ML20005E116

LER 89-030-00:on 891204,fire Suppression Sys Deluge Valve Isolated More than 1 H W/O Required Continuous Fire Watch Establishment.Caused by Personal Communication Breakdown. Valve Opened & Foreman in Charge counseled.W/891222 Ltr

ML20005E116
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/22/1989
From:	Bynum J, Hipp G TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-030, LER-89-30, NUDOCS 9001030298
Download: ML20005E116 (4)

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. TENNECOEE VALLEY AUTHORITY' 6N 38A Lookout Place December 22,=1989 U.S.= Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTNt- Document Control Desk Washington,'D.C. 20555 Gentlement i

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR, PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.

o 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-327/89030 The enclosed LER provides details of an event wherein a portion of the =l automatic. fire suppression system was inoperable for more than one hour without the required continuous fire watch being established. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.i. q Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY i s J6

. R. Bynum pVice President Nuclear Power Production Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Regional-Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 INPO Records Center  !

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennassee 37379 M I i fDR001030299 993,,,

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Fire suppression system deluge valve isolated for more than one hour without required continuous fire watch being established as a result of-personal communication breakdown EVENT DAf t (Si LER NUMagR 161 REPORT DATE 171 OTHER F ACILiYits INVOLVED let vtAR "E MONTH DAY YEAR * *y$U ',* 4 ,g,$ MONTH DAY vfAR F ACILIT V h AMt3 DUCR.41 NVMBERi$l Sequoyah, Unit 2 ol5l0l0t0 1312 t 8

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' OPERATING MOOT Me 1 to 40216) to 40stel to.736eH2Havl 73 71168 R 20 405(aH1Hel 60.3steH1) 60.73te H3 Hel 73.711.)

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NAWE TELEPHONE NUMBER ARE A CODS Geoffrey Hipp, Compliance Licensing Engineer 6 1 115 81 4 13 l- 17171616 COMPLETE ONE LINI FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRISED IN THis REPORT (13)

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SV$ TEM AUSE Sv8 TEM COMPONENT MhhC-I I i 1 l l l I I I i l l 1 I l l l I l I l I l I l I f SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (146 MONTM DAY lVEAR BUBMsS$10N 4ES lif v.s consmeo.te EX9ECTED SUBA,t35 TON CATil X ko l l l A. TuCT m-,, i mo .u., . r..,,,,,,..u,,,..,,,,,,...,no On December 4, 1989, with Unit 1 at 71 percent power and Unit 2 at 100 percent power, a portion of the automatic fire suppression system was inoperable for more than one hour without a continuous fire watch being established in areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged as required by Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.2 (spray and/or sprinkler systems). Deluge Valve 0-FCV-26-183 was isolated

~to prevent its actuation via smoke detectors sensing exhaust fumes from a truck dslivering a spare reactor coolant pump rotor to the auxiliary building railroad bay.

The root cause of this event has been attributed to a personal communication breakdown when trying to reopen the deluge valve after the truck left. This breakdown in communication was the result of inadequate attention to detail by the foreman in charge of the truck unloading evolution. As immediate corrective action, the deluge valve was opened, thereby restoring automatic actuation capability to the fire suppression system. The foreman in charge of the truck unloading evolution has been counselled rsgarding his failure to ensure the deluge valve was reopened on time.

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0 l0 0 l2 OF 0l3 ftXT (# more anece As #supwed, was emepa.I #AC rarm Javet (th Description of Event At 1400 Eastern standard time on December-4, 1989, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 71 percent '

power, 2,235 pounds per square inch gauge (psig), 569 degrees Fahrenheit (F), and Unit 2

.in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, 2,235 psig 578 degrees F, a portion of the automatic fire suppression system (EIIS Code KP) was inoperable for more than one hour without a continuous fire watch being established in areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged, as required by Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.2 (spray and/or sprinkler systems). At 1300 on December 4, 1989. deluge Valve 0-FCV-26-183 was isolated under Permit 89-084 to allow entry of a truck into the cuxiliary building railroad bay. The truck was delivering a spare reactor coolant pump rotor to the refueling floor on Elevation 734 of the auxiliary building. The deluge valve, which is located on Elevation 690 of the auxiliary building, was isolated to 3 prsvent its opening should the railroad bay smoke detectors be activated by the truck's sxhaust fumes. A fire operator with a portable radio remained by the deluge valve in cm e actuation of the fire suppression system was needed. LCO 3.7.11.2 was entered at 1300. However, because the truck unloading was expected to take less than one hour, no continuous fire watch was established at that time. After the deluge valve was icolated. the truck entered the railroad bay. The spare pump rotor was then lifted through a hatch onto the refuel floor, and the truck exited the railroad bay at 1354.

The deluge valve should have been reopened et this point and the LCO exited within one hour as planned. However, as a result of a personal communication breakdown, the deluge valve was not reopened until 1500 on December 4, 1989. Thus, the portion of the automatic fire suppression system supplied through deluge Valve 0-FCV-26-183 was inoperable for two hours without the action requirements of LCO 3.7.11.2 being fulfilled.

Ctuse of Event

'The root cause of this event has been attributed to a breakdown in personal communication when trying to reopen the deluge valve. This breakdown in communication was the result of inadequate attention to detail by the foreman in charge of the truck unloading evo'.ution. After directing the deluge valve be reopened, the foreman did not follow-up to ensure that the automatic fire suppression system had been restored to operable status within the allowable LCO action statement timeframe.

Analysis of Event This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.1, as an operation prohibited by technical specifications (TSs) because the action requirements of LCO 3.7.11.2 were not met.

The automatic fire suppression system is described in Section 9.5.1 of the SQN Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Deluge Valve 0-FCV-26-183 supplies water to a number of areas on Elevations 706 and 714 of the auxiliary building. While some of these areas are patrolled by existing roving fire watches, others are not and, therefore, required temporary fire watches to be established. While the deluge valve was isolated, no automatic fire suppression was available to the areas it serves. However, a fire operator with a portable radio remained by the deluge valve while it was isolated in N IC Form 3s6A (6499

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. Analysis of Event (Continued) c:se actuation of the fire suppression system was needed. Therefore, the fire suppression system remained capct.le of fulfilling its design function, albeit not cutomatically. Consequently, there was no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. ,

Corrective Actions As immediate corrective action, the delvge valve was opened at 1500, thereby restoring  ;

cutomatic actuation capability to the fire suppression system. I The foreman in charge of the truck unloading evolution has been counselled regarding his failure to ensure the deluge valve was reopened on time. TVA considers this event to have been an isolated occurrence, and no further corrective action is needed to prevent l future recurrences. I Additional Information Two previous events involving deluge valve isolation have been identified. LER 1-84018 .

i reported an event where a deluge valve was-inadvertently left isolated for two days ofter its discharge piping had been drained following a spurious actuation. LER 1-85046 rsported an event where a deluge valve was isolated because of a leaking discharge drain  ;

valvo. Backup fire suppression system coverage was provided to areas requiring such coverage except for the Unit 1 containment annulus area that was overlooked for four

. days. Neither of these previous events it.volved a personal communication breakdown.

Commitments None.

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NIC Ferm 386A 1649)