ML19319C273

Chapter 5 of Davis-Besse PSAR, Containment. Includes Revisions 1-8

ML19319C273
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/01/1969
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8002110742
Download: ML19319C273 (66)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section M

5 CONTAINMENT

, 5-1 5.1 CONTAINMENT CONCEPT 5-1 5.1.1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 5-1 5 1.2 DESIGN BASES 5-2 5.1.2.1 Postulated Accident Conditions 5-2 5.1.2.2 Energy and Material Release 5-2 5.1.2.3 Contribution of Engineered Safety Features 5-2 5.2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM STRUCTURAL DESIGN 5-3 5.2.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL DESIGN 5-3 5.2.1.1 Design Conditions 5-3 1

, 5.2.1.2 Design Leakage Rates 5-3 5.2.1.3 Design Loadings 5h 5.2.1.3.1 Dead Loads 5h 5.2.1.3.2 Loss of Coolant Accident Loads 5-4 5.2.1.3.3 operating Loads 5-4 5.2.1.3.h External Pressure Load 5h 5.2.1.3.5 Seismic Loads 5-5 5 2.1.h Codes 5-5 5 2.1.h.1 Design Codes

• 5-5 5.2.1.k.2 Vessel Classification 5-6 5 2.1.h.3 Code Stamp 5-6 .

5.2.1.h.h Materials 5-6 5.2.1.h.5 Code Requirements 5-6 x.

5.2.1.5 Design Bases ]ll 5-6 5-1 0024

D-B TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd) ,

Section Page 5 2.1.6 Design Analyses 5_7 5.2.1.6.1 Wind Analysis 57 5.2.1.6'.2 Seismic Analysis 5-7 5.2.1 7 Drawings 5_8 5.2.1.8 Penetrat ons 5_8 5.2.1.8.1 Design Bases 58 5.2.1.8.2 Electrical Penetrations 5_8 -

5.2.1.8.3 Piping Penetrations 5_9 5.2.1.8.h Equipment and Personnel Access 5-11 5.2.1.8.5 Fuel Transfer Penetrations 5-12 5.2.1 9 Missile ccotection Features 5-12

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5.2.1.10 Insulation 5-12 s/

5.2.1.11 Shielding 5-12 5.2.2 SHIELD BUILDING DESIGN 5_12 5.2.2.1 Design Conditions 5_12 5.2.2.2 Leakage Rate 5-13 5.2.2.3 Design Loadings 5_15 5.2.2.3.1 Dead Loads 5_15 5.2.2.3.2 Loss of Coolant Accident Load 5_15 5.2.2.3.3 Live Load 5_15 5.2.2.3.h Wind Load 5_15 5.2.2.3.5 Tornado Load 5-15 5.2.2.3.6 Uplift Due to Bouyant Forces 5-16 5 2.2.3 7 Seismic Loads 5-16 0025 5-11 ,

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, TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

Section Page 5.2.2.3.8 Seismic Analysis 5-17 5.2.2.3 9 External Missiles 5-18 5.2.2.3.10 Analysis and Design for Missiles 5-18 5.2.2.h Construction Materials 5-19 5.2.2.h.1 Concrete 5-19 5.2.2.h.2 Reinforcing Steel 5-22 5.2.2.5 Design Bases 5-23 .

5.2.2.5.1 Yield Capacity Reduction Factors 5-2h 5.2.2 5.2 Foundation and Supports 5-2h 5.2.2.6 Design Analysis 5-2h 5.2.2 7 Penetrations 5-25 5.2.2.8 Corrosion Protection 5-25 5.2.3 CONTAINMENT INTERIOR E' 7TURE 5-26 5.2.3.1 Internal Missile Protection Features 5-26 5.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM 5-28 5.3.1 DESIGN BASES 5-28 5.3.2 SYSTEM DESIGN 5-28 5.h CONTAINMENT VESSEL COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM 5-30 5.h.1 DESIGN BASES 5-30 5.h.1.1 Governing Conditions 5-30 5.h.1.2 Sizing 5-30 5.h.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 5-30 5.k.2.1 Isolation Valves 5-31 5.h.3 TESTS AND INSPECTION 5-31 55 D4ERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM 5-32 lT

% 0026 dmendment No. T 5-iii

D-B T_ABLE OF CONTENTS (contd) 8 Section Page 5.6 LEAKAGE MONITORING SYSTEM 5-33 5.T SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION 5-3h 5.8 TESTS AND INSPECTION 5-35 5.8.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL 5-35 5.8.1.1 Pre-Operational Quality Control and Testing 5-35 5.8.1.1.1 General Requirements 5-35 5.8.1.1.2 Penetrations 5-3T -

5.8.1.2 Post-Operational Testing and Inspection 5-37 5.8.1.2.1 Leakage Rate Testing 5-3T 5.8.1.2.2 Surveillance of Structural Integrity 5-37 5.8.2 SHIELD BUILDING 5-38 5.8.2.1 Pre-Overational Quality Control and Inspection 5-38 5.8.2.1.1 General Requirements 5-38 5.8.2.1.2 Leak-Tightness 5-39 5.8.2.2 Post-Ouerational Testing and Inspection 5-39 5.8.2.2.1 Leakage Rate Testing 5-39 59 OTHER MAJOR STATION STRUCTURES 5 h0 591 AUXILIARY BUILDING 5 h0 5 9.1.1 Design Bases 5-h0 5 9.1.2 Design Criteria and General Description 5-ho 5 9.1.3 Nuclear Fuel Storage Considerations 5 h1 5 9.2 TURBINE EUILDING 5-h1 8 INTAKE STRUCTURE 5 h2 l5.9.3 5.9.h DIESEL GENERATOR ENCLOSURE 5 h2 -

8 l5.9.5 0FFICE BUILDING 00Q7 5_ha J

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Amendmed+'No. 8 5-iv

D-B TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

Section Page 596 BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK 5-h2 597 DIESEL OIL STORACO TANK 5-h2 8 5 9.8 INTAKE WATER SYSTEM 5_h2A 5.9.9 DISCHARGE WATER SYSTEM 5-h2B 5 10 REFERENCES 5-h7 e

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D-B LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title g 5-1 Shield Building Leakage Rates 5_1h 5-2 Containment Vessel Isolation Valve Arrangements 5 h3 s

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0 5-vi Amendment No. 8

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LIST OF FIGURES (At Rear of Section)

Figure No. Title 5-1 Containment Vessel and Shield Building Typical Section 5-2 Equipment Hatch Detail 5-3 Personnel and Emergency Locks Detail 5h Electrical Penetration Details 5-5 Hot Piping Penetrations 5-6 Cold Piping Penetrations 5-7 Mathematice.1 Model 5-8 Flow Diagram - Isolation Valve Arrgt.

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D-B 5 CONTAINMENT 51 CONTAINMENT CONCEPT 5.1.1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS The containment for the station consists of two structures, a steel contain-ment vessel and a reinforced concrete shield building, and their associated systems as shown in Figure 5-1.

The containment vessel, including all its penetrations, is a low leakage steel shell which is designed to withstand a postulated loss of coolant accident and to confine a postulated release of radioactive material. Systems directly asso-ciated with the containment vessel are the safety injection system, the contain-ment spray system, the containment cooling system, and the containment isola-tion system.

The shield buildir.g is a concrete structure surrounding the containment vessel "

and is designed to provide biological shielding from hypothetical accident conditions, biological shielding during .ormal operation, environmental pro-tection for the containment vessel for Adverse atmospheric conditions and ex-ternal missiles, and a means for collection And filtration of fission product leakage from the containment vessel following a hypothetical accident. The shield building ventilation system is the engineered safety feature designed f8 to fulfill this last ob.iective.

(' The containment vessel is a cylindritn1 steel pressure vessel with hemispher-ical dome and ellipsoidal bottom which houses the reactor vessel, reactor coolant piping, pressurizer, pressurizer quench tank and coolers, reactor coolant pumps, steam generators, core flooding tanks, letdown coolers, and normal and l8 emergency ventilation system. It will be completely enclosed by a reinfozced

-concrete shield building having a cylindrical shape with a shallow dome 8 3 roof. An annular space is provided between the vall of the containment vessel and the shield building and clearance is also provided between the containment vessel and the dome of the shield building.

The containment vessel and shield building vill be supported on a concrete foundation founded on firm rock structure. Section 2 describes the geological conditions for the site.

The containment vessel vill be constructed in a two stage operation and in a manner that vill conform to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Article lh, N-lhll.

With the exception of the concrete under the containment vessel there vill be no structural ties between the containment vessel and the shield building above -

o s the foundation slab. Above this tnere vill be virtually unlimit e d freedom

.. for differential movement between the containment vessel and the shield building.

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i d ,! 5-1 Amendment No. 8

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f I 5 1.2 DESIGN BASES I #

l 5.1.2.1 Postulated Accident Conditions )!

t l The containment- system is designed to provide protection for the public from .

l the consequences of any break in the reactor coolant piping up to and includ-i ing a double-ended break of the largest reactor coolant pipe assuming unob-structed discharge from both ends. Pressure and temperature behaviour subse-quent to the accident is determined by calculations evaluating the combined influence of the energy sources, heat sinks and engineered safety features.

l These are discussed in detail in Section 14.

- The . containment system also provides protection for the public from the radio-

! logical consequences of a hypothetical accident discussed in Section 14 The j containment design, along with the engineered safety features provided, assure that the exposure of the public resulting from a hypothetical accident is below the guidelines established by 10 CFR 100.

5 1.2.2- Energy and Material Release The sources available for the release of energy and materials into the contain-

, ment systems are:

a. stored heat from the reactor core and internal structures;

b. fission coastdown and decay heat from the reactor core;

c. stored heat in the materials of the reactor coolant system;

d. reactor coolant and its contained corrosion and fission products;

e. fission products from the fuel elements in the core.

The amount of energy contributed by the major sources during various types of accidents is discussed in Section ik.

5.1.2.3 Contribution of Engineered Safety Features

- The design, application, and evaluation of the engineered safety features are discussed in Section 6. Their effectiveness is treated in Section Ih. Their relationship to the containment design is_ summarized in this section.

Engineered safety features systems are provided to minimize the consequences

. of postulated accidents by removing heat from the fuel, inserting negative i

reactivity-into the reactor, decreasing the pressure in the containment vessel by removing thermal energy, and removing radioactive material that may leak into the shield building from the containment vessel. The principal engineered -

safety' features are:

a.. tmergency injection system; b a

b. containment . spray system;

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c. containment cooling system;

d. shield building ventilation system.

With minimms safety injection available, as defined in Section 6.1.3, a negligible amount of metal-water reaction is calculated. Nevertheless there is sufficient margin between the design pressure of the containment and the highest calculated pressure resulting from a loss-of-coolant accident to accommodate a significant amount of metal-vater reaction and associated hydrogen combustion.

5.2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM STRUCTURAL DESIGN 5.2.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL DESIGN 5.2.1.1 Design Cenditions The containment vessel vill be designcd in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Class B. The " maximum internal pres-sure" as defined in Article N1'11 of that code is h0 psig. The coincident temperature is 26h F. The " design-internal pressure" as defined in that code is 36 psig. The coincident design temperature is 26h F.

The vessel inside diameter will be 130 feet and the net free volume vill be approximately 2,666,000 ft3 which for the above design pressure and temperature l 1l@

requires a maximum shell thickness of 1 1/2 inches.

In addition to the pressure and temperature conditions specified, the contain-ment vessel vill be designed to safely withstand the following loadings:

a. Structure dead load

b. Operating loads

c. Test pressure loads

d. Seismic loads

e. Jet forces associated with the flow fran the postulated rupture of any pipe (other then the reactor coolant piping) within or outside the containment.

f. Thermal stresses in the steel shell due to temperature gradients.

5.2.1.2 Design Leakage Rates The containment vecsel vill be tested at the conclusion of construction and after all penetrations have been installed to verify that the design leakage rate associated with the maximum internal pressure (h0 psig) does not exceed 0 5 percent of the containment contained weight of air and vapor in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. 6 The analysis in Section 14.2.2.4 shows that this is more than adequate to meet

' the guidelines of 10 CFR 100. The specified test leak rate at test conditions shall not exceed .25% of the contained weight of air and vapor.

t 5-3 .bN Amendment No. 8

D-B 5.2.1.3 Design Loadings 5.2.1.3.1 Dead Loads

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Dead loads vill consist of the dead weight of the containment vessel and its appurtenances, the weight of internal concrete and the vei6ht of structural steel and miscellaneous building items within the containa nt vessel.

Densities used for dead load calculations vill be as follows:

a. Concrete: 143 lb/cu ft

b. Steel reinforcing: 489 lb/cu ft using nominal cross section areas of reinforcing bar sizes.

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c. Steel containment vessel: 489 lb/cu ft

d. Structural Steel: 489 lb/cu ft 5.2.1.3.2 Loss of Coolant Accident Loads This load is determined by analysis of the transient pressure and temperature effects that could occur following a break cf a reactor coolant pipe. Breaks up to and including a double ended break of the largest reactor coolant pipe are considered. The analysis is presented in Section lb.2.2.3.

5.2.1.3.3 operating Leads Operating Loads include the following:

a. Gravity loads of all equipment and piping, including contained fluid.

2 b. Weight of water in the refueling pool and fuel transfer canal.

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c. Loads resulting from the restraint of that part of the vessel l vhich is embedded in concrete.

d. Crane loads.

Equipment loads will be those specified on the drawings supplied by the equip-2 l ment manufacturers.

Floor live loadings vill be assigned for the design of internal floors con- l sistent with their intended use. l

.- 5.2.1.3.h External Pressure Load A containment vessel of suitable thickness to meet the specified internal pressure requirements is capable of withstanding an external p" essure dif- l 2 l ferential of 0 50 psi in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel l Code,Section VIII, UG-28. The containment vessel is vented as required to l eliminate pressure fluctuations caused by air temperature changes during l various operating modes. This is accomplished through ventilation purge l connections which are normally closed while the reactor is in operation. l I

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Automatic vacuum relief devices are also used to prevent The containment

( ,' vessel from exceeding the external design pressure in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sect".on III, Article 16. Multiple vacuum breakers are used to relieve pressure from shield building into containment vessel in case containment vessel is ,,

subject to excess external pressure. These valves vill assure that external pressure differential on containment vessel does not exceed 0 50 psi.

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5.2.1.3 5 Seismic Loads Seismic loads are co=puted using the following:

a. Marim m probable (smaller) seismic horizontal ground accelera-tion is 0.08 g. 2

b. The maximum possible (larger) seismic borizontal ground acceler-ation is 0.15 g.

A vertical component of 2/3 of the horizontal ground acceleration is applied simultaneously with the horizontal acceleration.

Stresses arising from seismic loads will be added linearly and directly to stresses caused by loss ~of coolant accident, operating, live and dead loads as applicable. The response spectra utilized are indicated in Section 5.2.2.3.8.

The plots of the seismic response spectra are shown in Appendix 2C. The class-ification of station structures and equipment and the applicable damping factors are shown in Appendix 5A.

5 2.1.h Codes 5.2.1.4.1 Design Codes The design, fabrication, inspection and testing of the containment vessel vill ecmply with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and' Pressure Vessel Code, Sec-tion II Materials;Section III Nuclear Vessels, Subsection B " Requirements for Class B, Vessels,"Section VIII Unfired Pressure Vessels and Section IX Welding Qualifications.

The containment vessel design and construction vill also meet applicable re-quirements of State and local building codes.

The permissible out of roundness tolerance for cylindrical shells under internal pressure is specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII ~

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as follows: "The difference between maximum and minimum inside diameters at any cross section shall not exceed one percent of the no=inal diameter at the cross section under consideration." The containment vessel specification vill require thtt the difference between -avimm and minimum inside diameters shall not exceed one-half percent of the nominal diameter at,the cross section under i consideration. '

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, 4 5-5 Amendment No. 2 j

D-B 5.2.1.h.2 Vessel Classification

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The uontainment vessel is a Class B vessel as defined in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III Nuclear Vessels (N-132) 4 5.2.1.h.3 Code Stamp The containment vessel vill be code stamped in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Paragraph N-1500.

5.2.1.4.h Materials The containment vessel shall be fabricated of steel plate conforming to ASME

, Specification SA-299 The equipment hatch as well as the personnel and emer-gency air locks shall be fabricated of steel plate co'nforming to ASME Speci-fication SA-516, Grade 70. Both of these materials shall be made to con-form to ASME Specification SA-300 requirements except that impact test re- .

quirements will be as specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Cole, '

Section III, N-1211 (a) for a minimum service temperature of 30 F.

Penetrations, which are integral parts of the containment vessel,' vill be made of material conforming to either ASME Specification SA-333, Grade 6 or Speci-I fication SA-312, Type 304.

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Charpy V-Notch specimen (ASTM A370 Type A) vill be used for impact testing materiale of all product forms in accordance with the requirements of the '3 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, N-330. All ferritic material entering into the fabrication of the containment vessel vill have .)

4 a nil ductility transitior, temperature of 0 F ="im"= when tested in accor-dance with the appropriate specification for the material.

During reactor operation, or pressure or leak rate testing, the containment vessel metal temperature vill be maintained above 30 F.  ;

5.2.1.h.5 Code Requirements The design internal pressure for the containment vessel has been specified in accordance with the provisions of Sectica III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The design requirements for Class B Vessels are con-tained in Article 13. (See 5.2.1.1.)

The containment vessel vill be pressure tested in accordance with the rules

' of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, UG-100 and Section III N-1314 (4). The test pressure vill be 1.25 times the design internal pres .

sure of 36 psig.

5715 Design Bases l -

The design of the containment vessel vill be based on permissible stresses as set forth in the applicable codes.

i The containment vessel vill restrict leakage to an acceptable specified level under all conditions of loading that may occur during its lifetime. The vessel .

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D-B will be designed to exhibit an elastic behaviour under accident and 1 earthquake conditions of loading. For the maximum probable (smaller) earth-quake loading condition, the loadings are:

dead loads, plus operating leads, plus loss of coolant accident loads, plus maximum probable (smaller) earthquake loads.

For this loading condition the structure vill safely function within the normal design limits as specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section TTT: Firure N k1h (excluding N klh.5). This loading condition vill provide the i design bases upon which the containment vessel vill be code stamped. For the "ma.ximum possible (larger) earthquake" condition the loadings considered are:

dead loads, plus operating loads, plus loss of coolant accident loads, plus "mav4 =m possible (larger) earthquake" loads.

For thia loading condition a margin in the design will ensure no loss of function

• of the vessel. Under this loading condition, for any combination of primary, general and local membrane stresses and primary bending stresses the stress inten-l 1 sity limits will not exceed 90 percent of the code allowable yield stress at 26h F.

In consideration of the large diameter of the vessel, the shell bottom vill be analyzed by the Yale Shell Program. 1_/

Circumferential compressive stresses in the vicinity of the bottom knuckle resulting from internal pressure vill be calculated and held below the criti-cal buckling stresses with appropriate margins of safety. It is not envisaged that stiffeners vill be necessary to limit the buckling stresses in the shell.

The areas in the vessel adjacent to penetrations that are not subjected to externally applied loads will be designed by the area replacement method in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, N-131h (c).

Where external loads and moments are applied to penetrations, ahe secondary and local stresses will be treated in accordance with the Welding Research Council Bulletin 107, 2] and the basic stress intensity limits of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, paragraphs N-klk.1, N-klk.2, N klk.3 and N-blh.h will apply.

5 2.1.6 Design Analyses 5 2.1.6.1 Wind Analysis The containment vessel vill be completely enclosed by the shield building and will therefore not be directly subject to the forces and effects of vind and tornadoes. J 5.2.1.6.2 Seismic Analysis Seismic analysis for the containment vessel vill conform to the appropriate procedures outlined in Section 5.2.2.3.8 and Appendix 5 A.

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D-B 5.2.1 7 Drawings Drawings showing the co, m nment vessel and shield building, elevations and plans are inchded in Sw. tion I.

5.2.1.8 s Penetra' ion _s, 5 2.1.8.1 Design Bases All containment penetrations have the following design characteristics in order to maintain the detired containment integrity:

a. Penetrations will be capable of withstanding the maximum internal pressure which would occur due to the postulated rupture of any pipe inside the containment vessel.

b. Penetrations will be capable of withstanding the applicable jet -

forcas associated with the flow from a postulated rupture of the pipe in the penetration or adjacent to it , while still maintain-ing the integrity of costainment.

c. Penetrations will be capable of safely accommodating all thermal and mechanical stresses which may be encountered during all modes of operation and test.

The materials used for penetrations, including the personnel access air locks, the equipment access hatch, the piping and duct penetration sleeves and the ,,

! electrical penetration sleeves will conform with the requirements set forth

( by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. In accordance with this code i the penetration materials shall meet the necessary nil ductility transition impact values as specified ir Section 5 2.1.k.h.

5.2.1.8.2 Electrical Penetrations Cartridge type penetrations vill be used for all electrical conductors pas-l sing through the steel containment vessel. The penetration cartridges will l be hollow cylinders through which the conductors pass. Each cartrid6 e vill be provided with a pressure connection to allow pressurization for testing.

Figure 5 h shows typical electrical penetrations. The cartridges will be installed in penetration sleeves velded into the vall of the conta,inment l vessel. Sealing between the cartridges and the sleeves vill be accomplished l bf welding. The headers through which the cables pass will be hermetically sealed. All materials used in the design vill be selected for resistance to all possible environment conditions.

As shown in Figure 5 h two details of electrical penetrations are provided <

to cet the following requirements :

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a. Detail I - Typical High Voltage Power Penetration Consisting of ec..luetors sealed to high strength alumina or similar insulatu bushings at each end of cartridge.

b. Detail II - Typis . Lov Voltage Power Control & Instrumentation Penetration Cables will be connected to hermetically sealed plugs mounted in the headers.

Each cartridge will be sealed and tested at the factory for leakage. The only seals that vill need to be made in the field will be the velds mounting the cartridges into the sleeves. Where necessary, the outer sides of the penetration headers vill be protected against contamination by accumulations of dirt and moisture.

Cable penetrations through the shield building vill be made through relatively .

leak tight bulkhead type cable seals. Sufficient cable slack will be provided in the annulus to allow for differential expansion between the containment vessel and the shield building.

5 2.1.8.3 Piping Penetrations All penetrations vill penetrate the shield building as well as the containment vessel, both of which vill be provided with capped spare penetrations for

, possible future requirements.

Penetrations are divided into two general classes:

a. Type -1 " Hot" piping (penetrations which must accommodate thermal movement).

b. Type General piping (penetrations which are subject to only relatively small themal movement or stress) .

Commercially available components will be utilized in both types of penetra-tions, and will be assembled to fit the physical arrangement conditions pre-sent in the containment. The extension of the penetration and the addition of the flexible membrane seal at the shield building portion of the penetration represent no significant alteration to penetrations utilized in other contain-ment concepts. The material selected for the flexible membrane seal vill not impose significant stresses on the penetration. The two types of piping pene-trations are shown in Figures 5-5, and 5-6. The high temperature lines, such as the steam lines, vill have penetrations which will allow for both axial and lateral movement during normal station operations. The penetration sleeve is velded to the containment vessel, and a two-ply bellows expansion joint is provided to accommodate any movement between the process line and the contain-ment vessel and relative movement between the containment vessel and the shield building under any conditions. The bellows will be designed to withstand con-tainment design pressure. Test connections vill be provided to permit testing of the integrity of both expansion joints and membranes. A low pressure flex-

.- ible closure of rubber or impregnated canvas material, or equal, vill seal the 0039 g 5

D-B process line to the sleeve in the shield building. A guard pipe t=sediately <-'s surrounds the process line and is designed to protect the bellows and maintain )

the penetration seal should the process line fail within the annulus between the containment vessel und shield building. The fittings are designed to the same pressure requirements as the process line.

Figure 5-5 represents the penetration configuration for a typical " hot" pip-ing penetration. The process line is enclosed in a guard pipe as it passes through the containment vessel vall, and the process line and guard pipe are connected through a multiple-flued fitting. This fitting is a one-piece forg-ing with internal flues or nozzles and vill be designed to meet the require-ments o* the ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Sections III and VIII. The forging vill be tested as specified by this code. The process line penetration sleeve is velded to the containment vessel and extends into the space between the vessel shell and the shield building where it is velded to a bellows assembly which, in turn, is velded to the multiple flued fitting. The bellows, which vill be made of stainless steel, accommodates the maximum relative movements of the process pipe and containment structures.

Following is a more detailed description of the main steam penetrations which are basically M-1 type construction.

The normal operating position is essentially horizontal for the main steam line, as well as the guard pipe. The main steam pipe and the guard pipe are anchored and independent of the containment vessel. The pipe is anchored at one side of the penetration while a guide is provided on the opposite side to hold the steam line from uncontrolled movement in the event of a pipe break.

The main steam line passes through a large sleeve imbedded in the shield build- '}

ing. The resulting annular gap is sealed by an extremely flexible membrane seal which is attached on one end to the sleeve in the shield building and the other to the main steam pipe. There vill be no significant force transmitted from the main steam pipe through this membrane to the shield building under any conditions. The penetration sleeve, velded to the containment vessel is connected to the multiple-flued head by means of a two-ply bellows. No sig-nificant force vill be transmitted through this connection to the ccntainment vessel.

Following a loss of coolant accident, the containment vessel, due to increased vall temperature and pressure, vill expand upward from its base by varying amounts depending on elevation and will also expe' ' radially due to temperature and pressure. The main steam pipe and the guard pipe within the containment vessel vill remain anchored and essentially in their original positions. Rel-ative movement between the main steam pipe and the containment vessel vill be absorbed by compression and deflection of the expansion joints. Sufficient clearance vill be provided between the guard pipe and the penetration sleeve so that they vill not come into contact under any foreseeable conditions.

As previously indicated, a break of the main ~ steam pipe between the contain-ment vessel vall and the multiple-flued fitting vill restrict pipe jet forces by means of the anchors and guides and will also direct all released fluids into the containment vessel.

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/ The end of the guard pipe vill be provided with an i=pingement ring which would deflect the jet from a pipe break so as to protect the expansion bellows from a direct jet impingement.

The cold piping is velded directly to the penetration sleeves. Bellows and guard pipes are not necessary in this design, since the thermal stresses are small and are accounted for in the design of the veld joints. A low pressure flexible closure of rubber impregnated canvas material or equal, will seal the cold pipe to the sleeve penetrating the penetration room. This type of pene-tration is shown in Figure 5-6. The piping configuration and supports on either side of the penetration will be designed to preclude overstressing the contain=ent vessel at the penetration under post-accident conditions.

The expansion joints in the " hot" lines and the low pressure seals for all lines vill be designed to acco=modate the maximum combination of differential movements vertically and horizontally between the containment vessel and the shield building. .

Where necessary, the hot lines are anchored to limit the movement of the line relative to the contain=ent vessel as well as not to exceed permissible stress levels in the containment vessel penetrations. The limitation of movement is utilized to assure that the deJign limits of the flexing portions of the pene-tration are not exceeded during station operation, test, or post-accident condition.

5.2.1.8.h Equipment and Personnel Access An equipment hatch vill be provided as shown in Figure 5-2. This is a velded steel assembly, with a double gasketed flanged and bolted cover. Provision is made to pressurize the space between the double gaskets to h0 psig. One personnel air-lock and one emergency air-lock are provided as shown in Figure 5-3. These are velded steel assemblies. Each lock has two double gasketed doors in series.

Provision is made to pressurize the space between the gaskets. The doors will be mechanically interlocked to ensure that one door cannot be opened until the second door is sealed. Provisions shall be made for deliberately violating the interlock by the use of special tools and procedures under strict administra-tive control. Each door vill be equipped with quick acting valves for equaliz-ing the pressure across the doors. The doors will not be operable unless the pressure is equalized. Pressure equalization vill be possible from every point at which the associated door can be operated. The valves for the two doors vill be properly interlocked so that only one valve can be opened at one time, and only when the opposite door is closed and sealed. *Each door shall be de-signed so that with the other door open, it vill withstand and seal against design and testing pressures of the containment vessel. There vill be visual indication outside each door showing whether the opposite door is open or closed.

Provision vill be made outside each door for remotely closing and latching the -

opposite door so that in the event that one door is accidentally left open it can be closed by remote control. The air-locks shall have nozzles installed which vill permit pressure testing of the lock at any time.

An interior lighting system and a cor=unications sygtem will be installed;

these systems vill be capable of operating from the emergency power supply.

1 0041 $

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D-B 5.2.1.8.5 Fuel Transfer Penetrations Two fuel transfer penetrations are provided to transport fuel rods between the refueling transfer canal and the spent fuel pit during refueling operations of the reactor. Each penetration consists of a 30-inch diameter stainless steel pipe installed inside a 42-inch sleeve. The inner pipe acts as the transfer tube. Provisions will be made to provide integrity of contain=ent, allowance for differential movement between structures and prevent leakage through the transfer tubes in the event of an accident.

5.2.1 9 Missile Protection Features The containment vessel is protected from external missiles by the shield build-ing as described in Sections 5.2.2.3.9 and 5.2.2.3.10. Protection from internal missiles is provided by the primary shield and other containment internal structures as described in Section 5.2.3.

5 2.1.10 Insulation It is not anticipated that any part of the containment vessel vill be insu-lated.

5.2.1.11 Shielding The radiation shielding within the containment vessel is designed to minimize the exposure of station personnel to radiation emanating from the reactor and auxiliary systems. The radiation levels prevalent during station operation, 'S as well as those experienced upon shutdown, are considered in the determination i of the shielding requirements, as described in Section 11.2.2.

5.2.2 SHIELD BUILDING DESIGN 5.2.2.1 Design Conditions The shield building vill be a reinforced concrete structure of right cylinder configuration with a shallow dome roof. An annular space vill be provided 7lbetweenthesteelcontainmentvesselandtheinteriorfaceofthe 1 shield building of approximately k.5 feet to permit construction operations and periodic visual inspection of the steel containment vessel. The volume 8 contained within this annulus vill be approximately 678,700 cu. ft.

8l The shield building vill have a height of 279 5 ft measured from the top of the 1 f undation ring to the top of the dome. The thickness of the vall and the dome vill be approximately 2.5 ft and 2 ft, respectively. She design basis for shielding requirements for operational radiation protection are discussed in Section 11.2.2.

The normal ambient temperature in the annular space vill be set by heat loss through the steel containment vessel shell and concrete shield building. The steel containment vessel metal tepperature can be maintained above 30 F during reactor operation. s s

Amendment No. 8 5-12 NN

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( Following a loss of coolant accident, heat transferred to the air in the annular space could cause a pressure rise. The shield building ventilation system shall be designed to limit these temperature induced pressure transients to less than 6 inch H20. Conservative assumptions for temperature transmission to the space, and pressure drop in the shield building ventilation system are used in sizing the ventilation system. Following this initial 2 pressure transient the shield building is maintained at a slight negative pressure, between -1/2 and -1 1/2 inches vg. The shield building structure vill be analyzed also to assure adequate strength to accomodate thermal stresses resulting from thermal gradients produced by the temperature transients.

The following loadings will be considered in the design of the shield building:

a. Structures dead load

b. Loss of coolant accident load

c. Live Load

d. Wind Load

e. Tornado load

f. Uplift due to buoyant forces

g. Earthquake loads

h. External missiles

i. Equipment load

j. Thermal load

k. Earth load 5.2.2.2 Leakage Rate The shield building is designed so that its leakage rate at 1/4 inch of water is not greater than the quantities indicated in Table 5-1.

f l

l 0043 y i 44445 \

5-13 Amendment No. 2  !

D-B TABLE 5-1 7 SHIELD BUILDING LEAKAGE RATES '

(Based upon data presented in the Report NAA-SR-10100, Conventional Buildings for Reactor Containment)

Leakage Rate **

Leakage Rate ** (Percent of Annulus Source of Leakage (Cubic Feet in 2h Hours) Volume in 2h Hours)

Concrete Surface of Wall and Dome 10 7 3 7 x 10-3 Construction Joints

• 182 5 h5 7 x 10-3 Cracks in Concrete:

a. Temperature Cracks Negligible Negligible

b. Shrinkage Cracks Negligible Negligible

c. Earthquake Cracks Negligible Negligible

d. Stress Cracka at Springline 2220.0 555 x 10-3 Penetrations (All) Negli61ble Negligible Equipment Door' 576 1h4 x 10-3 Personnel Door - (2) 259 6h.8 x 10-3 Total Leakage 32h8.2 813 x 10-3

• Construction joint leakage is based on constructing the wall with built-up forms and allowing cold joints between successive 6 foot pours with no seals or coatings at joints. Leakage allowance has also been made for construc-tion joints in the roof.

• • At 1/h inch W.G. differential pressure.

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5.2.2 3 Design Loadings 5 2.2 3.1 Dead Loads Dead load will consist of the dead vei6ht of the shield building; the con-tainment vessel, grout under the containment vessel; the foundation slab, the weight of structural steel and miscellaneous building items within the contain=ent vessel.

Densities used for dead load calculation vill be an follows:

a. Concrete: 143 lb/cu ft

b. Steel Reinforcing: h89 lb/cu ft using nominal cross-section areas of reinforcing bar sizes. ,

c. Steel containment vessel: 489 lb/cu ft ,

5.2.2.3.2 Loss of Coolant Accident Load The loss of coolant accident load is determined by analysis of the pressure and temperature transients in the annulus durin6 a loss of coolant accident.

The shield building ventilation system and containment vacuum relief system will keep pressure in the annulus within design pressure under this condition.

5 2.2.3.3 Live Load

(

_, Live load on the doce which will be uniformly applied to the top surface of deme at an assumed value of h0 lb per horizontal plan projection square foot.

Live load is not considered in conjunction with loss of coolant accident load, and is intended only to assure structural adequacy of the roof.

5 2.2.3.h Wind Load Wind loading for t..a Shield Building is based on Figure 1 (b) ASCE Paper 3269,

" Wind Forces on Structures," using the fastest mile of wind for a 100-year period of recurrence. This results in 90-mph basic wind at 30 feet above grade. In addition, this paper vill be used to determine shape factors, gust factors and variation of wind velocity with height.

5 2.2 3.5 Tornado Load There are few reliable measurements of the pressure drop associated with a tornado funrel. The greatest reliably messured pressure drops have been on the order of 1.5 psi or less.

The design pressure drop will be assumed to be 3 psi in 3 seconds. This is 100" greater than the greatest pressure ever reliably measured, which is quite conservative.

Because of the complexity of the airflow in a tornado, it has not been possi-l t ble to calculate the velocity or trajectory of missiles that v ruly

' represent tornado conditions. It is assumed that objects of lo ss-sectional g

0045 5-15

D-B density, such as boards, metal siding and similar items, may be picked up and carried et the maximum vind velocity of 300 inph. O The behavior of heavier, oddly shaped objects such as the automobile is less

)

predictable.

The design values of 50 mph for a E 0 lb automobile lifted 25 ft in the air is considered to be representative of what could happen in a 300 mph vind as the automobile is lifted, tumbled along the ground, and ejected from the tornado funnel by centrifugal force. These missile velocities are consis-tent with reported behavior of such items in previous tornadoes.

The structure vill be analyzed for tornado loading (not coincident with the LOCA or earthquake) on the following basis:

a. Differential pressure between the inside and outside of the shield building is assumed to be 3 psi positive pressure.

b. Lateral force on the shield building vill be assumed as the force caused by a tornado funnel having a peripherical tangential .

velocity of 300 mph and a forward progression of 60 mph. The applicable portions of vind design methods described in ASCE Paper 3269 vill be used, particularly for shape factors. The provisions for gust factors and variation of vind velocity with height do not apply.

c. A tornado driven missile equivalent to a 12 foot long piece of wood 8 inches in diameter traveling end on at a speed of 250 mph.

d. A tornado driven missile equivalent to a h000 lb automobile traveling through the air at 50 mph and at not more than 25 feet ~

above t'le ground, vill be assumed.

r e.

A tornade driven missile equivalent to a 10 foot long piece of pipe 3.h inches 0.D. traveling end on at a speed of 100 mph will be assumed.

A discussion of the probability of tornado occurrence is presented in Section 2.3.

Except for local crushing at the missile impact area, the effect of tornado vill be accounted for in the design of the Shield building by the ultimate strength design  !

method in accordance with the loading combination in Appendix 5A. '

5 2.2.3.6 Uplift Due to Buoyant Forces 3

Uplift forces which are created by the displacement of ground water by the structure vill be accounted for in the design.

5 2.2.3.T Seismic Loads Seismic loads are computed using the following: (See Section 5.2.1.3 5)

H l

a. Maximum probable (smaller) horizontal seismic ground acceleration is 0.08 g.

b. The maximum possible (larger) horizontal seismic ground acceleratio considered is 0.15 g.

0046 Amendment No. 3 5-16 l

D-B

'_ c. Vertical ecmponent of 2/3 of the horizontal ground acceleration 4

is applied simultaneously with the horizontal acceleration.

5.2.2.3.8 Ceismic Analysis The seismic analysis of the contain=ent and the other critical structure and equipment within the contain=ent vill be based on a structural dynamic anal-ysis using a respense spectrum normalized to 0.08 g for the maximum probable 1 (smaller) earthauake and 0.15 g for the maximum possible (larger) case, '

respectively. (See Appendix 5A and Appendix 2C) 2 A dynsmic analysis is performed on the Class I structures to deter- 1 mine their behavior during an earthquake. The analysis is accomplished in five (5) steps. The first step consists of reducing a typical structure into a mathe=atical model in ter=s of lumped rasses and stiffness coefficients.

The second step is to obtain the natu 41 frequencies and mode shapes of the model. The third step is an evalucLion process to determine the proper values of da= ping. The fourth step determines resulting internal forces on ~

the typical contain=ent using the spectrum response curve of the earthq.uake.

The fifth step is for internal equipment located at different levels and provides a description of the earthquake environment.

In building the mathematical model, Figure 5-7, the locations for lumped masses are chosen at floor levels and points considered of critical interest. Between mass points the structural properties are reduced to uniform segments of cross-sectional area, effective shear area and coments of inertia. The foundations of the containment are located on competent rock and consequently are represented 1 s

in the model as fixed bases. Preliminary investigations indicate that the influence of translation and rotation on the rock is small and therefore can be neglected. With this information, a computerized analysis is used to form the stiffness matrix, [K} , cf the structure. The masses are arranged into a mass matrix, [M}.

The natural frequencies and mode shapes are obtained by solution of the equation below:

[K] [X} = v2 [M] [X]

The mode shapes are plotted and examined to determine how the structure is vibrating.

second. All modes are considered with frequencies less than 35 cycles per The basic values for damping of specific materials and types of construction are presanted in Appendix 5A.

of the mode shapes. These values are utilized after an evaluation If a structural mode of flexure indicates =ajor activity of a specific material "

then that material damping value is employed. For those modes which indicate activity of several materials, then their da= ping values are utilized based on a veighting piopess using the mode shapes and masses. Damping values are assigned to each m' ode.

s oon 5-17 Amendment No. 2

D-B Tha spectrum response curve of the earthquake is presented in Appendix 20.

Tha values of this curve are utilized by the standard spectrum response tech-niques. Acceleration values are selected from the curve for each mode, based on damping and natural frequency. Effective force, shear, and moment dia-grams are computed for each mode. The shears and moments of the individual mod:s are combined on a root mean square basis.

For internal equipment located at various elevations, the earthquake environ-ment is specified by additional analysis. This is done on a separate basis as the numerous equipment items of =m11 mass in comparison to the building ,

cannot feasibly be incorporated into the model. For internal equipment which is rigid, having natural frequencies greater than 30 cps, the maximum acceler-Micn to be expected is obtained from an acceleration diagram generated by tha spectrum response technique. For flexible equipment, having natural fre-quencies less than 30 cycles per second, the environment is specified by spec-trum response curves de.veloped at various elevations'and other points of tttrchments. The curves are generated by an ear,thquake time history analy-

"lsic of the building, using the Modified Helena, Montana earthquake of 31, October,

• 2 1935, E.W. component normalized to .08 g and .15 g accelerations for the smaller and larger earthquakes.

The applicant will investigate the seismic effects of vertical accelerations on the structures, components and equipments. The ground motion input to the model vill be two thirds of the horizontal ground motion. Wherever required a multi-6 degree freedom modal ana?ysis will be made which vill determine vertical displace-ments, velocities, accelerations, shears and moments. Se vertical stresses if significant will be added directly and linearly tc those stresses produced by j horizontal seismic analysis in combination with stresses caused by other concur-rent loads.

5 2.2.3.9 External Missiles The shield building vill be designed to withstand, without loss of function, a tornado driven nissle as described in Section 5.2.2.3 5 5.2.2.3.10 Analysis and Design for Missiles The shield building vill be designed to withstand the pote tal missile loads as referred to in Section 5 2.2.3 9 and Appendix 2A. The contain=ent internal structure surrounding major equipment will be designed to withstand the pctential missile loads as referred to in Section 5.2 3.1.

.) Analysis of the effect on structures for impact of the missiles will be based on methods presented in NavDocks P-51 8/and the report on defense activities by the NUS Corporation. See Appendix 2A for further discussion.

Am:ndment No.7 5-18

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5 2.2.4 Construction Materials

\ Basically, two materials will be used for the foundation and the shield building. They are:

a. Concrete

b. Reinforcing steel Detailed specifications and working drawings for these materials and their installation vill be of such scope as to assure that the quality of work will be commensurate with the necessary integrity of the containment.

Basic specifications for these materials, for their procurement and for their delivery to the structure are described in the following sections.

5.2.2.h.1 Concrete All concrete work will be in accordance with ACI 318-63, " Building Code '

Requirements for Reinforced Concrete" and ACI-301, " Specifications for Struc-tural Concrete for Buildings." Concrete vill be a dense, durable mixture of sound coarse aggregate, fine aggregate, cement, fly ash and water. Admixtures will be added to improve the quality and workability of the plastic cenert.t2 during placement and to retard the set of concrete. Aggregates will conform to " Standard Specifications for Concrete Aggregate," ASTM Designation C33.

Fine aggregate vill consist of sharp, hard, strong, and durable sand, free from adherent coatings, clay, loam, alkali, organic material, or other deleterious substances.

Acceptablity of aggregates will be based on the following ASTM tests. The tests will be performed by a qualified commercial testing laboratory.

Test ASTM Los Angeles Abrasion C-131 Clay Lumps Natural Aggregate C-lh2 8

9 '

00ag ,

5-19

D-B Test . ASTM Material Finer No. 200 Sieve C-117 Mortar Making Properties C-87 Organic Impurities C-k0 Potential Reactivity (Chemical) C-289 Potential Reactivity (Mortar Bar) C-227 (if necessary after performance of C-289)

Sieve Analysis C-136 Soundness C-88 Specific Gravity and Absorption C-127 ,

Specific Gravity and Absorption C-128 Petrographic C-295 Aggregate testing vill be carried out as follows:

a. Sand Sample for Gradation (ASTM C-33 Fine Aggregate).

b. Organic Test on Sand ( AC'"M C-40). ,

c. 3/4 Inch Sample for Gradation (ASTM C-33 Size No. 67).

d. 1-1/2 Inch Sample for Gradation (ASTM C-33 Size No. 4).

e. Check for Proportion of Flat and Elongated Particles.

Cement for all concrete except the shield building vill be Type II lov alkali O cement as specified in " Standard Specifications for Portland Cement," ASTM Designation C-150, ano. -ill be tested to comply with ASTM C-114 The shield 3

building vill have Type I cement above grade.

An equivalent of 15% of the weight of cement will be replaced by fly ash in 8l concrete except in concrete used in slip-form work.

Fly ash vill be specified as ASTM C-618-68 Class F, " Fly Ash and Raw or Cal-cined Natural Pozzolans for use in Portland Cement Concrete," and will be tested to comply with ASTM C-311, " Sampling and Testing Fly Ash for Use as an Admixture in ' Portland Cement Concrete."

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Amendment No. 8 5-20

a D-B

-~ Water for mixing concrete vill be clean and free from any deleterious amounts

', of acid, alkali, salts, oil, sediment, or organic matter and required to pass ACI 313 require =ents.

A vater-reducing agent vill be e= ployed to reduce shrinkage and creep of con-crete. Admixtures containing chlorides will not be used.

Concrete mixes may be designed in accordance with ACI 613, using materials qualified and accepted for this work. Only mixes meeting the design require-ment specified for containment building concrete vill be used. Trial mixes will be tested in accordance with applicable ASTM Codes as indicated below:

Test ASTM Making and Curing Cylinder in C-192 Laboratory Air Content C-231 .

Slump C-lh3 Bleeding C-232 Compressive Strength Tests C The concrete vill have a design compressive strength of 4000 psi at 28 days for the shield building vall, dome, building foundation and wall below grade and 5000 psi at 28 days for the Internal Structures. 1 Concrete samples vill be taken from the mix according to ASTM C-172,

" Sampling Fresh Concrete." From these samples, cylinders for compression testing vill be made. They vill be stripped within 2h hours after casting and marked and stored in the curing room. These cylinders vill be made in eccordance with ASTM C-31, " Tentative "ethod of Making and curing concrete Compression and Flexure Test Specimens in the Field."

Slump, air content, and temperature =easurements will be taken when cylinders are cast. Slumn tests vill be performed in accordance with ASTM C-lh3, "Stan-dard Method of Test for Slumn of Portland Cement Concrete." Air content tests will be performed in accordance with ASTM C-231, " Standard Method of Test for s.

]

M 0051

. .T.', 5-21

D-B Air Content of Freshly Mixed Concrete by the Pressure Method." Compressive strength tests vill be made in accordance with ASTM C-39, " Method of Test for ,

Compressive Strength of Molded Concrete Cylinders." .

Evaluation of compression test will be in accordance with ACI 21h-65 Design and construction vill comply with appropriate provisions of ACI 318-63 for concrete cover over cc 1ventional reinforcement with the following exceptions:

a. Bar sizes greater than No.11 and Cadweld splice s'.eeves at formed faces in contact with soil; 3 in. minimum clear cover.

b. Bar sizes No. 11 or less at formed faces in contact with soil; 2 in. minimum clear cover.

5 2.2.h.2 Reinforcing Steel Main reinforcing steel in the foundations, valls, and dome of the shield building and around penetrations in the valls will be deformed billet steel bars con-forming to ASTM A-615-68 Grade 60.

Mill test results will be obtained from the reinforcing steel supplier for each heat of steel to show proof that the reinforcing steel has the speci.fied composition, strength, and ductility.

The following are requirements for splices in reinforcement:

a. For bar sizes No.11 and smaller, splices vill be made in 8

l accordance with ACI 318-63 and proposed ACI 318-70 whichever' governs.

b. For bar sizes greater than No. 11, mechanical or velded splices vill be used.

c. All mechanical (Cadweld) splicing vill be in accordance with Appendix SC.

Welding of reinforcing steel, if required, vill be performed by qualified velders in accordance with AWS D12.1-61, " Recommended Practice for Welding Rein-forcing Steel, Metal Inserts, and Connections in Reinforced Concrete Construc-tion," but tack welding vill not be permitted.

l 3

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Amendment No. 8' M :.- 0052 5-22

D-B

- 5.2.2 5 Design Bases i'

• The shield building vill completely enclose the containment vessel, the personnel. access openings, the equipment hatch, and that portion of all penetrations that are associated with primary containment. The design of the shield building shall provide for (1) biological shielding, (2) controlled release of the annulus atmosphere under accident condition, and (3) environmental protection of the containment vessel.

The reinforced concrete shield building vill be designed in accordance with ACI 307-69, Specification for the Design and Construction of Reinforced Concrete Chimneys, and checked by the Ultimate Strength Design Method in accordance with ACI 318-63 Load combinations specified in ACI 307-69 provide the design basis of the shield building. In addition, the shield building vill be checked to see that all load combinations with load factors lists a in Appendix 5A are satisfied by using the Ultimate Strength Design Method.

See Appendix 5B for a detailed discussion of the load factors.

Adequate reinforcing vill be placed in the concrete valls, dome and foundation to control cracking due to concrete shrinkage and temperature gradients.

The loading condition 6.1.2.1 as stated in Appendix 5A provides a design basis to assure that the shield building vill suffer no loss of shielding or containment function due to a tornado (see Section 5.2.2.3.5). IT The design of the shield building vill assure an elastic behaviour of steel g

reinforcement during a maximum possible (larger) earthquake controlling cracking of concrete and impairment of leak tight integrity. 3 The personnel and equipment hatch openings and the major piping penetrations 8 through the shield building vill be designed such that all the anticipated loads be carried by frame action around the openings. This frame action vill be achieved by adding sufficient reinforcement around the perimeter of the openings. Diagonal bars at each corner of the opening vill be added to provide the horizontal and vertical shear resistance, l

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( o. 0053 5-23 Amendment No. 8

D-B 5.2.2 5 1 Yield Capacity Reduction Factors The yield capacity of all load carrying structural elements will be reduced -

by a yield'espacity reduction factor (9) as given below. The justification for these numerical values is given in Appendix SD. This factor vill provide for the possibility that small adverse variations in material strengths, work-macship, dimensions, control, and degree of supervision while individually within required tolerance and the limits of good practice, occasionally may combine to result in undercapacity.

5.2.2 5.2 Foundation and Supports The foundations of the shield building, containment vessel and internal structures will be located on bedded dolomite and will have no structural continuity with the foundation of any adjacent building.

Both the containment structures and the adjacent auxiliary building are founded on rock, consequently, relative static settlements are expected to be ,

negligibly small. Should the foundation analysis indicate differential settlements between adjoining structures , provision vill be made to accommodate the movements.

Relative horizontal displacements between adjacent structures occurring during an earthquake vill be developed by the Seismic A.:alysis. The structures vill be separated a sufficient distance to insure that impact cannot occur.

5.2.2.6 Design Analysis The shield building vill be analyzed for individual cases of dead load, temperature gradient, vind load, tornado, earthquake, and loss of coolant accident loads.

The basis of the vind analysis is identified in Section 5.2.2.3.h.

-The loading for tornado wind is discussed in Section 5.2.2.3.5.

The seismic analysis of the shield building is discussed in Section 5.2.2.3.8.

The resulting stresses from individual loadings vill be combined as indicated 3 in ACI 307-69 and. Appendix 5A.

Further descriptions of the methods of analysis vill be available as the design progresses.

. :0054 }~

, '~;.2}?,+

..s-6 H. P

' Amendment No. 3 5-2h

D-B

( 5 2.2 7 Penetrations The shield building and penetration room penetrations for piping, ducts, and electrical cable are designed to withstand the normal environmental conditions which may prevail during station operation and also +,o retain their integrity during the following postulated accidents.

The openings in the shield building and penetration rooms, including personnel access openings, equipment access openings and penetrations for piping, ducts, and electrical cable are designed to provide containment which is as effective as the shield building and consistent with the leakage rate specified. The penetration rooms for the cold piping are open to the shield building annulus.

Sealing of the penetration room to the shield building is provided by flexible membranes designed to accommodate relative motion of the two structures. For cold piping penetrations, see Figure 5-6. For containment cooling and ventile l2 tion system diagram, see Figure 6-7 Bulkheed type doors equipped with gasket seals and positive closure devices I are provided for personnel access. A bolted, sealed cover h provided at the equipment opening. Personnel access doors will be provided with devices to actuate indicating lights in the control room to show tight closure.

Sealed penetrations will be provided for steam lines, cooling water, vents, and other services. Flexible seals or expansion joints vill be installed where necessary to accommodate pipe movements.

I Possible deterioration of seals on the doors and penetrations vill be detected and remedied through periodic inspections and tests.

Electrical cable penetration through the shield build.ng vill be made through relatively leaktight cable seals.

Flexibility of all cables will be provided between the shield building and the containment vessel so that no damage can occur to the cables or structures due to differential movements between the two structures.

All redundant controls, instrumentation and power circuits will be physically separated so that no duplicate circuits will terminate at the same penetration canister at the containment vessel. '

A more complete discussion of penetrations is presented in Section 5.2.1.8.

5.2.2.8 Corrosion Protection For concrete structures, minimum concrete protection for reinforcement shall conform to the ACI Standard (ACI 318-63).

Based upon the recommendations of ACI Code, corrosion protection for the reinforcing steel in the shield building is provided by positioning reinforcing steel to allow 2 inches minimum clearangel between 3 the steel and any concrete face on the shield building vall.

Ap . . . . .

. . Waterproofidgibsmbrane vill be used around that_mortion of the shield building below t$ ' ground water level. .W55 5-25 Amendment No. 3

D-B 5.2.3 CONTAINMENT INTERIOR STRUCTURE

.O The containment interior structure consists of the concrete primary shield, a concrete refueling canal and a concrete operating floor enclosing the )

primary cooling system and service missile shields.

Tho structures which house or support the basic systems will be designed to sustain the Class I loading combinations as described in Appendix 5A.

The design bases to be applicti are:

a. The structuze will sustain all operating loads , thermal loads, seismic loads, and thermal deformations as indicated in Appendix 5A, with a reduction of yield capacity as shown,in Appendix 5A-6.1.1.2.

b. Loads and deformations resulting from a ' loss of coolant accident and its associated effects will be restricted such that the propagation of the failure to any other system is prevented. In addition, a failure in one loop of the nucle'ar steam supply -

system will not cause failure in the other loop.

Tha loss of coolant accident loads and associated effects include':

a. Thrust loads resulting from rapid mass release from a pipe break in any system.

b. Pressure buildup in locally confined areas.

D

c. Jet forces resulting from the impingement of the escaping mass upon adjacent structure.

.)

d. Erosion effects of jet spray.

e. Pipe whipping following a break in the pipe.

f. Rapid rise in ambient temperature and accompanying rise in ambient pressure.

g. Internal missile loads as described in Section 5.2.3.1. (See also Section 5.2.2.3.10 for analysis and design for missiles.)

Magnitude of thrust forces and pressure buildup resulting from the pipe break will be determined by computer methods; the calculation will be made from cppropriate blowdown values as they are developed.

Saismic analysis for the interior structures will conform to the appropriate procedures outlined in Section 5.2.2.3.8. Where concrete structure's such as '

tha primary shielding wall are subjected to' sustained. internal heat buildup,

• cooling will be provided to keep the internal temperatures below acceptable design limits.

5.2.3.1 Internal Missile Protection Features -

High-pressure reactor coolant system equipment which could be the source of ,

missiles is. suitably screened either by the concrete shield vall enclosing 7 '

.;; 3; -

0056

~

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D-B the reactor coolant loops or by the concrete operating floor to block any

(,ct.,,

passage of missiles to the containment vessel walls. The steam drum which forms an integral part of the steam generator represents a mass of steel which provides protection from missiles originating in the section of the containment within the shield we'l and below the operating floor. A structure is provided over the control rou drive mechanisms to block any missiles gener-ated from a hypothetical fracture of a housing.

Missile protection will be provided to comply with the following criteria:

a. The containment vessel vill be protected from loss of function due to damage by such missiles as might be generated in a loss of coolant accident for break sizes up to and including the .

double ended severance of a reactor coolant pipe.

b. The engineered safety features and components required to maintain containment integrity will be protected against loss of function due to damage by missiles. -

During the detailed station desira the missile protection necessary to meet 3

the above criteria vill be deve' -M and implemented using the following

considerations

a. Components of the reactor coolant system will be examined to

' identify and to classify missiles according to size, shape, and kinetic energy for purposes of analyzing their effects.

i

b. Missile veJ ocities will be calculated considering both fluid and mechanical driving forces which could act during missile generation.

c. The structural design of the missile shielding vill take into account both static and impact loads.

d. The reactor coolant system will be surrounded by reinforced concrete and steel structures designed to withstand the forces associated with double ended rupture of a reactor coolant pipe and designed to stop the missiles.

C V

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D-B 5.3 CONTAI2EIT ISOLATION SYE E_M r

5.3.1 DESIGN BASES '

The general design bases governing isolation valve requirements for contain-ment fluid penetraticns are:

Leakage through all penetrations not serving accident-consequence-limiting systems is to be minimized by a double barrier so that no single, credible failure or malfunctica of an active component can result in loss-of-isolation.

The installed double barriers take the form of closed piping syste ., both inside and outside the containment, and various types of isolatiot valves.

Containment isolation occurs on a signal of high pressure in the containment.

Valves which isolate penetrations that are directly open to the containment atmosphere such as the containment purge valves and sump drain valves will 'I also be closed on a high radiation signal. Development of the instrumentation l circuits and instrumentation signals is presented in Section 7 -l l The isolation system closes all penetrations, not required for cperation of  ;

the engineered safety features system, to minimise the leakage of radioactive materials to the environment. In addition, alt isolation valves, upon loss of actuating power, fail closed except those required for engineered safety features.

All remotely operated contain=ent isolation valves are provided with. control switches and position limit indicating lights in the control room. D 1 J

5.3.2 SYSTEM DESIGN The fluid penetrations which require isolation after an accident may be classed as follows:

Type I Each line connecting directly to the reactor coolant system has two containment isolation valves in series. These valves may be either a check valve and a remotely' operated valve or two remotely operated valves, depending upon the direction of normal flow.

Tyne II Each line connecting directly to the containment atmosphere has two isolation valves in series. These valves may be either l a check valve and a remotely operated valve or two remotely l operated valves, depending upon the direction of normal flow. '

Tyne III Each line not directly connected to the re<: tor coolant system or not open to the centainment atmosphere has one valve, either .s a check valve or a remotely operated valve, depending on the direction of normal flow. i 5-28 0058

D-B s Tyne IV Lines serving engineered safety features systems have isolation valves which are automatically operated by emergency injection signal or remotely from the control room, hence are not automatically actuated by the containment isolation signal.

Additionally, there are various arrangements in each of these major groups.

The individual system flow diagrams show the manner in which each containment vessel isolation valve arrangement fits into its respective system. For convenience, each different valve arrangement is shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-8 of this section.

The table lists the mode of actuation, the types of valves , and its normal position. The specific system penetrations to which each of these arrange-ments is applied are also presented. Each valve is tested periodically during normal operation or during shutdown conditions to insure its operability when needed.

• i 0059 5-29

D-B 5.4 CONTAINMENT VESSEL COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTFM 5.h.1 DESIGN BASES 5.h.1.1 Governing Conditions The containment cooling and ventilation system is composed of the air recir-culation cooling system and the purge system, which accomplishes three func-tions:

a. To remove heat released by equipment and piping in the containment-vessel during normal operations

b. To purge the containment vessel with clean fresh air whenever access is desired. .

c. To cool and reduce the pressure of the containment vessel atmosphere after a loss-of-coolant accident.

Function "c" of the containment vessel air recirculation cooling system is further described in Section 6.2, " Containment Atmosphere Cooling Systems."

5.4.1.2 Sizing To provide for access to the containment vessel, the nor=al ventilation system vill be sized to control the interior containment vessel air te=perature to a ..

maximum of 120' F in accessible areas during operation and a minimum of h0 F during shutdown. The air recirculation units vill be sized to distribute air l over and around all heat producing or releasing equipment.

The purge system equipment vill be sized to provide a minimum of one air change per hour in the containment vessel.

5.h.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION A flow diagram of the containment cooling and ventilation system is shown in Figure 6-7 The air recirculation cooling system consists of three fan-cooler units located throughout the containment vessel, outside the secondary shield. Each fan-cooler unit is composed of a finned tube cooling coil and a direct driven fan.

These coola;.:

units vill recirculate and cool the containment vessel atmosphere. The vill use service water as the heat removal medium as shown on Figure.

6-6. The units will discharge the cooled air through ducts to provide adequate distribution for the equipment. Any two units will satisfy the requirements of normal station operation. In the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, any two units vill be capable of recirculating and cooling the containmhnt vessel ,

ctmosphere to reduce the containment pressure.

The purge system is designed to. provide clean fresh air to the containment vessel or to the shield building and penetration rooms. Nor= ally, the purge system is not in operation and the purge system isolation valves are closed. ,

When access to the containment is desired, the purge fans are started and the '

s: ". %

5-30 ..

0060

D-B

-s containment isolation valves opened; the isolation valves on the supply and (1scharge lines to the shield building remain closed. When purging of the

( unield . building and penetration rooms is desired, the purge fans are started and the isolation valves outside the containment vessel open: the isolation valves inside the containment vill remain closed.

Supply air is taken through an outside air intake, roughing filter, heating coil and purge supply fan and discharged into the containment to provide adequate distribution. The purge air is exhausted by the purge exhaust fan through a roughing filter and a high efficiency particulate filter. The containment vessel air vill be monitored. Discharges to the vent will also be monitored to prevent releases exceeding acceptable limits.

The containment vessel purge system vill also serve to purge the shield building and penetration rooms (see Figure 6-7).

5.4.2.1 Isolation valves As the normal cooling system is contained completely within the containment vessel, it will not include provisions for any isolation valves other than on cooling water lines. The purge system will be provided with double, automatic, power operated, isolation valves in both the supply and discharge ducts. These valves vill be normally closed and will be opened only for the purging operatien.

The isolation signal and controls are discussed in Section 7.2. The closure 7

times and sequence vill be developed during detailed design and safety

(- analyses.

5.h.3 TESTS AND INSPECTION The equipment, piping, valves and instrumentation are arranged so that they can be visually inspected. The fan cooler units and associated piping are located outside the secondary concrete shield around the reactor coolant system loops. Personnel could enter the containment vessel during power operations for inspgetion and emergency maintenance of this equipment. The service water piping and valves outside the shield building are inspectable at all times. Operational tests and inspections will be performed prior to initial startup.

Operability testing of the isolation valves is accomplished each time the purge system is put into operation.

c J

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e.-

n. ,, 5-31 OkO131L g

D-B 7l55 DERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTD4 "l

Ventilation of the penetration roons during normal operation is accomplished l by using the purge system as described in Section 5.h.

f

)

7 l The Emergency Ventilation System is intended for use only in an accident situation to establish a slight vacuum in the shield building annulus, the penetration rooms, and the emergency safety features equipment rooms. Any ,

6 leakage would be into these spaces and exhaust would be through HEPA and char-8l coal filters. This system is more fully described in Section 6.3.

Alternately, the fans and filters of the Emergency Ventilation System may be used to establish a slight vacuum in the fuel handling area in the event of a fuel handling accident. This is described in Section 9.8.2.3.

J J

' oosz Amendment po. 8 ,

5-32 l ..

D-B 5.6 LEAKAGE' MONITORING SYSTEM As stated in Section 5.2.1 the containment vessel vill be designed in accor-dance with the ASME Code,Section III, and will be rigorously analyzed for loading conditions of a lose of coolant accident, a " maximum possible (larger) earthquake" and all other leading conditions which the vessel could experience.

As stated in Section 5.8.1 the containment vessel will be constructed under strict quality assurance requirements, and on completion will be tested for structural integrity at 25 percent over pressure in accordance with the ASME Code, followed on completion of installation of all penetrations by an accep-tance leak rate test.

Thermal loads on the containment vessel from elevated temperature process piping will be reduced to minimal amounts by the use of bellows connections to penetrations housing this piping. The vessel will be protected from extreme variations of outdoor weather conditions by the shield building. Therefore, thermal cycling of the containment vessel vill be minimal. ~

Penetrations containing bellows or resilient seals will be provided with volume between seals that can be pressurized to " maximum internal pressure" for a periodic leak rate test to assure that no deterioration of bellows or seals has occurred. (See Section 5.2.1.8.) These penetrations are conserva-tively designed in'a manner comparable to penetrations used in containment systems requiring leak rates in the order of 0.1 percent to 0.2 percent per day.

1 Because of the influence of the shield building and the shield building venti-lation system in reducing offsite consequences of accidents, a leak rate of 0.5 percent per day can be established in order to provide significant margin against any conceivable deterioration of leak-tight characteristics. (See

. Sections 14.2.2.3 and 14.2.2.h.)

As a result of the conservative design, there is no reason to anticipate pro-gressive deterioration of the containment vessel shell or its attached pene-tration sleeves which would reduce the effectiveness of the shell as a vapor barrier during the life of the station. Further, there is a significant margin available for deterioration of seals before the resultant increase in leak rate becomes unacceptable. Ther.efore, it is concluded that no continuous monitoring system is required for the veld closures of the containment vessel or attached penetration sleeves, or for observing small changes in leak rate that may result from deterioration of seals, which may be leak tested period-ically during normal scheduled maintenance periods.

0063 5-33 1-

D-B 5.7 SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION The margin by which the containment system meets the needs of the postulated accidents is shown by the results of the analyses described in Section 14.2.

' With minimum engineered safety features operating on emergency power, the expected peak containment pressure is significantly below containment design pressure.

Th-re is significant margin to accommodate other energy releases, including the metal-water reaction. If all containment cooling units and both spray pumps are operative, containment pressure reduction would be at an even greater rate and the magnitude of margin would be greatly increased.

Utilization of a leakage rate of 0 5 percent per day from the containment vessel in the analysis of the loss of coolant accident in Section 14.2.2.3 is also quite conservative. The leakaEe rate of 0 5 percent per day is higher than is expected from a containment system employing high quality and fully inspected weld seams, double barrier penetration seals and lov leakage containment isolation systems.

Because of these design margins, and because the site boundary consequences calculated in Section 14.2.2.h are below the guidelines set forth in 10 CFR' 100 even for a containment vessel leakage rate of 2.5 percent per day, signif-icant deterioration of the containment systems could be tolerated'before the guidelins of 10 CFR 100 are approached. For these reasons, the containment systems need not be dependent upon the operation of a continuous leakage monitoring or leak surveillance system and only periodic testing is contemplated.

N i m

0064 l

5-3h

D-B 5.8 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS k 5.8.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL 5.8.1.1 . Pre-Operational Quality Control and Testing 5 8.1.1.1 General Requirements Test, code and cleanliness requirements will accompany each specification or purchase order for materials and equipment. Tests to be performed by the supplying manufacturers will be enumerated in the specifications together with the requirements, if any, for test witnessing by inspectors. Fabrication and cleanliness standards, including final cleaning and sealing will also be de-scribed together with shipping procedures. Standards and tests will be speci-fled in accordance with applicable regulations, recognized technical society codes and current industrial practices.

The containment vessel manufacturer will be required to submit design calcu-lations, drawings, and weld procedures to the applicant for review by his engineer before the performance of any work. This review, and review of work during construction, will assure compliance with applicable codes and speci-fications.

All velders and welding procedures shall be qualified in strict accordance with, and will meet the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section IX. Prior to the start of welding operations, the vessel manufacturer shall provide the applicant and his engineer with copies of the qualified

( welding procedure specifications and reports of the results of the qualification tests for each velder or welding operator.

All longitudinal and circumferential velds in the shell of the containment vessel shall be double-welded full penatration butt joints. All butt joints in any accessories subject to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be full penetration welds. All welds subject to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be 100 percent radiographed or otherwise explained in accordance with the ASME 3 oiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Welds which cannot ie radiographed, or where the interpretation of radiographs would be open to c oubt shall be examined by the magnetic particle, liquid penetrant or ultra-onic method.

In manual arc-welding, the electrodes shall be of the low hydrogen type. All welding filler metal shall have mechanical properties which are similar to the base metal. All automatic welding shall be by the submerged-are process.

Preheat in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be applied to all seams whose thickness exceeds 1-1/4 inch regardless of the surrounding air temperature. Preheat at 100 F shall be applied to thinner seams if the surrounding air temperature falls below 40 F and/or the surfaces to be welded are damp.

Charpy V-Notch impact tests shall be made on material, weld deposit, and the l base metal weld heat affected zone employing a test temperature of not higher l than 0 F. The requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,  !

('v ~

Paragraph N-1211 shall be met for all materials under jurisdiciiion of the code. l M l

%. a 0065 l 5-35'  !

D-B Impact test of veld deposit and base metal veld heat affected zone shall be made for each velding procedure requiring ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, eq Section IX qualifications.

. .. f Specimen removal from the test veld shall conform to the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section IX and removal of the impact specimens shall be in accordance with paragraph N-5kl.3 On completion of the conts.inment vessel fabrication and after the penetration 3 internals are installed and the construction opening is closed, pneumatic tests vill be performed in accordance with the applicable requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to demonstrate the integrity and leak tightness of the completed vessel. The bottom head of the containment vessel vill be Halide Leak Tested in accordance with Section III, Article 1k, Paragraph N-lhll of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code prior to placing interior and exterior concrete fill.

A soap bubble inspection test will be conducted with the vessel pressurized to 5 psig.

Soap suds shall be applied to all veld seams and gaskets, including .

both doors of the personnel air locks. A second soap bubble inspection test will be performed at h0 psig upon completion of the over-pressure test in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

After successful completion of the initial soap bubble test, a pneumatic pressure test vill be made on the containment vessel and each of the personnel air locks at a pressure of h5 psig, both the inner and . outer doors of the personnel air locks shall be tested at this pressure. The test pressure in the containment vessel will be maintained for at least one hour. The test pressure vill be maintained on each individual airlock door for at least one- s half hour. Folleving a successful completion of the over-pressure test, a leakage test at h0 psig pressure vill be performed on the containment vessel

,)

with the personnel air lock inner doors closed. Pressure vill be maintained for whatever length of time is required to demenstrate full compliance with the airtightness requirements. The leakage rate vill be determined by the

" Reference System Method" which consists of measuring the pressure differential between the contained air and that of a hermetically closed reference system within the containment vessel. Equipment vill be capable of measuring with an accuracy consistent with the measurements to'be made. Continuous hourly readings vill be taken over a minimum period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> until it is satisfactorily shown that the total leakage during any 2h-hour period does not exceed 0.5 percent of the total contained weight of air.

The tests of the airlocks shall include operational testing and an overpressure test. -

After completion of the airlocks, including all latching mechanisms and inter-locks , each airlock will be given an operation test consisting of repeated operation of each door and mechanism to determine that all parts are operating smoothly without binding or other defects. All defects encountered will be <

corrected and retested. The process of testing, correcting defects, and re-testing vill be continued until no defects are detectable.

The airlocks vill be pressurized with air to h5 psig. All velds and seals vill be observed for visual signs of distress or noticeable leakage. The air-lock pressure vill then be reduced to h0 psig, and a soap solution vill be 1pplied to all velds and seals and observed for bubbles or dry flaking as indications of leaks. All leaks and questionable areas will be clearly mar,ked

]

for-identification and subsequent repair.

g, Amendment No. 3 5-36

D-B

-_ The internal pressure of the airlock. vill be reduced to atmospheric pressure and all leaks vill be repaired after which the airlock vill again be pressurized to 40 psig with air and all areas suspected or known to have leaked during the previous test will be retested by above soap bubble technique.

This precedure vill be repeated until no leaks are discernible by this means of testing.

5.8.1.1.2 Penetrations Penetration closure devices for electrica'l and hot piping penetrations will be purchased by written specification from suppliers with tested closure devices for similar service. Performance data from prototype closures of similar or identical design will be required as part of vendor qualifications.

Pipe penetrations which must accommodate thermal movement are provided with expansion bellows. The bellows expansion joints are designed to withstand containment vessel maximum internal pressure and can be checked for leak .

tightness when the containment vessel is pressurized. In addition, these joints are provided with a second seal and test tap so that the space between the seals can be pressurized to the maximum internal pressure to permit testing the individual penetrations for leakage at any time.

Penetrations which are velded directly to the containment vessel can be leak tested by pressurizing the entire containment vessel.

Electrical penetrations vill also be provided with double seals and will be separately tested. The test taps and seals vill be so located that the leakage tests of the electrical penetrations can be conducted without entering or pressurizing the containment vessel.

All containment closures which are fitted with resilient seals or gaskets vill be separately tested to verify leak tightness. The covers on flanged closures will be provided with double seals and with a test tap which vill allow pressurizing the space between the seals without pressurizing the entire con-tainment system. In addition, provision vill be made so that the space between the airlock doors can be pressurized to full containment vessel maximum internal pressure.

5.8.1.2 Post-Operational Testing and Inspection 58.1.2.1 Leakage Rate Testing Periodic leakage rate tests of the* centainment vessel and leak tests of the testable penetrations vill be conducted to verify their continued leak-tight integrity. The method and frequency of these tests vill be as described in Section 15.3.h.

5.8.1.2.2 surveillance of structural Integrity A steel shell pressure containment vessel, designed, fabricated, inspected and pressure tested in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and protected by the concrete shield building vill offer continued structural s integrity over the life of the unit. The vessel receives a code stamp from an 0067 5.-37

D-B authoritative body and represents the most recent developments in the techniques of pressure vessel design and fabrication that are backed up by '

years of research, testing and successful in-service experience. Therefore, it is contemplated that there vill be no need for any additional in-service surveillance program other than visual inspection of the exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel.

5.8.2 SHIELD BUILDING 5.8.2.1 Pre-orerational quality control and Insuection 5.8.2.1.1 General Requirements Appropriate ASTM Material Specifications vill be cited in the Building Specifi-cations for all construction materials which will describe the testing and basis for acceptance of materials. Standards and tests will be specified in accordance with applicable regulations and current building practices. ,

The testing of concrete and reinforcing bars will be accomplished by an independent testing laboratcry whose primary business is to perform such testing -

and who can show proof of the required knowledge and facilities to perform the specified tests and report accurate results. This testing compar.y will examine local aggregates and cement, take samples of concrete mixes and .aake the 3 required field tests.

Reinforcing steel samples of each bar size from each heat will be supplied by g the reinforcing steel supplier. These samples will be tested based upon ASTM )

specifications. The user inspection and testing of reinforcing vill be as '

follows:

a. Material All user-tests of reinforcing steel vill be in accordance with ASTM Specifications. Tests vill include one tension and one bend test per heat or per mill shipment, whichever is less, for each diameter bar. Test samples will be obtained at the fabrication station. High strength bars vill be clearly identified prior to shipment.

b. Mechanical Solices The "Cadweld" inspection program is detailed in Appendix 5c.

c. Fabrication Visual inspectica of fabricated reinforcements will be performed ,

to ascertain dimensional conformance with specifications and drawings.

d. Placement

~

Visual inspection of in-place reinforcements will be performed by the placing inspector to assure dimensional and location confor-mance with drawings and specifications. ,.

0068 Amendment No. 3 5-38

D-B

~p Inspections will be performed as necessary to verify compliance with specifications.

Because of the loads considered in the design of the shield building, standard building construction and quality control practices are satisfactory. Special attention will be given- to obtaining good leak-tightness.

5.8.2.1.2 Leak-Tightness Provisions will be made to test the leak-tightness of the shield building and penetration rooms. After installation of all. penetrations in the shield build-ing and penetration rooms, the buildings will be pressurized and/or exhausted to its maximum hypothetical accident pressure both positive and negative and measurements taken to determine the leak-tightness of the complete building.

The shield building and penetration room leakage rate under negative pressures v.tl1 be tested by connecting the inlet of a test fan with damper and calibrated orifice to the exhaust duct of the shield building and penetration room ventilation system. With damper adjusted to provide the desired negative pressure, flow through the orifice will equal the leakage rate.

For testing outward leakage under positive annulus pressure, the above pro-cedure will be used, but with the test fan discharge connected to the exhaust duct of the shield building and penetration room ventilation system.

5.8.2.2 Post-Operational Testing and Inspection a

5.8.2.2.1 Leakage Rate Testing Periodic leakage rate tests of the shield building and penetration rooms will be conducted to verify their continued leak-tight integrity.

The frequency of the tests will be consistent with the leakage rate approved  !

for the unit and the leak-tightness indicated in the initial and subsequent periodic tests.

l 1

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0063 5-39

D-B 5.9 OTHER MAJOR STATION STRUCTURES 591 AUXILIARY BUILDING 5 9 1.1 Design Bases All of the areas 'of the auxiliary building are designed to Class I standards as specified in Appendix 5A. Design requirements in addition to Appendix 5A to be considered where applicable are as follows:

1. Internal flooding due to pipe rupture and the resulting hydro-static load.

2. Special requirements to prevent criticality of new and spent fuel bundles.

The following significant facilities related to station safety are located "

in the auxiliary building:

1. New and spent fuel handling, storage, and shipment facilities.

2. Control room and related facilities.

3. Radvaste decontamination facilities.

h. Radvaste chemical and volume control facilities.

5 Access control area. J

6. Engineered safety features systems.

7 Electrical and mechanical penetrations.

5.9.1.2 Design Criteria and General Description The auxiliary building is designed in accordance with " Building Code Require-ments for Reinforced Concrete - ACI 318-63" for concrete, and " Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings,"

1963 edition, for structural steel unless otherwise noted. Live loads used in the design conform to requirements of the " Uniform Building Code," 1967 cdition. Wind and earthquake loadings, load factors and load combinations as specified in Appendix 5A are used in the design of this building. ,

The major structural materials used in the design of this building are as follows:

Concrete fc = h000 psi at 28 days

• Reinforcing bars ASTM A-615 Grade 60 Structural steel ASIM A-36 High strength bolts ASTM A-325 Stainbe's steel pocl liners ASTM A-167 Type 30hL

. h 5 h0

I D-B The building is founded on a concrete mat foundaticn on ecmpetent rock. The 1 reinforced concrete slabs and valls are designed as two-way slabs and bearing valls , respectively, for dead, live and vind or dead and tornado load ccabina-tions, wherever applicable. Some valls in the fuel pool area and in the area adjoining the containment structure are designed to act as deep beams. In the design, seismic, vind and other appropriate lateral loads have been assumed to be resisted and carried down to the foundations by diaphragm action of the slabs and the shear vall action of the valls.

The new and spent fuel pool valls.are inherently resistant to tornado and the missiles generated from it. The spent fuel pool has been designed to with-stand temperature stresses caused by the failure of the pool water cooling equipment. High-temperature service piping embedded in the fuel pool valls has been thermally insulated to avoid dar_ age to structural concrete of the fuel pool valls.

A concrete enclosure, with various floor levels, housing the control room, the ventilation equipment room, the cable spreading room, the access control room, -

and the switchgear and battery rooms, is designed to withstand the tornado loading specified in Appendix 5A.

The area containing the engineered safety features equipment is partitioned into separa.te rooms to provide protection in the event of flooding due to a pipe rupture. The partition valls are designed to withstand hydrostatic loading over their full height.

The feedvater lines are enclosed in separate concrete enclosures. These lines are restrained by structural steel frames , anchored to concrete slabs or valls, to prevent damage to one another or to any other critical systems due either to a double ended or a slot type of failure.

5.9.1.3 Nuclear Fuel Storage Considerations The spent fuel bundles are stored in rigid stainless steel racks. There are two plates between each pair of bundles, throughout the active length of the fuel bundles. This and the geometry serve to avoid criticality, assuming unborated water in the fuel pool. In addition, the fuel pool is filled with boric acid solution. A storage space for fuel bundles has been provided which amounts to approximately 1-1/3 of the reactor core. The valls and floor of the fuel pool are lined to provide leak tightness. Facilities for inspection of failed fuel bundles have been provided and four spaces are also provided for their storage.

The new fuel bundles are stored in a rigid rack. Protection against criti-cality in water is not required since the storage area has a grating floor to l

avoid flooding.

5.9.2 TURBINE BUILDING The following facility related to station safety is located in or near the l turbine building. It is:

l

~ Condensate Tanks 1 '

0071 I 5 kl Anendment No. 1

D-B The above facility is enclosed in a protective structure designed to with- -

stand the loads in Appendix 5A for Class II structures but will be sup- ,

ported by Class I streture. Also, the remainder of the turbine building and turbine generator foundations are designed to withstand the loads in Ap-pendix 5A for Class II stretures.

593 INTAKE STRCTURE The following facilities related to station safety and circulating water system are located in the Intake Streture. They are:

Service water pumps.

Fire water pumps.

8 Cooling tower water makeup pumps.

The reinforced concrete substructure of the intake structure and the en- -

closures for the service water pumps are designed to withstand the loads in Appendix 5A for Class I structures including tornado.

5 9.4 DIESEL GENERATOR ENCLOSURE The diesel generators are located in a concrete enclosure designed to with-stand the loads in Appendix 5A for Class I structures including tornado and maximum probable earthquake. Each diesel generating unit is enclosed by 3 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire valls. )

1 8 595 0FFICE BUILDING l

Buildings included in this category are designed to withstand the loads in Appendix 5A for Class II structures. ,

5 9.6 BORATED WATER STORAGE TME 8

The proposed borated water storage tank vill be of 390,000 gallons net capac-ity and is located in the station yard southwest of the auxiliary building.

The bottom of the tank vill be at elevation 585 (IGLD) almost twenty-three feet above bedrock. It is proposed to have a concrete slab and a ring foundation below the concrete slab on compacted structural fill: The max-imum anticipated contact pressure beneath the slab vill be hk/sq f,t. The concrete foundation and subgrade vill be designed to sustain a Class I structure, with the exception of a turbine and tornado missiles loads.

l 597 DIESEL OIL STORAGE TAIK j 8 The proposed 100,000 gallon nominal capacity diesel oil storage tank is lo-l l cated in the station yard northwest of the auxiliary building. The ring foundation with concrete slab on top vill be on structural compacted fill and the maximum anticipated bearing pressure beneath the foundation slab vill be approximately hk/sq ft. The concrete fcundation and subgrade vill be designe.d s I to sustain a Class I s ppeture excluding the external missiles such as tornado and turbine missiles.* * ]! '

Amend:::ent No. 8 5-h2

D-B 598 INTAKE WATER SYSTEM An intake water system from the lake to the intake structure will be constructed. .1 A built-up earthen dike on-shore, a submerged pipe off-shore, and an intake crib 2 in the lake will be constructed to establish flow and e.lignment of the intake water.

Apprcximately 700 feet of the intake canal's excavated portion and built-up earthen dike in front of the intake structure vill be designed and constructed as a Class I structure.

The Class I dikes vill be constructed of soil excavated in the dry. The dike slopes are designed to be 3 (hor.): 1. Analysis of the stability of the dike slopes have been made .under static and dynamic conditions. Even under the 2

vorst, hypothetical conditions, that is assuming that a rapid drav down of the canal water to elevation 561' (I.G.L.D)* simultaneously occurs with the maximum 3 possible (larger) earthquake, the factor of safety cf the dike slopes was cal-culated to be,1.50 for a shee.r strength of the dike soil equal to about 500 lb/ft2 . Based cn an analysis of the site soils, the representative sheer ,

strength of the soils in the completed dikes will exceed this value.

The intake canal dikes beyond the 700 feet Class I dikes,$according to the analysis of the stability of the dike slopes vill not fail during the maximum possible (large) earthquake.

Soundings along the intake canal vill be taken periodically during the operations 5 of the station to assure that excessive silting is not occurring. The design analysis of the intake canal indicates that the maximum velocity of the flow for two (2) units at a short ter= lov low water level is four (4) feet per second. This is within the permissible velocity for graded earthen type channels to provide clear water operations.

We do not expect any silting and sedimentation in the intake structure and intake canal forebay. Since the bottom of the intake structure is two (2) feet minimum below the suction bell of the pumps, there will be no problem of silting or sedimentation in this area. 1 For a canal water level at elevation of 560 (I.G.L.D), and an effective depth of 12 feet frcm elevaticn 560 (I.G.L.D) to the service water pump inlet, approximate volume of T.T million gallons will be available within the Class I 8 canal area limits.

(DELETED) 1 8 l i

During an emergency shutdown, the decay heat vill be removed at a centrolled 1 rate by use of the euxiliary feed pumps. The station will be kept at " hot i stand-by" for a minimum of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> followed by a 6 heure cooldown period to q IcVer nactor coolant system temperature to 280 F by using 250,000 gallens of 3  ;

store.. cndensate storage water.

After this initial 19 hurs, the decay heat removeJ system operatien vill be 1 started utilizing the service water pumps located in the intake structure and 2  !

pumping frca the intake canal. 1 0073 1 5-h2A Amendment No.3 l

. . . . . . . ~ - . . . . ..-

D-B The77milliongallonsofstoredwaterintheintakecanalforebaywillprovidel2l8 sufficient cooling surface to continue cooling the station by evaporation for at least 1h days. This should provide sufficient time to re-establish direct water flow communications between the lake and the station intake structure via 1 the intake water system.

f8 The design incorporates a Class I return line from the service water system 3 to the intake canal Class I area forebay.

Accident Analysis for Loss of Intake Water System is discussed in detail in 3 l8 Section 1h.2.2.6.

599 DISCHARGE WATER SYSTEM A discharge water system consisting of a submerged pipe from the station into the lake vill be constructed to allow controlled discharge of service water, cooling tower blowdown, liquid radvastes meeting 10 CFR 20 limitations. 8 -

• International Great Lakes De.tum (I.G.L.D.)

O i

0074

!/

- i..

l l

l Amendment No. S l- 5-h2B t

( i Table 5-2 Containment Vessel Isolation Valve Arrangements Normal Penetration Flow Valve Valve Number Service Direction Arrangement Signal h Position 1 Pressurizer ES Closed Sample Lines Out 6 I ES Closed g ES C)osed 2 Steam Generator Secondary Water Sample Line Out 2 III ES Closed 3 Component Cooling Water Inlet Line In 21 III ES Open 8 h Component Cooling y Water Outlet Line Out 2 III ES Open E  ?

5,6,7 Containment Air Recirculating and Cooling Units Cooling Water Inlet In 4 IV ES Open Open l8 Lines 8 A-J Containment Vessel In l8 _

Vacuum Breakers D 9, 10, 11 Containment Air g Recirculating and a Cooling Units E, Cooling Water Outlet --

Open k N Lines Out S

3 IV ES Open l0 m 12 A-D Containment Air Samples Or.t 12 II ES Closed ES Closed 0 o)

C C

M C/l ,

_ ____ _ _ ___ _ . _ - . ~

w Table 5-2 (Contd)

Penetration Normal

@ Flow Valve Valve y Number Service Direction Arrangement Type Signal Position R

W 13 Containment

.,/ Normal y & Sump Drain Out 1 ES Open

. w II ES Open 8

• 114 Spare l8 15 Letdown Line to ES Open

• Purification Out 6 Demineralizers I ES ES Open Open l8 16 Containment Equipment ES Open 8 Vent Header Out 1 II ES Open y 17 Containment Closed p Leak Test Inlet In 23 II Locked Closed e 18 Steam Generator t'd Secondary Water Sample Line ES Closed 8 Out 2 III 19 Normal Makeup to Reactor Coolant --

Open System In 9 I ES Open 8 19, 20, 21, 22 High Pressure '

Injection Lines Closed l8 In 9 IV ES Closed 23, 214 Fuel Transfer Tubes Closed In/Out 10 II --

Closed 25, 26 Crntainment ES Closed Spray Lines In 5 IV Closed g8 O

S.

m .

'. ' s h

t Table 5-2 (Contd)

Normal Penetration Flow Valve Valve Number Service Direction Arrangement Type Signal Position 27, 28 Low Pressure --

Closed lg Injection Lines In 9 IV ES Closed l 29 Decay Heat Removal HMC Closed Pump Suction Out 11 I RMC ES Closed Closed l8 30, 31 Containment Emergency Sump ES Closed Recirculation Lines Out 20 IV l8 32 Reactor Coolant System

. Drain Line to Reactor ES Open Coolant Drain Tank Out 1 I ES Open 0 I-  ?

33 Containment ES Closed

• Purge Inlet Line In 13 II ES Closed l8 34 Containment ES Closed Purge Outlet Line Out 14 II ES Closed 8 q

h 35, 36 Auxiliary Feedvater Lines In 15 IV --

Closed 37, 38 Main Feedwater Lines In 22 III Open l8

{

39,'40 Main Steam Lines out 16 III Low Pressure Open 8 S Downstream m: Or Reverse Flow o>

1 J

Table 5-2 (Contd)

Normal Penetration Flow Valve Valve Number Service Direction Arrangement Type Signal Position 41 Pressurizer Quench Tank Circulating Inlet Line In 21 III ES Open 0 42 Service Air --

Closed Supply Line In 5 II ES Closed 43 Instrument Air --

Open Supply Line In 5 II ES Open 44, 45 Core Flooding Tank Fill and --

Closed Nitrogen Supply Lines In 17 III --

Closed 0 46 Pressurizer Quench y Tak j[

Nitrogen Supply Line In 21 III ES Closed l0 a

47 Core Flooding ES Closed E Tank Sample Line Out 2 III h8 Pressurizer Quench Tank Circulating CD Outlet Line Out 2 III ES Open ,

8 CD y 49 Refueling Canal --

Closed l 0 Fill Line In 18 II --

Locked Closed 50 Pressurizer Quench D Tank Sample Line Out 2 III ES Closed R

Waste Disposal to Out 0 h 51 1 II ES Open g Misc. Waste Drain ES Open P Tenk co

_________________________________e_-_ .__ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

Table 5-2 (Contd)

Normal N Penetration Flow Valve Valve N _ Number Service Direction Arrangement Type Signal Position k

y 52, 53, 54, 55 Reactor Coolant Pump In 7 I ES Open Seal Water Supply --

Open o

• 56 Reactor Coolant Pump Out 24 I ES Open 0 Seal Water Return ES Open ES Open ES Open ES Open 57, 58 Steam Genere. tor Drains Out 2 III ES 01osed

's" ts Ch b

o O

d (D

s

D-B

('- '

5.10 REFERENCES

1. Analyses of Shells of Revolution Subjected to Symmetrical and and Non-Symmetrical Loads, Kalnins, Arthur; ASME Journal of Applied Mechanics, Volume 31, Series E, No. 3, pages h67 h76.

2. Local Stresses in Spherical and Cylindrical Shells Due to Exterior Loading, Welding Research Council 107

3. Design Criteria for Nuclear Reactors Subjected to Earthquake Hazards, Nemark, N. M.; Urbana, Ill., May 25, 1967 ,

b. Design Procedures for Dynamic Loaded Foundations, Whitman &

Richart, Journal of the Soil Mechanics and Foundation Division, ASCE November 1967 .

5 " Dynamics of Bases and Foundations" by D. D. Barkan , McGraw-Hill, 1 1960.

6. ASCE, Design of Structure to Resist Nuclear Weapons Effects ,

Manual No. 42, 1964 edition, 162 pp.

7 Effects of Impact and Explosion, Volume 1,1946, Defense Documentation Center, Defense Supply Agency, ASTIA Ad 221,586.

8. Design of Protective Structures, Arsnam Amirikian, Bureau of f Yards and Docks, Dept of the Navy, Washington, D. C., August

- 1950, Nav Docks P-51. 3-

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