ML19319C254: Difference between revisions

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The diesel emergency generator systems vill feature the following:                        l l
The diesel emergency generator systems vill feature the following:                        l l
: 1. The two engineered safety features distribution systems vill be connected to different 4160 volt emergency buses and they will be redundant in that completion of the starting and loading se-quence of one of the diesels vill be adequate to satisfy minimum engineered safety feature requirements as defined in Section 6.
: 1. The two engineered safety features distribution systems vill be connected to different 4160 volt emergency buses and they will be redundant in that completion of the starting and loading se-quence of one of the diesels vill be adequate to satisfy minimum engineered safety feature requirements as defined in Section 6.
: 2. The loads required for operation in the LOCA condition vill be below the continuous rating of one diesel generator which is 8000 hours.                                                    6 8 3    Relays connected to the potential transformers at the diesel generator terminals will detect generator rated voltage and frequency conditions and provide a permissive interlock for the closing of the respective generator circuit breaker.
: 2. The loads required for operation in the LOCA condition vill be below the continuous rating of one diesel generator which is [[estimated NRC review hours::8000 hours]].                                                    6 8 3    Relays connected to the potential transformers at the diesel generator terminals will detect generator rated voltage and frequency conditions and provide a permissive interlock for the closing of the respective generator circuit breaker.
Interlocks vill be provided to prevent automatic closing of a diesel generator breaker to an energized or faulted bus.
Interlocks vill be provided to prevent automatic closing of a diesel generator breaker to an energized or faulted bus.
: 4. Parallel operation of the diesel generators vill not be per-mitted. The nomal bus supply breakers vill be opened to the system and one of the tie breakers between emergency buses vill be maintained open by redundant interlocks.
: 4. Parallel operation of the diesel generators vill not be per-mitted. The nomal bus supply breakers vill be opened to the system and one of the tie breakers between emergency buses vill be maintained open by redundant interlocks.

Revision as of 17:14, 2 March 2020

Chapter 8 to Davis-Besse PSAR, Electrical Sys. Includes Revisions 1-8
ML19319C254
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/01/1969
From:
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8002110718
Download: ML19319C254 (18)


Text

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DAVIS-BESSE e*~ **-  !

NUCLEAR POWER STATION PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT .

RmM TO RE90 ATOR'l CEhTUJ.1.ES ROG,1016 Volume 3 .

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TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLU?E I Section Pace 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUf0fARY 1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1-1 1.2 DESIGIl HIGHLIGHTS 1-2 1.3 TABULAR CHARACTERISTICS 1-7 1.h PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA 1-17 -

1.5 RESEARCH AND DEVELOP!EIT 1_h6 1.6 PROPOSED STATION DESIGN IN THE AREAS OF CONCERN IDE'ITIFIED IN A.C.R.S. LETTERS AS ASTERISKED _

ITEMS 1-53 1.7 THE TOLEDO EDISON C0fEANY COMPETENCE TO BUILD AND OPERATE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1-56 1.8 IDENTIFICATION OF CONTRACTORS 1-56

1.9 CONCLUSION

S 1-56 2 SITE AND ENVIRON!ENT 2-1 2.1

SUMMARY

2-1 2.2 SITE !ND ADJACENT APIAS 2-2 2.3 METECROLOGY 2-7 2.4 HYDROLOGY 2-7 25 GEOLOGY 2-16 2.6 SEISMOLOGY 2-18 27 SUBSURFACE CONDITIO:IS 2-20 2.8 SITE ENVIRONIGITAL RADI0 ACTIVITY PRCGRAM 2-22 3 REACTOR 3-1 3.1 DESIGN BASES O'209 3-1 e

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

Section Pace 3.2 REACTOR DESIGN 3.3 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 3-88 3*h REFERENCES 3-93

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. . l D-B TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 2 Section Page h REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM h-1 h.1 DESIGN BASES h-1 h.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION h-5 h.3 SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION h-13 h.k TESTS AND INSPECTIONS h-21 k.5 QUALITY CONTROL h-2h h.6 REFERENCES h-29 5 CONTAIN!ENT 5-1 5.1 CONTAINMENT CONCEPT 5-1 5.2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM STRUCTURAL DESIGN 5-3 5 .'f CONTAINMENT VESSEL ISOLATION SYSTEMS 5-28 5.h COICAINMENT VESSEL COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM 5-30 5.5 SHIELD BUILDING AND PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION AND FILTRATION SYSTEM 5-32 5.6 LEAKAGE MONITORING SYSTEM 5-33 5.7 SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION, 5-3h 5.8 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 5-35 5.9 OTHER MAJOR STATION STRUCTURES 5 h0 5.10 REFERENCES 5-h7 6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6-1 <

6.1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 6-2 6.2 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE COOLING SYSTEMS 6-13 6.3 SHIELD BUILDING AND PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION AND FILTRATION SYSTEM 6-20 i11 a// **

D-B TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

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Section dage 7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 7-1 7.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 7-1 7.2 SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEMS 7-13 73 REGULATING SYSTEMS 7-22 7.k NUCLEAR UNIT INSTRUMENTATION 7-32 75 TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEMS 7-39 7.6 OPERATING CONTROL STATIONS 7 k0

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D-B TABLE OF CONTENT _S VOLUME 3 Section Page 8 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 8-1 8.1 DESIGN BASIS 8-1 8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 8-1 8.3 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 8-31 9 AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS 9-1 91 MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM . 9-2 9.2 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM 9-9 9.3 .c COOLING WATER SYSTEMS 9-13 9.4 SPENT FUEL COOLING SYSTEM 9-16 95 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM 9-18 9.6 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM 9-21 9.7 SAMPLING SYSTEM 9-26 9.8 STATION VENTILATION SYSTEMS 9-27 99 INSTRUMENT AND SERVICE AIR SYSTEM 9-28 9.10 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 9-30 9.11 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 9-32 10 STEAM AND POWER CONY.RSION SYSTEM 10-1 10.1 DESIGN BASIS 10-1 10.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 10-1 10.3 SYSTEM RELIABILITY 10-4 -

10.4 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 10-4 11 RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND RADIATION PROTECTION 11-1 11.1 RADIOACTIVE WASTES, 11-1 '

0213 >

D-B TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

Section Pace 11.2 RADIATION PROTECTION 11-13

11.3 REFERENCES

11-22 12 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 12-1

12.1 INTRODUCTION

12-1 12.2 ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 12-1 12.3 hRSONNEL TRAINING 12-2 12.4 WRITTEN PROCEDURE 12-6 12.5 RECORDS 12-6 7" 12.6 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 12-6 13 INITIAL TESTS AND OPERATION 13-1 13.1 TESTS PRIOR TO REACTOR FUELING 13-1

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13.2 INITIAL CRITICALITY 13-1 13.3 POSTCRITICALITY TESTS 13-1 ik SAFETY ANALYSIS lk-1 lb.1 CORE MiD COOLANT BOUNDARY PROTECTION ANALYSIS lk-1 lb.2 STANDBY SAFETY FEATURES ANALYSIS lk-23

14.3 REFERENCES

lh_6h 15 TECHNICAL SPECIFI' ATIONS 15-1 15.1 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 15-1 15.2 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 15-2 15.3 SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS 15-7 15.h DESIGh FEATURES 15-9 15 5 ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS 15-10 ea

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LIST OF APPENDICES Aprendix Volume 1A TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS 1 1B QUALITY ASSURANCE 1 1C PROJECT STAFF 1 2A RESTRICTED AREAS 1 2B METEOROLOGY 1 .

2C GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, SOIL AND FOUNDATION 1 .

DESIGN 2D LIMNOLOGY 1 5A DESIGN BASES FOR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 2 5B DESCRIPTIONS OF LOAD FACTORS FOR SHIELD BUILDING AND CONTAINMENT INTERNAL STRUCTURE DESIGN 2 5C SPLICING REINFORCING BAR !.3ING THE CADVELD PROCESS 2 5D JUSTIFICATION FOR YIELD REDUCTION FACTORS USED IN DETERMINING YIELD STRENGTH OF SHIELD BUILDING AND CONTAINMENT INTERNAL STRUCTURES 2 l

4

. . . . 4- .

0215 vii

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, TABLE OF CONTENTS Section M

8 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 8-1 8.1 DESIGN BASIS 8-1 8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN _ 8-1 8.2.1 NEI' WORK INTERCONNECTIONS 8_1 8.2.1.1 Single Line Diagrams 8-1 8.2.1.2 Reliabilit; Considerations 8-1 8.2.2 STATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 8-2 8.2.2.1 System Diagrams 8-3 8.2.2.2 Auxiliary Power and Start-un Transformers 8-3 1 8.2.2.3 13800 volt and h160 Volt ac Auxiliary System 8-3 8.2.2.4 h80 Volt ae Auxiliary System 8h 8.2.2.5 DC System 8-5 8.2.E.6 120 Volt ac Vital Instrument Power System 8-5 8.2.2 7 120 Volt ac Regulated Instrument Power System 8-6 8.2.2.8 120/208 Volt ac Power System 8-6 8.2.2.9 Evaluation of the Electrical Equipment Physical 8-6 Layout 8.2.3 RESERVE AND EMERGENCY POWER 8-8 8.2.3.1 Redundant Off-site Power Supplies 8-8 8.2.3.2 Power to Vital Loads 8-8 8.2.3.3 Emergency Diesel Generators 8-8 8.2.h LIGB'"ING SYSTEM 8-11 8.3 TESTS AND INSPECPIONS 8-11 x

0216 8-1

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LIST OF FIGURES ,

Figures Title

, 8-1 Single Line Diagram / Electrical System B-2 345 kv Switchyard one Line Diagram B-3 Electric Facilities of the Toledo Edison Co.

Bb Single Line Diagram 250/125 de System,120V ac Vital and Regulated Instrumentation Power Systems 3

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8-11 L

D-B j 8 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 8.1 DESIGN BASIS The electrical system for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station vill be designed to provide reliable power sources for all electrical equipment for start-up, nomal operation, safe shutdown and handling of all emergency situations.

The folleving bases vill be used in the system and equipment design:

a. All components of the system vill be sized for operation under nomal and emergency conditions.
b. No single component failure vill prevent operation of the required engineered safety features.
c. Redundant sources of power and/or automatic transfers of loads will be provided to ensure continuous operation of ~

equipment as required under emergency conditions.

d. Whenever practicable, the system vill be arranged in such a manner as to make it possible to test equipment with the station in operation.
e. The relevant USASI, ND4A and IEEE recommendations vill be used as a guide in the design,
f. Electrical and physical separation of cables and equipment associated with redundant elements of the engineered safety features vill be provided.

8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 8.2.1 NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS The output of the station, generated at 25 KV, vill be stepped up by the main transfor=er and delivered to a 3k5 KV switchyard as shown en the electrical system single line dia6 ram, Figure 8-1. Initially, three 3h5 KV transmissien circuits vill emanate from this switchyard. The three 3h5 KV lines are the Bay Shore Line, the Lemoyne Line and the Ohio Edison tie line.

8.2.1.1 Single Line Diagrams The electrical system single line diagram for the unit is shown in Figure 8-1, and the switchyard diagram is shown in Figure 8-2.

8.2.1.2 Reliability Ccnsiderations The possibility of power failure due to faults in the network interconnecticns and the associated switching is minimized by the following arrangements:

a. The system interconnections vill consist of three 3h5 KV lines. Any one of the three 3h5 KV circuits may be inter-rupted and the others vill be capable of carrying 'the load.
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D-B -

b. Two of the 3h5 KV transmission lines vill be installed on the 6\ same right-of-way, for a part of their length (about seven miles), .)

but the lines vill be supported on independent structures set far enough apart to avoid the possiblility of a structural collapse of one line causing an outage of both lines.

c. The 3h5 KV system vill be protected from lightning and switch-ing surges by lightning protection equipment and by overhead electrostatic shield wires.
d. The ring bus (future breaker and a half) switching arrangement in the 3h5 KV switchyard will include two full capacity main buses. Primary and back-up relaying vill be provided for each circuit along with circuit breaker failure back-up protection.

These provisions vill permit the following:

1. Any transmission line can be cleared under nornal or fault conditions without affecting any other transnission line.
2. Any single circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any circuit.

3 Short circuits on a section of ring bus vill be isolated without interrupting service to any circuit, other than that connected to the faulty bus section.

h. Short circuit failure of the north side west bus breaker vill result in the loss of the startup transformer No. 2, )

1l the Bay Shore Line, and the Ohio Edison tie line until the point of fault is isolated by disconnect switches.

5 Short circuit failure of the north side middle position breaker vill result in the loss of the main unit and the Bay Shore line, until the point of fault is isolated by disconnect switches.

6. Short circuit failure of the south side middle position breaker vill result in the loss of the startup transformer no.

1l 2, the Ohio Edison tie line, and the Lemoyne line.until the point of fault is isolated by disconnect switches.

7 Short circuit failure of the north side east bus breaker vill result in tripping the generator main breakers, the loss of 6 the unit from the system and of startup transfcrmer no. 1, until the point of fault is isolated by disconnect switches.

8. Short circuit failure of the south side east bus breaker vill result in the loss of the startup transformer no.1 and the Lemoyne line until the point of fault is isolated by disconnect switches.

8.2.2 STATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ~

The station distribution system vill consist of the various auxiliary electri-cal systems designed to provide reliable electrical power during all modes of station operation and shutdown conditions. Reliability vill te assured. -

by designing the ' systems-vith a sufficient number of power sources, redundant 02 gg Amendment No. 6 6-2

D-B buses, and with the necessary switching. Engineered safety feature circuits

- vill be arranged so that the loss of a single bus section for say reason vill result in only single losses of duplicate engineered safety features which perform the same function.

The station distribution system vill be capable of starting the largest required drive with the remainder of the connected motor load in service. The system will have a fast (6 cycles maximum) transfer to the reserve source following a turbine generator trip or reactor trip without the loss of the auxiliary load.

Protective relaying vill be arranged for selective tripping of circuit breakers after occurrence of any electrical fault in order to minimize the affected area.

8.2.2.1 System Diagrams Figure 8-1 is a single line diagram of the station distribution system. The 250/125-volt de system,120-volt ac vital and regulated instrumentation power .

syst. ems are shown on Figure 8 h.

8.2.2.2 Auxiliarv Power and 6 tart-Un Transformers 1 During normal operation of the station, the auxiliary power transformer 1 connected to the generator isoleted phase bus will provide the primary source of electrical power for the unit auxiliaries.

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Two start-up transfomers each of the sa=e approximate capacity as the

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auxiliary power transformer, will be supplied from diff erent 3h5 kv switchyard l bus sections. These transformers will provide power for start-up, shutdown, and post shutdown requirements and vill serve as a complete reserve source in the event of failure of the auxilisry transfor=er surply.

No single equipment or component failure vill remove both start-up transformers at one time. Normally each start-up transformer vill be the reserve source of 2 only one 13.8 kv bus. However, if either transformer is out of service the.

remaining start-up transformer is available to automatically back-un both . .3 13.8 kv buses if the normal source (auxiliary transformer) should fail.

8.2.2.3 13800 volt and h160 volt ac Auxiliary Systems l1 The unit will have auxiliary distribution systems at 13800 volts and h160 volts. l1 The 13800 volt system vill consist of 2 buses. Eachbusvillsupplytworeactorl1 coolant pu=ps , one h160 volt bus tie transformer, and one transformer of each of the three double ended substations supplying non-essential loads. l1 Thera vill be two bus-tie transformers stepping the power down from 13800 volts l1 to supply the h160 volt system. The capacities of the transformers and circuit "

breakers will be sufficient to per it full plent operation with one bus tie transfor=er out of service.

Both the 13800 volt and the h160 volt systems will be low resistance grounded. l1 The grounding p,oint vill be the neutral of each source transformer. -

8-3 Amendment No. 3 0220

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D-B Five 4160 volt buses will be provided. Two of the buses provide power to non-casential k000 volt auxiliary motors. The remaining three 4160 volt buses are cmergency (engineered safaty feature) buses, which will supply equipment essen- 3 T'

tial for the safe shutdown of the plant.

tiormal transfer of the auxiliary system buses between two sources (normal and r2 serve) will be initiated by the operator from the control room. Normal bus transfers used on startup or shutdown of the unit will be " live bus" transfers.

, The incoming source feeder circuit breeker will be closed onto the energized bus section, the closing of the incoming source breaker will be automatically checked, after a short time delay to assure that the incoming source breaker will remain closed, the outgoing source feeder circuit breaker will automatically trip open. This sequence will result in transfers without power interruption.

The paralleling of sources which are out of phase will be prevented by the use of synchronism check relays.

~

On loss of the normal station auxiliary power source rapid (6 cycle) automatic cmergency bus transfer to the start-up transformers will be initiated by protective relay action.

Bus feeder circuit breaker control switches for the auxiliary buses will be located in the control room. In ad'ition, controls required to maintain the unit in a hot standby condition will be provided at a location outside the control room for the contingency that the control room is not accessible.

8.2.2.h h80 Volt ae Auxiliary System 2 Three h80 volt double-ended (two transfomer) unit substations vill be provided for non-essential loads. All transfemer secondaries will be vye connected with the i neutral solidly grounded.

}

The transformers will be fed from the 13800 volt system and arranged so that each transformer of a double-ended unit is fed from a separate 13800 volt bus.

The capacities of the unit substation transformers are sufficient to pemit 2 plant operation with one transformer out of service. Electrical interlocks vill be provided to prevent tying separate power sources toEether. The system vill be arranged so that multiple pieces of equipnient with a common function

, are fed from independent buses.

In addition, two separate double-ended unit substations, each with a-single bus, vill be provided for the supply of power to'h80 volt engineered safety features,  !

and emergency equipment. Power for each of these two buses -will normally be j supplied from the corresponding substation transfor=er fed frc= cne of the h160 l 2 volt emergency buses. The second transformer of each substation vill be cross-connected to the other 4160 volt emergency bus through a normally open interlocked breaker to prevent para 11elin6 sources.

1 The loss of any 480 volt bus or the failure of any single cczaponent of the 13800, 4160, or 480 volt system would deprive the plant .of only part of the cquipment associated with that particular function. The remaining operational squipment will be adequate in these circumstances for operation and shutdown of the unit under normal or incident conditions.

i

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Amendment lio. 2 mt.,y 0k 0221 n a % s-N N

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D-B Various 480 volt motor control centers will be located throughout the station to supply power to equipment within the related area. Each motor control center vill be provided with feeders from two of the 480 volt auxiliary sys-tem buses interlocked to prevent paralleling sources.

The equipment vill be arranged and switching accomplished so as to prevent all power from being lost to all equipment associated with a particular fune-tion in the event of a failure of any single component of the .3800, h160, or h80 1 480 volt system. The remaining operational equipment will be adequate in these circumstances to continue the function.

8.2.2 5 DC System A 250/125-volt de system vill provide a source of reliable continued power for control, instrumentation and other loads for normal operation and order-ly shutdown and control of the unit. Each battery will be sized to carry '

station de load for one hour. 6 As shown by Figure 8-4, the system for the station will include two 250/125  :

volt de bus control center assemblies, six 125 volt de power supply battery chargers, and two full capacity 250/125 volt de batteries. Each 250/125 volt de bus vill be connected to one 250/125 volt de battery and three 125 volt battery chargers. Each of two chargers vill be connected between + 125 volt de and neutral, and between neutral and - 125 volt de respectively. The l8 third charger (on each 250/125 volt de bus) vill be installed so it can be switched to substitute for either of the other two, or left disconnected on stand-by.

Four separate 125 volt de control power panelboards will be provided. Each panelboard will be supplied by redundant feeders from both 250/125 volt de buses through manual throvover switches to prevent any de panel from being g supplied from more than one battery at a time. These de panels will pro-vide de instrumentation and control power as necessary for proper function-ing of the unit.

To maintain redundance in the 13800, kl60 and h80 volt systems, two de control 1 power feeders vill be provided for each separate bus or appropriate group of circuit breakers, each feeder from a separate de source.

A separate de system is provided for the 3h5 KV substation control and relaying consisting of two 125 volt '

control power panelboards.

teries,twobatterychargers,andtwoseparatedel8 The station de system vill be arranged so that a single fault within the system vill not prevent the reactor protective system, engineefed safety featura control system, and the engineered safety features from performing their safety functions. The batteri'eg ivill be. counted on Class I racks, installed in separate rooms within N a Cihs's,Ilstructures and separated by fire valls to s

minimize the possibility of simultaneous damage to both batteries. "

8.2.2.6 120 volt ac vital Instrument Power system Refer to Figure 8-h. Five 120 volt ac vital instrument power buses vill be provided to supply power to essential instrumentation and control loads under l5

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all operating conditions. Each of four buses will be supplied separately from a static inverter connected to one of the four 125 volt de panels des- 6 cribed in*8.2:2.5 The fifth bus will be an uninterruptable source.to supply the co=pu'ter,",NSSS Integrated Control System, and the load frequency contr 1.

8-5 O b, n o%

Amendment No. 8

D-B T

Tie breakers vill be provided from.each of the 120 volt vital ac buses to the alternate 120 volt regulated bus to provide backup and to permit servicing of the inverters.

Each of the four channels of the nuclear instrumentation and reactor protec-tive system equipment described in Section 7 vill be supplied separately from one of the four vital buses. Also, each of the four channels of the engineered 3 cafety features sensing systems will be supplied from a separate vital bus. The system is arragned so that any type of single failure or fault vill not prevent the reactor protective system engineered safety features control system or the engineered safety features from performing their safety functions.

8.2.2.7 120 Volt ac Regulated Instrument Power System A system vill be provided to supply non-essential instrumentation, control and power for loads requiring regulateG 120 volts ac power. It will consist of distribution panels and regulating transfomers fed from motor control centers as shown on Figure 8 h.

8.2.2.8 120/208 Volt ac Power System A system vill be provided to supply non-essential instrumentation, control, lighting, and power loads requiring unregulated 120/208 volt ac power. It will consist of distribution panels and transfomers fed from motor control ,

I centers which are connected to emergency h80 volt unit substation buses.

8.2.2 9 Evaluation of the Electrical Eauipment Physical Layout The physical locations of electrical distribution system equipment vill be such as to minimize vulnerability of vital circuits to physical damage as a result of accidents. The proposed locations are as follows:

1 j a. The auxiliary, start-up, and bus tie transformers vill be located out-of-doors, physically separated from each other. .

Lightning arrestors vill be provided for the start-up trans-fomers . All these transformers vill be covered by automatic water spray systems to extinguish oil fires quickly and pre-vent the spread of fire. Fire valls vill be installed where necessary between transformers to minimize the exposure to fire, water and mechanical dama6e.

1l b. The 13800 and 4160 volt switchgear, and k80 volt unit substations vill be located indoors in areas which minimize exposure to mechanical, fire and water damage.

This equipment will be properly coordinated electrically to permit safe operation of the equipment under normal and short circuit conditions.

.s h

0223 Amendment No. 6 .

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c. The 480 volt motor control centers vill be located indoors in areas of electrical load concentration.

Those associated with the turbine-generator auxiliary system vill, in general, be located below the turbine-generator's operating floor level. Those associated with the nuclear steam supply system vill be located in the Auxiliary Building. Motor control centers vill be located in areas so as to minimize their exposure to mechanical, fire and water damage.

d. The routing of major power conductors vill be such as to minimize exposure to mechanical fire and water damage and prevent outage of two branches due to a single failure. .
e. The application, installation and routing of control, instrumentation and power cables vill be such as to minimize their vulnerability to damage from any source and to maintain the integrity of their respective re-dundant channels and/or branches so that no single failure vill result in loss of the protection functions.
f. Feeder cables vill be well protected against overloads and faults. All cables vill be selected to provide con-servative margins with respect to their current' carrying capacities, short-circuit capacity, insulation properties and mechanical construction. Cable insulation in the containment will be selected so as to minimize the harm-ful effects of radiation, heat and humidity. Appropriate instrumentation cables vill be shielded to minimize in-duced noise interference.
g. Unesbedded power cables vill be in rigid steel cenduit or will be interlocked armored in ladder type trays.
h. The cables installed in cable trays will be grouped on the basis of their functions and/or voltages. Power cables vill be run in the top trays. Power cables on trays will be spaced and ampacities derated according to Section 318-6 of the National Electrical Code. Trays carrying control and instrumentation cables, vill have solid bottoms and solid covers.
i. Circuit schedules vill be prepared to give a permanent record of the routing and terminations of all cables.

The coding of the circuits will provide easy identification

. of the associated system. All cables vill have this code number permanently affixed at both ends. Thus, all cables associated with engineered safety feature equipment, as well as with other system, vill be readily identifiable.

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8.2.3 RESERVE AND EMERGENCY POWER 8.2.3.1 Redundant Off-site Power Supplies L

Normal power supply to all unit auxiliary loads vill be provided through the l auxiliary transformer connected to the generator bus. In case the unit is 6 tripped, the station auxiliary load vill be transferred within six cycles to the start-rp transformers.

Off-site (reserve) power will be available from three 3h5 kv transmission lines into the switchyard. Power vill be available to the station from two indepen-1 dent start-up transformers as redundant sources of reserve power. Normally each start-up transformer vill serve as a reserve source for only one 13800 volt bus.

With the initial ring-bus arrangement in the 3h5 kv switchyard, and also with the ultimate breaker-and-a-half scheme, the failure of any ona component will not result in loss of both start-up transformers at the same time.

In case one start-up transformer trips out, the corresponding 13800 volt bus 1 vill be manually switched so that the remaining start-up transformer vill serve as a back -g or reserve for both 13800 volt buses.

8.2.3.2 Power to Vital Loads Any of the povar sources available vill be able to supply power to the two kl60 V. emerg r :y buses which feed the engineered safety features equipment and reactor protecuive systems. The engineered safety features equipment and reactol protective systems vill be arranged so that a failure of any single bus see-tion vill not prevent the respective systems from fulfilling their protective functions. The emergency power sources vill be automatically switched onto each h160 volt bus of the unit in the preferential sequence of (1) the 3h5 EV start-up transformer, and (2) the diesel generator. In addition, power vill be available from the second start-up transformer for the emergency bus through manual switching by the control room operator.

8.2.3.3. Emergency Diesel Generators Each of two redundant diesel generator units located in separate rooms vill provide emer6ency power to one 4160 volt eme'rgency bus and satisfy engineered safety feature loads for essential auxiliaries.

Whenever the emergency generator control circuit senses a possible danger to the normal and/or reserve power supply, the emer6ency diesels vill be automatically 3 started.

If the loss of power to the energency buses is confirced, the folleving vill occur:

Amendment No. 6 0225 s

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,3 a. All load feeder breakers on the 4160 volt emergency buses will I be tripped.

b. The two emergency bus systems will be isolated from all normal and reserve supplies, and from each other.
c. As each diesel generator reaches rated voltage and frequency  ;

the generator'creaker connecting it to the corresponding kl60 l volt emergency bus, vill close. l 3

d. All assential engineered safety feature motors and loads connected I to each bus will be automatically energized in a predetermined sequence in increments which 411 prevent excessive voltage dip and will minimize accelerating time. The loading sequence vill be as given in Section 7.

1

e. After ,each motor is given the signal to start, the closing of the motor circuit breaker vill be checked. If the circuit .I breaker should have failed to close, an alarm vindow for the  ;

respective motor vill be annunciated in the control room.

The diesel emergency generator systems vill feature the following: l l

1. The two engineered safety features distribution systems vill be connected to different 4160 volt emergency buses and they will be redundant in that completion of the starting and loading se-quence of one of the diesels vill be adequate to satisfy minimum engineered safety feature requirements as defined in Section 6.
2. The loads required for operation in the LOCA condition vill be below the continuous rating of one diesel generator which is 8000 hours333.333 days <br />47.619 weeks <br />10.958 months <br />. 6 8 3 Relays connected to the potential transformers at the diesel generator terminals will detect generator rated voltage and frequency conditions and provide a permissive interlock for the closing of the respective generator circuit breaker.

Interlocks vill be provided to prevent automatic closing of a diesel generator breaker to an energized or faulted bus.

4. Parallel operation of the diesel generators vill not be per-mitted. The nomal bus supply breakers vill be opened to the system and one of the tie breakers between emergency buses vill be maintained open by redundant interlocks.

5 Each generator vill be supplied with a high speed voltage reg-ul.ator designed to return generator voltage to rated value _

vithing a minimum delay after starting of the largest load increment. Momentary voltage and frequency dips vill be a ,

maximum below rating, of 25% for voltage and 5% for frequency. 6

6. Each diesel generator vill be equipped for test purposes only with means for periodically starting, synchronizing and loading without' interrupting service. Only one diesel.will be tested at any time. .

8-9 m Amendment No. 8

D-B T. During test, interlocks vill prevent paralleling a diesel generator i 1

with the auxiliary or start-up transformer until the generator has been =anually eynchronized by the onerator.

8. A diesel oil stora6e tank system adequate for ten (10) days continuous and simultaneous half power operation for both diesels

" vill be provided. The oil stored on-site vill be replenished from other sources during this time. The day tank at each diesel engine vill contain sufficient oil for approximately 2h hours at 110% of full load cperation. The diesel engine day tanks will be replenished ,from the on-site storage tanks by individual supply lines. -

9 Each of the two diesel generator system vill be completely independent from the other and from any outside source of power.

Each diesel generator will have an electrically povered standby varming syste= which will automatically maintain the engine,

' cooling water and lubricating oil temperature at a satisfactory level to allow fast starting of the diesel generator sets. Local annunciation and local indication of malfunctions will be provided so that in the event of a failure an opera or may immediately determine the cause. Two complete and ind pendent starting air supply systems with compressors, receivers, valves, and fittings and two starting air motors will be supplied with each system.

The starting air receivers vill be charged by air compressors.

The air receivers for each of the two starting systems vill have j enough capacity for a minimum of three consecutive starts.

A 125 volt de bus will supply the power for the controls ~and generator field flashing for the diesel generator. The de supply will be taken from a different de source for each diesel generator

10. An engine cooling water neat exchanger of the shell and tube type vill be provided for each emergency diesel generator.

Cooling water will be circulated in a closed loop through the engine lubricating oil cooler, the engine cooling water passages, and the shell side of the heat exchanger by a cooling water pump driven by the engine.

The cooling mediu= flow through the tube side vi11 be part of the component cooling water system. Backup of this supply 2 vill be provided by a connection to the plant fire protection system.

Emergency diesel generator engines for this service vill operate for approximately three minutes at full load without cooling water supply. This will provide time, in the event of a dead bus, for the initiation of flow in the service water and reactor building cooling water systems supply the necessary pumps which are connected to the emergency generator bus.

N a.,.,

p..

0227 Amendmeht Io. 2 B-10

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\ 8.2.4 LIGHTING SYSTD(

Adequate lighting vill be provided as required by all normal and emergency conditions. Normal lighting vill be supplied frca the 120/208 volt ac power system. Under emergency conditions, lighting vill be provided in all vital areas, supplied either from the h80 volt emergency buses, directly from the station batteries, or from remote self-contained battery operated lighting units.

8.3 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS The 345 KV circuit breakers vill be inspected, maintained and tested on a routine basis. This can be accomplished without renoving the generators, transformers and transmission lines from service.

Transmission line protective relaying vill be tested on a routine basis. This can be accomplished without removing the transmission lines from service. Gen- -

erator, auxiliary transformers and start-up transformer relaying vill be tested when the generator is off-line.

The 13800, 4160 and 480 volt circuit breakers and associated equipment may be l1 tested while individual equipment is shut down. The circuit breakers may be placed in the " test" position and tested functionally. The breaker opening and closing may also be exercised. Circuit breakers and contactors for re-dundant or duplicated circuits may be tested in service without interfering with the operation of the unit.

Emergency transfers to the various emergency power sources vill be tested on a routine basis to prove the operability of the system.

The ungrounded de system will have detectors to indicate when there is a ground eristing on any portion of the system. A ground on one portion of the de systems will not cause any equipment to malfunction. Grounds will be located by logical isolation of individual circuits connected to the faulted system, while taking the necessary precautions to maintain the integrity of the vital bus supplies. The batteries are under continuous automatic charging and will be inspected and checked on a routine basis while the unit is in service.

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