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Initial Exam 2014-302 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML15013A262
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Site:	Harris
Issue date:	01/13/2015
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Progress Energy Carolinas
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 05000400/2014302 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

OATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions:

IC-5, BOL, 49% power

B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs.

1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs

B Gland Seal Exhauster Fan is under clearance due to high vibrations on the motor bearing.

Thunderstorms have been forecasted for the area, AP-301 actions are completed.

Turnover:

Plant is at approximately 49% power. Plant startup is in progress IAW GP-005 step 132.e. After taking the shift, continue plant startup at 4 DEH nd Units/min. to ~52% power then start the 2 Main Feedwater Pump. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip all RCPs within 10 minutes of a Phase B isolation signal

Isolate AFW flow to B Steam Generator prior to exiting EOP-E-2

Shut BIT Outlet valve 1SI-4 prior to establishing flow through the charging header Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description R - RO/SRO Continue plant startup to ~52% power 1 n/a N - BOP/SRO Start 2nd Main Feedwater Pump C - RO/SRO 2 prs06a Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage TS - SRO 3 eps12 C - BOP/SRO Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039)

I - BOP/SRO 4 pt:475 Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

TS - SRO C - RO/SRO 5 sws07a NSW Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)

TS - SRO 6 mss01b M - All Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment zrpk616a 7 I - BOP/SRO Failure of Auto AFW Isolation on B SG zrpk616b zrpk 719a zrpk719b zrpk722a 8 C - RO/SRO Failure of PZR PORVs to auto open when required zrpk722b zrpk710a zrpk710b sis017 9 C - RO/SRO Failure of BIT outlet isolation valve 1SI-4 to close sis018 SR Nuclear Instruments fail to energize post trip due to IR NI-35 10 nis06a I - RO/SRO undercompensated

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 Turnover provided to the crew is - The plant is operating at ~49% power in BOL. Criticality was achieved 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago, 74 hours8.564815e-4 days 0.0206 hours 1.223545e-4 weeks 2.8157e-5 months after a trip from 100% power. A plant startup in accordance with GP-005, Power Operation Mode 2 to Mode 1, is in progress. After initial turbine loading, the load increase has been performed at 4 units/min. The unit is currently at ~49% power. The National Weather Service has forecasted thunderstorms for the New Hill area and the actions for AP-301, Seasonal Weather Preparations and Monitoring have been completed by the crew.

Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

A startup has commenced and the crew has been directed to continue the power increase using GP-005 to ~52% power at a ramp rate of 4 DEH units/minute. At ~52% power or greater than 6.4 MPPH feedwater flow, the Turbine will be placed in hold and the BOP will place the second Main Feedwater Train Pump in service per OP-134.01, Feedwater System, Section 5.4.

Following the start of the B MFW Pump the crew will continue to ramp the unit towards full power operation.

The following equipment is under clearance:

B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs. The pump has been unavailable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

B Gland Seal Exhauster Fan is under clearance for motor repairs. The fan has been under clearance for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs. The valve is shut with power removed. The valve has been under clearance for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

OWP-SI-01, Safety Injection System, has been completed. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Tech Specs 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 apply.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (continued)

1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, Tech Specscontinued Event 1: Continue plant startup to ~52% power: The crew will perform a power increase of approximately 3%-5% power then place the Turbine to hold until the (BOP) starts the standby B MFW pump IAW OP-134.01 Section 5.4. Following the start of the B MFW pump the crew will continue efforts to raise power to the Lead Examiners discretion. For the reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will dilute and monitor auto rod withdrawal per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to raise Main Turbine power.

Event 2: Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage: This failure will cause PRZ PORV 445A to leak, resulting in rising PRT pressure and level. PORV Line Temp indicator TI-463 will increase as observed on the MCB and the crew will respond IAW ALB 009-8-2, Pressurizer Relief Discharge High Temp. The crew may utilize AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, Attachment 5 to determine which PORV is leaking by isolating each PORV Block valve individually until the leaking PORV is identified. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.4, Reactor Coolant System -

Relief Valves.

TS 3.4.4 applicable LCO is Action a, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to restore Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (continued)

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 3: Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039): The BOP should respond to annunciator ALB-022-3-1, Unit Aux Xfer-A Trouble. The crew should dispatch an operator to locally investigate the cause of the alarm. The report from the AO will be that all transformer cooling is lost. The crew should recognize this meets the entry conditions of AOP-039, Startup And Unit Auxiliary Transformer Trouble. The crew should monitor EFRIS to determine the UAT 1A temperature is approaching the limit that will require the transformer to be unloaded within 30 minute and the CRS should direct the BOP to transfer the house loads from the UAT 1A to the SUT 1A using OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 4: Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%: This event will require the BOP to place the A SG level control to manual and control SG level within Reactor trip limits.

The SRO should provide level band and trip guidance IAW OMM-001. The crew will take the channel out of service using OWP-ESF-02, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation, protection channel III Steam flow. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1 action 6, Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action a (tracking only since minimum number of channels are met), and Tech Spec 3.3.2 1.e Steam Line Press Low Action 19 applies.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (continued)

T.S. 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE TS 3.3.3.6 The Accident Monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE - tracking only since the minimum number of channels operable are met

ACTION a. - With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except In Core Thermocouples and Reactor Vessel Level less than the Total Required Number of Channels requirements shown in Table 3.3-10 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Tech Spec 3.3.2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (continued)

Tech Spec 3.3.2 (Continued)

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 5: NSW Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022) - Normal Service Water Pump A sheared shaft can be inserted once the crew has stabilized A SG water level. This will result in multiple NSW alarms and the crew should enter AOP-022. Once immediate actions are complete the crew should use the AOP to start up the standby NSW pump and verify proper system operation. While NSW system pressure is low the ESW system will automatically start and isolate into the A and B train headers. With lower temperature ESW water providing cooling into Containment the potential exist for a low pressure condition to occur. This will be indicated by ALB-028-5-1, Containment Air High Vacuum. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.1.4.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (continued)

Event 6: MAJOR - Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment. Once RCS pressure control has been established to the satisfaction of the Lead Examiner a Steam Line Break inside Containment on the B SG will occur. The crew should enter and carry out the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

The crew should diagnose that a LOCA is NOT in progress and transition from EOP-E-0 to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

While the crew is performing actions of EOP-E-2 the Containment pressure will continue to rise beyond 10 psig which will actuate a Containment Spray and a Phase B isolation signal. This will require ALL RCPs to be secured.

All RCPs will need to be manually tripped within 10 minutes of a Phase B isolation signal.

(Critical Task)

Event 7: Failure of Auto AFW Isolation on B SG. The crew should identify that an actuation signal for AFW Auto Isolation has failed on the B SG and manually isolate AFW flow to the B SG. (Critical Task)

Event 8: Failure of PZR PORVs to auto open when required. As RCS pressure increases the crew will be required to secure SI flow. If SI flow continues the RCS pressure will continue to increase as the PZR fills. If or when RCS pressure exceeds the PORV lift setting of 2335 psig the PORVs will NOT automatically open. The operator can manually open and close the PORVs to prevent an overpressure condition which could cause the RCS Safety Relief Valves to lift at 2485 psig. The Technical Specification RCS Safety Limit is 2735 psig which is 110% of design pressure.

Event 9: Failure of BIT outlet isolation valve 1SI-4 to close. While implementing EOP-E-2 the crew will be directed to reset SI and shut BIT outlet valves then establish a normal Charging lineup. Prior to the establishment of the Charging lineup High head SI flow should be isolated.

When the crew attempts to shut 1SI-4 from the MCB the valve will not close. RNO actions direct locally shutting the valves. The crew will direct an Aux Operator to locate and shut the valves. The actions and locally shutting 1SI-4 need to be performed prior to filling the RCS to solid conditions which could cause the SRVs to lift. (Critical Task)

Event 10: Source Range channels will fail to energize post trip due to IR NI-35 under compensation. The crew will need to identify the failure of the SR instrumentation MCB indication and audible counts. They will then manually energize the SR channels to establish an audio count rate.

The scenario will end when Safety Injection has been terminated and the crew restores letdown to service while implementing EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination. With PZR level lowering and RCS Hot Leg Temperatures stable or lowering the RCS pressure challenge will be removed.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Manually trip all RCPs within 10 minutes of a Phase B isolation signal Securing RCPs during a large steam break inside Containment is procedurally required when Containment pressure has exceeded the High 3 setpoint of 10 psig. Exceeding this pressure causes a Phase B actuation that isolates CCW flow to the RCP heat exchangers. If the RCPs are left operating they will overheat and become inoperable. Due to the rapid pressure increase in Containment from this event EOP-E-0 continuous action step 16 RNO b requires the crew to secure ALL RCPs. This action should be accomplished within 10 minutes of the Phase B actuation and prior to transitioning out of EOP-E-0.

2. Isolate AFW flow to B Steam Generator prior to exiting EOP-E-2.

Failure to isolate a faulted Steam Generator that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. This critical task requires the crew to recognize an automatic actuation should have occurred of an ESF system or component but has not and then take manual operator actions to perform the isolation.

3. Shut BIT Outlet valve 1SI-4 prior to establishing flow through the charging header.

Isolation of Safety Injection is required to allow the operator to stabilize RCS plant conditions. Eventually the Pressurizer will fill with water rendering pressurizer control ineffective. Consequently, in order to decrease RCS pressure to conserve makeup water, Safety Injection flow must be decreased. Because Safety Injection flow cannot be throttled, once the criteria to reduce Safety Injection flow is met Safety Injection is terminated by isolating Safety Injection flow, reducing to one CSIP in operation and realigning the CSIP discharge to the normal charging header. Shutting the BIT outlet valves is the first step in realigning normal charging to the RCS. Not shutting 1SI-4 prior to establishing a normal Charging lineup will cause simultaneous flow through the Charging and SI lines and cause a CSIP run out condition indicated by oscillating discharge pressure.

Note: An unanticipated critical task may be created in a scenario should an applicants action or lack of action cause an unexpected RPS or ESFAS actuation. A critical task may be assigned and graded as unsatisfactory even if corrected by another team member prior to the unanticipated RPS/ESFAS actuation. Should the applicant self-correct the action or inaction prior to the unanticipated plant response, a critical task failure should not be assigned to the applicant.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2014 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 1 Reset to IC-161 password spurs Press Start on Scaler / Timer and ensure range set correctly Go to RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner.

Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Post conditions for status board from IC-5 Reactor Power 48% steady state Control Bank D at 146 steps RCS boron 1842 ppm Provide crew marked up copy of GP-005 up to step 131 for turnover (step 2 N/A, step 121 and 122 still open)

Update the status board:

1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve has been under clearance for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Tech Spec 3.5.2 applies - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HSD within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Tech Spec 3.6.3 also applies but is met by removing power and having the valve shut.

Align equipment for repairs:

B Gland Seal Exhauster Fan, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch B DEH Pump, place pump switch to STOP-PULL-TO-LOCK, and hang CIT on MCB switch 1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, and hang CIT on MCB switch Place filled out copies of OWPs into the OWP book - ensure they are removed at end of day:

OWP-SI-01 for 1SI-3 Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed to re-commence a power escalation from 48% to 100% power. The power increase is on hold for turnover. The SRO is expected to conduct a reactivity brief prior to commencing the power escalation.

This brief may be conducted outside the simulator prior to starting the scenario.

Lead Evaluator:

When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run announce:

CREW UPDATE - (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift.

END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator:

annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN.

SRO GP-005, Step 131 Direct BOP to depress the GO button. BOP verifies turbine SRO/BOP settings and places DEH to GO.

The crew should monitor diverse indications of power during the power escalation (NIs, Core T, Turbine First Stage Pressure, Main Generator Output, ERFIS Continuous Calorimetric)

Evaluators Note:

Crew may determine to allow rods to withdraw in automatic instead of diluting per reactivity plan. If so, ramp will continue without makeup. Crew might also choose to dilute prior to starting the ramp.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 10 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control

DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the power BOP escalation and informs crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO and DEH is properly responding.

VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display increases.

VERIFY Generator load is increasing.

RO MONITORS primary systems response.

NOTE: With only one Main Feedwater Pump running, Turbine First Stage Pressure should be monitored and the Second Main Feedwater Pump started prior to exceeding 456 psig Turbine First Stage Pressure. A Turbine Runback will occur at approximately 507.2 psig.

Procedure Note:

NOTE: The second Main Feedwater Pump should be started after exceeding 6.4 and before 7.0 MPPH total feed flow. If 6.4 MPPH is not obtainable prior to exceeding 456 psig Turbine First Stage Pressure, then the second Main Feedwater Pump should be started and Turbine loading continued until total feed flow is greater than 6.4 MPPH.

WHEN Turbine First Stage Pressure between 360 psig and 456 psig (approximately 45% and 55% Turbine load), THEN SRO PLACE the second Main Feedwater Train Pump in service per OP-134.01 Section 5.4.

Monitors plant primary parameters while ramp is performed and places second Main Feedwater Train Pump in service CREW when indications of Turbine First Stage Pressure are between 360 psig and 456 psig (45% - 55% Turbine load)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 11 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCS Temperature Adjustment (Alt Dilution Method) per OP-OP-107.01 RO 107.01, Section 5.4 Verifies Initial Conditions:

The required amount of reactor makeup water is available in the RMW tank to provide adequate dilution without reducing the tank volume below 37.5%.

The Reactor is in steady state power operations and dilution is desired to compensate for fuel depletion.

RO

Normal charging is being maintained per OP-107 Section 5.3.

The reactor makeup water system is available to supply water to the makeup control system per OP-102.

Reactivity evolution signs have been posted to limit MCR access.

The crew is provided a reactivity plan and should Evaluator Note: determine the required volume of makeup water from the reactivity plan vice OPT-1525 for this evolution.

DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added RO (Current OPT-1525 Attachments 4 through 7)

FIS-114 may be set for one gallon less than desired. A pressure transient caused by 1CS-151 shutting results in FIS-Procedure Note:

114 normally indicating one gallon more than actual flow but two gallons more would be unexpected.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 12 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 13 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on Procedure Caution:

the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

SRO Directs Alternate dilution SET FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RO STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

IF the current potentiometer setpoint of controller 1CS-151, FK-RO 114 RWMU FLOW, needs to be changed to obtain makeup flow, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. RECORD the current potentiometer setpoint of controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, in Section 5.4.3.

b. SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the ALT DIL RO position.

Alternate Dilution may be manually stopped at any time by Procedure Note:

turning the control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 13 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 14 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

a. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

b. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

c. IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity has been added.

IF controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, potentiometer was changed in Step 5.4.2.5, THEN PERFORM the following:

RO

a. REPOSITION controller, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, in Section 5.4.3.

b. INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY FK-114 potentiometer BOP position of Step 5.4.2.9.a is correct.

RO MONITOR Tavg and rod control for proper operation.

WHEN VCT pressure is between 20 - 30 psig, THEN TURN RO control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

a. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

b. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

c. IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 14 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 15 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Systems and components operated from the Main Control Board on a daily basis to support normal plant operations do Procedure Note: not require Independent Verification. If this evolution is performed daily or more frequently, then Section 5.4.3 is not required to be performed. (Reference OPS-NGGC-1303)

RO IF required, THEN COMPLETE Section 5.4.3.

IF reactivity evolutions are complete, THEN REMOVE BOP reactivity evolution signs limiting MCR access.

Monitors plant parameters until target power level and target CREW 1st stage pressure is reached to meet initial conditions for starting the B MFW pump BOP Places main Turbine to hold to start B MFW pump Starting the Second Main FW Pump per OP-134.01, OP-134.01 BOP Section 5.4 This Section assumes the start of Main FW Pump B.

Procedure Note: Equipment numbers for the start of Main FW Pump A are in parentheses.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 15 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 16 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verifies initial conditions are met:

One Main FW Pump is running (YES)

Two Condensate Pumps and two Condensate (YES)

Booster Pumps are in operation

At least 267 psig suction pressure exists at PI- (YES) 2200, FW PMPS SUCT HDR PRESS

Seal water pressure is greater than 325 psig, (YES)

BOP as evident by absence of alarm ALB-016-2-3, MAIN FW PUMP SEAL WATER LOW PRESS OR HI DISCH TEMP (YES)

An Operator is standing by to observe starting of the Main FW Pump and to report any abnormal conditions (Contacts TB Aux Operator)

Starting second Main FW Pump is directed by (YES)

GP-005.

Chemistry is notified to ensure that hydrazine flow is increased up to and including starting a second hydrazine pump to Procedure Note: eliminate a vacuum being drawn on the hydrazine line due to the increased flow of two pumps running and thus causing the hydrazine pump to air bind. (Ref. 2.5.8)

Chemistry has been notified that a second feed pump will be BOP started.

Notifies Chemistry that a second feed pump will be started Simulator Acknowledges second feed pump is being placed in Communicator: service.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 16 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 17 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs Turbine Building Aux Operator to perform prestart BOP checks on B MFW pump Simulator The prestart checks are completed on the B MFW pump. I Communicator: am standing by for the pump start.

To ensure an adequate number of Condensate Polishing Beds are in service, NOTIFY the TB Operator prior to starting the BOP second Main FW Pump.

Notifies TB Aux Operator to ensure an adequate number of Condensate Polishing Beds are in service.

Simulator TB AO - An adequate number of Condensate Polishing Communicator: Beds are in service.

PLACE 1FW-39, MFW PUMP B RECIRC CONTROL, to OPEN AND VERIFY 1FW-39 is open.

BOP Locates MCB switch for 1FW-39 and takes switch to OPEN and verifies 1FW-39 red light lit.

In modulate, the Main FW Pump Recirc Valves, 1FW-8 and 1FW-39, should shut when Main FW Pump total suction flow Procedure Note:

reaches 8600 kpph (if available, the sum of ERFIS points FCE2210A and FCE2210B can be used).

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 17 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 18 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM the following:

MOMENTARILY PLACE MAIN FW PUMP B Control Switch to START (Starts B MFW pump)

CHECK MAIN FW PUMP B starts.

MONITOR Condensate Booster Pumps controllers and flows to ensure proper operation when the second Main FW Pump is started.

IF any SG level exceeds 62%, THEN PERFORM the BOP following:

o MANUALLY ADJUST the associated Main FW Regulating Valve(s) position until Feed Flow is just less than Steam Flow AND level is trending towards the normal operating band (55% to 59%).

o WHEN Steam Generator level is trending to 55% to 59%, THEN PLACE the associated Main FW Regulating Valve controller back to AUTO.

PLACE 1FW-39 control switch to MODU.

Locally VERIFY the Main Feed Pump B Aux Oil Pump has BOP stopped.

Contacts TB AO to verify Aux Oil Pump has stopped.

Simulator TB AO: Main Feed Pump B Aux Oil Pump has stopped Communicator:

Crew Continues ramp to full power operations IAW GP-005 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 18 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 19 of 82 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 48% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The next procedural steps will occur when Reactor Power is between 49 and 50% Reactor Power. The ramp to start the 2nd MFW pump may have exceeded this power level and this step may have been performed. IF so, the RO would have been directed by the SRO to verify bistables below -

Evaluators: VERIFY the following bistable and permissive status light conditions:

PR P-8 NC 41N (ON)

PR P-8 NC 42N (ON)

PR P-8 NC 43N (ON)

PR P-8 NC 44N (ON)

SINGLE LOOP LO FLOW TRIP BLOCKED P-8 (OFF)

Cue Event 2 - Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage. Event Lead Evaluator:

takes ~1min before annunciator alarms.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 19 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 20 of 82 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Simulator Operator:

Actuate Trigger 2 PRZ PORV 445B leakage

TI-463 rising Indications Available:

ALB-009-8-2 PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP

RESPONDS to alarms ALB-009-8-2.

RO

ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-009-8-2.

Refer to TS 3.4.4 action a and 3.4.6.2 as referenced by ALB-SRO 009-8-2 The SRO may elect to enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Evaluator Note: Leakage. If so, then those actions begin on page 22 of this guide.

Past experience has shown that this alarm may come in due to valve stem leakoff from one of the PORV Block Procedure Note: Valves. The block valves share a common leak-off line with the PORVs. This can be checked using ERFIS points TVL5647 and TVL5646.

ALB-009-RO CONFIRM alarm using:

8-2

PRZ PORV discharge line temperature TI-463.

PRESSURIZER relief tank level, pressure, and temperature LI-470.1, PI-472.1, and TI-471.1.

PRESSURIZER PORV position indication.

RO VERIFY Automatic Functions: (None)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

(NO)

IF a PORV is open, THEN CHECK PRZ pressure using PI-444, PI-445.1, PI-456, and PI-457.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 20 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 21 of 82 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior For minor leakage, it may be necessary to have Procedure Note:

Engineering assistance to develop proper strategies.

Any PORV isolations that are shut due to decreasing RCS Procedure Caution: Pressure should NOT be reopened without further evaluation.

IF all PORVs are closed and RCS pressure is normal, THEN DETERMINE which PORV is leaking and isolate it:

SRO

IF leakage is significant, THEN SHUT all PORV isolations.

REOPEN one at a time to identify affected PORV.

o Determines leakage is NOT significant and ONLY directs shutting one valve at a time ERFIS Point TRC-0463 can be used to evaluate if PORV is Evaluator Note:

leaking.

Shuts PORV isolations as directed by SRO o After shutting 1RC-117, PRT Relief Line RO Temperature starts to decrease

Determines/reports PORV-445A leaking.

SRO Directs RO to reopen 1RC-115 and or 1RC-113 if shut.

Declares 1RC-118 inoperable for excessive seat leakage -

(power will be maintained with block valve closed)

SRO ENTER TS 3.4.4.a - within one hour either restore the PORV to operable or close the block valve with power maintained.

Cue Event 3 - Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A Evaluator Note: (AOP-039) after the leaking PORV is isolated and the TS declaration.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 21 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 22 of 82 Event

Description:

Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If AOP-016 is entered (Optional reference), the crew will be Evaluator Note: directed to Attachment 5 for specific actions for a leaking PRZ PORV.

Enter AOP-016 (Optional reference)

Makes plant PA announcement for AOP entry AOP-016 SRO No immediate actions Conducts a crew alignment brief WHEN leakage location has been determined, THEN SRO PERFORM the applicable Attachment (Attachment 5)

CHECK the PRZ PORVs SHUT. (YES)

CHECK that the leaking PORV has been identified. (NO)

SHUT the associated PORV Block Valve.

RO

PERFORM ONE of the following based on severity of leak.

SHUT AND REOPEN ONE PORV Block Valve at a time to identify the affected PORV

Enter Tech Spec 3.4.4.a.

VERIFY valve manipulated for leak isolation is documented per the following:

o OMM-001, Operations - Conduct of Operations SRO o OPS-NGGC-1303, Independent Verification.

o Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist o Contacts WCC for assistance

EXIT this procedure.

Cue Event 3 - Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A Evaluator Note:

(AOP-039).

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 22 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 82 Event

Description:

Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Simulator Operator: Actuate Trigger 3 Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039)

Indications Available ALB-022-3-1, Unit Aux Xfmr-A Trouble

This alarm is common for any local alarm at UAT 1A.

Procedure Note:

If this annunciator is locked in, consideration should be given for compensatory actions.

Ground fault indication on both a 480V bus and the 6.9KV bus feeding it indicate transformer degradation. This could lead to catastrophic failure. Actions up to and including a Procedure Caution: reactor trip may be required in preparation for loss of bus resulting from transformer de-energization. If the transformer is confirmed to be grounded action should be taken to immediately isolate the grounded transformer.

ALB-022 Window BOP CONFIRM alarm using:

3-1 VERIFY Automatic Functions:

If UAT 1A Lockout Fault Pressure Trip occurs: (NO) o Generator Lockout occurs o Auto transfer to SUT 1A occurs BOP o UAT 1A Cooling Pumps and Fans will stop (To enable automatic control, both 86/G1A and 86/G1B Generator Lockout relays must be reset at the MCR Generator Relay Panels).

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF the loss of UAT 1A results in a loss of (NO)

BOP Emergency Bus 1A-SA, THEN GO TO AOP-025, Loss of One Emergency AC Bus (6.9KV) or Loss of One Emergency DC Bus (125V).

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 23 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 24 of 82 Event

Description:

Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Relay flags for 59/UATX and 59/UATY do not function.

Procedure Note: Contacts closed on the induction disc indicate the relay is picked up and open indicates not picked up.

A ground makes the electrical system unreliable; Procedure Caution: therefore, a high priority should be placed on locating and isolating the ground.

DISPATCH an operator to 286 RAB Swgr Room to check the following relays for grounds:

o Aux Bus 1A-3, UAT 1A to Aux Bus 1A, (NO)

BOP 59/UATX relay contact status o Aux Bus 1D-1, UAT 1A to Aux Bus 1D, (NO) 59/UATY relay contact status CREW Dispatches an AO to check the following relays for grounds Acknowledge request and wait 2 minutes then report back Simulator using the telephone NO grounds present on Aux Bus 1A Communicator:

or 1D

DISPATCH an operator to UAT-1A Local Panel BOP Alarm to check for alarms.

Acknowledge request and wait 3 minutes then report back Simulator using the radio The High Winding Temperature Communicator:

Annunciator is in and No cooling fans are running.

IF UAT 1A local alarms exist, THEN GO TO (YES)

BOP AOP-039, Startup and Unit Auxiliary Transformer Trouble.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 24 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 25 of 82 Event

Description:

Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enter AOP-039 Makes plant PA announcement for AOP entry AOP-039 SRO No immediate actions Conducts a crew alignment brief Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

DISPATCH an operator to the alarming transformer with the applicable

Attachment:

BOP

Attachment 2, Unit Auxiliary Transformer 1A or 1B Trouble Local Actions

DISPATCH an operator to perform Attachment 2 BOP for the 1A UAT Acknowledge request and wait 3 minutes then report back Simulator using the radio The Cooling Control toggle switch is in Communicator: MANUAL per AOP-039 Attachment 2 and ALL cooling fans are NOT running.

NOTIFY the following personnel of any problems with Startup or Unit Auxiliary Transformers:

CREW

Responsible Engineer

Load Dispatcher (System Operator)

Plant/Transmission Activities Coordinator (PTAC)

SRO GO TO the applicable Section:

Section Page 3.2, Unit Auxiliary Transformer Trouble 16 AOP-039 SRO Unit Auxiliary Transformer Trouble, Section 3.2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 25 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 26 of 82 Event

Description:

Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK alarming UAT supplying associated 6900V BOP (YES)

Aux Buses.

The following actions are taken in response to reports Procedure Note: received from the operator performing Attachment 2, Unit Auxiliary Transformer 1A or 1B Trouble Local Actions.

SRO GO TO the applicable Step:

Section Step Page UAT - Total Loss of Cooling Banks 3 16

Each UAT has three transformer cooling banks.

Each bank consists of one oil pump and three associated cooling fans. A cooling bank is Procedure Note: considered to be in service if the pump and at least one fan are operating.

This step may be terminated if the transformer has at least one cooling bank restored to service.

UATs are not designed to be self-cooled. If NO transformer cooling banks are operating, the transformer should be removed from service within 30 minutes (1-hour absolute Procedure Caution: maximum) of cooling loss if loaded (6-hours if unloaded) unless cooling is restored. Bubble formation in the oil reduces heat transfer and may result in transformer winding failure.

PERFORM the following for TOTAL loss of transformer cooling SRO banks:

VERIFY the Cooling Control Switch has been BOP (YES) placed in MANUAL.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 26 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 27 of 82 Event

Description:

Total Loss of Cooling Banks on the UAT 1A (AOP-039)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

REDUCE UAT load using ONE of the following methods:

o TRANSFER affected buses to the SUT, if available.

(Refer to OP-156.02 as necessary.)

SRO o TRANSFER to equipment with another power supply.

Directs the BOP to transfer Aux Bus 1A to the SUT per OP-156.02 OP-156.02, Section 7.1 is attached at the end of scenario, Evaluator Note:

see Attachment 2

CHECK that ANY cooling banks have been SRO (NO) restored.

PERFORM the following:

COMMENCE power reduction using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

GO TO Step 7 to remove transformers from service within the applicable time limits:

o 1-hour from loss of cooling (loaded)

After Aux Bus 1A is transferred to the SUT and the SRO communications with the Work Control Center are Evaluator Note:

completed cue Simulator Operator for Event 4 Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 27 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 28 of 82 Event

Description:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator Actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Indications

ALB-014-1-2, Loop A Hi Steam Line P Low-P1 Available:

ALB-014-1-4, Loop A Hi Steam Line Press Rate Alert

ALB-014-4-2A, Loop A Low Stm Line Press Alert

ALB-014-4-1A, SG A FW > STM Flow Mismatch

PI-475 SA failing to 0

SG FF/SF mismatch

SG level lowering

FI-474 SA Steam Flow failing to 0 BOP/RO RESPONDS to alarms and evaluates ALB-014.

IAW AD-OP-ALL-1000, the operator may take MANUAL Evaluator Note: control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure.

CONFIRM alarm using PI-474.1 SB, FI-474 SA, PI-484.1 SB, ALB-014- and PI-494 SB, Steam Generator A pressure.

BOP 1-2

Reports PI-475 or FI-474 reading or failing low.

VERIFY Automatic Functions:

(NONE)

Takes manual control of FK-478 (1FW-133) A BOP SG Main FW Reg Valve and stabilizes A SG level Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 28 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 29 of 82 Event

Description:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:

Dispatch an operator to investigate for feed line (NONE) break and steam line rupture

Check Containment press and temp for evidence (NO)

BOP of a Containment leak

IF no leakage is detected, THEN:

o CHECK for failed instrument (YES) o IF failed instrument identified then remove the failed instrument from service BOP Restores level to normal (57% NR).

Should provide guidance to maintain A SG level to be maintained between 52 to 62% IAW OMM-001, Attachment 13 SRO

Refer to OWP-ESF-02 to remove channel from service.

Contacts I&C to have channel removed from service.

Dispatch AO to investigate The failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.

Evaluators Note: If time is an issue with this scenario then evaluation of SRO Tech Specs for any event can be performed as follow-up questions at the conclusion of the scenario.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 29 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 30 of 82 Event

Description:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters Instrumentation TS TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 14 Steam Generator Water LevelLow Coincident With Steam/ Feedwater Flow Mismatch

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

SRO TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit item 1.e and 4.d

ACTION 19. - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

TS 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring instrumentation Table 3.3-10 number of channels is met (tracking LCO only)

BOP At request of the CRS - Place main turbine ramp in hold Requests extra operator for dedicated feedwater operation Directs operator and I&C to perform OWP-ESF-02 SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of A SG PT-475 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 30 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 31 of 82 Event

Description:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior It is not required to implement the entire OWP prior to Lead Evaluator Note:

continuing with the scenario.

BOP Performs OWP-ESF-02 (sheet 3 of 8) steps 1 and 2 Simulator Acknowledge request to perform OWP-ESF-02 for PT-475 Communicator: failure.

If requested to perform OWP-ESF-02 for PT 475 by the Simulator Operator: Lead Evaluator then:

Run OWP-ESF-02-III-TST when directed.

OWP-ESF-02 is attached at the end of scenario, see Attachment 1 FRV should go back to Auto when channel II instruments are selected per the OWP.

Evaluator Note:

While the crew is processing OWP-ESF-02 for PT-475 the scenario may continue.

Cue Event 5 - Insert failure NSW Pump A Shaft Shear after SG level is under control, the Tech Spec has been identified and the Work Control Center has been called.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 31 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 32 of 82 Event

Description:

NSW Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator:

NSW Pump A Shaft Shear

ALB-002-6-1, Serv Wtr Supply Hdr A Low Press

ALB-002-7-1, Serv Wtr Supply Hdr B Low Press Indications Available:

ALB-002-7-2, Serv Wtr Pumps Discharge Low Press

ALB 002-5-5, Serv Wtr Header A High-Low Flow

ALB 002-6-6, Serv Wtr Header B High-Low Flow Responds to ALB-002 alarms - reports low NSW header RO pressure with pump running indication.

Evaluator Note: The ESW Pumps will auto start on low header pressure.

Enters AOP-022, Loss Of Service Water.

AOP-022 SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry.

Conducts a crew alignment brief Immediate CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING CSIP - (NO)

RO Action MORE THAN 1-minute:

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 2.

Immediate CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING EDG - (NO)

RO Action MORE THAN 1-minute:

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 3.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 32 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 33 of 82 Event

Description:

NSW Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior There are several points in the AOP where an AO may be dispatched to check for leaks and proper operation of Simulator equipment. Report no leaks, no breaker problems but Communicator: when dispatched to the pump, after 1 to 2 minutes report that the coupling appears to have failed and request maintenance assistance.

IF REQUESTED TO OPEN KNIFE SWITCH ON THE A NSW PUMP BREAKER: go to rf SWS100 and open the knife Simulator Operator:

switch then have Communicator report back when completed GO TO the appropriate step as indicated by the (YES) parameter LOST:

SRO

NSW Pump failure

NSW Pump loss of flow GO TO 3.0/ Step 6 (Page 6)

CHECK loss of NSW Header due to NSW Pump FAILED or LOSS OF FLOW.

START standby NSW Pump as follows:

VERIFY discharge valve for affected pump is CLOSING by placing affected pump control switch to STOP.

RO

START standby NSW Pump in priming mode by momentarily placing standby NSW Pump control switch to START.

WHEN discharge valve for affected pump is fully SHUT, THEN PLACE and HOLD control switch for running pump to START to fully OPEN pump discharge valve.

CHECK ANY NSW Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

SRO GO TO Section 3.2 (page 30).

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 33 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 34 of 82 Event

Description:

NSW Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following alarms will annunciate due to loss of cooling in containment and subsequent start of ESW:

ALB-028-5-1, CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM Evaluator Note:

ALB-028-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM The BOP should identify these alarms and identify Tech Specs 3.6.1.4, 3.6.1.1, 3.6.3, 3.6.5 and 3.9.4 to be referenced MAY go to MANUAL and shut FK-7624 in order to raise CNMT BOP pressure to exit T.S. 3.6.1.4 T.S. 3.6.1.4 - Restore within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months LCO or HSD within next 6 SRO hours: due to High Vac in CNMT CHECK Turbine trip required by ANY of the following (NO) conditions - EXIST:

No NSW Pump can be operated RO

Non-isolable leak exists in the NSW system

Major isolable leak exists on the Turbine Building NSW Header AND time does not permit a controlled plant shutdown SRO RNO: OBSERVE Note prior to Step 13 AND GO TO Step 13.

Steps 13 through 19 address leaks on NSW turbine building header. Leaks on individual components supplied Procedure Note:

by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps 20 and 21.

CHECK for minor isolable leak on Turbine Building (NO)

CREW header - ANY EXISTING.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 34 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 35 of 82 Event

Description:

NSW Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO RNO: GO TO Step 20.

CHECK for leak in an individual component - ANY (NO)

CREW EXISTING.

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 22.

CREW CHECK for leak on WPB header - ANY EXISTING. (NO)

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 24.

RO CHECK that NSW Pump(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (YES)

PERFORM the following for affected NSW Pump(s):

CREW

CHECK NSW Pump breaker(s) - (NO)

MALFUNCTIONED.

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 25.b.

CHECK adequate pump suction inventory EXISTS:

o LI-9300.1, Service Water PMP A CHMBR LVL, (YES)

GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9300)

CREW o LI-9302, Service Water PMP B CHMBR LVL, (YES)

GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9302) o LI-1931, Cooling Tower Basin Level, GREATER (YES)

THAN 31 inches Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 35 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 36 of 82 Event

Description:

NSW Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Locally VERIFY the following for the affected NSW Pump per OP-139, Service Water System:

o Proper cooling and seal water supply to NSW (YES)

CREW Pumps.

o Proper operation of NSW strainer backwash. (YES)

Locally CHECK NSW Pump(s) for signs of damage (shaft shear or other obvious problems). (YES)

INITIATE appropriate corrective action for the loss of NSW.

SRO

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of A NSW Pump CHECK Reactor thermal power changed by less than (YES)

SRO 15% in any one hour period IF ESW Pump(s) were placed in service by this procedure, RO THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to sample the return to the Auxiliary Reservoir per CRC-155 SRO Exit AOP-022 The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (Steam line break on B SG inside containment) once the plant has stabilized Evaluator Note: back in its normal pressure band, the Tech Spec identification is completed and the Work Control Center communications are completed..

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 36 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 37 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 6 Simulator Operator:

Major Event: Steam Line Break B SG Inside Containment The crew should identify the leak and initiate a manual Safety Injection. The crew will enter E-0 and perform the immediate actions. The SRO may also direct a manual Steam Line Isolation. The crew should diagnose that a LOCA is NOT in progress and transition from E-0 to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

When SG B pressure is < 100 psi of A and C SG (with MSLI) an AFW isolation signal should have closed the B MD and TD AFW valves but fails to do so.

When Containment pressure > 3 psig the crew should Evaluator Note: identify Adverse Containment conditions are required to be implemented.

When RCS Pressure exceeds 2385 psig the PORVs should open but will fail to open when required to

When 1SI-4 is closed from the MCB it will fail to close requiring the RAB Aux Operator to locally close the valve

The Source Range will fail to auto energize due to Intermediate Range NI-36 being undercompensated

When Containment pressure exceeds 10 psig CNMT Spray pumps will auto start.

ALB-028-5-1 CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM will clear (if in due to earlier ESW Pump start)

ALB-028-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM

Rising pressure in containment Indications Available

Rising temperature in containment

Increased SG steam flow

Tavg lowers

Prz level and pressure lower

Power rises Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 37 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 38 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew may go to AOP-042. They will not have time to Evaluator Note:

make progress before requiring a trip.

Identifies an ESF actuation setpoint will be exceeded on any RO Safety Injection parameter.

Informs SRO then actuates a Manual Reactor Trip SRO Directs manual Reactor Trip and Safety Injection activation EOP Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection E-0 Makes plant PA announcement SRO Conducts a crew alignment brief Verify Reactor Trip (YES)

Immediate RO Action Check Turbine is Tripped - All throttle valves shut (YES)

Immediate BOP Action Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 38 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 39 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform The Following:

Immediate

AC emergency buses AT LEAST ONE (YES)

BOP Action ENERGIZED

AC emergency buses - BOTH energized (YES)

Safety Injection ACTUATED (BOTH TRAINS) (YES)

Immediate RO Action Perform The Following:

Review Foldout page.

o RO:

RCP Trip criteria SRO Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria RHR restart criteria o BOP Ruptured SG AFW Isolation criteria AFW supply switchover criteria Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 39 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 40 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: E-0 Foldout SRO

Evaluate EAL Matrix.

Identifies Containment Adverse Conditions CREW Containment Pressure > 3 psig Verify CSIPs - ALL RUNNING (YES)

RO A and B running Verify RHR Pumps - ALL RUNNING (YES)

RO A and B running RO Safety Injection flow > 200 gpm (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 40 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 41 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO RCS pressure LESS than 230 PSIG (NO)

Main Steam Line Isolation - ACTUATED (YES)

BOP BOP Verify All MSIVs AND Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

Event 7 - Failure of Auto AFW Isolation Any SG pressure - 100 PSIG LOWER THAN (YES)

BOP PRESSURE IN TWO OTHER SGs Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW Isolation Valves AND (NO)

Flow Control Valves To Affected SG - SHUT Shuts both MDAFW and TDAFW isolation valve and BOP FCV to the B SG

1AF-93 (SHUT)

1AF-143 (SHUT)

Check CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG (YES / NO time dependent)

Perform the following:

Critical

Verify Containment Spray - ACTUATED Task #1 RO

Stop ALL RCPs o Locates MCB switches and STOPS ALL 3 RCPs Critical to trip ALL 3 RCPs within 10 minutes of a Phase B isolation signal (ALB-001-5-1)

Time ALB-001-5-1, Containment Isolation Phase B, received _______

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 41 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 42 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH (YES)

BOP ESTABLISHED Sequencer Load Block 9 (Manual Loading Permissive) (YES)

BOP ACTUATED (BOTH TRAINS)

BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 Evaluator Note: E-0, Attachment 3 is located in the back of this guide.

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 3. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment IAW E-0 Attachment 3 Evaluator Note: without SRO approval.

The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 3 is not predictable.

Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation Of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 3, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", While Continuing With This Procedure.

Directs AO to place 1A and 1B Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per E-0 Attachment 3 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place 1A and 1B Air Simulator Compressor in the local control mode per Communicator E-0 Attachment 3 step 22 When directed to place the 1A and 1B Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode: Run APP\air\acs_to_local Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 42 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 43 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the APP for 1A and 1B Air Compressor has Simulator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the Communicator air compressors are running in local control.

Directs AO to Unlock AND Turn ON The Breakers For The BOP CSIP Suction AND Discharge CrossConnect Valves per E-0 Attachment 3 step 23 Acknowledge the request to Unlock AND Turn ON The Simulator Breakers For The CSIP Suction AND Discharge Communicator CrossConnect Valves per E-0 Attachment 3 step 23 When directed to Unlock AND Turn ON The Breakers for Simulator Operator the CSIP Suction AND Discharge CrossConnect Valves:

Run APP\cvc\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power.txt.

When the APP for CSIP Suction AND Discharge Simulator CrossConnect Valves has completed running call the Communicator MCR and inform them that CSIP Suction AND Discharge CrossConnect Valves are energized.

RCPs are secured therefore WR CL temperatures should be used when checking RCS temperature. RCS temp trend Examiners Note:

will be < 557° and dropping - control FF, maintain total FF > 210 KPPH until SG level > 40% (all MSIVs are shut)

Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND RO 559°F Using Table 1.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 43 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 44 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Evaluator Note: PORVs will NOT auto open when required (> 2235 psig)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 44 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6/8 Page 45 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Failure of PORVs to Auto Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event 8 - Failure of PORVs to Auto Open PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

RO PRZ Spray Valves - SHUT (RCPs are secured) (YES)

PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

Any SG pressure - DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR COMPLETELY (YES)

SRO DEPRESSURIZED (B SG)

GO TO E-2, "FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION", Step 1.

EOP-E-2 "FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION"

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution:

Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Verify All MSIVs - SHUT (YES)

BOP Verify All MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

Check Any SG pressure - STABLE OR RISING (NOT (YES)

BOP FAULTED) (A and C SG)

Any SG pressure - DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

BOP OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (B SG)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 45 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 46 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed Procedure Caution: flow, THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG.

Isolate Faulted SG(s) (Identified In Step 5):

Verify faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT (YES)

BOP

Verify main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

(Automatically)

Event 7 - Failure of Auto AFW Isolation Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT

1AF-93 (SHUT)

Critical

1AF-143 (SHUT)

Task #2 BOP (YES / NO time dependent - may have identified and isolated these valves in E-0)

Critical Task to isolate both valves prior to exiting E-2 Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW (SHUT) pump - SHUT Critical BOP Task #2 1MS-70 (Should have shut in E-0 actions)

Critical Task to isolate both valve prior to exiting E-2 Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs - (YES)

SHUT:

BOP Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 46 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 47 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Any SG - ABNORMAL RADIATION OR UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE (NO)

CREW Check If SI Has Been Terminated:

Check for all of the following:

o Check BIT outlet valves - SHUT OR RO ISOLATED 1SI-3 (Under clearance - SHUT) (YES) 1SI-4 (OPEN) (NO)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 47 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 48 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Simultaneous flow through the charging and SI lines may cause CSIP runout (as indicated by oscillating Procedure Caution: discharge pressure).

Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

Check SI Termination Criteria:

BOP

Check Subcooling - > 40°F (YES)

Level in at least one SG > 40% (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)

RO

PRZ level - > 30% (YES / NO - time dependent action)

PRZ level > 30%

IF YES then crew will continue with E-2 below Evaluator Note:

IF NO then crew will transition to E the actions for E-1 follow E-2 in this guide beginning on page 52 E-2 RO Reset SI Continues Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Crew Offsite Power. (There is no loss of power - N/A)

RO Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 48 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 49 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Open Instrument Air AND Nitrogen Valves to Containment:

RO Locates and OPENS both valves Stop all but ONE CSIP (STOPS A / B CSIP)

RO RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)

Check CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

RO Open Normal Miniflow Isolation Valves:

RO Locates controls and OPENS each valve Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 49 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 50 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event 9 - Failure of 1SI-4 to close Shut BIT Outlet Valves:

1SI-3 is under clearance and SHUT Critical RO 1SI-4 will not SHUT from MCB switch Task #3 Dispatches RAB Aux Operator to locally shut 1SI-4 (may also request that the breaker for the valve OPEN)

Critical Task to shut BIT Outlet valve 1SI-4 prior to establishing flow through the charging header or CSIP run out conditions will occur as indicated by oscillating discharge pressure.

To allow evaluation of the candidates ability to control PRZ Pressure manually using the PRZ PORVs the Simulator Evaluator Note: Operator actions will not be performed until PRZ Pressure is above the PRZ PORV lift setpoint of 2335 psig unless otherwise directed by the Lead Evaluator.

IF this valve has not been previously shut then:

Acknowledge request to locally shut 1SI-4 (A-230-FX32-Simulator W3-S2) AND if requested acknowledge request to OPEN Communicator: breaker prior to locally valve operation.

Report back approximately 1 minute after Simulator Operator completes actions below that 1SI-4 is SHUT.

When PRZ pressure exceeds 2335 psig confirm the lead evaluator is ready for the local operator actions for 1SI-4 to be performed. IF YES perform the following actions from Simulator Operator - Sim Diagram SIS02 to operate 1SI-4:

(IF requested) OPEN control power rf sis016 Engage handwheel rf sis017 Shut valve rf sis018 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 50 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 51 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify Cold Leg AND Hot Leg Injection Valves - SHUT (YES)

RO Procedure Note: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing.

Establish Charging Lineup:

Shut charging flow control valve:

(SHUT)

RO

Open charging line isolation valves:

(OPEN)

Monitor RCS Hot Leg Temperature:

Check RCS hot leg temperature - STABLE (YES / NO - time RO dependent - probably rising)

YES / NO - BOP action next step IF YES - Manually dump steam AND control feed flow to BOP maintain RCS temperature stable.

IF NO - If temperature rising, THEN manually dump steam from BOP intact SG PORVs at maximum rate to stabilize temperature.

RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of PRZ Procedure Note:

level trend.

IF NO - WHEN temperature stabilizes, THEN manually dump BOP steam AND control feed flow to maintain RCS temperature stable.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 51 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 52 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent Procedure Caution:

damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:

Control charging using charging flow control valve:

RO

Maintain charging flow less than 150 GPM

PRZ level - CAN BE MAINTAINED STABLE (YES)

RO OR RISING SRO GO TO ES-1.1, "SI TERMINATION", step 1 IF the crew transitioned to E-1 based on PRZ level < 30%

then continue on next page.

Evaluator Note:

If PRZ level is > 30% then go to PAGE 56 to continue with ES-1.1, SI Termination step 1.

EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Procedure Note: Foldout applies Assigns Foldout items to RO and BOP RO: RCP Trip criteria, RHR Restart criteria, Alternate Miniflow SRO Open/Shut criteria, Cold Leg Recirculation switchover criteria BOP: AFW supply switchover criteria, Secondary integrity criteria, E-3 transition criteria Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 52 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 53 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: E-1 Foldout CREW Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.

Check Intact SG Levels:

Any level - GREATER THAN 40% (YES)

BOP

Control Feed Flow to maintain all intact levels between 40% - 50%

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 53 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 54 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Any level - RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED (NO)

BOP MANNER The PRZ PORVs are failed. The crew should identify that when RCS pressure exceeds 2285 psig the PZR PORVs Evaluator Note:

failed to open and will MANUALLY open the PORVs to prevent the PRZ Safety valves from lifting.

RO Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED (YES)

Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (failed) (YES)

Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

RO

IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure drops to less than opening setpoint.

(should open / close when RCS pressure reaches 2335 psig)

Check SI Termination Criteria: (YES)

RO

RCS subcooling - >40°F

Level in at least one intact SG > 40% (YES)

BOP

Total feed flow to intact SGs > 210 KPPH (YES)

PRZ level > 30% (YES / NO time dependent)

RO YES - GO TO ES-1.1, SI Termination, Step 1 (PAGE 56)

NO - Continue with E-1 actions below Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 54 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6/10 Page 55 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment SR NI fails to energize Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check CNMT Spray Status:

Check any CNMT spray pump - RUNNING (YES)

E-1

Consult plant operations staff to determine if RO Continues CNMT spray should be placed in standby.

CNMT spray - TO BE PLACED IN STANDBY (When directed by plant operations staff)

The Intermediate Range channel N-35 is Evaluator Note: undercompensated and the crew must identify the failure and manually energize the SR detectors.

Event 10 - SR NI fails to energize Check Source Range Detector Status:

Intermediate range flux - LESS THAN 5x10-11 (YES)

AMPS

Verify source range detectors - ENERGIZED (NO)

RO Identifies NI-35 under-compensation, reports finding to SRO and manually energizes the SR detectors

Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale.

Check RHR Pump Status:

Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST RO

RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

RO

RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)

Stop RHR pumps (STOPS both RHR pumps)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 55 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 56 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS And SG Pressures: (time dependent)

Check for both of the following:

All SG Pressures - STABLE OR RISING (YES / NO)

RO RCS pressure - STABLE OR DROPPING (YES / NO)

IF NO - the crew will return to step 1 and loop back to through the procedure. When they reach step 5 to check PRZ level they will have adequate level and transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

SI Termination is entered from either E-2 step 29 or E-1 Evaluator Note:

Step 5.e EOP-ES-1.1 SI Termination Procedure Note: Foldout Applies Assigns foldout action items to RO and BOP RO - Cold leg recirculation switchover criteria and RHR restart SRO criteria BOP - Secondary integrity criteria and AFW switchover criteria Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 56 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 57 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: ES-1.1 Foldout SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Check If SI Has Been Terminated:

Check for all of the following:

RO Check BIT outlet valves - SHUT OR ISOLATED

1SI-3 (YES - shut and under clearance)

1SI-4 (YES / NO - shut in E-2 step 22 OR will be shut in ES-1.1 step 9.c - coming up)

RO IF answer is NO then perform actions on following pages for NO response to reset SI If YES then do this action then pick up on page 60 after NO response ends.

Check cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT

1SI-52 (YES)

RO

1SI-86 (YES)

1SI-107 (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 57 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 58 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reset SI (DONE)

Manually realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss of Offsite Power (NO action required)

Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation Signals (DONE)

Open IA and Nitrogen Valves to CNMT: (DONE)

Stop all but ONE CSIP (DONE)

Check RCS Pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)

Isolate High Head SI Flow:

Check CSIP suction - aligned to RWST NO RO response

Open normal miniflow isolation valves:

Shut BIT outlet valves: (1SI-4 is failed OPEN)

RNO for 1SI dispatch an Aux Operator to locally shut or isolate valve 1SI-4 (A-230-FX-W3-S2)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 58 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 59 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior To allow evaluation of the candidates ability to control PRZ Pressure manually using the PRZ PORVs the Simulator Evaluator Note: Operator actions will not be performed until PRZ Pressure is above the PRZ PORV lift setpoint of 2335 psig unless otherwise directed by the Lead Evaluator.

IF this valve has not been previously shut then:

Acknowledge request to locally shut 1SI-4 Simulator (A-230-FX32-W3-S2) AND if requested acknowledge Communicator: request to OPEN breaker prior to locally valve operation.

Report back approximately 1 minute after Simulator Operator completes actions below that 1SI-4 is SHUT.

When PRZ pressure exceeds 2335 psig confirm the lead evaluator is ready for the local operator actions for 1SI-4 to be performed. IF YES perform the following actions from Simulator Operator - Sim Diagram SIS02 to operate 1SI-4:

(IF requested) OPEN control power rf sis016 Engage handwheel rf sis017 Shut valve rf sis018

Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT (YES)

NO RO response Procedure Caution: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing NO Establish Charging Lineup:

response

Shut charging flow control valve:

ends RO (SHUTS) after this step Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 59 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 60 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Open charging line isolation valves:

(OPEN)

Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent Procedure Caution:

damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:

Control charging using charging flow control valve:

RO

Maintain charging flow < 150 gpm

PRZ level - CAN BE MAINTAINED STABLE (YES)

OR RISING Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

Check RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH (YES)

SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST RO

Stop RHR pumps (locates MCB stop switches and STOPs both RHR pumps)

Simultaneous flow through the charging and SI lines may cause CSIP runout (as indicated by oscillating Procedure Caution: discharge pressure).

Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 60 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 61 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI Reinitiation Criteria:

RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 40°F (YES)

RO

PRZ level - GREATER THAN 30%

(YES)

PRZ level - Can Be Maintained GREATER (YES)

THAN 30%

Additional foldout item, "SI REINITIATION CRITERIA" applies.

Procedure Note:

SRO Assigns RO SI Reinitiation criteria Establish Steam Generator Pressure Control Mode:

Check if steam dump to condenser AVAILABLE: (NO)

BOP

Use intact SG PORV for steam dumping in subsequent steps.

RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of PRZ Procedure Note:

level trend.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 61 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 62 of 82 Event

Description:

Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitor RCS Hot Leg Temperature:

RO

Check RCS hot leg temperature - STABLE (YES)

Excessive RCS activity can cause adverse radiological Procedure Caution:

conditions when letdown is placed in service.

Pressure controller PK-145.1 is normally set to maintain 350 Procedure Note: PSIG (58%). If RCS pressure is low, the setpoint may have to be reduced to obtain proper letdown flow.

Check If Letdown Can Be Placed In Service:

RO

Check PRZ Level - GREATER THAN 40% (YES)

Establish Letdown After letdown is established Pressurizer level can be lowered and Pressurizer pressure should no longer be a problem.

Examiners Note: The PORVs not functioning in Automatic are not a challenge since the Pressurizer level can be reduced to not be solid.

END OF SCENARIO With RCS hot leg temperature stable or stabilizing under the crews control and letdown established then:

TERMINATE THE SCENARIO.

Direct the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator to Lead Evaluator FREEZE Announce CREW UPDATE - The NRC has the shift.

Inform the crew to remain seated at their desk and to not discuss the scenario.

Simulator Operator When directed by Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 62 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 63 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 64 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 65 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 66 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 67 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 68 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 69 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 70 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 71 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 72 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 73 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 74 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 75 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 76 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 77 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1: OWP-ESF-02 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 78 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2: OP-156.02, Section 7.1 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 79 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2: OP-156.02, Section 7.1 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 80 of 82

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2: OP-156.02, Section 7.1 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL Page 81 of 82

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 1 Revision Summary Rev. 0 - Development Copy / send outline to NRC Rev. 1 - Outline Revision / Changes made by Exam Team Rev. 2 - Validation Rev. 3 - Validation, Final Ops and Training Management comments incorporated Rev. 4 - NRC 45 day exam submittal review comments incorporated Rev. FINAL - NRC Prep Week comments incorporated Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 05000400/2014302 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

OATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions:

IC-8, MOL, 3% power, Xenon free startup in progress. The crew transitioned to Mode 1 to start up the Main Turbine when secondary chemistry parameters forced the crew to lower power below 5%. GP-005 Turbine valve testing is complete.

B Circ Water Pump is Out of Service for motor replacement, expected return to service in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

B GS Condenser Exhauster Fan is Out of Service due to high vibrations on the motor bearing.

B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs.

FRV Bypass Valves controlling SG level

Thunderstorms have been forecasted for the area, AP-301 actions are completed.

Turnover:

The plant is at 3% power, MOL, plant startup in progress. Criticality was achieved 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months after a trip from 100% power. GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) is being implemented. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Critical Task:

Manually close B SG PORV prior to exiting EOP-E-3

Depressurize the RCS to minimize primary to secondary leakage prior to SG B exceeding 100% level Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description R - RO/SRO 1 n/a Start power escalation to 4 - 8% to raise turbine speed to 1800 rpm.

N - BOP/SRO 2 cws01a C - BOP/SRO Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure ccw19a C - RO/SRO Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump failure to auto 3

ccw047 TS - SRO start 4 lt:460 I - RO/SRO PRZ Level Transmitter for LT-460 fails low which isolates letdown.

5 n/a N - RO/SRO Restore letdown IAW OP-107.

6 Lt:990 TS - SRO Failure of RWST level channel, LI-990 fails high cfw16a cfw16b A MFP trips with MFP B failure to start. Maintain Rx power <10%

7 C - BOP/SRO zr211113 and initiate AFW in accordance with AOP-010.

zr211158 8 sgn05b M - ALL B SGTR occurs, 420 GPM ramped in over 3 minutes.

jpb455d Auto SI failure. Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B) Low Pressurizer 9 jpb456d C - RO/SRO Pressure relay failures. Failure of one MCB SI manual actuate switch xc1i036 B SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT-308B failing high, Operator 10 pt:308b I - BOP/SRO can close manually

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 The plant is at 3% power, MOL, plant startup in progress. GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) is being implemented. The crew transitioned to Mode 1 to start up the Main Turbine when secondary chemistry parameters forced the crew to lower power below 5%. Criticality was achieved 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months after a trip from 100% power. The National Weather Service has forecasted thunderstorms for the New Hill area and the actions for AP-301, Seasonal Weather Preparations and Monitoring have been completed by the crew. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

The following equipment is under clearance:

Circulating Water Pump B-NNS is under clearance due to high vibrations on the motor bearing. Has been under clearance for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

B Gland Seal Exhauster Fan is under clearance for motor repairs. Has been under clearance for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs. The pump has been unavailable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Event 1: Start power escalation to 4 - 8% to raise turbine speed to 1800 rpm. Start power escalation to 6%. The crew performs an ascension in Reactor power and with the Turbine at 1700 rpm, transfers control from the Throttle Valves to the Governor Valves and rolls the turbine up to 1800 rpm. They then prepare to proceed with GP-005.

Event 2: Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve, 1CW-10 fails to automatically shut. This malfunction can be inserted once the lead evaluator is satisfied with the crews ability to control the escalation of reactor power. The crew should identify the trip of the A Circ Water pump from annunciator ALB-021-4-4 and respond using the APP. The trip of the Circ Water pump is entry conditions for AOP-012, Partial Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, and the crew may enter the AOP without referencing the APP. The BOP should identify that the discharge valve for the A Circ Water pump,1CW-10, did not automatically shut and should attempt to shut the valve by taking the Circ Water pump control switch to stop.

The crew should monitor condenser vacuum for reactor trip criteria and discuss continuing with the GP-005 to raise power with only 1 Circ Water Pump in operation until B Circ Water pump is restored or if GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown From Power Operation To Hot Standby (Mode 1 To Mode 3) should be implemented to shut down the unit.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 (Continued)

Event 3: Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump failure to auto start. The standby B CCW Pump fails to Auto Start due to a pressure transmitter failure (instrument is isolated therefore pressure decrease is not sensed). The crew should recognize the loss and enter AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water. AOP-014 will direct the restoration of the CCW system. The RO will be directed by the SRO to manually start the B CCW (or will have started it IAW AD-OP-ALL-1000 when it did not auto start). The SRO should also evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.3, Component Cooling Water System.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 4: Pressurizer Level Transmitter for LT-460 fails low which isolates letdown. Must restore letdown per APP - Controlling Pressurizer level channel LT-460 fails low can be inserted. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009. The crew should take Charging FCV-122 to Manual and maintain Pressurizer level within the directed control band and shift level control to an alternate channel. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs and identify Tech Spec 3.3.1, action 6 is NOT applicable as the unit is below the P-7 setpoint of 10% Reactor power.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 (Continued)

Event 5: Restore letdown in accordance with OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Event 6: Failure of RWST level channel I, LI-990 fails high. RWST level instrument LI-990 will fail high (100%) which will cause annunciator ALB-04-2-1, Refueling Water Storage Tank High Level to alarm. The RO will respond by reviewing the alarm response in the APP.

(NOTE: The RO will not receive credit a competency for an instrument failure since there are not any evaluative actions taken).

The SRO will direct the crew to implement OWP-ESF-05. The SRO will complete OMM-001 and request assistance from the WCC center. Then evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.6 Tech Spec 3.3.2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 (Continued)

Event 7: A MFP trips with MFP B failure to start. Maintain Rx power <10% and initiate AFW in accordance with AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions - A MFP trip, with the B MFW pump failing to auto start may be inserted once Pressurizer level has been stabilized and letdown restored. Both MDAFW pumps fail to auto start but can be started in the MCR. The crew may need to reduce power to be within AFW flow capacity in order to maintain SG water levels between 52% and 62% in accordance with AOP-010.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 8: MAJOR - B SGTR occurs, 420 GPM ramped in over 3 minutes - SGTR on the B SG can be inserted following stabilization of secondary parameters in accordance with AOP-010. A 420 gpm tube leak will develop over 3 minutes. The crew will implement AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, due to the leakage. As the leak progresses, conditions will be met to require a reactor trip. The crew will initiate a reactor trip and implement EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection actions.

Event 9: Auto SI failure. Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B) Low Pressurizer Pressure relay failures. Failure of one MCB SI manual actuate switch - When conditions requiring a safety injection are met, automatic SI will not occur. One manual SI switch is blocked. Manual initiation of SI is possible with the other switch.

Event 10: B SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT-308B failing high, Operator can close manually (Critical Task) - When the BOP is directed to energize busses 1A1 and 1B1, the SG A PORV will fail open in automatic. The SG PORV may be closed manually at the MCB. The crew may recognize the PORV being open based on alarms and MCB indications and take pre-emptive action to close the PORV. If the PORV is not closed, MCB indications may require transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation and then to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to mitigate the ruptured SG. EOP-E-3 will implement actions to isolate the ruptured SG and depressurize the RCS to eliminate break flow. (Critical Task)

Terminate scenario once the RCS has been depressurized and all but one CSIP is stopped in accordance with EOP-E-3.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Manually close B SG PORV prior to improper transition to EOP-ECA-3.3 Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon the loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to an emergency contingency procedure (ECA-3.3) that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the mitigation strategy.

2. Depressurize the RCS to minimize primary to secondary leakage prior to SG B exceeding 100% level Failure to depressurize the RCS needlessly complicates mitigation of a SGTR event by allowing the Reactor Coolant leak to continue. It constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that introduced by the SGTR event analysis.

If primary to secondary leakage is not stopped the SG pressure will increase until either the SG PORV or Safety valve(s) open releasing radioactivity to the environment. If leakage is allowed to continue the increased inventory will result in water release through the PORV once SG overfill conditions are reached.

At the Harris plant, a NR level of 95% is the value at which overfill conditions will start to exist and the adverse effects of the condition may start to manifest themselves. Failure criteria of NR level of 100% is used since an increase in level can no longer be monitored and overfill conditions are occurring including the possibility of filling the steam lines with liquid.

Note: An unanticipated critical task may be created in a scenario should an applicants action or lack of action cause an unexpected RPS or ESFAS actuation. A critical task may be assigned and graded as unsatisfactory even if corrected by another team member prior to the unanticipated RPS/ESFAS actuation. Should the applicant self-correct the action or inaction prior to the unanticipated plant response, a critical task failure should not be assigned to the applicant.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2014 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 2 Reset to IC-162 password spurs Press Start on Scaler / Timer and ensure range set correctly Go to RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators Set Boric Acid Pot to 5.08 GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner.

Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Post conditions for status board from IC-8 Reactor Power 3% steady state Control Bank D at 98 steps RCS boron 1546 ppm Provide crew marked up copy of GP-005 up to step 84 for turnover (step 2 N/A, step 57 is open)

Update the status board:

None Align equipment for repairs:

B Circ Water Pump, and hang CIT on MCB switch B Gland Seal Exhauster Fan, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch B DEH Pump, place pump switch to STOP-PULL-TO-LOCK, and hang CIT on MCB switch Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 68 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator:

announce:

CREW UPDATE - (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift.

END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator:

annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN.

Crew may either manually withdraw Control rods or Evaluator Note:

perform RCS dilution per Reactivity plan.

GP-005 CREW Raise Reactor Power to ~ 6% to support Main Turbine Roll BOP Adjusts steam dump demand signal as necessary.

Withdraws Control Rods as necessary then initiates dilution per RO the reactivity plan with SRO concurrence OP-104 RO Withdraw Control Rods per OP-104, Section 5.4 Verifies Initial Conditions:

All shutdown rods have been withdrawn, per Section 5.3, by observing the Group Step Counters and RO Digital Rod Position Indication System. All Shutdown Rod Group Step Counters must read greater than or equal to 225 steps.

Reactivity evolution signs have been posted to limit MCR access.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 8 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 68 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reactivity Evolution category to be determined by the Procedure Note:

CRS.

Verifies At the MCB, the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch RO in MAN.

RO VERIFY Rod Speed of 48 steps per minute on SI-408.

During a Reactor Startup or testing, Steps 5.4.2.3 through 5.4.2.7 may be repeated multiple times, with rod motion Procedure Note:

stopped to observe reactivity affects, record 1/M data, or for other reasons. The intent is to initial for these Steps at the completion of the entire evolution, not for each time it is performed.

At the MCB, POSITION ROD MOTION Switch to RO WITHDRAW. OBSERVE that the RODS OUT Direction Lamp lights.

RO OBSERVE Bank Step Counters for proper rod motion, overlap and sequencing.

RO VERIFY the rods are moving out by OBSERVING the Digital Rod Position Indication System Display.

At the MCB, STOP rod motion by RELEASING the ROD RO MOTION Switch allowing it to return to the neutral position. VERIFY the RODS OUT Direction Lamp extinguishes.

RO IF necessary, THEN REPEAT Steps 5.4.2.3 through 5.4.2.7.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 9 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 68 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCS Temperature Adjustment (Alt Dilution Method) per OP-OP-107.01 RO 107.01, Section 5.4 Verifies Initial Conditions:

The required amount of reactor makeup water is available in the RMW tank to provide adequate dilution without reducing the tank volume below 37.5%.

The Reactor is in steady state power operations and dilution is desired to compensate for fuel depletion.

RO

Normal charging is being maintained per OP-107 Section 5.3.

The reactor makeup water system is available to supply water to the makeup control system per OP-102.

Reactivity evolution signs have been posted to limit MCR access.

DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added RO (Current OPT-1525 Attachments 4 through 7)

FIS-114 may be set for one gallon less than desired. A pressure transient caused by 1CS-151 shutting results in FIS-Procedure Note:

114 normally indicating one gallon more than actual flow but two gallons more would be unexpected.

If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on Procedure Caution:

the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 10 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 68 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs Alternate dilution SET FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RO STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

IF the current potentiometer setpoint of controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, needs to be changed to obtain makeup flow, THEN PERFORM the following:

RO a. RECORD the current potentiometer setpoint of controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, in Section 5.4.3.

b. SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the ALT DIL RO position.

Alternate Dilution may be manually stopped at any time by Procedure Note:

turning the control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

a. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

b. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

c. IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 11 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 68 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity has been added.

IF controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, potentiometer was changed in Step 5.4.2.5, THEN PERFORM the following:

RO

a. REPOSITION controller, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, in Section 5.4.3.

b. INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY FK-114 potentiometer BOP position of Step 5.4.2.9.a is correct.

RO MONITOR Tavg and rod control for proper operation.

WHEN VCT pressure is between 20 - 30 psig, THEN TURN RO control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

a. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

b. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

c. IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

Systems and components operated from the Main Control Board on a daily basis to support normal plant operations do Procedure Note: not require Independent Verification. If this evolution is performed daily or more frequently, then Section 5.4.3 is not required to be performed. (Reference OPS-NGGC-1303)

RO IF required, THEN COMPLETE Section 5.4.3.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 12 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 68 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF reactivity evolutions are complete, THEN REMOVE reactivity BOP evolution signs limiting MCR access.

GP-005 CREW As power is raised above 5% identifies entry into Mode 1 Completes step 57 in GP-005 SRO Directs BOP to perform Step 84, TRANSFER control from the Throttle Valves to the Governor Valves Verifies Main Turbine speed on DEH control panel indicates the Turbine is at 1700 RPM then transfers control from the BOP Throttle Valves to the Governor Valves by depressing the TRANSFER TV-GV pushbutton.

CHECK that the transfer from the Throttle Valves to the Governor Valves is complete by checking the following indications:

Valve position indicators BOP

TRANSFER TV light extinguished

GV light illuminated

Local observation (Throttle Valves smoothly transition to full open)

AOs are standing by to monitor the Throttle Valves.

For local observation of the Throttle Valves as Turbine Communicator:

Building AO report smooth operation to the full open position.

If the candidate asks if documentation of PMID 00021983 Evaluator Note: RQ 01 completion is required inform the candidate the WCC will document PMID 00021983 RQ 01.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 13 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 14 of 68 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENTER 1800 RPM into the DEMAND display AND VERIFY BOP the HOLD pushbutton is illuminated.

The REFERENCE display will count up to 1800 RPM at the Procedure Note: previously selected acceleration rate, and then the GO pushbutton will extinguish.

BOP Depresses the GO pushbutton.

Verifies the Main Turbine speed stops increasing at BOP 1800 rpm AND the GO pushbutton extinguishes.

At 1800 RPM, LOWER the Valve Position Limiter, as indicated in the REFERENCE display, until it indicates the BOP percent (%) value read in the DEMAND display plus an additional 2%.

Once the BOP has completed the adjustment of the Valve Lead Evaluator: Position Limiter cue Event 2 Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 14 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 68 Event

Description:

Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2 Simulator Operator: Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure.

Indications

ALB-021-4-4, CIRC WTR PMP A O/C - GND - TRIP Available:

BOP RESPONDS to alarm ALB-021-4-4.

The crew may enter AOP-012, Partial Loss of Condenser Evaluator Note: Vacuum, without doing the alarm response procedure.

The SRO may elect to reduce power to control vacuum.

APP-SRO ENTERS APP-ALB-021-4-4.

ALB-021 Evaluator Note: In accordance with AD-OP-ALL-1000, the operator may take MANUAL actions when automatic actions do not occur and place the CWP A control switch in the stop position to shut the pump discharge valve before being directed by a procedure.

BOP CONFIRM alarm using:

Circ Water Pump A status lights

Circ Water Pump A discharge valve position BOP VERIFY Automatic Functions:

CWP A trips (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 15 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 68 Event

Description:

Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP PERFORM Corrective Actions:

(YES)

IF Circulating Water Pump trips OR Condenser vacuum is degrading, THEN GO TO AOP-012, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

IF necessary, THEN START the standby CWP. (N/A)

SRO DISPATCHES AO to investigate.

Communicator: Wait 3 minutes and report the breaker tripped on overcurrent.

IF STOP signal is not given to CWP A control switch, DISPATCHES AO to manually CLOSE discharge valve.

BOP NOTE: they may direct opening the discharge valve breaker prior to manually stoking the valve The crew may direct opening the discharge valve breaker prior to having the valve manually stroked. IF they do, wait 2 minutes, and instead of running Trigger 20 go to the Summary Simulator Operator page and modify ilo xb2o069b (1CW-10 light status) to OFF.

Communicator Report back that the power has been removed.

NOTE:

5 minutes later report back that the discharge valve has been shut.

IF power has been left on the CW pump discharge valve THEN after approximately 5 minutes from when the AO Simulator Operator: was dispatched actuate Trigger 20. This will time out the discharge valve MCB light indications and provide the BOP indication that the discharge valve is stoking closed.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 16 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 68 Event

Description:

Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF the discharge valve has been manually stoked using Trigger 20, report back as the AO assigned the valve is Communicator:

closed when the discharge valve lights indicate the valve is closed.

Enters AOP-012, Partial Loss Of Condenser Vacuum AOP-012 SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Conducts a crew alignment brief Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

SRO CHECK Turbine - IN OPERATION (YES)

BOP CHECK Condenser pressure in both Zones less than:

7.5 inches Hg absolute AND Turbine first stage pressure is greater than 60% TURBINE LOAD (NO)

BOP OR

5 inches Hg absolute AND Turbine first stage pressure is less than 60% TURBINE LOAD (YES)

REDUCE Turbine load as necessary to maintain Condenser vacuum using ONE of the following:

SRO

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby

AOP-038, Rapid Downpower CONTINUE Turbine load reduction until directed otherwise by CRS based on the following:

SRO

Cause of vacuum loss identified and corrected (NO )

Vacuum stable or increasing Plant condition (YES) require Reactor or Turbine trip

Plant conditions require Reactor or Turbine trip (NO )

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 17 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 18 of 68 Event

Description:

Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK ALL available Condenser Vacuum Pumps -

BOP (NO)

OPERATING.

DISPATCH Operator(s) to locally perform actions of CREW Attachment 1, Local Actions for a Loss of Condenser (N/A)

Vacuum.

VERIFY the following valves - SHUT:

BOP

1CE-447, Condenser Vac Breaker (YES)

1CE-475, Condenser Vac Breaker (YES)

CONTACT Radwaste Control Room to determine if recent BOP equipment operations using auxiliary steam or condensate may have caused loss of vacuum.

Report no auxiliary steam or condensate equipment has Communicator:

been recently operated.

BOP CHECK Circulating Water Pumps - ANY TRIPPED (YES)

VERIFY associated pump discharge valve - SHUT. (NO)

BOP

IF STOP signal is not given to CWP A control switch, DISPATCHES AO to CLOSE valve.

(If not already done)

If a Circulating Water Pump has tripped, it is not considered Procedure Note: available until the cause of the trip has been identified and corrected.

CHECK ALL available Circulating Water Pumps -

SRO (YES)

RUNNING.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 18 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 19 of 68 Event

Description:

Trip of the A Circ Water Pump and Discharge valve failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Call as the AOM shift to get information on the A CWP trip then give permission to allow continued operations with Communicator:

one CWP. The B CWP will be returned to service in the next 30 minutes.

AOP-012 does not have to be completed to continue the scenario after the discharge valve is being closed. Cue Evaluator Note:

Event 3 Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump failure to auto start after the valve has been closed.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 19 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 68 Event

Description:

Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump failure to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3 Simulator Operator: Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump (B) failure to auto start The standby B CCW Pump fails to Auto Start due to its pressure transmitter being isolated but can be manually Evaluator Note: started. The crew should recognize the loss of flow and pressure and enter AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

Available Indications Multiple CCW alarms on ALB-005 Red indicating light on A CCW pump still on CCW Pump A discharge header low pressure Diagnosis CCW event to be A CCW Shaft Shear recommends entry to AOP-014 / with no immediate actions RO *May identify that the B CCW pump has not auto started on low system pressure and may use AD-OP-ALL-1000 guidance to start the B CCW pump prior to procedural directions.

ENTER AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water AOP-014 SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Conducts a crew alignment brief This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Procedure Note: Loss of CCW may require implementation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.

Directs SM to REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification SRO And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 20 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 68 Event

Description:

Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump failure to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate SRO section. (Section 3.3, Loss of a CCW Pump)

(NO)

(YES)

Procedure Note: The standby CCW pump starts at 52 psig discharge pressure.

RO CHECK the standby CCW pump has STARTED. (NO)

Dispatch an operator to investigate Simulator If dispatched to the field to investigate report back after 2-3 Communicator: minutes that A CCW Pump shaft is sheared If A CCW pump has not been secured, it should be secured RO now.

RO START the standby CCW pump.

IF RHR is in service providing shutdown cooling, RCS temperature control will be impacted by the loss of RCP heat input to the RCS. RHR cooling should be significantly reduced Procedure Note: immediately after trip of the RCPs to prevent excessive cooldown of the RCS. RCS pressure control will be via Aux Spray and manual control of Pressurizer heaters.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 21 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 22 of 68 Event

Description:

Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump failure to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Att 1. (YES)

CHECK in-service CCW header(s) pressure greater RO (YES) than 52 psig.

VERIFY adequate ESW cooling water flow to the RO (YES) associated CCW heat exchanger.

RO CHECK RHR operating. (NO)

REFER TO Technical Specifications 3.5.2 and 3.7.3

Two independent ECCS subsystem shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of: b) One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger SRO

With only one component cooling water flow path OPERABLE restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

CONTACT Maintenance to determine the cause of the CCW SRO pump failure, AND INITIATE corrective action.

CHECK with Operations Staff to determine the desirability of SRO using the swing CCW pump.

SRO CHECK CCW flow RESTORED to the affected train. (NO)

May dispatch Aux Operator to Open the control power knife Crew switch for the A CCW pump.

Simulator Acknowledge request.

Communicator / Open control power knife switch on A CCW pump then Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 22 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 23 of 68 Event

Description:

Shaft Shear A CCW Pump with standby CCW pump failure to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Operator contact MCR that control power has been removed.

Crew may implement OWP-CC at this point. This OWP will have the crew verify the ESF Status Light Boxes.

Evaluator Note:

The implementation of the OWP is not required to continue with the scenario.

SRO EXIT this procedure.

Procedure Note: The crew may choose to not exit the procedure since only one Circulating Water pump is operating.

Once the plant has stabilized, cue Simulator Operator to Lead Evaluator: insert Trigger 4 Event 4 - Pressurizer Level Transmitter for LT-460 fails low Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 23 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 24 of 68 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter LI-460 Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator:

Pressurizer Level Instrument, LT-460, fails low

ALB-009-4-3, PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL LTDN SECURED AND HTRS OFF Indications Available:

LI-460, Pressurizer Level Indication

FI-150.1, Letdown Flow Indication Responds to ALB-009-4-3 or indication of a failed Pressurizer RO Level Channel on LI-460.

APP-SRO Enters APP-ALB-009-4-3 ALB-009 Operator may use AD-OP-ALL-1000 guidance to take manual Evaluator Note: control of charging to avoid a trip or transient prior to the SRO direction.

CONFIRM alarm using:

RO

Pressurizer level LI-459A1, LI-460, LI-461.1 (LI-460 low)

Letdown flow FI-150.1 VERIFY Automatic Functions:

RO

All pressurizer heaters off

Letdown isolated Provide level bands and trip levels IAW OMM-001 Att. 13 SRO (controlling band +/- 5% of reference level, trip limits of 10%

and 90%)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 24 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 25 of 68 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter LI-460 Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF PRZ level is low, THEN VERIFY letdown is isolated AND heaters are off. (YES)

IF RCS leakage is indicated, THEN GO TO AOP- (NO) 016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. (NO)

IF alarm is due to malfunction of level control system, THEN MANUALLY RESTORE normal level. (LT-459 is controlling channel for PZR level)

IF the alarm is due to a failed level instrument (YES)

RO o USING the Pressurizer Level Controller Selector switch, THEN SELECT a position which places the two operable channels into service. (Select channels 459/461) o VERIFY the failed channel is not selected, at the MCB recorder panel.

o RESET the control heaters by placing the control switch to OFF and then back to ON.

IF maintenance is to be performed, THEN REFER TO OWP-RP, Reactor Protection.

RO SELECT 459/461 on Pressurizer Level Controller Selector T.S. 3.3.3.6 (Tracking EIR)

Prepares an Equipment Problem Checklist SRO Contacts WCC for assistance.

(WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

Simulator Acknowledge request.

Communicator Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 25 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 26 of 68 Event

Description:

Initiate Normal Letdown per OP-107 Section 5.4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Once the crew has taken manual control of Charging FCV-122 (to control PZR level) and selects an alternate Evaluator Note:

controlling Pressurizer channel normal letdown flow may be initiated.

OP-107 RO OP-107, Section 5.4 Verifies Initial Conditions:

Charging flow has been established per Section 5.3

Pressurizer level is greater than 17%

RO

The following valves are shut:

o 1CS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A o 1CS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B o 1CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C If Charging flow was stopped or greatly reduced prior to letdown being secured, there is a possibility that the Letdown Procedure Caution: line contains voids due to insufficient cooling. This is a precursor to water hammer, and should be evaluated prior to initiating letdown flow.

VERIFY 1CC-337, TK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE, controller is:

In AUTO AND RO

set for 110 to 120 F (4.0 to 4.7 on potentiometer) normal operation OR

set for 90 to 120 F (2.67 to 4.7 on potentiometer) if operating per Section 8.11 PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, 1CS-38, may have to be Procedure Note:

adjusted to control at lower pressures.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 26 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 68 Event

Description:

Initiate Normal Letdown per OP-107 Section 5.4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY 1CS-38 Controller, PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, in RO MAN with output set at 50%.

VERIFY open the following Letdown Isolation Valves:

RO

1CS-2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459

1CS-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-460 RO VERIFY open 1CS-11, LETDOWN ISOLATION.

The following table gives the minimum charging flow required to Procedure Note: keep the regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when letdown is established:

If Pressurizer level is above the programmed level setpoint, charging flow should be adjusted to a point above the minimum Procedure Note:

required to prevent regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm but low enough to reduce pressurizer level.

ADJUST controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, as required to:

RO

Maintain normal pressurizer level program

Keep regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when the desired letdown orifice is placed in service.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 27 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 28 of 68 Event

Description:

Initiate Normal Letdown per OP-107 Section 5.4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If CVCS Demins have cooled from normal operating temperature, an increased reactivity affect may be observed.

Consideration may be given to increasing CVCS Demins to Procedure Note: operating temperature by flushing them to the RHT prior to restoring letdown. TIS-250, Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer Temperature Switch, can be used to determine temperature during flushing to the RHT.

IF flushing CVCS Demins to the RHT is desired for (NOT RO increasing temperature, THEN PERFORM the Desired) following:

a. NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room that letdown flow will be diverted to the RHT.

b. PLACE 1CS-120, LETDOWN TO VCT/HOLDUP TANK LCV-115A to the RHT position.

Changes in Letdown flowrate will affect the displayed value for Procedure Note: RM-3502A (Channel 2303) due to the detector's proximity to the LTDN line.

RO OPEN additional orifice isolation valves (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9) as required.

ADJUST charging flow as necessary to:

RO

Prevent high temperature alarm (per table above)

Maintain pressurizer programmed level.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 28 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 29 of 68 Event

Description:

Initiate Normal Letdown per OP-107 Section 5.4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Placing LK-459F in AUTO may take several minutes due to matching PRZ level to reference level.

Evaluator Note:

Once letdown flow is established, event 6 can be initiated without waiting for charging flow control to be restored to AUTO.

RO PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in AUTO, as follows:

a. PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in MAN to cancel any integrated signal.

b. RECORD FI-122A.1, CHARGING FLOW.

______GPM

c. DETERMINE PRZ level controller, LK-459F setpoint by one of the two methods. (Ref 2.7.14) (N/A Step not performed)

DETERMINE LK-459F based on the table below:

CALCULATE PRZ level controller, LK-459F setpoint.

(Ref. 2.7.14)

LK-459F setpoint = (Desired Charging Flow ÷ 150 GPM)2 X 100%

N/A

d. ADJUST PRZ level controller, LK-459F, to the calculated setpoint.

e. PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in AUTO.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 29 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 30 of 68 Event

Description:

Initiate Normal Letdown per OP-107 Section 5.4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO WHEN the following occurs:

Program pressurizer level is matching the current pressurizer level AND

Letdown and seal return are balanced with seal injection flow and charging flow.

RO THEN place controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, in AUTO.

RO COMPLETE Section 5.4.3. (Position Verification)

After the actions to initiate normal letdown is completed, Lead Evaluator: cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 6 Event 6 - Failure of RWST level channel I, LI-990 fails high.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 30 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 31 of 68 Event

Description:

Failure of RWST level channel I, LI-990 fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 6:

Simulator Operator:

Failure of RWST level channel I, LI-990 fails high Indications Available

ALB-04-2-1, Refueling Water Storange Tank High Level

LI-990 reads 100%

Responds to annunciator Identifies LI-990 failed high - reports information to SRO RO Reviews the APP response Directs SRO to OWP-ESF and provides list of possible applicable Tech Specs from APP response Directs the crew to implement OWP-ESF-05 Complete OMM-001 Attachment 5 and requests assistance from the WCC center Evaluates Tech Specs for the failed channel

Tech Spec 3.3.2 Requires ESF Actuation system instrumentation channels to be OPERABLE Action 16 would apply SRO

Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 Action a (RWST Level LI-990 is an accident monitoring instrument based on OST-1021 Attachment 6 - Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Log, Item # 9)

Action a applies:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 31 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 32 of 68 Event

Description:

Failure of RWST level channel I, LI-990 fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Acknowledge any requests for assistance including Communicator: implementation of the OWP.

Evaluator Note: Implementation of the OWP does not have to be completed to continue with the scenario.

When the Tech Spec evaluation is complete continue Evaluator Note: scenario cue Event 7 - A MFW Pump Trip with B MFW Pump Fail to Start Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 32 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 33 of 68 Event

Description:

A MFW Pump Trip with B MFW Pump Fail to Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 7 Simulator Operator:

A MFW Pump Trip with B MFW Pump Fail to Start.

The Operator may use AD-OP-ALL-1000 guidance to manually Evaluator Note:

start the AFW pumps following the loss of MFW.

ALB-016-1-2, FW PUMP A/B LUBE OIL LOW PRESS OR TRIP Indications Available:

ALB-016-2-2, LOSS OF BOTH MAIN FW PUMPS

Lowering Level on all three Steam Generators Identify loss of A MFW pump BOP Identify annunciators Enters AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions AOP-010 SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Conducts a crew alignment brief CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)

Immediate CHECK initial Reactor power less than 90%. (YES)

BOP Action CHECK initial Reactor power less than 80%. (YES)

Turbine runback will automatically terminate at approximately 50% power with DEH in AUTO.

Turbine runbacks are quickly identified by ALB-020-2-2, Procedure Note:

TURBINE RUNBACK OPERATIVE, in alarm and RUNBACK OPER light LIT as long as the initiating signal is present on DEH Panel A.

BOP CHECK initial Reactor power less than 60%. (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 33 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 34 of 68 Event

Description:

A MFW Pump Trip with B MFW Pump Fail to Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP CHECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY. (YES)

BOP Dispatch operators to investigate the loss of A MFP Simulator Communicator: Acknowledge communications.

MAINTAIN ALL of the following:

At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (NO)

BOP

Main Feedwater flow to ALL Steam Generators (NO)

ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 30% (YES)

RNO: PERFORM the following:

a. IF ANY SG level drops to 30% THEN TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP E-0. (NO)

b. IF Above POAH AND Reactor power is LESS (YES)

SRO THAN 10%, THEN:

1) INITIATE AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62%.

(AFW is running due to loss of both MFW pumps)

2) REDUCE power as necessary Procedure Note: Mode change occurs at 5% Reactor power.

c. IF below POAH, THEN: (NO)

1) VERIFY AFW capable of feeding Steam SRO Generators.

2) MAINTAIN Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62%.

3) EXIT this procedure.

Once AFW is established, or the SRO directs a Reactor Lead Evaluator: Trip, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 8 Event 8 - B SGTR - 420 gpm Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 34 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 35 of 68 Event

Description:

B SGTR Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The SGTR ramps in over 3 min to 420 gpm. IF AOP-016 is entered the crew will perform those actions until the leak size is > makeup capability then manually trip the Reactor Evaluator Note: and SI then enter EOP-E-0.

Crew actions are time dependent. The crew may conservatively elect to trip the Reactor after analyzing the event in progress.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 8 Simulator Operator:

B SGTR - 420 gpm

ALB-009-2-2, Pressurizer Control Low Level Indications Available: Deviation

ALB-010-4-5, Rad Monitor System Trouble Evaluators Note: Alarms associated with RCS leakage will direct implementation of AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE. The RO may take MANUAL control of FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, at any point after the failure is recognized.

If the crew elected to trip the Reactor on loss of MFW, the crew will implement EOP-E-0 and not enter AOP-016.

RO Responds to alarms and/or indications of RCS leakage.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 35 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 36 of 68 Event

Description:

B SGTR Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage AOP-016 SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Conducts a crew alignment brief Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

RO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 3.

REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

May identify B SG as the ruptured generator due to rising SG CREW level.

RO CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (NO)

RNO: Perform the following:

SRO

TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP-E-0. (Perform RNO substeps 4.b and 4.c as time permits)

If SI Actuation is required, the Reactor and Turbine should be Procedure Note:

verified tripped in EOP-E-0 before manually actuating SI.

Manually INITIATE Safety Injection SRO

EXIT this procedure RO INITIATES MANUAL Reactor Trip and attempts SI.

SRO ENTERS and directs actions of E-0.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 36 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 37 of 68 Event

Description:

B SGTR Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection EOP-E-0 SRO Makes PA announcement for EOP entry Conducts a crew alignment brief RO Initiates a MANUAL reactor trip.

RO/BOP Performs E-0 immediate actions.

VERIFY Reactor Trip:

Immediate (YES)

RO Actions (YES)

(YES)

Check Turbine Trip - ALL THROTTLE VALVES SHUT (YES)

Immediate (YES)

BOP Actions (YES)

(YES)

Perform The Following:

(YES)

Immediate

AC Emergency Buses - AT LEAST ONE BOP Actions ENERGIZED (YES)

AC Emergency Buses - BOTH ENERGIZED Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 37 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 38 of 68 Event

Description:

Auto SI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Safety Injection - ACTUCATED (BOTH TRAINS) (NO)

Immediate RO Actions RNO Check Safety Injection - REQUIRED (YES)

Immediate RO Actions Perform the following:

IF Safety Injection actuation is required, THEN perform the following:

(Event 8) o Manually actuate Safety Injection RO o GO TO Step 5.

(MCB SI switch on Reactor panel does NOT function)

Uses second SI switch to manually actuate SI near SI reset switches (successful SI)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 38 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 39 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

If B SG previously identified as the ruptured generator due to CREW rising SG level, then Ruptured SG AFW Isolation foldout will apply SRO Perform The Following:

a. Review Foldout page.

RO- RCP Trip Criteria, Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut Criteria, RHR Restart Criteria

BOP - Ruptured SG AFW Isolation criteria, AFW Supply Switchover Criteria

b. Directs Shift Manager to Evaluate EAL Matrix Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 39 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 40 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Verify CSIPs - ALL RUNNING (YES)

RO Verify RHR pumps - ALL RUNNING (YES)

RO Safety Injection flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

RO RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 12.

BOP MAIN Steam Line Isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)

SRO RNO: Perform the following:

Check MAIN Steam Line Isolation - REQUIRED (NO)

BOP

IF Main Steam Isolation is NOT required ,

THEN GO TO Step 16.

CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS (YES)

RO THAN 10 PSIG Verify AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH BOP (YES)

ESTABLISHED Sequencer Load Block 9 (Manual Loading Permissive)

BOP (YES)

- ACTUATED (BOTH TRAINS)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 40 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 41 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 A linked Simulator command will fail OPEN the B SG PORV when the BOP energizes AC bus 1B1.

A crew member may identify that the SG PORV is open Evaluator Note: and manually shut the valve at any time from this point forward.

Shutting B SG PORV is a critical task on page 46 of this guide.

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 3. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 3 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies Evaluator Note:

tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 3 is not predictable.

To follow BOP actions E-0 Attachment 3 is located on page 61 of this guide.

VERIFY Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 3, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing with this Procedure.

Directs TB AO - Place air compressor 1A and 1B in the Local BOP Control mode.

When contacted to place A/B air compressors in Local Simulator Operator:

Control mode, run CAEP :\air\ACs_to_local.txt.

When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors Communicator:

are running in local control mode.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 41 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 42 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs RAB AO - Locally unlock and turn on the breakers for BOP the CSIP Suction and Discharge Cross-Connect valves Simulator Acknowledge request to Locally unlock and turn on the Communicator: breakers for the CSIP Suction and Discharge Cross-Connect valves.

When RAB AO is contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-Simulator Operator:

connect valves, run CAEP :\cvc\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power.txt.

Simulator When the CAEP is complete, report task to the MCR.

Communicator:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 42 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 43 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

BOP

Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 F AND 559 F Identifies that the cooldown is continuing and the MSIVs need BOP to be shut.

BOP Shuts all MSIVs RO PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 43 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 44 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRZ PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

RO (All OPEN)

If the crew has not shut SG B PORV then a transition to E-2 should occur. If SG B PORV has been closed in Evaluator Note:

MANUAL then the crew will continue in E-0 to the E-3 transition. (Go to page 48 of this guide)

ANY SG pressures - DROPPING IN AN (YES)

UNCONTROLLED MANNER BOP OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

GO TO E-2, "FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION",

SRO Step 1.

(IF SG PORV Remains Open)

Enters E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation EOP-E-2 SRO Makes PA announcement for EOP entry Conducts a crew alignment brief If directed to walk down the system to check for leaks:

Communicator: Wait 3 minutes and then report SG B PORV tailpipe is blowing steam.

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Note: Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 44 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 45 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT, BOP shuts all MSIVs here (YES)

BOP if not previously shut.

BOP VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

Check any SG pressure - STABLE OR RISING (NOT (YES)

BOP FAULTED)

ANY SG pressures - DROPPING IN AN (YES)

UNCONTROLLED MANNER BOP OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, Procedure Caution: THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG.

BOP ISOLATE Faulted SG(s) (identified in Step 5):

VERIFY faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT (NO)

Places SG B PORV in MANUAL and closes to Critical terminate the release BOP Task #1 Critical to manually close B SG PORV prior to an improper crew transition to EOP-ECA-3.3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 45 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 46 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY MDAFW and TDAFW pump isolation (YES) valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT

SHUT faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to (YES)

TDAFW pump - SHUT BOP

VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before (YES)

MSIVs - SHUT:

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP (YES)

VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves -

SHUT BOP CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

The Check secondary radiation could be answered YES Evaluator Note: or NO, depending on the condition of the alarm before SI was initiated.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 46 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 47 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any SG - ABNORMAL RADIATION (YES OR /NO)

UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE (YES)

SRO SRO GO TO E-3, "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE", Step 1.

Enters E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture EOP-E-3 SRO Conducts a crew alignment brief Procedure Note: Foldout applies.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 47 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 48 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

No actions should result from FOLDOUT page during the remainder of the scenario.

Assigns RO and BOP Foldout items:

RO- Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut Criteria, RHR Restart Criteria, SI Reinitiation Criteria, Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover Criteria SRO BOP - Secondary Integrity Criteria, Multiple Tube Rupture Criteria, AFW Supply Switchover Criteria Initiates Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 48 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 49 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Any RCP - RUNNING (YES)

The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is Procedure Note:

initiated.

CHECK RCP Trip Criteria:

Check all of the following:

RO

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 (NO)

PSIG SRO RNO: GO TO Step 4.

CHECK Ruptured SG(s) - IDENTIFIED (YES)

BOP ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1145 BOP PSIG) AND place in AUTO.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 49 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 50 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Places SG B PORV in MANUAL and closes (if not already performed earlier). It should NOT be placed in AUTO. If it Evaluator Note: is placed in AUTO then the operator should determine that it has opened, place it in MANUAL, close it, and leave it in MANUAL.

BOP CHECK ruptured SG PORV - SHUT. (YES/NO)

BOP Check Feed Flow To Intact SG(s) - AVAILABLE (YES)

FROM MDAFW PUMP SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

BOP May be closed previously in E-2 VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG - (YES)

SHUT BOP SHUT ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before (YES)

MSIV:

BOP Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 50 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 51 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP SHUT ruptured SG MSIV AND BYPASS valve. (YES)

SRO Ruptured SG - FAULTED (NO)

BOP Ruptured SG Level - GREATER THAN 25% (YES)

BOP Check Feed Flow To Ruptured SG(s) - ISOLATED (YES)

SRO GO TO Step 18.

BOP Check Steam Supply Valve From Ruptured SG To (YES)

TDAFW Pump - SHUT OR ISOLATED (STEP 8)

BOP CHECK Ruptured SG(s) Pressure - GREATER THAN (YES) 260 PSIG The Check PRZ Pressure could be answered YES or NO, Evaluator Note: depending on the pace at which the SRO progresses through the EOP network.

RO Check PRZ Pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (NO)

RNO: When LESS THAN 2000 then Block Low Steam SRO Pressure SI.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 51 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 52 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Steamline High Pressure Rate Bistables - (YES)

CLEAR (NOT LIT)

RO After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

RO Block Low Steam Pressure SI.

SRO At least one intact SG - AVAILABLE FOR RCS (YES)

COOLDOWN SRO GO TO Step 28.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 52 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 53 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured SG pressure:

SRO The MSIVs should have been previously shut. IF the crew transitioned to EOP-E-2 or exercised the continuing Evaluator Note: cooldown step in table 1, they may have closed all MSIVs.

IF so this would require using the SG A and C PORVs to perform the cool down.

Condenser Available For Steam Dump: (NO)

BOP Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 53 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 54 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs the BOP to dump steam from intact SGs at maximum rate using any of the following (Listed in order of preference):

SG PORVs SRO

Locally operate SG PORVs using OP126, "MAIN STEAM,EXTRACTION STEAM, AND STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS", Section 8.2.

TDAFW pump BOP Opens the A and C SG PORVs fully BOP Opens MS-72 to start the TDAFW pump and feeds the C S/G SRO Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED (NO)

TEMPERATURE RNO: WHEN core exit TCs less than required temperature, THEN perform Steps 37 AND 38.

SRO

Observe CAUTION Prior To Step 39 AND Continue with Step 39.

If no RCPs running, the following actions may cause a false Procedure Caution: indication for the INTEGRITY CSFST. Disregard ruptured SG wide range cold leg temperature until Step 94 complete.

Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 54 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 55 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

If an AFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signal may be reset to allow restoration of AFW. (An AFW isolation will occur if a main steam line isolation signal is present AND one SG pressure decreases 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.)

Procedure Caution:

If the steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to TDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing SG level, it must be restored to the shut position. (Two out of three SG levels decreasing below 25% will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)

BOP Any Intact SG Level - GREATER THAN 25% (YES)

BOP AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

Control Feed Flow To Maintain Intact SG Levels Between 25%

BOP And 50%

RO Verify Power To PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE (YES)

RO PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

RO Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

RO Reset SI.

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of SRO Offsite Power. (Direct BOP)

Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. (Phase A only RO is actuated)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 55 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 56 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Open Instrument Air AND Nitrogen Valves To CNMT:

RO Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

RO RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

RO Stop RHR pumps.

Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED (YES)

RO TEMPERATURE BOP Stop RCS cooldown BOP Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.

BOP Check ruptured SG pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)

RO Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 30 F (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 56 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 57 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Normal PRZ spray - AVAILABLE (INCLUDING (YES)

INSTRUMENT AIR TO CNMT)

RO RO Check PRZ level - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 75% (YES)

Manually Open All Available Normal PRZ Spray Valves AND Spray At Maximum Rate (Until ANY Of The RCS Depressurization Termination Criteria in Step 61 Satisfied).

Critical Minimize primary to secondary leakage prior to SG B RO exceeding 100% level Task #2 Critical to depressurize the RCS to minimize primary to secondary leakage preventing the SG B NR level from exceeding 100%

Crew will maintain the spray valves open until RCS Evaluator Note: pressure is less than SG pressure. They may close the spray valves if they do not meet PRZ level or subcooling conditions.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 57 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 58 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Depressurization Termination Criteria - (NO)

SATISFIED RO RNO: Continue to monitor termination criteria.

SRO

WHEN criteria satisfied, THEN GO TO Step 62.

RO Shut spray valve used for depressurization:

SRO GO TO Step 70.

RO RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F (YES)

BOP Level In At Least One Intact SG - GREATER THAN (YES) 25%

SRO GO TO Step 74.

RO RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)

RO PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 58 of 68

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 59 of 68 Event

Description:

B SG PORV fails open / B SGTR continues Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Stop All But One CSIP.

Check CSIP Suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

RO Open Normal Miniflow Isolation Valves:

RO Shut BIT outlet valves:

RO Terminate the scenario after BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 are SHUT.

Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation.

Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions.

When directed by Lead Evaluator place the Simulator in Simulator Operator:

FREEZE.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 59 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 60 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 61 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 62 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 63 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 64 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 65 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 66 of 68 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL Page 67 of 68

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 2 Revision Summary Rev. 0 - Development Copy / send outline to NRC Rev. 1 - Outline Revision / Changes made by Exam Team Rev. 2 - Validation Rev. 3 - Validation, Final Ops and Training Management comments incorporated Rev. 4 - NRC 45 day exam submittal review comments Rev. FINAL - NRC Prep Week review comments incorporated Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 05000400/2014302 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

OATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: IC-26, MOL, 88% power

A MDAFW Pump Out of Service due to high vibrations, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , awaiting motor bearing parts from vendor

B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs

1CS-9, Orifice Isolation Valve, Out of Service for solenoid repairs

Thunderstorms have been forecasted for the area, AP-301 actions are completed.

Turnover:

Plant is at 88% power. AH-3 has been leaking for the last 5 days. Service water tube plugging plans have been developed and Maintenance is ready to plug the leaking tube.

To allow personnel to enter Containment and work on the air handler the unit will be reduced to 60% power. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to the downpower.

The power reduction is in progress IAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown step 9.

The desired load rate change is 4 DEH units per minute.

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip all RCPs within 10 minutes of a Phase B isolation signal

Align one train of Containment Spray System for operation

Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

R - RO 1 n/a Start power reduction to 85 - 83%

N - BOP ft:497 I - BOP/SRO Feed flow transmitter on C SG FT-497 Channel IV (selected 2

imf cfw19c TS - SRO for 1C SG) fails low - additionally, FRV C fails in Auto 3 lt:115 I - RO/SRO VCT Level Channel 115 fails low idii xd1i142 4 ilo xd1o142w C - BOP/SRO Reactor Primary Shield Fan Trip ian xn27e05 C - RO/SRO CSIP Trip - 1 available, requiring AOP-018 entry 5 cvc05a ASI Pump start / Respond to Boron addition to RCS from ASI TS - SRO 6 n/a N - RO/SRO Restore letdown IAW OP-107.

7 rcs01b M - ALL Large Break LOCA 8 zdsq2:52a C - RO/SRO A RHR Fails to auto-start on Safety Injection (preset) zrpk643a/b 9 zrpk644a/b C - RO/SRO BOTH Containment Spray Pumps Fail to auto-start (preset) zrpk645a/b RWST swap-over fails, 1SI-300 and 1SI-310, Containment 10 zrpk740a C - RO/SRO Sump To RHR Pump A-SA, valves fail to open when RWST level reaches 23.4% (preset)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 The plant is at 88% power with middle of life core conditions and the turbine in HOLD. AH-3 has been leaking for the last 5 days. Service water tube plugging plans have been developed and Maintenance is ready to plug the leaking tube. To allow personnel to enter Containment and work on the air handler the unit will be reduced to 60% power.

A power reduction is in progress IAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown From Power Operation To Hot Standby (Mode 1 To Mode 3) step 9.

The desired load rate change is 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 120, and the turbine is in hold.

The National Weather Service has forecasted thunderstorms for the New Hill area and the actions for AP-301, Seasonal Weather Preparations and Monitoring have been completed by the crew. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to the downpower.

The following equipment is under clearance:

AFW Pump A-SA is under clearance due to high vibrations on the motor bearing. The pump has been inoperable for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , awaiting motor bearing parts from vendor. Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 LCO Action a.

B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs. The pump has been unavailable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 (Continued)

Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve 1CS-9 is under clearance for breaker inspection. Tech Spec 3.6.3 LCO Action b applies. OWP-CS-09 has been completed.

Event 1: Crew performs a power reduction IAW GP-006. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power. After approximately a 3-5% power reduction 85 to 83% Event 2 will begin.

Event 2: Feed flow transmitter on C SG FT-497 Channel IV (selected for 1C SG) fails low -

additionally, FRV C fails in Auto. When the plant is in a stable condition, the Lead Evaluator can cue the SG C Feed Flow channel failure. The crew should respond in accordance with the alarm response procedure and AD-OP-ALL-1000. The BOP will be controlling SG C level with the FRV in MANUAL and may switch controlling FF channels to restore control to AUTO. The crew will take the channel out of service using OWP-RP-10, Reactor Protection, SF/FF Loop 3.

IF FRV C is placed back into Auto the controller will fail to 60% output and the valve will respond by placing the FRV controller back to MANUAL and adjusting Feed Flow accordingly.

The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Specs for failure of FT-497:

T.S. 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 (Continued)

T.S. 3.3.1 (continued)

The crew should implement OWP-RP-10 for this failure.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 3: VCT Level Channel 115 fails low. This failure will cause automatic make up to the VCT to initiate. The crew should enter AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control, identify the failed level transmitter, and secure the automatic makeup caused by the failed instrument.

Event 4: Reactor Primary Shield Cooling Fan S2-1A trips. The crew will respond to ALB 027-5-5 and evaluate the condition. The standby fan will be started in accordance with the alarm response. A fan is required to be in operation anytime RCS temperature is greater than 140°F.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 5: Trip of the running A Charging Pump breaker. The crew will enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions and carry out the immediate actions. The crew should isolate letdown and then implement actions to place the B Charging Pump in service. The crew will have to secure the ASI pump after the CSIP is started and evaluate the boration caused by the ASI pump running. The efficiency that the crew has in progressing through AOP-018 to the point of securing the ASI pump will determine the amount of boric acid added to the RCS through the RCP seals. This could require the SRO to direct the RO and BOP to coordinate Reactor and Turbine controls (dilute, rod movement and / or Turbine reduction) to accommodate the boron addition for Tavg/Tref stabilization.

Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 (Continued)

The SRO should evaluate the loss of the CSIP in accordance with Tech Specs 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 TS 3.1.2.2 - At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging/safety injection pumps to the RCS.

ACTION: With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the RCS OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR), plant procedure PLP-I06 at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

TS 3.1.2 4 - With only one Charging/safety injection pump OPERABLE restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) plant procedure PLP-106 at 200°F within t he next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s: restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

TS 3.5.2 - Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

One OPERABLE Charging/safety injection pump One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger One OPERABLE RHR pump and An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and. upon being manually aligned transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

ACTION: a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Operations Administrative Requirements, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 6: Restore letdown IAW OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System (Evaluators discretion) - once the B Charging Pump is in service, the crew will restore letdown IAW OP-107 Section 5.4 to establish inventory control. Once letdown has been restored, Tech Specs have been evaluated for the loss of the A CSIP, and the crew response to the boron addition from the ASI system have been addressed to the satisfaction of the Lead Examiner the next event can be initiated.

Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2014 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 (Continued)

Event 7: MAJOR - LBLOCA. The crew should implement EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

During the implementation of EOP-E-1 plant conditions will require the CRS to transition to EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock. Plant conditions will also require the crew to evaluate the need to transition to EOP-FR-C.2 based on RVLIS level fluctuations from the LOCA and input from the ECCS components. After implementation of the FR procedures the crew will return to EOP-E-1.

Event 8: The A RHR Pump will fail to auto start on sequencer operation but may be started manually from the MCB after Load Block 9 manual permissive is available.

Event 9: Shortly after entering EOP-E-0, the crew should recognize that the Foldout Criteria for securing all RCPs has been met and carry out that action. The RCPs must be manually tripped within 10 minutes of receiving a Phase B isolation signal. (Critical Task).

Pressure in Containment will continue to rise due to the LOCA and a Containment Spray Actuation setpoint will be reached. Both Containment Spray Pumps will fail to automatically start and at least one pump will need to be manually started with a flow path established to Containment (Critical Task).

Without Containment Spray in service, an ORANGE path will be met for Containment. The crew will not be required to make the transition to EOP-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, if they start and align at least on Containment Spray pump.

Event 10: When RWST level reaches 23.4%, the crew will transition to EOP-ES-1.3, Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation. 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 will fail to automatically open when RWST level reaches 23.4% and will need to be manually opened (Critical Task).

Once cold leg recirculation has been established, the scenario may be terminated.

Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Manually trip all RCPs within 10 minutes of a Phase B isolation signal Securing RCPs during a large break LOCA inside Containment is procedurally required when Containment pressure has exceeded the High 3 setpoint of 10 psig. Exceeding this pressure causes a Phase B actuation that isolates CCW flow to the RCP heat exchangers. If the RCPs are left operating they will overheat and become inoperable. Due to the rapid pressure increase in Containment from this event EOP-E-0 continuous action step 16 RNO b requires the crew to secure ALL RCPs. This action should be accomplished within 10 minutes of the Phase B actuation and prior to transitioning out of EOP-E-0.

2. Align one train of Containment Spray (CT) System for operation The CT System at HNP is designed to remove iodine from the Containment internal atmosphere. Actuating at least one train of CT is critical on the basis of iodine removal assumptions made in the FSAR. Since the event in this scenario is a large break LOCA this task should be completed prior to exiting E-0 based on continuous action step step 16 Check CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. RNO statement is to verify CNMT spray - ACTUATED.

It will not be actuated and require the crew will manually start at least one Containment Spray pump and then align the system for operation prior to exiting EOP-E-0. NOTE: the WOG Critical Task analysis states that this task should be completed prior to transition out of EOP-FR-Z.1 but since the event will cause the Containment pressure to quickly rise the continuous action statement in EOP-E-0 would be applicable. EOP-FR-Z.1 would not apply until the crew exits EOP-E-0 and transitions to EOP-E-1, step 1 where they would initiate monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. At this step the crew would identify that an ORANGE path condition to enter EOP-FR-Z.1 is present and at step 3.e they would verify CNMT spray pumps - RUNNING then align the system for injection.

3. Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation Improper performance or omission by an operator to correctly establish a RCS Cold Leg Recirculation line up will result in direct adverse consequences or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The establishment of the Cold Leg Recirculation lineup must be completed after the RWST level has lowered to < 23.4% and prior to the depletion of the RWST to a level <3%. This task is expected to be completed while performing the actions of EOP-ES-1.3, Transfer to cold leg recirculation. If the A RHR pump suction source remains aligned to both the Containment Recirc Sump and the empty RWST the RHR pump suction and discharge pressures will rapidly drop. Critical to complete suction lineup prior to the A RHR pump loss of suction which could potentially damage the pump and cause the pump to become inoperable at a time that it may be required to be in operation. (Suction and discharge pressure will rapidly reduce to ~0 psig upon loss of pump suction).

Note: An unanticipated critical task may be created in a scenario should an applicants action or lack of action cause an unexpected RPS or ESFAS actuation. A critical task may be assigned and graded as unsatisfactory even if corrected by another team member prior to the unanticipated RPS/ESFAS actuation. Should the applicant self-correct the action or inaction prior to the unanticipated plant response, a critical task failure should not be assigned to the applicant.

Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2014 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 3 Reset to IC-163 password spurs Go to RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner.

Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from IC-163, MOL, 88% power Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Ensure that DEH is set to 4 DEH Units / Min Set Boron FK-113 to 3.26 Provide a marked up copy of GP-006 Rev 72 through Section 5.2. step 8 Provide Reactivity Plan for down power Place CIT on A MDAFW Pump and Protected Train Placard on B MDAFW Pump switch Place Protected Train Placard on TDAFW Pump 1MS-70/72 switch Place CIT on A DEH Pump and place switch in pull to lock Place Protected Train Placard on B DEH Pump switch Place CIT on 1CS-9 Place OWP-CS-09 in OWP book Update the status board:

AFW Pump A-SA, Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO. OOS for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 81 Event

Description:

Perform a power reduction in accordance with GP-006 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce:

CREW UPDATE - (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift.

END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator:

annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN.

When the evaluating team has completed their evaluation Lead Evaluator: of the power change Cue Event 2 FT-497 C SG fails low.

The crew should place the Turbine on HOLD.

The crew has been directed to shut down the plant IAW GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown due to the leak on AH-3.

GP-006 is signed off through Section 5.2, step 8, and the Evaluator Note:

power reduction is on hold for turnover.

The crew should have briefed GP-006 prior to entering the Simulator and be ready to proceed with the power change.

GP-006, Step 5.2 Step 9 WHEN Turbine load is less than 75%, THEN VERIFY the GP-006 SRO SGBD Regenerative Heat Exchanger Condensate Outlet is aligned to the CPD effluent per OP-127, Section 7.1.

The SRO will evaluate RCS Tavg conditions with recommendations from the RO direct a boration. The crew Evaluator Note: may elect to perform the boration prior to placing the Turbine in GO. The boration steps are located on page 13 of this guide.

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 Units/Min with SRO target value set at 120. May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 9 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 81 Event

Description:

Perform a power reduction in accordance with GP-006 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following steps will initiate turbine load reduction IAW Evaluator Note: GP-006 section 5.2 step 5. These steps should be validated prior to commencing the power reduction.

Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Procedure Note:

Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

A failure of the Vidar in the DEH computer has resulted in a plant trip in the past. This failure would affect operation in Operator Auto, and can be detected in either of the following ways:

If OSI-PI is available, the process book PLANTSTATUS.PIW, DEH Trends function of the Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu) contains a point for DEH MEGAWATTS. With a failure of the Vidar, this point will not be updating.

If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics display computer (in the Termination Cabinet room near the ATWS panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the Vidar is functioning properly.

Procedure Caution:

If the DEH graphics computer is out of service, VIDAR can be checked as updating on the operator panel as follows:

1) DEPRESS TURBINE PROGRAM display button.

2) CHECK TURBINE PROGRAM display button is illuminated.

3) CHECK REFERENCE and DEMAND displays indicate 0000.

4) DEPRESS 1577.

5) DEPRESS "ENTER".

6) If the DEMAND display indicates 0000 then VIDAR is updating.

7) If the DEMAND display indicates 0001 then VIDAR is not updating.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 10 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 81 Event

Description:

Perform a power reduction in accordance with GP-006 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.

ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.

DEPRESS the REF push-button.

BOP

ENTER the desired load (120 MW per CRS) in the DEMAND display.

DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate.

Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control RO Peer checks DEH settings The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will Procedure Note: illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

Requests PEER check prior to depressing GO pushbutton DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO.

VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display BOP decreases.

VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.

WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A and 3B Feedwater Vents have been opened per OP-136, Feedwater Heaters, Vents, and Drains, Section 7.2 Provides PEER check for BOP RO After GO depressed, MONITORS primary systems response.

INITIATES boration, as necessary (with SRO direction) per OP-RO 107.01, CVCS Boration, Dilution, and Chemistry Control.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 11 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 81 Event

Description:

Perform a power reduction in accordance with GP-006 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs RO to perform a boration per reactivity plan OP-107.01, CVCS Boration, Dilution, and Chemistry Control, OP-107.01 RO Section 5.2

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added (Current RO OPT-1525 Attachments 4 through 7 or approved reactivity plan from Engineering may be used.)

FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Procedure Note:

position.

If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on Procedure Caution:

the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity.

SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

RO

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

NOTE: Boric Acid flow controller must be set between 0.2 and 6 (1 and 30 gpm.).

NOTE: Performing small borations at high flow rates may result in an over boration based on equipment response Procedure Note:

times. Boration flow should be set such that the time required to reach the desired setpoint will happen after release of the control switch.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 12 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 81 Event

Description:

Perform a power reduction in accordance with GP-006 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF the current potentiometer setpoint of controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, needs to be changed to obtain makeup flow, THEN:

RO a. RECORD the current potentiometer setpoint of controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, in Section 5.2.3.

b. SET controller 1CS 283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR RO position.

NOTE: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

Procedure Note: NOTE: During makeup operations following an alternate dilution, approximately 10 gallons of dilution should be expected due to dilution water remaining in the primary makeup lines.

START the makeup system as follows:

a. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

RO

b. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

c. IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity of boron has been added.

IF controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, was changed in Step 5.2.2.5, THEN:

RO a. REPOSITION controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, to the position recorded in Step 5.2.2.5.a.

b. INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, position.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 13 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 81 Event

Description:

Perform a power reduction in accordance with GP-006 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO MONITOR Tavg and rod control for proper operation.

WHEN VCT pressure is between 20 - 30 psig, THEN TURN RO control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

START the makeup system as follows:

a. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.

b. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

After the evaluation team is satisfied with the crews performance of the power reduction initiate Event 2.

A good initiation point for Event 2 is after either one Lead Evaluator: or two borations are completed and following the return of RMW CONTROL to START.

Cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2 Event 2 - FT-497 C SG Feed Flow transmitter fails low.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 14 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 15 of 81 Event

Description:

FT-497 Channel IV Feed flow transmitter on C SG fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

After the evaluation team is satisfied with the crews performance of the power reduction initiate Event 2.

A good initiation point for Event 2 is after either one Lead Evaluator: or two borations are completed and following the return of RMW CONTROL to START.

Cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2 Event 2 - FT-497 C SG Feed Flow transmitter fails low.

When directed by the Lead Evaluator Actuate Trigger 2 Simulator Operator: SG C FF Channel fails LO FT:497 SG C - feed flow controlling channel ALB-014-6-1B, SG C STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH Indications Available:

FI-497 decreases to 0 MPPH Performs actions of APP-ALB-014-6-1B/6-1A/3-1B or per AD-BOP OP-ALL-1000 to take manual control of a failed controller.

CONFIRM alarm using:

FI-496, FI-497, SG C Feed Flow

FI-494, FI-495, SG C Steam Flow (YES)

Reports FI-497 failed LOW

PERFORM Corrective Actions: (OMM-001 and AD-OP-ALL-BOP 1000)

IF FCV-498, Feedwater Reg Valve, is NOT controlling SG level, THEN MANUALLY CONTROL FK-498 AND REDUCE feed flow.

DISPATCH an operator to check for indications of feedwater leaks.

Simulator Acknowledge requests for assistance.

Communicator:

DIRECTS BOP to maintain SG level within control band and SRO within trip limits of OMM-001 Attachment 13 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 15 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 16 of 81 Event

Description:

FT-497 Channel IV Feed flow transmitter on C SG fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE SRO

DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the instrument malfunction.

SRO

Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC and I&C support for OWP implementation.

(WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

Acknowledge any request for assistance. When I&C requested Sim communicator can come down and Simulator implement OWP as I&C. Return to booth and run AMS Communicator: file: rps/OWP-RP-10-III-TST Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 16 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 17 of 81 Event

Description:

FT-497 Channel IV Feed flow transmitter on C SG fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If an additional Operator is requested them they will be here as soon as they can.

CREW Implements OWP-RP-10 Evaluator Note: OWP-RP-10 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 17 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 18 of 81 Event

Description:

FT-497 Channel IV Feed flow transmitter on C SG fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed to implement OWP-RP-10 run AMS file:

Simulator Operator: rps/OWP-RP-10-III-TST. An I&C Tech will need to come to the MCR for a brief on OWP implementation.

Simulator Contact MCR when complete Communicator:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 18 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 81 Event

Description:

FT-497 Channel IV Feed flow transmitter on C SG fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the C FRV is placed back into Auto the controller will fail to 60% output and the valve will OPEN causing more flow than required and increasing SG level. The BOP Evaluator Note:

should identify the malfunction and respond by placing the FRV controller back to MANUAL and adjusting Feed Flow accordingly.

(When the C SF FRV controller is returned to AUTO control Feed Flow will increase as the valve drifts open to ~ 60%.)

Recognizes that Feed Flow is rising and has lost control of C BOP SG level control in Automatic. Returns the FRV control back to MANUAL.

Informs the SRO that C SG FRV control has malfunctioned and will not control level in automatic.

May direct BOP to control SG C level within OMM-001 Attachment 13 limits again. Limits were already in effect when SRO FRV was initially taken to manual.

Contacts WCC and requests assistance for C FRV failure to control in Automatic.

Simulator Acknowledge request for support.

Communicator:

Wait for OWP-RP-10 to be completed and the BOP to identify the FRV problem and place the valve in MANUAL prior to next event.

Evaluator Note: Once the SG level has been restored to within the normal operating band and the Tech Spec has been identified, direct initiation of Event 3, VCT Level Channel 115 fails low.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 19 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 20 of 81 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 failure low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Wait for OWP-RP-10 to be completed and the BOP to identify the FRV problem and place the valve in MANUAL prior to next event.

Evaluator Note: Once the SG level has been restored to within the normal operating band and the Tech Spec has been identified, direct initiation of Event 3, VCT Level Channel 115 fails low.

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 3 Simulator Operator:

VCT Level Channel 115 failure low

Auto Makeup initiates

ALB-007-4-3, VCT HIGH-LOW LEVEL Indications Available

ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-007-4-3 or enters AOP-003 directly Crew may immediately secure auto makeup based on SRO AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, guidance since the makeup is due solely to the instrument failure.

The SRO is likely to direct the Turbine to be placed to HOLD and go directly to AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF Evaluator Note:

REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL, while the RO references the APP.

At the DEH controls, depresses the Turbine HOLD push BOP button and places the Turbine in HOLD APP-RO ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-007-4-3. If not in AOP-003.

ALB-007 RO CONFIRM alarm using

LI-115-1, Vol Control Tank Level (MCB-1A2).

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 20 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 21 of 81 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 failure low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO DETERMINES LT-115 failed LOW.

VERIFY Automatic Functions:

AT 5% VCT level, the following occurs:

(N/A)

1CS-291, Suction from RWST (LCV-115B) opens.

1CS-292, Suction from RWST (LCV-115D) opens

1CS-165, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115C) shuts RO

1CS-166, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115E) shuts

AT 20% VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor Makeup System starts. (YES)

AT 40% VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor (N/A)

Makeup System stops. (N/A)

AT 80% VCT level, 1CS-120, VCT Level Control Vlv, fully diverts letdown flow to the RHT.

Procedure Caution: Low VCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIPs.

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

MATCH charging and letdown flows.

RO

IF charging flow is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions.

If either LT-112 or LT-115 fails high, the automatic CSIP Procedure Note: suction swapover from the VCT to the RWST will not function if required. (Reference 1)

IF EITHER of the following occurs:

VCT level is less than 20% AND automatic makeup is NOT in progress SRO

VCT level is greater than 40% AND automatic makeup is still in progress THEN GO TO AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control.

Holds crew alignment brief AOP-003 SRO Enters AOP-003, Malfunction Of Reactor Makeup Control.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 21 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 22 of 81 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 failure low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

CREW CHECK instrument air available. (YES)

CHECK BOTH LT-112 and LT-115 functioning RO (NO) properly.

SRO RNO: GO TO Section 3.1, LT-112 or LT-115 Malfunction.

REFER TO Attachment 1, VCT Level Control Channels SRO Operation, as necessary to assess the effects of an LT-112 or LT-115 malfunction.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 22 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 23 of 81 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 failure low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: Crew may brief on AOP-003, Attachment 1.

An instrument malfunction may manifest itself as a slow drift rather than a full high or full low failure. Until the instrument Procedure Note:

has failed fully high or fully low, all steps should be reviewed for applicability periodically, even if not continuously applicable.

RO CHECK that LT-115 is FAILING. (YES)

MONITOR VCT level using either of the following:

RO

ERFIS point LCS0112

LI-112 (local)

If AO is dispatched to take local readings on LI-112 wait 1-Simulator 2 minutes and report current ERFIS reading to MCR. If Communicator:

prompted report no leaks.

RO CHECK LT-115 FAILING LOW. (YES)

PLACE RMW CONTROL Switch in STOP.

RO (May already have been performed.)

Normally, VCT level is maintained between 20 and 40% by Procedure Note:

auto makeup.

CONTROL VCT level as follows:

RO

MAINTAIN level BELOW 70%

MAINTAIN level ABOVE 20% OR DESIRED MINIMUM SRO GO TO Step 12.

RO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5%.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 23 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 24 of 81 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 failure low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO OBSERVE the note prior to Step 19 AND GO TO Step 19.

Lifting leads in the following step will simulate a low-low level Procedure Note: signal from the failed instrument. This is to allow a valid low-low level signal one instrument to initiate emergency makeup.

RO CHECK the malfunctioning instrument FAILING LOW. (YES)

DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the instrument SRO malfunction.

CHECK that the instrument malfunction has been SRO (NO) repaired.

SRO RNO: WAIT until repairs are complete before proceeding.

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist. Contacts WCC and support personnel for repairs.

Simulator Respond to crew requests.

Communicator:

After the crew has VCT level sufficiently controlled Cue the Lead Evaluator: Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4 Event 4 - Reactor Primary Shield Cooling Fan Trip.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 24 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 25 of 81 Event

Description:

Reactor Primary Shield Cooling Fan Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After the crew has VCT level sufficiently controlled Cue the Lead Evaluator: Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4 Event 4 - Reactor Primary Shield Cooling Fan Trip.

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator:

Reactor Primary Shield Cooling Fan Trip

ALB-027-5-5, REACTOR PRIMARY SHIELD CLG FANS S2 LOW FLOW-O/L Indications Available

Fan control switch indicating lights:

o White light on indicates thermal overload APP-BOP ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-027-5-5 ALB-027 BOP CONFIRM alarm using Control switch indicating lights:

White light ON indicates thermal overload

All indication lost indicates power supply de-energized SRO VERIFY Automatic Functions: None PERFORM Corrective Actions:

BOP

START the standby Primary Shield Cooling fan (YES) per OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation.

DISPATCH an operator to check the status of the following breakers:

BOP o 1A21-SA-4C, S-2 (1A-SA) Primary Shield Cooling Fan (both breakers)

If dispatched to investigate the breaker, report back (in 1- 2 Simulator mins) that both breakers for 1A21-SA-4C, S-2 (1A-SA)

Communicator: Primary Shield Cooling Fan are tripped with no apparent cause evident.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 25 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 26 of 81 Event

Description:

Reactor Primary Shield Cooling Fan Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

IF the breaker has tripped, OR has a thermal overload, SRO/BOP THEN ENSURE that the cause of the trip has been investigated and corrected prior to resetting breaker.

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist.

SRO Contacts WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

Initiates OWP-HVAC (no Tech. Spec. implications)

After the crew has restored Reactor Primary Shield Lead Evaluator: Cooling Cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5 Event 5 - Trip of the A CSIP Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 26 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5/6 Page 27 of 81 Event

Description:

A CSIP trip / Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After the crew has restored Reactor Primary Shield Lead Evaluator: Cooling Cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5 Event 5 - Trip of the A CSIP On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator:

A CSIP trip ALB-06-1-1 Charging Pump Discharge Header High-Low Flow ALB-06-1-2 Chrg Pump A Trouble Indications Available: ALB-06-1-3 Chrg Pump A Trip Or Close Ckt Trouble ALB-08-2-1 RCP Seal Water Injection Low Flow ALB-08-2-2 ASI Pump Auto Start Timer Initiated

RESPONDS to multiple alarms on ALB-06 (1-1, 1-2, 1-3)

RO and ALB-08 (2-1 & 2-2).

REPORTS CSIP A tripped.

Identifies Entry Conditions met for AOP-018, Reactor Coolant CREW Pump Abnormal Conditions AOP-018 Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions PERFORMS immediate actions.

CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. (NO)

Immediate

ISOLATE letdown by verifying the following valves SHUT:

Action RO o 1CS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A o 1CS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B o 1CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C ENTERS AOP-018, RCP Abnormal Conditions SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Conducts a plant alignment brief Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 27 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5/6 Page 28 of 81 Event

Description:

A CSIP trip / Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Dispatch operators to investigate cause of trip If dispatched to investigate, wait 3-4 minutes then report a Simulator breaker overcurrent trip flag on Phase A. Report as Communicator: second AO that there are no obvious problems at the pump.

Informs SM to REFER to PEP-110, Emergency Classification SRO and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

Minimum allowable flow for a CSIP is 60 gpm which is provided by normal miniflow during normal operation and Procedure Note: alternate miniflow during safety injection. Maintaining CSIP flow greater than or equal to 60 gpm also satisfies this requirement.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate SRO section:

MALFUNCTION SECTION PAGE Loss of CCW and/or Seal Injection to 3.1 5 RCPs CHECK ALB-5-1-2A, RCP Thermal Bar HDR High (YES)

RO Flow, alarm CLEAR.

CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of (YES)

SRO Attachment 1.

CHECK the following NORMAL for ALL RCPs:

RO o CCW flow (YES) o Seal Injection flow (NO)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 28 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5/6 Page 29 of 81 Event

Description:

A CSIP trip / Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO RESTORE using the applicable attachment:

MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT Loss of Seal Injection flow only Attachment 4 The ASI System will actuate in 2 minutes and 45 seconds Procedure Note:

from timer initiation. ALB-8-2-4 ASI pump start will alarm The ASI system when actuated will provide RCP seal injection of highly borated water. During the time the ASI Evaluator Note: pump is running a negative reactivity addition is being conducted in the form of boration. The sooner the system is shut down the less effect it will have on reactivity.

CHECK at least one CSIP RUNNING. (NO)

RO

Dispatch an operator to monitor operation of the ASI System Simulator Acknowledge request.

Communicator:

Be prepared to STOP the ASI pump when requested to.

Either use RF CVC 195 STOP Simulator Operator:

OR Drawing CVC ASI 01. ASI Pump Switch

PLACE controller FK-122.1, Charging Flow in MANUAL AND SHUT.

RO

SHUT HC-186.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow.

VERIFY a suction path for the standby CSIP by performing the following:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 29 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5/6 Page 30 of 81 Event

Description:

A CSIP trip / Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior o VERIFY CSIP suction flowpath from VCT as follows:

VERIFY greater than 5% level is (YES) established in VCT.

RO VERIFY the following valves are OPEN: (YES)

LCV-115C, VCT Outlet (1CS-165)

LCV-115E, VCT Outlet (1CS-166) (YES)

Provide Pressurizer level control bands and trip limits per SRO OMM-001 Att. 13 - Control band - Maintain level within 5% of Reference level - trip limits of 10% low and 90% high Procedure Caution: Low VCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIPs CHECK VCT level is greater than 5%, AND STABLE RO (YES)

OR RISING RO MAINTAIN CCW HX outlet temperature less than 105°F.

RO START the standby CSIP. (Starts B CSIP)

CHECK seal injection flow being supplied by the ASI RO (YES)

System.

OPEN HC-186.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow.

RO DIRECT the operator monitoring the ASI System to STOP the ASI Pump by placing CS-210.1, ASI PUMP MOTOR CONTROL SWITCH, in STOP. (At the ASI Control Panel)

Simulator Acknowledge request to secure the ASI pump Communicator:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 30 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5/6 Page 31 of 81 Event

Description:

A CSIP trip / Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Secure the ASI pump when communications are complete Simulator Operator:

CVC 195 STOP Evaluator Note: ALB-8-2-3 ASI system Trouble will alarm when ASI pump is stopped Simulator Report back that the ASI pump is secured Communicator:

ADJUST HC-186.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow, to establish seal injection flow as necessary to maintain the following:

RO

Less than 31 gpm total flow to all RCPs.

Between 8 and 13 gpm to all RCPs.

DIRECT the operator monitoring the ASI System to PLACE RO CS-210.1, ASI PUMP MOTOR CONTROL SWITCH, in AUTO.

(At the ASI System Control Panel)

Simulator Acknowledge request Communicator:

Place ASI control back to AUTO Simulator Operator: CVC 195 AUTO report back to MCR when back in AUTO.

Drawing CVC ASI 01. ASI Pump Switch.

START CSIP room ventilation per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC System.

IF B Train is being started, THEN PLACE the following Air BOP Handling Units control switches to START AND VERIFY proper damper and valve operation (if they start):

CSIP SB AREA FAN COOLER AH-9 B SB RESTORE Charging and Letdown flow per OP-107, Chemical RO and Volume Control System.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 31 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5/6 Page 32 of 81 Event

Description:

A CSIP trip / Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Restoration of Letdown is not required to be completed prior to initiation of Event 7 and is up to the Lead Evaluator Evaluator Note: discretion on whether it should be completed.

OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System, section 5.4 is included on page 58 of this scenario guide.

Start B Chiller per OP-148, section 5.2.

BOP Contact AO for Chiller pre-start checks (NOTE: At this time the crew may start Pump P-4 B)

OP-148, section 5.2 is included on page 64 of this scenario guide. It is NOT intended to wait for the crew to place the Evaluator Note: standby Chiller in service - Continue with scenario. There is also the potential for the SRO to call for a train swap.

Judgment call by SRO.

MONITOR Tavg to Tref. (ASI injection has added negative RO reactivity)

INITIATE action to determine and correct the cause of the loss SRO of the CSIP.

CHECK seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm has been RO established to all RCPs.

WHEN seal injection flow has been established between 8 and 13 gpm, THEN PERFORM OST-1126, Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Controlled Leakage Evaluation Monthly Interval RO Modes 1-4.

Note: OST-1126 may not be performed promptly.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 32 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5/6 Page 33 of 81 Event

Description:

A CSIP trip / Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK CCW flow is established to the RCPs.

SRO EXIT this procedure. (AOP-018)

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of the CSIP.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Simulator Acknowledge request for support.

Communicator:

Addresses Technical Specifications:

3.1.2.4 - CSIPs

3.5.2 Action a.- ECCS Subsystems SRO Both are 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore action statements.

After the Plant has stabilized cue Simulator Operator to Lead Evaluator:

insert Event 7 Large Break LOCA.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 33 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 34 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After the Plant has stabilized cue Simulator Operator to Lead Evaluator:

insert Event 7 Large Break LOCA.

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Activate Trigger 7 Simulator Operator Large Break LOCA

RCS Pressure rapid decrease

Charging flow increasing

Pressurizer level decreasing

ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS Indications Available

ALB-09-2-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION

ALB-09-3-3 PRZ CONT LOW PRESS AND HEATERS ON

ALB-10-8-5a CMPTR ALARM RX COOLANT

Radiation monitors in alarm Evaluator Note: The A RHR Pump will not auto start when SI is initiated.

CREW RESPONDS to RCS inventory alarms.

Initiate a MANUAL reactor trip.

RO (Due to the rapid decrease in RCS pressure an automatic Reactor Trip/SI is likely)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 34 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 35 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP-E-0 Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection Enters E-0 SRO Conducts an Alignment brief Makes a PA announcement RO/BOP Performs E-0 immediate actions.

VERIFY Reactor Trip:

Immediate (YES)

Actions RO (YES)

(YES)

Check Turbine Trip - ALL THROTTLE VALVES SHUT (YES)

(YES)

Immediate Actions BOP (YES)

(YES)

Perform The Following:

(YES)

Immediate a. AC Emergency Buses - AT LEAST ONE Actions BOP ENERGIZED (YES)

b. AC Emergency Buses - BOTH ENERGIZED (YES/

Safety Injection - ACTUCATED (BOTH TRAINS) NO)

Immediate Actions RO Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 35 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 36 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RNO Perform the following:

Check Safety Injection - REQUIRED (YES)

Immediate Actions RO

IF Safety Injection actuation is required THEN perform the following:

o MANUALLY actuate Safety Injection.

o GO TO Step 5.

Once Containment Pressure exceeds 3 psig the crew Evaluators Note: should apply adverse CNMT values for the remainder of the scenario.

Perform The Following:

SRO

Review Foldout page.

Evaluate EAL Matrix.

The crew may brief on the foldout criteria and stop the Evaluators Note: RCPs at this time dependent on RCS conditions and leak progression.

(YES/

RO VERIFY CSIPs - ALL RUNNING.

NO)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 36 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 37 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY RHR pumps - ALL RUNNING. (NO)

Event 8 RO * (A RHR Pump is not running) o STARTS A RHR Pump RO Safety Injection flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RCS pressure may be greater than 230 PSIG if crew Evaluators Note: progression is quicker than the validation crew. IF this is the case the RNO actions will apply.

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG.

RO (YES)

GO TO Step 12 Foldout - RCP trip criteria is met or PHASE B Actuation Stops ALL RCPs RCP Trip Criteria:

Critical IF both of the following occur, THEN stop all RCPs:

RO Task #1

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 PSIG Critical to trip ALL 3 RCPs within 10 minutes of a Phase B isolation signal (ALB-001-5-1)

Time ALB-001-5-1, Containment Isolation Phase B, received _______

MAIN Steam Line Isolation - ACTUATED. (YES)

BOP Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 37 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 38 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY all MSIVs and Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

Any SG pressure 100 PSIG LOWER THAN BOP PRESSURE IN TWO OTHER SGs (NO)

GO TO Step 16 CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (NO)

Perform the following:

o Verify CNMT spray - ACTUATED o May refer to FR-Z.1 (NO) o Start at least one CNMT spray pump Critical Starts B CT Pump RO Task #2 OPENS 1CT-88 and 1CT-11 OR Starts A CT Pump OPENS 1CT-50 and 1CT-12 (Critical to start and align one Train of Containment Spray prior to exiting EOP-E-0)

RO Stop all RCPs (if not performed previously)

BOP Verify AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH ESTABLISHED (YES)

BOP Sequencer Load Block 9 (Manual Loading Permissive) (YES)

ACTUATED (BOTH TRAINS)

BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 38 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 39 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ASSIGNS a crew member to perform the following:

VERIFY alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS Signals using Attachment 3, Safeguards SRO Actuation Verification, while continuing with implementation of EOPs.

(Copy of Att. 3 contained in back of the guide)

STABILIZE AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

TABLE 1: RCS TEMPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINES FOLLOWING RX TRIP

Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs otherwise.

IF no RCPs running, THEN use wide range cold leg temperature.

LESS THAN 557°F AND GREATER THAN 557°F STABLE AT OR DECREASING AND INCREASING TRENDING TO 557°F

Stop dumping steam

Control feed flow and

IF condenser available steam dump to BOP THEN transfer steam establish and maintain dump to STEAM RCS temperature PRESSURE mode between 555°F AND using OP-126, Section 559°F 5.3 AND dump steam to condenser

Control feed flow OR

Maintain total feed flow

Dump steam using greater than 210 KPPH intact SG PORVs until level greater than

Control feed flow to 25% [40%] in at least maintain SG levels one on intact SG PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT (YES)

PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 39 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 40 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ANY SG pressures - DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

BOP OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

GO TO Step 27 ANY SG - ABNORMAL RADIATION (NO)

OR UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE (NO)

GO TO Step 30 BOP RO CNMT pressure - NORMAL. (NO)

GO TO E1, "LOSS OF REACTOR OR SRO SECONDARY COOLANT", Step 1.

Initiate monitoring of CSFSTs Due to RCS conditions a RED on EOP-FR-P.1 will require a transition to the function restoration procedures.

EOP-FR-P.1 does NOT contain any significant actions for Evaluator Note: the current plant conditions. The crew will return to procedure and step in effect.

The following steps encompass the EOP-FR-P.1 actions with return to EOP-E-1.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 40 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 41 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock FR-P.1

Initiates FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized SRO Thermal Shock

Conducts an Alignment brief Check RCS Pressure:

Check for both of the following:

o RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

SRO o Any RHR HX header flow - GREATER THAN (YES) 1000 GPM

RETURN to procedure and step in effect. (E-1)

SRO Return to EOP-E-1 (or condition dependent - EOP-FR-C.2)

Due to RVLIS level fluctuations (<39%) caused by lowering inventory of RCS from the LOCA and input from the ECCS components an ORANGE condition will toggle in/out and Evaluator Note: finally remain on for Core Cooling. This will require the crew to implement EOP-FR-C.2.

The following steps encompass the EOP-FR-C.2 actions with return to EOP-E-1.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 41 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 42 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP Response to Degraded Core Cooling FR-C.2 Implements EOP-FR-C.2 SRO Conducts an Alignment brief SRO INFORMS Crew that EOP-FR-C.2 Foldouts apply.

Evaluator Note: The crew may brief on the foldout criteria.

BOP Verify SI Valves - PROPERLYALIGNED A copy of EOP-E-0 Attachment 1 is attached to the back of this Evaluator Note:

guide.

CAUTION To prevent damage to the RCP seals, the ASI pump should NOT be manually started.

CRS NOTE The ASI pump starts on a time delay of 2 MINUTES and 45 SECONDS after loss of RCP seal injection. Seal injection from the ASI pump is NOT sufficient to be considered an alternate source of high head injection.

Verify SI Flow In All Trains: SI flow - GREATER THAN RO (YES) 200 GPM RO RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

Check for all of the following:

RO

RHR HX Train A header flows - > 1000 GPM (YES)

RHR HX Train B header flows - > 1000 GPM (YES)

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 42 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 43 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Vent Paths: Check Power to PRZ PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES)

RO PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

PRZ Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

Verify reactor vessel vent valves - SHUT:

1RC-900 (YES)

RO

1RC-901 (YES)

1RC-904 (YES)

1RC-905 (YES)

Verify PRZ vent valves - SHUT:

RO

1RC-902 (YES)

1RC-903 (YES)

Verify PRZ PORV closure following any subsequent opening of RO the valve to prevent primary plant depressurization.

Check RCP Status: Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RO (NO)

RUNNING Check Core Cooling: RVLIS full range - GREATER THAN 39%

(YES/NO - RVLIS level will be fluctuating)

RO YES - Core exit TCs - < 730°F Return to procedure and step in effect (E-1)

NO - continue with Step 8 Since RVLIS is fluctuating the crew may / may not see level the same. IF they are at a condition where level is

< 39% then they will continue with EOP-FR-C.2 until the RWST level is < 23.4% at which time they will transition to Evaluator Note: ES-1.3 and align for Cold Leg Recirc.

The remaining steps of EOP-FR-C.2 are located in the back of this guide (page 79) to follow along with IF RVLIS level is < 39% at this decision point. The next page of this guide continues with EOP-E-1.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 43 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 44 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP-E-1 Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant Implements EOP-E-1 SRO Conducts an Alignment brief SRO INFORMS Crew that EOP-E-1 Foldouts apply.

Evaluator Note: The crew may brief on the foldout criteria.

CREW Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

MAINTAIN RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND RO 13 GPM.

CHECK Intact SG Levels:

ANY level - GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

BOP

CONTROL feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% AND 50% [40% AND 50%].

Any level - RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED (NO)

MANNER SRO GO TO Step 4.

CHECK PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

VERIFY AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

RO

CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts RO after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 44 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 45 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK SI Termination Criteria:

RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN RO o 10°F [40°F] - C (NO) o 20°F [50°F] - M (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 6.

When contacted to place A/B air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP :\air\ACs_to_local.txt. When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode.

Simulator Operator /

When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for Communicator the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP :\cvc\E-0 Att 3 CSIP suct & disch valve power.

When the CAEP is complete, report completion to the MCR.

Check CNMT Spray Status:

RO

CHECK any CMT Spray Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

CONSULT plant operations staff to determine if CNMT SRO spray should be placed in standby.

If contacted as plant operations staff, provide the following Simulator direction: Unless directed by procedure, leave CNMT Communicator: Spray in service until the TSC has completed an evaluation.

WHEN plant operations staff directs, CNMT Spray be placed in SRO standby alignment, THEN do Steps 6d, e AND f.

o Continue with Step 7.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 45 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 46 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN flux less than 5x10-11 AMPS, THEN do Steps 52b AND c.

RO

VERIFY source range detectors - ENERGIZED.

TRANSFER nuclear recorder to source range scale.

RO CHECK RHR Pump Status:

RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 10.

SRO Establish CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchanger:

Verify both CCW pumps - RUNNING (YES)

Open the following valves:

o TRAIN A: 1CC-147 o TRAIN B: 1CC-167

Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchangers (YES)

Perform one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems o Shut train A CCW non-essential supply RO AND return valves 1CC-99 (SHUTS) 1CC-128 (SHUTS)

OR o Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves 1CC-113 1CC-127 CHECK EDG Status:

BOP

CHECK AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1B-SB - (YES)

ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 46 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 47 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO GO TO Step 11e.

BOP

CHECK any EDG - RUNNING UNLOADED (YES)

RO RESET SI.

Manually realign safeguards equipment following a loss of SRO offsite power.

Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-155 "DIESEL SRO GENERATOR EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM" Section 7.0.

SRO Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status

RHR system - CAPABLE OF COLD LEG (YES)

RECIRCULATION RO

Check Auxiliary AND Radwaste Processing Building (YES) radiation - NORMAL SRO GO TO Step 13.

SRO Check RCS status

Check for both of the following:

(YES) o RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 psig RO o ANY RHR HX header flow - GREATER (YES)

THAN 1000 GPM The following step may have RWST level less than 23.4%,

requiring transition to ES-1.3 dependent on RWST Evaluator Note: conditions. Otherwise, the crew will return to step 12 of E-1 until RWST level drops to 23.4% and apply foldout criteria to transition to establish cold leg recirculation.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 47 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 48 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Check Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover Criteria:

Check SI System - ALIGNED FOR COLD LEG (NO)

RO RECIRCULATION SRO GO TO Step 14c.

Perform a brief on EOP-ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD SRO LEG RECIRCULATION to prepare for transfer to cold leg recirculation.

RWST level - LESS THAN 23.4% (2/4 LOW-LOW (YES)

RO ALARM GO TO EOP-ES-1.3, "TRANSFER TO COLD LEG SRO RECIRCULATION", Step 1. (Evaluating RCS conditions).

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 48 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 49 of 81 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to open)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation ES-1.3 Implements EOP-ES-1.3 SRO Conducts an Alignment brief

Perform Steps 1 through 9 without delay. Do NOT implement Function Restoration Procedures prior to completion of these steps.

Procedure Caution

SI recirculation flow to RCS must be maintained at all times.

Switchover to recirculation may cause high radiation levels in the reactor auxiliary building. Radiation levels must be assessed prior to performance of local actions in the affected areas.

Foldout applies.

A minimum of 142 INCHES CNMT wide range sump level ensures the recirculation sump strainers are completely Procedure Note submerged AND assures a long term recirculation suction source.

The following sequence of steps to transfer to cold leg recirculation assumes operability of at least one train of safeguards equipment.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 49 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 50 of 81 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to open)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew may identify that 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 will not open due to failed relay based on the following indications:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Bypass Permissive Light Box 4-8 flashing

No white light on SI Suction Auto Switchover Reset Train A switch SRO Check RHR Pump Recirculation Alignment:

Verify both RHR pumps - RUNNING (YES)

Verify CNMT sump to RHR pump suction valves -

OPEN:

o Train A RHR pump:

RO 1SI-300 AND 1SI-310 (NO)

Open 1SI-300 AND 1SI-310 o Train B RHR pump:

1SI-301 AND 1SI-311 SRO Establish RHR Pump Recirculation Alignment:

Shut RWST to RHR pump suction valves:

o 1SI-322 (Train A) (SHUTS) o 1SI-323 (Train B) (SHUTS)

Shut low head SI Train A to cold leg valve:

Critical o 1SI-340 (SHUTS)

RO

Check RHR pump recirculation alignment - AT Task #3 LEAST ONE TRAIN ESTABLISHED (YES)

Critical to complete lineup prior to RSWT level depleting to < 0% and prior to the A RHR pump suction and discharge pressure rapidly reducing to ~0 psig.

SRO Establish CSIP Recirculation Alignment:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 50 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 51 of 81 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to open)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Shut CSIP alternate miniflow isolation valves:

o 1CS-746 (Train A CSIP) (Already SHUT) o 1CS-752 (Train B CSIP) (Already SHUT)

Verify normal miniflow isolation valves - SHUT (YES) o 1CS-182 RO o 1CS-196 o 1CS-210 o 1CS-214

Open RHR discharge to CSIP suction valves:

o 1RH-25 (OPENS) o 1RH-63 (OPENS)

Reset SI. (Already RESET)

Manually realign safeguards equipment following a loss of offsite power. (Refer to E-0, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION", Attachment 6.)

RO

Shut RWST to CSIP suction valves AND place in pull-to-lock position (PTL):

o 1CS-291 (LCV-115B) (SHUTS and places in PTL) o 1CS-292 (LCV-115D) (SHUTS and places in PTL)

SRO Check Charging AND SI System Status:

Check any charging line isolation valves - SHUT (YES) o 1CS-235 o 1CS-238

Verify Both Charging Pumps - RUNNING o Train A CSIP (NO)

RO o Train B CSIP

Check alternate cold leg AND hot leg injection (YES) valves - SHUT o 1SI-52 o 1SI-86 o 1SI-107 SRO Establish Recirculation Injection Flowpath:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 51 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 52 of 81 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to open)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Open alternate high head SI to cold leg valve:

o 1SI-52 (OPENS)

Check any BIT outlet valve - OPEN (YES) o 1SI-3 o 1SI-4 (YES)

RO

Check power for CSIP discharge cross-connect valves - AVAILABLE o 1CS-219 (MCC 1A35-SA-14E) o 1CS-217 (MCC 1B35-SB-12C) o 1CS-218 (MCC 1A35-SA-14D) o 1CS-220 (MCC 1B35-SB-9D)

Shut CSIP discharge cross connect-valves based on Table:

RO EVALUATOR NOTE: 1CS-217 and 1CS-218 SHUT when placed in SHUT SRO Check High Head SI Flow:

Alternate header flow (Train A): (NO) o FI-940 RO

Normal header flow (Train B):

o FI-943 (YES)

SRO Verify CCW Alignment To The RHR Heat Exchangers:

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 52 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 53 of 81 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to open)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Verify both CCW pumps - RUNNING (YES)

Verify the following valves OPEN (YES) o 1CC-147 o 1CC-167

Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchanger(s).

Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return (YES)

RO valves:

o 1CC-99 (Already SHUT) o 1CC-128 (Already SHUT)

Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves: (YES) o 1CC-113 (SHUTS) o 1CC-127 (SHUTS)

SRO Observe NOTE prior to Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10.

Procedure Note:

Additional foldout item, "AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA", applies.

SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

SRO Align CNMT Spray For Recirculation:

Any CNMT spray pump - RUNNING (YES)

Verify CNMT sump to CNMT spray suction valves -

(YES)

OPEN o 1CT-105 RO o 1CT-102

Verify RWST to CNMT spray pump suction valves - (YES)

SHUT o 1CT-26 o 1CT-71 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 53 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 54 of 81 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to open)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After crew has verified the alignment of Containment Spray for Recirculation the evaluation of this scenario is complete.

Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam and await any follow-up questions the Evaluators may have.

When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator Simulator Operator:

in FREEZE.

Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 54 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Section 5.4 - Initiating Normal Letdown Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 55 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Section 5.4 - Initiating Normal Letdown Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 56 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Section 5.4 - Initiating Normal Letdown Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 57 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Section 5.4 - Initiating Normal Letdown Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 58 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Section 5.4 - Initiating Normal Letdown Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 59 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Section 5.4 - Initiating Normal Letdown Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 60 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 61 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 62 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 63 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 64 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 65 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 66 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 67 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 68 of 81 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 69 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 70 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 71 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 72 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 73 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 74 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 75 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 76 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 77 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 78 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (FR-C.2 continued from Step 8)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FR-C.2 Response to Degraded Core Cooling - continued, Step 8 Check SI Accumulator Isolation Valve Status:

a. Locally unlock AND close both breakers for each SI accumulator discharge valve while continuing with this procedure:

RO 1SI-246 (MCC-1A21-SA-5C) 1SI-247 (MCC-1B21-SB-5C) 1SI-248 (MCC-1A21-SA-3D)

Contacts AO to perform action Simulator Acknowledge request to unlock and close Accumulator Communicator: discharge valve breakers When contacted to Unlock and Close both breakers for the accumulator discharge valves, run CAEP

\sis\SI_ACCUM_POWER_APPLY Simulator Operator:

When the CAEP is complete, report that the accumulator discharge valve breakers have been unlocked and closed to the MCR.

RO OPENs ALL accumulator isolation valves Check Intact SG Levels: Any level > 40%

(Maintains total FF > 210 KPPH until level > 40% in at least 1 BOP intact SG.)

Controls FF to ALL intact SGs and maintains levels between 40% to 50%

Check PRZ Pressure: < 2000 PSIG RO (YES)

Block low steam pressure SI Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 78 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 79 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (FR-C.2 continued from Step 8)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Depressurize All Intact SGs To 130 PSIG:

a. Maintain RCS cooldown rate less than 100°F/HR.

BOP b. Dump steam to condenser or SG PORVs

c. SG pressures < 130 psig + at least 2 RCS HL temps

< 390°F then STOP SG depressurization RO Verify RHR Pumps RUNNING (YES)

RO Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:

RCS hot leg temperatures - AT LEAST TWO < 390°F (YES)

Reset SI Shut SI accumulator discharge valves:

1SI-246

1SI-247

1SI-248 RO Dispatch an AO to Locally open AND lock both breakers for each SI accumulator discharge valve.

1SI-246 (MCC-1A21-SA-5C)

1SI-247 (MCC-1B21-SB-5C)

1SI-248 (MCC-1A21-SA-3D)

Simulator Acknowledge request Communicator:

When contacted to Open and Lock both breakers for the accumulator discharge valves, run CAEP

\sis\SI_ACCUM_POWER_REMOVE Simulator Operator:

When the CAEP is complete, report that the accumulator discharge valve breakers have been Opened and Locked to the MCR.

RO Stop All RCPs. (ALL OFF)

Depressurize All Intact SGs To Atmospheric Pressure:

BOP Maintain RCS cooldown rate less than 100°F/HR.

Dump steam to condenser or use SG PORVs Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 79 of 81

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 80 of 81 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (FR-C.2 continued from Step 8)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify SI Flow By Observing Any Of The Following:

RO SI flow > 200 GPM Any RHR HX header flow - > 1000 GPM Check Core Cooling - Check for both of the following:

RO RVLIS full range - > 63%

RCS hot leg temperatures - AT LEAST TWO <350°F SRO Go to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant", step 12 Harris 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL Page 80 of 81

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2014 NRC SCENARIO 3 Revision Summary Rev. 0 - Development Copy / send outline to NRC Rev. 1 - Outline Revision / Changes made by Exam Team Rev. 2 - Validation Rev. 3 - Validation, Final Ops and Training Management comments incorporated Rev. 4 - NRC 45 day exam submittal review comments incorporated Rev. FINAL - NRC Prep Week comments incorporated Harris 2014 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. FINAL

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