that have demonstrated excessive movement speeds.

• Sections 7.0 and 8.0 of 8.3.2 have already been completed.

• A current control rod printout has just been printed

• A Reactivity Manager has been stationed and reactivity brief conducted.

• An operator (state the individual's/evaluator's name) has been assigned to verify control rod withdraw.

INITIATING CUE:

• "[State the operator's name], commence the weekly control rod exercising lAW procedure 8.3.2, Section 8.1."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-1 - 16

PILGRIM 201*1 NRC JPM S-:;:~

NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

HPCI SWAPOVER FROM PRESSURE CON"rROL TO INJECTION CALTERNATE PATH)

OPERATOR: DATE: ____________________

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A I PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): B Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: HPCI is operating in pressure control mode and must be swapped to injection mode.

When HPCI is placed in injection mode and the candidate attempts to raise injection flow the HPCI Flow Controller FIC-2340-1 fails high, the operator must place the controller in manual to raise flow.

TASK HPCI injecting to the RPV. The HPCI System shall be operated in accordance with all STANDARD: applicable precautions and limitations. The HPCI procedure shall be followed and there shall be no failure of critical elements.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-2 -1

PILGRIM 201"1 NRC JPM 8-~~

REVISION LOG Revision Number: 5 Date Originated: 7/20/2005 Pages Affected: All

Description:

New template Revision Number: 6 Date Originated: 8/10/2010 Pages Affected: All

Description:

Revised for NRC exam and faulted JPM PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-2 -2

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-2 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&A RATING:

HPCI Swapover from Pressure 206-01-01-005 206000 A4.02 4.0/3.8 Control to Injection

REFERENCES:

Procedure 5.3.35.1, Attachment 23 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. Exam IC-54, this will:

• Trip all three feed pumps

• Trip RCIC

• Initiate HPCI in full'flow test for pressure control

• Reactor water level is about -20"

• Insert malfunction HPCI Flow Controller FIC-2340-1 fails high with the controller in AUTO occurs when the full flow test valve MO-2301-1 0 is fully closed as indicated by the red light going OFF.

GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. N/A CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: HPCI SWAPOVER FROM PRESSURE CON"rROL TO INJECTION" b) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) The reactor has scrammed on low level following a loss of feed.

ii) RCIC has tripped.

iii) HPCI is presently operating in pressure control mode and has been manually initiated in accordance with PI\lPS 2.2.21.5.

iv) Current RPV level is approximately -20 inches."

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-2 -3

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-2 INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], swap HPCI from pressure control to injection in accordance with procedure 5.3.35.1, Attachment 23. Restore and maintain level-20" to +45". Inform me when HPCI is aligned for injection and maintaining RPV level -20" to +45".

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-2 -4

PILGRIM 2011 !\IRC JPM S-2 PERFORMANCE:

Notes This task is covered in 5.3.35.1, Attachment 23.

All controls are located on control room panel C903/904.

All critical steps must be performed in order unless otherwise noted.

START TIME:

1 Procedure Step: I 1 .

Standard Review the applicable sections of the Qrocedure. I Cue None I Notes i i

Results SAT D UNSAT D I D

(J)lMT D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-2 -5

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM 8-2 UNSAT D necessary UNSAT D Cue: This completes this JPM.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-2 -6

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM S-2 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the ...IPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need onlY consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-2 -7

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-2 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UN8AT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments. positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-2 -8

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-2 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The reactor has scrammed on low level following a loss of feed.

• RCIC has tripped.

• HPCI is presently operating in pressure control mode and has been manually initiated in accordance with PNPS 2.2.21.5.

• Current RPV level is approximately -20 inches."

INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], swap HPCI from pressure control to injection in accordance with procedure 5.3.35.1, Attachment 23. Restore and maintain level -20" to +45". Inform me when HPCI is aligned for injection and maintaining RPV level -20" to +45".

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-2 -9

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM s-a NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

TITLE: RE-OPEN AN MSIV FOLLOWING CLOSURE OPERATOR: DATE: ___________________

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: The plant is at 50% power. The "D" outboard MSIV inadvertently closed early on the previous shift due to a broken airline which has since been repaired.

TASK MSIVs shall be opened without causing inadvertent actuations and shall be STANDARD: accomplished in accordance with all system precautions and limitations. 2.2.92 shall be followed without failure of any critical elements.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant Simulate X Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 -1

PILGRIM 201'1 NRC JPM 8<1 REVISION LOG Revision Number: 0 Date Originated: 8/10/2010 Pages Affected: All

Description:

Revised for NRC exam and faulted JPM PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-3 -2

PILGRIM 201"1 NRC JPM S-3 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&ARATING:

RESPOND TO MSIV CLOSURE 200-05-01-003 239001 A2.03 4.0/

4.2 REFERENCES

Procedure 2.2.92, Revision 52 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. Exam IC: 37, Reactor power -50%

2. Initialize the simulator.

3. Close Main Steam Line 0 Outboard and Inboard MSIVs.

4. Complete PNPS 2.2.92 section 7.2 Steps [1] thru [4]

a) MO-220-1 and MO-220-2 closed b) Open MO-220-3 and jog open MO-220-4 to establish and maintain a Main Steam Line low point drain temperature (TE-3604) as close to BUT NOT GREATER THAN 520°F.

GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. N/A CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State" the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this "IPM is: RE-OPEN AN MSIV FOLLOWING CLOSURE b) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) The plant is at 50% power ii) The "0" outboard MSIV inadvertently closed early on the previous shift due to a broken airline which has since been repaired

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

INITIATING CUE:

"[State the operator's name] reopen the outboard and inboard "0" MSIVs lAW PNPS 2.2.92 Section 7.2 beginning at step [5]."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 -3

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 PERFORMANCE:

Notes START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Verify drainage of the Main Steam Line through MO-220-3 (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN VLV) and MO-220-4 (MAIN STEAM LlI\JE DRN TO CONDR) according to the table below:

15 mi nute~

> Ih minutes  ::; 1101.,

Standard Operator determines that the limitations of the table have been met.

Cue As the CRS inform the Operator that MO-220-3 and MO-220-4 have been I . open for 30 minutes.

. ---t---------:--------1 Notes Initiating cue states the MSIV closed on the previous shift. Operator determines that the limitations of the table have been met. MSIV closed on the previous shift (less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ago) and MO-220-3 and MO-220-4 have been open for greater than 10 minutes.

Results SAT c===J UNSAT c===J

2. ~.Step: WHEN the above time limitations are satisfied, THEN CLOSE the Main Steam Line drain valve, MO-220-4, MAIN STEAM LINE DRN TO CONDR

.:  ;'\.

Stadatd Operator CLOSES MO-220-4 Cue Notes Operator observes green indicating lights on and red lights off for MO-220-4 on the PCIS status board or apron section of C904.

R_ults SAT UNSAT I c===J c===J PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 -4

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3

3. PJVCIdure'atep: OPEN the following valves:

• MO-220*1, MSIV DRNS INBD ISOL VLV

• MO*220*2, MSIV DRNS OUTBD ISOL VLV

, StanGarei Operator OPENS MO*220*1 and MO-220-2.

... Cue Notes Operator observes red indicating lights on and green lights off for MO-220-1, and MO-220-2 on the PCIS status board or apron section of C904.

Results SAT D UNSAT D

4. . , . ..... ltep: SLOWLY JOG OPEN, until FULLY OPEN, MO-220-4, (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN TO CONDR).

(1) DRAIN the Main Steam Une for 10 minutes.

\

Standard Operator Jogs MO-22G-4 FULL OPEN and marks time .

Cue Wait until annunciator C905R, Ea, MAIN STM LINE TO TURBINE STM FLOW MISMATCH. alarms (-30 sees after MO-220-4 is opened) After operator confirms alarm inform Operator that 10 minutes has elapsed.

Notes Operator observes red light on and green light off for MO-220-4.

R.ulta SAT I I UNSAT D

15. Procedure Step: Annunciator 905R, E-8, MAIN STM LINE TO TURBINE STM FLOW MISMATCH may alarm.

1. Confirm Alarm a) Compare main steam flow (PR/FR-640-27, RX WIDE RANGE PRESSURE RX STEAM FLOW) and Turbine steam flow (PR/FR/LR-640-28, RX STM FLOW/NARROW RANGE WTR LVL RX NARROW RANGE PRESSURE) on PanelC905 Standard Operator determines that this is an expected alarm because of the steam flow being diverted to the condenser by the open steam line drain valve.

Cue After operator confirms alarm inform Operator that 10 minutes has elapsed.

Notes I

i I Results SAT D UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 -5

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S<~

6. P....U... Step: OPEN all outboard MSIV's that are currently closed:

I

• AO-203-2A, Main Steam Line A Outboard Isolation Valve

• AO-203-2B, Main Steam Line B Outboard Isolation Valve

• AO-203-2C, Main Steam Line C Outboard Isolation Valve

• AO-203-20, Main Steam Line 0 Outboard Isolation Valve i i

Standard Operator selects and OPENS AO-203-20. i Cue Notes Operator observes green indicating light off, red indicating light on.

D i

I Results SAT D UNSAT 7.

I Procedure Step: Open MO-220-3. (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN VLV).

Standard Operator locates and verifies open MO-220-3.

NOTE The following cue should be given for time compression to permit continuing the task in atimely manner.

Cue AFTER MO-220-3 is OPEN, STATE that "10 minutes have elapsed".

Notes Operator observes GREEN indicating light OFF, RED indicating light LIT.

Results I SAT UNSAT D D I

~p~8tep:

8. OPEN, one at a time, all inboard MSIVs that are currently closed: I

• AO-203-1 A, Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve A )

• AO-203-1 B, Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve B

• AO-203-1C, Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve C

• AO-203-1 D, Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve D stindard Operator selects and OPENS AO-203-10.

Cue Notel Operator observes GREEN indicating light OFF, RED indicating light LIT.

Resutts

• SAT i D UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 - 6

PILGRIM 201 '1 NRC

• JPM S-~I

9. Procedure Step: CLOSE the following lives: I (1) MO-220-4 (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN TO CONDR)

(2) MO-220-2 (MSIV DRNS OUTBD ISOL VLV)

(3) MO-220-1 (MSIV DRNS INBD ISOL VLV)

Standard Operator locates and closes MO-220-4, MO-220-2 and MO-220-1 .

Cue Notes Operator observes GREEN indicating lights LIT, RED indicating lights OFF.

i Results SAT UNSAT I I I I I I This JPM is complete.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 7

PILGRIM 2011 t\IRC

• JPM S-3 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the ,JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered ..IPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 -8

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREM ENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UN8AT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UN8AT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-3 - 9

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at 50% power.

The "0" outboard MSIV inadvertently closed early on the previous shift due to a broken airline which has since been repaired INITIATING CUE:

"[State the operator's name] reopen the outboard and inboard "0" MSIVs lAW PNPS 2.2.92 Section 7.2 beginning at step [5]."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-3 - 10

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

TITLE: CONNECT THE TURBINE GENERATOR TO THE GRID OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A I

! PERFORMANCE TIME: i Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

I JPM RESULTS*: SAT UN8AT NEED81MPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: A plant startup is progress. The Turbine Generator is ready to be synchronized to the grid. The TG will be synched to the grid.

TASK STANDARD: The TG synched to grid by the operator.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-4 -1

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 REVISION LOG Revision Number: 7 Date Originated: 03/10/09 I Pages Affected: All

Description:

Converted to Alternate Path for.

2009 Audit Exam i I Revision Number:8 Date Originated: 08L10L11 Pages Affected: All

Description:

Revised for Cold Turbine Startup instead of Hot Turbine Startup, Removed Alternate Path for 2011 NRC Exam PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&ARATING:

CONNECT THE TURBINE 245-01-01-007 245000 A4.09 3.1/2.9 GENERATOR TO THE GRID

REFERENCES:

PNPS 2.1.1 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. NRC Exam IC 56, @ approx. 18 - 20% power

2. Reset C1 00 alarms.

GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. N/A CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: CONNECT THE TURBINE GENERATOR TO THE GRID:

b) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) A Plant startup is in progress ii) Turbine speed is 1800 RPM and being controlled by the speed load changer iii) Currently on Step 127 of PNP8 2.1.1 iv) A TG Cold Startup is being performed

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-4 -3

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 INITIATING CUE:

"[State the operator's name]. sync the Turbine Generator to the grid using ACB 104 lAW PNPS 2.1.1, and connect the ring bus and pick up the initial load for a cold turbine."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 -4

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-4 PERFORMANCE:

Notes Reviews precautions & limitations of 2.1.1.

START TIME:

(127] (a)

APPLY Exciter field, by closing the Exciter Field Breaker.

.WCtl:lterfield breaker applied by pushing.. in the control switch and taking it the

. RED ON, GREEN ht OFF.

o UNSAT 0 APPLY Generator field, by closing the Main Generator Field Breaker.

~$Id applied. by pushing in the control switch and taking it to the CLOSE QQ$itkln*.AEO II ht ON, GREEN Ii ht OFF.

UNSAT 0 (e)

GRADUALLY RAISE the MANUAL VOLTAGE ADJUSTER on Panel C3 AND SLOWLY BUILD LIP Generator voltage to 23kV.

Verifies,.,oltage is 23kV and raises as required with the MANUAL VOLTAGE

• AOJUSTER

• • eAT o UNSAT 0 PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-4 -5

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 (d)

VERIFY alarm "MAIN XFMR UNDERVOLTAGE" (C3L-ES) clears.

Verifies alarm is clear

F\lI8Ylts SAT D UNSAT D

5. .... (e)

SEND an Operator to Main Transformer to verify that AT LEAST one Cooling Group is operating.

Contacts filed operator to check at least one cooling group is operating ondas field operator that one coonn roup is operating.

D UNSAT D

6. Procedure Step: [128]

TEST the manual voltage controls by turning control S\I'itch to "LOWER" AND OBSERVE the response on the GENERATOR VOLTAGE meter.

(a) READJUST the MANUAL VOLTAGE ADJUSTER to approximately 23kV on GENERATOR VOLTAGE meter.

Standard The manual voltage control switch is taken to LOWER and a response is verified on the Generator Voltage meter.

Voltage is then returned to 23kV.  :

Cue I

Notes i

Results SAT D ISA I I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 6

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4

7. Procedure Step: (b)

TEST the operability of the auto voltage regulator before going on line as follows:

(1 ) RAISE, THEN LOWER the Main Generator VOLTAGE REGULATOR SETPOINT ADJUSTER CIS .A.tU;;!. PRODUCE a buck-boost indication on the VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFER VOLTMETER.

Standard The VOLTAGE REGULATOR SETPOINT ADJUSTER control switch is raised and then lowered until a buck-boost indication on the VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFER VOLTMETER is observed.

Cue r

Notes l \

Results SAT D

8. Procedure Step: (2)

READJUST the Main Generator VOLTAGE REGULATOR SETPOINT ADJUSTER CIS until a null-zero reading shows on the VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFER VOLTMETER.

Standard The VOLTAGE REGULATOR SETPOINT ADJUSTER control switch is adjusted to a null-zero reading on the VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFER i VOLTMETER.

Cue Notes

. ~.*I.~r'i"'%i(3)

PLACE the VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFER SWITCH to the "AUTO" position.

The VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFER Switch is placed in AUTO f&tor observes amber A light lit is ON and amber M light Is OFF.

UNSAT D D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 7

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-4 PREPARE TO SYNCHRONIZE Generator in accordance vvith the following:

(a) TURN the AUTO SYNC SELECTOR SWITCH on Panel C3 from the "OFF" position to position "ACB-104" or position "ACB-105" for the selected ACB to be used for synchronizing.

AUTO SYNC SELECTOR SWITCH is moved to the ACB-1 04 position UNSAT D D TURN to the "ON" position either ACB-1 04 SYNC switch or ACB-105 SYNC switch. whichever has been selected, for synchronizing. !f. BOTH ACB-104 and ACB-105 are equally available, it may be desirable to alternate ACBs and use a aifferent breaker each time the unit is paralleled to the system.

the ON Doslltlon UNSAT D D

12. Procedure Step: (c)

INITIALLY ADJUST the Turbine Generator speed to produce a slow rotation in either direction on the i MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHROSCOPE. USE the SPEED/LOAD CHANGER raise and iO'vver control switch on Panel C3.

i Standard The SPEED/LOAD CHANGER is used to produce a slow rotation in either direction.

Cue I Notes I

~_______R_e_su_ltS~S_A_T__I____I_______________U_NS_A_T___I ____I____~

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 -8

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-4

13. Procedure Step: (d)

INITIALLY ADJUST the Generator voltage to the 345kV system by matching the INCOMING VOLTAGE Meter indication to the RUNNING VOLTAGE Meter using the AUTO VOLTAGE i REGULATOR SETPOINT ADJUSTER control s\vitch.

Standard INCOMING VOLTAGE meter indication is matched to the RUNNING VOLTAGE meter indication Cue Notes Results I SAT IN8AT D I I 1j~'~I~~~i"'~ "'(t)

REPEAT voltage and speed adjustments as necessary in order to match INCOMING VOLTAGE and RUNNING VOLTAGE indications while at the same time producing a slow cloch.'Wise rotation on the MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHROSCOPE on Panel C3.

INCOMING and RUNNING VOLTAGE are matched with a slow clockwise rotation on the MAIN GENERATORSYNCHROSCOPE UNSAT D D Procedure Step: .I (f)

. RECHECK Generator incoming voltage and Generator speed. READJUST as necessary prior to closing ACB.

Standard Generator incoming voltage and speed are rechecked Cue Notes PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 9

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 Procedure Step:

16'1 I NOTE  !

i i With the synchroscope indicating approximately 5 degrees before 12 o'clock position A!iQ the i

[INCOMING and RUNNING VOLTAGEs equal. the synchronizer should permit closure of the selected ACB.

I Standard Reviews NOTE I Cue I

i I Notes Results SAT UNSAT I I D D I (9)

TURN the selected ACB control switch to CLOSE at 5 degrees before the 12 o'clock position on the MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHROSCOPE.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ time unit synchronized T~e ACS,.1 04 control switch is moved to CLOSE at 5 degrees before the

.. 12o'c(OOk posit.on on the synch scope.

Observet AOB-104 closed. red light ON, green light OFF.

Flecords time of s nchronization.

UNSAT D D

18. I Procedure Step: (h)

TURN to "OFF" position either ACB-1 04 SYNC switch or ACB-1 05 SYNC switch. whichever has just been synchronized.

Standard Places the ACB-104 synchronizing switch to "OFF", I i

I Cue I Notes Results SAT UNSAT i I i I I D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 10

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4

[130]

PICK UP some load immediately after closing~in. USE the SPEED/LOAD CHANGER AND BRING the unit to its initial load:

Cold Startup: 3%* 20MWe Warm Startup: 5% - 34MWe Hot Startup: 15% -100MWe Uses SPEED/LOAD CHANGER to bring load to approx 20 MWe SAT UNSAT D CI

20. ' Procedure Step: I [131]

. PLACE the AUTO SYNC SELECTOR SWITCH on Panel C3 I to "OFF",

Standard The AUTO SYNC SELECTOR SWITCH is placed in OFF i Cue I I Notes  !

Results SAT UNSAT I

D D MANUALLY CLOSE the remaining ACB.

(a) At Panel C3, TURN applicable SYNC s\vitch (ACB-104 or ACB-105) to "ON".

CLOSE IN the remaining ACB.

At Panel C3. TURN applicable SYNC switch to "OFF".

Twmsthe ACB-105 SYNC switch ON, CLOSES ACB-105 and observes red OFF. Turns SYNC switch to the OFF nn!l:tlinnn UNSAT D D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-4 - 11

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4

22. Procedure Step: * [133]

OBSERVE balanced Generator amps on the ammeters and balanced three-phase voltages.

i Standard Observes Main Generator three-phase voltage amps are balanced on the ammeters. I Cue Notify the operator that the turbine/generator will remain at this load and that the JPM is completed. I Notes I Results SAT UIISAT i

D I I This JPM is complete.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 12

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the ,JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 13

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 14

PILGRIM 2011 NRC

. JPM S-4 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• A Plant startup is in progress

• Turbine speed is 1800 RPM and being controlled by the speed load changer

• Currently on Step 127 of PNPS 2.1.1

• A TG Cold Startup is being performed INITIATING CUE:

"[State the operator's name], sync the Turbine Generator to the grid using ACB 104 lAW PNPS 2.1.1, and connect the ring bus and pick up the initial load for a cold turbine."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-4 - 15

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 LICENSED OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

TITLE: MANUALLY START SBGT AND VENT THE TORUS (ALTERNATE PATH)

OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A I Actual Time (min): N/A i

I PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 20 Actual Time (min):

I JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes I No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: The operator will align standby gas to vent the torus and re-establish the Drywell to Torus DIP. After establishing the lineup, a reactor coolant pressure boundary leak develops in the drywell. The operator will secure the standby gas vent alignment lAW Section 7.10 of 2.2.70.

TASK The torus is initially aligned for the torus venting evolution. The operator diagnoses a STANDARD: leak in the drywell and takes action to secure the torus venting lineup. The primary containment atmosphere control and standby gas treatment systems shall be operated in accordance with all applicable system precautions and limitations. The system procedure shall be followed without failure of critical tasks EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant Simulate x Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 -1

PILGRIM 201"1 NRC JPM S-5 REVISION LOG Revision Number:

Date Originated:

Pages Affected:

Description:

Revision Number:

Date Originated:

Pages Affected:

Description:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 -2

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-~)

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&A RATING:

RESPOND TO LEAKS IN THE 223-04-01-001 232002 A4.02 3.9/3.8 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.

REFERENCES:

Procedure 2.2.70, Rev. 107 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. NRC Exam IC 52, @ 45%

2. Verify:

a) Crywolf: C7L-C5, "Cooler 205C Leaking" annunciator b) Crywolf: C7L-C6, "Cooler 205F Leaking" annunciator c) Crywolf: C904LC-B-3, "C19 NB Trouble" annunciator GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. N/A CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 -3

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker and/or peer checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker/peer checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin."

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: MANUALLY START SBGT AND VENT THE TORUS" b) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) The plant is at 45% power with the mode switch in "RUN",

ii} During the plant startup the Torus was inerted with cold Nitrogen the nitrogen has subsequently heated up raising Torus pressure.

iii) The OSS has determined that a reduction in torus airspace pressure will restore the drywell to-torus differential pressure to within specification".

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], Vent the torus using the Bravo train of Standby Gas Treatment in accordance with 2.2.70, Section 7.3 and 7.3.3."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 -4

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 PERFORMANCE:

Notes START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Review the procedure 2.2.70 NOTE and CAUTION of 2.2.70, Section 7.3.

Standard Reviews procedure 2.2.70 NOTE and CAUTION of 2.2.70, Section 7.3.

Cue None Notes I

I I Results SAT D UNSAT D

2. Procedure Step:

Reviews NOTE and CAUTION

1. This section specifies methods to vent the Drywell or Torus while maintaining the Drywall to Torus differential pressure, and during the performance of PNPS 8.A.1.

2. Nitrogen expands as it warms in the Drywell. This will cause a pre~sure increase:_ _---'

CAUTION IF, while executing this section, a Primary Containment isolation signal is present on AO-S041 A, AO-S041 B (TORUS NORMAL EXHAUST ISOL VLVs) and AO-5043A, AO-50438 (DRYWELL NORMAL EXHAUST ISOL VLVs);

at:!Q fission products are present or suspected to be present in the Drywell or Torus:

THEN J2.Q!iQ! place the control switches to these valves in the "EMERGENCY OPEN" position unless directed to defeat isolation interlocks by EOP-03, "Primary Containment Control".

Standard Reviews NOTE and Caution PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 -5

PILGRIM 2011 !\IRC JPM S-5

3. Procedure Step: 7.3.3 Torus Venting Without Nitrogen Addition To The Drywell I i

[1] REFER TO Technical Specifications Section 3.7.A.B.b.

I Standard Operator references T.S. Section 3.7.A.1.K or asks the CRS to do so.

I Cue Notes T.S.3.7.A.1.k The differential pressure may be reduced to less than 1.17 I psid for a maximum of four (4) hours for maintenance activities on the i differential pressure control system and during required operability testing of i i the HPCI system, the relief valves, the RCIC system and the drywell i suppression chamber vacuum breakers.

Results SAT D UNSAT D I

4. Procedure Step: [2] IF, while purging, venting, or inerting the containment. an alarm is received which requires termination of the purging, venting, or inerting evolution, THEN EXIT this section ~ ENTER Attachment 13 (Isolation of Containment Purge Lines Upon Indication of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage). Alarms are listed below

[NUREG 0737]

• "SBGT DISCH RAD HI'" (C904LC-F4)

• "C19 AlB TROUBLE" (C904lC-B3)

• "DRYWELL EQPT DRAIN SUMP DISCH HIGH TOTAL FLOW" (C20C)

• "DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP DISCH HIGH TOTAL FLOW" (C20C)

• "DRYWELL EQPT DRAIN PUMP SUMP HIGH LEVEL" (twice within 30 minutes (C20L)

• "DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP HIGH LEVEL" (twice within a 160-minute interval) (C20L)

• "COOLER 'NNN' LEAKING" alarms, where 'NNN' is the specific cooler number (more than one unit in alarm) Panel C7l windows A5, A6, A7, B5, B6, B7, C5, and C6 Standard I' Operator reviews directions for actions in the event of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.,

i Cue. i Notes The purpose of this section is to specify the actions required when indication

. of a reactor coolant leak exists.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 -6

PILGRIM 2011 NRC

• JPM 8-5

[3] OPEN AO-5041A, TORUS NORMAL EXHAUST ISOL VLV.

Oparatorrotates "AO-5041A" control switch to the "OPEN" position and observes valve change state. Red light on, green light off.

UNSAT D OPEN AO-5041 B, TORUS NORMAL EXHAUST ISOL VLV.

!llEmlHor rotates "AO-5041 B" control switch to the "OPEN" position and observes valve change state. Red light on, green light off.

D UNSAT D VERIFY OPEN OR OPEN:

(a) AO-N-98, CONTAMINATED EXH TO SGTS INLET PLENUM (b) AO-N-101, REFUEL FLOOR EXH TO SGTS INLET PLENUM

Am11'3 ¥<lillpenltor rotates "AO-N-98" and AO-N-1 01 control switches to the "OPEN" position and observes valves change state. Red light on, green light off.

D UNSAT D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-5 -7

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-5 IF using the "B" Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) train, VERIFY OR ESTABLISH the lineup at Panel C7 as follows:

(a) AO-N-112, TRAIN B OUTL DMPR, is OPEN.

(b) VEX-210A, STANDBY GAS FAN A, is in "AUTO".

(c) OPEN AO-N-106, TRAIN B INLET DMPR at Panel C7.

(d) VERIFY that VEX-210B, STANDBY GAS FAN B. starts at Panel C7.

(e) RECORD the start time in the CRS Log.

Operator rotates "AO-N-112" control switch to the "OPEN" position and obServes damper change state. Red light on, green light off.

Operator verifies VEX-21 OA control switch in "AUTO" position. Green light

$!l ,red light off.

OJfJl'atorrotates "AO-N-106" control switch to the "OPEN" position and

. verifies damper change state and fan start. Flow indicated on FI-8126 and Ff.;8121.

1a:te annunciators a,re automatically triggered to occur within 15 and 30

. ssconds of the SBGT start D UN8AT D

[3J IF, while purging, venting, or inerting the containment, an alarm is received which requires termination of the purging, venting. or inerting evolution, I.!::!§t:!. EXIT this section AND ENTER Attachment 13 (Isolation of Containment Purge Lines Upon Indication of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage). Alarms are listed below AnnUnciators C7L-C5 & C6 and C904LC*B3 alarm

'~~,~* * *I; iJ,perator references ARP for alarms received after pressing alarm

.1id<rtOWledge PB on C7 and C904.

9perator reports alarming conditions and ARP actions for C904LC-B3 and C7L-C5 &06.

Tarmi'Aates venting

. erator exits Section 7.3.3 and enters Attachment 13.

SAT D UNSAT D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-5 -8

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5

10. Procedure Step:

NOTE

'VIIV\:I may of a Reactor coolant leak inside containment:

• "C19 AlB TROUBLE" (C904LC-B3)

I

• "DRYWELL EQUIPMENT/FLOOR DRAIN SUMP HIGH FLOW" on Panel C20

• Any Drywell cooler leaking alarm on Panel C7L IThe purpose of this section is to :specify the actions required when indication of a Reactor Icoolant leak exists,

[1] Personnel assigned to perform this Attachment have read and understand all its sections, All personnel involved shall print their name and sign their initials below:

Name (print) Initials Name (print) Initials i

Standard Operator reviews all sections and prints their name and signs the procedure.

Cue Notes I

Results SAT D UNSAT D

THEN CLOSE OR VERIFY CLOSED the following valves:

[NUREG 0737]

(a) SV-5030A N2 Makeup Supply Block Valve (b) AO-5035A, Drywell Purge Supply Isol Vlv (c) AO-5036A, Torus Purge Supply Isol Vlv (d) AO-5041A Torus Normal Exhaust Isol Vlv (e) AO-5041 B, Torus Normal Exhaust Isol Vlv (f) AO-5042A Torus Purge Exhaust 1501 Vlv (9) AO-5042B, Torus Purge Exhaust Isol Vlv (h) AO-5043A, Drywell Normal Exhaust Isol Vlv (i) AO-5043B, Dr)'\"Iel/ Normal Exhaust 1501 Vlv

0) AO-5044A, Drywell Purge Exhaust Isol Vlv (k) AO-5044B, Drywell Purge Exhaust Isol Vlv PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 -9

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5

'Qperator verifies

• "PCV-S030A" control switch in the "CLOSE" position. Green light on, red light off.

• "AO-6035A" control switch in the "CLOSE" position. Green light on, red IIght off.

• "AO-SOSSA" control switch in the "CLOSE" position. Green light on, red light off.

• uAO-6041A" PLACES control switch to the "CLOSE" position, then Green light on, red light off.

• "AO..50418" PLACES control switch to the "CLOSE" position.

Gr**n light on, red light off.

• "A0-5042A" control switch in the "CLOSE" position. Green light on, rea light off.

• "AO-5042B" control switch in the "CLOSE" position. Green light on, red light off.

• "AQ..I043A" control switch to the "CLOSE" position. Green light on, red light off.

• "AO"5043B" control switch to the "CLOSE" pOSition. Green light on, red Ughtoff.

• "AQ..6044A" control switch in the "CLOSE" position. Green light on,

~*Iight off.

• "AO'"5044B" control switch in the "CLOSE" position. Green light on, red tight off.

A and AO-S041 B are Critical for this Ste .

o UNSAT

[3] RETURN SGTS to "AUTO" mode as follows:

(b) IF "S" SGTS was running, THEN, at Panel C7, PLACE control switch for AO-N-106, Train S Inlet Dmpr, to "AUTO".

".Hor rotates"AO-N-1 06" control switch to the "AUTO" position .

...,\IAll damper change state, and VEX-2108 shutdown. AO-N-106 green off. VeX-210B, crew light on, amber light off, red light off.

o UNSAT D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 - 10

PILGRIM 201"1 NRC JPM 8-5 (c) VERIFY OR PLACE the following dampers into the "AUTO" position:

(1) AO-N-99, Train A Inlet Dmpr (2) AO-N-108, Train A Outl Dmpr (3) AO-I\I-112, Train B Outl Dmpr Vermes "AO-N-99" control switch in the "AUTO" position.

Verifies "AO-N-1 08" control switch in the "AUTO" position.

Qperator rotates "AO-N-112" control switch in the "AUTO" position.

D UN8AT D Cue: This completes this JPM.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-5 - 11

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the ,JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet{s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 - 12

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 - 13

PILGRIM 2011 NRC

• JPM S-5 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant is at 45% power with the mode switch in "RUN".

• During the plant startup the Torus was inerted with cold Nitrogen the nitrogen has subsequently heated up raising Torus pressure.

• The OSS has determined that a reduction in torus airspace pressure will restore the drywell-to torus differential pressure to within specification".

INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], Vent the torus using the Bravo train of Standby Gas Treatment in accordance with 2.2.70, Section 7.3 and 7.3.3."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-5 - 14

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (NLIRO/SRO)

TITLE: BYPASS DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD SHED FOR PLACING CRD PUMPS IN SERVICE OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

i CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): NA Actual Time (min): NA i PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS*:

SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: A Reactor Scram has occurred due to a loss of offsite power and a small leak in containment has led to diesel load shed. Level is lower and two CRD pump emergency makeup is required. The CRD Load shed logic needs to be defeated.

TASK Defeat CRD load shed logic in accordance with procedure 2.4.4. (Emergency Diesel STANDARD: Generator Load Shed Relay Test Switches 105A-TS-9, 105A-TS-10, 1058-TS-9 and 1058-TS-1 0 are pulled open; 105C-TS-1, 105C-TS-2, 1050-TS-1 and 1050-TS-2 are pulled open)

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant Simulate X Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 -1

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 REVISION LOG Revision Number: 5 Date Originated: 09-18-06

. Pages Affected: All

Description:

New Format and changed from Control Floom to Simulator JPM I

Revision Number: 5

• Date Originated: 08-19-10

. Pages Affected: All I

Description:

Revised for 2011 LOT NRC Exam PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 -2

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-E>

TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&A RATING:

Defeat CRD Diesel Load Shed 201-02-04-021 264000 K4.05 3.2/

3.5 REFERENCES

1. Procedure 2.4.4

2. Procedure 2.2.8 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. Initialize Exam IC 55, (Need to terminate switch-check with various conditions)

• HPCI Aux oil pump PTL

• Insert small break LOCA to raise DW pressure >2.2# and scram

• RCIC is tripped

2. Stabilize plant conditions as required.

3. The Simulator Operator must control Reactor pressure by cycling SRVs as necessary from the Simulator Booth GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Safety Glasses, Rubber Gloves and a Long Sleeve Cotton Shirt or Lab Coat should be provided or placed at the Electrical Cabinet.

2. Flashlight CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 -3

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the "first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin."

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) 'The title of this JPM is: BYPASS DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD SHED FOR PLACING CRD PUMPS IN SERVICE" b) "Task conditions are as follows:

i} The Emergency Diesel Generators are supplying buses A5 and A6 following a loss of off site power.

ii) A small LOCA has resulted in a high drywell pressure condition, which has actuated load shedding on A5 and A6.

iii) HPCI is out of service iv) RCIC has tripped v) Reactor water level is approximately -120 inches and slowly lowering.

vi) The CRS wants to verify the CRD pumps will not overload their respective Emergency Diesel Generators and then defeat the CRD pump load shed for emergency makeup.

vii) The CRD 25 Valve is closed

3. Another operator will assume Reactor pressure control

4. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

INITIATING CUE:

1. State the following:

"[Operator's name], verify the CRD pumps will not overload their respective Emergency Diesel Generators and then defeat the load shed logic for CRD pumps A and B in accordance with Procedure 2.4.4. Electrical safety equipment is available. Inform me when you have completed the assigned task."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 -4

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 PERFORMANCE:

Notes This task is covered in procedure 2.4.4, Attachment 1.

All controls are located on the back of panel C6 unless noted.

All critical steps must be performed in any order written unless otherwise noted START TIME:

1. i Procedure Step:

OBTAIN permission from the 8M to defeat load shed signals to the ap~icable eRD pump{SI.

i Standard Operator request permission from the SM to defeat load shed signals.

The Shift Manager grants permission to defeat load shed and initials the Cue procedure Notes Results SAT UN8AT I I I I 2.

Procedure Step: Obtains PNPS 2.2.8, review Section 4.1 [5J determines Equipment Rating of the diesels Standard Operator looks at diesels ratings and determines ratings are for 2600 kW.

Cue I Notes Both Diesels will support the CRD pump start. I Results SAT UN8AT D D I

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-6 -5

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 3.

I Procedure Step: VERIFY there is sufficient capacity available to start a eRD pump (approximately 227~JN)on the associated Diesel Generator bus in accordance with PNPS 2.2.8 Step 4 1[5].

Standard Operator looks at both diesels for loading considerations.

"The load on the 'A' EDG is 850 KW. The load on the 'B' EDG is 1000 KW."

Cue Notes Both Diesels will support the CRD pump start.

Results SAT UNSAT D D

{b) .A.t the back of Panel C6. PULL OPEN #112 knife switches on TS lOSe \w*ll open contacts in stop circuit for P-209A}.

~tor at Panel C6 opens 1#1/2 knife btade switches on TS 105C SAT D UNSAT D To bypass load shed for CRD Pump ",A.", P-209A:

(a) At the back of Panel ce, PULL OPEN #9l1 0 knife switches on TS105C (wi!! close contacts in start circuit for P-209A,i.

• .*~r at Panel ce opens #911 0 knife blade switches on TS 105C D UNSAT D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 -6

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-0 (b) At the back of Panel C6 PULL OPEN #1 i2 knife switches on TS 1()5D (wiH open contacts in stop circuit for P-209B.L

'aperatorat Panel C6 opens #1/2 knife blade switches on TS 1050.

Operator informs evaluator that the load shed is defeated for CRO.

"'rhis JPM is completed,"

• • "'e8 D UNSAT D To bypass load shed for CRD PlJmp "S", P-209B (a) At the back of Panel C6. PULL OPEN #9/10 knife switches on TS 105D (will close contacts in start circuit! for P-209B.1.

PGt'1tO,rat Panel C6 opens #9/10 knife blade switches on TS 1050 eperator may continue on to start a CRO pump before notifying the evatuator of task completion. If operator proceeds to start a CRD pump, then CUE: that another 0 erator will start the CRO Pum .

UNSAT STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-6 - 7

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the ,JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations.

Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 -8

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• An overall evaluation of UNSAT for the JPM requires documentation in the comment section below. The JPM shall be evaluated as UNSAT if any of the following conditions are met:

• Any critical element is graded as "UNSAr'

• Any "critical time frame" is not met

• Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this

..rPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 -9

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 INITIAL CONDITIONS

• The Emergency Diesel Generators are supplying buses A5 and A6 following a loss of off site power.

• A small LOCA has resulted in a high drywell pressure condition, which has actuated load shedding on A5 and A6.

• HPCI is out of service

• RCIC has tripped

• Reactor water level is approximately -120 inches and slowly lowering.

• The CRS wants to defeat the load shed and restart both CRD pumps for emergency makeup. It has been determined that thH CRD pumps will not overload their respective Emergency Diesel Generators."

• Another operator will assume Reactor pressure control INITIATING CUE:

"[Operator's name], verify the CRD pumps will not overload their respective Emergency Diesel Generators and then defeat the load shed logic for CRD pumps A and B in accordance with Procedure 2.4.4. Electrical safety equipment is available. Inform me when you have completed the assigned task."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-6 - 10

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

TITLE: PERFORM REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM SURVIELLANCE TEST PNPS 8.M.1-23 (ALTERNATE PATH)

OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: _____________

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A I Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME:  : Average Time (min): 15 I Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for UNSAT, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: An operator is directed to perform Reactor Manual Scram Test, PNPS 8.M.1-23. The operator will start the test however when the channel B manual scram is inserted three control rods will drift into the core requiring the operator to manually scram the reactor.

TASK The operator will perform Reactor Manual Scram Test, PNPS 8.M.1-23. When the STANDARD: channel B manual scram is inserted three control rods will drift into the core. The operator to diagnose the failure of more than two control rods drifting more than three notches and manually scram the reactor.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

~ Perform Plant Simulate Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 -1

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-7 REVISION LOG Revision Number Date Description I

0 11/04/10 Developed JPM for 2011 NRC Exam. I I

I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-7 -2

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&ARATING:

RESPOND TO A DRIFTING CONTROL 201-04-01-010 212000 A2.03, 3.3 I 3.5 ROD.

REFERENCES:

PNPS 8.M.1-23, Reactor Manual Scram SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. Initialize the simulator to the NRC Exam IC 30

2. Load Lesson Plan 09 [NRC2011 LP#9 NRC S-7 RPS Testing]

3. Verify three control rods triggered to slowly drift into the core when the Channel B Manual Scram pushbuttons are pressed.

GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. PNPS 8.M.1-23, Reactor Manual Scram, signed off through step [3] (d)

CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 -3

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

'The title of this JPM is: "PERFORM REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM SURVIELLANCE TEST PNPS 8.M.1-23"

1. "The task conditions are as follows:

a. The plant is operating at 100% power.

b. PNPS 8.M.1-23, Reactor Manual Scram, Steps through [3] (d) has been completed.

c. You are the C905 operator the examiner will act as the C915 and C917 operator.

2. Allow the operator time to review the prepared copy of PNPS 8.M.1-23, Reactor Manual Scram, prior to commencing and solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[State the operator's name], Perform PNPS 8.M.1-23, F~eactor Manual Scram, starting at Step [3] (e) and when completed notify the CRS.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 -4

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 PERFORMANCE:

Notes This task is covered in procedure 8.M.1-23, Attachment 1.

All critical steps must be performed in order written unless otherwise noted START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Operator obtains and reviews PNPS 8. M.1-23, Attachment 1 I

I Standard Operator reviews PNPS 8.M, 1-23, Attachment 1 and determines they must start on Step [3] (e).

I Cue i Notes Results I i I I UNSAT D

2. Procedure Step: (e) VERIFY Control (3roup 1-4 iights are (I) 1-4 (2) 1-4 i

Standard Verifies all Train A GROUP SCRAM LOGIC lights on Panel C905 are I i

ILLUMINATED.

I Cue Lights are illuminated on C915 Notes Results SAT D UNSAT I J PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 -5

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7

3. Procedure Step: VERIFY Control Rod Drive Scram Solenoid Train B Groupl lights are ILLUMINATED.

(3roup Lights Panel 1'1) '1-4 C9i7 (2) 1-4 c:: EtOS I

Standard Verifies all Train B GROUP SCRAM LOGIC lights on Panel C905 are I ILLUMINATED.

I i

Cue Lights are illuminated on C917 I

i Notes Results SAT D I I

4. Procedure Step: (g) VERIFY annunciator "AUTO SCRAM CHAN An (C90SR-A ) is CLEAR (h) VERIFY annunciator "AUTO SCRAM CHAN B" (CflOSR-A4) is CLEAR.

(i) VERIFY annunciator "MANUAL SCRAM CHAN AU (C90E,R-Bl) is CLEAR

(]) VERIFY annunciator "MANUAL SCRAM CHAN Bit (C~lOSR-B4) is CLEAR Standard Verifies all scram annunciators are clear.

i I Cue i

Notes I

Results SAT D UN8AT I J PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-7 -6

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7

5. Procedure Step: (k) VERIFY the following red indicating lights Dre 0 FF. I i

(1) REACTOR r11ANUAL SCRAfvl CH A push button (5A-S3A) at Panel e90S i

REACTOR MAN UAL SCRAfvi CH B button (SA-S3B1 at Panel i

Standard Cue i Notes I I Results SAT D I I i

6. Procedure Step: (I) PERFORM Attaciment 2 (RPS Reset VerifICation}.

Attachment 2

['1J VERIFY that the backup ScmlTI valve Gr reset JS foHoVJs:

(a) VERIFY voltage indicator Et-302-J EIAA on Panel C91£, reads approximately 62 volts DC.

(b) VERIFY voltage indicator 1flAB on P'anel 15 reads approximately 132 volts DC:.

(C) VERIFY voltage indicator Ef-302-1 EIBB on Panel C9 7 reads approxirnately 62 volts DC.

(d) VERIFY voltage indicator EI-302-!9BA on Panel C917 reads approximately 62 volts DC.

Standard At RPS back panel operator verifies the following voltage indicators reads approximately 62 volts DC on their voltage indicators EL-302-19AA EI-302-19AB EI-302-19BB EI-302-19BA I I Cue : If the candidates believe that the voltages are NOT approximately 62 i VDC (they will be very close), Respond that for the purposes of the

. JPM, the EL*302 indicators all read approximately 62 volts DC. They can continue with the task.

Notes' PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 - 7

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7

7. Procedure Step: (e) lE. any of the voitafles verified in Steps (a) through (d) i were NOT approx.irnately 132'./ DC, THEN STOP this i Procedure AND NOTIFY the Shift Manafler. lE. the i

voltages were acceptable, ENTER "NiP".

I Standard Determines voltages are satisfactory and returns to Attachment 1 I

Cue If the candidates believe that the voltages are NOT approximately 62 vec (they will be very close), Respond that for the purposes of the i JPM, the EL-302 indicators all read approximately 62 volts DC. They can continue with the task.

i Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D

8. Procedure Step:

[4] ESTABLISH communications between the Cor1trol Room I Operator (Panel egOS) ancl Control Roorn Operator at Panels CEllS and 17.

Standard Confirms communication with the C915 and C917 operator I

Cue Acknowledges communication check I Notes I i

Results SAT I I UNSAT D I

.1; . . . .re . .:*

[5] At Panel Cfl05, REQUEST Operations to perform the follov,ling:

(a) ~,"1ornentariiy depress and release REACTOR r.. .*1ANUAL SCRAfvl CH A push button (SA-S:3A)

(b) Verify red indicating light on REACTOR f",1.A.NUAL SCRM.. 1 CH A push button (:SA-S3A) is ON.

standarEi Operator depresses and releases REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM CH A pushbutton and verifies the RED indicating light on the pushbutton is ON.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 - 8

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 Cue

'Notes I

Results SAT D UNSAT D j

10. Procedure Step: [6] VERIFY the following Control Rod Drive Scram Solenoid Train A Group 1-4 lights are OFF:

Group Lights Panel (a) 1-4 C915 (b) 1-4 C905 Standard Verifies all Train A GROUP SCRAM LOGIC lights on Panel C905 are OFF.

Cue Li hts at C915 are OFF UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: [7] VERIFY the following Control Rod Drive Scram Solenoid Train B Group 1-4 lights are ILLUMINATED:

Group Lights Panel (a) 1-4 C917 (b) 1-4 e905 Standard Verifies all Train B GROUP SCRAM LOGIC lights on Panel C905 are ILLUMINATED.

Cue Li hts at C917 are illuminated Notes Results PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 -9

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-~7

12. Procedure Step: [8] VERIFY annunciator "AUTO SCRAM CHAN An (C90SR-A 1) is CLEAR.

[9] VERIFY annunciator "AUTO SCRAM CHAN B n (C90SR-A4) is CLEAR.

[10] VERIFY annunciator "MANUAL SCRAM CHAN A" (C9QSR-B1) is ON.

[11 ] VERIFY annunciator "MANUAL SCRAM CHAN B" (C90SR-B4) is CLEAR Standard Verifies the MANUAL SCRAM CHAN A annunciator is ON and all other scram annunciators are clear. i i

Cue Notes I SAT i

Results D UNSAT D

t3. 'tooed** Step: [12] At Panel C90S, PERFORM the following:

(a) REQUEST Operations to reset the half-Scram using pistol grip SCRAM RESET switch (SA-SS).

(b) VERIFY red indicating light on REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM CH A push button (5A-S3A) is OFF .

Standard The operator resets the scram using the pistol grip SCRAM RESET switch and verifies the RED indicating light on the REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM CH A push button is OFF.

i

. q" ....

Cue Results SAT D UNSAT D

I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-7 - 10

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7

14. I Procedure Step: [13] VERIFY the following Control Rod Drive Scram Solenoid Train A Group 1-4 lights are ILLUMINATED:

I I

Group Lights Panel i

(a) 1-4 C915 (b) 1-4 C905 i I

i I Standard Verifies all Train A GROUP SCRAM LOGIC lights on Panel C905 are ILLUMINATED.

I Cue Lights at C915 are illuminated i i

I Notes Results SAT D I I

15. Procedure Step: [14] VERIFY the following Control Rod Drive Scram Solenoid Train B Group 1-4 lights are ILLUMINATED:

Group Lights Panel (a) 1-4 C917 (b) 1-4 e905 Standard Verifies all Train B GROUP SCRAM LOGIC lights on Panel C905 are ILLUMINATED.

Cue Li hts at C917 are illuminated PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 - 11

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-"1

16. Procedure Step: [15] VERIFY annunciator "AUTO SCRAM CHAN An (C905R-A1) is CLEAR.

[16] VERIFY annunciator "AUTO SCRAM CHAN B" (C905R-A4) is CLEAR.

[17) VERIFY annunciator "MANUAL SCRAM CHAN A" (C905R-B1) is CLEAR.

i

[18J VERIFY annunciator "MANUAL SCRAM CHAN B" (C905R-B4) is CLEAR.

Standard Verifies all scram annunciators are clear.

i I

Cue i

Notes I

i Results SAT D I I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 - 12

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-l 17, PtONdur* *ep: Operator observes Annunciator 905L-A3, ROD DRIFT Standard Operator recognizes Annunciator A3, Rod Drift and Checks the full core display, I

Cue Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D

18. ~ure"p! Operator determines that multiple control rods are drifting I I

Standard Operator determines that more than two control rods are drifting three or more notches, Cue Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D

tl. p......,. . . .: Operator takes the immediate action for PNPS 2.4.11, Control Rod Positioning Malfunctions.

[3} IF two or more control rods are drifting {H1 or our; three or more THEN PERFORM the follOWing (a) MANUALLY SCRAM the Reactor.

(b) ENTER PNPS 2.16. "Reactor Scmm".

I

~d Operator manually scrams the reactor I

Cue When the Manual Scram Is Initiated notify the operator that the JPM Is I comptete.

I Notes RftUlts SAT D UNSAT D I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-7 - 13

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-7 Cue: This completes this JPM.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-7 - 14

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical elemenVstep is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered ..IPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s} describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 - 15

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator de'ficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this "IPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 - 16

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The task conditions are as follows:

• The plant is operating at 100% power.

• PNPS 8.M.1-23, Reactor Manual Scram, Steps through [3] (d) has been completed.

• You are the C905 operator the examiner will act as the C915 and C917 operator.

INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

Perform PNPS 8.M.1-23, Reactor Manual Scram, starting at Step [3] (e) and when completed notify the CRS.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-7 - 17

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S*8 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

TITLE: ISOLATE A CONDENSER WATERBOX DURING CHLORIDE INTRUSION OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A i Actual Time (min):

I i

i PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 15 I Actual Time (min): I JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow*Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: The plant is at 45% with indications of high conductivity in the 1-3 waterbox. The operator must isolate water box 1-3.

TASK The operator will isolate Water Box 1-3 due to chloride intrusion lAW PNPS 2.4.33 STANDARD: Att.3. The procedure shall be followed with no failure of critical elements.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant Simulate X Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 -1

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&ARATING:

RESPOND TO A CONDENSER 256-01-01-025 256000 A2.15 2.8/3.1 CHLORIDE INTRUSION.

REFERENCES:

PNPS 2.4.33 ATIACHMENT 3.

SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. NRC Exam IC 52 @ 45%, this will establish:

• Core Flow is at -42 mlbm/hr

• 1st 3 steps of RPR have been inserted

• "C" RFP is secured

• Annunciator for "Conductivity Hi" is in alarm (C1 L-D5, D6 and D7)

• Conductivity is >0.3 GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. N/A CRIl"ICAl ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: ISOLATE A CONDENSER WATERBOX DURING CHLORIDE INTRUSION" b) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) The plant was operating at 45% power ii) PNPS 2.4.33 has been entered due to chloride intrusion iii) Reactor power has been lowered lAW PNPS 2.1.14 Sections 7.10 and 7.11.

iv) The location of the leak has been determined to be Waterbox 1-3 v) You are only responsible for annunciators and actions occurring on Panel C1 PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 -2

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

INITIATING CUE:

Isolate Waterbox 1-3 lAW PNPS 2.4.33 Att.3.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 -3

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-8 PERFORMANCE:

Notes Reviews precautions & limitations of PNP8 2.4.33 START TIME:

'i . . . . . . .t~ 'ANPS 2.4.33 ATIACHMENT 3 [1] (a)

To isolate the 1-3 Condenser, PERFORM the following:

Goes to back panel C10, CLOSE the following vapor valves to the steam jet

_ejectors:

AO';'3710, Cndsr A West Side Off Gas Valve SV-3710

• AO-3704, Ondsr B East Side Off Gas Valve SV-3704 Oloses the following vapor valves to the steam jet air ejectors:

AO-3T10, Ondsr A West Side Off Gas Valve SV-3710 AO-3704, Cndsr B EastSide Off Gas Valve SV-3704 UNSAT D

• At 01 Panel, PARTIALLY CLOSE the following Water Box Inlet Valves (valve Is 12 to 18% open when white light illuminates):

• MO-3870 (Water Box #3 Inlet Valve)

• MO-3872 (Water Box #1 Inlet Valve)

WH'" the first white light (12 to 18% open position) comes on in Step

[1](b), THEN STOP Seawater Pump B, P-10SB.

P",tillillv oloses the following Water Box Inlet Valves (valve is 12 to 18%

open when white light illuminates):

• MO-3870 (Water Box #3 Inlet Valve)

• MO-3872 (Water Box #1 Inlet Valve)

P-10SB.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM 8-8 - 4

PILGRIM 2011 NRC

..'PM S-8 CLOSE the following Water Box Inlet Valve:

• MO-3872(Water Box #1 Inlet Valve).

D UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: . (e) IF 3-water box operation is desired, THEN PERFORM Steps [1](f) through [1]0) in sequence. IF 3-water box operation is NOT desired, THEN OMIT Steps [1](f) through [1]0).

I Standard Cue When asked state that 3-waterbox operation is NOT desired Notes I

Results SAT D UNSAT Q I (k) IF 3-water box operation is NOT desired, I.!::iSt! PERFORM Steps [1](1) through [1](n).

(I) OPEN the following Scavenger System valve:

• AO-3842 (1-3 Condenser Vent Valve)

Qontacts operator and directs opening AO-3842 (1-3 Condenser Vent ValVe).

When contacted as an operator, acknowledge the request to open AO-3842

(:t;'-3Condenser Vent Valve), wait 30 seconds and reply that AO-S842 has b$en8 ned.

UNSAT D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 -5

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 (m) AFTER the Condenser quadrant has drained (approximately 5 minutes). CLOSE MO-3870, WATER BOX #3 INLET VLV (Seawater Inlet from 1-3 Condenser).

AFTER the Condenser quadrant has drained, CLOSE MO-3870,

• • • • .WATE:ABOX #3 INLET VLV (Seawater Inlet from 1-3 Condenser).

Ctoses MO-3870, WATER BOX #3 INLET VLV (Seawater Inlet from 1-3 Gonde,.,).

After 30 seconds report to the candidate those 5 minutes has elapsed.

SAT UNSAT D D

7. Procedure Step: (n) CLOSE the following valve:

I I

• AO-3842 (1-3 Condenser Vent Valve)

I I Contacts operator and directs closing AO-3842 (1-3 Condenser Vent Valve).

Standard When contacted as an operator, acknowledge the request to close AO-3842 (1-3 Condenser Vent Valve), wait 30 seconds and reply that AO-3842 has I been closed.

Cue Notes Results SAT D UNSAT I I I This JPM Is complete.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 -6

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the ...!PM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 -7

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 -8

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 INITIAL CONOn"IONS:

• The plant was operating at 45% power

• PNPS 2.4.33 has been entered due to chloride intrusion

• Reactor power has been lowered lAW PNPS 2.1.14 Sections 7.10 and 7.11.

• The location of the leak has been determined to be Waterbox 1-3

• You are only responsible for annunciators and actions occurring on Panel C1 INITIATING CUE:

Isolate Waterbox 1-3 lAW PNPS 2.4.33 Att.3.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM S-8 - 9

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (RO/SRO)

TITLE: DEPRESSURIZE SCRAM VOLUME PRESSURE HEADER (ALTERNATE PATH)

OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: I Required Time (min): NA I Actual Time (min):

I NA PERFORMANCE TIME: i Average Time (min): 12 \ Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes I No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: With the reactor having received a reactor SCRAM all rods did not insert due to an electrical malfunction in the RPS circuit. The control room has given the order to depressurize the SPVAH in the field per 5.3.23. (preferred method will not work due to stuck valve.)

TASK The SPVAH shall be depressurized in lAW 5.3.23. The procedure should be followed STANDARD: with no failure of critical elements.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform Plant x Simulate Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 REVISION LOG Revision Number: 0 Date Originated: 8/30/06 Pages Affected: All

Description:

New JPM Revision Number: 1 Date Originated: 8/29/07 Pages Affected: 7

Description:

Clarify what was required to complete critical step number 6 PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-"I TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&ARATING:

Depressurize SPVAH in accordance 200-05-01-020 295037 4.6/4.6 EA 1.01 with 5.3.23.

REFERENCES:

PNPS 5.3.23 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Wrench to remove pipe cap and plug.

CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be simulated. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: DEPRESSURIZE SCRAM VOLUME PRESSURE HEADER" b) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) The plant has experienced a Reactor SCRAM.

ii) An electrical failure of the RPS has prevented control rods from inserting.

iii) Control Room actions have not been successful in inserting rods.

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-'l INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], lAW with 5,3.23, vent the Scram air header and inform the control room when you have completed the task.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-'I PERFORMANCE:

Notes This task is covered in 5.3.23, Section 3.2 All components are located on 23' east side the reactor building and on the CRD mezzanine.

All critical steps must be performed in order written unless otherwise noted START TIME:

1. Procedure Step:

VENT 1he Scram air header a'S follows (in order of preference)

(a) At pressure reduction manifold (Reactor B%dg 23' elev.):

(1 ) VERIFY OPEN .QB OPEN 301*256C, Backup Regulator Outlet Valve; i

8!!Q. i I i i

i Standard Operator verifies or simulates opening 301-256C by turning valve counterclockwise I

Cue The valve's position is as you see it.

Notes This valve is normally open.

I

~".

i Results SAT CJ UNSAT CJ i

2. ~ureSt.p: CLOSE 301*264.A, PresSlire Reducing Manifold Inlet Valve: !l1Q.

Standard Operator simulates closing the 301-264 by turning it clockwise.

i i

Cue Indicate that the valve turns in the clockwise direction and stops

-- Notes NOT Critical if 301-70A and 301-708 are closed in following steps 4 &5 i

i ReStJIts SAT CJ UNSAT I I I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-'l 3, Procedure Step: I UNCAP atQ OPEN JOI.258C, Backup Regulator Outlet Test Connection Valve.

Standard Operator simulates removing the cap and then attempts to open the 301 258C Cue "The pipe cap is removed" When the operator simulates opening valve 301-258C, CUE:

"The valve does not move" Continue to provide this CUE as required if operator repeats attempts I to open valve.

Notes Valve 301-258C is frozen closed and cannot be opened. The operator should i realize that the procedure provides alternate methods for depressurizing the .

header.

Results SAT D UNSAT D

4. ~Step: At the Scram air header filter in~l valves (CRD Quad Mezzanine):

(1 ) ClOSEQB.VERIFY CLOSED 301*70A A SCR.A.M INSTR AIR FILTER INLET

.. Standard Operator simulates closing the 301-70A by turniqg it clockwise Cue Valve turns in clockwise direction and stops Notes NOT critical if 301-264A was closed earlier in step 2 i

Results SAT D UNSAT D

5. Procedure Step: CLOSE 2B. VERIFY CLOSED 301

• 70S.. B SCRAM INSTR AIR FILTER INLET.

I I

.Standard Operator simulates closing the 301-708 by turning it clockwise. I Cue Valve turns in clockwise direction and stops I I

Notes NOT critical if 301-264A was closed earlier in step 2 Resutts SAT D UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM p ..\

6. Pr....ureStep: VENT the Scram pilot air header using one or more of the fonowing methods:

a. REMOVE plug A!:!Q OPEN 30 A31 PI 302~80 TEST CONN (preferred method).

b. OPEN the Scram I'nstrument Air Filter Slowdown Vahies~

Standard If option "a" is used:

• Operator removes the plug

• Opens valve 301-31 by turning the valve in the counterclockwise and/or opens the Scram instrument air filter blowdown valves 302-15A/B by turning them in the counterclockwise direction ..

Cue If option "a" is used:

• " the pipe cap is removed."

• Valve stop's turning in the counterclockwise direction and air is heard rushing out of the piping".

Standard If option "bl! is used:

• Operator opens 302-15A, Air Filter Blowdown Valve

• Operator opens 302-15B, Air Filter Blowdown Valve Cue If option lib" is used: I For each valve Blowdown Valve operated CUE: '

Valve stop's turning in the counterclockwise direction and air is heard I rushing out of the piping". ,

Notes If option "b" is used, operator must open at least one of the two blowdown valves to satisfy this critical step.

Results SAT D UNSAT D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 *7* February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-'I

7. Procedure Step:

WHEN cootrol rod insertion is completed OR conlrol rods are not moving inward. THEN RESTORE Scram air header in accordance ~th Attachment 5Section 2.0, I

I Standard Operator notifies control room that the SPVAH header is depressurized.

I Cue "That's the end of the JPM" Notes Results SAT D I I STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-l JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the ,JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant has experienced a Reactor SCRAM.

• An electrical failure of the RPS has prevented control rods from inserting.

• Control Room actions have not been successful in inserting rods.

INITIATING CUE:

"[Operator's name], lAW with 5.3.23, vent the Scram air header and inform the control room when you have completed the task.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-1 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (NL/RO/SRO)

TITLE: INSTALL BACKUP Ng FOR EXTENDED SRV OPERATION OPERATOR: DATE: ___________________

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min):

J PERFORMANCE TIME: Average Time (min): 20 Actual Time (min):

I JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of ..IPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: Following a seismic event with a subsequent loss of N2 /air supply to the drywell, the Emergency Director requires backup N2 supplied to 'B' and 'C' SRVs for continued reactor pressure control.

TASK The drywell instrument air header is depressurized. Install backup nitrogen bottles and STANDARD: repressurize RV-203-3B and RV-203-3C accumulators for continued reactor pressure control lAW PNPS 2.2.70, Section 7.12. The procedure shall be followed without failure of critical elements.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform X Plant x Simulate Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-:2 REVISION LOG I

I Revision Number: 2 Date Originated: 5/31/05 Pages Affected: All

Description:

Reformatted JPM.

Revision Number: 3 Date Originated: 5/31/05 Pages Affected: 3, 5, 6, 7

Description:

Remove procedure revision number added steps 4 and 5 and changed steps 1, 7 and 10 to reflect current I procedure revision.

I Revision Number: 4 *1 Date Originated: 9/13/07

.\L----,P=-a-g-e-s-A~ff-::-e-c-te-d:-:-7-------+---Description: Correction to cue to simulate

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- L_ _ __Nitrogen

~ _

flow.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&A RATING:

Install Backup N2 for Extended SRV 200-05-04-030 218000 3.4/3.6 A2.03 Operation

REFERENCES:

PNPS 2.2.70 EN-IS-109 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. None GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Key to compressed gas bottle storage facility

2. Adjustable wrench

3. PNPS 2.2.70, Section 7.12

4. PNPS 1.4.36

5. EN-IS-109 CRn*ICAl ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be simulated. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: INSTALL BACKUP N2 FOR EXTENDED SRV OPERATION" b) The task conditions are as follows:

i) A seismic event has occurred with a subsequent loss of air/nitrogen to drywell instrumentation.

ii) The Emergency Director has determined that continued use of relief valves for reactor pressure control is necessary.

iii) Previous attempts to re-pressurize the drywell instrument air header have failed.

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], install backup nitrogen bottles to repressurize '8' and 'C' relief valve accumulators lAW PNPS 2.2.70. Inform me when you have completed this task."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 PERFORMANCE:

Notes Operator reviews applicable precautions and limitations.

All critical steps must be performed in order written unless otherwise noted.

This task is covered in PNPS 2.2.70, Section 7.12.

Operator recognizes requirements in EN-IS-109 and knows where to obtain key for gas bottle storage facility.

START TIME:

NOTE

1. SRV accumulators should only be charged externally during an emergency when directed by EOPs to continue cooldown beyond the accumulators capacity.

2. Nitrogen cylinder may be prestaged in the bottle station, but not hooked up. If bottles are prestaged, proceed to Step [3].

L

"""dUrelt.,= OBTAIN two nitrogen cylinders from the Bottle Storage Yard in accordance with EN-IS-109, "Compressed Gas Cylinder Handling and Storage" Standard Operator knows where to obtain key and nitrogen cylinders in accordance with EN-IS-109.

Cue Inform operator that he has the nitrogen cylinders and to proceed with task.

/'

Notes This step is only critical if the nitrogen cylinders are not prestaged. I I

Results SAT 0 UNSAT 0 i I

2. Procedure Step: INSTALL cylinders in bottle station on 23' Reactor Building north wall outside

'B' RHR Valve Room.

Standard Operator locates correct area. I Cue i I

Notes i i

I 0 I I PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 S. ~/ltap: CONNECT the Nitrogen cylinders to the tubing at bottle station by removing the protective cap and installing the tubing.

........ Standard Operator locates tubing and simulates connecting to nitrogen cylinders.

Cue "The tubing is connected to the cylinders."

Notes If operator did not bring (or simulate bringing) tools, ask where he would get them.

i I

Results SAT D UNSAT D

4. P...,.,..**ep: To prevent overpressurizing the containment nitrogen header, rotate the handwheel to PCV-20S-11, counterclockwise. [

Standard Operator locatesPCV-20S-11 and simulates backing off pressure setting by turning it counterclockwise.

Cue ThfiJpressure regulator is backed off."

Nott$.

~ft8 SAT D UNSAT D I

5. '~ltep.: OPEN the N2 cylinder isolation valves. I StAndard He simulates opening the N2 isolation valves.

Cue "The cylinder isolation valves are open." i Notes NOTE: the candidate may open the isolation valve in step 6 before performing step 5 this is acceptable.

AetmltS SAT D UNSAT D

6. ' . . . . . . . .p: .OPENNERIFY open 9-HO-380 OR 9-HO-382, Backup SRV N2 Cylinder to PCV 203-11 Isolation Valves.

Standard Operator locates and simulates turning 9-HO-380(S82) counterclockwise.

Cue "The valve moves freely and is now stopped."  !

.... Notes i Results SAT I I UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2

7.  !

~*.$t.p; ADJUST PCV 203-11, Backup SRV N2 Supply Pressure Control Valve, to a I discharge pressure of 115 psig. I Sta1"ldard Operator locates PCV 203-11 and observes it is set to 115 psig. i Cue "PCV 203-11 is set to 115 psig."

I Notes I Results SAT UNSAT D D CAUTION i An operator must remain at the bottle station while the SRV accumulators are being charged, and valves 9-HO-378 and 9-HO-379 are OPEN (SE-3291).

8. OPEN 9-HO-37B, Backup SRV N2 Supply Containment Isolation Valve #2.

rator locates and simulates turning 9-HO-37B counterclockwise.

"The valve turns freely and is now open."

Notes Results SAT D UNSAT D

9. ~ ..  : OPEN 9-HO-379, Backup SRV N2 Supply Containment Isolation Valve #1.

Standard Operator locates and simulates turning 9-HO-379 counterclockwise.

Cue "The valve turns freely, and as the valve is opened, you hear a temporary sound of gas flow through the tubing. The valve is now open." I Nptes "uulftJ SAT D UNSAT D

10. Procedure Step: VERIFY PCV 203-11 is maintaining pressure less than 125 psig.

Standard I Operator verifies PCV 302-11 pressure at 115 psig.

i---------,

Cue \. "PCV 203-11 remains at 115 psig, and that the sound of gas flow has

. stopped."

Notes t Results I SAT l~

UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2

11. Procedure Step: WHEN RV-203-38 and RV-203-3C accumulators are sufficiently charged, THEN CLOSENERIFY CLOSED the following valves: I

• 9-HO-378

• 9-HO-379

• Nitrogen cylinder isolation valves i Standard Operator locates and simulates turning 9-HO-378, 379 and N2 cylinder valves clockwise.

i Cue This completes the JPM." i i

Notes i I

Results SAT UI\ISAT I J I I i I J STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable.

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 JPM COMMENT SHEET REQUIREMENTS:

• Any operator deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented.

• Any follow-up questions asked and the operator's response must be documented.

• Any operator deficiencies which, in themselves, would not result in an UNSAT evaluation of this JPM but may, when coupled with performance on other JPMs, result in an OVERALL FAILING evaluation for the JPM exam should also be documented below.

• Any other comments, positive or negative, that the evaluator determines is worth noting.

COMMENTS:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• A seismic event has occurred with a subsequent loss of air/nitrogen to drywell instrumentation.

• The Emergency Director has determined that continued use of relief valves for reactor pressure control is necessary.

• Previous attempts to re-pressurize the drywell instrument air header have failed.

INITIATING CUE:

"[Operator's name], install backup nitrogen bottles to repressurize '8' and 'C' relief valve accumulators lAW PNPS 2.2.70. Inform me when you have completed this task."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-2 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC

..IPM P-3 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (NLO/RO/SRO)

TITLE: ALTERNATE POWER TO RHRVALVES OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE: _______________

I CRITICAL TIME FRAME: i Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: i Average Time (min): 13 Actual Time (min):

I JPM RESULTS*: SAT UNSAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (Circle one) *Refer to Grading Instructions at end of JPM COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat, Needs Improvement or Follow-Up Questions)

SYNOPSIS: During a refueling outage with shutdown cooling in service a loss of 480 Volt bus 820 has occurred, resulting in a loss of power to selected RHR valves. The operator will align alternate power to those RHR valves fed from 820 and which have failed as is.

TASK Power is restored to the RHR shutdown cooling valves. The procedure shall be STANDARD: followed without failure of any critical elements.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform X Plant x Simulate Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: Date:

Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 REVISION LOG Revision Number: 5 Date Originated: 8/22/05 Pages Affected: All

Description:

Revised JPM to reflect new procedure 2.4.B20 and 2.4.B.6.

Revision Number: 6 Date Originated: 10/27/05 Pages Affected: 1 Updated accurate time for JPM

• performance, updated task title for 262-04 01-018 I

I~~~~~~--~----------------+=-~~-

Revision Number: 7 Date Originated: 9/05/06 Pages Affected: All Updated procedure rev.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 TASK

Title:

Task Number K&ASYSTEM: K&A RATING:

Respond to a Loss of B6 262-04-01-018 Respond to a loss of SDC. 205-04-01-001

REFERENCES:

PNPS 2.4.8.20 PNPS 2.4.B.6 SIMULATOR CONDITIONS:

1. N/A GENERAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Key (CR-J Shlage BH3) to padlocks for breakers 52-2036, 52-2071 and 52-2093 on MCC B20 and breakers 52-17116 on MCC B17. (This key is a "Switchgear" or "S" key.)

CRITICAL ELEMENTS:

Critical elements are shaded in gray within the body of this document.

OPERATOR BRIEF:

1. State the following paragraph IF this is the first performance in this setting:

a) "All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be simulated. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will state the task conditions and answer any questions, then provide a cue to begin".

2. Always state the following two paragraphs:

a) "The title of this JPM is: ALTERNATE POWER TO RHR VALVES" b) "The task conditions are as follows:

i) The plant is in a refueling outage with shutdown cooling in service; ii) B20 has de-energized due to a fault.

iii) The Control Room has determined that the RHR shutdown cooling valves need to be supplied power from their alternate power source, ."

3. Solicit and answer any questions the operator may have.

INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], restore power to the RHR shutdown cooling valves using PNPS 2.4.B.20, Attachment 3."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 PERFORMANCE:

Notes All critical steps must be performed in order written unless otherwise noted.

Component locations are the 23' Reactor Building.

At this time, it may be convenient to get the keys for the padlocks on B20 and B17. These keys are listed as CR-J Shlage BH3, or otherwise known as Switchgear or "S" keys. These keys can also be found in locker for 2.4.143.

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: .

CAUTIONS

1. An engineering analysis for 817 would be needed if power were restored to MO-1 001-28A (8) or MO-1 001-50 during normal operating or outage conditions.

2. If required, enter LCOsfor LPCI and/or Primary Containment in accordance with Technical Specifications Sections 3.5.A/3.7.A.2.

[1] PROVIDE alternate power to MO-1 00 1-28A (8) and/or MO-1 001 50.

The following steps describe how to provide alternate 480V AC power to three RHR valves necessary for cooldown:

• MO-1 001-28A (RHR A Otbd Inj)

• MO-1001-288 (RHR 8 Otbd Inj)

• MO-1001-50 (SOC Inbd Suct)

Standard a erator reviews cautions related to Attachment 3, 2.4.B20.

Cue If questioned, CUE that concurrence from engineering has been obtained.

If uestioned, CUE that the appropriate LCO's have been entered.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3

2. *~e"p; (a) On MCC 620 (EI. 231AB), UNLOCK the padlocks on the following breakers (key required is an Operator1s liS" key):

Breaker Position Checkoff 52-2036 (MO-1001-50) Unlocked Standard Operator locates and simulates unlocking breaker 52-2036 on bus 820.

Cue "The key is inserted, the padlock unlocked and removed."

Notes Location is at the bottom of 3ra set of breakers from the left.

Results SAT D UNSAT D

3. ......dureStep: LOCATE AND UNLOCK breaker 52-2071 on bus 820 (MO-1001-28A).

Standard f Operator locates and simulates unlocking breaker 52-2071 on bus 820.

Cue "The key is inserted, the padlock unlocked and removed."

., Notes Location is at the top of 7m set of breakers from the left.

ResultE$ SAT D UNSAT D I

4. '. "-ec.tufe,,-p: LOCATE AND UNLOCK breaker 52-2093A on bus 820 (MO-1001-288).

Standard Operator locates and simulates unlocking breaker 52-2093A on bus 820.

Cue The key is inserted, the padlock unlocked and removed."

Notes Location is at the top of 9tn set of breakers from the left.

RMUIts SAT UNSAT i

D D

5. ttOIr:dIbStep: (b) On MCC B20, OPEN AND LOCK OPEN the following breakers (USE padlocks from Step [1](a) above): I Breaker Position Checkoff 52-2031 (MO-1001-28A) Locked OFF I i

Stam,Card Operator simulates opening and locking open breaker 52-2031 on bus 820.

I

.QWe. "1"- switch Is being pushed down, a click is heard and the switch is on the bottom. The padlock is placed on the switch in the locked position."

Notes R_tilts SAT D UNSAT D

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3

'6. P~reStep: LOCATE Y.Q LOCK OPEN breaker 52-2034 on bus B20 (MO-1001-28B). i Standard Operator simulates opening and locking open breaker 52-2034 on bus B20.

Cue "The switch is being pushed down, a click is heard and the switch is on the bottom. The padlock is placed on the switch in the locked position."

... Notes Results SAT UNSAT D D I

7. *~. Step: LOCATE AND LOCK OPEN breaker 52-2046 on bus B20 (MO-1001-50).

i Standard Operator simulates locking open breaker 52-2046 on bus B20.

I Cue "The padlock Is placed on the switch in the locked position."

I

. ~eI1Breaker is Norma1ly Open i ResultS SAT UNSAT i

I I D I

8. procacMre*8tep: (c) On MCC B17 (EI. 23' RB), UNLOCK AND CLOSE the following breaker (shunt trip to 52-17116 has been defeated):

Brea~~r Position Checkoff 52-17116 (Loss of CSR Feed to X Camp) ON

~fd Operator locates, simulates unlocking and clOSing breaker 52-17116 on bus B17. i i

Cue "The key is inserted, the padlock unlocked and removed. The switch is being i pushed up, a click is heard, and the switch indicator is ON." .

Nota* Breaker location Is at the lower right hand corner of B17.

R&SultS SAT UNSAT I D D PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 9~, . P~re..,: (d) On MCC 820, CLOSE the following breakers:

I Breaker Position Checkoff 52-2036 (MO-1001-50) ON Standard Operator simulates closing breaker 52-2036.

Cue "The breaker switch is being pushed up, a click is heard and the switch is at i the top." I Notes AeSults I

SAT D UNSAT D

10. '~reStep: CLOSE breaker 52-2071 (MO-1001-28A). I I

S~d Operator simulates closing breaker 52-2071.

Gue "The breaker switch is being pushed up, a click is heard and the switch is at I i

the top."

j' ., 'Notet .

Reslilfts SAT D UNSAT D

U. p~Ste,! CLOSE breaker 52-2093A (MO-1001-28B). i Stal'tdard Operator simulates closing breaker 52-2093A.

Cue "The breaker switch is being pushed up, a click is heard and the switch is at the top," i Notel I Results SAT D UNSAT D

Cue: This completes this JPM.

STOP TIME:

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 JPM GRADING INSTRUCTIONS CRITERIA FOR SATISFACTORY EVALUATION

1. 100% of critical elements/steps identified in the JPM successfully completed.

2. Critical Time Frame is met if applicable

3. No actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

CRITERIA FOR UNSAT EVALUATION

1. Any critical element/step is graded as "UNSAT"

2. Critical Time Frame is not met if applicable. *

3. Actual safety violation (radiological or industrial) requiring evaluator intervention.

4. Operator's actions would have damaged plant equipment, created a personnel safety hazard, or otherwise reduced the level of safety of the plant CRITERIA FOR NEEDS IMPROVEMENT EVALUATION

1. One or more non-critical elements/ steps evaluated as UNSAT which indicate the need for remediation.

2. Any relevant Management Expectation/Standard missed a majority of the opportunities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Any performance deficiencies resulting in an UNSAT or NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluation shall be documented on the JPM comment sheet.

Documentation for Satisfactory evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and any applicable comment sheet(s) provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured.

Documentation for UNSAT evaluations shall consist of the entire, as administered JPM, with associated comment sheets.

Documentation for NEEDS IMPROVEMENT evaluations need only consist of the cover sheet and the associated comment sheet(s) describing the operator deficiencies noted, provided that a Master Copy of the JPM is on file or captured and the deficiencies are involving only management expectations. Otherwise, the entire JPM shall be retained.

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 8- February 2011

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• The plant is in a refueling outage with shutdown cooling in service;

• 820 has de-energized due to a fault.

• The Control Room has determined that the RHR shutdown cooling valves need to be supplied power from their alternate power source.

INITIATING CUE:

State the following:

"[Operator's name], restore power to the RHR shutdown cooling valves using PNPS 2.4.8.20, Attachment 3. Inform me when you have completed this task."

PILGRIM 2011 NRC JPM P-3 February 2011

'. Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Operator Action T

Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 1 of 15 Event

Description:

Secure Torus Cooling and plaGe in Standby Lineup per 2.2.19 Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

1. Initialize Simulator to IC 14

2. Reduce power to 90% using core flow and stabilize

3. Place "A" Loop of RHR in Torus Cooling lAW PNPS 2.2.19,

4. Verify "F" RBCCW pump in service

a. Start Lesson Plan NRC Scenario 2 and trigger Step 1, Initial Conditions. This step

b. Insert an INOP trip on "APRM A and a trip on "D" RBCCW pump

c. Insert trips on both SBLC pumps

d. Delete the SBLC pump trip on the pump that is not initially started.

5. Bypass APRM A, reset RPS and hang tags on bypass switch and RBCCW Pump "D"

6. Verify AGAFs are in spec

1) Brief crew on plant status SRO 2) Direct BOP to secure Torus Cooling and place RHR in a Standby Lineup per 2.2.19

3) Secure Torus Cooling lAW 2.2.19, section 7.1.2, Step [11]:

a) OPEN MO-1001-18A, RHR Minimum FlowVlv.

PROCEDURE NOTE: In order to prevent the possibility of introducing air into the system, the RHR Pump should be secured when the flow rate is reduced to 2000 GPM or less.

b) CLOSE MO-100'1-36A, Torus Cooling Vlv, AND MONITOR flow rate (C903) during valve closure.

c) WHEN RHR loop flow reduces to less than approximately 2000 GPM on available flow indicator (C903), THEN SECURE RHR Pump A BOP d) OPEN MO-1 001 .. 16A (B).

e) CLOSE MO-1 00'1-34A (B).

f) SECURE RBCCW Flow to RHR HX by closing MO-4060A AND MO-4060B RBCCW Loop A Inlet Valve to RHR HX E 207A g) IF running, SECURE the second RBCCW Pump; P-202A B, or C; in the applicable loop.

h) RESTORENERIFY the setpoint of TIC-383, RBCCW Loop A Temp Controller, to 70°F.

i) IF no longer required for RBCCWfTBCCW cooling, SECURE additional SSW Pump(s); P-208A, B, C, D, or E.

j) VERIFY that the RHR System is in a normal standby lineup in accordance with Step 7.1 [1]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 2 of 15 Event

Description:

Secure Torus Cooling and place in Standby Lineup per 2.2.19 Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 3 of 15 Event

Description:

Accumulator Trouble that will not clear TS 3.3.D.A.1 Time Position A licant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

1. Trigger Step 2 of the Lesson Plan, Accumulator Trouble Alarm. Step inserts AD08, Accumulator Trouble on rod 46-15.

2. Report that the alarm is due to low gas pressure when asked.

3. After being requested to recharge the accumulator, report that you can only recharge the accumulator to 800 psig.

4. If asked, the affected control rod scram time is within the limits of TS Table 3.3.C-1.

5. If asked, report that there are no other slow rods in the core.

4) Report and respond to alarm C905R-F6, Accumulator Trouble a) Determine the affected control rod (rod 46-15)

RO b) Verify charging header pressure is > 940 psig c) Direct field operator to determine cause and then to recharge the accumulator

5) When notified that the accumulator cannot be charged past 800 psig. declare the accumulator inoperable. (Examiner Note: lAW PNPS 2.2.87, CRD System, an accumulator is to be declared

/NOP if pressure is less than 940 psig) a) Determine that the associated control rod is to be declared "slow" or inoperable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> lAW TS 3.3.D.A.1.

SAO (Examiner Notes: The SRO may solicit input as to the rods scram time, as the rod can only be declared slow if its scram time is within limits.

TS 3.3.D.A.1 also allows declaring the rod INOP within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This would necessitate fully inserting the rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarming within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> lAW TS 3.3.B.1.C) lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 4 of 15 Event

Description:

RBCCW Pump Trip - Tech Spec 3.5.B.3 Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

1. Trigger Step 3 of Lesson Plan, "F" RBCCW Pump Trip. Step trips "F" pump and disables auto start of "E" RBCCW pump.

2. If asked to investigate report that the thermal overload for the breaker is tripped.

BOP 6) Announce and respond to annunciator "RBCCW LOOP B HDR DISCH PRESS LO" (C1 R-A5).

7) Report that "F" RBCCW pump has tripped

8) Start "E" RBCCW pump (Examiner Note: If "E" is started within 90 seconds of the low pressure alarm, the crew may not realize that the auto start circuit has failed.)

Examiner Note: RECIRC PUMP "A" and "8" SEAL COOLING LOW FLOW Alarms will also annunciate when R8CCW flow is lost.

9) Refer to PNPS 2.4.4~!, Loss of RBCCW and determine that no additional procedural actions are required.

SRO 10) Refer to Tech Spec 3.5.B.3 and declare a 7 day LCO due to the "B" RBCCW Loop now being inoperable. (Examiner Note: AN RBCCW subsystem is operable when at least two of the three pumps are operable) lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 4,5 Page 5 of 15 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump Seal Failure - Trip And Isolate the Recirc Pump per PNPS 2.4.22, RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE and PNPS 2.4.17, RECIRC PUMP TRIP.

Insert the RPR Array to exit the Unanalyzed and Exclusion regions of the power to flow map.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

1. Trigger Step 4 of the Lesson Plan, "B" Recirc Pump Seal Failures. Step:

a. Inserts RR13, #1 Seal Failure, ramped to 100% over 1 minute

b. Inserts RR14, #2 Seal Failure, ramped to 100% over 1 minute, with a 3 minute time delay.

11) Announce and respond per ARP C904R-D5, "Pump B Seal Staging Flow Hi".

BOP a) Check seal temperatures on TR -262-19.

b) Recognize PI-26:~-1SB and 17B are equalized c) Determine that #'1 seal has been lost

12) Refer to 2.4.22, Recirc pump Seal Failure and direct monitoring of SRO drywell parameters.

Second Seal Fails

13) Announce and respond per ARP, "Pump B Seal Leakage Hi".

BOP 14) Determine that the #e:~ seal is failing

15) Report slowly rising drywell temperature and pressure Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.4.22 (Examiner Note: The immediate action was to determine the type of failure)

16) Determine that a catastrophic seal failure has occurred

17) Direct that the Recirc Pump be tripped and isolated per section SRO 4.0 of PNPS 2.4.22, Step [1]

1S) Enter and execute 2.4.17, Recirc Pump trip.

19) Trip and isolate Recirc Pump B a) TRIP the affected pump.

b) PLACE CIS for AO-5150B, Seal Wtr Block Vlv, to "CLOSE".

c) PLACE CIS for MO-202-4B, Pump Suct. Vlv, to "CLOSE".

BOP d) WHEN MO-202-4B indicates CLOSED, THEN PLACE CIS for MO-202-5B, Pump Disch Vlv, to "CLOSE".

e) Direct NLO to CL.OSE F-OOSB Recirc Pump Purge Block Valve.

ANY 20) Report lowering of drywell temperature and pressure Applicable Immediate Actions of PNPS 2.4.17 Procedure CAUTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 4,5 Page 6 of 15 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump Seal Failure - Trip And Isolate the Recirc Pump per PNPS 2.4.22, RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE and PNPS 2.4.17, RECIRC PUMP TRIP.

Insert the RPR Array to exit the Unanalyzed and Exclusion regions of the power to flow map.

Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior If the Exclusion Region on the Pilgrim Single Loop Power/Flow Map is entered as a result of this transient, then Operators are required to take immediate actions in accordance with PNPS 2.1.14 Section 7.10 to exit the exclusion Region.

Increasing core flow by starting a tripped Recirculation Pump Is an unacceptable method of exiting the Exclusion Region.

21) IF at any time during single recirculation loop power operation it is determined that the power/flow relationship is outside of the analyzed limits on the Pilgrim Single Loop Power/Flow Map, THEN action shall be initiated within 1S minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits and be within the prescribed limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. (Examiner Note: Core flow will be determined via a subsequent step. Once determined, the immediate action will then apply)

Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.4.17

22) CLOSE MO-202-SB, PUMP DISCH VLV. (already closed via 2.4.22 actions)

23) ESTIMATE total core flow (TCF) by performing the following:

a) OBTAIN AND RECORD total core flow from EPIC points SLCORFLO and RECOS2 (EPIC Group Point Display #22).

BOP/RO b) USE current Reactor power AND PLOT both of the calculated flow values on the Pilgrim Single Loop Power/Flow Map c) COMPARE plotted values to determine forward/reverse flow.

24) Determine and report that reverse flow exists and that the reactor is operating in the Unanalyzed Region of the Power to flow Map.

25) Direct entry into 2.4.165 REACTOR CORE INSTABILITY upon SRO notification that the reactor is operating in the Unanalyzed Region Applicable Immediate Actions of 2.4.165,

26) MONITORS LPRM alarms on C90S.

27) IF either core-wide OR regional instability is verified by the existence of any of the following conditions:

a) Multiple, periodic high or low LPRM alarms (typical < 3 sec)

RO b) Multiple, periodic LPRM oscillations> 20% peak-to-peak (typical < 3 sec) c) Multiple, periodic APRM oscillations> 10% peak-to-peak (typical < 3 sec)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 4,5 Page 7 of 15 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump Seal Failure - Trip And Isolate the Recirc Pump per PNPS 2.4.22, RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE and PNPS 2.4.17, RECIRC PUMP TRIP.

Insert the RPR Array to exit the Unanalyzed and Exclusion regions of the power to flow map.

Position A licant's Actions or Behavior

28) THEN MANUALLY SCRAM the Reactor AND PERFORM PNPS 2.1.6, "Reactor Scram".

29) ENSURE an Operator is assigned the responsibility for monitoring for core thermal-hydraulic instability.

SRO 30) Direct exiting of the Unanalyzed and Exclusion Regions by Inserting control rods in accordance with Section 7.9 of PNPS 2.1.14 Reactivity Manipulation - RPR Array Insertion

31) Exit the Unanalyzed and Exclusion Regions as follows:

a) VERIFY/REDUCE the total calculated core flow is less than 43 Mlb/hr.

b) INSERT control rods using the RPR array to exit the Exclusion Region AND be within the SLO analyzed area on the Pilgrim SinglEl Loop Power/Flow Map.

Note: the following steps are contained in PNPS 9.13, Attachment 8 PROCEDURE CAUTIONS

• DO NOT exit from any step in RPR array without inserting all rods in that step unless specific guidance is provided by Reactor Engineering.

• DO NOT deviate from the step sequence specified in the RPR array.

RO

• AVOID reducing core thermal power below 25%

of rated.

PROCEDURE NOTE CRD drive pressure may be increased 50 psid above the normal drive pressure (250 psid) without entering PNPS 2.4.11.1 to expedite control rod insertion.

i) FULLY INSERT control rods listed in Step 1 of RPR Array Sheet in any order using Emergency In continuous rod insertion for each rod.

ii) The C905 Reactor Operator shall verify that control rods in Step 1 of the RPR Array Sheet are fully inserted AND initial in the indicated location.

jji) DETERMINE whether a further Reactor power reduction is required. IF following PNPS 5.3.23, INSERT all steps of the RPR array. (Examiner Note: 5.3.23 is an A TWS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 4,5 Page 8 of 15 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump Seal Failure Trip And Isolate the Recirc Pump per PNPS 2.4.22, RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE and PNPS 2.4.17, RECIRC PUMP TRIP.

Insert the RPR Array to exit the Unanalyzed and Exclusion regions of the power to flow map.

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior response procedure and;s not applicable) iv) REPEAT Steps above for subsequent steps in RPR array until the desired power reduction has been obtained or until directed otherwise by the Shift Manager.

(Examiner Note: A least two steps will be required)

Recirc Pump Trip Follow

• Up Actions - PNPS 2.4.17

32) Direct that core flow be verified or adjusted to within the required SRO band of 27.6 to 35.9 Mlbm/hr

33) WHEN at least 5 minutes have elapsed since the closure of the Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve (MO-202-SA) THEN OPEN the discharge valve to maintain the idle loop suction temperature RO

> 400°F. (Examiner Note: A procedure caution directs the operator to skip this step if the valve was closed to isolate a seal leak and this step should therefore NOT be performed) lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2

• Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 Page 9 of 15 Event

Description:

Second Recirc Pump Trip and manual scram - PNPS 2.4.17 ATWS EOP02, Failure to Scram Position A licant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator: Trigger Step 5 of Lesson Plan, "A" Recirc Pump Trip. Steps 6 and 7 will automatically trigger. These steps:

1. Insert RR07, Recirc Pump "A" Drive Motor Breaker Trip

2. Insert RR27, Core Wide Oscillations, ramped to 100% over 1 minute

3. Delete RR27, Core Wide Oscillations, when RPV level is < -25 inches.

4. Insert RD29, Scram Discharge Volume level at 98% for both East and West SDIVs.

5. Insert TC09, All turbine bypass valves fail closed. with a time delay of 2 minutes.

ANY 34) Recognize and announce "A" Recirc Pump Trip

35) Insert a manual scram (Examiner Note: Immediate Action of PNPS 2.4. 17)

RO 36) Report that APRMs are not downscale and that many rods did not insert.

37) Report power oscillations SRO I 38) Enter EOP01 initially, then exit and Enter EOP-02

39) Place mode switch to shutdown

40) Initiate ARI RO

41) Verify both Recirc pumps are tripped

42) Enter 5.3.23 for control rod insertion.

43) Direct pressure be controlled 900 1050 psig

. 44) Direct RPV level be controlled -20 to + 10 inches (Examiner Note: The control bands above are specified in procedure 5.3.35.2)

SRO

45) Direct that Standby Liquid Control be injected

46) Direct verification of Isolations, ECCS initiations EDG initiation

47) Direct ADS be inhibited

48) Direct bypassing MSIV low water level isolation

49) Set FWLC Master Controller to +5 to control water level in RO specified band.

50) Verify status of isolations, initiations and EDGs. (Group 2, 6 isolations, RBIS and Standby Gas Treatment Start)

51) Inhibit ADS 52} Place PCIS Bypass Switches (4) on panels C915 and C917 in BOP "BYPASS" Position a) Verify Alarm "REACTOR WATER LEVEL LO LO BYPASS" (C905L-F1) is ON.

i

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7 Page 10 of 15 Event

Description:

Second Recirc Pump Trip and manual scram - PNPS 2.4.17 ATWS EOP02, Failure to Scram Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #1: During failure to scram conditions terminate and prevent Injection from all sources (except CRD, RCIC, and SBlC) and lower level to < -25 Inches. Critical Task will be satisfied if there is no unintended Injection prior to level lowering to -25 Inches.

53) Direct all injections to the RPV be stopped and prevented except SRO boron, RCIC and CRD:

54) Direct that level be lowered to less than -25"

55) Terminate Feedwater as follows:

a) CLOSE the Feedwater Regulating Valves AND CLOSE the Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve. (It IS NOT necessary to secure feed and condensate pumps at this time.)

i) FV-642A, Feedwater Regulating Valve "A" RO/BOP ii) FV-642B, Feedwater Regulating Valve liB" iii) HIC-640-20, Startup Reg Flow Control iv) 1st Point Heater Outlet Block Valve MO-3479 v) 1st Point Heater Outlet Block Valve MO-3480

56) Report when level is less than -25"

57) Terminate ECCS as follows:

a) IF HPCI IS NOT running, THEN PLACE the Aux Oil Pump (P 229) in the PULL-TO-LOCK position.

BOP b) PLACE RHR Pumps and Core Spray pumps in the PULL-TO LOCK position. (Examiner Note: Procedure 5.3.35.1 allows leaving RHR pumps in containment control modes provided that they are secured before RPV pressure lowers to the injection pressure - 300 psig)

58) Direct injection be re-established to maintain level < -25 inches SRO using outside the shroud injection systems

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # 8,9 Page 11 of 15

• Event

Description:

Standby Liquid Pump Trip All Turbine Bypass Valves fail closed A licant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #2: Inject SBLC before torus water temperature exceeds the BIIT or in response to core oscillations

59) Inject S9lC as follows:

a) START one SlC System by placing the SlC ACTUATE switch to "SYS A" OR "SYS 9" position at Panel C905.

b) VERIFY the following:

i) Alarm "SQUIB VlV CONTINUITY FAilURE" (C905R-A9) is ON.

ii) SQUIB VALVE CONTINUITY light for the selected system is OFF.

iii) Red STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP A or PUMP 9 motor running light for the selected system is ON.

RO 60) Determine that the selected pump did not start and place SLC ACTUATE switch to alternate position and verify that pump starts i) Verify Reactor Cleanup System isolation, ii) Verify pump discharge pressure on PI-1140-1, INJ HDR PRESS, (Panel C905) is slightly greater than Reactor pressure and reactor power decreasing.

iii) Verify decreasing level on Storage Tank Level indicator

[LI-1140-2 (STOR TK LVL) on Panel C905].

Examiner Note: That SBLC pump that does start will trip after 1 I minute of operation.

61) Report Bypass Valves have failed closed BOP 62) Establish pressure control by taking manual control of SRVs and I stabilizing pressure within prescribed band.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 12 of 15 Event

Description:

ATWAS Follow -up Actions - Control rod insertion and transition to EOP01 Time Position ctions or Behavior Critical Task #3: During failure to scram conditions, insert control rods using one or more methods contained within 5.3.23 and / or EOP-02 to achieve Rx. Shutdown under all conditions. Critical Task will be satisfied If all control rods are inserted prior to the termination of the scenario.

63) Notify Reactor Engineering of the event.

64) Insert control rods per PNPS 5.3.23 as follows:

a) VERIFY RUNNING OR START one CRD Pump.

b) CLOSE 301-25, CRD Charging Water Supply Valve (CRD Mezzanine).

c) BYPASS the Roel Worth Minimizer. (Panel C904, spare key CR-lO)

Procedure CAUTION The combination of Reactor pressure and Drive Water Differential Pressure should not be allowed to exceed 1750 pslg.

RO d) INCREASE Drive Water Differential Pressure to 400 psid by throttling closed MO-302-8, DRIVE WTR PCV (Panel C905).

e) Drive Water Differential Pressure may be increased in 50 psi increments up to a maximum of 600 psid as needed to facilitate rod insertion.

f) RAPIDLY INSERT all steps of the RPR Array using the EMERG. IN switch i) LIMIT the duration of the insert signal for each rod to ::; 2 minutes.

g) WHEN all control rods of the RPR Array have been inserted/attempted inserted, THEN INSERT the remaining control rods .

• lOS Operator:

1. When directed to defeat RPS and ARI, wait 10 minutes then trigger Step 8 of lesson plan, Defeat RPS and ARI.

2. When directed to close the CRD 25 valve, wait 2 minutes and then trigger step 9 of the Lesson Plan, Close the CRD 25 Valve.

RO 65) PERFORM repeated manual Scrams as follows:

a) DEFEATNERIFY DEFEATED RPS and ARllogic trips in accordance with Attachments 1 and 2.

b) IF Reactor pressure is less than 800 pSig, THEN:VERIFY RUNNING OR START one CRD Pump.

AND c) OPEN 301-25, CRD Charging Water Supply Valve (CRD I Mezzanine).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 13 of 15 Event

Description:

ATWAS Follow -up Actions - Control rod insertion and transition to EOP01 Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior d} RESET Scram (Panel C905).

e) VERIFY the Scram is reset:

f) PLACE the AIR DUMP SYSTEM TEST SWITCH to "ISOLATE" (Panel C905).

g) VERIFY alarm "8PVAH PRESSURE LO" (C90SR-F1) clears.

h) PLACE the AIR DUMP SYSTEM TEST SWITCH to "NORM" (Panel C90S). (Examiner Note: It will take - 1 minute for this alarm to clear) i) VERIFY that one of the following conditions exists:

i) "SDIV LEVEL HI" (C905R-D3) is CLEAR.

OR ii} "SDIV EAST NOT DRAINED" (C90SR-G4) AND "SDIV WEST NOT DRAINED" (C90SR-G1) are CLEAR.

(Examiner Note: This will be the condition satisfied)

OR iii) Five minutes have elapsed since the SDIV vent and drain valves were opened.

j) INITIATE a manual Scram.

k) IF control rods move inward, THEN REPEAT Steps until all rods are fully insE~rted control rods do not move inward.

(Examiner Note: It will take 2 to 3 scrams for a/l the rods to insert)

I) Report when all rods have been inserted Additional EOP-02 Actions i 66) When notified that the MSIV low level isolation has been  !

defeated, widen the water level control band to -1S0 inches to

-100 inches SRO

67) Direct that SBLC be secured when report received that all rods have been inserted.

68) Exit EOP-02 and enters EOP-01 69} Direct that scram procedure 2.1.6 be entered.

70} Re-verify isolations and initiations SRO

71) Direct that level be restored to normal range

72) Direct that a plant cooldown be commenced BOP 73) Commence plant cooldown using SRVs or HPCI EOP-03 Actions

74) Report if/when torus water temperature has exceeded the entry ANY condition (80 degrees)

SRO 75) Enter EOP-03

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 14 of 15 Event

Description:

ATWAS Follow -up Actions - Control rod insertion and transition to EOP01 Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

76) Direct that torus cooling be placed in serviced I BOP 77) Place torus cooling in service i The scenario may be terminated at the discretion of the Lead Examiner OR when RPV level has been restored to between + 12 and +45 and a cooldown has been initiated.

Emergency Classification: Site Area Emergency EAL: 2.3.1.3, Reactor power> 3% and boron injection into the RPV intentionally initiated i

NRC Scenario 2 Turnover Sheet Plant Status:

• Reactor Power: 90%

• Reactor power was reduced to 90% last shift for rod pattern adjustments.

• Core flow is 49 Mlbm/hr

• Current Rod Position: Sequence A 1, Step 87, rod 18-43

• RHR Loop "A" was placed in torus cooling mode to support a HPCI surveillance last shift.

Equipment Out * "A" APRM has a faulty power supply and is DOS and Of Service: bypassed. Tracking LCD initiated. All other APRMs are operable.

• "D" RBCCW pump is ODS. All other RBCCW pumps are operable. Tracking LCD initiated.

Directions to the

• Secure torus cooling and restore power to 100% lAW PNPS Shift: 2.1.14, Station Power Changes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

• Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # Page 1 of 17 Event

Description:

Reduce Reactor Power lAW PNPS 2.1.5 and 2.1.14 and lowers power to 75%

Time Position A licant's Actions or Behavior IDS Instructions:

1. Initialize Simulator to IC 14 AND INSERT steps 86 and 85 of the pull sheets. Power should stabilize - 81 %)

2. Verify AGAFs are in spec.

3. Start Lesson Plan NRC Scenario 3 and trigger Step 1, Initial Conditions AND Step 11.

4. Step 1 will:

a. Insert an INOP trip on "APRM A and a trip on "0" RBCCW pump

b. Opens the breaker for MO-1 001-23A

c. Inserts EO-13, Bus A-1 Fails to Transfer

d. Overrides the Reactor Mode Switch to the Run Position.

5. Step 11 will fail RHR Pumps "B" and "0" to auto start.

6. Bypass APRM A, reset RPS and hang tags on bypass switch, RBCCW Pump "0" and MO 1001-23A.

• 7. Verify "A" RWCU pumps in service SRO 1) Brief plant status and direct power be reduced by lowering Recirc pump speed to 43 Mlbm/hr lAW PNPS 2.1.5 and 2.1.14.

2) Lower core flow as follows:

a) To lower Reactor power, PERFORM the following on the selected Recirc Speed Controller SIC-262-025A OR SIC-262 025B:

i) ENSURE the selected Recirc Speed Controller is in MANUAL by observing that an "M" is illuminated to the right of the bar graphs.

ii) ENSURE the RIGHT BAR (Speed Demand) is selected by observing that the dot above the RIGHT BAR is RO illuminated.

iii) MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the down C.. ) push button on the left side of the control pad.

iv) OBSERVE the RIGHT BAR (Speed Demand) indication lowers.

b) CONTINUE TO REPERFORM Steps above until the desired Reactor power or core flow is obtained.

3) Insert control rods as required to achieve - 75% power

4) Report when reactor power is at 75%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event II 2 Page 2 of 17 Event

Description:

Reactor Shutdown Actions at 75% power lAW PNPS 2.1.5, Section F Time Position A licant's Actions or Behavior SRO 5) Direct BOP to lower Speed Load Changer ISW Step PNPS 2.1.5, step [3] (c).

6) When reactor power has been lowered to between 50 and 75%

BOP I lower the Speed Load Changer output to 82%

7) At approximately 75% Reactor power, direct the BOP to CYCLE SRO the RFP recirculation valves AND SECURE one RFP.

8) CYCLE the RFP recirculation valves AND SECURE one RFP as follows:

a) For each of the three RFP Recirc valves:

i) PLACE control switch for the selected RFP A RECIRC VLV into the "OPEN" position AND VERIFY the valve BOP indicates OPEN ii) PLACE control switch for the selected RFP A RECIRC VLV into the "AUTO" position AND VERIFY the valve indicates CLOSED.

b) IF any RFP recirculation valve fails to open, INITIATE a WR and a CR. (Examiner Note: All Recirc valves will open)

BOP 9) PLACES RFP TRIP SEQUENCE, ENABLE selector switch to "OFF" at Panel C2.

BOP 10) REMOVES one Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) from service in accordance with PI\JPS 2.2.96, Attachment 16.

a) RECORD the RFP to be secured:

b) PLACENERIFY the RFP TRIP SEQUENCE ENABLE switch is in the "OFF" position.

c) WHEN total feedwater flow is S 75%, THEN STOP the selected RFP by placing the control switch on Panel C 1 to the "STOP" position:

d) VERIFY motor heater breaker is CLOSED for secured pump (Examiner Note: The operator should contact a field operator to verify this step) e) VERIFY Reactor water level is stable

11) VERIFY on the remaining operating Reactor Feed Pumps Motor Current Indicators amps are normal << 650 amps)

12) VERIFY Auxiliary L.O. Pump for the selected RFP auto-starts:

13) Direct the NLO to perform the following:

a) secure hydrogen injection to the RFP b) AFTER RFP coast down is complete for the selected RFP, THROTTLE the TBCCW outlet valves from the lube oil coolers to maintain temperatures of 90°F to 110°F SRO/BOP 14) Direct Radwaste to REMOVE Condensate Demineralizers from service at the discretion of the SM to maintain a differential

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 3 of 17 Event

Description:

Reactor Shutdown Actions at 75% power lAW PNPS 2.1.5, Section F Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I pressure of approximately 30 to 60.

lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 4 of 17 Event

Description:

Loss of EDG "An Control Power - TS 3.5.F.1 Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

I

1. Trigger step 2 of the Lesson Plan, Loss of EDG "Au Control Power. This step inserts a Crywolf on alarm C3L-B1 and turns off breaker indicating lights on panel C3.

2. When asked to investigate, wait an appropriate amount of time and then Role Playas Electrical maintenance that you've found a blown fuse in the breaker's control power circuit.

15) Report and respond to alarm C3L-B1, "GENERATOR BKR TRIP/INOP" BOP

16) Check breaker indicating lights and determine that the breaker appears to have lost control power.

17) Refer to Tech Specs 3.9.A, 3.9.B and 3.5.F.

18) Declare the "An EDG Inop SRO 19) Determine that the "A" EDG being INOP in conjunction with the "A" Containment Spray Loop results in a 24 hr cold shutdown LCO.

20} Directs Field Operator to investigate locally lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 5 of 17 Event

Description:

RWCU Pump Trip PNPS 2.4.:27, REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Position A licant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

I

1. Trigger Step 3 of the lesson Plan, RWCU Pump Trip. Step inserts CU02, RWCU Pump Trip and a Crywolf on alarm C904RC-A2, RWCU Pumps RBCCW Temp High.

2. If asked to investigate report that the temperaturE! switch, TIS-1291-4BA, for the "An pump seems to have failed, resulting in the pump trip.

21) Report and respond to alarm PUMP RBCCW TEMP HI, C904RC A2.

BOP a) Verify Automatic Actions i) RWCU Pumps trip (P-204A, P-204B)

SRO 22) Enter and direct PNPS 2.4.27, RWCU Malfunctions.  ;

Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.4.27 i (Examiner Note: There are no applicable immediate actions)

23) IF the loss of RWCU is due to a pump trip, THEN PERFORM the following:

BOP a) CLOSE MO-1201-BO.

b) CLOSE MO-1201-5.

c) CLOSE MO-1201-2.

24) WHEN conditions permit. PLACE the RWCU System back into service in accordance with PNPS 2.2.83.

25} NOTIFY Chemistry of the isolation SRO

26) Make preparations to restart the system using standby pump lAW PNPS 2.2.B3, Section 7.2 lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 6 of 17 Event

Description:

Recirc Speed Controller Fails Upscale requires a manual scoop tube lock PNPS 2.4.20, REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM SPEED OR FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

Position A licant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

1. Trigger step 5 of the Lesson Plan, Recirc "An Speed Controller fails Upscale". Step 6 is linked to step 5 and will automatically initiate. These steps.

a. Take local control of Recirc MG set and ramp scoop tube to increase speed and insert RR20, Recirc Pump "An Controller Fails Upscale.

b. When Scoop tube lock is depressed on C904, local control is deleted and speed stabilizes.

2. If directed, take local control of scoop tube and vary MG set speed as directed using remote functions.

27) Report and respond to alarm C904RC-C7, HMG A SPEED DEVIATION HI" a} Observe controller indications and determine that "A" Recirc controller output has failed upscale.

b) Actuate MANUAL scoop tube lockup push button at Panel C904 (Examiner Note: This ARP directed action is also an RO immediate action of PNPS 2.4.20) c) Refer to PNPS 2.4.20 (Examiner Note: PNPS Procedure 2.4.13, UNEXPLAINED RAPID INCREASE IN REACTOR POWER may also be referenced. However there are no additional applicable actions in that procedure that are not also included in PNPS 2.4.20)

Applicable Immediate Actions 01 PNPS 2.4.20

28) IF it is determined that a malfunction in one of the individual pump controllers has occurred, THEN INITIATE a scoop tube lockup by depressing the Manual Scoop Tube Positioner Lockup push button (located on Panel C904) AND REFER TO PNPS 2.4.19, RO "Recirculation Pump MG Set Scoop Tube Lockup".

29) IF the malfunction is severe and could lead to a Reactor Scram, THEN TRIP the malfunctioning Reactor Recirculation Pump AND I REFER TO PNPS 2.4.17, "Recirculation Pump(s) Trip" .

Applicable Immediate Actions 01 PNPS 2.4.20

30) ASSESS operating conditions by plotting power versus core flow on the Pilgrim Power/Flow Map.

SRO/RO 31) IF Reactor power is above MELLLA line, THEN REDUCE power in accordance with PNPS 2.1.14 Section 7.9 until below the MELLLA line.

32) CHECK PRMs on Panel C910 AND PRM recorders on Panel C902 to ensure fuel integrity.

33) IF it is desirable to remove the Control Room signal from the

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 7 of 17 Event

Description:

Recirc Speed Controller Fails Upscale requires a manual scoop tube lock PNPS 2.4.20, REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM SPEED OR FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior scoop tube drive, THEN TURN OFF the power to the scoop tube.

(ON/OFF switch located in amplifier control box U117/U118.)

34} ATTEMPT TO RESTORE the pump speeds within the specified limit.

35) IF Reactor power is > 80%, THEN Recirculation Pump speeds shall be within 8%.

36) IF Reactor power is s 80%, THEN Recirculation Pump speeds shall be within 13%. (Examiner Note: The 8% and 13% limits are admin limits. The Tech Spec limits of LCO 3.6.F.1 below are 10 and 15%)

37) Technical Specifications Section 3.6.F.3 requires compliance within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

38) IF compliance with Recirculation Pump speed limits is NOT restored, THEN the Reactor shall be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

39) Evaluates Tech Spec compliance based on current pump speed mismatch.

Applicable Actions from 2.4.19, RECIRCULATION PUMP MG SET SCOOP TUBE LOCKUP (Examiner Note: At any point the Lead Examiner may move on to the next event)

40) ENSURE loop flows are balanced in accordance with PNPS 2.1.15 Attachment 1 Daily Log Test #17 (#17 A, #17B, #17C, and

1. 17D).

SRO/BOP 41) IF required, ADJUST the speed of the unaffected Recirc Pump.

42) IF required, MANUAL.LY ADJUST the speed of the locked up Recirc Pump in accordance with PNPS 2.2.84 Section 7.9. ,

(Examiner Note: The expected response is to manually lower the I speed of Recirc MG set 'WI Manual Operation of "A" Reclrc MG Set Scoop Tube (PNPS 2.2.84 Section 7.9)

BOP 43) To adjust Reactor power, PERFORM the following:

a) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN communications with the a licensed operator at the MG set b) Direct the Licensed Operator to adjust the motor generator speed by slowly rotating the hand crank as follows:

i} Clockwise to lower speed ii} Counterclockwise to raise speed c} CONTINUE Recirculation Pump speed changes until the I desired flow conditions are established.

lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 II Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Page 8 of 17 Event

Description:

SAV 3B leaks then fails open Manual scram. PNPS 2.4.29, SOSRV 4KV bus A-1 fails to fast transfer Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Operator:

1. Trigger step 7 of the Lesson Plan, SRV Leaks then Fails Open. Step 8, SRV Tail Pipe Failure, is linked and will automatically initiate. These steps:

a. Insert MS13, SRV 3B Leak

b. Insert MS14, SRV 3B Fails Open after a 2 minute time delay

c. Deletes SRV Fail Open when RPV pressure lowers to 800 psig and inserts SRV leak at max severity to simulate partial re-closure as pressure lowers.

d. Inserts PC22, SRV Tail Pipe Break when RPV pressure is < 900 psig

44) Report and respond to alarm C903L-A2, RELIEF/SFTY VALVE LEAKING a) Check tail pipe temperatures and determine that SRV3B is leaking BOP

45) Report and respond to alarm C903L-B2, RELIEF/SFTY VALVE OPEN a) Determine that SRV 3B has now failed open by observing Acoustic Monitor indication.

SRO 46) Enter and execute PNPS 2.4.29, Stuck Open SRV.

Applicable Immediate Actions of PNPS 2.4.29

47) IF ANY of the following conditions occur, THEN MANUALLY SCRAM the Reactor AND CONCURRENTLY PERFORM PNPS 2.1.6, "Reactor Scram".

a) Torus bulk temperature reaches 110°F.

OR SRO b) The safety relief valve remains open for longer than 5 minutes.

OR c} It has been determined that the safety relief valve cannot be closed.

Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.4.29 SRO/RO 148) REDUCE Reactor power in accordance with PNPS 2.1.14 Section 7.11. (Examiner Note: Due to status of '}!\" Recirc MG set,

• limited options are available to reduce power other then inserting the RPR array)

49) Reduce power as directed.

I Examiner Note: Recirc may need to be reduced to 43 mlb/hr prior to rod insertion i

! lOS Operator:

i 1. When I if directed to attempt to close the SRV from the ASP, wait an appropriate amount of

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event It 6, 7 Page 9 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV 3B leaks then fails open Manual scram. PNPS 2.4.29, SOSRV 4KV bus A-1 fails to fast transfer Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior time and then trigger step 9 of the lesson plan, Attempt to close SRV 38 from ASP. Step places ASP control switch to Close.

2. If asked to return ASP to normal, trigger Step 10 of the lesson plan. Step places ASP switch back to Remote.

Procedure Note Steps below may be performed as necessary and in any order based on the type of malfunction that has occurred.

50} Malfunction of SRV:

a) ATTEMPT TO CLOSE the affected SRV{s) from its Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP) by directing NLO to place the ASP BOP control switch in the CLOSE position.

b) Determine that the valve did not close.

c) Direct the NLO to return the ASP control switch to the REMOTE position.

d) CHECK "Drywell Equipment Supply Pressure" indication on Panel C7 and determine pressure is normal e) Report EOP03 entry condition when Torus Temperature exceeds 80 degrees.

Critical Task #1: Scram the reactor before torus water temperature exceeds 110 degrees following SOSRV.

51) When the SRV cannot be closed direct the reactor be manually SRO scrammed.

52) Enter procedure 2.1.6, Reactor Scram and perform immediate actions Procedure NOTE While It is the intent of the Procedure to outline the many steps required following a Scram, the sequence suggested for steps may be altered to suit existing plant conditions.

53) At Panel C90S, DEPRESS both manual Reactor Scram push buttons.

RO

54) PLACE Reactor Mode switch in "SHUTDOWN".

55) VERIFY AND ANNOUNCE the status of APRM downscales.

56) VERIFY all control rods are fully inserted. (Evaluator Note: The simulator randomly selects a few control rods to go "beyond full in" resulting in a foss of position indication. Plant Process computer may take up to 3 minutes before an "ALL RODS In" indication is received.)

57) IF any control rod is NOT fully inserted, THEN INSERT control rods using methods detailed in PNPS 5.3.23, "Alternate Rod

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event It 6, 7 Page 10 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV 3B leaks then fails open Manual scram. PNPS 2.4.29, SOSRV 4KV bus A-1 fails to fast transfer Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Insertion".

58) IF any control rod position cannot be determined AND the Reactor is shutdown, THEN EVALUATE "CALLRODS" EPIC indications AND DISPATCH an Operator to close 301-25, CRD Charging Water Supply Valve.

59) IF any control rod position cannot be determined AND the Reactor is shutdown, THEN SELECT each control rod not at position "00" AND ATTEMPT TO NOTCH INSERT the control rod to determine whether the control rod will settle at position "00".

60) In order to maintain availability of the Main Condenser, HPCI, and RCIC, PERFORM the following:

a) CLOSE the Feedwater Regulating Valves and the Feedwater HP Block Valves (Panel C905):

b) FC-642A, FLOW CONTROL VLV A c) FC-642B, FLOW CONTROL VLV B d) MO-3479, 1ST PT HTR OUTLET BLOCK VALVE e) MO-3480, 1ST PT HTR OUTLET BLOCK VALVE f) IF Reactor water level rises rapidly, THEN SECURE Reactor Feed Pumps as required.

61) Report when EOP-01, RPV Control low RPV Level entry condition << +12 inches) is exceeded.

Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.1.6, Reactor Scram

62) RESTORE AND MAINTAIN RPV water level between +12 inches and +45 inches using Condensate/feedwater

63) WHEN conditions allow, THEN REDUCE the number of operating Reactor Feed Pumps and Condensate Pumps to one each.

64) IF water level is increasing rapidly, THEN SECURE the remaining feed pump.

65) With Reactor power < 10%, OPEN the Minimum Flow Recirc Valve for the operating RFP.

RO 66) IF required to control RPV level, THEN REOPEN the following valves:

a) FC-642A, FLOW CONTROL VLV A b) FC-642B, FLOW CONTROL VLV B c) MO-3479, 1ST PT HTR OUTLET BLOCK VALVE d) MO-3480, 1ST PT HTR OUTLET BLOCK VALVE

67) RESTORE AND MAINTAIN RPV water level in the normal range using HIC-640-20, STARTUP REG FLOW CONTROL (Panel C905).

68) IF required for RPV level control, THEN CLOSE the CRD S:tstem I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario II 3 Event # 6, 7 Page 11 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV 3B leaks then fails open Manual scram. PNPS 2.4.29, SOSRV 4KV bus A-1 fails to fast transfer Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior 301-25 valve, Charging Water Supply Valve.

RO/BOP 69) VERIFY OR MANUALLY TRIP the Turbine.

70) VERIFY OR MANUALLY PLACE Reactor Recirc Pumps at minimum speed.

a) Determine that t~le "A" recirc pump is locked and that speed is above the required minimum speed and trip the MG set Actions for 4KV Bus A-1 Failing to Fast Transfer BOP 71) Evaluate whether all house loads transferred to the Startup Transformer.

72) Determine that A-1 is de-energized.

73) Observe alarms and indications and determine that the bus failed to fast transfer.

74) Manually transfer A-1 to the Startup Transformer as follows:

a} PLACE the Startup Transformer synchronizing switch for Bus A-1 to "ON".

b} CLOSE IN Startup Transformer Breaker A 104.

c} OBSERVE Startup Transformer Breaker A 104 is closed-in and feeding Bus A-1 d) PLACE the Startup Transformer synchronizing switch for Bus A-1 to "OFF".

EOP-01, RPV Control Actions SRO 75) Enter EOP-01, RPV Control and a} Direct entry into scram procedure.

b} Direct pressure be controlled using available pressure control systems between 900 and 1050 psig c) Direct that isolations and initiations be verified.

d) Direct level be controlled using available systems between

+12 and +45 inches.

ANY 76} Report when MSIVs !~o closed SRO 77) Direct Pressure control via alternate pressure control systems SRO 78) Determine that an aggressive cool down is required lAW PNPS 5.3.25.2, OPERATIONS EMERGENCY AND TRANSIENT RESPONSE STRATEGIES, Attachment 2 79} Direct a new reactor pressure band of 500 to 1050 psig i

I 80) Expand the water level control band to -20 to +45" band.

81) Open one relief valve to augment pressure reduction BOP I 82} Stabilize pressure between 450 to 550 psig I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 6,7 Page 12 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV 3B leaks then fails open Manual scram. PNPS 2.4.29, SOSRV 4KV bus A-1 fails to fast transfer Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 i Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 8,9 Page 13 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV Tail Pipe Leak -Torus Bottom Pressure exceeds the Pressure Suppression Pressure. Emergency Depressurize RHR Pumps "B" and "0" fail to auto start.

A licant's Actions or Behavior (Examiner Note: The tail pipe failure will automatically initiate when RPV pressure lowers to < 900 psig)

83) Report rising drywell pressure and temperature ANY 84) Report when entry EOP entry conditions are exceeded (drywell pressure> 2.2. psig, drywell temperature> 150 degrees) i

85) Enter EOP-03, Primary Containment Control SRO 86) Re-enter EOP-01, RPV Control

87) Direct isolations and initiations and EDG status be verified

88) Verify ECCS and EDG status a) Determine that RHR pumps "B" and "D" failed to auto start and manually starts both pumps BOP b) Report that both EDGs, Core Spray and RHR LOOP "An i Pumps started and that a manual start of Loop "8" pumps was performed.

89) Report HPCI is injecting SRO 90) Direct that HPCI injection be secured.

EOP-03, PC Control Actions

91) Direct that drywell cooling be maximized

92) Update crew that EOP Caution 1 regarding RPV Level Instrumentation is applicable.

SRO 93) Before torus bottom pressure exceeds 16 psig, direct that torus sprays be initiated.

i 94} When operators become available direct that H2/02 analyzers be placed in service.

95) Initiate Torus Spray as follows:

PROCEDURE NOTES

• Torus Spray may be Initiated before closing MO-1001 16A (B), RHR HX A (B) Bypass Valve.

• 5000 GPM on FI-104Q-11A (B) and/or FI-104Q-12A (B) is BOP the maximum RHR loop flow in Torus Spray mode to allow for sufficient spray header pressure and flow.

• Torus Spray is established with only one loop of RHR.

a) IF only the LPCI initiation signal is present, THEN PLACE the LPCI OVERRIDE switch to "MANUAL OVERRIDE".

i bJ OPEN MO-1001-34A (B), Torus Cooling/Spray Block Valve,

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 8,9 Page 14 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV Tail Pipe Leak -Torus Bottom Pressure exceeds the Pressure Suppression Pressure. Emergency Depressurize RHR Pumps "B" and "0" fail to auto start.

Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior i in the RHR loop selected for operation.

c) STARTNERIFY STARTED one RHR Pump.

d) IF no pump discharge flow path exists, THEN OPEN MO 1001-18A (B), RHR Pumps Loop A (B) Minimum Flow Valve, for the selected loop.

e) OPEN MO-1001**37A (B), Torus Spray Valve, in the RHR loop with the operating pump.

f) SLOWLY OPEN MO-1001-36A (B). Torus Cooling Valve, AND INCREASE flow to 4800 to 5000 GPM on FI-1040-11A (B) and/or FI-1040-12A (B).

g) CLOSE MO-1001-18A (B), Pump Min Flow Valve.

96) WHEN time permits, VERIFY/ALIGN the RHR System in the Maximize Torus Cooling mode

97) Maximize drywell cooling as follows:

PROCEDURE NOTE The following three steps may be performed in any order.

BOPtRO a) STARTNERIFY STARTED all available Drywell cooling fans on Panel C61 . (Examiner Note: This is a local panel) b) FULLY OPEN all Drywell cooler RBCCW valves by rotating all pots on Panel C7 to the full clockwise position.

c) MAXIMIZE RBCCW cooling in accordance with Attachment 1 of 5.3.35, TRANSIENT RESPONSE HARDCARDS FOR OPERATING CREWS, Attachment 12

98) Monitor rising Torus bottom pressure and Drywell SRO Temperature I ANY 99) Report when torus bottom pressure exceeds 16 psig.

Critical Task #2: Initiate drywell sprays when torus bottom pressure exceeds 16 psig or before drywell temperature reaches 280 degrees.

I 100) Verify that Torus Level is < 180 inches 101 ) Verify that drywell temperature and pressure are within the SRO Drywell Spray Initiation Limit 102) Verify / Direct that Recirc pumps be tripped 103) Direct that Drywell Sprays be initiated 104} Spray the drywell as follows:

BOP PROCEDURE NOTES

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

! Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event II 8,9 Page 15 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV Tail Pipe Leak -Torus Bottom Pressure exceeds the Pressure Suppression Pressure. Emergency Depressurize RHR Pumps "B" and "0" fail to auto start.

Time A licant's Actions or Behavior

• Drywell Spray may be initiated before closing MO-1001- i I 16A (B), RHR HX A (B) Bypass Valve.

• 5000 GPM on FI-1040-11A (B) and FI-1040-12A (B) is the maximum RHR loop flow in Drywell Spray mode to allow for sufficient spray header pressure and flow.

• If available, the Drywell is to be sprayed with both loops i of RHR.

I a) IF running, THEN TRIP the Reactor Recirc Pump(s) by opening the associated pump drive motor breaker control switch(es) at Panel C904.

BOP b) IF it is necessary to override LPCI initiation signals, THEN PERFORM the following:

c) IF only the LPCI initiation Signal is present, THEN PLACE the i

LPCI OVERRIDE switch to "MANUAL OVERRIDE".

BOP d) OPENNERIFY OPEN MO-1001-34B, Torus Cooling/Spray Block Vlv.

e) STARTNERIFY STARTED one RHR Pump in each loop.

(Examiner Note: Due to initial conditions of scenario, Loop "8" is the only loop available) f) IF no pump discharge flow path exists, THEN OPEN MO 1001-18B, RHR Pumps Loop B Minimum Flow Valve.

g) FULLY OPEN both Drywell Spray valves in RHR loop B:

i) MO-1001-23B, RHR Loop B Upper Drywell Spray Valve

1. 1 AND ii) MO-1 001-268, RHR Loop B Upper Drywell Spray Valve I #2 h) IF Torus Cooling has NOT been previously established, I THEN ESTABLISH a loop flow of 4800 to 5000 GPM on FI 1040-11 Band/or FI-1 040-12B by slowly opening MO-1 001 36B, Torus Cooling Valve.

i) CLOSE MO-1 001-18B, Pump Min Flow Valve.

105) WHEN time permits, VERIFY/ALIGN the RHR System in the Maximize Torus Cooling Mode i Emergency Depressurization - EOP-17 I Any 106) Report torus bottom pressure continuing to rise.

Critical Task #3: Emergency Depressurize the RPV when torus bottom pressure cannot be I

maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure.

SRO 107) Determine that Torus Bottom Pressure cannot be maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure and that

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 3 Event # 8,9 Page 16 of 17 Event

Description:

SRV Tail Pipe Leak -Torus Bottom Pressure exceeds the Pressure Suppression Pressure. Emergency Depressurize RHR Pumps "B" and "0" fail to auto start.

Position A licant's Actions or Behavior Emergency RPV Depressurization is required.

I I 108) Enter EOP-17 Procedure Caution i

RPV pressure below 300 psig with a high drywell pressure ECCS initiation may cause rapid injection from Core Spray and RHR pumps 109) Verify that torus level is > 50 inches 110) Direct that all SRVs be opened i

111 ) Open all SRVs BOP 112) Report all four SRVs are open Follow-up Actions I

RO 113) Maintain RPV level by increasing injection flow as required I SRO/BOP 114) If containment spray secured to prevent uncontrolled injection from RHR, re-establish containment spray.

The scenario may be terminated at the discretion of the Lead Examiner OR when the RPV has been depressurized, RPV level stabilized and Torus Bottom Pressure is lowering.

Emergency Classification: Site Area Emergency EAL 3.4.1.3: Torus bottom pressure cannot be maintained below the "Pressure Suppression i Pressure" (PSP} EOP Figure 6.

NRC Scenario 3 Turnover Sheet Plant Status:

• Reactor Power: 90%

• Tech Spec required shutdown is in progress following a catastrophic failure of MO-1 001-23A, RHR Loop A, Upper Drywell Spray Valve #1, which cannot be repaired within the specified LCO time due unavailability of replacement parts.

• Currently on step [3] (b) of PNPS 2.1.5 Section F, Controlled Shutdown Without Manual Scram

• Core flow: 57 Mlbm/hr

• Current rod position: Step 85, rod 18-43 Equipment Out * "A" APRM has a faulty power supply and is OOS and Of Service: bypassed. Tracking LCO initiated. All other APRMs are operable.

• "0" RBCCW pump is OOS. All other RBCCW pumps are operable. Trackin~l LCO initiated.

• "A" Containment Spray Loop Inoperable. Day 6 of 7 day LCO 3.5.B.2 Directions to the

• Continue the plant shutdown lAW PNPS 2.1.5, Section F.

Shift: Step [3] is in progress.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # Page 1 of 19

! Event

Description:

HPCI placed in Standby Lineup.

Time Position A licant's Actions or Behavior lOS Instructions:

1. Initialize Simulator to IC 14

2. Insert Rod Sequence steps 86 and 85 to lower power to - 89%

3. Verify AGAFs

4. Start Lesson Plan NRC Scenario 5 and trigger Step 1, Initial Conditions. Step 2 is linked to step 1 and will automatically initiate. These steps will:

a. Insert a trip of RBCCW pump D and fail APRM "A".

b. Insert RH04, LPCI Injection Valve fails to open

c. Generate a momentarily HPCllsolation.

d. Prevent the HPCI Steam Admission Valve - M02301-3 from automaticallyopening.

5. After the Initial Condition Step has been triggered, Override the "HPCI Turbine Area Elev -17 Ft Temp Hi" indicating light on panel C921 to FALSE.

6. Bypass APRM, "A", reset % scram, place "D" RBCCW pump in PTL, and hang tags.

7. Verify that HPCI steam line pressure has decayed to zero before commencing scenario.

8. Verify that "B" CRD and "B" TBCCW pumps are in service.

9. "B" side cooling fans in service SRO 1} Brief plant status and direct HPCI be placed in a Standby Lineup.

2} Refer to 2.2.125.1 RESET OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BOP CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONS, Attachment 4 Procedure Note It is desirable to reset Channel A prior to resetting Channel B tor verifying both channels tripped on the isolation signal.

3) WHEN the cause of the isolation has been corrected, THEN:

a} DEPRESS the PCIS GRP IV ISOL CHANNEL A reset push button on Panel C903 AND WATCH the white light go off.

b) DEPRESS the PCIS GRP IV ISOL CHANNEL B reset push button on Panel C903 AND WATCH the white light go off.

4) The isolation is now reset. REFER TO PNPS 2.2.21 for restoring BOP HPCI System to service.

5) WHENEVER HPCI System has been isolated from closure of the steam isolation valves, MO-2301-4 and/or MO-2301-5, FOLLOW this procedure for reopening the steam valves to avoid water hammer.

a) VERIFY both MO-2301-4 and MO-2301-5 are CLOSED.

b) OPEN MO-2301-5, Outboard Steam Isolation Valve.

Procedure CAUTION During the execution of the following step, excessive opening of MO-2301-4 without adequate steam line pressurization may result in a HPCI high steam supply flow

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # Page 2 of 19 Event

Description:

HPCI placed in Standby Lineup.

I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior condition that could Initiate a PCIS Group IV Isolation (ESF actuation). Prior to repeating jog opening attempts, ensure sufficient time is provided to adequately monitor for a pressure response. Additionally, experience has shown that this evolution becomes Increasingly sensitive at lower Reactor pressures. (PR99.9539) c) CRACK OPEN MO-2301-4, Inboard Steam Isolation Valve.

d) OBSERVE HPCI steam line pressure at PI-2340-4 on Panel C903.

e) ALLOW steam line pressure to slowly increase to Reactor pressure.

f) FULLY OPEN MO-2301-4.

i lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 3 of 19 Event

Description:

ATWS I RPT Level Transmitter Failure. Tech Spec Table 3.2.G Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

! IDS Instructions:

1. Trigger Step 3 of Lesson Plan, LT -263-120D Fails Upscale. Step inserts RX18, LT-120D fails upscale.

• 2. When asked to investigate report that the meter for LlS-263-121 D is full upscale and its gross failure light is lit.

RO 6) Announce and respond to alarm Division Two Panel Trouble, C90SL-B5 (Examiner Note: Both of the below actions are done locally) a} Check Division 2 trip units (Panel C2278) for gross failure or trip units out of file b) Check the Division 2 power supplies

7) Refer to Tech Spec 3.2.G and associated Table 3.2.G and SRO determine that ATWS Division Two is inoperable and that a 14 day Hot Shutdown LCD is required.

lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 3,4 Page 4 of 19 Event

Description:

Single MSIV Closure - PNPS 2.4.30 and 2.2.92 Power reduction to < 75%

Time I Position !I Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Instructions:

1. Trigger step 4 of the Lesson Plan, MSIV Closure. This step overrides the MSIV Test pushbutton and then overrides the "S" MSIV Outboard control switch to the closed position.

8) Announce and respond to alarm "MSIV NOT FULL OPEN" C905R-D2 RO

9) Confirm that US" Outboard MSIV is going closed by observing lowering steam flow in B main steam line.

SRO 10) Enters PNPS 2.4.30, MSIV Closure Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.4.30 (Examiner Note: There are no applicable immediate actions)

11) IF MSIV closure results in THREE Main Steam Lines still in operation; AND A Reactor Scram has not occurred; SRO AND Reactor power is above 75%;

THEN REDUCE Reactor power to s 75% power in accordance with PNPS 2.1.14 Sections 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11 as required. I

12) Lower power to 75% by reducing Recirc Pump Speed to 43 Mlbm/hr.

RO

13) If 75% cannot be obtained before reaching 43Mlm/hr insert steps of RPR as required to achieve 75% or as directed by SRO

14) CHECK Process Radiation Monitors on Panels C910 and C902 for indications of fuel failure caused by power/pressure spiking.

15) CHECK power and pressure indications for peak values during the transient.

16) DETERMINE which MSIV(s) have closed.

a) PLACE the MSIV control switches to "CLOSE" for those SOP MSIVs which indicate closed.

b) DETERMINE cause of the closure.

17) IF operation of the Main Turbine for longer than 15 minutes with one or more closed MSIVs is expected, THEN REFER TO PNPS 2.2.92, "Main Steam Line Isolation and Turbine Sypass Valves,"

Section 7.2 (Operation With One Or More MSIVs Closed and Main Steam To The Main Turbine).

Actions for Continued Operation with 3 Main Steam Lines BOP 1 18) CLOSENERIFY CLOSED the following Main Steam Line Drain

. Valves:

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario /I 5 Event II 3,4 Page 5 of 19 Event

Description:

Single MSIV Closure - PNPS 2.4.30 and 2.2.92 Power reduction to < 75%

A licant's Actions or Behavior a) MO-220-1, MSIV DRNS INBD ISOL VLV b) MO-220-2, MSIV DRNS OUTBD ISOL VLV c) MO-220-4, MAIN STEAM LINE DRN TO CON DR

19) OPENNERIFY OPEN MO-220-3, MAIN STEAM LINE DRN VLV.

Procedure NOTE Main Steam Line low point drain temperature (TE-3604) is monitored on the Kaye temperature computer frlSU-812S)

(Secondary Plant Performance Menu).

Procedure CAUTION Fully opening the Main Steam Drain to the Condenser may affect Condenser vacuum. Closely monitor Condenser vacuum when opening MO-220-4 (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN TOCONDR).

20) VERY SLOWLY POSITION the MO-220-4 (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN TO CONDR) valve to establish and maintain a Main Steam Line low point drain temperature (TE-3604) as close to BUT NOT GREATER THAN 520°F. [Calc M9S3]

21) CONTINUE TO OPERATE with MO-220-3 (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN VLV) OPEN AND MO-220-4 (MAIN STEAM LINE DRN TO CON DR) THROTTLED until the closed MSIV can be returned to service.

lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

CRD Flow Control Valve Fails Open - PNPS 2.4.11.1 Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Instructions:

1. Trigger step S of the Lesson Plan, CRD Flow Control Valve Fails Open. Step inserts RD01 to fail the CRD flow control valve full open.

2. When directed to shift flow control valves, trigger step 10 of the Lesson Plan, Shift CRD Flow Control Valves.

RO 22) Report and respond to alarm C90SL-F5, Drive Filter Dp High a) Evaluate CRD system parameters and indications and determine that the CRD Flow Control Valve has failed open SRO 23) Enters PNPS 2.4.11.1 CRD System Malfunctions Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.4.11.1 (Examiner Note: There are no applicable immediate actions)

24) Failure of in-service flow control valve (A or 8) or E/P positioned:

a) PLACE the CRD FLOW CONTROL controller on Panel C905 to "MANUAL" RO b) AND, using the potentiometer, POSITION the controller to full "CLOSED".

2S) Direct operator at local flow control station to shift flow control valves

26) Place standby flow control valve in service after receiving report that local actions have been completed.

a) At Panel C90S, SLOWLY RAISE CRD flow controller to a setpoint of 50 GPM; VERIFY the flow increase.

b) At Panel C90S, CHECK DRIVE WTR and COOLING WTR DIFF PRESS Indicators, dPI-340-4 and dPI-340-5, AND, IF needed, ADJUST pressures.

c) RETURN flow controller (FIC-340-1) on Panel C90S to "AUTO".

d) IF valve jams causing excessive flow. THEN ENSURE that cooling water does not cause rods to drift in AND THROTTLE the flow locally at the valve station.

e) At Panel C90S, CHECK DRIVE WTR and COOLING WTR DIFF PRESS Indicators,dPI-340-4 and dPI-340-S, AND ADJUST pressures by ad'usting MO-302-8, DRIVE WTR PCV.

lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Bus A PNPS 2.4.A5, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL BUS A5 Position A licant's Actions or Behavior lOS Instructions:

1. Trigger step 6 of Lesson Plan, Loss of A-5. Step inserts ED07, AS bus failure. I

2. When directed to cross tie RBCCW, wait an appropriate amount of time and then trigger step i 7 of Lesson Plan, Cross Tie RBCCW.

i

3. If directed to investigate report that AS is faulted and that the bus lockout has tripped.

27) Report and respond to alarm "A-5 LOCKOUT" C3LC-A 1 BOP a) Confirm that AS is de-energized SRO 28) Enter and execute PNPS 2.4.AS Applicable Immediate Actions of PNPS 2.4.A5

29) VERIFY STARTED OR START "B" TBCCW Pump. I i

a) THROTTLE MO-3805 as necessary to provide cooling water BOP to TBCCW E-122B heat exchanger.

30) CROSS CONNECT RBCCW loops in accordance with PNPS 2.4.42, "Loss of RBCCW".

i Actions for Cross Connecting RBCCW (PNPS 2.4.42, Attachment 6)

31) PLACENERIFY sufficient RBCCW Pumps in service in the active loop.

32) SECURE any running RBCCW Pump(s) in the idle loop from Panel C1.

33) PLACE all three control switches for RBCCW Pumps in the idle loop to "PULL-TO-LOCK" at Panel C1.

34) Direct reactor building operator to cross connect RBCCW, "B" Loop supplying. (entails cloSing idle loop Surge Tank Outlet Valve, and opening suction and discharge cross connect valves)

BOP 35) For the idle RBCCW loop, PERFORM the following:

a) OPENNERIFY OPEN MO-4083, HX B RBCCW BYP VLV.

b) PLACE TIC-3836, LOOP A TEMP CONT, to "MANUAL" at Panel C1.

c) FULLY OPEN the HEAT EXCH. OUTLET TEMP CONTROL valve for the idle loop.

36) MONITOR eqUipment temperatures to ensure they remain within operational limits.

37) MAINTAIN the RBCCW heat exchanger outlet temperature less than or equal to 80°F.

38) ENTER appropriate LCO for RBCCW System inoperable (Tech  !

SRO Spec 3.S.B.3 24 Hr Cold SID LCO due to cross-connect valves being open).

Applicable Subsequent Actions of PNPS 2.4.A5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 8 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Bus A-5 PNPS 2.4.AS, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL BUS A5

! Time J Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF Drywell pressure approaches the Scram setpoint, THEN SRO MANUALLY SCRAM the Reactor AND CONCURRENTLY EXECUTE PNPS 2.1.6, "Reactor Scram".

Actions to Start the Standby CRO Pump lAW PNPS 2.4.4

39) Transfer CRD Flow Controller (FIC-340-1) to Manual and close the Flow Control Valve by rotating the manual potentiometer counterclockwise.

40) Verify the in service Flow Control valve is closed by observing the Green C905 valve position light for FLOW CONTROL VLV A

41) Start the standby CRD pump

42) When the CRD pump discharge pressure and pump amps stabilize, THEN balance the deviation meter on the CRD Flow Controller by slowly rotating the manual potentiometer clockwise while observing flow

43) When the deviation is in the "Green Band" on the CRD flow controller, THEN transferthe CRD flow controller to "AUTO" Recirc Pump trip Actions lAW PNPS 2.4.17

44) RESPOND to the "A" Recire Pump trip in accordance with PNPS 2.4.17.

Procedure CAUTIONS If the Exclusion Region on the Pilgrim Single Loop Power/Flow Map Is entered as a result of this transient, then Operators are required to take immediate actions in accordance with PNPS 2.1.14 Section 7.10 to exit the Exclusion Region.

Increasing core flow by starting a tripped Recirculation Pump is an unacceptable method of exiting the Exclusion Region.

RO a} CLOSES MO-202-SA, PUMP DISCH VLV.

b) Determine core flow i) Determine that reverse flow exists and that the reactor is operating in the Exclusion Region of the Single Loop Power to Flow Map c) Enter PNPS 2.4.16S, Reactor Core Instability, AND PERFORM CONCURRENTLY.

d) IF required to exit the Exclusion Region or be within the SLO analyzed limits on the Pilgrim Single Loop Power/Flow Map, THEN PERFORM the following:

i) VERIFY/REDUCE the total calculated core flow is less I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 9 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Bus A-5 PNPS 2.4.A5, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL BUS A5 Time A licant's Actions or Behavior than 43 Mlb/hl I ii) INSERT control rods using the RPR array in accordance with the requirements of PNPS 2.1.14 Section 7.9 to exit the Exclusion Region AND be within the SLO analyzed area on the Pilgrim Single Loop Power/Flow Map.

e) Continue on with remaining actions of Recirc Pump Trip procedure.

i) Re-open MO-202-5A, PUMP DISCH VLV after five minutes. I

45) VERIFY Y1 is powered from B10 AND ENTER PNPS 5.3.7 for a BOP momentary (or sustained) loss of Y1.

46) RESPOND to the loss of Feedwater Heating in accordance with PNPS 2.4.150.

a) When a feedwater temperature reduction of ~ 5°F is observed, THEN REDUCE Reactor power in accordance with PNPS 2.1.14 Sections 7.10 and 7.11 until any of the following SRO conditions exists: [NRC GL 94-02 (BWROG-94078)]

b) Reactor power is 25% of rated thermal power below its pre-transient level. (Examiner Note: 25% power reduction will be achieved via the Recirc Pump trip and the actions taken in response.)

Procedure NOTE Steps below may be performed in any order at the discretion of the SM/CRS.

47) FULLY OPEN RBCCW flow to all Drywell coolers at Panel C7.

48) STARTNERIFY STARTED all "B" side Drywell coolers at Reactor Building HVAC Panel C61.

BOP 49) To ensure the availability of the Salt Service Water System:

a) OPENNERIFY OPEN MO-3813, SSW XOVER Isolation Valve.

b) CLOSENERIFY CLOSED MO-3808, SSW XOVER Isolation Valve.

50) INITIATE a full RBIS isolation by placing the Panel C7 RBIS TEST LOGIC/TRIP keylock switches for Channels A and B to "ISOLATE".

a) AFTER the isolation, RETURN the switches to "STANDBY",

51) MAXIMIZE portable ventilation to the Main Steam Tunnel.

(Examiner Note: This action should be directed to an equipment SRO operator as the actions are done locally) a) IF Main Steam Tunnel temperature approaches 160 degrees

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES~D~2 OpTest No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 10 of 19

. Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Bus A PNPS 2.4.A5, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL BUS A5 Time I: Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior F, THEN MANUALLY SCRAM the Reactor AND I CONCURRENTLY EXECUTE PNPS 2.1.6, "Reactor Scram".

52) SECURE all Reactor Building Supply and Exhaust fans at BOP Reactor Building HVAC Panel C61 (Local Action) i

53) VERIFY Bus B6 has transferred to B2.

54) ENTER PNPS 5.3.18, "Loss of 120V AC Safeguard Buses Y3 and Y31 ", AND CONCURRENTLY EXECUTE with this Procedure.

SRO I

• 55) ENTER PNPS 2.4.2i', "Reactor Water Cleanup System Malfunctions", AND CONCURRENTLY EXECUTE with this Procedure.

I

56) TRANSFER "N' 125V DC bus to backup charger in accordance with PNPS 2.2.14, "125V DC Battery Systems" (Local Action)

57) NOTIFY Maintenanc., of the existing status of 4160V AC Bus AS.

58) Initiate action to RESTORE feedwater heaters to service using I Attachment 3 of PNPS 2.4.150.

59) Once the plant is stabilized, review Technical Specifications and determine that multiple 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> cold shutdown LCOs exit.

(Examiner Note: The last page of this document lists the TS SRO related equipment impacted by the loss of AS and the associated LCOs. Multiple 24 hr LCOs exist due to the combination of I equipment lost) I lOS Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event I

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event i¥ 7,8 Page 11 of 19 Event

Description:

Feed Line Break Inside the Drywell - EOP-01 and EOP-03 HPCI Steam Admission Valve MO-2301-3 Fails to Open - Manual Action required I Time I Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior lOS Instructions:

1. Trigger step 8 of the Lesson Plan, Feed Line Break. This step inserts FW34, Feed line break ramped to a severity of 40% over an 18 minute period. PC01, Rx Coolant Leak, is also ramped to 2000 gpm over a 10 minute period.

I Any 60) Report Rising Drywell Pressure and Temperature I

61) Direct that a manual scram be inserted when drywell pressure I SRO approaches 2.2 psig.

I I

Applicable Immediate Actions of PNPS 2.1.6, Reactor Scram Procedure NOTE While it is the intent of the Procedure to outline the many steps required following a Scram, the sequence suggested for steps may be altered to suit existing plant conditions.

62) At Panel C905, DEPF~ESS both manual Reactor Scram push buttons.

63) PLACE Reactor Mode switch in "SHUTDOWN".

64) VERIFY AND ANNOUNCE the status of APRM downscales.

65) VERIFY all control rods are fully inserted. (Evaluator Note: The simulator randomly s!ilects a few control rods to go "beyond ful/

in" resulting in a loss of position indication. Plant Process computer may take up to 3 minutes before an "ALL RODS In" indication is received.)

RO 66) IF any control rod is NOT fully inserted, THEN INSERT control rods using methods detailed in PNPS 5.3.23, "Alternate Rod Insertion" .

67) IF any control rod position cannot be determined AND the Reactor is shutdown, THEN EVALUATE "CALLRODS" EPIC indications AND DISPATCH an Operator to close 301-25, CRD Charging Water Supply Valve.

68) IF any control rod position cannot be determined AND the Reactor is shutdown, THEN SELECT each control rod not at position "00" AND ATTEMPT TO NOTCH INSERT the control rod to determine whether the control rod will settle at position "00".

69) In order to maintain availability of the Main Condenser, HPCI, and RCIC, PERFORM the following:

a) CLOSE the Feedwater Regulating Valves and the Feedwater HP Block Valves (Panel C905):

i

• FC-642A, FLOW CONTROL VLV A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 7,8 Page 12 of 19 Event

Description:

Feed Line Break Inside the Drywell EOP-01 and EOP-03 HPCI Steam Admission Valve MO-2301-3 Fails to Open - Manual Action required Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• FC-642B, FLOW CONTROL VLV B

• MO-3479, 1ST PT HTR OUTLET BLOCK VALVE

• MO-3480, 1ST PT HTR OUTLET BLOCK VALVE b) IF Reactor water level rises rapidly, THEN SECURE Reactor Feed Pumps as required.

70) Report when EOP-O'I, RPV Control low RPV Level entry I

condition << +12 inches) is exceeded. (Examiner Note: Initially i

the feed system will be able to maintain level)

71) Enter EOP-01, RPV Control and a} Direct entry into scram procedure.

SRO b) Direct pressure be controlled using available pressure control systems between 900 and 1050 psig (Use of the Main i

Condenser is expected) c) Direct that Isolations and Initiations be venfled .

I HPCI Steam Admission Valve Fails to Open

72) Verify isolations and mitiations

73) Determine that all LP ECCS started and that the EDGs are running

74) Determine that HPCI is not injecting BOP 75) Diagnose that the HPCI Steam Admission Valve MO-2301-3 did not open a) Manually OPEN MO-2301-3 b) Verify HPCI injection I 76) Report status to SRO I

77) Direct level be controlled using available systems between +12 I SRO and +45 inches. (Use of the feed system is initially expected until i the symptoms of the Feedline break become evident.)

78) Report when drywell temperature exceeds 150 degrees and ANY I I

drywell pressure exceeds 2.2 psig SRO  : 79) Re-enter EOP-01 and enter EOP-03 I i

Initial EOP-03 Actions

80) Direct that drywell cooling be maximized

81) Update crew the Caution 1 regarding RPV Level Instrumentation is applicable, SRO

82) Before torus bottom pressure exceeds 16 psjg, direct that torus I sprays be Initiated .

83) When operators become available direct that H2/02 analyzers be

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 7,8 Page 13 of 19

, Event

Description:

Feed Line Break Inside the Drywall - EOP-01 and EOP-03 HPCI Steam Admission Valve MO-2301-3 Fails to Open - Manual Action required Time Position A licant's Actions or Behavior placed in service.

84) Initiate Torus Spray as follows: (Examiner Note: Due to the loss of AS only loop "8" is available for torus and drywell sprays. A/so, initially only the LPCI initiation signal interlock will be required to open the containment COOling valves. )

PROCEDURE NOTES

• Torus Spray may be Initiated before closing MO-1001 16A (B), RHR HX A (B) Bypass Valve.

• 5000 GPM on FI-1040-11A (B) and/or FI-104Q-12A (B) is the maximum RHR loop flow in Torus Spray mode to allow for sufficient spray header pressure and flow.

• Torus Spray is established with only one loop of RHR.

BOP a) IF only the LPCI initiation Signal is present. THEN PLACE the LPCI OVERRIDE switch to "MANUAL OVERRIDE".

b) OPEN MO-1001-34BTorus Cooling/Spray Block Valve, c) STARTNERIFY STARTED one RHR Pump.

d) IF no pump discharge flow path exists, THEN OPEN MO 1001-18B, RHR Pumps Loop B Minimum Flow Valve, for the selected loop.

e) OPEN MO-1001-37B Torus Spray Valve, in the RHR loop with the operating pump.

f) SLOWLY OPEN MO-1001-36B Torus Cooling Valve, AND INCREASE flow to 4800 to 5000 GPM on FI-1 040-11 Band/or FI-1040-12B g} CLOSE MO-1001-18B Pump Min Flow Valve.

85) WHEN time permits, VERIFY/ALIGN the RHR System In the 1 Maximize Torus Cooling mode

86) Maximize drywell coaling as follows:

PROCEDURE NOTE The following three steps may be performed in any order.

BOP a) STARTNERIFY STARTED all available Drywell cooling fans on Panel C61 . (Examiner Note: This is a local panel) b) FULLY OPEN all Drywell cooler RBCCW valves by rotating all pots on Panel C7 to the full clockwise position.

c} MAXIMIZE RBCCW cooling in accordance with Attachment 1 of 5.3.35, TRANSIENT RESPONSE HARDCARDS FOR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event ;1# 7,8 Page 14 of 19 Event

Description:

Feed Line Break Inside the Drywell- EOP-01 and EOP-03 HPCI Steam Admission Valve MO-2301-3 Fails to Open Manual Action required Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior OPERATING CREWS, Attachment 12 SRO 87) Monitor rising Torus bottom pressure and Drywell Temperature Initial RPV Level Control Actions RO 88) Report when level cannot be maintained above + 12" using the feed system.

a) Determine that a leak exists on the "A" Feedline (Examiner Note: Indications of the feed fine leak is rising flow on the '}\"

Feed Flow indicator as the flow control valves are opened without a corresponding increase in either RPV /evel or "B" Feed Flow. Additionally, Feed/ine pressure will indicate lower I than RPV pressure on Feedwater Header Pressure Recorder PR-3495 on panel C-1)

I SRO 89) Direct that level control be shifted to HPCI BOP 90) Inject with HPCI and maintain level in prescribed band (Examiner Note: This scenario guide is written assuming that the BOP will recognize the Aux Oil pump failure upon initial entry into EOP-01.

If not recognized then it should be diagnosed at this pOint)

SRO 91) Determine that an aggressive cool down should be performed lAW PNPS 5.3.25.2, OPERATIONS EMERGENCY AND TRANSIENT RESPONSE STRATEGIES, Attachment 2 I 92} Direct a new reactor pressure band of 500 to 1050 psig I 93) Expand the water level control band to -20 to +45" band.

94) Open one relief valve or bypass valve to augment pressure I BOP reduction

95) Stabilize pressure between 450 to 550 psig l . ,

I BOP 96) Secures feedwater injectIOn when It becomes eVident that the i feed system is not injecting.

Critical Task #1: Initiate drywell sprays when torus bottom pressure exceeds 16psig I

I ANY 97) Report when torus bottom pressure exceeds 16 psig. I

98) Verify that Torus Level is < 180 inches 99} Verify that drywell temperature and pressure are within the SRO Drywell Spray Initiation Limit I

100) Direct that Recirc pumps be tripped 101 ) Direct that Drywell Sprays be initiated 102) Sprays the drywell as follows:

I BOP PROCEDURE NOTES I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 7,8 Page 15 of 19 Event

Description:

Feed Line Break Inside the Drywall - EOP-01 and EOP-03 HPCI Steam Admission Valve MO-2301-3 Fails to Open Manual Action required Time Position A licant's Actions or Behavior

• Drywell Spray may be initiated before closing MO-1001 16A (B), RHR HX A (B) Bypass Valve.

• 5000 GPM on FI-1040-11A (B) and FI-1040-12A (B) is the maximum RHR loop flow in Drywell Spray mode to allow for sufficient spray header pressure and flow.

• If available, the Drywell is to be sprayed with both loops of RHR.

a) IF running, THEN TRIP the Reactor Recirc Pump(s) by opening the associated pump drive motor breaker control switch(es) at Panel C904.

BOP b) IF it is necessary to override LPCI initiation signals, THEN PERFORM the following:

I c) IF only the LPCI initiation signal is present, THEN PLACE the LPCI OVERRIDE switch to "MANUAL OVERRIDE".

d) OPENNERIFY OPEN MO-1 001-34B, Torus Cooling/Spray Block Vlv.

e) STARTNERIFY STARTED one RHR Pump in each loop.

f) IF no pump discharge flow path exists, THEN OPEN MO 1001-18B, RHR Pumps Loop B Minimum Flow Valve.

BOP g) FULLY OPEN both Drywell Spray valves in RHR loop B:

i) MO-1001-23B, RHR Loop B Upper Drywell Spray Valve

1. 1 AND ii) MO-1 001-26B. RHR Loop B Upper Drywell Spray Valve I I #2 h) IF Torus Cooling has NOT been previously established, THEN ESTABLISH a loop flow of 4800 to 5000 GPM on FI 1040-11 Band/or FI-1 040-12B by slowly opening MO-1001 BOP 36B, Torus Cooling Valve.

I i) CLOSE MO-1001-188, Pump Min Flow Valve.

i 103) WHEN time permits, VERIFY/ALIGN the RHR System in the I Maximize Torus Cooling Mode I

• lOS Operator. When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 10 Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

HPCI Turbine Trip -Level lowers to below the Top of The Active (TAF) Fuel EOP-17, Emergency RPV Depressurization.

LPCI Injection Valve Fails to Open - Manual Operator Action Required.

Time Position A licant's Actions or Behavior lOS Instructions:

1. Trigger step 9 of the Lesson Plan, HPCI Trip. Step inserts HP02, HPCI Turbine trip and increase PC01, Reactor Coolant Leak to 2500 gpm.

i 2. If requested to investigate, report that there is a large HPCI oil leak .

. 3. Role Playas Equipment Operator as required to align CRD for emergency makeup.

BOP/RO . 104) Report and respond to alarm C903-A2, HPCI Turbine Trip a) Dispatch operator to investigate alarm C903C-E1, HPCI Turbine Brg Oil Press Low.

Any 105) Report lowering level 106) Establish successively lower level bands of control as level continues to fall SRO 107) Before RPV level lowers to -45 inches, direct ADS be inhibited i

108) Inhibit ADS BOP 109) Report when MSIVs close at -46 inches 110) Shift pressure control to SRVs 111) Shift level control to the fuel zone level instruments (Examiner Note: The PNPS Fuel Zone Instruments are calibrated for accident conditions and read significantly lower than actual SRO level with the RPV at pressure. Conversion charts are used to correlate indicated level to actual level) 112) Direct that "B" CRD be aligned for emergency makeup I

i J 113) Direct "B" SBLC pump be started I

114) Inject with SBLC RO . 115) Aligns CRD for emergency makeup lAW PNPS 2.2.87, CRD I

System I 116) As level continues to lower direct that available low pressure SRO ECCS be aligned for injection.

BOP 117) Aligns available low pressure ECCS for injection Critical Task #2: Emergency Depressurize the RPV when RPV cannot be restored and maintained above -150 inches. (Examiner Note: At a pressure band of 450 to 550 psig, TAF will be reached when the Fuel Zone Level Indicators indicate -155 inches. Minimum Steam Cooling i Water Level will be reached when indicators read -176 inches.)

Any 118) Report when level drops below TAF.

i 119) When level cannot be restored and maintained >-150 inches SRO (actual) enter EOP-i7, Emergency RPV Depressurization

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2011 Scenario # 5 Event # 9,10 Page 17 of 19

, Event

Description:

HPCI Turbine Trip -Level lowers to below the Top of The Active (TAF) Fuel EOP-17, Emergency RPV Depressurization.

LPCI Injection Valve Fails to Open - Manual Operator Action Required.

I Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution RPV pressure below 300 psig with a high drywell pressure ECCS initiation may cause rapid injection from Core Spray and RHR pumps 120) Verify torus level is > 50 inches SRO I 121 ) Direct that all SRVs be opened I 122) Open all SRVs 123) Report that all SRVs have opened 124) Monitor for low pressure injection (Examiner Note: Low pressure EGGS injection valves start to open at 400 psig.

BOP However the shutoff head of the pumps is - 300 psig) i 125) Diagnose that LPCI Injection Valve MO-29 failed to open when pressure dropped below 400 psig.

\126) Manually open LPCI injection Valve.

Follow-up Actions 127) Direct that level be restored to the normal range 128) Direct that H202 analyzers be placed in service as operators become available SRO 129) Direct that Containment cooling (Torus spray, drywell spray) be re-established (Examiner Note The containment cooling valves closed when level dropped below the 2/3rds core coverage interlock unless the interlock was previously over I ridden)

I 130) Restore level to the normal range BOP/RO 131 ) Re-establish containment cooling I 132) Place H202 analyzers In service as time permits The scenario may be terminated at the discretion of the Lead Examiner OR when the RPV has been depressurized, RPV level stabilized and Containment Parameters are lowering Emergency Classification: Alert EAL 3.4.1.2: Primary containment pressure cannot be maintained < 2.2 psig

Inoperable Equipment Following Loss of 4KV Bus A5 REQUIRED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS) ENTRIES

1. Facility Operating License - Single Loop Operation.

2. TS 3.2.F - C171 is de-energized.

3. TS 3A.B SLC subsystem A inop - A SLC Pump is de-energized.

4. TS 3.5.A.2.a - Core Spray A inop - A CS Pump and MOVs de-energized.

5. TS 3.5.AA - LPCI inop - A and C RHR pumps de-energized ..

6. TS 3.5.B.1.A - RHR Torus Cooling - containment coaling valves de-energized.

7. TS 3.5.B.2.A - RHR Containment Spray - containment cooling valves de-energized.

8. TS 3.5.B.3.C - RBCCW inop - RBCCW cross-tied.

9. TS 3.5.B.4.A - A SSW loop inop - A and B SSW Pumps have no power.

10.

• TS 3.5.C.2 HPCI inop - MO-2301-4 and MO-2301-33 have no power.

11.

• TS 3.5.0.2 - RCIC inop - Quad coolers are de-energized.

12.

• TS 3.5.F - A EDG inop - Aux Panel (C103A) and ventilation sup/exh fans de-energized.

13.

• TS 3.6.C.2.b.1 - Drywell sump monitoring system, cannot open AO-7011A and AO-7017A.

14.

• TS 3.6.C.2.b.2 - Gaseous/Particualte monitoring, both C19's inop (no sample path)

Procedure NOTE from 2.4.B.1 When implementing the Primary Containment LCO in accordance with Technical Specifications Section 3.7.A.2.aA for the HPCI MO-2301-4 valve, DO NOT isolate MO-2301-5; refer to Technical Specifications Section 3.7.A.5 and enter the 24-hour LCO for Primary Containment inoperability.

15.

• TS 3.7.A.2.a.4 - PCIS - MO-2301-4 and MO-2301-33 have no power.

16.

• TS 3.7.B.i.c - A SGTS inop - A SGTS exhaust fan is de-energized.

17.

• TS 3.7.B.2.c - A CRHEAFS inop - A CHREAFS supply fan is de-energized.

18.

• TS 4.7.A.5 - C41 inop.

NRC Scenario 5 Turnover Sheet Plant Status:

• Reactor Power: 90% Plant Status: Reactor power at 90%

following control rod exercising

• HPCI is isolated due to I&C error during surveillance last shift and is currently INOP

• Core flow is 57 Mlbm/hr

• Current rod position: Sequence A-1, Step 85, Rod 18-43 Equipment Out * "AI> APRM has a faulty power supply and is DOS and Of Service: bypassed. Tracking LCD initiated. All other APRMs are operable.

• "0" RBCCW pump is ~OS. All other RBCCW pumps are operable. Tracking LCD initiated.

• HPCI Directions to the

• Un-isolate HPCI lAW 2.2.125.1, RESET OF PRIMARY AND Shift: SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONS

• Restore power to 100%.