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{{#Wiki_filter:}} | {{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314) | ||
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: I Op Test No.: Nl4-l Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
( RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The lB MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description XMT C-BOP VCT Level Controller failure NV_i NVL T5760 C-SRO 2 XMT I(Ts)-sRo Pzr Level Channel failure 1NCLT 5170 REM 3 C-RO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently SA0048 4 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Turbine Control Unit failure DEHOO8B C-SRO MAL 6 C-BOP High Vibration on 1 B NCP NCPOO3B C-SRO MAL 7 M-RO Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip DEHOO3A DEHOO3B - | |||
M-SRO MAL 8 NA Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump CAOO5 MAL g NA iA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CAOO9A (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314) | |||
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator lAD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Shortly after taking the watch, the VCT level controller will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F8, DCS ALTERNATE ACTION, and go to OPI1/A161021003, DCS System Operation, Enclosure 4.4, Removing/Returning a VCT Level Channel From/To Service. | |||
Next, Pzr Level channel 3 will fail low. The DCS will automatically select a non-failed instrument to replace the failed instrument as the controlling channel, and no NCS inventory control upset will result. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation. | |||
Following this, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that reactor power is rising, and that the pump should not be running, and take action to reduce Turbine load and isolate CA flow to the Steam Generators per the Crew Expectation Manual. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) | |||
System, which will require a plant shutdown, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The operator may use AP/1/N5500/1, Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure, and if so, use OP/11A162501002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, in an attempt to stop the pump. Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A15500/4, Rapid Downpower. | |||
During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change. | |||
After this, a high vibration condition will develop on the lB NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, lB NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM), | |||
and enter AP/1/A15500108, Malfunction of NC Pump. Ultimately, the vibration condition will rise above the Hi-Hi threshold requiring tripping of the reactor and stopping the NCP. | |||
The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EP/1IAI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Following the plant trip, a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWIS) will occur prematurely and the Main Turbine will fail to trip automatically or manually; and the operator will be required to manually close the Turbine Governor Valves. It is likely that SI will actuate due to the delayed Turbine isolation. At the same time, the TDCA Pump, if not already running, will start on low Steam Generator levels. If the TDCA Pump was not running at the start of the event, it will trip on overspeed upon startup. If the TDCA Pump was running at the start of the event, it will trip when the operator initiates flow to the Steam Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314) | |||
Generators. Furthermore, the 1A MDCA Pump will trip on overcurrent during pump startup, and any attempts to restart the pump will be unsuccessful. Consequently, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur shortly after SI actuation, or upon the transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The operator will transition from EP/1/A/5000/E-0 to EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. | |||
The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-0. | |||
The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-0, or ES-0.1, after the secondary heat sink has been restored. | |||
Critical Tasks: | |||
55 Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%. | |||
Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% | |||
power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates mis-operation or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS). | |||
E-OQ Manually close the Main Turbine Governor Valves before an Orange path develops on the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when conditions exist that allow the operator to do so, constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance that unnecessarily challenges the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function. | |||
Additionally, failure to isolate steam to the Main Turbine reduces Steam Generator Inventory when the CA System is in an inoperable condition, and could unnecessarily result in a challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, including the need to Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314) implement Bleed and Feed cooling of the NC; and ultimately challenging the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function. | |||
FR-H.1 Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers. | |||
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-1 | |||
==REFERENCES:== | |||
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation (Amendment 184/166) | |||
: 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 221/203) | |||
: 3. OP/1/A/6100/010 C, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-2 (Rev 63) | |||
: 4. OP/1/A/6102/003, DCS System Operation (Rev 9) | |||
: 5. AP/1/A/5500/1, Steam Leak (Rev 18) | |||
: 6. Control Room Crew Expectations Manual (Rev 8/8/1 2) | |||
: 7. SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System (Rev 133) | |||
: 8. OP/1/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System (Rev 118) | |||
: 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 Applicability (Amendment 238/220) | |||
: 10. AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower (Rev 24) | |||
: 11. OP/1/A/61 50/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121) | |||
: 12. OP/1/A/6100/010 B, Annunciator Response for Panel lAD-i (Rev 46) | |||
: 13. OP/1/A/6300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11) | |||
: 14. AP/1/A/5500/08, Malfunction of NC Pump (Rev 14) | |||
: 15. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33) | |||
: 16. EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 36) | |||
: 17. EP/1/A/5000/F-0, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 5) | |||
: 18. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (Rev 17) | |||
Validation Time: 74 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc. | |||
Facility Review: | |||
Rev. 050314 1 | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N 14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description XMT 1 C-BOP VCT Level Controller failure NV_1NVL T5760 C-SRO 2 XMT l(TS)-SRO Pzr Level Channel failure 1NCLT 5170 3 REM C-RO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently SA0048 C(TS)-SRO ABC 4 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Turbine Control Unit failure DEHOO8B C-SRO MAL 6 C-BOP High Vibration on 1 B NCP NCPOO3B C-SRO MAL 7 M-RO Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip DEHOO3A M-BOP DEHOO3B M-SRO 8 NA Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump CAOO5 MAI. | |||
9 NA 1A MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CAOO9A (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Shortly after taking the watch, the VCT level controller will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F8, DCS ALTERNATE ACTION, and go to OP/1/A16102/003, DCS System Operation, Enclosure 4.4, Removing/Returning a VCT Level Channel From/To Service. | |||
Next, Pzr Level channel 3 will fail low. The DCS will automatically select a non-failed instrument to replace the failed instrument as the controlling channel, and no NCS inventory control upset will result. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation. | |||
Following this, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that reactor power is rising, and that the pump should not be running, and take action to reduce Turbine load and isolate CA flow to the Steam Generators per the Crew Expectation Manual. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, which will require a plant shutdown, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The operator may use AP/1/A15500/1, Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure, and if so, use OP/1/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, in an attempt to stop the pump. Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/11A1550014, Rapid Downpower. | |||
During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change. | |||
After this, a high vibration condition will develop on the lB NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, lB NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM), and enter API1/A15500108, Malfunction of NC Pump. Ultimately, the vibration condition will rise above the Hi-Hi threshold requiring tripping of the reactor and stopping the NCP. The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Following the plant trip, a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWIS) will occur prematurely and the Main Turbine will fail to trip automatically or manually; and the operator will be required to manually close the Turbine Governor Valves. It is likely that SI will actuate due to the delayed Turbine isolation. At the same time, the TDCA Pump, if not already running, will start on low Steam Generator levels. If the TDCA Pump was not running at the start of the event, it will trip on overspeed upon startup. If the TDCA Pump was running at the start of the event, it will trip when the operator initiates flow to the Steam Generators. Furthermore, the 1A MDCA Pump will trip on overcurrent during pump startup, and any attempts to restart the pump will be unsuccessful. Consequently, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur shortly after SI actuation, or upon the transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The operator will Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 transition from EP/1!AI5000IE-O to EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. | |||
The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with Enclosure 8 (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-0. | |||
The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-0, or ES-0.1, after the secondary heat sink has been restored. | |||
Critical Tasks: | |||
ss Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%. | |||
Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates mis-operation or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS). | |||
E-OQ Manually close the Main Turbine Governor Valves before an Orange path develops on the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when conditions exist that allow the operator to do so, constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance that unnecessarily challenges the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function. Additionally, failure to isolate steam to the Main Turbine reduces Steam Generator Inventory when the CA System is in an inoperable condition, and could unnecessarily result in a challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, including the need to implement Bleed and Feed cooling of the NC; and ultimately challenging the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 FR-H.1 Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR H.1. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS D Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 240 T 0 Malfunctions (From IC-39): | |||
Q = | |||
(Originally IC-39). | |||
insert LOA-CAOIO RACKED OUT; insert LOA-CAOIOA = RACKED OUT; (lB MDCA Pump is OOS) insert MAL-ENBOI3C = 0 (PR N42 is OOS) insert OVR-l AD9 C06 ON (MCB Annunciator I AD9IC6) | |||
Per Lesson Plan 2014 NRC Exam Scenario I insert MAL-DEHOO8B TRUE cdh_xI 0_280_4 eq V (DEH Switch to Manual triggered from INV-265B open light ON) insert MAL-ISEOO7A ACT_AUTO cthH_X01_094_2 EQ V (Automatic FWI Train A occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insert MAL-ISEOO7B ACT_AUTO cdH_X01_094_2 EQ V (Automatic FWI Train B occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insert MAL-ISEOO7A INACTIVE cdH_X02_I02_2 EQ 1 (Remove signal after insertion) insert MAL-ISEOO7B INACTIVE cdH_X02_1 I 0_2 EQ 1 (Remove signal after insertion) insert MAL-CAOO9A TRUE cdH_X10_077_4 EQ 1 delayo (MD CA Pump IA trips on overcurrent after pump ON light actuates) insert MAL-CAOO5 TRIP cdH_X01_094_2 EQ V delayo (TDCA Overspeed Trip occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insertMAL-DEHOO3A = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Auto Trip) insertMAL-DEHOO3B = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Manual Iv Trip) | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION RUN Place Tagout/0-Stick on: | |||
Q lB MDCA Pump (Tagout) | |||
Reset all SLIMs PR N42 (0-stick) | |||
MCB Annunciator IAD-9, C-6 (0-stick) | |||
Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO <1000 ppb. | |||
Q = | |||
Setup OAC Q Freeze. | |||
Q Update Fresh Tech. | |||
Spec. Log. | |||
Q Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info. | |||
Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q Crew Briefing | |||
: 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | |||
: 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. | |||
: 3. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. | |||
: 4. Retain a copy of 0P111A162501002 which may need to be provided to the crew during Event 2. | |||
Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N14-1-l. | |||
Q At direction of Event I VCT Level Controller failure examiner insertXMT NV_INVLT576O = 100 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q At direction of Event 2 Pzr Level Channel failure examiner insert XMT NC_INCLT5I7O = 1.0 Q At direction of Event 3 TDCA Pump starts inadvertently examiner insert REM- NOTE: Locally Close ISA-I if directed: insert SAOO48ABC = 1.0 RE#M-SA000I = 0 Q At direction of Event 4 Rapid Downpower examiner Q At direction of Event 5 Turbine Control Unit failure examiner insert DEHOO8A (Turbine Control Fails to MANUAL) Set in initial conditions. | |||
Triggered from INV 265B open light ON. | |||
Q At direction of Event 6 High Vibration on 1 B NCP examiner insertMAL NCPOO3B=4.6 (HI Vibration Alarm) i nsertMAL NCPOO3B5.1 cd = | |||
X05_OOlell_1 I (Hi Vibration Alarm Ramp 360 seconds) (HI-HI Vibration Alarm) | |||
Q At direction of Event 7 Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip examiner insert ISEOO7AIB (FWIS These malfunctions will occur on Reactor Trip. | |||
actuates) Set in initial conditions. Triggered from Rx trip. NOTE: Start 2A RN Pump and throttle flow: | |||
. rt DEHOO3AIB insertLOA-RN088 ON (Main Turbine fails to insert LOA-RN084 = 8000.0024 trip) Set in initial conditions. | |||
Q Post-Rx Trip Event 8 Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump insert CAOO5 This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip. | |||
Set in initial conditions. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Post-Rx Trip Event 9 1A MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start insert CAOO9A This malfunction will occur on Reactor | |||
* *. TriplLow SG Levels. | |||
Set in initial conditions. | |||
NOTE: Block FWIS: | |||
insertMAL-ISEOO7A = BLK_BOTH insertMAL-ISEOO7B = BLK_BOTH Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
VCT Level Controller failure Shortly after taking the watch, the VCT level controller will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with MOB Annunciator 1AD-2, F8, DOS ALTERNATE ACTION, and go to OP/1IA/6102/003, DOS System Operation, Enclosure 4.4, Removing/Returning a VOT Level Channel From/To Service. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert XMT-NV_INVLT576O = 100 Indications Available: | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-7 D3, VCT ABNORMAL (Momentary) | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 E8, DOS TROUBLE | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 F8, DOS Alternate Action | |||
. VCT Level (1NVP-5760) indicates 100% | |||
. VCT Level (1 NVP-5763) indicates that the level is lowering. | |||
. VCT Level SLIMs shifts into MANUAL Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The BOP may address ARP for 1AD-7, D3. | |||
NOTE: The ORS may direct the BOP to place 1 NV-i 37 to VOT position. | |||
MCB ANNUNCIATOR IAD-2, F8 DCS ALTERNATE ACTION CRS (Step 1) Halt any power change in progress. | |||
BOP (Step 2) Check DOS Workstation alarms. | |||
DCS WORKSTATION ALARMS M1D1168, VCT LEVEL ALTERNATE ACTION BOP (Step 1) Manually control VCT level at desired value. | |||
CRS (Step 2) Write work request and investigate repair. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
VCT Level Controller failure CRS (Step 3) GO TO OP/1/A16102/002 (DOS System Operation). | |||
NOTE: The ORS will transition to OP/i 11102/002. | |||
OPII!P-J61 02/003, DCS SYSTEM OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.4, REMOVING!RETURNING A VCT LEVEL CHANNEL FROM/TO SERVICE BOP (Step 3.1) Performing the following section, as applicable: | |||
Section 3.2, Respond To An Alternate Action. | |||
BOP (Step 3.2) Respond To An Alternate Action On DOS Boric Acid Blender graphic, perform the following: | |||
. Select 2XS for VOT Level 1. | |||
. Determine which level transmitter is NOT faulted. | |||
NVAA 5760 (Transmitter_A) | |||
NVAA 5761 (Transmitter B) NOTE: NVAA 5761 (Transmitter B) is NOT faulted. | |||
. Select the non-faulted level transmitter for VOT level input (Transmitter A or Transmitter B). | |||
. Select DEV MRE INHIBIT to block the deviation input. | |||
. Oheck MRE BLOOKED lit (blinking red). | |||
BOP | |||
* On DOS Boric Acid Blender Graphic, perform the following: | |||
* Select 2XS for VOT Level 2. | |||
* Determine which level transmitter is NOT faulted. | |||
NVAA 5761 (Transmitter A) NOTE: NVAA 5761 (Transmitter A) is NOT faulted. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
VCT Level Controller failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
* NVAA 5760 (Transmitter B) | |||
. Select the non-faulted level transmitter for VCT level input (Transmitter A or Transmitter B). | |||
. Select DEV MRE INHIBIT to block the deviation input. | |||
. Check MRE BLOCKED lit (blinking red). | |||
NOTE: An Auto Makeup may occur once the crew removes the faulty instrument from service. | |||
BOP . On DCS Boric Acid Blender graphic, perform the following: | |||
. Select NV-i 37A (VCT Level) | |||
. Ensure NV-i 37A is in auto CRS | |||
* WHEN VCT Level Channel has been NOTE: The CRS may call required, go to Section 3.4. WCC/IAE to address the malfunction. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Level Channel failure Next, Pzr Level channel 3 will fail low. The DCS will automatically select a non-failed instrument to replace the failed instrument as the controlling channel, and no NCS inventory control upset will result. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert XMT-NC_INCLT5I7O = 0 Indications Available: | |||
* MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 E8, DOS TROUBLE | |||
* OAO Alarm M1A0976, Ui PZR LEVEL III | |||
* 1NCP-5170, Pzr Level Ohannel 3 indicates 0% | |||
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The DOS will auto select a non-failed instrument to control the Pzr level system. | |||
The ORS will evaluate the effect of the failure on Technical specifications. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) | |||
INSTRUMENTATION ORS LOO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be 0 PERABLE. | |||
ORS APPLIOABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-i. | |||
ORS AOTIONS | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event# 2 Page 14 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Level Channel failure CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s). | |||
inoperable. | |||
M. One channel M.1 Place 72 hours NOTE: The CRS will inoperable, channel in determine that ACTION M trip, must be entered. | |||
OR M.2 Reduce 78 hours THERMAL POWER to | |||
< P-7. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 15 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Following this, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that reactor power is rising, and that the pump should not be running, and take action to reduce Turbine load and isolate CA flow to the Steam Generators per the Crew Expectation Manual. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) | |||
System, which will require a plant shutdown, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The operator may use API1IAI5500I1 Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure, and if so, use OPI1IA/62501002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, in an attempt to stop the pump. Ultimately, the crew will enter API1IA/550014, Rapid Downpower. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-SAOO48ABC = 1.0 Indications Available: | |||
. Reactor power starts to rise | |||
. 1SA48ABC Red status light is LIT. | |||
. TDCA Pump Turbine Speed rising | |||
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-5/F1 TURBINE DRIVEN CA PUMP LO SUCTION PRESSURE CONTROL ROOM EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO! TIG load reduction during normal ops and BOP transients (no procedure guidance and immediate need to reduce load = transient) for over power events. | |||
Normal load changes: Auto is preferred NOTE: The RO will reduce Transient load changes: Manual is Turbine load sufficiently to preferred- immediately reduce 2OMWe and maintain Rx power < 100%. | |||
then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the initial 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced. TPBE on the OAC updates once per minute. Other indications (PR meters and Delta T meters) will indicate reactor response more quickly and will enable the operators to control the plant even more precisely. (This combines the Operator Fundamentals of Conservatism and Controlling Plant Evolutions Precisely). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 16 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently RO! CA Operation above 10% power. | |||
BOP IF CA Auto start at greater than 3% power NOTE: The BOP will throttle and Main Feedwater is providing flow to the CA flow from the TDCA Pump, steam generators, then CA flow should be rendering the CA Pumps throttled/isolated as soon as practical. This inoperable. | |||
will make the affected CA pumps inoperable due to the control valve not being fully open above 10% as required by the CA Surveillance Requirements. | |||
NOTE: The CRS may or may not address APi. | |||
If so, the crew will ultimately go to OP/i /A16250/002 and attempt to shutdown the TDCA Pump. | |||
On the other hand, the operator may elect to leave the pump running, close the CA Control Valves, and investigate the failure. | |||
APIIIAI5500IOI, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the NOTE: The RO will need to following: reduce load to limit reactor power. | |||
. Excore NIs LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%. | |||
. NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F DIT | |||
. T-Avg AT T-REF. | |||
CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS. NOT in progress. | |||
CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 17 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event GREATER THAN P-li (1955 PSIG). | |||
BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr level is expected to GOING UP. be stable, however, it may be lowering. If so, perform Step 6 RNO. Otherwise continue with Step 7. | |||
BOP (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level: | |||
. Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps. | |||
. Ensure 1NV-238 (Ui Charging Hdr Control) OPENING. | |||
. OPEN 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM. | |||
. Reduce or isolate letdown. | |||
. Start additional NV pump. | |||
IF Pzr level going down with maximum NOTE: It is expected that the charging flow... BOP will be able to control Pzr level. | |||
BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware. | |||
CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12. | |||
CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenano# 1 Event# 3 Page 18 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows: | |||
. (Step 1 3a) Check SM PORVs CLOSED. | |||
RO * (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED. | |||
* (Step 13.b RNO) IF steam dumps NOTE: The Steam Dumps are required to be closed.., likely to be closed. | |||
BOP * (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL: | |||
. Containment temperature | |||
. Containment pressure | |||
* Containment humidity | |||
* Containment floor and equipment sump level. | |||
RO I * (Step 1 3.d) Check TD CA pump OFF. | |||
BOP NOTE: TheTDCAPumpis running. | |||
* (Step 13.d RNO) IF operation of TD CA Examiner NOTE: CRS may pump is causing uncontrolled cooldown direct that the TDCA Pump be AND flow from TD CA pump not stopped per the OP. | |||
required, THEN stop TD CA pump PER If so continue as scripted 0P111A16250/002 (Auxiliary Feedwater System) Enclosure 4.4 (Manual If NOT, continue with the Operation of #1 TD CA Pump) remaining steps of AP-1 on Page 20. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response. | |||
0P111A162501002, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, MANUAL OPERATION OF #1 TD CA PUMP | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs NOTE: The CRS/BOP may that may impact performance of this call WCC/IAE to address the procedure. R&Rs on the TDCA Pump. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none exist. | |||
BOP (Step 3.2) Ensure that a pre-job briefing has NOTE: The CRS may call been performed that includes discussion of WCC/IAE to address the reactivity management concerns with this R&Rs on the TDCA Pump. | |||
procedure. | |||
BOP (Step 3.3) IF #1 TD CA Pump to be operated NOTE: The pump is NOT to locally... be operated locally. | |||
BOP (Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable: | |||
. Section 3.6, Stopping #1 TD CA Pump BOP (Step 3.6) Stopping #1 TD CA Pump | |||
. IF stopping pump following EP/AP, NOTE: The CRS may decide check TURB depressed on the to take this action if the OP following: was entered from APi. | |||
. CA Modulating Valves Reset Train A | |||
. CA Modulating Valves Reset Train B | |||
. IF operating #1 TD CA Pump locally... NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally. | |||
BOP | |||
* Ensure the following closed: | |||
* 1CA-64AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1A SIG Control) | |||
* 1CA-52AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to lB SIG Control) | |||
* 1CA-48AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1C 5/0 Control) | |||
* 1CA-36AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1 D S/G Control) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 20 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently BOP | |||
* Ensure RESET lit on TD CA Pump Auto Start Reset. | |||
BOP | |||
* Place #1 TD CA Pump in STOP. | |||
* Ensure the following closed: | |||
* 1SA-48ABC (1C SIG SM Supply To NOTE: The CRS will Ui TD CA Pump Turb Isol) recognize that 1SA-48ABC has failed OPEN. | |||
Because of this the CRS may dispatch an AO to locally close the upstream isolation valve 1 SA-1. The only other choice is to leave the TDCA Pump running. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as AO. | |||
Booth Instructor: Wait 3 minutes and Insert REM SA000I = 0.0; then call as AO and report that 1 SA-1 is CLOSED. | |||
* 1SA-49AB (lB S/G SM Supply To Ui TD CA Pump Turb Isol) | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
APIIIAI5500IOI, STEAM LEAK Examiner NOTE: Continue here if the OP is NOT used to stop TDCA Pump. | |||
BOP * (Step 1 3.e) Check valves on STEAM NOTE: One or more of these LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1 MC-9) valves may be cycling. The CLOSED. RNO will direct closing the valves. | |||
CRS * (Step 1 3.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE for AS Header pressure. | |||
GREATER THAN 200 PSIG. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is zl000 psig. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 21 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently (Step 1 3.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks. an AC to look for leaks. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor: | |||
acknowledge. | |||
Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks. | |||
NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the Steam Dump valve opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered. | |||
BOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows: | |||
Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2. | |||
Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria: the startup. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
. Size of leak | |||
. Location of leak | |||
. Rate of depletion of secondary inventory | |||
. IF steam is leaking from a secondary NOTE: No Relief Valve is heater relief OR MSR relief valve, leaking. | |||
THEN reducing turbine load.... | |||
. IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak NOTE: A Turbine Trip is NOT (such as feedwater heater leak or needed to isolate the steam MSR leak)... leak. | |||
Check unit shutdown or load reduction NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED. Reduction will NOT be required. | |||
CRS (Step 1 S.c RNO) Perform the following: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 22 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired. | |||
Exit this procedure. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, And 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. | |||
CRS ACTIONS | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One steam A.1 Restore 7 days supply to steam supply turbine driven to AND AFW pump OPERABLE 10 days form inoperable status. discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. One AFW B.1 Restore AFW 72 hours train train to inoperable in OPERABLE AND MODE 1, 2, status. 10 days from or 3 for discovery of reasons failure to meet other than the LCO Condition A. | |||
C. Required C.1 Be in Action and MODE 3. | |||
6 hours NOTE: The CRS will associated determine that ACTION A, B Completion AND and C must be entered. | |||
Time for Condition A C.2 Be in 12 hours The CRS will note that this or B not MODE 4. condition requires a plant met. shutdown. | |||
Q Two AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1,2, or3. | |||
SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be FUNCTIONAL. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. | |||
CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 24 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that SLC 16.9.7 A. One or more A.1 Verify the 1 hour ACTION A is applicable. | |||
required SSS FUNCTIONA components LITY of fire identified in detection and Table 16.9.7- suppression 1 non- systems in functional. the associated areas identified in Tablel 6.9.7-AND A.2 Restore the 7 days component to FUNCTIONAL status. | |||
NOTE: CRS will Call WCC/Management to address the CA inoperability. | |||
When this occurs, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and as Station Management direct the crew to be in Mode 3 within 2 hours due to the inoperability and the impending bad weather. | |||
When the crew enters AP-4 move to Event #4. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 25 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Rapid Downpower Ultimately, the crew will enter AP111A1550014, Rapid Downpower. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER ROl (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO. | |||
RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE. | |||
RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton. | |||
CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 DESIRED. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate: | |||
. Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% PowerDESIRED | |||
. At least two CA pumps - | |||
FUNCTIONAL. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 26 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
IF Mode 3 is timed critical AND the reactor will be shutdown by manually inserting control rods, THEN allow an additional 45 minutes to reach Mode 3 once turbine load reduction is complete. | |||
. IF turbine will be shutdown during downpower, THEN enter target load of 15 MWE in turbine control panel. | |||
. Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8. | |||
CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/rn in). load at 1O MWe/minute. | |||
RO (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO. | |||
RO (Step 9RNO) Perform the following: | |||
* IF auto control available, THEN perform the following: | |||
* Place control rods in auto. | |||
* GOTOStep1O. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge. | |||
RO (Step 1 1) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate. | |||
BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows: | |||
. Energize all backup Pzr heaters. | |||
CRS | |||
* Check unit to be shutdown VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER. shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 27 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d. | |||
BOP | |||
* Determine boration amount based on the following: | |||
* Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm) | |||
. Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm) | |||
. Total Power change (%). | |||
* Record calculated boration amount: 800 NOTE: Based on the rate of gallons. load reduction the total boration is 800 gallons. | |||
RO | |||
* Check auto or manual rod control AVAILABLE. | |||
BOP | |||
* Perform boration in 4 equal additions NOTE: The CRS may assign during load reduction PER the BOP to perform this action. | |||
OP/i IA/61 50/009 (Boron Concentration If so, BOP Examiner follow Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using actions of Enclosure 4.7. | |||
1 NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)). | |||
OPIIIAI6I 50/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7 BORATION USING INV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS) | |||
BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure. | |||
BOP (Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per 0P111A161001003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable: | |||
* Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14.1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 28 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid | |||
. Ensure one of the following running: | |||
. lABATransPump OR | |||
. lB BA Trans Pump | |||
. Determine length of time 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open as follows: (R.M.) | |||
BOP IF using Table 4.7-1 (Time 1 NV NOTE: The BOP will 265B Full Open With One BAT determine that 1 NV-265 must Pump Running), record time 1NV- be open for 138 seconds. | |||
265B full open from table: sec. | |||
. IF using equation | |||
. Open 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric NOTE: When the BOP opens Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.) 1 NV-265 the Turbine Control will fail to MANUAL. | |||
HOLD until 1NV-265B (Ui NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1 NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup lsol). (R.M.) | |||
. IF 1NV-265B (Ui NV Boric Acid Sup sd) will NOT close... | |||
IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following: | |||
. Ensure the following off: | |||
. lABATransPump | |||
. iBBATransPump | |||
. Ensure one of the following selected to AUTO: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 29 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. lABATransPump OR | |||
. iBBATransPump When the Turbine Shifts to Manual, move to Event #5. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 30 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Control Unit failure During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-IIF-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/11A163001001A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: (Turbine Control Fails to MANUAL) Set in initial conditions. Triggered from INV-265B open light ON. | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. Turbine MWe indication stabilizes | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will continue in AP-4 while the ARP/OP are addressed. | |||
MCB ANNUNCIATOR IAD-11F4, TURBINE IN MANUAL RO Immediate Action: Ensure Turbine/Generator NOTE: The Turbine will operation stabilizes in either Load or Speed stabilize in LOAD Mode. | |||
Modes of operation. | |||
CRS (Step 1) Determine cause and effect, then NOTE: The CRS may call notify IAE of any malfunction. WCC/IAE to address the Turbine Control failure. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WOO. | |||
RO (Step 2) Refer to OP/1/A16300/001 A NOTE: The RO will continue (Turbine-Generator Load Change) for the load reduction in MANUAL. | |||
manual operation of Turbine Generator. | |||
CRS (Step 3) WHEN available and desired, return DEH to OPER AUTO. | |||
0P111A163001001 A, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 31 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Control Unit failure Time j Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load RO (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO... | |||
RO (Step 3.5.3) IF Turbine in MANUAL perform the following: | |||
. Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve. | |||
. If turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change. | |||
. IF raising load, | |||
. IF decreasing load, depress GV LOWER. | |||
Examiner NOTE: It may be necessary to allow the crew to stabilize the plant prior to moving to Event 6. | |||
AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF. | |||
RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL. | |||
CRS (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD NOTE: This is a Continuous BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is Action. The CRS will make lit, THEN perform one of the following to both board operators aware. | |||
comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 32 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Control Unit failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
. Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in. | |||
OR | |||
. Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits. | |||
CRS (Step 16) IF AT ANYTIME during this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure C-7A is received, THEN ensure Action. The CRS will make Transient Monitor freeze is triggered, both board operators aware. | |||
CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM. | |||
. RPIOIN5700I000 (Classification of Emergency) | |||
. RPIOIAI5700IO1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements). | |||
CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of NOTE: The CRS may call load reduction. WCC/RE to address the load reduction. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE. | |||
Examiner NOTE: The CRS may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while waiting for the BOP to complete the first boration. | |||
If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration and then proceed to the next event. | |||
(Step 19) Check target load LESS THAN 1000 MW. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 33 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Control Unit failure (Step 20) Check Unit 2 available to supply aux steam as follows: | |||
. Unit 2 Reactor power GREATER THAN NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO 15% for status. | |||
Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is at 100% | |||
power. | |||
. Unit 2 AS-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr Control NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO Inlet Isol) OPEN for valve position. | |||
Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 AS-12 is OPEN. | |||
. Unit 2 AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO HEADER. for AS availability. | |||
Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is available to supply AS Header. | |||
(Step 21) Check SM flow on all S/Gs GREATER THAN 25%. | |||
(Step 22) WHEN all SM flows are less than 75%, THEN ensure the following valves ramp CLOSED: | |||
. 1CF-1O4AB (1A SIG CF Control Bypass) | |||
. 1CF-1O5AB (lB SIG CF Control Bypass) | |||
. 1CF-1O6AB (1C SIG CF Control Bypass) | |||
. iCE-i O7AB (1D SIG CF Control Bypass) | |||
EXAMINER NOTE: The crew will continue in AP4 as Event 6 is ramping in. | |||
Move to Event #6. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 34 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
High Vibration on lB NCP After this, a high vibration condition will develop on the 1 B NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, lB NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM), | |||
and enter API1IAI5500/08, Malfunction of NC Pump. Ultimately, the vibration condition will rise above the Hi-Hi threshold requiring tripping of the reactor and stopping the NCP. | |||
The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EPI1IAJ5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-NCPOO3B=4.6 (HI Vibration Alarm) insertMAL-NCPOO3B=5.1 Cd X05_001 El 1_I = I (Hi Vibration Alarm Ramp = 300 seconds) (HI-HI Vibration Alarm) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. OAC Alarm: lB NC Pump Vibration | |||
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-61E-11 NC Pump Hi Vibration | |||
. 1 B NC Pump hi vibration on NC Pump Vibration Monitor NOTE: The performance of Step 5 of AP8 will be dependent upon the timing addressing the procedure (i.e. | |||
Step 5 may be performed when Hi-Hi Vibration exceeds setpoint). | |||
AP111A15500108, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP CASE Ill, EXCESSIVE VIBRATION BOP (Step 1) Check NC Pump vibration problem KNOWN TO BE VALID. | |||
BOP (Step 2) Check affected NC pump vibration indication within operating limits: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 35 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
High Vibration on I B NCP | |||
. Motor frame vibration LESS THAN 5 NOTE: The Pump Shaft MILS Vibration will be> 15 mils. | |||
. All of the following LESS THAN 20 MILS | |||
. Motor shaft vibration | |||
. Pump shaft vibration | |||
. Motor axial vibration | |||
. Motor flywheel vibration CR5 (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME vibration exceeds NOTE: CRS will make crew operating limits, THEN GO TO Step 5 aware. | |||
CRS (Step 4) GO TO Step 6 CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on the paging system. | |||
CRS (Step 7) Check NC pumps ANY RUNNING | |||
- NOTE: All 4 NCPs are currently running. The CRS will direct the crew to continue monitoring NCP vibrations until the Hi Hi Vibration alarm actuates. When alarm occurs, the crew will go to Step 5. | |||
BOP (Step 5) Stop affected NC pump as follows: | |||
. IF A or B NC pump is the affected pump, Then CLOSE associated spray valve: | |||
BOP | |||
* 1 NC-27C (1A NC Loop PZR Spray Control). | |||
* 1 NC-29C (1 B NC Loop PZR Spray Control). | |||
* Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2. | |||
RO | |||
* Trip reactor BOP | |||
* WHEN reactor power less than 5%, | |||
THEN stop affected NC pump. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 36 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
High Vibration on lB NCP Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRITICAL TASK (SS) Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%. | |||
Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% | |||
power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates mis-operation or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS). | |||
CRS | |||
* GO TO EP/1IAI5000IE-O (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection). | |||
When the crew trips the reactor move to Events #7-9. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Following the plant trip, a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWIS) will occur prematurely and the Main Turbine will fail to trip automatically or manually; and the operator will be required to manually close the Turbine Governor Valves. It is likely that SI will actuate due to the delayed Turbine isolation. At the same time, the TDCA Pump, if not already running, will start on low Steam Generator levels. If the TDCA Pump was not running at the start of the event, it will trip on overspeed upon startup. If the TDCA Pump was running at the start of the event, it will trip when the operator initiates flow to the Steam Generators. Furthermore, the 1A MDCA Pump will trip on overcurrent during pump startup, and any attempts to restart the pump will be unsuccessful. Consequently, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur shortly after SI actuation, or upon the transition to EPI1IAI5000IES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response. The operator will transition from EPI1IAI5000IE-O to EPI1IN5OOO/FRH.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. | |||
The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-O. The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-O, or ES-O.1, after the secondary heat sink has been restored. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: The following will occur on the Rx trip: | |||
* insert MAL-ISEOO7A ACT_AUTO cd=H_XO1_094_2 EQ 1 (FWIS Train A) | |||
* insert MAL-ISEOO7B ACT_AUTO cdH_XO1_094_2 EQ 1 (FWIS Train B) | |||
* insertMAL-DEHOO3A = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Auto Trip) | |||
* insertMAL-DEHOO3B = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Manually Trip) | |||
* insert MAL-CAOO9A TRUE cdH_X1O_102_4 EQ 1 (MD CA Pump IA trips on startup) | |||
* insert MAL-CAOO5 TRIP cdH_X01094_2 EQ 1 delayO (TDCA Overspeed Trip occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) | |||
NOTE: When an AO is dispatched to check the IA MDCA Pump Breaker. | |||
Acknowledge as AO. Wait five minutes and report back that the breaker has an overcurrent lockout relay showing, and the motor smells of burnt insulation. | |||
NOTE: When an AO is dispatched to check the ITDCA Pump. Wait five minutes and report back that the TDCA Turbine has overspeed and will NOT reset. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Indications Available: | |||
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/B-1 through 4, SIG A-D LEVEL DEVIATION | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-4/C-1 through 4, SIG A-D FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-4/E-1 through 4, S/G A-D LO LEVEL ALERT | |||
. RED Path on Heat Sink. | |||
NOTE: If the TDCA Pumps is still running from a previous malfunction, the BOP may attempt to open the CA Control Valves to prevent the Red Path on Heat Sink. | |||
However, the TDCA will overspeed shortly after event initiation. | |||
EPIIIAI5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action | |||
. All rod bottom lights LIT | |||
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN | |||
. JR amps - GOING DOWN. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action | |||
. All throttle valves CLOSED. | |||
RO (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action | |||
. Trip turbine. | |||
. IF turbine will not trip, THEN perform the NOTE: Turbine will NOT trip following: manually. | |||
. Place turbine in manual. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. CLOSE governor valves in fast action. | |||
. IF governor valves will not close... | |||
CRITICAL TASK: | |||
(E-O Q) Manually close the Main Turbine Governor Valves before an Orange path develops on the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when conditions exist that allow the operator to do so, constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance that unnecessarily challenges the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function. | |||
Additionally, failure to isolate steam to the Main Turbine reduces Steam Generator Inventory when the CA System is in an inoperable condition, and could unnecessarily result in a challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, including the need to implement Bleed and Feed cooling of the NC; and ultimately challenging the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED. | |||
NOTE: Depending on the timing of diagnosis of the failure of the Main Turbine to trip, the crew may or may not actuate SI. | |||
The script assumes that SI has occurred, and that FR-H.1 will be entered later. | |||
If SI is NOT actuated the crew will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, and with the RED Path on Heat Sink active, transition to FR-H.1 instead. If so, Examiners move forward to Page 42. | |||
RO! (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
* Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) LIT. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. | |||
RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) LIT. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s): | |||
. Groups 1,2, 5DARK. | |||
. Group3LIT. | |||
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED. | |||
. Group 6LIT. | |||
CRS | |||
* GOTOSteplO. | |||
RO! (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status: | |||
BOP | |||
* MDCApumpsON (Step lOa RNO) Start pumps | |||
* NIR level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%. | |||
(Step lOb RNO) EnsureTD CA pump on. | |||
BOP (Step 1 1) Check all KC pumps - ON | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFailure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON. | |||
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running. | |||
. Start 2A RN pump. | |||
. THROTTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor: | |||
for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delayo ramplo (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow) | |||
RO (Step 14) Check all SIG pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG. | |||
BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is normal. | |||
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow: | |||
BOP | |||
* Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW. | |||
* Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PSIG. | |||
BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following: | |||
BOP | |||
* Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running_pump(s) OPEN: | |||
* 1ND-68A (IA ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) | |||
* 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol). | |||
CRS | |||
* IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A15000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address. | |||
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. | |||
acknowledge as OSM. | |||
(Step 18) Check CA flow: | |||
. Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM. | |||
(Step 18 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11% | |||
(32% ACC), THEN perform the following: | |||
. Ensure correct valve alignment. | |||
. Start CA pumps. | |||
IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 1 1% | |||
(32% ACC) AND feed flow greater than 450 GPM cannot be established, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees). | |||
. GO TO EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink). | |||
Examiner NOTE: It is expected that the Red Path on Heat Sink will exist by this time. | |||
The CRS will transition to FR H.1. | |||
EP/IIA/5000IFR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CRS (Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 NOTE: This condition is NOT GPM due to operator action.., met, and the crew will remain in FR-Hi. | |||
RO! (Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is BOP required: | |||
. NC pressure GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE. | |||
. Any NC T-Hot GREATER THAN 350°F NOTE: A Secondary Heat Sink (347° F ACC). is required. | |||
ROI (Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page. | |||
BOP BOP (Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps AVAILABLE: | |||
. lANVpump OR | |||
* lBNVpump. | |||
RO (Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated: | |||
* Check W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs LESS THAN 24% (36% ACC). | |||
RO/ (Step 5.a RNO) Perform the following: | |||
BOP | |||
. Monitor feed and bleed initiation criteria. | |||
. WHEN criteria satisfied, THEN GO TO NOTE: This is a Continuous Step 22. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. | |||
CRS | |||
* GO TO Step 6. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 6) Ensure SIG B8 and NM valves NOTE: The CRS may assign CLOSED PER Enclosure 3 (S/G 88 and the BOP (RO) to perform this Sampling Valve Checklist), action. | |||
If so, BOP (RO) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3. | |||
Others should move ahead to Step 7 on Page 45 to continue in FR-Hi. | |||
EPII!AJ5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 3, SIG BB AND SAMPLING VALVE CHECKLIST BOP (Step 1) Check the following valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the (RO) CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform. | |||
. 1BB-1B (1A SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED | |||
. 1 BB-2B (18 SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED | |||
. 188-38 (1 C SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED | |||
. 1BB-4B (1D SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED | |||
. 1 BB-5A (A SIG BB Cont Inside Isol) - | |||
CLOSED | |||
. 1BB-6A (B S/G 88 Cont Inside Isol) - | |||
CLOSED | |||
. 1 BB-7A (C SIG 88 Cont Inside lsol) - | |||
CLOSED | |||
. 1 BB-8A (D SIG 88 Cont Inside Iso!) - | |||
CLOSED | |||
. 1NM-187A (1A SIG Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) CLOSED BOP | |||
* 1NM-190A (1A SIG Blowdown Sample (RO) Cont Inside Isol) CLOSED | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
. 1NM-201A (lB SIG Blowdawn Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isal) CLOSED | |||
. 1 NM-207A (1 C SIG Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) CLOSED | |||
. 1NM-210A (1C SIG Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isal) CLOSED | |||
. 1NM-221A (1D S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cant Outside Isal) CLOSED | |||
. 1NM-191B (1AS/G Blowdawn Sample Hdr Cant Outside Isal) CLOSED | |||
. 1NM-197B (lB SIG Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside sal) CLOSED BOP | |||
* 1NM-200B (lB SIG Blawdawn Sample (RO) Cant Inside Isal) CLOSED | |||
* 1 NM-21 1 B (1 C SIG Blawdawn Sample Hdr Cant Outside Isal) CLOSED | |||
* 1 NM-21 7B (1 D S/C Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside sal) CLOSED | |||
* 1 NM-220B (1 D SIG Blawdawn Sample Cant Inside Isal) CLOSED EPIIIAJ5000IFR-H1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO (Step 7) Attempt ta establish CA flaw ta at Examiner NOTE: Examiners (BOP) least ane S/C as fallaws: NOT fallawing BOP (RO) actians in Enclasure 3, cantinue HERE. | |||
* Check pawer ta bath MD CA pumps NOTE: The 1A MDCA Pump is AVAILABLE. OOS, and the 1 B MDCA Pump has failed upan Auta Start. | |||
NOTE: 1 ETA and 1 ETB are bath energized. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWlSIFailure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
Acknowledge as AC. Wait five minutes and report back that the breaker has an overcurrent lockout relay showing, and the motor smells of burnt insulation. | |||
RO | |||
* Ensure control room CA valves aligned NOTE: The CRS may assign (BOP) PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve Alignment), the RO (BOP) to perform this action. | |||
If so, RO (BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4. | |||
Others should move ahead to Step 7.c on Page 49 to continue in FR-H.1. | |||
EPIIIAJ5000IFR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 4, CA VALVE ALIGNMENT Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 4 if RO (BOP) is assigned by CRS to perform. | |||
RO (Step 1) Check the following valves - OPEN (BOP) | |||
* 1CA-66AC (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1A SIG Isol) OPEN | |||
* 1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A SIG Isol) OPEN | |||
* 1CA-54AC (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B SIG Isol) OPEN | |||
* 1 CA-58A (1 A CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol) OPEN | |||
* 1CA-50B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1C SIG Isol) OPEN | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
. 1 CA-46B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 10 SIG Isol) OPEN | |||
. 1CA-38B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1D SIG Isol) OPEN | |||
. 1 CA-42B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Isol) OPEN RO (Step 2) Check the following valves - OPEN (BOP) | |||
. 1CA-64B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control) OPEN | |||
. 1CA-60A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A SIG Control) OPEN | |||
. 1CA-52AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Control) OPEN | |||
. 1CA-56A (1A CA Pump Disch To lB SIG Control) OPEN | |||
. 1CA-48AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1C SIG Control) OPEN | |||
. 1CA-44B (lB CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) OPEN | |||
. 1CA-36AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Control) OPEN | |||
. 1 CA-40B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 1 D S/G Control) OPEN RO (Step 3) Check CA Storage Tank (water (BOP) tower) level GREATER THAN 1.5 FT. | |||
RO (Step 4) Check the following valves - | |||
(BOP) CLOSED | |||
. 1 RN-69A (1A RN Assured Supply TO Ui CA Isol) CLOSED | |||
. 1CA-86A (Ui TD CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) CLOSED | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
. 1CA-15A (1A CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) CLOSED | |||
. 1RN-162B (18 RN Assured Supply To Ui CA Isol) CLOSED | |||
. 1CA-1168 (Ui TD CA Pump Suction From lB RN Isol) CLOSED | |||
. 1CA-18B (lB CA Pump Suction From lB RN Isol) CLOSED RO (Step 5) Check the following valves OPEN: | |||
(BOP) | |||
. 1 CA-i 1A (1A CA Pump Suction Isol) - | |||
OPEN | |||
. 1 CA-7AC (Ui TD CA Pump Suction Isol) | |||
- OPEN | |||
. 1CA-9B (18 CA Pump Suction Isol) - | |||
OPEN RD (Step 6) GO TO Step 8. | |||
(BOP) | |||
RD (Step 8) Check 1CA-2 (Ui CA Pump Suct (BOP) From CA Storage Tank Isol) OPEN. | |||
RD (Step 9) Check CA pump suction from UST (BOP) and CA Condensate Storage Tank (service bldg roof tank) valves CLOSED: | |||
. 1CS-i8(U1 UST To CA Pump Suct Hdr Isol) CLOSED | |||
. 1CA-4(U1 CAPumpsSuctFromSUT Isol) CLOSED | |||
. 1CA-6(Ui CA PumpsSuct From CA CST Isol) CLOSED. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 9 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start EPII!AI5000IFR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Examiner NOTE: Examiners NOT following RO (BOP) actions in Enclosure 4, continue HERE. | |||
BOP (Step 7.c) Start all available CA pumps. | |||
(RO) | |||
BOP (Step 7.d) Check TD CA pump RUNNING. NOTE: The TDCA Pump is (RO) NOT running. | |||
BOP (Step 7.d RNO) Perform the following as (RO) necessary: | |||
. IF 1SA-48BC (SM From S!G C To TD CA NOTE: 1SA-48BC indicates Pump Isol) is closed, THEN... OPEN. | |||
. IF 1SA-49AB (SM From S/G B to TD CA NOTE: 1SA-49AB indicates Pump Isol) is closed, THEN... OPEN. | |||
CRS . IF TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT NOTE: The CRS will dispatch OPEN alarm (1AD-5, F-3) is lit, THEN an AO. | |||
dispatch operator to reset 1SA-3 (Unit 1 Booth Instructor: | |||
TD CA Pump Turb Stop Valve) PER Acknowledge as AO. Wait EP/1/A/5000!G-1 (Generic Enclosures), | |||
five minutes and report back Enclosure 24 (Resetting TD CA Stop that the TDCA Turbine has Valve). | |||
overspeed and will NOT reset. | |||
CRS . IF reason for loss of steam supply to TD NOTE: The CRS will CA pump not determined,... determine from the AO report that the TDCA Pump is unavailable. | |||
RO/ (Step 7.e) Check total flow to S/G(s) NOTE: There is no feedwater BOP GREATER THAN 450 GPM. flow. | |||
ROt (Step 7.e RNO) Perform the following: | |||
BOP | |||
. IF only one MD CA pump is on,... NOTE: There are no MDCA Pumps running. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start IF any CA pump is started,... NOTE: There are no CA Pumps running. | |||
IF any feed flow to at least on SIG is NOTE: There is no feedwater indicated,.., flow. | |||
CRS | |||
* IF no feed flow indicated, THEN perform the following: | |||
* IF no CA pump can be started, NOTE: The CRS may call THEN dispatch operator and WCC/IAE to address the CA maintenance to CA pumps to try to Pump situation. | |||
restore one CA pump to service. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
* Dispatch operator to ensure CA NOTE: The CRS will dispatch valves aligned PER Enclosure 6 an AC. | |||
(Local CA Valve Alignment). | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
Acknowledge as AC. | |||
Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes report completion. | |||
CRS | |||
* GO TO Step 8. | |||
RO (Step 8) Check steam dumps as follows: | |||
* Check condenser available as follows: | |||
* C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1SI-18) - | |||
LIT | |||
* Any MSIV OPEN. NOTE: The MSIVs may be OPEN or CLOSED. If the MSIVs are CLOSED, proceed to Step 9. | |||
* STEAM DUMP SELECT - IN T-AVG MODE. | |||
* Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode: | |||
* Ensure STM PRESS CONTROLLER setpoint at 1 090-1095 PSIG. | |||
* Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in manual. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
. Adjust STM PRESS CONTROLLER output to equal STEAM DUMP DEMAND signal. | |||
. Place STEAM DUMP SELECT in steam pressure mode. | |||
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in auto. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Stop all NC pumps. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Reset Feedwater Isolation as follows: | |||
. Check any Condensate Booster pump ON. | |||
Check the following alarms DARK. | |||
. 1AD-5, G-6 (Inner Doghouse Level Hi) | |||
. 1AD-5, H-6 (Outer Doghouse Level Hi). | |||
CRS | |||
* Dispatch operator to block Feedwater NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Isolation signal PER Enclosure 7 an AO. | |||
(Feedwater Isolation Override). Booth Instructor: | |||
Acknowledge as AO. | |||
Booth Instructor: dellA MAL ISEOO7A 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) dellA MAL-ISEOO7B 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISEOO7A = | |||
BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISEOO7B = | |||
BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) | |||
As AO, report completion. | |||
Booth instructor: do not delay performance of enclosure 7 | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start BOP | |||
* Check S/I HAS BEEN ACTUATED. NOTE: SI may have been actuated. | |||
BOP | |||
* Reset the following: | |||
* S/I | |||
* Sequencers BOP . IF AT ANY TIME a B/C signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on. | |||
BOP . Do not continue until Enclosure 7 (Feedwater Isolation Override) is completed. | |||
BOP (Step 11) Check CM System in service: | |||
. Hotwell pump(s) - ON | |||
. Condensate Booster pump(s) ON. | |||
RO! (Step 12) Check CF pumps AT LEAST NOTE: Both CF Pumps are BOP ONE AVAILABLE TO START. available to start. | |||
CRS (Step 13) Establish CF flow PER Enclosure 8 (Re-establishing CF Flow). | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 8. | |||
EP/11A15000/FR-H.I, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 8, RE-ESTABLISHING CF FLOW RO (Step 1) Place the following valves in manual and CLOSE: | |||
* S/G CF control valves | |||
* S/G CF control bypass valves. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start RO (Step 2) CLOSE the following CF control isolation valves: | |||
. CLOSE ICF-31 (1A SIG CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-33 (1A SIG CF Control Outlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-22 (lB S/G CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-24 (lB SIG CF Control Outlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-19 (1C S/G CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-21 (1C S/G CF Control Outlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-16 (1D SIG CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1 CF-i 8 (1 D S/G CF Control Outlet Isol). | |||
BOP (Step 3) Depress and release the Feedwater Isolation reset pushbuttons. | |||
RO! (Step 4) Check any CF pump RESET. | |||
BOP CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 13. | |||
RO! (Step 13) Depress RESET on iA OR lB BOP CF PUMP RECIRC VALVE CLOSURE CIRCUIT and check RESET light lit. | |||
RO! (Step 14) Reset CF pump turbine that will be BOP placed in service as follows: | |||
. Depress RESET and hold RESET 2-3 seconds after the RST light is lit on pump to be started. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 5 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFailure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
. Check CF pump turbine to be started RESET. | |||
RD (Step 15) Align AS header as follows: | |||
. CLOSE 1AS-9 (Ui C Htr Bleed To AS Hdr Isol). | |||
CRS | |||
* Check Unit 2 as follows: | |||
. Unit 2 Reactor power GREATER NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to THAN 15% report power level. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor report 100% as U2 RD. | |||
* Unit 2 2AS-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to Control Inlet Isol) OPEN | |||
- report valve position. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor report 2AS-12 is OPEN. | |||
CRS | |||
* Unit 2 AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to AS HEADER. report U2 AS Availability. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor report U2 AS is available. | |||
ROt | |||
* Isolate Unit 1 SM to AS header as BOP follows: | |||
* IF AT ANY TIME AS header NOTE: This is a Continuous pressure cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make greater than 140 PSIG while both board operators aware. | |||
performing the following step, THEN GO TO Step 15.e. | |||
ROt | |||
* Slowly CLOSE 1AS-12 (Ui SM To BOP AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol) while monitoring AS header pressure. | |||
CRS (Step 1 5.d) GO TO Step 16. | |||
ROt (Step 16) Check 1HM-95 (Ui Aux Steam NOTE: 1HM-95 is CLOSED. | |||
BOP Supply to CF Pumps Turbine Isol) OPEN. | |||
RO! Step 16 RNO) Open 1HM-95. | |||
BOP | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start ROI (Step 17) CLOSE the following valves: | |||
BOP | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-35AB (1AS/G CF Cont Outside Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-3OAB (lB SIG CF Cont Outside Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-28AB (1C S/C CF Cont Outside Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-26AB (1D SIG CF Cont Outside Isol). | |||
RO! (Step 18) Check lACE pumpTO BE BOP PLACED IN SERVICE. | |||
RO! (Step 19) Place 1A CF pump in service as BOP follows: | |||
. Place the following in auto: | |||
. 1A CF pump turbine low pressure governor control. | |||
. 1A CF pump turbine high pressure governor control. | |||
. OPEN stop valves by depressing RAISE on lA CF PUMP TURBINE HP-LP SV until MAX light is lit on the following: | |||
. 1 SP-1 5 (1 A CFPT Turb Hi Press Step_valve) | |||
. 1HM-l57 (1A CFPT Turb Lo Press Step_valve) | |||
. Adjust 1A CF pump turbine speed using NOTE: S/G pressures are control located on low pressure governor 1100 psig. | |||
controller to establish CF HEADER PRESSURE 50-1 00 PSIG above SIG pressure. | |||
CRS (Step 1 9.d) GO TO Step 21. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start ROI (Step 21) Check feed and bleed NOTE: Feed and Bleed has BOP ESTABLISHED IN BODYOF THIS NOT been established. | |||
PROCEDURE. | |||
ROI (Step 21 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
BOP WHEN restoring feed flow in next steps, THEN control feed flow as required to raise SIG levels while preventing an uncontrolled NC system cooldown. | |||
CRS . GO TO Step 25. | |||
RO (Step 25) OPEN the following valve(s) for the S/Gs to be fed: | |||
. 1CF-126B (1A SIG CF To CA Nozzle Isol) | |||
. 1 CF-i 27B (1 B SIG CF To CA Nozzle Isol) | |||
. 1CF-i28B (iC SIG CF TO CA Nozzle Isol) | |||
. 1 CF-i 29B (1 D SIG CF To CA Nozzle Isol). | |||
RO (Step 26) Establish feed flow to desired SIG(s) as follows: | |||
. THROTTLE OPEN SIG CF control bypass valve for SIG(s) to be fed. | |||
. Monitor CF pump discharge pressure NOTE: This is a Continuous and adjust CF pump speed as needed to Action. The CRS will make maintain CF HEADER PRESSURE 50- both board operators aware. | |||
100 PSIG above S/G pressure. | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME SIG CF control bypass NOTE: This is a Continuous valves are throttled closed, THEN ensure Action. The CRS will make pump speed is controlled at same time to both board operators aware. | |||
avoid a CF pump trip on high discharge pressure_(1435_PSIG). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 27) Check Step 23 or 24 in this NOTE: Step 23 or 24 have enclosure IMPLEMENTED. | |||
NOT been implemented. | |||
RO (Step 27 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. WHEN S/G N/R level is greater than 1 1% | |||
(32% ACC), THEN control CF flow to maintain N/R level between 11% (32% | |||
ACC) and 50%. | |||
CRITICAL TASK (FR-H.1) Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers. | |||
CRS (Step 27 RNO b) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Step 14 of FR-H.1. | |||
EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.I, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ROI (Step 14) Check SIG levels: | |||
BOP | |||
. N/R level in at least on S/G GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC). | |||
RO/ (Step 14 RNO a) Perform the following: | |||
BOP | |||
. IF feed flow to at least on S/G is indicated, THEN maintain flow to restore N/R level to between 1 1 % (32% ACC) and 50%. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
. IF feed flow not ndicated, THEN NOTE: Feed flow is indicated. | |||
. Check feed and bleed ESTABLISHED PER STEP 23 through 27. | |||
CRS (Step 14 RNO b) Return to procedure and NOTE: The CRS will transition step in effect. to E-0 or ES-0.1 if the transition into FR-H.1 came from ES-0.1. | |||
Examiner Note: If the transition is made to ES-0.1, move to Termination of the Exam. | |||
EPIIIAI5000!E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Step 19) Check NC temperatures: | |||
. IFanyNCpumpon... | |||
OR | |||
. IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557° F (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves: | |||
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
. Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED. | |||
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN. | |||
(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F. | |||
(Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start | |||
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
. All S/Gs PRESSURIZED. | |||
(Step 23) Check if SIG tubes intact: | |||
. The following secondary EMFs NORMAL: | |||
. 1 EMF-34(L) (SIG Sample (Lo Range)) | |||
. 1 EMF-24 (S/G_A) | |||
. 1 EMF-25 (S/G_B) | |||
. 1 EMF-26 (S/G_C) | |||
. 1 EMF-27 (S/G_D) | |||
. S/G levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. | |||
(Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows: | |||
. 1 EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR)) NORMAL | |||
. 1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) NORMAL | |||
. 1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine) - | |||
NORMAL | |||
. Check containment pressure LESS THAN 1 PSIG | |||
. Check containment sump level NORMAL. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam. | |||
UNIT I STATUS: | |||
Power Level: 100% NCS [B] 925 ppm Pzr [B]: 925 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 178 days Core Burnup: 251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/i /A161 00/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT: | |||
* The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: | |||
* The 18 MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. | |||
* MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Crew Directions: | |||
* Maintain current plant conditions. | |||
Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5 | |||
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) | |||
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N14-l Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is 005 due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event Ma If. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAL 2 C-RO Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure MGOO1 C-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP 1 B RN Pump Trip RNOO7B C(TS)-SRO 4 MAL C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in EPOO3C AUTO/Stuck Rod/ Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction IREOO9 C-BOP IREO1OD12 C(TS)-SRO MAL 5 M-RO LOOP/A EDG fails to start in AUTO/B EDG fails to start EPOO1 EQBOO3A - | |||
M-SRO DGOO1B MAL 6 M-RO Pzr Steam Space Break NCO14A M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA 1NI-9AI1OB fail to OPEN automatically NIOO9A NIOO9B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) | |||
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MOB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% | |||
starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. | |||
During the power increase, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail causing the Main Generator to operate outside the Capability Curve. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY, and enter AP/1/A15500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage. | |||
Next, the lB RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/20, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (COW) System, 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating). | |||
Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position. While the plant is stabilizing a Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail As-Is causing Pzr pressure to lower, and requiring the operator to manually close the Spray Valve. After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod and/or AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, to address the failed Pressurizer Spray Valve. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio. | |||
Shortly afterwards, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will fail to start automatically, and the lB DG will fail to start at all. The operator will enter EP/l/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EPI1IAI5000IECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. Within ECA-0.0, the operator will take action to manually start the 1A DG. Upon restoration of power to 1 ETA, the operator will transition to E-0. | |||
Upon return to E-0, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Safety Injection. Upon the trip, 1NI-9 and 10 will fail to auto open, and the operator will be required to open at least one of these valves manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. | |||
The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EPI1IAI5000/ES-1 .2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. | |||
Critical Tasks: | |||
E-OC Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA 0.0. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. | |||
Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS. | |||
E-0 J Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E 0. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation (1NI-9/10) constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition. | |||
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-2 | |||
==REFERENCES:== | |||
: 1. SLC 16.7.6, Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Rev 14) | |||
: 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS-Operating (Amendment 184/166) | |||
: 3. OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Rev 185) | |||
: 4. OPI1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121) | |||
: 5. OP/1/A/6300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11) | |||
: 6. AP/l/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances (Rev 11) | |||
: 7. AP/l/A/5500/20, Loss of RN (Rev 31) | |||
: 8. SLC 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating) (Rev 101) | |||
: 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) (Amendment 184/166) | |||
: 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System (Amendment 265/245) | |||
: 11. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 221/203) | |||
: 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System (Amendment 184/166) | |||
: 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating (Amendment 221/203) | |||
: 14. AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection (Rev 28) | |||
: 15. AP/1/A/5500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies (Rev 11) | |||
: 16. AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction (Rev 16) | |||
: 17. Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits (Amendment 184/166) | |||
: 18. Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (Amendment 184/1 66) | |||
: 19. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33) | |||
: 20. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power (Rev 34) | |||
: 21. EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev 15) | |||
: 22. EP!1/A/5000/ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization (Rev 16) | |||
Validation Time: 120 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc. | |||
Facility Review: | |||
Rev. 050214 1 | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, SIG Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAC 2 C-RO Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure MGOO1 C-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP lB RN Pump Trip RNOO7B C(TS)-SRO 4 MAL C-RO Zone 18 Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in EPOO3C AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction C BOP IREOO9 - | |||
IREO1OD12 C(TS)-SRO MAC 5 M-RO LOOP/A EDG fails to start in AUTO/B EDG fails to start EPOO1 M-BOP EQBOO3A M-SRO DGOO1B MAC 6 M-RO Pzr Steam Space Break NCO14A M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA 1NI-9AI1OB fail to OPEN automatically NIOO9A NIOO9B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, SIG Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with .4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1!A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. | |||
During the power increase, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail causing the Main Generator to operate outside the Capability Curve. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY, and enter AP/1/A15500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage. | |||
Next, the 1 B RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/20, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) | |||
System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating). | |||
Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position. While the plant is stabilizing a Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail As-Is causing Pzr pressure to lower, and requiring the operator to manually close the Spray Valve. After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod and/or AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, to address the failed Pressurizer Spray Valve. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio. | |||
Shortly afterwards, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will fail to start automatically, and the 1 B DG will fail to start at all. The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EP/1/A15000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. | |||
Within ECA-0.0, the operator will take action to manually start the 1A DG. Upon restoration of power to 1 ETA, the operator will transition to E-0. | |||
Upon return to E-0, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Safety Injection. Upon the trip, 1NI-9 and 10 will fail to auto open, and the operator will be required to Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 open at least one of these valves manually. Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EP/11A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. | |||
The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EP/1 IAI5000IES-1 .2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. | |||
Critical Tasks: | |||
E-OC Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA-O.O. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS. | |||
E-O J Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-O. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation (1NI-9/1O) constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q Reset to Temp IC 241 T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-37): | |||
(Originally IC-37). | |||
insert LOA-NI014 = Racked_OUT; insert LOA NIOI4A = Racked_OUT (IA NI Pump is OOS) insert MAL-EMF-34L = 10; insert MAL-EMF-34H | |||
=10 (IEMF34i500S) insert OVR-IADIO_E02 = ON (MCB Annunciator IADIOIE2) | |||
From IC-241 Per Lesson Plan 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 insertMAL-NIOO9A = TRUE (Failure of INI-9A) insertMAL-NIOO9B = TRUE (Failure of INI-IOB) | |||
Q RUN Place Tagout/O-Stick on: | |||
IA NI Pump (Tagout) | |||
Reset all SLIMs IEMF34 (0-stick) | |||
MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2 (0-stick) | |||
Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb. | |||
Setup OAC Q Freeze. | |||
Q Update Fresh Tech. | |||
Spec. Log. | |||
Q Fill out the A0s Available section of Shift Turnover Info. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q Crew Briefing | |||
: 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | |||
: 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. | |||
: 3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase. | |||
: 4. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OPI1/A161001003 marked up as follows: | |||
. Step 2.3 initialed. | |||
. Note prior to Step 3.1 checked. | |||
. Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
. Step 3.2 initialed. | |||
. Step 3.3 initialed. | |||
. Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
. Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.36.10 is entered. | |||
. Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked. | |||
. Step 3.3.4 Initialed. | |||
: 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. | |||
Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N 14-1-2. | |||
Q At direction of Event 1 Power Increase examiner Q At direction of Event 2 Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure examiner inse MAL-MG001 95 rampl2O seconds Q At direction of Event 3 1 B RN Pump Trip examiner insertMAL-RNOO7B = | |||
TRUE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q At direction of Event 4 Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to examiner move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve insert MALEPOO3C = Malfunction ACTIVE insert MAL-IREOO9 = | |||
FAIL_OF_AUTO NOTE: insertLOA-IPBOO3 Override when directed. | |||
Insert MAL IREOIODI2 | |||
=TRUE REM-NCOO27C = 0.3 REM-NCOO27C = 0.0 cdXlO 605 1 =1 (Delete eme NOTE: The Pzr Spray Valve will fail at function when beginning of Step 11 of AP-3 Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE) | |||
Q At direction of Event 5 LOOP/A EDG fails to start in AUTO/B EDG fails to examiner . start insert MAL-EPOOI ACTIVE (Loss of Offsite PowerISBO) insert MAL-DGOOIB = | |||
TRUE (lB DIG Fails to Start) insert MAL-EQBOO3A = | |||
ON_BLACKOUT (IA DG fails in AUTO due to a Sequencer failure) | |||
Q At direction of Event 6 Pzr Steam Space Break examiner insert MAL-NCOI4A = NOTE: insertLOA-NFOI6 = STOP when 1.5 ramp45 directed. | |||
Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 1NI-9A/1OB fail to OPEN automatically insertMAL-NIOO9A = This malfunction will occur on Safety Injection TRUE Actuation (Set at T = 0). | |||
insertMAL-NIOO9B = | |||
TRUE Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% | |||
starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/11A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/i /A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.36.10) Prior to increasing to greater NOTE: The power increase than 75% RTP, check all governor valves will be at 2 MWe/minute. | |||
open. | |||
RO! (Step 3.36.1 1) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, NOTE: Based on the extent of OTDT DCS alarming as follows: the power increase, this action BOP may or may not be taken. | |||
. On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU. | |||
. Select TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS & | |||
ALARM CHECKING graphic. | |||
. Select ON for the following: | |||
. NCAA 5422 | |||
. NCAA 5462 | |||
. NCAA 5502 | |||
. NCAA 5542 | |||
. OTDELTAT-FAIL (Step 3.36.12) IF startup from refueling outage | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.36.13) IF performing Generator/Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) testing at 78% RTP... | |||
0P111A16150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase. | |||
BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.) | |||
. Total Reactor Makeup Water: NOTE: Total makeup is 200 gallons. | |||
BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero: | |||
(R.M.) | |||
. Total Make Up Flow Counter | |||
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller. | |||
BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1 NV-i 71 A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water MIU Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow. | |||
desired flowrate. | |||
BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANYTIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual. | |||
(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate. | |||
BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANYTIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure. | |||
(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (Ui NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level. | |||
Contrl). | |||
(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS. | |||
(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl). | |||
BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANYTIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.) | |||
(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit. | |||
BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open. | |||
BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required. | |||
BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-i7lA is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO. | |||
check 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open. | |||
BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts. | |||
BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs: | |||
. Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR | |||
. Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.) | |||
(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off: | |||
. iA Rx M/U Water Pump | |||
. lB Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) | |||
. 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) | |||
. 1NV-i7iA(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control) | |||
BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-i7lA(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.1 1 Flow Control was NOT adjusted. | |||
BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-i37A(U1 NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender.... NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender. | |||
BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller. | |||
BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. | |||
BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit. | |||
BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.) | |||
. Total Make Up Flow Counter | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water. | |||
0P111A163001001 A, TURBI N E-GEN ERATOR STARTU PISHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5.2) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.5.2.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.3) Depress LOAD RATE. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.4) Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 VARIABLE DISPLAY. MWe/Min loading rate. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.5) Depress ENTER. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.6) Depress REFERENCE. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.8) Depress ENTER. | |||
(Step 3.5.2.9) Depress GO (Step 3.5.2.1 0) Check load changes at selected rate. | |||
OPIIIAI6IOO/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.36.14) Continue power increase to NOTE: The power increase 95% RTP. will be at 2 MWe/minute. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure During the power increase, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail causing the Main Generator to operate outside the Capability Curve. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY, and enter AP111A15500105, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-MGOOI = 95, Ramp = 120 seconds. | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. Annunciator lAD-i, C/5, EXCITATION LIMITER IN ACTION | |||
. OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY LO-LO | |||
. MOB MVAR indication lower from 150 to -232 | |||
. Main Generator Power Factor moves to Leading 0.95 | |||
. Main Generator Voltage 25KV NOTE: The ORS may enter AP5 directly. | |||
OAC ALARM M1A0960, UI GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY ORS (Step 1) LO-LO 100 MVARs Leading (-100 MVARS) | |||
. GO TO AP/1/A15500/05 (Generator NOTE: The CR5 will transition Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances). to AP5. | |||
AP111A15500105, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES ORS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
CRS (Step 2) Ensure dispatcher is aware of NOTE: The CRS/BOP will problem. contact SOC. | |||
Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3) Notify Unit 2 to evaluate Floor Instructor: As U2 RO, implementing API2/A15500105 (Generator acknowledge. | |||
Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances). | |||
RD (Step 4) Check Unit 1 Generator TIED TD GRID. | |||
RD (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is NOTE: This is a Continuous greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine Action. The CRS will make load to maintain reactor power less than both board operators aware. | |||
100%. | |||
RD (Step 6) Check Unit 1 Generator frequency-GREATER THAN 58.5 Hz. | |||
RD (Step 7) Monitor Generator Capability Curve NOTE: The RD or BDP will as follows: most likely place Curve on DAC Screen. | |||
. Check Generator voltage LESS THAN 24 Ky. | |||
(Step 7a RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Monitor Generator Capability Curve PER Enclosure 1 (Generator Capability Curve 24KV). | |||
. GDTDStep8. | |||
RD (Step 8) Check Generator MVARs WITHIN NOTE: The MVARs will NDT LIMITS DF GENERATDR CAPABILITY be within the capability curve. | |||
CURVE. | |||
CRS (Step 8 RND) GD TD Step 11. | |||
RD (Step 1 1) Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve by performing one of the following: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Depress LOWER on the VOLTAGE ADJUST to reduce lagging MVARs OR | |||
. Depress RAISE on the VOLTAGE NOTE: This adjustment will ADJUST to reduce leading MVARs. NOT be effective at controlling MVARs. | |||
RO (Step 12) Check Generator MVARs NOTE: The MVARs will NOT WITHING LIMITS OF GENERATOR be within the capability curve. | |||
CAPABILITY CURVE. | |||
NOTE: If crew fails to recognize MVARS are outside the gen capability curve here, then at step 17, respond as Engineering to control MVAR as necessary to remain out of OAC alarm state. | |||
NOTE: The RO may recognize that the Voltage Regulator is NOT operating correctly in AUTO, and take the Voltage Regulator to MANUAL. | |||
RO (Step 12 RNO) IF actions in Step 11 do not restore MVARs, THEN perform the following: | |||
. IF voltage regulator in AUTO, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Place voltage regulator in MAN. | |||
. Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve. | |||
. IF unable to maintain MVARs within NOTE: The MVARs will be curve... able to be adjusted with the Voltage Regulator in MANUAL. | |||
RO (Step 13) Monitor Generator frequency as follows: | |||
. Check generator frequency BETWEEN 59.9 60.1 Hz. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF AT ANY TIME generator frequency is NOTE: This is a Continuous abnormal OR TCCISOC reports Action. The CRS will make abnormal grid frequency condition, both board operators aware. | |||
THEN GO TO Step 13d. | |||
CRS . GOTOStep16. | |||
RO (Step 16) Check if voltage regulator malfunction has occurred: | |||
. Generator MVARs FLUCTUATED WITHOUT A KNOWN GRID DISTURBANCE IN EFFECT OR | |||
. OAC turn on code MAINGEN INDICATES PROBLEM WITH VOLTAGE REGULATOR. | |||
OR | |||
. VOLTAGE REGULATOR COMMON NOTE: The RO will conclude TROUBLE alarm (lAD-i, D-4) LIT. that a Voltage Regulator malfunction has occurred because it would NOT operate in AUTO. | |||
CRS (Step 17) Contact the following personnel for NOTE: The CRS may call guidance: WCC to address the malfunction. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
. Engineering NOTE: If crew fails to recognize MVARS are outside the gen capability curve in Step 12, respond as Engineering to control MVAR as necessary to remain out of OAC alarm state. | |||
. Maintenance Technical Support. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 18 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 18) IF AT ANY TIME System NOTE: This is a Continuous Engineering or Maintenance Technical Action. The CRS will make Support request operation of the voltage both board operators aware. | |||
regulator from the local panel, THEN dispatch licensed operator to perform applicable section(s) of OPI1IAJ6300IOO1 (Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown), | |||
Enclosure 4.10 (Voltage Regulator Operation From Ui Gen Voltage Reg Local Control Panel). | |||
RO (Step 19) Check voltage regulator IN - NOTE: The Voltage Regulator AUTO. is NOT in AUTO. | |||
RO (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
Notify SOC of the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP will contact SOC. | |||
Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge. | |||
. Unit 1 voltage regulator is in manual. | |||
. Ensure Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) considers status of the Unit 1 voltage regulator. | |||
WHEN Engineering or Maintenance NOTE: The investigation will directs restoring voltage regulator to continue. | |||
AUTO, THEN perform the following: | |||
. IF voltage regulator READY light is dark, THEN do not continue unless directed by maintenance. | |||
. Place voltage regulator to AUTO. | |||
. Notify SOC that Unit 1 voltage regulator has been placed in AUTO and to ensure Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) considers status of the voltage regulator. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 19 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 20) Check if TCC or SOC has reported any of the following: | |||
Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicated that switchyard voltage would not be adequate should the unit trip. | |||
OR Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicates that switchyard voltage would not be adequate if further grid degradation occurs. | |||
OR | |||
. Red grid condition exists or is predicted within the next 24 hours. | |||
OR | |||
. Degraded 230 KV switchyard (grid) NOTE: SOC has NOT voltage or frequency condition exists. reported any of the listed conditions. | |||
CRS (Step 20 RNO) GO TO Step 27. | |||
CRS (Step 27) WHEN conditions return to normal, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. | |||
. Check Generator frequency HAS REMAINED GREATER THAN 58.5 HZ. | |||
. Check Unit 1 Generator TIED TO GRID. | |||
. Ensure Unit 1 Generator Bus Voltage is adjusted PER Data Book, Enclosure 4.3, Table 3.1 .3, Generator Voltage Operating Schedule, including any operational restrictions. | |||
CRS | |||
* Exit this AP. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Next, the 1 B RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP111A15500120, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating). | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-RNOO7B = TRUE (lB RN Pump trips) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. 1 B RN Pump Motor breaker Green status light is LIT | |||
. lB RN Pump Motor amps indicating 0 | |||
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 2/A-3 A RN PMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS | |||
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 2/A-4 B RN PMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS AP111A15500120, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check for potential loss of LLI as follows: | |||
. Check Unit 2 RN pump(s) that are Floor Instructor: If asked, As aligned to LLI OPERATING U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is PROPERLY. running properly. | |||
. Check suction flowpath AVAILABLE. | |||
CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
BOP (Step 3) Check if adequate NPSH exists to running RN Pumps as follows: | |||
. Any RN pump ON. NOTE: Both RN Pumps are OFF. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 6. | |||
BOP (Step 6) Place idle RN train in service as follows: | |||
BOP | |||
* Check idle RN train AVAILABLE TO START. | |||
* Start one train of RN as follows: | |||
. To start 1A RN pump perform the following: | |||
* Place manual loader for 1 RN 89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to 10% OPEN. | |||
* Start 1A RN pump. NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A RN Pump. | |||
* Ensure the following valve for train being started OPEN. | |||
* 1 RN-86A (A KG Hx Inlet Isol). | |||
* Check the following cross-tie valves | |||
-OPEN: | |||
* 1 RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) | |||
* 1 RN-41 B (Train B TO Non Ess Hdr Isol) | |||
* 1 RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol). | |||
* Ensure malfunctioning RN pump is off. | |||
BOP | |||
* Check if local venting of RN pump NOTE: Local venting of RN has been performed PER one of the pump has NOT been following: performed. | |||
* Enclosure 6 (1A RN Pump Venting) | |||
OR | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 22 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Enclosure 7 (1 B RN Pump Venting). | |||
CRS (Step 6.f RNO) GO TO Step 6.h. | |||
BOP . Check Enclosure 8 (NV Pump NOTE: Enclosure 8 has NOT Cooling Via Gravity Drain To Sump) been performed. | |||
- HAS BEEN PERFORMED. | |||
CRS (Step 6.h RNO) GO TO Sep 6.j. | |||
BOP . Check Case II (Loss of Low Level or NOTE: Case II has NOT been RC Supply Crossover) HAS BEEN performed. | |||
IMPLEMENTED. | |||
CRS (Step 6.j RNO) GO TO Step 7. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Ensure cooling to KC as follows: | |||
BOP . Check 1A KC pump(s) RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train of KC is operating. | |||
CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f. | |||
BOP | |||
* ChecklBKCpump(s)RUNNING. | |||
BOP | |||
* Ensure lB KC pumps aligned to reactor bldg non essential header as follows: | |||
* OPEN the following valves: | |||
* 1 KC-1 8B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). | |||
* 1KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol). | |||
* CLOSE the following valves: | |||
* 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 23 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
. 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). | |||
BOP . Check 1 B RN pump OFF. | |||
BOP . Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet NOTE: 1RN-187B has NOT Isol) LOCALLY THROTTLED been locally throttled. | |||
DURING THIS PROCEDURE. | |||
BOP (Step 7.i RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Place 1RN-187B MODE SELECT switch to manual. | |||
. OPEN 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol). | |||
BOP (Step 8) Perform the following on operating train: | |||
. A Train: | |||
IF 1A RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN THROTTLE 1 RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow while attempting to maintain 1A RN pump flow less than 16,000 GPM. | |||
BOPI (Step 9) Investigate reason for loss of RN CRS train as follows: | |||
. Dispatch operator to check RN pump. NOTE: The BOP/CRS will dispatch an AC. | |||
Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes, as AO, report that the 51 Relay on the 1 B RN Pump breaker has operated. | |||
. Dispatch operator to check RN pump breaker. | |||
. Check suction flowpath alignment. | |||
. Check discharge flowpath alignment. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Pump malfunction. | |||
if so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 24 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavIor Comments CRS (Step 10) Ensure Control Room Area Chiller NOTE: The CRS may assign in service PER Enclosure 3 (VC!YC the RO to perform this action, Operation). or have the BOP perform these actions prior to continuing with Step 1 1. | |||
If actions are performed in parallel, Appropriate Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3. | |||
Other Examiners follow AP 20 Actions, Step 11, below. | |||
APIIIAI5500!20, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 3, VCIYC OPERATION Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform. | |||
RO! (Step 1) Check train selected Control Room NOTE: The Chiller is Area Chiller ON. | |||
expected to be ON. If not, the BOP RO/BOP will take action per the RNO to restart the Chiller. | |||
AP111A15500120, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP continue HERE. | |||
BOP (Step 1 1) Align operating train of equipment with running RN pump as follows: | |||
. Check 1A RN pump ON. | |||
. Check the following equipment ON: | |||
. 1A1 and 1A2 KC pumps - ON CRS (Step 11 .b RNO) GO TO Step 11 | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 25 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 11 .i) Perform one of the following as necessary to align operating RN train with train of equipment cooled by RN: | |||
. Swap operating equipment to opposite train as follows: | |||
. IF desired to swap KC trains, THEN perform Enclosure 2 (Shifting KC Trains). | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 2. | |||
AP111A15500120, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 2, SHIFTING KC TRAINS BOP (Step 1) Limit KC flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in subsequent steps. | |||
BOP (Step 2) Check the following: | |||
. 1 RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) - | |||
OPEN | |||
. 1 RN-41 B (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) - | |||
OPEN | |||
. 1 RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) - | |||
OPEN | |||
. Any KC pump RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train KC Pumps are operating. | |||
BOP (Step 3) Check both ND pumps OFF. | |||
CRS (Step 4) Perform the following: | |||
. IF shifting from 1A KC Train to 1 B KC NOTE: The crew will be Train,... shiftingfrom lB KCTrain to 1A KC Train. | |||
OR | |||
. IFshiftingfrom lBKCTrainto 1AKC Train, THEN GO TO Step 20. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 26 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 20) Maintain the following limits in next steps: | |||
. IF 1A RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN maintain 1A pump flow less than 16,000 GPM. | |||
BOP (Step 21) Perform the following to establish RN flow to 1A KC Hx: | |||
. Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) | |||
Mode Select switch is in manual. | |||
. IF required to reduce RN flow to 1 B KC NOTE: It is NOT required to Hx,... reduce RN flow to 1 B KC Hx. | |||
THROTTLE OPEN 1 RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow to 1A KC Hx, while maintaining 1A RN pump within flow limit of Step 20. | |||
BOP (Step 22) Perform the following: | |||
. Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the AUTO position. | |||
. Ensure 1KC-51A OPENS. | |||
BOP (Step 23) Start 1A1 KC pump. | |||
BOP (Step 24) Start 1A2 KC pump. | |||
BOP (Step 25) Align Reactor Bldg header to 1 A Train as follows: | |||
. OPEN the following valves: | |||
. 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) | |||
. 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol). | |||
. CLOSE the following valves: | |||
. 1 KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg non Ess Sup_Isol) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 27 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. 1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). | |||
BOP (Step 26) Check both ND pumps OFF. | |||
BOP (Step 27) Place 1 RN-i 87B MODE SELECT switch to auto. | |||
BOP (Step 28) Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet 1501) CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 29) WHEN RN flow through the 1 B KC Hx begins to go down, THEN THROTTLE OPEN 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to achieve desired flow rate while maintaining iA RN pump within the following flow limit: | |||
. IF iA RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN maintain 1A RN pump flow less than 16,000 GPM. | |||
BOP (Step 30) Place 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in CLOSE. | |||
BOP (Step 31) Ensure 1 KC-54B is CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 32) Stop the following pumps: | |||
. 1B1 KCpump | |||
. lB2KCpump. | |||
BOP (Step 33) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves are OPEN. | |||
BOP (Step 34) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 28 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
I B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will return to the main body of AP-20. | |||
Examiner NOTE: Because there are still AP-related actions to take with this procedure, the CRS may NOT address the TS at the time. | |||
Consequently, it may be necessary to move to next event, and address the TS after the scenario. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CRS 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) | |||
CRS LCD 3.7.7 Two NSWS trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One NSWS A. 1 Restore 72 hours train NSWS train inoperable. to OPERABLE status. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.2, ECCS - OPERATING CRS LCD 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. | |||
CRS ACTIONS | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 29 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore 72 hours trains trains to inoperable. OPERABLE status. | |||
AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM CRS 3.6.6 Containment Spray System CRS LCO 3.6.6 Two Containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. one A.1 Restore 72 hours containment containment spray train spray train inoperable, to OPERABLE status. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM CRS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 30 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TI ME NOTE: The entry into B. One AFW B.1 Restore 72 hours train AFW train to Condition B is for the 1 B MD inoperable in OPERABLE AND CA Pump. | |||
MODE 1,2, status. 10 days from or 3 for discovery of reasons failure to meet other than the LCO. | |||
Condition A. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) | |||
SYSTEM CRS 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) | |||
System CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One CCW A.1 Restore 72 hours train CCW train inoperable. to OPERABLE status. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 31 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS 3.8.1 AC Source Operating CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE: | |||
. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND | |||
. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND | |||
. The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 32 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos Expeci d ActionslB iavior Comments B.1 Perform 1 hour B. OneDG SR 3.8.1.1 inoperable, for the offsite AND circuit(s). | |||
Once per 8 hours thereafter AND B.2 Declare 4 hours from required discovery of feature(s) Condition B supported by concurrent with the inoperability of inoperable redundant DG required inoperable feature(s) when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable. | |||
AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not 24 hours inoperable due to common cause failure. | |||
OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours for OPERABLE DG. | |||
AND B.4 Restore DG 72 hours to OPERABLE status. AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.9, BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATH (OPERATING) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 33 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
I B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS 16.9.9 Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating) | |||
CRS LCO 16.9.9 Two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE: | |||
The flow path from a boric acid tank via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the reactor coolant system, AND Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the reactor coolant system. | |||
Note: An OPERABLE charging pump used to satisfy OPERABLITY requirements of one boration flow path may not be used to satisfy OPERABILITY requirements for a second boration flow path. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One required A.1 Restore the 72 hours boron required injection flow boron path injection inoperable, flow path to OPERABLE status. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will identify that entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required because of two inoperable ECCS Trains. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 34 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position. While the plant is stabilizing a Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail As-Is causing Pzr pressure to lower, and requiring the operator to manually close the Spray Valve. After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address API1/A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod and/or AP/1/ASSOO/l 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, to address the failed Pressurizer Spray Valve. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-EPOO3C = ACTIVE delay = 10 seconds insert MAL-IREOO9 = FAIL_OF_AUTO insert MAL IREOI 0012 =TRUE Indications Available: | |||
. MCB Annunciator lAD-i, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms. | |||
. Turbine Generator MWe lowering. | |||
. Tavg-Tref deviation with no Auto Rod motion. | |||
. MCB Annunciator lAD-li, K3, UNIT 1 LOCKOUT, alarms. | |||
. 1 of 2 Main Generator Breakers is OPEN. | |||
. PCB-11 and 12 OPEN. | |||
AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto. Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RO will inform the CRS of the situation, and the CRS will direct that the RO control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 35 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows: | |||
. Check Generator TIED TO GRID. | |||
. Check Generator output GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows: | |||
. Check control banks MOVING IN AS NOTE: The Control Rods will REQUIRED. NOT be moving in as required. | |||
RO (Step 3a RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following: | |||
. Place Control Rods in manual. | |||
. Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref. | |||
. If no rods will move, THEN NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL. | |||
RO . Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK. | |||
RO (Step 3b RNO) IF two or more control rods NOTE: Only one Control Rod are misaligned greater that 24 steps... (D12) is misaligned from Group D. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows: | |||
. Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps RUNNING. | |||
. 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection_Bypass_control) OPEN. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 36 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRocis fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF runback to 56% power in effect, THEN ensure turbine inlet pressure going down to less than or equal to 500 PS 1G. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Announce: UNIT 1 LOAD NOTE: CRS mayask U2 RO REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL to make Plant Announcement. | |||
PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 If so, Floor Instructor TURBINE BLDG. | |||
acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters LESS THAN 20%. | |||
CRS / (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
RO | |||
. Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power. | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to Action. The CRS will stabilize reactor power. designate the RO to observe this action. | |||
CRS | |||
* GOTOStep9. | |||
RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves MODULATING OPEN. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (lAD-il, J-5) DARK. | |||
RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PB cooling as follows: | |||
. IF MAIN GENERATOR less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps... NOT < 10,000 amps. | |||
CRS | |||
* Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The CRS will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an AO. | |||
Room of results within 5 minutes: | |||
* 1A Main Step Up Transformer | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 37 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
. 1 B Main Step Up Transformer | |||
. Unit 1 IPB Fan Enclosure area. | |||
CRS | |||
* Record approximate time lockout occurred. | |||
CRS | |||
* Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor: | |||
given sufficient time (approximately 5 Within 3 minutes, as AO minutes) to complete fire inspection, report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area. | |||
CRS | |||
* IF operator confirms a fire has NOTE: No fire has occurred. | |||
occurred... | |||
CRS | |||
* IF operator confirms no fire has NOTE: The CRS will dispatch occurred, THEN dispatch operator to an AO. | |||
perform the following at the Unit I IPB ALARM PANEL: | |||
* Depress LOCKOUT OVERRIDE on Booth Instructor: | |||
the fan in MAN. | |||
Insert LOA-IPBOO3 OVERRIDE | |||
* IF IPB fan in MAN cannot be Booth Instructor: | |||
started, Within 3 minutes, as AO report that the Lockout Override has been pressed, and the IA IPB Fan is running. | |||
CRS | |||
* IF neither IPB fan can be started NOTE: The 1A IPB Fan is running. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 38 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-NC0027C = 0.1 delay0 rampl0 SECONDS REM-NCOO27C =0 delay5 cdX10_605_1 EQ 1, (Delete Remote function when Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. The 1NC-27C SLIMS indicates that the 1NC-27C is in the intermediate position. | |||
. Pzr Pressure is lowering. | |||
. OAC NCS, Pressurizer and PRT Graphic shows 1 NC-27C in the intermediate position. | |||
BOP (Step 1 1) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows: | |||
. Ensure Pzr heater are in auto. | |||
. Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto. | |||
. Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
. Check Pzr spray control valves - NOTE: The BOP will need to CLOSED use the 1 NC-27 Emergency Close Switch to close the stuck open Pzr Spray valve. | |||
RO (Step 12) Check load rejection DUE TO NOTE: The load rejection was LOSS OF CF PUMP. NOT due toa Loss of CF Pump. | |||
CRS (Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 15 RO (Step 15) Check turbine inlet pressure NOTE: Turbine Inlet pressure LESS THAN 330 PSIG. is 470 psig. | |||
RO (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME turbine inlet pressure drops to less than 330 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 16. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 39 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS . GOTOStepl9. | |||
RD (Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows: | |||
. Check Generator Breakers EITHER GENERATOR BREAKERS CLOSED. | |||
. Check Generator TIED TO GRID. | |||
. Check generator power factor 0.9 TO 1.0 LAGGING. | |||
CRS . GO TO Step 20. | |||
CRS (Step 20) Ensure the following have been NOTE: The CRS may ask implemented: OSM to address. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM. | |||
. RPIOIAJ5700/000 (Classification of Emergency) | |||
. RPIOIAI5700IO1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements). | |||
RD (Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Check reactor power GREATER THAN 40%. | |||
. Check the following on in service CF pump(s): | |||
. Low pressure governor control IN AUTO | |||
. High pressure governor control IN AUTO. | |||
. Check SM flow on all S/Gs LESS NOTE: SM flow is 58%. | |||
THAN 75%. | |||
. Check SM flow on all S/Gs LESS NOTE: SM flow is 58%. | |||
THAN 25%. | |||
RD (Step 21d RNO) Perform the following: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 40 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments | |||
. Check the following CF control bypass valves CLOSED: | |||
. iCE-i O4AB (1A SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED | |||
. iCE-i O5AB (lB SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED | |||
. iCE-i O6AB (1C SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED | |||
. iCE-i O7AB (1D SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED RO | |||
* IF any CF control bypass valve is open... NOTE: All CF control bypass valves are closed. | |||
CRS | |||
* GOTOStep2l.f. | |||
BOP | |||
* Slowly CLOSE 1 CM-420 (Unit 1 NOTE: The BOP will close Generator Load Rejection Bypass 1CM-420. | |||
Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure. | |||
* WHEN 1CM-420 is closed, THEN check load rejection signal reset (OAC turn on code CM). | |||
* Reposition manual loader for 1 CM-420 to NOTE: The BOP will open 100% OPEN. 1CM-420. | |||
* IF thermal power is greater than 15%, | |||
THEN within 4 hours of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance. | |||
* Check T-AvgGREATER THAN 561°F. | |||
* Check CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, 8-9) DARK. | |||
. Check CONTROL ROD BANK LO NOTE: 1AD-2, A-9 may be LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, A-9) DARK. | |||
LIT. If so, the operator will perform Step 21.1 RNO. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 41 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments RO (Step 21 .1 RNO) Ensure the CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT alarm clears as Xenon builds in. | |||
RO (Step 22) Check load rejection DUE TO NOTE: The load rejection was LOSS OF CF PUMP. NOT due to a Loss of CF Pump. | |||
CRS (Step 22 RNO) GO TO Step 24. | |||
BOP (Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running NOTE: The CRS may plant equipment as follows: transition to AP-14 based on the failure of Rods to move in AUTO, and the stuck rod. | |||
BOP . Condensate Booster pumps and place in NOTE: The BOP may stop auto. one Condensate Booster Pump. | |||
. Hotwell pumps and place in auto. NOTE: The BOP may stop one Hotwell Pump. | |||
. IF desired to secure, THEN dispatch operator to shutdown PER 0P111B162501004 (Feedwater Heater Vents, Drains and Bleed System) | |||
Enclosure 4.2 (System Shutdown) the following: | |||
. Unit 1 C Heater Drain Tank pumps | |||
. Unit 1 G Heater Drain Tank pumps. | |||
CRS (Step 25) IF power change greater than 15% NOTE: The CRS may call in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry Chemistry to address the to perform required Tech Spec sampling. power decrease. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry. | |||
RO (Step 26) WHEN condenser dump valves closed AND no longer required for temperature control, THEN reset C-7A using STEAM DUMP SELECT switch. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 4-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 42 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may transition to AP-14 based on the failure of Rods to move in AUTO, and the stuck rod; OR AP-1 1 based on the Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction. | |||
AP/IIA!5500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either Immediate Action dropped OR misaligned by great than 24 NOTE: Only one Rod is steps,... | |||
misaligned during this event. | |||
RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will place the rods in Manual. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED. Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK. | |||
RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following. | |||
. IF misaligned rod(s) due to DRPI NOTE: Only one rod is indication failure only,... misaligned. | |||
. IF T-Avg has gone down NOTE: The RO may adjust load on the Turbine to maintain Tavg-Tref = 1°F. | |||
. GO TO Enclosure 1 (Response To Dropped or Misaligned_Rod) | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 1. | |||
AP111A15500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 1, RESPONSE TO DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 43 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
CRS (Step 2) Dispatch rod control system NOTE: The CRS may call qualified IAE to perform the following: WCC/IAE to address. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE as appropriate. | |||
. Correct cause of misaligned rod. | |||
. Notify Control Room operators when auto or manual rod motion is available for reactivity control. | |||
RO (Step 3) Do not move rods until IAE determines rod movement is available. | |||
CRS (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: A runback has already while in this procedure, THEN occurred, and the Control Rods have been moved in MANUAL. | |||
RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-b) DARK. | |||
RO (Step 6) Use OAC point M1P1 385 (Reactor Thermal Power, Best Estimate) to determine reactor power in subsequent steps. | |||
RO (Step 7) Check AFD (Tech Spec 3.2.3) | |||
WITHIN TECH SPEC LIMITS. | |||
CRS (Step 8) REFER TO the following Tech Specs while continuing in the enclosure: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 44 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Tech Spec 3.1 .4 (Rod Group Alignment NOTE: The CRS may check Limits). the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.1 .4 must be entered. | |||
. Tech Spec 3.1 .5 (Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits). | |||
. Tech Spec 3.1 .6 (Control Bank Insertion Lim its). | |||
. Tech Spec 3.2.4 (QPTR) NOTE: The CRS may check the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.2.4 must be entered. | |||
. Ensure shutdown margin calculation is performed within 1 hour. | |||
Examiner NOTE: It is intended that the CRS evaluate the TS at this point. | |||
If the CRS requests the WCC evaluate the TS, and continues with Enclosure 1 of AP14, move to the next event, and evaluate the TS after the exam has been completed. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4, ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS CRS LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. | |||
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 45 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO!Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos Expec d ActiorisIB iavior Comments B. One rod not B.lRestore rod 1 hour within to within alignment alignment limits, limits. | |||
OR B.2.1.1 Verify SDM is 1 hour within the limit specified in the COLR. | |||
OR B.2.1.2 Initiate boration to 1 hour restore SDM to within limit. | |||
AND B.2.2 Reduce 2 hours THERMAL POWER to | |||
<75% RTP. | |||
AND B.2.3 Verify SDM is within the Once per limit specified 12 hours in the COLR. | |||
AND B.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1. 72 hours AND B.2.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1. 72 hours AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate safety 5 days analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 32.4, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO CRS LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be 1 .02. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 46 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 with THERMAL POWER >50% RTP. | |||
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TI ME A.1 Reduce 2 hours A. QPTR not THERMAL within limit. POWER 3% from RTP for each 1%ofQPTR | |||
>1.02. | |||
AND A.2 Perform SR Once per 12 3.2.4.1 and hours reduce THERMAL POWER 3% from RTP for each 1%ofQPTR | |||
>1.02. | |||
AND A.3 Perform SR 24 hours 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1. AND Once per 7 AND days thereafter A.4 Reduce Power 72 hours Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint 3% | |||
for each 1% | |||
of QPTR> | |||
1.02. | |||
AND A.5 Reevaluate safety Prior to analyses and increasing | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 47 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Ruriback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expec ?d ActionslB avior Comments confirm THERMAL results POWER above remain valid the more for duration restrictive limit of operation of Required under this Action A.1 or condition. A.2 AND A.6 Calibrate Prior to excore increasing detectors to THERMAL show zero POWER above QPT. the more restrictive limit of Required Action A.1 or A.2 AND A.7 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and Within 24 hours SR 3.2.2.1. after reaching RTP OR Within 48 hours after increasing THERMAL POWER above the more restrictive limit of Required Action A.1 or A.2 NOTE: The BOP may take all the necessary actions in the Immediate Actions, before CRS reads AOP. | |||
APII/A15500!l1, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE Immediate Action DOWN. | |||
BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED - Immediate Action | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 48 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3 RNO) CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s). NOTE: The BOP will recognize that the SLIMs is NOT effective at controlling the valve, and operate the EMERG SWITCH. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves NOTE: IF the BOP has already CLOSED. used the EMERG SWITCH, the CRS may answer YES, and continue to Step 6. | |||
If NOT, the Step 5 RNO will be performed. | |||
NOTE: When the BOP uses this switch the Spray Valve will Close. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray to PZR Isol) CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters ON: | |||
. 1A | |||
. lB | |||
. 1D BOP (Step 9) Check 1 C Pzr heaters ON. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER IN AUTO. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 49 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 11) Check 1 NC-27 PRESSURIZER NOTE: In order to close the SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch - malfunctioning Spray Valve, S ELECTED TO NORMAL. the BOP had to take the EM ERG SWITCH to CLOSE. | |||
CRS (Step 1 1 RNO) Notify station management to NOTE: The CRS may call ensure switch restored to NORMAL once WCC/Station Management to spray valve is repaired. address the switch position. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
BOP (Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch - | |||
SELECTED TO NORMAL. | |||
80P (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE. | |||
CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve failure. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move Event #5. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 50 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failurelA EDG fails to start automatically Shortly afterwards, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will fail to start automatically, and the lB DG will fail to start at all. The operator will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EP/lIA5000/ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power. Within ECA-O.O, the operator will take action to manually start the 1A DG. Upon restoration of power to 1 ETA, the operator will transition to E-O. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-EPOOI ACTIVE (Loss of Offsite PowerISBO) insert MAL-DGOOIB = TRUE (lB DIG Fails to Auto Start) insert MAL-EQBOO3A = ON_BLACKOUT (IA DG fails in AUTO due to a Sequencer failure) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. Main Control Room lights DIM | |||
. 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE X is LIT | |||
. 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Y is LIT | |||
. 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Z is LIT | |||
. 1 B EDG not running | |||
. Both Trains of DRPI DARK EP/11A15000/ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER CRS (Step 1) CSF Status trees should be NOTE: Crew will carry out monitored for information only. EPs Immediate Actions of ECA-0.0, referenced by them should not be prior to the CRS addressing implemented. the EP. | |||
RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION | |||
. All rod bottom lights LIT NOTE: DRPI is NOT available on the LOOP. | |||
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN | |||
. hR amps - GOING DOWN. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 51 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failure/A EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2 RNO) Trip reactor. IMMEDIATE ACTION NOTE: other indications are used to determine that the reactor has tripped. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION | |||
. All throttle valves CLOSED. | |||
CRS (Step 4) Establish NC pump seal injection from the SSF as follows: | |||
CRS | |||
* Immediately dispatch operator to SSF to NOTE: The CRS will dispatch perform the following: an AO to complete Enclosure 1. | |||
Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, however, do not take actions (It is expected that these directions will be subsequently stopped). | |||
* Obtain Brown Folder at SSF and complete Enclosure 1 CRS | |||
* Dispatch operator to 1 ETA room as follows: | |||
* Check if operator will enter aux bldg | |||
- FROM MG SET ROOM. | |||
* Give operator dosimeter from Unit 2 SRO desk. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 52 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
LOOPIB EDG Sequencer failure/A EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS . Dispatch operator to perform NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Enclosure 2 (Unit 1 ETA And ETB an A0 to complete Enclosure Rooms ECA-0.0 Actions). | |||
2. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor Instructor acknowledge as appropriate. | |||
Booth Instructor: wait 2 minutes, then insertLOA EP057 OPEN_BOTH (IEXMA-4 Bkrs IA, IEXMA2-OIB and 3A SMXG-FO2C NormIAIt Sup) i nsertLOA-EP057 CLOSE_ALT Delay 10 seconds (IEXMA-4 Bkrs IA, I EXMA2-O1 B and 3A SMXG FO2C NormIAlt Sup) | |||
CRS Use any of the following to notify security NOTE: The CRS will dispatch to immediately dispatch officer with key a Security Officer to the SSF. | |||
to SSF to ensure operator can access Booth Instructor: | |||
SSF: | |||
Acknowledge as Security. | |||
. Security ringdown phone (located on Unit 2 SRO desk) | |||
. 2688 | |||
. 4900. Floor Instructor: If asked, U2 does NOT have normal power, and both DGs are running. | |||
BOP (Step 5) Check NC System ISOLATED: | |||
BOP | |||
* Check the following letdown orifice isolation valves CLOSED. | |||
* 1NV-458A (Ui 75 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol). | |||
* 1NV-457A (Ui 45 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol). | |||
* 1 NV-35A (Ui Variable LID Orifice Outlet Cont Isol). | |||
BOP | |||
* CLOSE the following valves: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 53 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failure/A EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. 1NV-1A (Ui NC LID isol To Regenerative Hx) | |||
. 1 NV-2A (Ui NC L/D iso! To Regenerative Hx). | |||
BOP . Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
BOP . Check the following excess letdown isolation valves CLOSED: | |||
. 1 NV-24B (1 C NC Loop To Excess LID Hx iso!) | |||
. 1 NV-25B (1 C NC Loop To Excess LID Hx isol). | |||
BOP . Check 1NV-121 (Ui ND Letdown Control) CLOSED. | |||
RO (Step 6) Check total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Try to restore power to 1 ETA or 1 ETB as foilows: | |||
. Place both trains D/G mode select switches to control room. | |||
. Perform the following for any D/G(s) that are off: | |||
. Depress, then release, RESET on sequencer. | |||
. Start D/G. NOTE: This action will start the 1A D/G. | |||
. Check both D/Gs RUNNiNG. | |||
BOP (Step 7.c RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. initiate S/i | |||
. Notify Unit 2 to immediateiy ensure flow NOTE: The CRS will notify path for 2B RN pump PER Enciosure 6 U2. | |||
(Unit 2 Actions). | |||
Floor Instructor: | |||
Acknowiedge as U2 RO. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 54 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failurelA EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS . IF at least one DIG starts, THEN GO TO NOTE: The 1A DIG will be Step 7.d. running after this action. | |||
BOP * (Step 7.d).Check bus energized and NOTE: Neither Sequencer will sequencer applying loads, be applying loads automatically. | |||
* Notify dispatched operators at 1 EMXA-4 and SSF to stop where they are at. | |||
* Check status of the following local actions: | |||
CRITICAL TASK: | |||
(E-O C) Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA-O.O. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS. | |||
. SSF D/G OFF | |||
. 1 EMXA-4 normal incoming breaker | |||
-CLOSED. | |||
. Notify dispatched operators that actions at SSF and 1 EMXA-4 are not required. | |||
CRS . Implement EP/1/A15000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees). | |||
CRS . RETURN TO procedure and step in NOTE: The CRS will transition effect. to E-O. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 55 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space Break/INI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Upon return to E-0, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Safety Injection. Upon the trip, 1 NI-9 and 10 will fail to auto open, and the operator will be required to open at least one of these valves manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. | |||
The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EP/1 /A15000/ES-1 .2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-NCOI4A 1.5 delayO ramp45 (PZR Steam Space Leak) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 3/B-3, CONT PRESSURE ALERT HI | |||
. Pzr level lowers | |||
. Containment pressure starts to rise | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-6/A-6, PZR LO PRESSPORV NC34 BLOCKED | |||
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-61B-6. PZR LO PRESSPORV NC32 & 36 BLOCKED Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. | |||
EPIIIAJ5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO! (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action | |||
. All rod bottom lights LIT | |||
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN | |||
. hR amps - GOING DOWN. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action | |||
. All throttle valves CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 56 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space Break/lNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF both busses de-energized,... | |||
WHEN time allows, THEN try to restore power to de-energized bus PER AP111A15500107 (Loss of Electrical Power) while continuing with this procedure. | |||
RO! (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP | |||
. SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT. | |||
. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1 SI-i 4) LIT. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) LIT. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s): | |||
. Groups 1,2, 5DARK. | |||
. Group3LIT. | |||
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED. | |||
(Step 9d RNO) Align or start components as required. | |||
. Group 6 LIT. NOTE: I KC-332B is OPEN. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 57 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically | |||
. GOTOSteplO. | |||
NOTE: The crew will attempt to close 1 KC-332, however, the valve will NOT close. | |||
RO! (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status: NOTE: The B Train is de BOP energized. | |||
. MDCApumps-ON (Step lOa RNO) Start pumps. | |||
. NIR level in at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%, | |||
BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON NOTE: The B Train is de energized. | |||
(Step 1 1 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Start pumps | |||
. IF all KC pumps running.... | |||
. If any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD-6... | |||
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON. NOTE: The B Train is de energized. | |||
(Step 12 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Start pump(s). | |||
. IF any RN pump off, THEN perform the following: | |||
. lFlARNpumpisoff... | |||
. IF affected train is deenergized, AND its DIG is off, THEN GO TO Step 13. | |||
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 6&7 Page 58 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space Breakll NI-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically Start 2A RN pump. | |||
THROTTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor: | |||
for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay0 rampl0 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow) | |||
RO (Step 14) Check all SIG pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG. | |||
BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is 2.0 psig, and slowly rising due to the LOCA. | |||
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow: | |||
BOP | |||
* Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW. | |||
* Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PS 1G. | |||
* Check NI pumps INDICATING FLOW. | |||
(Step 16c RNO) Start NI pumps and align NOTE: The B Train is de valves, energized. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 59 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakllNl-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK: | |||
(E-O J) Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-O. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation (1 N 1-9/10) constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition. | |||
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 275 PS 1G. | |||
80P (Step 1 6.d RNO) Perform the following: | |||
BOP | |||
* Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN: | |||
* 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) | |||
CRS | |||
* IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17. | |||
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address. | |||
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM. | |||
ROl (Step 18) Check CA flow: | |||
BOP | |||
* Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 GPM. | |||
* Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 60 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments WHEN each SIG N/R level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that SIG NIR level both board operators aware. | |||
between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%. | |||
NOTE: The use of adverse Containment numbers is required if Containment Pressure is > 3 psig. | |||
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures: | |||
. IF all NC pumps on, THEN check NC T NOTE: The NC Pumps are Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO OFF. | |||
557°F. | |||
OR | |||
. IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T NOTE: Tavg and/Tcolds may Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO | |||
- be < 557° F, but also stable. If 557°F. so, Examiners move to Step 20 of E-0. | |||
RO (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions: | |||
. IF temperature less than 557° F AND NOTE: The cooldown may be going down, THEN attempt to stop under control, and Enclosure 3 cooldown PER Enclosure 3 may NOT be needed. | |||
(Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown). | |||
NOTE: If needed, the CRS may assign the RO to perform this action. | |||
If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3. | |||
Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 62. | |||
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 61 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically RO (Step 1 RNO) CLOSE steam dump valves as follows: | |||
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in manual. | |||
. Adjust STM PRESS CONTROLLER output to 0%. | |||
. Place STEAM DUMP SELECT in steam pressure mode. | |||
. IF steam dumps still open... NOTE: The Steam Dump Valves will be CLOSED. | |||
RD (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT. | |||
RD (Step 4) Check any NC pump ON. NOTE: It is likely that the NCPs will be OFF at this time. | |||
RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6. | |||
RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows: | |||
. IF SIG N/R level is less than 11% (32% | |||
ACC) in all S/Gs... | |||
. WHEN N/R level is greater than 11% | |||
(32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to: | |||
. Minimize cooldown | |||
. Maintain at least one SIC N/R level greater than 1 1% (32%_ACC). | |||
RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSIVs are CLOSED. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 62 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 8) CLOSE 1SM-15 (Ui SM TO MSR 2 Stg Tube Bundles Isol). | |||
RO (Step 9) Check any NC pump ON - | |||
RO (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF any NC T-Cold is still going down,... NOTE: It is expected that NC Tcolds will be stabilized. | |||
. IF cooldown stopped, THEN exit this enclosure. | |||
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP continue HERE. | |||
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves: | |||
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED. NOTE: 1 NC-34A previously failed OPEN. | |||
NOTE: 1NC-270 is CLOSED. | |||
NOTE: 1NC-34A isolation valve is CLOSED. | |||
NOTE: 1 NC-34A isolation valve is CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 20.b) Normal Pzr spray valves - | |||
CLOSED BOP (Step 20.c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN. | |||
RO (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on NOTE: NCS Subcooling is core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F. | |||
NEGATIVE 1 5°F. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 63 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 21 RNO) IF at least one NV or NI NOTE: If not already pump on, THEN stop all NC pumps while accomplished the NC Pumps maintaining seal injection flow. should be stopped here. | |||
RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact: | |||
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP | |||
. All SIGs PRESSURIZED. | |||
ROI (Step 23) Check if SIG tubes intact: | |||
BOP | |||
. The following secondary EMFs NORMAL: | |||
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) | |||
. 1 EMF-34(L) (SIG Sample (Lo Range)) | |||
. 1 EMF-24 (SIG A) | |||
. 1EMF-25 (SIG B) | |||
. 1EMF-26(S/GC) | |||
. 1EMF-27(S/GD) | |||
. SIG levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. | |||
BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows: | |||
. 1 EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR)) NORMAL | |||
. 1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) NORMAL | |||
. 1 EMF-40 (Containment Iodine) - | |||
NORMAL | |||
. Check containment pressure LESS NOTE: Containment pressure THAN 1 PSIG. is rising slowly and likely will exceed 3 psig. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 64 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
. Check containment sump level NORMAL. | |||
BOP (Step 24 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF H 2 Igniters are off, THEN perform the NOTE: The H2 Igniters are following: OFF. | |||
. Energize H2 Igniters by depressing ON and OVERRIDE. | |||
. Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NOTE: The CRS will dispatch NE AHUs PER EPI1IAI5000/G-l an AC. | |||
(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 Booth Instructor: as AO, (De-energizing Ice Condenser k wI d g AHU) insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU StartlStop) | |||
CRS | |||
* IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN perform Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start And Isolating RV Cooling): | |||
* Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG | |||
. Containment pressure is between 1 NOTE: These conditions may PSIG and 3 PSIG. exist. | |||
If so, the BOP may perform Enclosure 4 (BOP Examiner proceed to Page 71). | |||
* Implement EPI1IAI5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees). | |||
* GO TO EPIIIAI5000/E-1 (Loss OF Reactor Or Secondary Coolant). | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-1. | |||
EPIIIAI5000IE-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 65 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check NC subcooling based on core NOTE: NCS subcooling will exit TICs GREATER THAN 0°F. | |||
most likely be less than 0°F. | |||
BOP (Step 2 RNO) IF any NV OR NI pump is on, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Ensure all NC pumps are off. | |||
. Maintain seal injection flow. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check main steamlines intact as follows: | |||
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP | |||
. All SIGs PRESSURIZED. | |||
RO (Step 4) Control intact SIG levels as follows: | |||
. Check N/R level in any intact SIG NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC). Numbers may be used if pressure has risen > 3 psig. | |||
BOP . Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG. | |||
RO . THROTTLE feed flow to maintain all NOTE: Adverse Containment intact SIG N/R levels between 1 1% (32% Numbers may be used if ACC) and 50%. pressure has risen > 3 psig. | |||
BOP (Step 5) Check secondary radiation normal as follows: | |||
. Check all SIGs INTACT. | |||
. Notify RP to perform the following: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the need for local surveys. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCIRP. | |||
. Frisk all Unit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly_higher for any SIG. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 66 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space Break/INI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Notify Control Room of survey results. | |||
. WHEN all survey results reported, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. | |||
. Check all SIG(s) activity levels NORMAL. | |||
BOP | |||
* Check secondary EMFs NORMAL: | |||
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) | |||
* 1 EMF-34(L) (S!G Sample (Lo Range)) | |||
* 1EMF-24(S/GA) | |||
. 1EMF-25(S/GB) | |||
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG C) | |||
. 1EMF-27 (SIG D). | |||
BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves: | |||
* Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves NOTE: The B Train is de AVAILABLE, energized. | |||
(Step 6a RNO) Evaluate cause of power loss and initiate actions to restore power to affected isolation valve(s). | |||
(Step 6b) All Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 6c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN. | |||
BOP (Step 6d) IF AT ANY TIME any Pzr PORV NOTE: This is a Continuous opens due to high pressure, THEN after Action. The CRS will make pressure goes below 2315 PSIG, ensure both board operators aware. | |||
PORV CLOSES or is isolated. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 67 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 7) Check S/I termination criteria: | |||
. NC subcooling based on core exit TICs NOTE: NCS subcooling will GREATER THAN 0°F. most likely be less than 0°F. | |||
CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f. | |||
RO/ (Step 7.f) Monitor S/I termination criteria PER NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP Enclosure 2 (S/I Termination Criteria) while Action. The CRS will make in the procedure. both board operators aware. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Check if ND pumps should be stopped: | |||
. NC pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG. | |||
. NC Pressure STABLE OR GOING UP. NOTE: With the NC pressure stable, the ND Pumps will be stopped. | |||
(Step 8b RNO) GO TO Step 9. | |||
RO (Step 9) Check NC and SIG pressures: | |||
* All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
* NC pressure STABLE OR GOING DOWN. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Check if D/Gs should be stopped. | |||
BOP | |||
* Any D/G ON. NOTE: The 1A DG is running. | |||
* Check 1 ETA energized by offsite power as follows: | |||
* 1 ETA Emergency Breaker OPEN. | |||
* 1ETAENERGIZED. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 68 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step lOb RNO) Attempt to restore offsite power to affected switchgear PER AP111A15500107 (Loss of Electrical Power). | |||
(Step 1 Oc) Check 1 ETB energized of offsite power as follows: | |||
. 1 ETB Emergency Breaker OPEN. | |||
. 1ETBENERGIZED. | |||
(Step lOc RNO) Attempt to restore offsite power to affected switchgear PER API1/A15500107 (Loss of Electrical Power). | |||
(Step lOd) Reset the following: | |||
. S/I. | |||
. Sequencers. | |||
(Step 1 Od RNO) Dispatch operator to open affected sequencer control power breaker: | |||
. A Train - 1 EVDA Breaker 6 | |||
. B Train - 1 EVDD Breaker 8. NOTE: CRS will dispatch an AC to take this action. | |||
Floor Instructor acknowledge as the AC. | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME a B/C signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on. both board operators aware. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 69 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space Break/I NI-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
* Dispatch operator to stop unloaded NOTE: The CRS will dispatch D/G(s) and place in standby readiness an AC. | |||
PER 0P111A163501002 (Diesel Generator): Booth Instructor acknowledge as AC. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
insert LOA-DGOO4 STOP_DSG (StartlStop I B Diesel Generator), and report upon completion | |||
* Enclosure 4.3 (1A DIG Shutdown). | |||
. Enclosure 4.4 (1 B D/G Shutdown). | |||
BOP (Step 1 1) Check containment H 2 concentration: | |||
* Ensure operator dispatched to stop Unit NOTE: This action was likely 1 NE AHUs PER EPI1IAI5000IG-1 taken previously. | |||
(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-If NOT the CRS will dispatch energizing Ice Condenser AHU5). | |||
an AC. | |||
Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge insert LOA-NFOI6 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop) | |||
* Check H 2 analyzers IN SERVICE. NOTE: The H 2 Analyzers have NOT been placed in service. | |||
BOP (Step 1 lb RNO) Perform the following: | |||
* Dispatch operator to place H 2 analyzers NOTE: The CRS will dispatch in service PER EP/l/AJ5000IG-l an AC. | |||
(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 5 Booth Instructor: as AO (Placing H2 Analyzers In Service), | |||
acknowledge. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
insert LOA-VXOO9 enabled deIay300 (H2 Analyzer IA) insert LOA-VXOIO ENABLED delay600 (H2 Analyzer I B) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 6&7 Page 70 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space Break/I Nl-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically | |||
. WHEN H 2 analyzers in service, THEN complete Steps 11 .c and 1 1 .d. | |||
CRS | |||
* GOTOStepl2. | |||
RO/ (Step 12) Initiate evaluation of plant status as follows: | |||
BOP | |||
* Check Cold Leg Recirc capability from at least on train as follows: | |||
ROI | |||
* Train A: | |||
BOP | |||
* 1A ND pump AVAILABLE | |||
* 1NI-185A(1A ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol) POWER AVAILABLE. | |||
BOP (Step 1 2.b) Check for potential leak in aux bldg as follows: | |||
* Check aux bldg radiation: | |||
* All area monitor EMFs - | |||
NORMAL | |||
* EMF-41 (Aux Bldg Ventilation) | |||
NORMAL. | |||
* Check NC to ND pressure boundary intact as follows: | |||
* ND Temperature NORMAL | |||
* ND Flow - NORMAL | |||
* ND Pressure NORMAL. | |||
CRS (Step 12.c) WHEN TSC staffed, THEN have NOTE: This is a Continuous TSC perform EPI1IAI5000IG-1 (Generic Action. The CRS will make Enclosures), Enclosure 30 (Evaluation of both board operators aware. | |||
Plant Status During LOCAs by TSC). | |||
NOTE: The TSC is NOT staffed. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 71 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 13) Check if NC System cooldown and depressurization is required: | |||
. NC pressure GREATER THAN 275 PS 1G. | |||
. GO TO EPI1IAJ5000!ES-1 .2 (Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization). | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.2. | |||
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 4, VX MANUAL START AND ISOALTING RV COOLING BOP (Step 1) IF containment pressure has gone NOTE: Containment pressure above 3 PSIG is likely to be < 3 psig. | |||
BOP (Step 2) IF NC leak exists, THEN GO TO Step 4. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Start one train of VX containment air return fan as follows: | |||
. Train A: | |||
. OPEN 1 RAF-D-2 (1A Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A). | |||
. WHEN 1 RAF-D-2 is open, THEN start 1A Cont Air Return fan. | |||
OR | |||
. Train B: | |||
. OPEN 1 RAF-D-4 (1 B Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A). | |||
. WHEN 1 RAF-D-4 is open, THEN start 1 B Cont Air Return fan. | |||
BOP (Step 5) Isolate RV cooling to containment ventilation units as follows: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 72 of 73 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr Steam Space BreakIINI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. CLOSE 1 RV-79A (Ui VU AHUS RV Cont Outside Supply Hdr Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1RV-1O1A (Ui VU AHUS RV Cant Inside Return Hdr Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1 RV-32A (Ui VLNT AHUS RV Cont Outside Supply Hdr Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1RV-76A(U1 VL/VTAHUS RV Cant Inside Return Hdr sal). | |||
. CLOSE 1 RV-808 (UI VU AHUS RV Cont Inside Supply Hdr Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1RV-102B (Ui VU AHUS RV Cant Outside Return Hdr Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1 RV-33B (Ui VLNT AHUS RV Cant Inside Supply Hdr Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1RV-77B(Ui VLNTAHUSRV Cant Outside Return Hdr Isol). | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam. | |||
UNIT I STATUS: | |||
Power Level: 75% NCS [B] 1037 ppm Pzr [B]: 1034 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 12 days Core Burnup: 251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: 0P111A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT: | |||
* The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
* The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: | |||
* The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. | |||
* 1EMF34, SIG Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). | |||
* MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). | |||
Crew Directions: | |||
* The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/N6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. | |||
* Use of Alternate Dilute has been approved. | |||
* RE has recommended an initial Alternate Dilution of 200 gallons. | |||
* Turbine loading rate will be 2MWe/minute. | |||
Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5 | |||
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) | |||
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-il) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-li, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAL 2 C-BOP Pzr PORV fails OPEN N0003B C TS SRO NCO12B - | |||
MAL 3 C-RO SG 1 B PORV fails OPEN SMOO1B C-SRO 4 MAL C-BOP Steam Generator Tube Leak SGOO1B C(TS)-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion IREOO3A C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGOO1B M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA Failure of the C-9 Interlock IPEOO4H REM 8 NA Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN NC0027 N00029 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) | |||
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-il) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i 1, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating). | |||
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% | |||
starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/i/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/i /A/6300/00 1 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. | |||
During the power increase, Pzr PORV 1 NC34A will fail partially OPEN, and fail in this position. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/i/A/5500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS). | |||
Next, the lB Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/i/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORV5), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. | |||
Subsequently, a 100 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur (over 10 minutes) on the lB Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/i/A/5500/i0, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The crew will be directed by AP/i/A/5500/i0 to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/l/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. | |||
During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/N5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods. | |||
After this, the leak will develop into a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EP/i/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the lB Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. While performing an NCS cooldown the C-9 Interlock will fail and Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) result in a loss of the steam dumps. The operator will be required to re-initiate the cooldown using the available SG PORVs. During the NCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will fail to open. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using the last available Pzr PORV. | |||
The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System. | |||
Critical Tasks: | |||
E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of z\P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of i.P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG. | |||
E-3C Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO.cts). | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. | |||
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-3 | |||
==REFERENCES:== | |||
: 1. AP/l/A/5500/l 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies (Rev 11) | |||
: 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS) | |||
(Amendment 221/203) | |||
: 3. OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Rev 185) | |||
: 4. OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121) | |||
: 5. OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11) | |||
: 6. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits (Amendment 219/201) | |||
: 7. AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak (Rev 18) | |||
: 8. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORV5) (Amendment 221/203) | |||
: 9. AP/1/A15500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps (Rev 23) | |||
: 10. OP/0/A6450/01 1, Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System (Rev 97) | |||
: 11. AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower (Rev 24) | |||
: 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage (Amendment 237/21 9) | |||
: 13. SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System (Rev 133) | |||
: 14. AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction (Rev 16) | |||
: 15. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33) | |||
: 16. EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Rev 23) | |||
Validation Time: 106 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc. | |||
Facility Review: | |||
Rev. 050214 1 | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-Il) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-li, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event Maif. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAL 2 C-BOP Pzr PORV fails OPEN NCOO3B C(TS)-SRO NCO12B MAL 3 C-RO SG 1 B PORV fails OPEN SMOO1B C-SRO 4 MAL C-BOP Steam Generator Tube Leak SGOO1B C(TS)-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion IREOO3A C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGOO1B M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA Failure of the C-9 Interlock IPEOO4H REM 8 NA Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN NC0027 NC0029 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-1 1) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-il, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating). | |||
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with .4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. | |||
During the power increase, Pzr PORV 1NC34A will fail partially OPEN, and fail in this position. | |||
The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS). | |||
Next, the 18 Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. | |||
Subsequently, a 100 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur (over 10 minutes) on the lB Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The crew will be directed by AP/1/A15500/10 to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A15500/04, Rapid Downpower. | |||
During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods. | |||
After this, the leak will develop into a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EP/1/N5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. While performing an NCS cooldown the C-9 Interlock will fail and result in a loss of the steam dumps. | |||
The operator will be required to re-initiate the cooldown using the available SG PORVs. During the NCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will fail to open. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using the last available Pzr PORV. | |||
The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Tasks: | |||
E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of zP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of AP, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG. | |||
E-3C Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO.cts). | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. | |||
-4,- | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS D Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q Reset to Temp IC 242 T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-18): | |||
(Originally IC-18). | |||
Place INC3IB to CLOSE; (Pzr PORV INC-32B is OOS) insert XMT-KR_OKRP_5040 = 0 (OKRP-5040, KR Tank Level is OOS) | |||
From lC-242: | |||
T0 MAL-IPEOO4H = True (C-9 fails), | |||
cdH_X01_094_2 = I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON) | |||
REM-NCOO27C = 0 (A Spray Valve fails closed) | |||
REM-NCOO29C 0 (B Spray Valve fails closed) cd=H_XOI_094_2 I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON) | |||
Q RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on: | |||
I NC-32B (Tagout) | |||
Reset all SLIMs OKRP-5040 (0-stick) | |||
MCB Annunciator lAD-Il, E-2 (0-stick) | |||
Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb. | |||
Setup OAC Q Freeze. | |||
Q Update Fresh Tech. | |||
Spec. Log. | |||
Q Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing | |||
: 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | |||
: 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. | |||
: 3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase. | |||
: 4. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of 0P111A161001003 marked up as follows: | |||
* Step 2.3 initialed. | |||
* Note prior to Step 3.1 checked. | |||
* Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.2 initialed. | |||
* Step 3.3 initialed. | |||
* Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.34.15 is entered. | |||
* Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.3.4 Initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34 circled. | |||
* Step 3.34.1 initialed (Person Notified/Todays time and date filled in). | |||
* Step 3.34.2 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Note prior to Step34.4 is checked. | |||
* Step 3.34.4 is NA. | |||
* Step 3.34.5 is initialed (Person Notified/Todays time and date filled in). | |||
* Step 3.34.6 is circled. | |||
* Step 3.34.7 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.8 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.9 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.10 is initialed. | |||
* Note prior to Step 3.34.11 is checked. | |||
* Step 3.34.11 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.11.1 All four checkboxes are checked, BB flow is recorded for each. | |||
* Step 3.34.11.2 All four Bullets are initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.11.3 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.11.4 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.34.11 .5 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.34.11.6 All four Bullets are initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.12 All four Bullets are initialed. | |||
* Step 3.34.13.1 All three Checkboxes are Checked, (Person Notified/Todays time and date filled in). | |||
* Step 3.34.13.2 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Note prior to Step 3.34.14 is checked. | |||
* Step 3.34.14 is initialed. | |||
: 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q T-O Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N14-1-3. | |||
Q At direction of Event I Power Increase examiner Q At direction of Event 2 Pzr PORV fails OPEN examiner i nsertMAL NCNCO03B=30 NOTE: insert LOA-NCO34A = RACKED_OUT insertMAL-NCOI2B = when directed. | |||
25 Q At direction of Event 3 SG 1 B PORV fails OPEN examiner insert MAL-SMOOIB 100 rampl0 Q At direction of Event 4 Steam Generator Tube Leak examiner insert MAL-SGOOIB 100 ramp600 Q At direction of Event 5 Continuous inward Rod Motion examiner insertMAL-IREOO3A = | |||
IN Q At direction of Event 6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture examiner insert MAL-SGOOIB NOTE: insertLOA-RN087 0N and LOA-RN083 500 rampl2O 8000 when directed. | |||
NOTE: insertREM-5A0002 =0 and REM-00078 = | |||
0 when directed. | |||
Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Failure of the C-9 Interlock dunrNCS InsertMAL-IPEOO4H NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip True (C-9 fails), | |||
cdH_X01_094_2 = I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON) | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Post-Rx Trip Event 8 Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN insertREM-NCOO27C = NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip deress 0 (A Spray Valve fails closed) insertREM-NC0029C = | |||
0 (B Spray Valve fails closed) cdH_X01_094_2 = I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON) | |||
Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% | |||
starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with 0P111A163001001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.34) Increase power to 50% RTP. NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 Mwe/minute. | |||
ROl (Step 3.34.15) WHEN Turbine load greater that 40% (360 psig Turbine Inlet Pressure) | |||
BOP begin aligning MSRs per 0P111B16250101 1 (Moisture Separator Reheater Operation). | |||
0P111A161501009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor NOTE: The BOP may repeat makeup water needed to obtain desired this task as needed during the boron concentration using McGuire Data power increase. | |||
Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.) | |||
. Total Reactor Makeup Water: | |||
BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero: | |||
(R.M.) | |||
. Total Make Up Flow Counter | |||
. Boric Acid Flow Counter | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 3 Event# I Page 11 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller. | |||
BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control). | |||
BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow. | |||
desired flowrate. | |||
BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual. | |||
(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate. | |||
BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure. | |||
(Step 3.1 3.2) Select HUT on 1 NV-i 37A (Ui NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level. | |||
Contrl). | |||
(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS. | |||
(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1 NV-I 37A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 12 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.) | |||
(Step 3.14.2) IF INV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit. | |||
BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open. | |||
BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required. | |||
BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-171A is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO. | |||
check 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open. | |||
BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts. | |||
BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs: | |||
. Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase OR | |||
. Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.) | |||
(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off: | |||
. 1A Rx M/U Water Pump | |||
. 1 B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed: | |||
. 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) | |||
. 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) | |||
. 1NV-171A(Ui Boric Acid BlenderTo VCT Inlet Control) | |||
BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.1 i ... Flow Control was NOT adjusted. | |||
BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1 NV-i 37A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender.... NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller. | |||
BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. | |||
BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit. | |||
BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.) | |||
. Total Make Up Flow Counter | |||
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water. | |||
OP/I 1A163001001 A, TURBI N E-GEN ERATOR STARTUPISHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve. | |||
(Step 3.5.1 .2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change. | |||
(Step 3.5.1 .3)_Depress LOAD RATE. | |||
(Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 VARIABLE DISPLAY. Mwe/Min loading rate. | |||
(Step_3.5.1.5)_Depress ENTER. | |||
(Step 3.5.1 .6)_Depress REFERENCE. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 15 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Power Increase (Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY. | |||
(Step_3.5.1.8)_Depress ENTER. | |||
(Step_3.5.1.9)_Depress GO (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate. | |||
0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 41, POWER INCREASE RO/ (Step 3.34.16) WHEN Turbine Inlet Pressure NOTE: Based on the extent of 365 367 psig, check AMSAC ACTUATION the power increase, this action BOP BLOCK/UNBLOCK as follows: may or may not be taken. | |||
. IF UNBLOCK dark, reset as follows: | |||
. Check all AMSAC S/G LOW FLOW status lights dark. | |||
. Check SIG PATH CLSD>30 SEC dark. | |||
. Depress UNBLOCK for AMSAC ACTUATION BLOCK/UNBLOCK. | |||
. Check UNBLOCK lit. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 16 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr PORV fails OPEN During the power increase, Pzr PORV 1NC34A will fail partially OPEN, and fail in this position. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/11A15500111, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS). | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-NCOO3B = 30 (PZR PORV INC-34A fails OPEN) | |||
Insert MAL-NCOI2B =25 (PZR PORV INC-34A sticks OPEN on CLOSE) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
* OAC Alarm: Ui PZR PRESS I through IV | |||
* 1 NC-34A dual status light indication (Red and Green status lights LIT) | |||
* MCB Annunciator 1AD-61B-9 PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI | |||
* MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/C-6 PZR LO PRESS CONTROL | |||
* Pzr Pressure is lowering | |||
* Expected ActionslBehavior NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the Pzr PORV prior to being directed by the CRS. | |||
APII 1150011, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE Immediate Action DOWN. | |||
BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action | |||
* CLOSE PORVs. NOTE: 1 NC-34A will display dual indication, even after closing the PORV. | |||
* IF PORV will not close, THEN CLOSE PORV isolation valve. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 17 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr PORV fails OPEN SOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED. Immediate Action SOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. CLOSE associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows: | |||
. IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, NOTE: 1NC-34A has failed THEN CLOSE 1 NC-270 (PZR PORV OPEN. | |||
Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A). | |||
CRS | |||
* IF Pzr PORV isolation valve is closed for failed Pzr PORV, THEN GO TO Step 5. | |||
SOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Check 1 NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) CLOSED. | |||
SOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters ON: | |||
* 1A | |||
* lB | |||
* 1D SOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters ON. | |||
SOP (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER IN AUTO. | |||
SOP (Step 11) Check 1 NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch SELECTED TO NORMAL. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 18 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 12) Check 1 NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch SELECTED TO NORMAL. | |||
BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE. | |||
CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
Booth Instructor: insert LOA-NC034 = Racked Out, delay = 10 minutes. | |||
As AO call and report. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVs) | |||
CRS LCO 3.4.1 1 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 AND 3. | |||
CRS ACTIONS | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Pzr PORV fails OPEN CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME recognize that Actions B.1 and B. One or two 8.1 Close 1 hour B.2 are now applicable. | |||
PORV5 associated inoperable block valves. | |||
and not capable of AND being 8.2 Remove 1 hour manually power from cycled, associated block valves. | |||
AND 8.3 Restore one 72 hours PORVto OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours pressure or parameter(s) | |||
RCS average to within limit. | |||
temperature DNB parameters not within limits. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 3 Page 20 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
SO lB PORV fails OPEN Next, the 18 Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1IA/5500101, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SMOOIB 100 delayo ramplo (SIG PORV ISVI3 SOB fails OPEN) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
* iSV-i 3AB Red status light LIT | |||
* 1 SV-1 3AB Black needle indication at 100% | |||
* OAC Alarm: TM FREEZE M1D3499-VLVSV13B SM PORV | |||
* OAC Alarm: Ui SV-PORV/SAFETY VLV OPEN -T/D CA PMP ON | |||
* OAC Alarm: iSV-i 3AB 18 SM PORV | |||
* Core AT5 rising | |||
* Rx Power rising | |||
* Steam flow on 1 B steam line risinq NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the 1 B SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS. | |||
(Step 13) | |||
CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred NOTE: The crew may immediately reduce 2OMwe and then diagnose an overpower reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less condition and adjust turbine than pre-transient condition. After the initial load per the Crew Expectation 20 Mwe load reduction, it is preferred that the Manual. | |||
operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced. | |||
APIIIAJ5500IOI, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 21 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
SG I B PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following: | |||
. Excore Nis LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%. | |||
. NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F D/T | |||
. T-Avg AT T-REF. | |||
CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS. NOT in progress. | |||
CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5. | |||
BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event GREATER THAN P-il (1955 PSIG). | |||
BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware. | |||
CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12. | |||
CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows: | |||
. (Step 1 3a) Check SM PORVs NOTE: The 1 B SG PORV is CLOSED. Open. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 22 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
SO lB PORV fails OPEN RO (Step 13a RNO) IF SIG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Close affected S/G SM PORV manual NOTE: Closing the Manual loader. Loader will have no effect. | |||
. IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform NOTE: The lB SG PORV the following: Isolation Valve will need to be closed. | |||
. Close SM PORV isolation valve. | |||
. IF SM PORV isolation valve still NOTE: The PORV Isolation open valve is closed. | |||
RO * (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED. | |||
BOP * (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL: | |||
. Containment temperature | |||
* Containment pressure | |||
. Containment humidity | |||
. Containment floor and equipment sump level. | |||
RU I * (Step 1 3.d) Check TD CA pump OFF. | |||
BOP BOP * (Step 1 3.e) Check valves on STEAM NOTE: One or more of these LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1 MC-9) valves may be cycling. The CLOSED. RNO will direct closing the valves. | |||
CRS * (Step 1 3.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE for AS Header pressure. | |||
GREATER THAN 200 PSIG. If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is lOOO psig. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 23 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
SG lB PORV fails OPEN CRS * (Step 1 3.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks. an AC to look for leaks. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor: | |||
acknowledge. | |||
Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks. | |||
NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered. | |||
BOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows: | |||
* Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2. | |||
* Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria: the startup. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
* Size of leak | |||
* Location of leak | |||
* Rate of depletion of secondary inventory | |||
. IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve... | |||
* IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak... | |||
* Check unit shutdown or load reduction NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED. Reduction will NOT be required. | |||
CRS (Step 1 5.c RNO) Perform the following: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 24 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
SG lB PORV fails OPEN Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired. | |||
Exit this procedure. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.4, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs) | |||
CRS LCD 3.7.4 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE NOTE: After evaluation, the 4 when steam generator is relied upon for CRS will determine that iSV-heat removal. 7ABC is OPERABLE and that LCD 3.7.4 is NOT entered. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCD 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-i. entered and exited during the transient. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1. | |||
CRS ACTIONS | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 25 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
SG lB PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expec ed ActionslBE lavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours pressure or parameter(s) | |||
RCS average to within limit. | |||
temperature DNB parameters not within limits. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 26 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Subsequently, a 100 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur (over 10 minutes) on the 1 B Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1 1A15500/l 0, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The crew will be directed by API1IAI5500I1O to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with API1!A15500104, Rapid Downpower. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SGOOIB 100 delayo ramp600 (SIG lB Tube Leak) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
* Pzr level is lowering | |||
* Charging starts to rise | |||
* MOB Annunciator 1AD-61E-7, PZR LO LEVEL DEVIATION | |||
* Trip 1 on EMF 72 Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments APIIIAI5500IIO, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr Level will be slowly GOING UP. lowering. | |||
BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level: | |||
* Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent_steps. | |||
* Ensure 1 NV-238 (Ui Charging Hdr NOTE: The BOP may take Control) OPENING. | |||
manual control of 1 NV-238. | |||
* OPEN 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water lnj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM. | |||
* Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: The BOP may reduce letdown flow to 45 gpm, or isolate it altogether. | |||
* Start additional NV pump. NOTE: The BOP will NOT need to start an additional NV Pump. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 27 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. IF CLAs are isolated NOTE: The CLAs are NOT isolated. | |||
. IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater NOTE: The Pzr level is NOT < | |||
than 4% .... 4%, or decreasing with maximum Charging flow. | |||
RO! (Step 2) IF AT ANY TIME Pzr level goes NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP down in an uncontrolled manner OR cannot Action. The CRS will make be maintained greater than 4%, THEN both board operators aware. | |||
perform Step 1. | |||
RO! (Step 3) Identify affected SIG as follows: | |||
BOP | |||
. Any SIG NIR level GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. | |||
OR | |||
. Check any of the following EMFs ABOVE NORMAL: | |||
. 1 EMF-24 (S/G A Steamline Hi Rad) | |||
. 1 EMF-25 (SIG B Steamline Hi Rad) | |||
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG C Steamline Hi Rad) | |||
. 1 EMF-27 (SIG D Steamline Hi Rad) | |||
. 1 EMF-71 (S/G A Leakage Hi Rad) | |||
. 1 EMF-72 (S/G B Leakage Hi Rad) NOTE: This rad monitor will be rising, and could be in either Trip 1 or TRIP 2. | |||
. 1EMF-73 (SIG C Leakage Hi Rad) | |||
. 1 EMF-74 (SIG D Leakage Hi Rad) | |||
OR | |||
. Check CF Flow LOWER IN ANY SIG COMPARED TO ALL. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 28 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 4) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
CRS (Step 5) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM. | |||
. RP/01A15700/000 (Classification of Emergency) | |||
. RP/0!A/5700/O1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements). | |||
CRS (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage NOTE: The CRS will exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the determine that Leakage has following: exceeded the TS Limits. | |||
Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 in service PER OPIO/A16450/O1 1 BOP to take this action. | |||
(Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water If so, Floor Instructor System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room acknowledge as U2 BOP and Atmosphere Pressurization During perform actions Abnormal Conditions). | |||
Have another SRO evaluate if leakage NOTE: The CRS may ask exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits OSM, STA, or Plant SRO to and immediately notify security if SSF is perform this action. | |||
inoperable. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge accordingly. | |||
NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. | |||
If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.4. | |||
Other Examiners follow AP 10 Actions, Step 7, on Page 30. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 29 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/01A16450101 1, CONTROL AREA VENTILATIONICHILLED WATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, CONTROL ROOM ATMOSPHERE PRESSURIZATION DURING ABNORMAL CONDITIONS (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure. | |||
(Step 3.2) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows: | |||
(Step 3.2.1) Ensure at least one of the following groups of intake valves open: | |||
. 1VC-IA (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) | |||
. 1VC-2A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) | |||
. 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) | |||
. 1VC-48 (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) | |||
OR | |||
. 1VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) | |||
. 1VC-1OA (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) | |||
. 1VC-I1B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) | |||
. 1VC-12B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) | |||
(Step 3.2.2) IF A Train VC/YC operating, place A Train CR Outside Air Press Fan to ON. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 30 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.2.3) IF B Train VC/YC operating, place B Train CR Outside Air Press Fan to (Step 3.2.4) Depress MAN for the following (to ensure fans off): | |||
. #1 CRA Otsd Air Fan | |||
. #2 CRA Otsd Air Fan (Step 3.2.5) Depress OFF for the following: | |||
. CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Dam per) | |||
. CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Dam per) | |||
(Step 3.2.6) Check the following dark: | |||
. CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) OPEN light. | |||
. CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) OPEN light. | |||
APII/A15500110, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIRO continue HERE. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Check if unit shutdown or reactor trip required as follows: | |||
. Check VCT makeup IN PROGRESS. NOTE: A VCT makeup may be in progress. | |||
. Check VCT level GOING UP. | |||
BOP | |||
* Check S/G tube leak size LESS THAN NOTE: The CRS will 90 GPM. determine the SGTL to be about 70-90 gpm. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 31 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Leakage in one SIG GREATER THAN 125 GPD (GALLON PER DAY). | |||
CRS . Observe the following limits while reducing load in Step 8: | |||
. Ensure reactor power is less than 50% within 1 hour of exceeding 125 GPD. | |||
. Be in Mode 3 within 3 hours of exceeding 125 GPD. | |||
CRS (Step 8) Reduce load PER one of the following, while continuing with this AP as time allows beginning at Step 9. | |||
CRS . AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Downpower) NOTE: The CRS will implement AP-4, and may continue with these actions after the downpower is started. | |||
(Examiner Move forward to Page 34) | |||
OR | |||
. OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation). Enclosure 4.2 (Power Reduction). | |||
RO (Step 9) Minimize secondary side NOTE: The following actions contamination as follows: are scripted because as the plant power is reduced, the CRS may continue to perform actions within AP-lO. | |||
Check affected SIG IDENTIFIED. | |||
CLOSE the blowdown throttle control valve for affected SIG. | |||
. 1A: 1BB-123(1AS/G Blowdown Throttle Control) | |||
. 1B: 1BB-124 (lB SIG Blowdown Throttle Control) | |||
. 1C: 1BB-125 (1C SIG Blowdown Throttle Control) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 32 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. 1D: IBB-126 (1D SIG Blowdown Throttle Control) | |||
. Perform EP!1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic NOTE: The CRS may ask the Enclosures), Enclosure 15 (Minimizing U2 BOP to perform this action. | |||
Secondary Side Contamination). | |||
If so, Floor Instructor: | |||
acknowledge as U2 BOP. | |||
RD (Step 10) Check reactor trip breakers OPEN. | |||
(Step 10 RNO) Do not continue in the procedure until the reactor is tripped PER Step 8. | |||
Examiner NOTE: Based on the transient nature of evaluating this TS, the Examiner may need to question the CRS after the scenario. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS LCD 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: | |||
. 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through all steam generators (SGs): and | |||
. 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG) | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 33 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 6 hours Action and 3. | |||
associated Completion AND Time of B.2 Be in MODE Condition A 36 hours not met. | |||
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists. | |||
OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits. | |||
SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 1&9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. | |||
CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 34 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expec ed ActionslB ,avior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TI ME C. Total C.1 Declare the Immediately Unidentified Standby LEAKAGE, Makeup Identified Pump LEAKAGE, inoperable. | |||
and reactor coolant pump AND seal leakoff> C.2 Enter 20 gpm. Condition A. | |||
OR Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff | |||
> 16.3 gpm. | |||
OR Any reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff> 4.0 gpm. | |||
NOTE: | |||
Simulator Instructor Insert Event 5 upon crew entering AP-4. | |||
AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER ROI (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RD to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RD. | |||
RD (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO. | |||
RD (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 35 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 DESIRED. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate: | |||
. Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% NOTE: It is normal practice to Power DESIRED. | |||
shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%. | |||
. At least two CA pumps - FUNCTIONAL CRS (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF Mode 3 is time critical AND the reactor will be shutdown by manually inserting control rods, THEN allow an additional 45 minutes to reach Mode 3 once turbine load reduction is complete. | |||
. IF turbine will be shutdown during down power, THEN enter target load of 15 MWE in turbine control panel. | |||
. Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8. | |||
CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/mm). load at 1 0-15 MWe/minute. | |||
RO (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge. | |||
RO (Step 1 1) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate. | |||
BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 36 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Energize all backup Pzr heaters. | |||
CRS . Check unit to be shutdown VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER. shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%. | |||
CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d. | |||
BOP . Determine boration amount based on the following: | |||
. Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm) | |||
. Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm) | |||
. Total Power change (%). | |||
NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is 680-900 gallons. | |||
RO . Check auto or manual rod control AVAILABLE. | |||
BOP . Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/i /A161 50/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1 NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)). | |||
RO (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF. | |||
RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL. | |||
RO (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD NOTE: This is a Continuous BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit Action. The CRS will make THEN comply with Tech Spec 3.1 .6 (Control both board operators aware. | |||
Bank Insertion Limits): | |||
RO (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during procedure NOTE: This is a Continuous C-7A is received, THEN insure Transient Action. The CRS will make Monitor freeze is triggered, both board operators aware. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 37 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following: | |||
. RPIOIAI5700I000 (Classification of Emergency) | |||
. RPIOIAI5700/01O (NRC Immediate NOTE: The CRS may ask Notification Requirements). OSM to address. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM. | |||
CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of NOTE: The CRS may call load reduction. WCC!RE to address the switch position. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE as appropriate. | |||
When Rod Control Malfunction is diagnosed move to Event 5. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 38 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Continuous inward Rod Motion During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/11A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-l REOO3A (IN) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. Control Rods are moving inward in AUTO without a proper signal. | |||
APII 1A15500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either Immediate Action dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 NOTE: No Rods have dropped steps... | |||
in this event. | |||
RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will place the rods in MANUAL. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED. Immediate Action NOTE: When the RO places the Rods to MANUAL, continual inward Rod Motion will stop. | |||
RO (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK. | |||
RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-b) DARK. | |||
RO (Step 6) Check T-AVGIT-REF FAILURE ROD STOP alarm (1AD-2, B-7) DARK. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 39 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to NOTE: The CRS will transition unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, to Enclosure 3 of AP-14. | |||
THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response To Continuous Rod Movement). | |||
ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 3 - RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RD system. to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RD. | |||
CRS (Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. | |||
CRS (Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal: | |||
. Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur. | |||
. Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactors response. | |||
RD (Step 4) Check T-Ref indication - NORMAL CRS! (Step 5) Do not move rods until IAE Booth Instructor: after 2 RD determines rod motion in permissible. minutes, as IAE, report that MANUAL rod control only is permissible. | |||
RD (Step 6) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref as follows: | |||
. Adjust Turbine load | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 40 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments OR | |||
. Borate/dilute NC System. | |||
RO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: This is a Continuous while in this procedure,... Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. | |||
RO! (Step 8) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure a unit shutdown is required AND Action. The CRS will make BOP both board operators aware. | |||
rods cannot be moved, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Borate as required during shutdown to maintain T-Avg at T-Ref. | |||
. Monitor AFD during load reduction. | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech Spec limit AND reactor power is greater than 50%, | |||
. IF entry into Mode 3 is desired, THEN perform the following: | |||
. WHEN the turbine is tripped OR at desired power level, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Trip Reactor. | |||
. GO TO EP/1/A15000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection). | |||
CRS (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired... | |||
NOTE: The RO can move rods in MANUAL. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN After this, the leak will develop into a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. While performing an NCS cooldown the C-9 Interlock will fail and result in a loss of the steam dumps. The operator will be required to re-initiate the cooldown using the available SG PORVs. During the NCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will fail to open. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using the last available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SGO0IB 500 delay0 rampl2O (SIG lB Tube Rupture) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
. Pzr level lowers uncontrollably | |||
. Pzr pressure lowers consistently with Pzr level NOTE: Upon changing plant conditions the crew will implement Continuous Action Step 2 of AP-lO, and return to Step 1 of AP-lO. | |||
APIIIAI5500IIO, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr Level will be slowly GOING UP. lowering. | |||
BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level: | |||
. Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent_steps. | |||
. Ensure 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) OPENING. | |||
BOP | |||
* OPEN 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water lnj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP | |||
* Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: If not isolated already the BOP isolate letdown. | |||
BOP | |||
* Start additional NV pump. NOTE: The BOP will need to start an additional NV Pump. | |||
. IF CLAs are isolated NOTE: The CLAs are NOT isolated. | |||
. IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater NOTE: The Pzr level is than 4% OR Pzr level going down with decreasing with maximum maximum charging flow, THEN perform Charging flow. | |||
the following: | |||
. IF lB OR 1C S/G identified as NOTE: The CRS will dispatch ruptured, THEN immediately two AOs. | |||
dispatch two operators to isolate TD Floor Instructor: | |||
CA pump steam supply from Acknowledge as AOs. | |||
ruptured S/G PER Enclosure 3 (TD CA Pump Steam Supply Isolation) Booth Instructor: | |||
insertREMSA0002 0 insertREMSAOO78 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as AO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the lB SG. | |||
RO | |||
* Trip reactor. | |||
RO/ | |||
* WHEN reactor tripped OR auto S/I BOP setpoint reached, THEN ensure S/I initiated. | |||
CRS | |||
* GO TO EP/l/A15000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection). | |||
EPIIIAI5000IE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. NOTE: Crew will carry out BOP Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. | |||
RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action | |||
* All rod bottom lights LIT | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN | |||
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN | |||
. hR amps - GOING DOWN. | |||
NOTE: The reactor will trip manually. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action | |||
. All throttle valves CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED. | |||
RO! (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP | |||
. SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT. | |||
. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) LIT. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Check all Feed water Isolation status lights (1S1-4) LIT BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s): | |||
. Groupsl,2,5DARK. | |||
. Group 3 LIT. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN | |||
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED. | |||
BOP (Step 9c RNO) Align or start components as required. | |||
. Group 6 LIT. | |||
CRS | |||
* GOTOSteplO. | |||
RO (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status: | |||
. MDCApumps-ON. | |||
. N/R level in at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%. | |||
BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON. | |||
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON. | |||
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running. | |||
* Start2ARN pump. | |||
. THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor: | |||
for existing plant condition. insei-t LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delayo rampl0 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow) | |||
RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG. | |||
BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PS 1G. is normal. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow: | |||
. Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW. | |||
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PSIG. | |||
BOP (Step 1 6b RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN: | |||
. 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) | |||
. 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol). | |||
CRS . IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17. | |||
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EPI1/AI5000IG-1 (Generic OSM to address. | |||
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. | |||
acknowledge as OSM. | |||
RO/ (Step 18) Check CA flow: | |||
BOP | |||
. Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM. | |||
BOP . Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG. | |||
RO/ WHEN each S/G NIR level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that S/G N/R level both board operators aware. | |||
between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%. | |||
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures: | |||
. IF any NC pumps on, THEN check NC NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF T-Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO due to the LOOP. | |||
557°F. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 46 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN NOTE: It is most likely that the cooldown will be under control. | |||
If NOT, the CRS will assign the RO (BOP) to perform Enclosure 3 (Not Scripted), | |||
and continue the performance of E-0 with the BOP (RO). | |||
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray (RO) valves: | |||
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
(Step 20a RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following: | |||
. CLOSE Pzr PORV(s). | |||
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following: | |||
. CLOSE its isolation valve. | |||
. CLOSE the following valve(s): | |||
. IF 1 NC-34A (Ui Pzr PORV) failed, THEN CLOSE 1NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34). | |||
. IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed... | |||
. Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED. | |||
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve-OPEN. | |||
BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on (RO) core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F. | |||
BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact: | |||
(RO) | |||
. All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING UP | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 47 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN | |||
. All SIGs PRESSURIZED. | |||
BOP (Step 23) Check if SIG tubes intact: | |||
(RO) | |||
. The following secondary EMFs NORMAL: | |||
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) | |||
. 1EMF-34(L) (SIG Sample (Lo Range)) | |||
. 1 EMF-24 (S!G_A) | |||
. 1EMF-25 (SIG_8) | |||
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG_C) | |||
. 1 EMF-27 (S/G_D). | |||
. SIG levels STABLE OR GOING NOTE: The 1 B SG Level is UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. increasing in an uncontrolled manner. | |||
CRS (Step 21 RNO) IF S!G levels going up in an uncontrolled manner OR any EMF abnormal, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Implement EP/1/AJ5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees). | |||
. GO TO EPI1IAI5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture). | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-3. | |||
EPIIIAI5000IE-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE ROl (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP BOP (Step 2) Identify ruptured SIG(s): | |||
. Any SIG NIR level GOING UP IN AN NOTE: The 1 B SG Level is UNCONTROLLED MANNER increasing in an uncontrolled manner. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 48 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 Interlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN OR | |||
. Chemistry or RP has determined NOTE: The CRS may contact ruptured SIG. Chemistry for sampling. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
Acknowledge as appropriate. | |||
OR | |||
. Any of the following EMFs ABOVE NORMAL: | |||
. 1 EMF-24 (SIG_A) | |||
. 1 EMF-25 (SIC_B) | |||
. 1 EMF-26 (SIC_C) | |||
. 1 EMF-27 (SIC_D) | |||
RO (Step 3) Check at least one SIG AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN. | |||
RO (Step 4) Isolate flow from ruptured SIG(s) as follows: | |||
. Check ruptured S/C(s) PORV NOTE: This valve has CLOSED. previously failed open. | |||
(Step 4a RNO) WHEN ruptured SIG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following on affected SM PORV: | |||
. Check SM PORV closed. | |||
. IF SM PORV is still open, THEN NOTE: Previous operation of CLOSE its manual loader, the Manual Loader has failed to close the 1 B SC PORV. | |||
. IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform the following: | |||
. CLOSE SM PORV isolation valve. | |||
. IF SM PORV isolation valve cannot be closed... | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 49 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Check SIGs 1 B and 1 C INTACT. NOTE: The 1 B SG is NOT Intact. | |||
CRS (Step 4b RNO) Isolate TD CA pump steam supply from ruptured SIG as follows: | |||
IF TD CA pump is the only source of NOTE: The TD CA Pump is feedwater.... NOT the ONLY CA Source. | |||
Ensure operators dispatched in next step immediately notify Control Room Supervisor when valves are closed. | |||
Immediately dispatch 2 operators to NOTE: This step was most concurrently verify (CV), unlock and likely accomplished in AP-1 0 If CLOSE valves on ruptured S!G(s): NOT, the CRS will dispatch two AOs. | |||
Floor Instructor: | |||
Acknowledge as AOs. | |||
For1BSIG: | |||
. 1SA-78 (18 S/G SM Supply to Booth Instructor: | |||
Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb insertREMSA0002 = 0 Loop Seal Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+1 0, FF-53). insertREMSAOO78 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as AO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the lB SG. | |||
. 1SA-2 (lB SIG SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Maint Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+10, FF-53, above ladder). | |||
CRS | |||
* IF AT ANY TIME local closure of SA NOTE: Eight minutes will NOT valves takes over 8 minutes, THEN elapse before the valves are isolate TD CA pump steam supply closed. | |||
PER Enclosure 2 (Tripping TD CA Pump Stop Valve or Alternate Steam Isolation). | |||
RO | |||
* Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured SIGI(s) CLOSED. | |||
* For1BS/G: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 50 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 Interlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. 1BB-2B (lB SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) | |||
. 1 BB-6A (B S!G BB Cont Inside Isol). | |||
BOP | |||
* CLOSE steam drain on ruptured SIG(s) | |||
. 1SM-89 (B SM Line Drain lsol) | |||
RO | |||
* CLOSE the following valves on ruptured SIG(s): | |||
* MSIV | |||
. MSIV bypass valve. | |||
RO (Step 5) Control ruptured SIG(s) level as follows: | |||
* Check ruptured SIG(s) NIR level GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC). | |||
BOP | |||
* Isolate feed flow to ruptured SIG(s): | |||
. ForlBS/G: | |||
CLOSE 1CA-54AC (Ui TD CA Pump Disch TO 1 B SIG Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1 B SIG Isol). | |||
CRITICAL TASK: | |||
(E-3A) Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of AP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 51 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN RD (Step 6) Check ruptured SIG(s) pressure GREATER THAN 280 PS 1G. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump RUNNING. NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF due to the LOOP. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG. | |||
RD (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows: | |||
CRS | |||
* Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured SIG pressure: | |||
>1099 psig - 520°F NOTE: The CRS will determine the target 1000 1099 psig 508°F temperature to be between 508-520°F. | |||
RD | |||
* Check the following valves on ruptured SIG(s) CLOSED: | |||
* MSIV | |||
* MSIV bypass valve. | |||
RD | |||
* Check ruptured SIG(s) SM PORV CLOSED. | |||
(Step 9c RND) IF ruptured SIG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following: | |||
* Ensure SM PORV on ruptured S/G(s) is CLOSED or isolated. | |||
* IF SM PORV is not closed or isolated, THEN perform the following: | |||
* Ensure operator dispatched to CLOSE SM PORV isolation valve. | |||
* Do not continue until affected SIG PORV is: | |||
* Isolated | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 52 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN OR | |||
. Determined to be unisolable. | |||
RO | |||
* Check SIG(s) 1 B and 1 C INTACT. NOTE: The 1 B SG is ruptured. | |||
RO (Step 9.d RNO) IF lB OR 1C SIG is ruptured, THEN perform the following: | |||
* Ensure steam to TDCA pump is isolated from ruptured SIG per one of the following: | |||
* Local isolation of SA line (per Step | |||
: 4. b) | |||
NOTE: If NOT already done, the CRS will direct two AOs to CLOSE 1SA-2 and 78. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
insertREMSA0002 = 0 insertREMSAOO78 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as AO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the lB SG. | |||
RO * (Step 9e) Check condenser available as NOTE: Because of a C-9 follows: failure the Condenser is NOT available. | |||
RO | |||
* C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1 SI-i 8) | |||
LIT CRS (Step 9e RNO) GO TO RNO for Step 9.h. | |||
BOP (Step 9h RNO) Perform the following: | |||
* Ensure at least one Pzr PORV isolation valve is OPEN. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 53 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN | |||
. IF VI is lost... NOTE: Neither condition has occurred. | |||
. IF Pzr pressure is greater than 1955 NOTE: Pzr Pressure may be < | |||
PSIG, THEN depressurize to 1900 PSIG 1955 psig. If pressure> 1955 using Pzr PORV. psig, the crew will have to depressurize. | |||
RO | |||
* Depress BLOCK on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches. | |||
BOP | |||
* Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG. | |||
RO | |||
* Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset. | |||
RO | |||
* Ensure SM PORVs reset. | |||
RO | |||
* IF any intact S/G SM PORV isolation NOTE: lB SO PORV has valves is closed AND associated SM previously failed OPEN. | |||
PORV is operable THEN perform the following: | |||
RO | |||
* Dump steam using all intact S/G(s) SM PORVs at maximum rate as follows: | |||
* CLOSE SM PORV manual NOTE: 18 SG PORV has loader on ruptured SIG(s). previously failed OPEN and has been isolated. | |||
* Place intact S/G SM PORV manual loaders at 50%. | |||
* Select MANUAL on SM PORV MODE SELECT. | |||
* Adjust manual loaders on intact SIG SM PORVs as required to control intact SIG depressurization rate at approximately 2 PSIG per second. | |||
CRS | |||
* IF any intact S/G SM PORV closed,... NOTE: 18 SG PORV has previously failed OPEN. | |||
CRS | |||
* IF no intact S/G available... NOTE: The 1A, 1C and 1D SC are available. | |||
RO (Step 9i) Check Low Pressure Steamline Isolation BLOCKED. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 54 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 9i RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Depressurize Pzr to less than 1955 PSIG using one of the following: | |||
. Maximum available Pzr spray OR | |||
. IF normal Pzr spray is not available, THEN use Pzr PORV. | |||
. Do not continue until Pzr pressure is less than 1955 PSIG. | |||
. Depress BLOCK on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches. | |||
. CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s) and Pzr PORVs. | |||
. Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSI G. | |||
RO . (Step 9.j) Check Core exit T/Cs- LESS NOTE: it is likely that when the THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached. | |||
RO (Step 9.j RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: This action will be taken after the target temperature has been achieved. | |||
WHEN Core exit T/Cs are less than required temperature, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Stop NC System cooldown. | |||
. Maintain core exit T/Cs less than required temperature. | |||
CRS NOTE: The CRS will proceed and return to this step when the target temperature has been achieved. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 55 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN RO (Step 10) Control intact SIG levels: | |||
. Check NIR level in any intact SIG GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC). | |||
. Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact SIG NIR levels between 22% (32% ACC) and 50%. | |||
BOP (Step 1 1) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves: | |||
. Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves AVAILABLE. | |||
(Step 11 a RNO) Evaluate cause of power loss and initiate actions to restore power to affected isolation valve(s). | |||
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
(Step 11 b RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following: | |||
. CLOSE Pzr PORV(s). | |||
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN CLOSE it isolation valve. | |||
. IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed... | |||
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or isolated... | |||
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN CLOSE the following valve(s): | |||
IF 1 NC-34A (Ui Pzr PORV) failed, THEN CLOSE 1NC-.270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A). | |||
(Step 1 1 c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 56 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 12) Reset the following: | |||
. S/I | |||
. Sequencers | |||
. Phase A Isolation | |||
. Phase B Isolation BOP (Step 13) Establish VI to containment as follows: | |||
. Open the following valves: | |||
. 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)) | |||
. 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)) | |||
. 1 VI-1 50B (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Isol). | |||
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG. | |||
RO (Step 14) Check if NC System cooldown should be stopped as follows: | |||
Check cooldown INITIATED PER STEP 9. | |||
. Check Core exit T/Cs LESS THAN NOTE: It is likely that when the REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached. | |||
CRS (Step 14b RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME while in this step NOTE: This is a Continuous ruptured S/G pressure changes by over Action. The CRS will make 100 PSIG, AND ruptured S/G pressure is both board operators aware, greater than 400 PSIG, THEN select a and HOLD. | |||
new target temperature from table in Step 9.a. | |||
. Do not continue until core exit T/Cs are less than target temperature. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 57 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO . (Step 14c) Stop NC System cooldown. | |||
. Maintain Core exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQURIED TEMPERATURE. | |||
RO (Step 15) Check ruptured SIG(s) pressure STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
RO (Step 16) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 20°F. | |||
BOP (Step 17) Depressurize NC System using Pzr spray as follows: | |||
. Check normal Pzr spray flow AVAILABLE. | |||
. Initiate NC depressurization using NOTE: The Pzr Spray valves maximum available spray. will not open when operated. | |||
IF AT ANY TIME during this step, spray valves are not effective in reducing NC pressure, OR ruptured SIG(s) NR level goes above 83% (73% ACC), THEN GO TO Step 18. | |||
CRS (Step 1 7a RNO) GO TO Step 18. | |||
BOP (Step 18) Depressurize NC System using Pzr PORV as follows: | |||
. Check at least one Pzr PORV - | |||
AVAILABLE. | |||
. Open one Pzr PORV. | |||
. Do not continue until any of the following conditions satisfied: | |||
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs LESS THAN 0°F OR | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 58 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 76% | |||
(58% ACC) | |||
OR | |||
. Both of the following: | |||
. NC pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SIG(s) | |||
PRESSURE. | |||
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29% ACC). | |||
. Close Pzr PORV. | |||
. Close Pzr spray valves. | |||
BOP (Step 19) Check NC pressure GOING UP. | |||
RO! (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria: | |||
BOP | |||
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F. | |||
. Secondary heat sink: | |||
. N/R level in at least one intact S/G GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC) | |||
. NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% | |||
BOP (Step 21) Stop S/I pumps as follows: | |||
. NI pumps. | |||
. All but one NV pump. | |||
BOP (Step 22) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows: | |||
. Check the following valves - OPEN | |||
. 1NV-221A(U1 NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 59 of 60 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. 1NV-222B (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol). | |||
Check the following valves OPEN | |||
. 1NV-150B (Ui NV Pump Recirc NOTE: Both valves are Isol). CLOSED (Due to Item #3 of the E-3 Foldout Page). | |||
. 1NV-151A (Ui NV Pump Recirc lsol). | |||
BOP | |||
* Close the following valves: | |||
* 1 Nl-9A (NC Cold Leg_Inj From NV) | |||
* 1NI-1OB (NC Cold Leg_Inj From NV). | |||
CRITICAL TASK: | |||
(E-3C) Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO.cts). | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam. | |||
UNIT I STATUS: | |||
Power Level: 39% NCS [B] 1894 ppm Pzr [B]: 1893 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: Raised from 30% on previous shift Core Burnup: 43 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/11A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT: | |||
* The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
* The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: | |||
* Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-1 1) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. | |||
* OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) | |||
* MCB Annunciator lAD-il, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating). | |||
Crew Directions: | |||
* The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/i/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. | |||
* Use of Alternate Dilute has been approved. | |||
* RE has recommended an initial Alternate Dilution of 400 gallons. | |||
* Turbine loading rate will be 2MWe/minute. | |||
Work Control SROlOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5 | |||
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050614) | |||
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i 3, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 X01_157 C-RO Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main C-SRO Generator Autosynch Circuit 2 NA R-RO Raise power to 1 2OMWe N-BOP N-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP 1A2 KC Pump trip KCO1OB C(TS)-SRO MAC 4 C-RO Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker LTOO2E Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure C-SRO EPOO4B REM SB000X MAL 5 C-BOP Loss of 1 ETA/Sequencer Failure EPOO9A C TS SRO EQBOO3A - | |||
MAL 6 M-RO Steam Line Break Inside Containment SMOO7D M-BOP M-SRO MAC 7 NA SI fails to actuate automatically ISEOO2A ISEOO2B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050614) | |||
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-OfService: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating). | |||
Upon shift turnover, the operator will continue with the startup starting with Step 3.32.16 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, and continue with the Turbine startup starting with Step 3.13 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A16300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. The operator will place the Voltage Regulator in service and attempt to synchronize the Main Generator to the electrical grid. When the operator attempts to synchronize the Main Generator the autosynch circuit for the breaker that is attempted to be closed first, will fail. The operator will need to recognize the failure and attempt to close the other breaker in accordance with Step 3.14.12.3 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A16300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. | |||
Once the Main Generator is connected to the grid, the turbine will be loaded to 120 MWe, and the crew will realign the Steam Dump System from Steam Pressure Mode to Tavg Mode. It is expected that one or more boron concentration dilutions will be required. | |||
Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, and LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System. | |||
Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. Since the plant power is less than P-8, the Reactor will not trip. Simultaneously, the 1 B Main Generator Breaker will fail to trip and the Steam Dump Valves will fail to open as required. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1!A15500/02, Turbine Generator Trip. | |||
Next, the normal supply breaker to 1ETA will trip open causing 1ETA to de-energize. | |||
The 1A EDG will automatically start but not sequence its loads. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources Operating, and LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating. | |||
Following this, a large steam rupture will occur inside Containment on the 1 D Steamline. | |||
SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Draft (Rev 050614) | |||
Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EP/1IA/50001E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition either to EPI1IAI5000IE-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or to EPI1IAI5000IES-i.i, SI Termination. If the crew transitions to E-i, the scenario will terminate upon transition. If the crew transitions to ES-i .1, the scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-i .i, after the crew has closed iNI-9A and iNI-iOB. | |||
Critical Tasks: | |||
E-O D Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition out of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid. | |||
E-2A Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably). | |||
NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitor/control Reactor Power and Tavg. This is based on Steps 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of Enclosure 4.8 of OPIIIA/61001003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The RO candidate must be assigned to phase on the Turbine Generator to the electrical grid during event I and raise turbine load during event 2. | |||
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-4 | |||
==REFERENCES:== | |||
: 1. OPI1IAI6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Rev 185) | |||
: 2. OPI1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121) | |||
: 3. OP/1/A/6300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown (Rev 98) | |||
: 4. OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11) | |||
: 5. AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage (Rev 10) | |||
: 6. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System (Amendment 184/166) | |||
: 7. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating (Amendment 184/1 66) | |||
: 8. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System (Amendment 265/245) | |||
: 9. AP/1/A15500/2, Turbine Generator Trip (Rev 25) | |||
: 10. AP/1/A15500/07, Loss of Electrical Power (Rev 32) | |||
: 11. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating (Amendment 221/203) | |||
: 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources Operating and (Amendment 184/1 66) | |||
: 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating (Amendment 184/1 66) | |||
: 14. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33) | |||
: 15. EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 10) | |||
: 16. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1 .2, Safety Injection Termination (Rev 26) | |||
Validation Time: 128 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc. | |||
Facility Review: | |||
Rev. 050314 1 | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | |||
(BOP) | |||
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift. | |||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i 3, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating). | |||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 X0l.j57 C-RO Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit C-SRO 2 NA R-RO Raise power to 1 2OMWe N-BOP N-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP 1A2 KC Pump trip KCO1OB C(TS)-SRO MAL 4 C-RO Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker LTOO2E Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure C-SRO EPOO4B REM SB000X MAL C-BOP Loss of 1 ETA/Sequencer Failure EPOO9A C(TS)-SRO EQBOO3A MAL 6 M-RO Steam Line Break Inside Containment SMOO7D M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA SI fails to actuate automatically ISEOO2A ISEOO2B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP -5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating). | |||
Upon shift turnover, the operator will continue with the startup starting with Step 3.32.16 of .1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, and continue with the Turbine startup starting with Step 3.13 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A/6300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. The operator will place the Voltage Regulator in service and attempt to synchronize the Main Generator to the electrical grid. When the operator attempts to synchronize the Main Generator the autosynch circuit for the breaker that is attempted to be closed first, will fail. The operator will need to recognize the failure and attempt to close the other breaker in accordance with Step 3.14.12.3 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A16300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. | |||
Once the Main Generator is connected to the grid, the turbine will be loaded to 120 MWe, and the crew will realign the Steam Dump System from Steam Pressure Mode to Tavg Mode. It is expected that one or more boron concentration dilutions will be required. | |||
Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, and LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System. | |||
Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. Since the plant power is less than P-8, the Reactor will not trip. Simultaneously, the 1 B Main Generator Breaker will fail to trip and the Steam Dump Valves will fail to open as required. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, Turbine Generator Trip. | |||
Next, the normal supply breaker to 1ETA will trip open causing 1ETA to de-energize. The 1A EDG will automatically start but not sequence its loads. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources - | |||
Operating, and LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating. | |||
Following this, a large steam rupture will occur inside Containment on the 1 D Steamline. SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition either to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination. If the crew transitions to E-1, the scenario will terminate upon transition. If the Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 crew transitions to ES-i.1, the scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-ti, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-1OB. | |||
Critical Tasks: | |||
E-O D Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition out of E 0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid. | |||
E-2A Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably). | |||
NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitorlcontrol Reactor Power and Tavg. This is based on Steps 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of Enclosure 4.8 of 0P111A161001003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The RO candidate must be assigned to phase on the Turbine Generator to the electrical grid during event I and raise turbine load during event 2. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 243 T 0 Malfunctions (From IC-15): | |||
Q = | |||
(Originally 15). | |||
insert LOA-CM056 = Racked Out; insert LOA CMO56A = Racked Out; (IA Hotwell Pump is OOS) insert XMT-KC_IKCPT549O = 0 (PKC-5490 is OOS) insert OVR-IADI3_F07 = ON (MCB Annunciator IADI3IF7) | |||
From IC-243 Per Lesson Plan 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 4 insert MAL-ISEOO2A AUTO (SI Train A Fails to Actuate in AUTO) insert MAL-ISEOO2B AUTO (SI Train B Fails to Actuate in AUTO) | |||
RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on: | |||
Q IA CM Pump (Tagout) | |||
Reset all SLIMs PKC-5490 (0-stick) | |||
MCB Annunciator lAD-I 3, F-7 (0-stick) | |||
Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb. | |||
Setup OAC Q Freeze. | |||
Q Update Fresh Tech. | |||
Spec. Log. | |||
Q Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q Crew Briefing | |||
: 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | |||
: 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. | |||
: 3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase. | |||
: 4. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OPI1/A16l001003 marked up as follows: | |||
* All Limits and Precautions (Including NOTEs) Checked | |||
* Step 2.3 initialed. | |||
* Note prior to Step 3.1 checked. | |||
* Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.2 initialed. | |||
* Step 3.3 initialed. | |||
* Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.32.16 is entered. | |||
* Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.3.4 is NA. | |||
* Step 3.32.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.32.2 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.32.3 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.32.4 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Step 3.32.5 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Note prior to Step 3.32.6 checked. | |||
* Step 3.32.6 is NA. | |||
* Step 3.32.7 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Note prior to Step 3.32.8 checked. | |||
* Step 3.32.8 is initialed. | |||
* Step 3.32.9 is NA. | |||
* Step 3.32.10 Checkbox is checked. | |||
* Note prior to Step 3.32.11 checked. | |||
* Step 3.32.11 is initialed (Person Notified Time and Date are entered). | |||
* Step 3.32.12 is NA. | |||
* Step 3.32.13 is NA. | |||
* Step 3.32.14 is NA. | |||
* Step 3.32.15 initialed. | |||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION | |||
: 5. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OPI1/AJ6300/001 marked up as follows: | |||
. All Limits and Precautions (Including NOTEs) Checked. | |||
. Step 2.1 is initialed. | |||
. Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
. Step 3.2 is circled. | |||
. Step 3.3 is initialed. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 is initialed. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .1 is NA. | |||
. Step 3.11.2 is NA. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .3 is initialed. | |||
st 1 | |||
. Step 3.11.4 Bullet initialed, 2 Bullet is NA. | |||
. Step 3.11.5 1 st Bullet initialed, 2 Bullet initialed. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .6 is initialed. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .7 Checkbox is checked. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .8 is initialed. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .9 is initialed. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .10 Checkbox is checked. | |||
. Step 3.1 1 .1 1 Checkbox is checked. | |||
. Note prior to Step 3.12 is checked. | |||
. Step 3.12 Checkbox is checked. | |||
: 6. Prepare a copy of Enclosure 4.4 of OP/1/A16300/001 so that the Floor Instructor can provide a hard copy to the BOP during Event 2. | |||
: 7. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. | |||
Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N14-1-4. | |||
Q At direction of Event I Synchronize the Main Generator to the examiner Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Insert XO1_157_2 I Delete XOI_157_2 2 (Delete After Opposite Breaker Selected) | |||
Q At direction of Event 2 Raise power to 1 2OMWe examiner Q At direction of Event 3 1A2 KC Pump trip examiner Insert MAL-KCOIOB = | |||
TRUE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 4 Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine examiner Trip/Generator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Insert MAL-LTOO2 = | |||
Dump failure 6.0, Ramp = 120 Insert: | |||
REM-SB0003=0 REM-SB0006=0 REM-SB0009=O REM-SBOOI 2=0 REM-SBOOI 5=0 REM-SBOOI 8=0 REM-SBOO2I =0 REM-SB0024=0 REM-SB0027=0 Delete: | |||
REM-SB0003=2 REM-SB0006=2 REM-SB0009=2 REM-SBOOI 2=2 REM-SBOOI 5=2 REM-SBOOI 8=2 REM-SBOO2I =2 REM-SB0024=2 REM-SB00272 CdXO2_1 63_3 EQI insert MAL-EPOO4B ACTIVE (lB Generator Breaker fails to Trip on Turbine Trip) delete MAL- EPOO4B cdXOl_189_1 EQI and X01_189_1 EQI Q At direction of Event 5 Loss of 1 ETA/Sequencer Failure examiner insert MAL-EPOO9A = AP-7 Actions TRIP insertLOA-RN087 = ON delay = 60 seconds (Start 2A RN Pump) insert MALEQBOOIA = insertREM-RNOO4OA I = 0 (Close 1RN-40A) | |||
ON_BLACKOUT Q At direction of Event 6 Steam Line Break Inside Containment examiner insert MAL-SMOO7D 2021250.000000 Ramp6O Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 SI fails to actuate automatically insert MAL-ISEOO2A Note: This event is set at T0. | |||
AUTO (SI Train A Fails to Actuate in AUTO) E-O Actions Start 2A RN Pump and Throttle Flow insert MAL-ISEOO2B insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) | |||
AUTO (SI Train B Fails insert LOA-RN083 8000.000000 delayo to Actuate in AUTO) ramplo (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow) | |||
Stop All NF AHUs insert LOA-NFOI6 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU StartlStop) | |||
Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 10 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the GridlFailure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Upon shift turnover, the operator will continue with the startup starting with Step 3.32.16 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OPI1IAI6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, and continue with the Turbine startup starting with Step 3.13 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/11A163001001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. The operator will place the Voltage Regulator in service and attempt to synchronize the Main Generator to the electrical grid. When the operator attempts to synchronize the Main Generator the autosynch circuit for the breaker that is attempted to be closed first, will fail. The operator will need to recognize the failure and attempt to close the other breaker in accordance with Step 3.14.12.3 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A/6300/0O1, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: AO (Bill) is standing by at the Main Generator Voltage Regulator Panel. | |||
Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The RO should be performing activities associated with the Main Turbine Generator during this event. | |||
0P111A163001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FROR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.32.16) Ensure TV/GV Transfer complete and Voltage Regulator placed in service per OP/1/A16300/001 (Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown). | |||
CRS (Step 3.32.17) Close Generator MODs per OP/1/A/6300/001 (Turbine Generator Startu p/Shutdown). | |||
CRS (Step 3.32.18) Synchronize Generator and load Generator to 120 MWE per OP/1/A16300/001 (Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 11 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3.32.19) WHEN Main Generator Breakers closed, record the following values and notify Engineering: | |||
. 1A Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor Pilot Valve Counter | |||
. 1 B Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor Pilot Valve Counter | |||
. Date/Time 1A Main Generator Breaker Closed | |||
. Date/Time 1 B Main Generator Breaker Closed CRS (Step 3.32.20) IF performing NOTE: AVR Testing will NOT Generator/Automatic Voltage be performed. | |||
Regulator(AVR) testing on line at 15% | |||
RTP... | |||
OPII IA/6300/OO1 , TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, STARTUP WITH TURBINE CONTROL IN OPERATOR AUTO RO (Step 3.13) Place Voltage Regulator in service as follows: | |||
RO (Step 3.13.1) Check Turbine speed greater than 1710 rpm. | |||
RO (Step 3.1 3.2) Locally check closed: NOTE: RO will contact AO (Bill). | |||
Booth Operator: As AO (Bill) report Disconnects are CLOSED. | |||
. 1 EGB-SX-Q701 (Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 1 Discon) | |||
. 1 EGB-SX-Q702 (Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 2 Discon) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 12 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RD (Step 3.13.3) Check PMG voltage 120 140 VAC. | |||
RD (Step 3.13.4) IF any Voltage Regulator NOTE: RD will contact AD Alarms are present at Local control Panel... (Bill). | |||
Booth Operator: As AC (Bill) report There are NO alarms at local panel. | |||
RD (Step 3.13.5) Check Voltage Regulator aligned for Control Room operation per one of the following: | |||
. DAC Graphic MAINGEN | |||
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Local Control Panel | |||
. M1D2342 (Ui Gen Volt Reg in Local Cabinet Control) | |||
RD (Step 3.13.6) Check one of the following: | |||
. Mi D2348 (Ui Gen Voltage Regulator System) is normal DR | |||
. Trouble alarms or faults have been reviewed on the following: | |||
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Local Control Panel | |||
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 1 Panel | |||
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 2 Panel RD (Step 3.1 3.7) Ensure Voltage Regulator in MAN. | |||
RD (Step 3.13.8) IF performing Generator I NOTE: Turnover has Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) indicated that this testing will testing,... not occur. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 13 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3.13.9) Ensure Excitation ON. | |||
RO (Step 3.13.10) IF Generator! AVR personnel NOTE: Turnover has are performing post Turbine OPC and indicated that this testing will Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test tuning, ... not occur. | |||
RO (Step 3.13.11) Check Generator Voltage 22.4 23.2 KV. | |||
RO (Step 3.13.12) Check READY lit on Voltage Regulator. | |||
RO (Step 13.13.13) IF auto Voltage Regulator operation is desired, perform the following: | |||
. Ensure Voltage Regulator in AUTO. | |||
. Notify SOC that McGu ire Unit 1 NOTE: RO will contact SOC. | |||
Generator Voltage Regulator status is Booth Operator As SOC now in AUTO AND to update this status acknowledge in the EMS System. (Dispatcher Phone or 704-382-4413) | |||
RO (Step 3.13.14) IF manual Voltage Regulator NOTE: Manual voltage operation is desired.... regulator operation is NOT desired. | |||
RO (Step 3.13.15) Depress and hold SYNC on either Generator Breaker 1A or Generator Breaker lB. | |||
RO (Step 3.13.16) Using Voltage Adjust, ensure Station Run Volts slightly higher than Generator Incoming Volts. | |||
RO (Step 3.13.17) Release SYNC. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 14 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.13.18) Notify Engineering that Exciter NOTE: RO will contact field has been flashed. WCC/SE. | |||
Booth Operator: As WCC/SE (Jim Allgood) acknowledge. | |||
RO (Step 3.14) Close Generator MODs as follows: | |||
RO (Step 3.14.1) Ensure Generator Frequency greater than or equal to 59.6 Hz. | |||
RO (Step 3.14.2) IF both Generator Breakers are available to be placed in service and Control Room operation of Generator Breaker MODs is desired, close the following: | |||
. MODs for Generator Breaker 1A | |||
. MODs for Generator Breaker 1 B RO (Step 3.14.3) IF both Generator Breakers are NOTE: Both Generator NOT available to be placed in service Breakers are available. | |||
(Step 3.14.4) Dispatch operator to locally NOTE: RO will dispatch AC. | |||
check: | |||
Booth Operator: As AC report MODs IA and lB CLOSED, no condensation in IPB Enclosures. | |||
RO . MODs closed for Generator Breaker 1A (if closed) | |||
. MODs closed for Generator Breaker 1 B (if closed) | |||
. No condensation in IPB enclosures through windows at MODs RO (Step 3.14.5) IF local operation of MODs is NOTE: local operation will not required,... be required. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 15 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosyrich Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.15) IF auto synchronization of Generator to grid is desired, perform as follows: | |||
RD (Step 3.15.1) Obtain a copy of OP/i /A16300100 1 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change). | |||
RO (Step 3.15.2) Notify SOC (System Operation NOTE: RD will contact SOC. | |||
Center) unit to be paralleled to the grid. (382-Booth Operator: As SOC 4413 or dispatcher phone) acknowledge. | |||
RO (Step 3.15.3) Perform the following to limit Governor Valves travel: | |||
. Depress Valve Position Limit Display | |||
. Check Valve Position Limit Display lit. | |||
. Depress Valve Position Limit Lower until Variable Display indicates 17%. | |||
RO (Step 3.15.4) Check Voltage Regulator in AUTO. | |||
RD (Step 3.1 5.5) Depress and hold SYNC for breaker to be closed. | |||
RO (Step 3.15.6) Using Voltage Adjust, ensure Station Run Voltage is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage. | |||
RO (Step 3.1 5.7) Adjust Generator speed per 0P111A163001001 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change) until Synchroscope hand moves smoothly and slowly in FAST direction. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 16 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the GridlFailure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RD (Step 3.1 5.8) IF a significant time delay (greater than 5 minutes) has occurred since performing Step 3.15.6, ensure Station Run Volts is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage RD (Step 3.15.9) Release SYNC. | |||
RD (Step 3.15.10) Place Gen Auto/Man Sync BoothlFloor Instructor: | |||
Select to Auto lA or Auto 1B. Observe Gen Auto/Man Sync Select position, and take following action: | |||
If placed in AUTO IA: Delete DVR-MGO1 7B If placed in AUTO IB: Delete OVR-MGO1 7A RD (Step 3.15.1 1) WHEN selected Generator NOTE: The selected Breaker Breaker closes will NOT Close. | |||
RD (Step 3.15.12) IF the selected Generator Breaker did NOT close, perform the following: | |||
. Depress Auto Sync on DEH panel. | |||
. WHEN time allows, notify Engineering of which Generator breaker(s) failed to auto sync. | |||
IF selected Generator Breaker fails NOTE: The RD will attempt to to close within 5 minutes, perform close the other breaker. | |||
Steps 3.15.5 3.1 5.12.2 for opposite breaker. | |||
RD (Step 3.15.5) Depress and hold SYNC for breaker to be closed. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 17 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.15.6) Using Voltage Adjust, ensure Station Run Voltage is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage. | |||
RO (Step 3.15.7) Adjust Generator speed per OP/i 11300101 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change) until Synchroscope hand moves smoothly and slowly in FAST direction. | |||
RO (Step 3.15.8) IF a significant time delay (greater than 5 minutes) has occurred since performing Step 3.15.6, ensure Station Run Volts is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage. | |||
RO (Step 3.15.9) Release SYNC. | |||
RO (Step 3.15.10) Place Gen Auto/Man Sync Select to Auto lA or Auto 1 B. | |||
RO (Step 3.1 5.1 1) WHEN selected Generator NOTE: The selected Breaker Breaker closes immediately load the will Close. | |||
Generator by performing the following: {PIP M-1 3-i 808} | |||
. Using Voltage Adjust, maintain Pwr Fact 0.90-0.95 (Lag). | |||
. Depress MW IN. | |||
. Depress LOAD RATE. | |||
. Enter a Load Rate of 25 in VARIABLE DISPLAY. | |||
. Depress ENTER. | |||
. Depress REFERENCE. | |||
. Enter a Load of 50 in VARIABLE DISPLAY. | |||
. Depress ENTER. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 18 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit | |||
. Depress GD. | |||
. Check Generator loaded by comparing actual load to Demand and Reference windows. | |||
RD (Step 3.15.12) IF the selected Generator NOTE: The selected Breaker Breaker did NOT close.., did Close. | |||
(Step 5.13.13) Place Gen Auto/Man Sync Select in Man. | |||
RD (Step 3.15.14) IF neither Generator Breaker NOTE: One Breaker is Closed. | |||
is closed,... | |||
RD (Step 3.15.15) IF other Generator Breaker NOTE: The RD will Close the available, place in service as follows: 2 Generator Breaker. | |||
. Depress and hold SYNC for selected breaker. | |||
AFTER Synchroscope for selected breaker in 12 oclock position, depress CLOSE for selected breaker until CLSD light is lit. | |||
. Release SYNC. | |||
RD (Step 3.15.16) Perform the following to limit Governor Valve travel: | |||
. Depress Valve Position Limit Display and check Valve Position Limit Display lit. | |||
. Depress Valve Position Limit Raise until Variable Display indicates 120%. | |||
RD (Step 3.16) IF manual synchronization of NOTE: The Generator is Generator to grid is desired.... already synched to the Grid. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 19 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Raise power to I2OMWe Once the Main Generator is connected to the grid, the turbine will be loaded to 120 MWe, and the crew will realign the Steam Dump System from Steam Pressure Mode to Tavg Mode. It is expected that one or more boron concentration dilutions will be required. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0P111A163001001, TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, STARTUP WITH TURBINE CONTROL IN OPERATOR AUTO RO (Step 3.17) Load Turbine to 120 MWE per OP/11A163001001 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change). | |||
BOP (Step 3.18) Perform the following while continuing with unit startup: | |||
. Maintain air temperature out of Exciter Air Cooler at 90-11 5°F by throttling 1 KR-i 78 (Exciter Air Cooler Throttle)._{PIP_00-0867} | |||
. Place Turb Drn Vlvs Cntrl in AUTO. | |||
. Place in AUTO: | |||
. 1SM-78 (A SM line Drain) | |||
. 1SM-84 (B SM line Drain) | |||
. 1SM-90 (C SM line Drain) | |||
. 1SM-96 (D SM line Drain) | |||
. IF MSR Control System is in SYTSTEM MANUAL... | |||
. Check all piston operated check NOTE: When the BOP seeks valves open per Enclosure 4.4 a copy of Enclosure 4.4 of (Piston Operated Check Valve OP/i /A16300100i, Floor Checklist), Instructor provide a hard copy. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 20 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Raise power to I2OMWe Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A163001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FROR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE BOP (Step 3.32.21) IF PT111A142501004 C (Turbine OPC and Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test) to be performed following load increase to greater than 112 MWe... | |||
(Step 3.32.22) WHEN steam dumps close, perform the following: | |||
. IF C-7A Loss of Load Intlk Cond Dump on 1SI-18 lit... | |||
. Place Steam Dump Select to T AVG. | |||
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER to auto. | |||
. Set STM PRESS CONTROLLER setpoint at 1092 psig (1090-1095). | |||
BOP (Step 3.32.23) Perform the following: | |||
Monitor the following while opening iSP-i (Main Steam to 1A CF Pump Turb Isol) and 1SP-2 (Main Steam to 1 B CF Pump Turb Isol): (PIP 09-6340) | |||
M1A0723 (Ui H/P Steam to 1A CFPT Press) | |||
M1A0729 (Ui H/P Steam to lB CFPT Press) | |||
BOP | |||
* Open the following: NOTE: The BOP may direct an AO to open these valves. | |||
If so, FloorlBooth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and wait 3 minutes and report that they are OPEN (NOT Modeled). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenano# 4 Event# 2 Page 21 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Raise power to I2OMWe Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
. isp-i (Main Steam to lACE Pump Turb Isol) | |||
. 1SP-12 (Main Steam to lB CF Pump Turb Isol) | |||
Check the following for corresponding increase in steam pressure with iSP-i (Main Steam to iA CF Pump Turb Isol) and iSP-2 (Main Steam to 1 B CF Pump Turb Isol) open: (PIP 09-6340) | |||
. M1A0723 (Ui H/P Steam to 1A CFPT Press) | |||
. M1A0729 (Ui H/P Steam to lB CFPT Press) | |||
OPIIIA/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase. | |||
BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.) | |||
. Total Reactor Makeup Water: NOTE: Total makeup is 200 gallons. | |||
BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero: | |||
(R.M.) | |||
. Total Make Up Flow Counter | |||
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 22 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Raise power to I2OMWe BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller. | |||
BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control). | |||
BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow. | |||
desired flowrate. | |||
BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual. | |||
(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate. | |||
BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following: | |||
(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure. | |||
(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (Ui NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level. | |||
Contrl). | |||
(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS. | |||
(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1 NV-i 37A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl). | |||
BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 23 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Raise power to I2OMWe (Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.) | |||
(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters Otit to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit. | |||
BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open. | |||
BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required. | |||
BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-i7iA(Ui Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-l7iA is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO. | |||
check 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open. | |||
BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts. | |||
BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs: | |||
. Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR | |||
. Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 24 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Raise power to I2OMWe BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.) | |||
(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off: | |||
. 1A Rx M/U Water Pump | |||
. 1 B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed: | |||
. 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) | |||
. 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) | |||
. 1NV-i7iA(Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control) | |||
BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A(Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.) | |||
BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.1 1 ... Flow Control was NOT adjusted. | |||
BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO. | |||
BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender.... NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender. | |||
BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 25 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Raise power to I2OMWe BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. | |||
BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit. | |||
BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.) | |||
. Total Make Up Flow Counter | |||
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 26 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KC Pump trip Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, and LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-KCOIOB Indications Available: | |||
* OAC Alarm: 1A2 KC Pump Trip | |||
* 1A2 KC Pump Green Status light LIT | |||
* 1A2 KC Pump amps go to 0 | |||
* MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, Bi through B4, A (B, C, and D) NC PUMP UPPER MTR BRG LO KC FLO, alarms (Delayed) | |||
* MCB Annunciator 1 RAD1 1 EMF 46A, LOSS OF TRN A KC SAMPLE FLO (Delayed) | |||
* MCB Annunciator 1 RAD1 1 EMF 46B, LOSS OF TRN B KC SAMPLE FLO (Delavedi NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an NEO to check out the 1A2 KC Pump. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor, wait 3 minutes, and then report that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker shows a 51/50 Relay has operated, and the pump is NOT running. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will transition toAP-21. | |||
APIIIAI5500!21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump ON. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly. | |||
ROI (Step 2) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress. NOTE: A dilution may still be in progress. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 27 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KC Pump trip BOP (Step 4) Check ND IN RHR MODE. NOTE: ND is NOT in the RHR Mode. | |||
CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7. | |||
CRS (Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Check both trains KC Surge Tank level STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Start standby KC train as follows: | |||
. Check standby KC train AVAILABLE TO START. | |||
. Check standby KC Surge Tank Level GREATER THAN 2 FT. | |||
. Start standby KC train PER one of the following enclosures: | |||
. To start 1 B Train, GO TO Enclosure 5 (Startup of 1 B KC Train). | |||
AP/1/A15500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 5, STARTUP OF lB KC TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC-81B (lB ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 2) Check 1KC-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 3) Check 1A Train KC pumps OFF. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 28 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KC Pump trip CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5. | |||
BOP (Step 5) Check 1 B Train KC pumps OFF. | |||
BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1 B KC Train is NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected.... suspected. | |||
BOP (Step 7) Close the following: | |||
. 1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). | |||
. 1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). | |||
. 1 KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). | |||
. 1 KC-1 8B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). | |||
BOP (Step 8) Start 1 B RN pump. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) OPENS. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the AUTO position. | |||
BOP (Step 11) Ensure 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) OPENS. | |||
BOP (Step 12) Start 1B1 KC pump. | |||
BOP (Step 13) Check 1KC-12 (1B1 KC Pump NOTE: 1KC-12 was NOT Disch Isol) LOCALLY THROTTLED IN locally throttled in Step 6. | |||
STEP 6. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 29 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos._J Expected Actions/Behavior I Comments BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an AO to check out the B Train KC Pumps. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor, as AO report that both pumps are operating normally. | |||
. Start 1B2 KC pump. | |||
CRS . GO TO Step 17. | |||
BOP (Step 17) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF. | |||
CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20. | |||
BOP (Step 20) Check KC leak HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred. | |||
BOP (Step 20 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step. | |||
. OPEN the following valves: | |||
. 1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). | |||
. 1 KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol). | |||
. CLOSE the following valves: | |||
. 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol). | |||
. 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). | |||
. Open the following valves: | |||
. 1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret sd). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 30 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KG Pump trip | |||
. 1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol). | |||
CRS | |||
* GO TO Step 25. | |||
BOP (Step 25) Check 1A ND pump OFF. | |||
BOP (Step 26) Check 1KC-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for 1 KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the CLOSE position. | |||
BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) closes. | |||
BOP (Step 29) Stop 1A1 and 1A2 Pumps. NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1A1 KC Pump. | |||
BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP. | |||
BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF. | |||
CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37. | |||
BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred. | |||
CRS (Step 37 RNO) GO TO Step 41 in body of this procedure. | |||
AP/1/A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 31 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KC Pump trip BOP (Step 41) Check any letdown path IN NOTE: Normal Letdown is in SERVICE. service. | |||
BOP (Step 42) Check NC pump thermal barrier valves OPEN: | |||
. 1 KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) | |||
. 1 KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt) | |||
. 1 KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt) | |||
. 1KC-413B(D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt). | |||
BOP (Step 43) Check KC to Aux Bldg Non essential header ESTABLISHED. | |||
BOP (Step 44) Check NM valves (on 1 MC-8) NOTE: NM Valves have NOT PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BY THIS been previously Closed by this PROCEDURE. procedure. | |||
CRS (Step 44 RNO) GO TO Step 46. | |||
CRS (Step 46) Check KC Surge Tank makeup HAS BEEN INITIATED. | |||
NOTE: KC System makeup has NOT occurred. | |||
(Step 46 RNO) GO TO Step 48. NOTE: There is NO NEED for KC System Feed and Bleed. | |||
BOP (Step 48) Check both trains RN suction ALIGN ED TO LLI. | |||
CRS (Step 49) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely address Technical Specifications. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 32 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KC Pump trip TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3J.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will declare ACTION TIME the A KC Train inoperable. | |||
A. One CCW A.1 Restore CCW 72 hours train train to inoperable. OPERABLE status. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 35.2, ECCS OPERATING - | |||
CRS LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3. | |||
CRS ACTIONS | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 33 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
1A2 KC Pump trip CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore 72 hours trains train(s) to inoperable. OPERABLE status. | |||
AND At least 100% | |||
oftheECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTYEM CRS LCD 3.6.6 Two containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One A.1 Restore 72 hours containment containment spray train spray train to inoperable. OPERABLE status. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 34 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Low Lube Oil PressurelTurbine Trip IGenerator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. Since the plant power is less than P-8, the Reactor will not trip. Simultaneously, the 1 B Main Generator Breaker will fail to trip and the Steam Dump Valves will fail to open as required. The operator will respond in accordance with API1/A15500102, Turbine Generator Trip. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: MAL-LTOO2 = 6.0, Ramp = 2 mm Insert: | |||
REM-SB0003=0 REM-SB00060 REM-SB0009=0 REM-SB00120 REM-SBOOI 5=0 REM-SBOOI 8=0 REM-SBOO2I =0 REM-SB00240 REM-SB00270 insert MAL-EPOO4B ACTIVE (lB Generator Breaker fails to Trip on Turbine Trip) | |||
Indications Available: | |||
* OAC Alarm: Unit 1 Turbine Seal Oil Backup Pump On. | |||
* Turbine bearing oil pressure starts to lower. | |||
* MOB Annunciator 1AD-1/A-9 LO TURB BRG OIL PRESS TURB TRIP | |||
* Turbine Trip Valves closed | |||
* Turbine Governor Valves closed | |||
* Rx does NOT trip (Rx Trip Breakers closed) | |||
* 1 B Generator Breaker remains closed on Turbine Trip | |||
* Steam Dump Valves do not open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: If a AO is dispatched to investigate: | |||
Wait 5 mm, then report there is a large oil leak on the discharge of the Main Turbine Oil Tank Eductor. | |||
NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-02. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 35 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Low Lube Oil PressurelTurbine Trip IGenerator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure APIIIAI500IO2, TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP RO (Step 1) Check Turbine Trip: | |||
. All throttle valves CLOSED. | |||
RO (Step 2) Check PIR meters LESS THAN NOTE: PR indication is < | |||
20%. 20%. | |||
(Step 3) Stabilize reactor power as follows: | |||
. Place control rods in manual. NOTE: The rods must be moved in MANUAL. | |||
. Check P/R meters GREATER THAN NOTE: The CRS will 5%. designate the RO. | |||
. Stabilize reactor power, as indicated on NOTE: This is a Continuous P/R meters, between 12%-i 5% with Action. The CRS will make control rods in manual. both board operators aware. | |||
WHEN reactor power is stabilized between 12%-i 5%, THEN maintain hR startup rate at 0 to ensure a constant power level. | |||
RO (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power NOTE: This is a Continuous goes below 5%, THEN perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. | |||
RO . Do not pull control rods. | |||
. Insert control rods as necessary to maintain negative SUR on hR startup rate meters. | |||
RO (Step 5) Check C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1SI-18) | |||
LIT. | |||
BOP (Step 6) Check any CF pump IN SERVICE. NOTE: The 1A CF Pump is in service. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 36 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Low Lube Oil PressurelTurbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure RO (Step 7) Check both generator breakers NOTE: The lB Generator OPEN. Breaker is CLOSED. | |||
(Step 7 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Manually initiate turbine trip. | |||
. IF any main turbine throttle valve is still open... | |||
. IF both generator breakers open... NOTE: The lB Generator Breaker is CLOSED. | |||
. IF Turbine Generator output less than or equal to zero MW, THEN perform the following: | |||
. Open both generator breakers by depressing ENABLE and TRIP at the same time. | |||
. GO TO Step 8. | |||
RO (Step 8) Check EXCITATION OFF. | |||
RO (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME T-Avg is less than NOTE: This is a Continuous 551°F AND going down, THEN perform the Action. The CRS will make following: both board operators aware. | |||
. Trip reactor. | |||
. GO TO EP/1IAI5000IE-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection). | |||
RO (Step 10) Check all control rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK. | |||
RO (Step 1 1) Check MSR RESET light LIT. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 37 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPENISteam Dump failure CRS (Step 12) Announce the following: Unit 1 NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO Turbine trip, non-essential personnel stay out to make Plant Announcement. | |||
of Unit 1 turbine bldg. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO. | |||
RO (Step 13) Check UNBLOCK light for AMSAC ACTUATION BLOCK/UNBLOCK switch (1 MC-2) DARK. | |||
RO (Step 14) Check condenser dump valves NOTE: The condenser dump MODULATING OPEN. valves are CLOSED. | |||
RO (Step 14 RNO) Transfer steam dumps to steam pressure mode as follows: | |||
. Ensure STM PRESS CONTROLLER setpoint at 1090-1095 PSIG. | |||
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in manual. | |||
. Adjust STM PRESS CONTROLLER output to 0%. | |||
. Using STEAM DUMP SELECT switch, perform the following: | |||
. Ensure C-7A reset. | |||
. Place steam dumps in steam pressure mode. | |||
IF STEAM HEADER PRESSURE is greater than 1100 PSIG, THEN manually OPEN steam dumps to control pressure 1090-1 095 PSIG. | |||
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in auto. | |||
BOP (Step 15) Check Pzr pressure control response: | |||
. Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 38 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure | |||
. Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto. | |||
. Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. | |||
. Check Pzr spray control valves CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 16) Check Pzr level TRENDING TO PROG RAM. | |||
RD (Step 17) Ensure Bearing Lift Pump in AUTO. | |||
RO (Step 18) WHEN bearing oil pressure goes down to 1 1-12 PSIG, THEN ensure AC Bearing Oil Pump starts. | |||
RD (Step 19) Transfer AS header supply: | |||
. CLOSE 1AS-9 (Ui C Htr Bleed To AS Hdr Isol). | |||
. Check Unit 2 as follows: | |||
. Unit 2 Reactor power GREATER NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to THAN 15% report power level. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor report 100% as U2 RD. | |||
. Unit 2 2AS-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to Control Inlet Isol) OPEN | |||
- report valve position. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor report 2AS-12 is OPEN. | |||
. Unit 2 AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to HEADER. report U2 AS Availability. | |||
If so, Floor Instructor report U2 AS is available. | |||
RD | |||
* Isolate Unit 1 SM to AS header as follows: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 39 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip IGenerator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME AS pressure cannot NOTE: This is a Continuous be maintained greater than 140 Action. The CRS will make PSIG while performing the following both board operators aware. | |||
step, THEN GO TO Step 19e. | |||
. Slowly CLOSE 1AS-12 (Ui SM TO AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol) while monitoring AS header pressure. | |||
CRS | |||
* GO TO Step 20. | |||
RO (Step 20) Remove one CF pump from service as follows: | |||
. Check both CF pumps RESET. | |||
CRS (Step 20 RNO) GO TO Step 21. | |||
RO (Step 21) Check T-Avg GREATER THAN 561°F. | |||
RO (Step 22) Check steam seal supply aligned to AS as follows: | |||
* Check 1TL-21 (AS To Steam Seal Isol) OPEN. | |||
* Check 1TL-3 (SM TO Steam Seal Isol) CLOSED. | |||
CRS (Step 23) Check reactor shutdown to less than 5% power PLANNED OR HAS OCCURRED. | |||
CRS (Step 23 RNO) IF reactor power to remain greater than or equal to 5%, THEN perform the following: | |||
* IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that NOTE: This is a Continuous reactor power cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make greater than or equal to 5%, THEN both board operators aware. | |||
RETURN TO Step 19. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 40 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPENISteam Dump failure | |||
. Observe Caution prior to Step 31 and GOTO Step 31. | |||
RO (Step 31) Monitor S/G levels as follows: | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level(s) NOTE: This is a Continuous cannot be controlled within +/- 10% of Action. The CRS will make setpoint, THEN control S/G level(s) both board operators aware. | |||
manually PER Step 31c through 31e | |||
. GO TO Step 32. | |||
RO (Step 32) Swap CF pump steam supply as follows: | |||
. Check 1 HM-95 (Ui Aux Steam Supply to CF Pumps Turbine Isol) | |||
CLOSED. | |||
CRS (Step 32a RNO) IF 1 HM-95 is full open, THEN GO TO Step 34. | |||
crs (Step 34) IF AT ANY TIME CF control NOTE: This is a Continuous bypass valves are maintaining S/C levels Action. The CRS will make AND all CF control valves are closed, THEN both board operators aware. | |||
perform the following: | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-31 (1A S/C CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-22 (lB SIC CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-19 (1C S/G CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. CLOSE 1CF-16 (1D S/C CF Control Inlet Isol). | |||
. Place all S/G CF control valves in manual. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #5. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 41 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure Next, the normal supply breaker to 1ETA will trip open causing 1ETA to de-energize. | |||
The 1A EDG will automatically start but not sequence its loads. The operator will enter API1/A5500107, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources Operating, and LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-EPOO9A = TRIP insert MAL-EQBOOIA = ON_BLACKOUT Indications Available: | |||
. 1 SI-i 4 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE X is LIT | |||
. 1SI-i4 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Y is LIT | |||
. iSI-14 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Z is LIT | |||
. MCB Annunciator lAD-i 1/A-i U ETA 4.16KV TROUBLE | |||
. MCB Annunciator lAD-i 1/A-2U ETA 600V LC TROUBLE | |||
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 1/A-3U ETA 600 V/i 20V TROUBLE | |||
. 1 ETA Normal Supply Breaker Green status light is LIT AP111A15500107, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER CASE II, LOSS OF NORMAL POWER TO EITHER IETA OR IETB BOP (Step 1) Check affected bus(s) - | |||
ENERGIZED AND SEQUENCER APPLYING LOADS. | |||
BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF both busses deenergized... NOTE: 1ETB is energized. | |||
. Ensure the following pumps running on energized bus: | |||
. NV pump NOTE: The BOP will start the lB NV Pump. | |||
. KC pumps NOTE: The BOP will start the iBi and 1B2 KC Pumps | |||
. RN pump. NOTE: The BOP will start the lB RN Pump. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 42 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of I ETA/Sequencer Failure BOP (Step 2) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves on energized train(s) | |||
OPEN. | |||
RO (Step 3) Maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB BOTH NOTE: ONLY1ETBis ENERGIZED. energized. | |||
CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 6. | |||
BOP (Step 6) Check S/I HAS OCCURRED NOTE: SI has NOT occurred. | |||
DURING THIS EVENT. | |||
BOP (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF both NV pumps off,... NOTE: The 1 B NV is running. | |||
CRS . IF any pump was manually started per NOTE: The 1 B NV Pump was APO7 Immediate Actions, THEN GO TO manually started. | |||
Step 8. | |||
CRS (Step 8) Check D/Gs OFF. NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AC to check out the Diesel and the Sequencer. | |||
If so, FloorlBooth Instructor acknowledge as AC. Report back within 10 minutes. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Check ND System status: | |||
. ND System - IN RHR MODE AT TIME NOTE: ND is NOT in RHR OF B/C. Mode. | |||
CRS (Step 9a RNO) GO TO Step 10. | |||
BOP (Step 10) Check any RN pump RUNNING. NOTE: The lB RN Pump is running. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 43 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure BOP (Step 1 1) Align KC as follows: | |||
BOP | |||
* Place recirc valve on operating train in AUTO: | |||
* 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol). | |||
* Ensure KC flow remains less than 4000 GPM per operating KC pump while performing next step. | |||
* Ensure the following valves on energized train are OPEN: | |||
* B Train: | |||
* OPEN 1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) | |||
* OPEN 1KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol) | |||
* OPEN 1KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) | |||
* OPEN 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt). | |||
BOP (Step 12) Check any charging pump RUNNING. | |||
BOP (Step 13) Align RN as follows: | |||
* Check 1A RN pump RUNNING. NOTE: The 1A RN is OFF. | |||
BOP (Step 1 3a RNO) Align 1 B RN as follows: | |||
* Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) is OPEN. | |||
* THROTTLE 1RN-1 90B (RN To B KC Hx Control) for desired KC cooling, while maintaining the following: | |||
* lB RN pump flowLESS THAN 14,000 GPM. | |||
* 1 B RN pump discharge pressure GREATER THAN 50 PSIG. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 44 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP . Start all available RV pumps. NOTE: Two additional RV pumps will be started. | |||
CRS . GOTOStep14. | |||
CRS (Step 14) Notify Unit 2 RO to start 2A RN Floor Instructor: As U2 RO pump. report 2A RN Pump is running. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
insertLOA-RN087 = ON delay 60 seconds (Start 2A RN Pump) | |||
BOP (Step 15) Check VCT makeup control system. | |||
. Ensure boric acid transfer pump on energized train running. | |||
. Ensure NC System makeup controller in auto. | |||
. Place NC System makeup switch to start. | |||
BOP (Step 16) Check B/O ON 1 ETA. | |||
BOP (Step 17) Check B and D Pzr heater group Examiner NOTE: IF NV Pump supply breakers on vertical board not started on B Train within CLOSED. 20 seconds of BO, loss of letdown! Pzr heaters off will occur, and require RNO actions. | |||
If NV Pump started within 20 seconds, move forward to Step 18. | |||
BOP (Step 17 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF Pzr level is less than 17% NOTE: Pzr level is most likely | |||
> 17%. | |||
. IF S/I has occurred NOTE: SI has NOT occurred. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 45 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of IETA/Sequencer Failure | |||
. Place the following Pzr heater groups in manual: | |||
. B | |||
. D | |||
. Close the following Pzr heater group supply breakers: | |||
. B | |||
. D | |||
. Close C Pzr heater group supply breaker. | |||
. Return the following Pzr heater groups to auto: | |||
.8 | |||
. D BOP (Step 18) Perform one of the following to isolate RN train crosstie: | |||
. Dispatch operator to close 1 RN-40A NOTE: The CRS will dispatch (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) (aux bldg, an AC to close I RN-40A. | |||
716+7, GG-55 beside Unit 1 side Booth Instructor: | |||
stairway to 695 elevation), | |||
acknowledge as appropriate. | |||
insertREM-RNOO4OA_1 = 0, delay = 5 mm (Close IRN 40A) | |||
After closing valve, Booth Instructor report action taken to Control Room. | |||
OR | |||
. Evaluate CLOSING 1 RN-41 B (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol). | |||
CRS (Step 19) WHEN RN train crosstie is NOTE: This is a Continuous isolated, THEN 1 RN-i 90B (RN To B KC Hx Action. The CRS will make Control) may be throttled further OPEN, both board operators aware. | |||
while maintaining the following: | |||
. 1 B RN pump flow LESS THAN 14,000 GPM. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 46 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of I ETA/Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | |||
. 1 B RN pump discharge pressure GREATER THAN 50 PSIG. | |||
CRS (Step 20) Dispatch operator to close the NOTE: CRS will dispatch an following valves: NEC to close 1 KC-230A and 1 KC-3A. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
acknowledge as appropriate. | |||
insert REM-KC0003A = 0, delay 5 mm (Close IKC 3A) insert REM-KCO23OA = 0, delay 5 mm (Close I KC 230A) | |||
After closing valves, Booth Instructor report action taken to Control Room. | |||
BOP | |||
* 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) (aux bldg, 750+12, JJ-55, above north end of KC HX 1 A) | |||
BOP | |||
* 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) (aux bldg, 733+8, HH-55, north of column HH-55). | |||
BOP (Step 21) Check 1A ND Train WAS IN RHR MODE. | |||
CRS (Step 21 RNO) GO TO Step 36. | |||
BOP (Step 36) Check normal letdown IN SERVICE. | |||
CRS (Step 36 RNO) IF desired to establish normal or excess letdown, THEN have any available operator establish letdown PER AP/1/A/5500/12 (LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION) while continuing with this procedure. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 47 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure NOTE: The CRS will NOT stop to look at Tech Specs while in AP-07. Tech Spec review should occur after completion of scenario. Therefore, at the discretion of the lead examiner, move to Event 6 (Page 52) | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS 3.8.1 AC Source Operating CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE: | |||
. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND | |||
. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND | |||
. The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED I COMPLETION The operator will determine ACTION TIME | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 48 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of I ETAlSequencer Failure A. One offsite A.1 Perform SR 1 hour that one offsite line and one circuit 3.8.1.1 for DG are inoperable because inoperable. OPERABLE AND neither are capable of offsite Once per 8 circuit. supplying the Emergency Bus hours thereafter (TS Basis pB3.8.1-2). | |||
AND A.2 Declare 24 hours from required discovery of no features offsite power to with no one train offsite concurrent with power inoperability of available redundant inoperable required with its feature(s). | |||
redundant required feature(s) is inoperable. | |||
AND A.3 Restore 72 hours offsite circuit AND to OPERABLE 6 days from status. failure to meet LCO. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 49 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure Time Pos Expé ed ActionslBe avior Comments B. One DG B.1 Perform SR 1 hour inoperable. 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE AND offsite Once per 8 circuit. hours AND thereafter. | |||
B.2 Declare required 4 hours from features discovery of supported Condition B by the concurrent with inoperable inoperability of DG redundant inoperable required when its feature(s). | |||
required redundant feature(s) is inoperable. | |||
AND B.3.1 Determine inoperable DG is 24 hours not inoperable due to common cause failure. | |||
OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours OPERABLE DG. | |||
AND B.4 Restore DG 72 hours to OPERABLE AND status 6 days from failure to meet LCO. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.4, DC SOURCES OPERATING - | |||
CRS LCO 3.8.4 The four channels of DC sources shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 50 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of IETA/Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The operator will determine ACTION TIME that the AC Battery Chargers A.. One A.1 Restore 2 hours are inoperable. (TS Basis channel of channel of pB3.8.4-3). | |||
DC source DC source to inoperable. OPERABLE status. | |||
OR 2 hours A.2.1 Verify associated bus tie breakers are closed between DC channels. | |||
AND A.2.2 Restore 72 hours channel of DC source to OPERABLE status. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 38.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS OPERATING - | |||
CRS LCD 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, four channels of DC, and four AC vital buses electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 51 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure A. One or more A.1 Restore AC 8 hours The operator will determine AC electrical electrical that 1 ETA is inoperable. | |||
power power AND distribution distribution 16 hours from subsystem(s) subsystem(s) discove of inoperable, to failure to meet OPERABLE LCO. | |||
status. | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 52 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Following this, a large steam rupture will occur inside Containment on the 1 D Steamline. | |||
SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EPI1IAI5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition either to EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or to EPI1IAI5000IES-i.1, SI Termination. If the crew transitions to E-i, the scenario will terminate upon transition. If the crew transitions to ES-i .1, the scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-i.1, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-1OB. | |||
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SMOO7D 2021250 Ram p60 Indications Available: | |||
. Containment pressure rises to> 1 psig | |||
. MCB Annunciator 1AD9 A-5, ICE CONDENSER DOORS INLET DOORS OPEN | |||
. MCB Annunciator 1AD9 A-8, CONT .5 PSIG ALERT | |||
. Tavg starts to lower. | |||
NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. | |||
EPIIIAI5000IE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action | |||
. All rod bottom lights LIT | |||
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN | |||
. hR amps - GOING DOWN. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 53 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically | |||
. All throttle valves CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED. | |||
RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP NOTE: SI will fail to auto actuate, but may have been manually actuated by the time that the crew arrives at this Step. | |||
If NOT, the RO/BOP will manually actuate SI. | |||
A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1 SI-i 8) LIT. | |||
Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1 SI-i 4) LIT. | |||
NOTE: SI is required and will be actuated if NOT already done. | |||
NOTE: SI has been actuated. | |||
CRITICAL TASK: | |||
(E-O D) Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition out of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid. | |||
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 54 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) LIT. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK. | |||
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s): | |||
. Groupsl,2,5DARK. | |||
. Group 3LIT. | |||
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED. | |||
. Group 6 - LIT | |||
. GOTOStep10. | |||
ROI (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status: | |||
BOP | |||
. MDCApumps-ON N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%. | |||
BOP (Step 11)Check all KCpumpsON. NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump is OFF. | |||
(Step 11 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: No attempt will be made to start the 1A2 KC Pump. | |||
. Start pumps. | |||
. IF all KC pumps running... | |||
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 55 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RD following: report 2A RN Pump is running. | |||
. Start2ARN pump. | |||
RD | |||
* THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor: | |||
for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delayo rampl0 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow) | |||
RD (Step 14) Check all SIG pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG. | |||
RD (Step 14 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: 1 D SG Pressure is decreasing uncontrollably. | |||
* Check the following valves closed: | |||
* AllMSIVs | |||
* All MSIV Bypass Valves | |||
* AIISMPDRVs | |||
* If any valve open NOTE: All SM PORVs are CLOSED. | |||
RO/ (Step 15) Check containment pressure NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is > 3 psig. | |||
BOP BOP (Step 15 RND) Perform the following: | |||
* Check Monitor Light Panel Group 7 lit. | |||
* IF Group 7 window is dark on energized NOTE: Group 7 status lights train(s).., are LIT. | |||
* Stop all NC pumps while maintaining seal injection flow. | |||
* Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 56 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP . Energize H2 Igniters by depressing ON and OVERRIDE. | |||
CRS . Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NE NOTE: The CRS will dispatch AHUs PER EPI1IAI5000IG-l (Generic AC. | |||
Enclosures) Enclosure 28 (De-energizing Booth Instructor: | |||
Ice Condenser AHU5). | |||
Acknowledge as appropriate. | |||
Booth Instructor: | |||
insert LOA-NFOI6 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU StartlStop) | |||
And then, report as AC that breakers are closed. | |||
BOP . WHEN time allows, THEN check Phase NOTE: The CRS may assign B HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 2 the RO (BOP) to perform this (Phase B HVAC Equipment). action. | |||
If so, RO (BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 2. | |||
Other Examiners follow E-O Actions, Step 16, on Page 57. | |||
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 2, PHASE B HVAC EQUIPMENT Examiner NOTE: Eollow the actions associated with Enclosure 2 if RO (BOP) is assigned by CRS to perform. | |||
RO/ (Step 1) Check VE System in operation as BOP follows: | |||
. VE Eans ON. | |||
. Ensure all damper mode select switches in AUTO: | |||
. 1AVS-D-7 Mode Select | |||
. 1AVS-D-8 Mode Select | |||
. 1AVS-D-2 Mode Select | |||
. 1AVS-D-3 Mode Select | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 57 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Annulus pressure being maintained - | |||
NEGATIVE. | |||
RO! (Step 2) Check VX System in operation as BOP follows: | |||
. Time since Phase B actuation - NOTE: It is likely that 10 GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES. minutes has NOT elapsed since the Phase B actuation. | |||
ROI (Step 2 RNO) WHEN 10 minutes has BOP expired, THEN perform rest of this enclosure. | |||
ROI (Step 2.b) Check the following dampers - | |||
BOP OPEN: | |||
. 1 RAF-D-4 (1 B Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A) | |||
. 1VX-2B (lB H2 Skimmer Fan Isol Test A) | |||
. 1 RAF-D-2 (1A Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A) | |||
. 1VX-1A (1A H2 Skimmer Fan Isol Test A). | |||
RO/ (Step 2.c) Check Containment Air Return BOP fans-ON ROl (Step 2.d) Check H2 Skimmer fans ON. - | |||
BOP E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP (RO) continue HERE. | |||
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow: | |||
. Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW. | |||
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 NOTE: NC Pressure is 1 400 PSIG. psig. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 6&7 Page 58 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN: | |||
. 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) | |||
. 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol). | |||
CRS | |||
* IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17. | |||
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EPI1IAI5000IG-1 (Generic OSM to address. | |||
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. | |||
acknowledge as OSM. | |||
ROl (Step 18) Check CA flow: | |||
BOP | |||
* Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM. | |||
BOP | |||
* Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG. | |||
RO | |||
* WHEN each SIG N/R level is greater NOTE: Adverse Containment than 1 1% (32% ACC), THEN control CA numbers will need to be used flow to maintain that SIG NIR level until Containment Pressure is between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%. < 3 pisg. | |||
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures: | |||
* IF all NC pumps on, THEN check NC T- NOTE: All NC Pumps will be Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO OFF. | |||
557°F. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 59 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based NOTE: The CRS may assign on plant conditions: the RO to perform this action. | |||
If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3. | |||
Others should move ahead to Step 20 on Page 60 to continue in E-0. | |||
IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown). | |||
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform. | |||
RO (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT. | |||
RO (Step 4) Check any NC pump ON. | |||
RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6. | |||
RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 60 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically IF SIG NIR level is less than 11% (32% NOTE: Adverse Containment ACC) in all SIGs,... numbers will need to be used until Containment Pressure is | |||
< 3 pisg. | |||
WHEN NIR level is greater than 1 1 % NOTE: Adverse Containment (32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN numbers will need to be used THROTTLE feed flow further to: until Containment Pressure is | |||
< 3 pisg. | |||
. Minimize cooldown | |||
. Maintain at least one S/G N/R level NOTE: The RD may stop feed greater than 11% (32% ACC). flow to 1 D SG. | |||
RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSlVs will be closed. | |||
RO (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. Close MSIV bypass valves. | |||
. Exit this enclosure. | |||
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners NOT following RD actions in Enclosure 3, continue HERE. | |||
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PDRV and spray valves: | |||
. All PzrPDRVsCLDSED. | |||
BOP . Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED. | |||
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN. | |||
BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F. | |||
BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact: | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 61 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically | |||
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING NOTE: The 1 D SG is Faulted. | |||
UP | |||
. All S/Os PRESSURIZED. | |||
BOP (Step 22 RNO) IF any SIG is faulted, THEN perform the following: | |||
CRS . Implement EPI1IAI5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees). | |||
CRS . GO TO EP/1IAI5000IE-2 (Faulted Steam NOTE: The CRS will transition Generator Isolation). to E-2. | |||
EPII IAI5000IE-2, FAULTED STEAM GEN ERATOR ISOLATION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted SIG or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown. | |||
RO (Step 3) Check the following CLOSED: | |||
. AIIMSIVs | |||
. All MSIV bypass valves. | |||
RO (Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure NOTE: Although all SG STABLE OR GOING UP. pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG). | |||
Otherwise a transition to ECA 2.1 will be made. | |||
RO/ (Step 5) Identify faulted SIG(s): NOTE: The 1D SG is Faulted. | |||
BOP | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 62 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically | |||
. Any SIG pressure GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR | |||
. Any SIG DEPRESSURIZED. | |||
RO (Step 6) Maintain at least one SIG available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps. | |||
RO (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV CLOSED. | |||
BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves. | |||
RO/ (Step 9) Isolate faulted SIG(s) as follows: | |||
BOP RO! | |||
* For1DS/G: | |||
BOP | |||
* Check SIG D FDW ISOLATED status light (1 SI-4) LIT. | |||
* CLOSE 1CA-38B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Isol). | |||
* CLOSE 1CA-42B (lB CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Isol). | |||
* Check BB valves CLOSED: | |||
* 1 BB-4B (1 D SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control). | |||
* 1BB-8A (D SIG BB Cont Inside Isol). | |||
* Close 1SM-lOl (D SM Line Drain Isol). | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 63 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK: | |||
(E-2 A) Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E 2. | |||
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably). | |||
RO (Step 10) Close 1AS-12 (Ui SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Iso!). | |||
ROI (Step 11) Check SIG tubes intact as follows: | |||
BOP Check the following EMFs NORMAL: | |||
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) | |||
. 1EMF-24(SIGA) | |||
. 1EMF-25 (SIG_B) | |||
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG_C) | |||
. 1 EMF-27 (SIG_D). | |||
IF any SIG has previously been identified NOTE: There have been no as ruptured SGTRs identified. | |||
Notify RP to perform the following: NOTE: The CRS may call RP to perform surveys. | |||
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP. | |||
. IF SIG(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation. | |||
. Frisk all Unit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly_higher for any SIG. | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 64 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions. | |||
. WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate SIG activity. | |||
RO/ (Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria: | |||
BOP | |||
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F. | |||
. Secondary heat sink: | |||
. N/R level in at least one intact SIG NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC) numbers will need to be used. | |||
OR | |||
. Total feed flow to intact S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 GPM. | |||
. NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29% NOTE: Adverse Containment ACC). numbers will need to be used. | |||
CRS (Step i 2.d RNO) GO TO Step 13. NOTE: Because of the Adverse Containment condition, the crew may NOT meet the Pzr Level threshold to terminate SI. | |||
If NOT, the crew will go to E-1, and the exam should be terminated. | |||
CRS (Step 12.e) GO TO EP/1/A15000/ES-1 .1 NOTE: The crew may meet (Safety Injection Termination), the Pzr Level threshold to terminate SI. If so, the CRS will transition to ES-i .1 EPIIIAI5000IES-1 .1, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N141 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 65 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containmentl SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO! (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. | |||
BOP BOP (Step 2) Reset the following: | |||
. S/I. | |||
. Sequencers. | |||
. Phase A Isolation. | |||
. Phase B Isolation. | |||
. IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on. both board operators aware. | |||
BOP (Step 3) Establish VI to containment as follows: | |||
. Open the following valves: | |||
. 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol) | |||
. 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess Hdr Outside Isol) | |||
. 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol). | |||
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG. | |||
BOP (Step 4) Stop all but one NV pump. | |||
RO (Step 5 Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP. | |||
BOP (Step 6) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows: | |||
. Check the following valves OPEN: | |||
. 1NV-221A (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol) | |||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 66 of 67 Event | |||
== Description:== | |||
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments | |||
. 1NV-222B (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol) | |||
. Check the following valves - OPEN NOTE: Both valves are CLOSED. | |||
. 1NV-150B (Ui NV Pump Recirc Isol) | |||
. 1NV-151A (Ui NV Pump Recirc Isol). | |||
BOP (Step 6.b RNO) Perform the following: | |||
. OPEN valves. | |||
. IF both valves open, THEN GO TO Step 6.c. | |||
(Step 6.c) CLOSE the following valves: | |||
. 1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV) | |||
. 1NI-1OB (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV). | |||
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam. | |||
UNIT I STATUS: | |||
Power Level: 15% NCS [B] 1963 ppm Pzr [B]: 1974 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: Startup in progress Core Burnup: 25.1 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/l/A/6100/003, Enclosure 4.1, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. | |||
OP/i /A16300/001, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT: | |||
* The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. | |||
* The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. | |||
* Apower ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: | |||
* The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. | |||
* 1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) | |||
* MCB Annunciator lAD-i 3, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating). | |||
Crew Directions: | |||
* Complete the Turbine startup and synchronize the main generator to the electrical grid. | |||
* AO (Bill) is standing by at the Main Generator Voltage Regulator Panel. | |||
* Jim Aligood (SE) is available in the WCC (x4276). | |||
* Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) testing and post Turbine OPC and Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test will NOT be conducted. | |||
* Use of Alternate Dilute has been approved. | |||
* RE has recommended an initial Alternate Dilution of 200 gallons. | |||
* Turbine loading rate will be 5MWe/minute. | |||
Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe AOs AVAILABLE Unitl Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5 | |||
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya}} |
Latest revision as of 13:06, 5 February 2020
ML15125A472 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Mcguire, McGuire ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/05/2015 |
From: | Division of Nuclear Materials Safety II |
To: | Duke Energy Carolinas |
References | |
Download: ML15125A472 (273) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314)
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: I Op Test No.: Nl4-l Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
( RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The lB MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description XMT C-BOP VCT Level Controller failure NV_i NVL T5760 C-SRO 2 XMT I(Ts)-sRo Pzr Level Channel failure 1NCLT 5170 REM 3 C-RO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently SA0048 4 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Turbine Control Unit failure DEHOO8B C-SRO MAL 6 C-BOP High Vibration on 1 B NCP NCPOO3B C-SRO MAL 7 M-RO Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip DEHOO3A DEHOO3B -
M-SRO MAL 8 NA Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump CAOO5 MAL g NA iA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CAOO9A (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314)
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator lAD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the VCT level controller will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F8, DCS ALTERNATE ACTION, and go to OPI1/A161021003, DCS System Operation, Enclosure 4.4, Removing/Returning a VCT Level Channel From/To Service.
Next, Pzr Level channel 3 will fail low. The DCS will automatically select a non-failed instrument to replace the failed instrument as the controlling channel, and no NCS inventory control upset will result. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.
Following this, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that reactor power is rising, and that the pump should not be running, and take action to reduce Turbine load and isolate CA flow to the Steam Generators per the Crew Expectation Manual. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
System, which will require a plant shutdown, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The operator may use AP/1/N5500/1, Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure, and if so, use OP/11A162501002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, in an attempt to stop the pump. Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A15500/4, Rapid Downpower.
During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change.
After this, a high vibration condition will develop on the lB NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, lB NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM),
and enter AP/1/A15500108, Malfunction of NC Pump. Ultimately, the vibration condition will rise above the Hi-Hi threshold requiring tripping of the reactor and stopping the NCP.
The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EP/1IAI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Following the plant trip, a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWIS) will occur prematurely and the Main Turbine will fail to trip automatically or manually; and the operator will be required to manually close the Turbine Governor Valves. It is likely that SI will actuate due to the delayed Turbine isolation. At the same time, the TDCA Pump, if not already running, will start on low Steam Generator levels. If the TDCA Pump was not running at the start of the event, it will trip on overspeed upon startup. If the TDCA Pump was running at the start of the event, it will trip when the operator initiates flow to the Steam Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314)
Generators. Furthermore, the 1A MDCA Pump will trip on overcurrent during pump startup, and any attempts to restart the pump will be unsuccessful. Consequently, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur shortly after SI actuation, or upon the transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The operator will transition from EP/1/A/5000/E-0 to EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-0.
The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-0, or ES-0.1, after the secondary heat sink has been restored.
Critical Tasks:
55 Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%.
Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48%
power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates mis-operation or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).
E-OQ Manually close the Main Turbine Governor Valves before an Orange path develops on the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when conditions exist that allow the operator to do so, constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance that unnecessarily challenges the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function.
Additionally, failure to isolate steam to the Main Turbine reduces Steam Generator Inventory when the CA System is in an inoperable condition, and could unnecessarily result in a challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, including the need to Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050314) implement Bleed and Feed cooling of the NC; and ultimately challenging the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function.
FR-H.1 Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-1
REFERENCES:
- 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation (Amendment 184/166)
- 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 221/203)
- 3. OP/1/A/6100/010 C, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-2 (Rev 63)
- 4. OP/1/A/6102/003, DCS System Operation (Rev 9)
- 5. AP/1/A/5500/1, Steam Leak (Rev 18)
- 6. Control Room Crew Expectations Manual (Rev 8/8/1 2)
- 7. SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System (Rev 133)
- 8. OP/1/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System (Rev 118)
- 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 Applicability (Amendment 238/220)
- 10. AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower (Rev 24)
- 11. OP/1/A/61 50/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121)
- 12. OP/1/A/6100/010 B, Annunciator Response for Panel lAD-i (Rev 46)
- 13. OP/1/A/6300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11)
- 14. AP/1/A/5500/08, Malfunction of NC Pump (Rev 14)
- 15. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33)
- 16. EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 36)
- 17. EP/1/A/5000/F-0, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 5)
- 18. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (Rev 17)
Validation Time: 74 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.
Facility Review:
Rev. 050314 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N 14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description XMT 1 C-BOP VCT Level Controller failure NV_1NVL T5760 C-SRO 2 XMT l(TS)-SRO Pzr Level Channel failure 1NCLT 5170 3 REM C-RO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently SA0048 C(TS)-SRO ABC 4 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Turbine Control Unit failure DEHOO8B C-SRO MAL 6 C-BOP High Vibration on 1 B NCP NCPOO3B C-SRO MAL 7 M-RO Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip DEHOO3A M-BOP DEHOO3B M-SRO 8 NA Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump CAOO5 MAI.
9 NA 1A MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CAOO9A (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the VCT level controller will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F8, DCS ALTERNATE ACTION, and go to OP/1/A16102/003, DCS System Operation, Enclosure 4.4, Removing/Returning a VCT Level Channel From/To Service.
Next, Pzr Level channel 3 will fail low. The DCS will automatically select a non-failed instrument to replace the failed instrument as the controlling channel, and no NCS inventory control upset will result. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.
Following this, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that reactor power is rising, and that the pump should not be running, and take action to reduce Turbine load and isolate CA flow to the Steam Generators per the Crew Expectation Manual. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, which will require a plant shutdown, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The operator may use AP/1/A15500/1, Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure, and if so, use OP/1/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, in an attempt to stop the pump. Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/11A1550014, Rapid Downpower.
During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change.
After this, a high vibration condition will develop on the lB NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, lB NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM), and enter API1/A15500108, Malfunction of NC Pump. Ultimately, the vibration condition will rise above the Hi-Hi threshold requiring tripping of the reactor and stopping the NCP. The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Following the plant trip, a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWIS) will occur prematurely and the Main Turbine will fail to trip automatically or manually; and the operator will be required to manually close the Turbine Governor Valves. It is likely that SI will actuate due to the delayed Turbine isolation. At the same time, the TDCA Pump, if not already running, will start on low Steam Generator levels. If the TDCA Pump was not running at the start of the event, it will trip on overspeed upon startup. If the TDCA Pump was running at the start of the event, it will trip when the operator initiates flow to the Steam Generators. Furthermore, the 1A MDCA Pump will trip on overcurrent during pump startup, and any attempts to restart the pump will be unsuccessful. Consequently, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur shortly after SI actuation, or upon the transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The operator will Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 transition from EP/1!AI5000IE-O to EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with Enclosure 8 (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-0.
The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-0, or ES-0.1, after the secondary heat sink has been restored.
Critical Tasks:
ss Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%.
Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates mis-operation or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).
E-OQ Manually close the Main Turbine Governor Valves before an Orange path develops on the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when conditions exist that allow the operator to do so, constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance that unnecessarily challenges the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function. Additionally, failure to isolate steam to the Main Turbine reduces Steam Generator Inventory when the CA System is in an inoperable condition, and could unnecessarily result in a challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, including the need to implement Bleed and Feed cooling of the NC; and ultimately challenging the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 FR-H.1 Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR H.1.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS D Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 240 T 0 Malfunctions (From IC-39):
Q =
(Originally IC-39).
insert LOA-CAOIO RACKED OUT; insert LOA-CAOIOA = RACKED OUT; (lB MDCA Pump is OOS) insert MAL-ENBOI3C = 0 (PR N42 is OOS) insert OVR-l AD9 C06 ON (MCB Annunciator I AD9IC6)
Per Lesson Plan 2014 NRC Exam Scenario I insert MAL-DEHOO8B TRUE cdh_xI 0_280_4 eq V (DEH Switch to Manual triggered from INV-265B open light ON) insert MAL-ISEOO7A ACT_AUTO cthH_X01_094_2 EQ V (Automatic FWI Train A occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insert MAL-ISEOO7B ACT_AUTO cdH_X01_094_2 EQ V (Automatic FWI Train B occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insert MAL-ISEOO7A INACTIVE cdH_X02_I02_2 EQ 1 (Remove signal after insertion) insert MAL-ISEOO7B INACTIVE cdH_X02_1 I 0_2 EQ 1 (Remove signal after insertion) insert MAL-CAOO9A TRUE cdH_X10_077_4 EQ 1 delayo (MD CA Pump IA trips on overcurrent after pump ON light actuates) insert MAL-CAOO5 TRIP cdH_X01_094_2 EQ V delayo (TDCA Overspeed Trip occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insertMAL-DEHOO3A = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Auto Trip) insertMAL-DEHOO3B = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Manual Iv Trip)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION RUN Place Tagout/0-Stick on:
Q lB MDCA Pump (Tagout)
Reset all SLIMs PR N42 (0-stick)
MCB Annunciator IAD-9, C-6 (0-stick)
Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO <1000 ppb.
Q =
Setup OAC Q Freeze.
Q Update Fresh Tech.
Spec. Log.
Q Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.
Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
- 4. Retain a copy of 0P111A162501002 which may need to be provided to the crew during Event 2.
Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N14-1-l.
Q At direction of Event I VCT Level Controller failure examiner insertXMT NV_INVLT576O = 100 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q At direction of Event 2 Pzr Level Channel failure examiner insert XMT NC_INCLT5I7O = 1.0 Q At direction of Event 3 TDCA Pump starts inadvertently examiner insert REM- NOTE: Locally Close ISA-I if directed: insert SAOO48ABC = 1.0 RE#M-SA000I = 0 Q At direction of Event 4 Rapid Downpower examiner Q At direction of Event 5 Turbine Control Unit failure examiner insert DEHOO8A (Turbine Control Fails to MANUAL) Set in initial conditions.
Triggered from INV 265B open light ON.
Q At direction of Event 6 High Vibration on 1 B NCP examiner insertMAL NCPOO3B=4.6 (HI Vibration Alarm) i nsertMAL NCPOO3B5.1 cd =
X05_OOlell_1 I (Hi Vibration Alarm Ramp 360 seconds) (HI-HI Vibration Alarm)
Q At direction of Event 7 Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip examiner insert ISEOO7AIB (FWIS These malfunctions will occur on Reactor Trip.
actuates) Set in initial conditions. Triggered from Rx trip. NOTE: Start 2A RN Pump and throttle flow:
. rt DEHOO3AIB insertLOA-RN088 ON (Main Turbine fails to insert LOA-RN084 = 8000.0024 trip) Set in initial conditions.
Q Post-Rx Trip Event 8 Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump insert CAOO5 This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.
Set in initial conditions.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Post-Rx Trip Event 9 1A MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start insert CAOO9A This malfunction will occur on Reactor
- *. TriplLow SG Levels.
Set in initial conditions.
NOTE: Block FWIS:
insertMAL-ISEOO7A = BLK_BOTH insertMAL-ISEOO7B = BLK_BOTH Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 60 Event
Description:
VCT Level Controller failure Shortly after taking the watch, the VCT level controller will fail HIGH. The operator will respond in accordance with MOB Annunciator 1AD-2, F8, DOS ALTERNATE ACTION, and go to OP/1IA/6102/003, DOS System Operation, Enclosure 4.4, Removing/Returning a VOT Level Channel From/To Service.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert XMT-NV_INVLT576O = 100 Indications Available:
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-7 D3, VCT ABNORMAL (Momentary)
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 E8, DOS TROUBLE
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 F8, DOS Alternate Action
. VCT Level (1NVP-5760) indicates 100%
. VCT Level (1 NVP-5763) indicates that the level is lowering.
. VCT Level SLIMs shifts into MANUAL Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The BOP may address ARP for 1AD-7, D3.
NOTE: The ORS may direct the BOP to place 1 NV-i 37 to VOT position.
MCB ANNUNCIATOR IAD-2, F8 DCS ALTERNATE ACTION CRS (Step 1) Halt any power change in progress.
BOP (Step 2) Check DOS Workstation alarms.
DCS WORKSTATION ALARMS M1D1168, VCT LEVEL ALTERNATE ACTION BOP (Step 1) Manually control VCT level at desired value.
CRS (Step 2) Write work request and investigate repair.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 60 Event
Description:
VCT Level Controller failure CRS (Step 3) GO TO OP/1/A16102/002 (DOS System Operation).
NOTE: The ORS will transition to OP/i 11102/002.
OPII!P-J61 02/003, DCS SYSTEM OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.4, REMOVING!RETURNING A VCT LEVEL CHANNEL FROM/TO SERVICE BOP (Step 3.1) Performing the following section, as applicable:
Section 3.2, Respond To An Alternate Action.
BOP (Step 3.2) Respond To An Alternate Action On DOS Boric Acid Blender graphic, perform the following:
. Select 2XS for VOT Level 1.
. Determine which level transmitter is NOT faulted.
NVAA 5760 (Transmitter_A)
NVAA 5761 (Transmitter B) NOTE: NVAA 5761 (Transmitter B) is NOT faulted.
. Select the non-faulted level transmitter for VOT level input (Transmitter A or Transmitter B).
. Select DEV MRE INHIBIT to block the deviation input.
. Oheck MRE BLOOKED lit (blinking red).
- On DOS Boric Acid Blender Graphic, perform the following:
- Select 2XS for VOT Level 2.
- Determine which level transmitter is NOT faulted.
NVAA 5761 (Transmitter A) NOTE: NVAA 5761 (Transmitter A) is NOT faulted.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 60 Event
Description:
VCT Level Controller failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- NVAA 5760 (Transmitter B)
. Select the non-faulted level transmitter for VCT level input (Transmitter A or Transmitter B).
. Select DEV MRE INHIBIT to block the deviation input.
. Check MRE BLOCKED lit (blinking red).
NOTE: An Auto Makeup may occur once the crew removes the faulty instrument from service.
BOP . On DCS Boric Acid Blender graphic, perform the following:
. Select NV-i 37A (VCT Level)
. Ensure NV-i 37A is in auto CRS
- WHEN VCT Level Channel has been NOTE: The CRS may call required, go to Section 3.4. WCC/IAE to address the malfunction.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 60 Event
Description:
Pzr Level Channel failure Next, Pzr Level channel 3 will fail low. The DCS will automatically select a non-failed instrument to replace the failed instrument as the controlling channel, and no NCS inventory control upset will result. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert XMT-NC_INCLT5I7O = 0 Indications Available:
- MOB Annunciator 1AD-2 E8, DOS TROUBLE
- OAO Alarm M1A0976, Ui PZR LEVEL III
- 1NCP-5170, Pzr Level Ohannel 3 indicates 0%
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The DOS will auto select a non-failed instrument to control the Pzr level system.
The ORS will evaluate the effect of the failure on Technical specifications.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)
INSTRUMENTATION ORS LOO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be 0 PERABLE.
ORS APPLIOABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-i.
ORS AOTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event# 2 Page 14 of 60 Event
Description:
Pzr Level Channel failure CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s).
M. One channel M.1 Place 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will inoperable, channel in determine that ACTION M trip, must be entered.
OR M.2 Reduce 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> THERMAL POWER to
< P-7.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 15 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Following this, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that reactor power is rising, and that the pump should not be running, and take action to reduce Turbine load and isolate CA flow to the Steam Generators per the Crew Expectation Manual. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
System, which will require a plant shutdown, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The operator may use API1IAI5500I1 Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure, and if so, use OPI1IA/62501002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, in an attempt to stop the pump. Ultimately, the crew will enter API1IA/550014, Rapid Downpower.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-SAOO48ABC = 1.0 Indications Available:
. Reactor power starts to rise
. 1SA48ABC Red status light is LIT.
. TDCA Pump Turbine Speed rising
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-5/F1 TURBINE DRIVEN CA PUMP LO SUCTION PRESSURE CONTROL ROOM EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO! TIG load reduction during normal ops and BOP transients (no procedure guidance and immediate need to reduce load = transient) for over power events.
Normal load changes: Auto is preferred NOTE: The RO will reduce Transient load changes: Manual is Turbine load sufficiently to preferred- immediately reduce 2OMWe and maintain Rx power < 100%.
then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the initial 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced. TPBE on the OAC updates once per minute. Other indications (PR meters and Delta T meters) will indicate reactor response more quickly and will enable the operators to control the plant even more precisely. (This combines the Operator Fundamentals of Conservatism and Controlling Plant Evolutions Precisely).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 16 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently RO! CA Operation above 10% power.
BOP IF CA Auto start at greater than 3% power NOTE: The BOP will throttle and Main Feedwater is providing flow to the CA flow from the TDCA Pump, steam generators, then CA flow should be rendering the CA Pumps throttled/isolated as soon as practical. This inoperable.
will make the affected CA pumps inoperable due to the control valve not being fully open above 10% as required by the CA Surveillance Requirements.
NOTE: The CRS may or may not address APi.
If so, the crew will ultimately go to OP/i /A16250/002 and attempt to shutdown the TDCA Pump.
On the other hand, the operator may elect to leave the pump running, close the CA Control Valves, and investigate the failure.
APIIIAI5500IOI, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the NOTE: The RO will need to following: reduce load to limit reactor power.
. Excore NIs LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.
. NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F DIT
. T-Avg AT T-REF.
CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS. NOT in progress.
CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 17 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event GREATER THAN P-li (1955 PSIG).
BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr level is expected to GOING UP. be stable, however, it may be lowering. If so, perform Step 6 RNO. Otherwise continue with Step 7.
BOP (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:
. Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.
. Ensure 1NV-238 (Ui Charging Hdr Control) OPENING.
. OPEN 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.
. Reduce or isolate letdown.
. Start additional NV pump.
IF Pzr level going down with maximum NOTE: It is expected that the charging flow... BOP will be able to control Pzr level.
BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware.
CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.
CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenano# 1 Event# 3 Page 18 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:
. (Step 1 3a) Check SM PORVs CLOSED.
RO * (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED.
- (Step 13.b RNO) IF steam dumps NOTE: The Steam Dumps are required to be closed.., likely to be closed.
BOP * (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL:
. Containment temperature
. Containment pressure
- Containment humidity
- Containment floor and equipment sump level.
RO I * (Step 1 3.d) Check TD CA pump OFF.
BOP NOTE: TheTDCAPumpis running.
- (Step 13.d RNO) IF operation of TD CA Examiner NOTE: CRS may pump is causing uncontrolled cooldown direct that the TDCA Pump be AND flow from TD CA pump not stopped per the OP.
required, THEN stop TD CA pump PER If so continue as scripted 0P111A16250/002 (Auxiliary Feedwater System) Enclosure 4.4 (Manual If NOT, continue with the Operation of #1 TD CA Pump) remaining steps of AP-1 on Page 20.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.
0P111A162501002, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, MANUAL OPERATION OF #1 TD CA PUMP
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs NOTE: The CRS/BOP may that may impact performance of this call WCC/IAE to address the procedure. R&Rs on the TDCA Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none exist.
BOP (Step 3.2) Ensure that a pre-job briefing has NOTE: The CRS may call been performed that includes discussion of WCC/IAE to address the reactivity management concerns with this R&Rs on the TDCA Pump.
procedure.
BOP (Step 3.3) IF #1 TD CA Pump to be operated NOTE: The pump is NOT to locally... be operated locally.
BOP (Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable:
. Section 3.6, Stopping #1 TD CA Pump BOP (Step 3.6) Stopping #1 TD CA Pump
. IF stopping pump following EP/AP, NOTE: The CRS may decide check TURB depressed on the to take this action if the OP following: was entered from APi.
. CA Modulating Valves Reset Train A
. CA Modulating Valves Reset Train B
. IF operating #1 TD CA Pump locally... NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally.
- Ensure the following closed:
- 1CA-64AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1A SIG Control)
- 1CA-52AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to lB SIG Control)
- 1CA-48AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1C 5/0 Control)
- 1CA-36AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1 D S/G Control)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 20 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently BOP
- Ensure RESET lit on TD CA Pump Auto Start Reset.
- Place #1 TD CA Pump in STOP.
- Ensure the following closed:
- 1SA-48ABC (1C SIG SM Supply To NOTE: The CRS will Ui TD CA Pump Turb Isol) recognize that 1SA-48ABC has failed OPEN.
Because of this the CRS may dispatch an AO to locally close the upstream isolation valve 1 SA-1. The only other choice is to leave the TDCA Pump running.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as AO.
Booth Instructor: Wait 3 minutes and Insert REM SA000I = 0.0; then call as AO and report that 1 SA-1 is CLOSED.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
APIIIAI5500IOI, STEAM LEAK Examiner NOTE: Continue here if the OP is NOT used to stop TDCA Pump.
BOP * (Step 1 3.e) Check valves on STEAM NOTE: One or more of these LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1 MC-9) valves may be cycling. The CLOSED. RNO will direct closing the valves.
CRS * (Step 1 3.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE for AS Header pressure.
GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.
If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is zl000 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 21 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently (Step 1 3.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks. an AC to look for leaks.
If so, Floor Instructor:
acknowledge.
Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.
NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the Steam Dump valve opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.
BOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP.
CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:
Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2.
Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria: the startup.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
. Size of leak
. Location of leak
. Rate of depletion of secondary inventory
. IF steam is leaking from a secondary NOTE: No Relief Valve is heater relief OR MSR relief valve, leaking.
THEN reducing turbine load....
. IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak NOTE: A Turbine Trip is NOT (such as feedwater heater leak or needed to isolate the steam MSR leak)... leak.
Check unit shutdown or load reduction NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED. Reduction will NOT be required.
CRS (Step 1 S.c RNO) Perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 22 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.
Exit this procedure.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, And 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One steam A.1 Restore 7 days supply to steam supply turbine driven to AND AFW pump OPERABLE 10 days form inoperable status. discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. One AFW B.1 Restore AFW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train train to inoperable in OPERABLE AND MODE 1, 2, status. 10 days from or 3 for discovery of reasons failure to meet other than the LCO Condition A.
C. Required C.1 Be in Action and MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will associated determine that ACTION A, B Completion AND and C must be entered.
Time for Condition A C.2 Be in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The CRS will note that this or B not MODE 4. condition requires a plant met. shutdown.
Q Two AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1,2, or3.
SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be FUNCTIONAL.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 24 of 60 Event
Description:
TDCA Pump starts inadvertently CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that SLC 16.9.7 A. One or more A.1 Verify the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ACTION A is applicable.
required SSS FUNCTIONA components LITY of fire identified in detection and Table 16.9.7- suppression 1 non- systems in functional. the associated areas identified in Tablel 6.9.7-AND A.2 Restore the 7 days component to FUNCTIONAL status.
NOTE: CRS will Call WCC/Management to address the CA inoperability.
When this occurs, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and as Station Management direct the crew to be in Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> due to the inoperability and the impending bad weather.
When the crew enters AP-4 move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 25 of 60 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Ultimately, the crew will enter AP111A1550014, Rapid Downpower.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER ROl (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO.
RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.
RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton.
CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 DESIRED.
CRS (Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate:
. Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% PowerDESIRED
. At least two CA pumps -
FUNCTIONAL.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 26 of 60 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:
IF Mode 3 is timed critical AND the reactor will be shutdown by manually inserting control rods, THEN allow an additional 45 minutes to reach Mode 3 once turbine load reduction is complete.
. IF turbine will be shutdown during downpower, THEN enter target load of 15 MWE in turbine control panel.
. Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.
CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/rn in). load at 1O MWe/minute.
RO (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO.
RO (Step 9RNO) Perform the following:
- IF auto control available, THEN perform the following:
- Place control rods in auto.
- GOTOStep1O.
BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge.
RO (Step 1 1) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.
BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:
. Energize all backup Pzr heaters.
- Check unit to be shutdown VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER. shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 27 of 60 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.
- Determine boration amount based on the following:
- Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm)
. Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)
. Total Power change (%).
- Record calculated boration amount: 800 NOTE: Based on the rate of gallons. load reduction the total boration is 800 gallons.
- Check auto or manual rod control AVAILABLE.
- Perform boration in 4 equal additions NOTE: The CRS may assign during load reduction PER the BOP to perform this action.
OP/i IA/61 50/009 (Boron Concentration If so, BOP Examiner follow Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using actions of Enclosure 4.7.
1 NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).
OPIIIAI6I 50/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7 BORATION USING INV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS)
BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.
BOP (Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per 0P111A161001003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable:
- Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14.1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 28 of 60 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid
. Ensure one of the following running:
. lABATransPump OR
. lB BA Trans Pump
. Determine length of time 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open as follows: (R.M.)
BOP IF using Table 4.7-1 (Time 1 NV NOTE: The BOP will 265B Full Open With One BAT determine that 1 NV-265 must Pump Running), record time 1NV- be open for 138 seconds.
265B full open from table: sec.
. IF using equation
. Open 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric NOTE: When the BOP opens Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.) 1 NV-265 the Turbine Control will fail to MANUAL.
HOLD until 1NV-265B (Ui NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1 NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup lsol). (R.M.)
. IF 1NV-265B (Ui NV Boric Acid Sup sd) will NOT close...
IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following:
. Ensure the following off:
. lABATransPump
. iBBATransPump
. Ensure one of the following selected to AUTO:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 29 of 60 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. lABATransPump OR
. iBBATransPump When the Turbine Shifts to Manual, move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 30 of 60 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Unit failure During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-IIF-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/11A163001001A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change.
Booth Operator Instructions: (Turbine Control Fails to MANUAL) Set in initial conditions. Triggered from INV-265B open light ON.
Indications Available:
. Turbine MWe indication stabilizes
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will continue in AP-4 while the ARP/OP are addressed.
MCB ANNUNCIATOR IAD-11F4, TURBINE IN MANUAL RO Immediate Action: Ensure Turbine/Generator NOTE: The Turbine will operation stabilizes in either Load or Speed stabilize in LOAD Mode.
Modes of operation.
CRS (Step 1) Determine cause and effect, then NOTE: The CRS may call notify IAE of any malfunction. WCC/IAE to address the Turbine Control failure.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WOO.
RO (Step 2) Refer to OP/1/A16300/001 A NOTE: The RO will continue (Turbine-Generator Load Change) for the load reduction in MANUAL.
manual operation of Turbine Generator.
CRS (Step 3) WHEN available and desired, return DEH to OPER AUTO.
0P111A163001001 A, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 31 of 60 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Unit failure Time j Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load RO (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO...
RO (Step 3.5.3) IF Turbine in MANUAL perform the following:
. Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.
. If turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.
. IF raising load,
. IF decreasing load, depress GV LOWER.
Examiner NOTE: It may be necessary to allow the crew to stabilize the plant prior to moving to Event 6.
AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.
RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL.
CRS (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD NOTE: This is a Continuous BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is Action. The CRS will make lit, THEN perform one of the following to both board operators aware.
comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 32 of 60 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Unit failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
. Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.
. Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits.
CRS (Step 16) IF AT ANYTIME during this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure C-7A is received, THEN ensure Action. The CRS will make Transient Monitor freeze is triggered, both board operators aware.
CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
. RPIOIN5700I000 (Classification of Emergency)
. RPIOIAI5700IO1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).
CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of NOTE: The CRS may call load reduction. WCC/RE to address the load reduction.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.
Examiner NOTE: The CRS may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while waiting for the BOP to complete the first boration.
If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration and then proceed to the next event.
(Step 19) Check target load LESS THAN 1000 MW.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 33 of 60 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Unit failure (Step 20) Check Unit 2 available to supply aux steam as follows:
. Unit 2 Reactor power GREATER THAN NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO 15% for status.
Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is at 100%
power.
. Unit 2 AS-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr Control NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO Inlet Isol) OPEN for valve position.
Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 AS-12 is OPEN.
. Unit 2 AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO HEADER. for AS availability.
Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is available to supply AS Header.
(Step 21) Check SM flow on all S/Gs GREATER THAN 25%.
(Step 22) WHEN all SM flows are less than 75%, THEN ensure the following valves ramp CLOSED:
. 1CF-1O4AB (1A SIG CF Control Bypass)
. 1CF-1O5AB (lB SIG CF Control Bypass)
. 1CF-1O6AB (1C SIG CF Control Bypass)
. iCE-i O7AB (1D SIG CF Control Bypass)
EXAMINER NOTE: The crew will continue in AP4 as Event 6 is ramping in.
Move to Event #6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 34 of 60 Event
Description:
High Vibration on lB NCP After this, a high vibration condition will develop on the 1 B NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, lB NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM),
and enter API1IAI5500/08, Malfunction of NC Pump. Ultimately, the vibration condition will rise above the Hi-Hi threshold requiring tripping of the reactor and stopping the NCP.
The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EPI1IAJ5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-NCPOO3B=4.6 (HI Vibration Alarm) insertMAL-NCPOO3B=5.1 Cd X05_001 El 1_I = I (Hi Vibration Alarm Ramp = 300 seconds) (HI-HI Vibration Alarm)
Indications Available:
. OAC Alarm: lB NC Pump Vibration
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-61E-11 NC Pump Hi Vibration
. 1 B NC Pump hi vibration on NC Pump Vibration Monitor NOTE: The performance of Step 5 of AP8 will be dependent upon the timing addressing the procedure (i.e.
Step 5 may be performed when Hi-Hi Vibration exceeds setpoint).
AP111A15500108, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP CASE Ill, EXCESSIVE VIBRATION BOP (Step 1) Check NC Pump vibration problem KNOWN TO BE VALID.
BOP (Step 2) Check affected NC pump vibration indication within operating limits:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 35 of 60 Event
Description:
High Vibration on I B NCP
. Motor frame vibration LESS THAN 5 NOTE: The Pump Shaft MILS Vibration will be> 15 mils.
. All of the following LESS THAN 20 MILS
. Motor shaft vibration
. Pump shaft vibration
. Motor axial vibration
. Motor flywheel vibration CR5 (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME vibration exceeds NOTE: CRS will make crew operating limits, THEN GO TO Step 5 aware.
CRS (Step 4) GO TO Step 6 CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on the paging system.
CRS (Step 7) Check NC pumps ANY RUNNING
- NOTE: All 4 NCPs are currently running. The CRS will direct the crew to continue monitoring NCP vibrations until the Hi Hi Vibration alarm actuates. When alarm occurs, the crew will go to Step 5.
BOP (Step 5) Stop affected NC pump as follows:
. IF A or B NC pump is the affected pump, Then CLOSE associated spray valve:
- 1 NC-27C (1A NC Loop PZR Spray Control).
- 1 NC-29C (1 B NC Loop PZR Spray Control).
- Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2.
- Trip reactor BOP
- WHEN reactor power less than 5%,
THEN stop affected NC pump.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 36 of 60 Event
Description:
High Vibration on lB NCP Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRITICAL TASK (SS) Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%.
Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48%
power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates mis-operation or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).
- GO TO EP/1IAI5000IE-O (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection).
When the crew trips the reactor move to Events #7-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Following the plant trip, a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWIS) will occur prematurely and the Main Turbine will fail to trip automatically or manually; and the operator will be required to manually close the Turbine Governor Valves. It is likely that SI will actuate due to the delayed Turbine isolation. At the same time, the TDCA Pump, if not already running, will start on low Steam Generator levels. If the TDCA Pump was not running at the start of the event, it will trip on overspeed upon startup. If the TDCA Pump was running at the start of the event, it will trip when the operator initiates flow to the Steam Generators. Furthermore, the 1A MDCA Pump will trip on overcurrent during pump startup, and any attempts to restart the pump will be unsuccessful. Consequently, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur shortly after SI actuation, or upon the transition to EPI1IAI5000IES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response. The operator will transition from EPI1IAI5000IE-O to EPI1IN5OOO/FRH.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-O. The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-O, or ES-O.1, after the secondary heat sink has been restored.
Booth Operator Instructions: The following will occur on the Rx trip:
- insert MAL-ISEOO7A ACT_AUTO cd=H_XO1_094_2 EQ 1 (FWIS Train A)
- insert MAL-ISEOO7B ACT_AUTO cdH_XO1_094_2 EQ 1 (FWIS Train B)
- insertMAL-DEHOO3A = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Auto Trip)
- insertMAL-DEHOO3B = TRUE (Main Turbine fails to Manually Trip)
- insert MAL-CAOO5 TRIP cdH_X01094_2 EQ 1 delayO (TDCA Overspeed Trip occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light)
NOTE: When an AO is dispatched to check the IA MDCA Pump Breaker.
Acknowledge as AO. Wait five minutes and report back that the breaker has an overcurrent lockout relay showing, and the motor smells of burnt insulation.
NOTE: When an AO is dispatched to check the ITDCA Pump. Wait five minutes and report back that the TDCA Turbine has overspeed and will NOT reset.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/B-1 through 4, SIG A-D LEVEL DEVIATION
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-4/C-1 through 4, SIG A-D FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-4/E-1 through 4, S/G A-D LO LEVEL ALERT
. RED Path on Heat Sink.
NOTE: If the TDCA Pumps is still running from a previous malfunction, the BOP may attempt to open the CA Control Valves to prevent the Red Path on Heat Sink.
However, the TDCA will overspeed shortly after event initiation.
EPIIIAI5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action
. All rod bottom lights LIT
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
. JR amps - GOING DOWN.
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
RO (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action
. Trip turbine.
. IF turbine will not trip, THEN perform the NOTE: Turbine will NOT trip following: manually.
. Place turbine in manual.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. CLOSE governor valves in fast action.
. IF governor valves will not close...
CRITICAL TASK:
(E-O Q) Manually close the Main Turbine Governor Valves before an Orange path develops on the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when conditions exist that allow the operator to do so, constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance that unnecessarily challenges the Subcriticality or Integrity Critical Safety Function.
Additionally, failure to isolate steam to the Main Turbine reduces Steam Generator Inventory when the CA System is in an inoperable condition, and could unnecessarily result in a challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function, including the need to implement Bleed and Feed cooling of the NC; and ultimately challenging the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED.
NOTE: Depending on the timing of diagnosis of the failure of the Main Turbine to trip, the crew may or may not actuate SI.
The script assumes that SI has occurred, and that FR-H.1 will be entered later.
If SI is NOT actuated the crew will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, and with the RED Path on Heat Sink active, transition to FR-H.1 instead. If so, Examiners move forward to Page 42.
RO! (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.
RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) LIT.
BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK.
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):
. Groups 1,2, 5DARK.
. Group3LIT.
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED.
. Group 6LIT.
- GOTOSteplO.
RO! (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:
- MDCApumpsON (Step lOa RNO) Start pumps
- NIR level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.
(Step lOb RNO) EnsureTD CA pump on.
BOP (Step 1 1) Check all KC pumps - ON
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFailure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.
. Start 2A RN pump.
. THROTTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:
for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delayo ramplo (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)
RO (Step 14) Check all SIG pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.
BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is normal.
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:
- Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.
- Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.
BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:
- Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running_pump(s) OPEN:
- 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).
- IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A15000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.
acknowledge as OSM.
(Step 18) Check CA flow:
. Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
(Step 18 RNO) Perform the following:
IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11%
(32% ACC), THEN perform the following:
. Ensure correct valve alignment.
. Start CA pumps.
IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 1 1%
(32% ACC) AND feed flow greater than 450 GPM cannot be established, THEN perform the following:
. Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).
. GO TO EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).
Examiner NOTE: It is expected that the Red Path on Heat Sink will exist by this time.
The CRS will transition to FR H.1.
EP/IIA/5000IFR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CRS (Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 NOTE: This condition is NOT GPM due to operator action.., met, and the crew will remain in FR-Hi.
RO! (Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is BOP required:
. NC pressure GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE.
. Any NC T-Hot GREATER THAN 350°F NOTE: A Secondary Heat Sink (347° F ACC). is required.
ROI (Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page.
BOP BOP (Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps AVAILABLE:
. lANVpump OR
- lBNVpump.
RO (Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated:
- Check W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs LESS THAN 24% (36% ACC).
RO/ (Step 5.a RNO) Perform the following:
. Monitor feed and bleed initiation criteria.
. WHEN criteria satisfied, THEN GO TO NOTE: This is a Continuous Step 22. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.
- GO TO Step 6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 6) Ensure SIG B8 and NM valves NOTE: The CRS may assign CLOSED PER Enclosure 3 (S/G 88 and the BOP (RO) to perform this Sampling Valve Checklist), action.
If so, BOP (RO) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.
Others should move ahead to Step 7 on Page 45 to continue in FR-Hi.
EPII!AJ5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 3, SIG BB AND SAMPLING VALVE CHECKLIST BOP (Step 1) Check the following valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the (RO) CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.
. 1BB-1B (1A SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED
. 1 BB-2B (18 SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED
. 188-38 (1 C SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED
. 1BB-4B (1D SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) CLOSED
. 1 BB-5A (A SIG BB Cont Inside Isol) -
CLOSED
. 1BB-6A (B S/G 88 Cont Inside Isol) -
CLOSED
. 1 BB-7A (C SIG 88 Cont Inside lsol) -
CLOSED
. 1 BB-8A (D SIG 88 Cont Inside Iso!) -
CLOSED
. 1NM-187A (1A SIG Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) CLOSED BOP
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
. 1NM-201A (lB SIG Blowdawn Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isal) CLOSED
. 1 NM-207A (1 C SIG Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) CLOSED
. 1NM-210A (1C SIG Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isal) CLOSED
. 1NM-221A (1D S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cant Outside Isal) CLOSED
. 1NM-191B (1AS/G Blowdawn Sample Hdr Cant Outside Isal) CLOSED
. 1NM-197B (lB SIG Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside sal) CLOSED BOP
- 1 NM-21 1 B (1 C SIG Blawdawn Sample Hdr Cant Outside Isal) CLOSED
- 1 NM-21 7B (1 D S/C Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside sal) CLOSED
- 1 NM-220B (1 D SIG Blawdawn Sample Cant Inside Isal) CLOSED EPIIIAJ5000IFR-H1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO (Step 7) Attempt ta establish CA flaw ta at Examiner NOTE: Examiners (BOP) least ane S/C as fallaws: NOT fallawing BOP (RO) actians in Enclasure 3, cantinue HERE.
- Check pawer ta bath MD CA pumps NOTE: The 1A MDCA Pump is AVAILABLE. OOS, and the 1 B MDCA Pump has failed upan Auta Start.
NOTE: 1 ETA and 1 ETB are bath energized.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWlSIFailure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.
Booth Instructor:
Acknowledge as AC. Wait five minutes and report back that the breaker has an overcurrent lockout relay showing, and the motor smells of burnt insulation.
- Ensure control room CA valves aligned NOTE: The CRS may assign (BOP) PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve Alignment), the RO (BOP) to perform this action.
If so, RO (BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.
Others should move ahead to Step 7.c on Page 49 to continue in FR-H.1.
EPIIIAJ5000IFR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 4, CA VALVE ALIGNMENT Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 4 if RO (BOP) is assigned by CRS to perform.
RO (Step 1) Check the following valves - OPEN (BOP)
- 1CA-66AC (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1A SIG Isol) OPEN
- 1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A SIG Isol) OPEN
- 1CA-54AC (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B SIG Isol) OPEN
- 1 CA-58A (1 A CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol) OPEN
- 1CA-50B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1C SIG Isol) OPEN
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
. 1 CA-46B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 10 SIG Isol) OPEN
. 1CA-38B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1D SIG Isol) OPEN
. 1 CA-42B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Isol) OPEN RO (Step 2) Check the following valves - OPEN (BOP)
. 1CA-64B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control) OPEN
. 1CA-60A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A SIG Control) OPEN
. 1CA-52AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Control) OPEN
. 1CA-56A (1A CA Pump Disch To lB SIG Control) OPEN
. 1CA-48AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1C SIG Control) OPEN
. 1CA-44B (lB CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) OPEN
. 1CA-36AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Control) OPEN
. 1 CA-40B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 1 D S/G Control) OPEN RO (Step 3) Check CA Storage Tank (water (BOP) tower) level GREATER THAN 1.5 FT.
RO (Step 4) Check the following valves -
(BOP) CLOSED
. 1 RN-69A (1A RN Assured Supply TO Ui CA Isol) CLOSED
. 1CA-86A (Ui TD CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) CLOSED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
. 1CA-15A (1A CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) CLOSED
. 1RN-162B (18 RN Assured Supply To Ui CA Isol) CLOSED
. 1CA-1168 (Ui TD CA Pump Suction From lB RN Isol) CLOSED
. 1CA-18B (lB CA Pump Suction From lB RN Isol) CLOSED RO (Step 5) Check the following valves OPEN:
(BOP)
. 1 CA-i 1A (1A CA Pump Suction Isol) -
OPEN
. 1 CA-7AC (Ui TD CA Pump Suction Isol)
- OPEN
. 1CA-9B (18 CA Pump Suction Isol) -
OPEN RD (Step 6) GO TO Step 8.
(BOP)
RD (Step 8) Check 1CA-2 (Ui CA Pump Suct (BOP) From CA Storage Tank Isol) OPEN.
RD (Step 9) Check CA pump suction from UST (BOP) and CA Condensate Storage Tank (service bldg roof tank) valves CLOSED:
. 1CS-i8(U1 UST To CA Pump Suct Hdr Isol) CLOSED
. 1CA-4(U1 CAPumpsSuctFromSUT Isol) CLOSED
. 1CA-6(Ui CA PumpsSuct From CA CST Isol) CLOSED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 9 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start EPII!AI5000IFR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Examiner NOTE: Examiners NOT following RO (BOP) actions in Enclosure 4, continue HERE.
BOP (Step 7.c) Start all available CA pumps.
(RO)
BOP (Step 7.d) Check TD CA pump RUNNING. NOTE: The TDCA Pump is (RO) NOT running.
BOP (Step 7.d RNO) Perform the following as (RO) necessary:
. IF 1SA-48BC (SM From S!G C To TD CA NOTE: 1SA-48BC indicates Pump Isol) is closed, THEN... OPEN.
. IF 1SA-49AB (SM From S/G B to TD CA NOTE: 1SA-49AB indicates Pump Isol) is closed, THEN... OPEN.
CRS . IF TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT NOTE: The CRS will dispatch OPEN alarm (1AD-5, F-3) is lit, THEN an AO.
dispatch operator to reset 1SA-3 (Unit 1 Booth Instructor:
TD CA Pump Turb Stop Valve) PER Acknowledge as AO. Wait EP/1/A/5000!G-1 (Generic Enclosures),
five minutes and report back Enclosure 24 (Resetting TD CA Stop that the TDCA Turbine has Valve).
overspeed and will NOT reset.
CRS . IF reason for loss of steam supply to TD NOTE: The CRS will CA pump not determined,... determine from the AO report that the TDCA Pump is unavailable.
RO/ (Step 7.e) Check total flow to S/G(s) NOTE: There is no feedwater BOP GREATER THAN 450 GPM. flow.
ROt (Step 7.e RNO) Perform the following:
. IF only one MD CA pump is on,... NOTE: There are no MDCA Pumps running.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start IF any CA pump is started,... NOTE: There are no CA Pumps running.
IF any feed flow to at least on SIG is NOTE: There is no feedwater indicated,.., flow.
- IF no feed flow indicated, THEN perform the following:
- IF no CA pump can be started, NOTE: The CRS may call THEN dispatch operator and WCC/IAE to address the CA maintenance to CA pumps to try to Pump situation.
restore one CA pump to service.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
(Local CA Valve Alignment).
Booth Instructor:
Acknowledge as AC.
Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes report completion.
- GO TO Step 8.
RO (Step 8) Check steam dumps as follows:
- Check condenser available as follows:
- C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1SI-18) -
LIT
- STEAM DUMP SELECT - IN T-AVG MODE.
- Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:
- Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in manual.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
. Adjust STM PRESS CONTROLLER output to equal STEAM DUMP DEMAND signal.
. Place STEAM DUMP SELECT in steam pressure mode.
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in auto.
BOP (Step 9) Stop all NC pumps.
BOP (Step 10) Reset Feedwater Isolation as follows:
. Check any Condensate Booster pump ON.
Check the following alarms DARK.
. 1AD-5, G-6 (Inner Doghouse Level Hi)
. 1AD-5, H-6 (Outer Doghouse Level Hi).
- Dispatch operator to block Feedwater NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Isolation signal PER Enclosure 7 an AO.
(Feedwater Isolation Override). Booth Instructor:
Acknowledge as AO.
Booth Instructor: dellA MAL ISEOO7A 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) dellA MAL-ISEOO7B 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISEOO7A =
BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISEOO7B =
BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS)
As AO, report completion.
Booth instructor: do not delay performance of enclosure 7
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start BOP
- Check S/I HAS BEEN ACTUATED. NOTE: SI may have been actuated.
- Reset the following:
- S/I
- Sequencers BOP . IF AT ANY TIME a B/C signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on.
BOP . Do not continue until Enclosure 7 (Feedwater Isolation Override) is completed.
BOP (Step 11) Check CM System in service:
. Hotwell pump(s) - ON
. Condensate Booster pump(s) ON.
RO! (Step 12) Check CF pumps AT LEAST NOTE: Both CF Pumps are BOP ONE AVAILABLE TO START. available to start.
CRS (Step 13) Establish CF flow PER Enclosure 8 (Re-establishing CF Flow).
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 8.
EP/11A15000/FR-H.I, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 8, RE-ESTABLISHING CF FLOW RO (Step 1) Place the following valves in manual and CLOSE:
- S/G CF control valves
- S/G CF control bypass valves.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start RO (Step 2) CLOSE the following CF control isolation valves:
. CLOSE ICF-31 (1A SIG CF Control Inlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-33 (1A SIG CF Control Outlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-22 (lB S/G CF Control Inlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-24 (lB SIG CF Control Outlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-19 (1C S/G CF Control Inlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-21 (1C S/G CF Control Outlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-16 (1D SIG CF Control Inlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1 CF-i 8 (1 D S/G CF Control Outlet Isol).
BOP (Step 3) Depress and release the Feedwater Isolation reset pushbuttons.
RO! (Step 4) Check any CF pump RESET.
BOP CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 13.
RO! (Step 13) Depress RESET on iA OR lB BOP CF PUMP RECIRC VALVE CLOSURE CIRCUIT and check RESET light lit.
RO! (Step 14) Reset CF pump turbine that will be BOP placed in service as follows:
. Depress RESET and hold RESET 2-3 seconds after the RST light is lit on pump to be started.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 5 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFailure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
. Check CF pump turbine to be started RESET.
RD (Step 15) Align AS header as follows:
. CLOSE 1AS-9 (Ui C Htr Bleed To AS Hdr Isol).
- Check Unit 2 as follows:
. Unit 2 Reactor power GREATER NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to THAN 15% report power level.
If so, Floor Instructor report 100% as U2 RD.
- report valve position.
If so, Floor Instructor report 2AS-12 is OPEN.
If so, Floor Instructor report U2 AS is available.
ROt
- IF AT ANY TIME AS header NOTE: This is a Continuous pressure cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make greater than 140 PSIG while both board operators aware.
performing the following step, THEN GO TO Step 15.e.
ROt
CRS (Step 1 5.d) GO TO Step 16.
ROt (Step 16) Check 1HM-95 (Ui Aux Steam NOTE: 1HM-95 is CLOSED.
BOP Supply to CF Pumps Turbine Isol) OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start ROI (Step 17) CLOSE the following valves:
. CLOSE 1CF-35AB (1AS/G CF Cont Outside Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-3OAB (lB SIG CF Cont Outside Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-28AB (1C S/C CF Cont Outside Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-26AB (1D SIG CF Cont Outside Isol).
RO! (Step 18) Check lACE pumpTO BE BOP PLACED IN SERVICE.
RO! (Step 19) Place 1A CF pump in service as BOP follows:
. Place the following in auto:
. 1A CF pump turbine low pressure governor control.
. 1A CF pump turbine high pressure governor control.
. OPEN stop valves by depressing RAISE on lA CF PUMP TURBINE HP-LP SV until MAX light is lit on the following:
. 1 SP-1 5 (1 A CFPT Turb Hi Press Step_valve)
. 1HM-l57 (1A CFPT Turb Lo Press Step_valve)
. Adjust 1A CF pump turbine speed using NOTE: S/G pressures are control located on low pressure governor 1100 psig.
controller to establish CF HEADER PRESSURE 50-1 00 PSIG above SIG pressure.
CRS (Step 1 9.d) GO TO Step 21.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start ROI (Step 21) Check feed and bleed NOTE: Feed and Bleed has BOP ESTABLISHED IN BODYOF THIS NOT been established.
PROCEDURE.
ROI (Step 21 RNO) Perform the following:
BOP WHEN restoring feed flow in next steps, THEN control feed flow as required to raise SIG levels while preventing an uncontrolled NC system cooldown.
CRS . GO TO Step 25.
RO (Step 25) OPEN the following valve(s) for the S/Gs to be fed:
. 1CF-126B (1A SIG CF To CA Nozzle Isol)
. 1 CF-i 27B (1 B SIG CF To CA Nozzle Isol)
. 1CF-i28B (iC SIG CF TO CA Nozzle Isol)
. 1 CF-i 29B (1 D SIG CF To CA Nozzle Isol).
RO (Step 26) Establish feed flow to desired SIG(s) as follows:
. THROTTLE OPEN SIG CF control bypass valve for SIG(s) to be fed.
. Monitor CF pump discharge pressure NOTE: This is a Continuous and adjust CF pump speed as needed to Action. The CRS will make maintain CF HEADER PRESSURE 50- both board operators aware.
100 PSIG above S/G pressure.
. IF AT ANY TIME SIG CF control bypass NOTE: This is a Continuous valves are throttled closed, THEN ensure Action. The CRS will make pump speed is controlled at same time to both board operators aware.
avoid a CF pump trip on high discharge pressure_(1435_PSIG).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/IA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 27) Check Step 23 or 24 in this NOTE: Step 23 or 24 have enclosure IMPLEMENTED.
NOT been implemented.
RO (Step 27 RNO) Perform the following:
. WHEN S/G N/R level is greater than 1 1%
(32% ACC), THEN control CF flow to maintain N/R level between 11% (32%
ACC) and 50%.
CRITICAL TASK (FR-H.1) Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.
CRS (Step 27 RNO b) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure.
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Step 14 of FR-H.1.
EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.I, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ROI (Step 14) Check SIG levels:
. N/R level in at least on S/G GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).
RO/ (Step 14 RNO a) Perform the following:
. IF feed flow to at least on S/G is indicated, THEN maintain flow to restore N/R level to between 1 1 % (32% ACC) and 50%.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWISIFaiIure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
. IF feed flow not ndicated, THEN NOTE: Feed flow is indicated.
. Check feed and bleed ESTABLISHED PER STEP 23 through 27.
CRS (Step 14 RNO b) Return to procedure and NOTE: The CRS will transition step in effect. to E-0 or ES-0.1 if the transition into FR-H.1 came from ES-0.1.
Examiner Note: If the transition is made to ES-0.1, move to Termination of the Exam.
EPIIIAI5000!E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:
. IFanyNCpumpon...
. IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557° F (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
. Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
(Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 60 Event
Description:
Premature FWIS/Failure of Main Turbine to Trip I Overspeed Trip of TDCA PumpIlA MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP.
. All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.
(Step 23) Check if SIG tubes intact:
. The following secondary EMFs NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-34(L) (SIG Sample (Lo Range))
. 1 EMF-24 (S/G_A)
. 1 EMF-25 (S/G_B)
. 1 EMF-26 (S/G_C)
. 1 EMF-27 (S/G_D)
. S/G levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.
(Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows:
. 1 EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR)) NORMAL
. 1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) NORMAL
. 1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine) -
NORMAL
. Check containment pressure LESS THAN 1 PSIG
. Check containment sump level NORMAL.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
UNIT I STATUS:
Power Level: 100% NCS [B] 925 ppm Pzr [B]: 925 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 178 days Core Burnup: 251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/i /A161 00/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:
- The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:
- The 18 MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B.
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, C-6, GLYCOL EXPANSION TNK HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Crew Directions:
- Maintain current plant conditions.
Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214)
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N14-l Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is 005 due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Event Ma If. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAL 2 C-RO Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure MGOO1 C-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP 1 B RN Pump Trip RNOO7B C(TS)-SRO 4 MAL C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in EPOO3C AUTO/Stuck Rod/ Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction IREOO9 C-BOP IREO1OD12 C(TS)-SRO MAL 5 M-RO LOOP/A EDG fails to start in AUTO/B EDG fails to start EPOO1 EQBOO3A -
M-SRO DGOO1B MAL 6 M-RO Pzr Steam Space Break NCO14A M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA 1NI-9AI1OB fail to OPEN automatically NIOO9A NIOO9B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214)
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MOB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%
starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
During the power increase, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail causing the Main Generator to operate outside the Capability Curve. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY, and enter AP/1/A15500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.
Next, the lB RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/20, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (COW) System, 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating).
Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position. While the plant is stabilizing a Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail As-Is causing Pzr pressure to lower, and requiring the operator to manually close the Spray Valve. After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod and/or AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, to address the failed Pressurizer Spray Valve. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
Shortly afterwards, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will fail to start automatically, and the lB DG will fail to start at all. The operator will enter EP/l/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EPI1IAI5000IECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. Within ECA-0.0, the operator will take action to manually start the 1A DG. Upon restoration of power to 1 ETA, the operator will transition to E-0.
Upon return to E-0, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Safety Injection. Upon the trip, 1NI-9 and 10 will fail to auto open, and the operator will be required to open at least one of these valves manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EPI1IAI5000/ES-1 .2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
Critical Tasks:
E-OC Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA 0.0.
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity.
Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS.
E-0 J Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E 0.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation (1NI-9/10) constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-2
REFERENCES:
- 1. SLC 16.7.6, Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Rev 14)
- 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS-Operating (Amendment 184/166)
- 3. OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Rev 185)
- 4. OPI1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121)
- 5. OP/1/A/6300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11)
- 6. AP/l/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances (Rev 11)
- 7. AP/l/A/5500/20, Loss of RN (Rev 31)
- 8. SLC 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating) (Rev 101)
- 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) (Amendment 184/166)
- 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System (Amendment 265/245)
- 11. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 221/203)
- 14. AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection (Rev 28)
- 15. AP/1/A/5500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies (Rev 11)
- 16. AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction (Rev 16)
- 17. Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits (Amendment 184/166)
- 18. Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (Amendment 184/1 66)
- 19. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33)
- 20. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power (Rev 34)
- 21. EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev 15)
- 22. EP!1/A/5000/ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization (Rev 16)
Validation Time: 120 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.
Facility Review:
Rev. 050214 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, SIG Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAC 2 C-RO Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure MGOO1 C-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP lB RN Pump Trip RNOO7B C(TS)-SRO 4 MAL C-RO Zone 18 Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in EPOO3C AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction C BOP IREOO9 -
IREO1OD12 C(TS)-SRO MAC 5 M-RO LOOP/A EDG fails to start in AUTO/B EDG fails to start EPOO1 M-BOP EQBOO3A M-SRO DGOO1B MAC 6 M-RO Pzr Steam Space Break NCO14A M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA 1NI-9AI1OB fail to OPEN automatically NIOO9A NIOO9B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. 1EMF34, SIG Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with .4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1!A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
During the power increase, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail causing the Main Generator to operate outside the Capability Curve. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY, and enter AP/1/A15500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.
Next, the 1 B RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/20, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating).
Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position. While the plant is stabilizing a Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail As-Is causing Pzr pressure to lower, and requiring the operator to manually close the Spray Valve. After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod and/or AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, to address the failed Pressurizer Spray Valve. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
Shortly afterwards, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will fail to start automatically, and the 1 B DG will fail to start at all. The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EP/1/A15000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.
Within ECA-0.0, the operator will take action to manually start the 1A DG. Upon restoration of power to 1 ETA, the operator will transition to E-0.
Upon return to E-0, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Safety Injection. Upon the trip, 1NI-9 and 10 will fail to auto open, and the operator will be required to Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 open at least one of these valves manually. Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EP/11A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EP/1 IAI5000IES-1 .2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
Critical Tasks:
E-OC Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA-O.O.
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS.
E-O J Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-O.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation (1NI-9/1O) constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q Reset to Temp IC 241 T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-37):
(Originally IC-37).
insert LOA-NI014 = Racked_OUT; insert LOA NIOI4A = Racked_OUT (IA NI Pump is OOS) insert MAL-EMF-34L = 10; insert MAL-EMF-34H
=10 (IEMF34i500S) insert OVR-IADIO_E02 = ON (MCB Annunciator IADIOIE2)
From IC-241 Per Lesson Plan 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 2 insertMAL-NIOO9A = TRUE (Failure of INI-9A) insertMAL-NIOO9B = TRUE (Failure of INI-IOB)
Q RUN Place Tagout/O-Stick on:
IA NI Pump (Tagout)
Reset all SLIMs IEMF34 (0-stick)
MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2 (0-stick)
Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.
Setup OAC Q Freeze.
Q Update Fresh Tech.
Spec. Log.
Q Fill out the A0s Available section of Shift Turnover Info.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase.
- 4. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OPI1/A161001003 marked up as follows:
. Step 2.3 initialed.
. Note prior to Step 3.1 checked.
. Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.
. Step 3.2 initialed.
. Step 3.3 initialed.
. Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked.
. Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.36.10 is entered.
. Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked.
. Step 3.3.4 Initialed.
- 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N 14-1-2.
Q At direction of Event 1 Power Increase examiner Q At direction of Event 2 Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure examiner inse MAL-MG001 95 rampl2O seconds Q At direction of Event 3 1 B RN Pump Trip examiner insertMAL-RNOO7B =
TRUE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q At direction of Event 4 Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to examiner move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve insert MALEPOO3C = Malfunction ACTIVE insert MAL-IREOO9 =
FAIL_OF_AUTO NOTE: insertLOA-IPBOO3 Override when directed.
Insert MAL IREOIODI2
=TRUE REM-NCOO27C = 0.3 REM-NCOO27C = 0.0 cdXlO 605 1 =1 (Delete eme NOTE: The Pzr Spray Valve will fail at function when beginning of Step 11 of AP-3 Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE)
Q At direction of Event 5 LOOP/A EDG fails to start in AUTO/B EDG fails to examiner . start insert MAL-EPOOI ACTIVE (Loss of Offsite PowerISBO) insert MAL-DGOOIB =
TRUE (lB DIG Fails to Start) insert MAL-EQBOO3A =
ON_BLACKOUT (IA DG fails in AUTO due to a Sequencer failure)
Q At direction of Event 6 Pzr Steam Space Break examiner insert MAL-NCOI4A = NOTE: insertLOA-NFOI6 = STOP when 1.5 ramp45 directed.
Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 1NI-9A/1OB fail to OPEN automatically insertMAL-NIOO9A = This malfunction will occur on Safety Injection TRUE Actuation (Set at T = 0).
insertMAL-NIOO9B =
TRUE Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 73 Event
Description:
Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%
starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/11A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/i /A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.36.10) Prior to increasing to greater NOTE: The power increase than 75% RTP, check all governor valves will be at 2 MWe/minute.
open.
RO! (Step 3.36.1 1) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, NOTE: Based on the extent of OTDT DCS alarming as follows: the power increase, this action BOP may or may not be taken.
. On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU.
. Select TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS &
ALARM CHECKING graphic.
. Select ON for the following:
. NCAA 5422
. NCAA 5462
. NCAA 5502
. NCAA 5542
. OTDELTAT-FAIL (Step 3.36.12) IF startup from refueling outage
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 73 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.36.13) IF performing Generator/Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) testing at 78% RTP...
0P111A16150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.
BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)
. Total Reactor Makeup Water: NOTE: Total makeup is 200 gallons.
BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero:
(R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller.
BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1 NV-i 71 A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 73 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water MIU Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.
desired flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANYTIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:
(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.
(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANYTIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:
(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.
(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (Ui NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level.
Contrl).
(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.
(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).
BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANYTIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:
(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)
(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 73 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.
BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.
BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-i7lA is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO.
check 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.
BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.
BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:
. Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR
. Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)
(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:
. iA Rx M/U Water Pump
. lB Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 73 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control)
. 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl)
. 1NV-i7iA(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control)
BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-i7lA(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.1 1 Flow Control was NOT adjusted.
BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-i37A(U1 NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender.... NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.
BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.
BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.
BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 73 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.
0P111A163001001 A, TURBI N E-GEN ERATOR STARTU PISHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5.2) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following:
(Step 3.5.2.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.
(Step 3.5.2.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.
(Step 3.5.2.3) Depress LOAD RATE.
(Step 3.5.2.4) Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 VARIABLE DISPLAY. MWe/Min loading rate.
(Step 3.5.2.5) Depress ENTER.
(Step 3.5.2.6) Depress REFERENCE.
(Step 3.5.2.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.
(Step 3.5.2.8) Depress ENTER.
(Step 3.5.2.9) Depress GO (Step 3.5.2.1 0) Check load changes at selected rate.
OPIIIAI6IOO/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.36.14) Continue power increase to NOTE: The power increase 95% RTP. will be at 2 MWe/minute.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 73 Event
Description:
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure During the power increase, the Main Generator Voltage Regulator will fail causing the Main Generator to operate outside the Capability Curve. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY, and enter AP111A15500105, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-MGOOI = 95, Ramp = 120 seconds.
Indications Available:
. Annunciator lAD-i, C/5, EXCITATION LIMITER IN ACTION
. OAC Alarm M1A0960, Ui GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY LO-LO
. MOB MVAR indication lower from 150 to -232
. Main Generator Power Factor moves to Leading 0.95
. Main Generator Voltage 25KV NOTE: The ORS may enter AP5 directly.
OAC ALARM M1A0960, UI GENERATOR MVAR PRIMARY ORS (Step 1) LO-LO 100 MVARs Leading (-100 MVARS)
. GO TO AP/1/A15500/05 (Generator NOTE: The CR5 will transition Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances). to AP5.
AP111A15500105, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES ORS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
CRS (Step 2) Ensure dispatcher is aware of NOTE: The CRS/BOP will problem. contact SOC.
Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 73 Event
Description:
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3) Notify Unit 2 to evaluate Floor Instructor: As U2 RO, implementing API2/A15500105 (Generator acknowledge.
Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances).
RD (Step 4) Check Unit 1 Generator TIED TD GRID.
RD (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is NOTE: This is a Continuous greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine Action. The CRS will make load to maintain reactor power less than both board operators aware.
100%.
RD (Step 6) Check Unit 1 Generator frequency-GREATER THAN 58.5 Hz.
RD (Step 7) Monitor Generator Capability Curve NOTE: The RD or BDP will as follows: most likely place Curve on DAC Screen.
. Check Generator voltage LESS THAN 24 Ky.
(Step 7a RNO) Perform the following:
. Monitor Generator Capability Curve PER Enclosure 1 (Generator Capability Curve 24KV).
. GDTDStep8.
RD (Step 8) Check Generator MVARs WITHIN NOTE: The MVARs will NDT LIMITS DF GENERATDR CAPABILITY be within the capability curve.
CURVE.
CRS (Step 8 RND) GD TD Step 11.
RD (Step 1 1) Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve by performing one of the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 73 Event
Description:
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Depress LOWER on the VOLTAGE ADJUST to reduce lagging MVARs OR
. Depress RAISE on the VOLTAGE NOTE: This adjustment will ADJUST to reduce leading MVARs. NOT be effective at controlling MVARs.
RO (Step 12) Check Generator MVARs NOTE: The MVARs will NOT WITHING LIMITS OF GENERATOR be within the capability curve.
CAPABILITY CURVE.
NOTE: If crew fails to recognize MVARS are outside the gen capability curve here, then at step 17, respond as Engineering to control MVAR as necessary to remain out of OAC alarm state.
NOTE: The RO may recognize that the Voltage Regulator is NOT operating correctly in AUTO, and take the Voltage Regulator to MANUAL.
RO (Step 12 RNO) IF actions in Step 11 do not restore MVARs, THEN perform the following:
. IF voltage regulator in AUTO, THEN perform the following:
. Place voltage regulator in MAN.
. Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve.
. IF unable to maintain MVARs within NOTE: The MVARs will be curve... able to be adjusted with the Voltage Regulator in MANUAL.
RO (Step 13) Monitor Generator frequency as follows:
. Check generator frequency BETWEEN 59.9 60.1 Hz.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 73 Event
Description:
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF AT ANY TIME generator frequency is NOTE: This is a Continuous abnormal OR TCCISOC reports Action. The CRS will make abnormal grid frequency condition, both board operators aware.
THEN GO TO Step 13d.
CRS . GOTOStep16.
RO (Step 16) Check if voltage regulator malfunction has occurred:
. Generator MVARs FLUCTUATED WITHOUT A KNOWN GRID DISTURBANCE IN EFFECT OR
. OAC turn on code MAINGEN INDICATES PROBLEM WITH VOLTAGE REGULATOR.
. VOLTAGE REGULATOR COMMON NOTE: The RO will conclude TROUBLE alarm (lAD-i, D-4) LIT. that a Voltage Regulator malfunction has occurred because it would NOT operate in AUTO.
CRS (Step 17) Contact the following personnel for NOTE: The CRS may call guidance: WCC to address the malfunction.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
. Engineering NOTE: If crew fails to recognize MVARS are outside the gen capability curve in Step 12, respond as Engineering to control MVAR as necessary to remain out of OAC alarm state.
. Maintenance Technical Support.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 18 of 73 Event
Description:
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 18) IF AT ANY TIME System NOTE: This is a Continuous Engineering or Maintenance Technical Action. The CRS will make Support request operation of the voltage both board operators aware.
regulator from the local panel, THEN dispatch licensed operator to perform applicable section(s) of OPI1IAJ6300IOO1 (Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown),
Enclosure 4.10 (Voltage Regulator Operation From Ui Gen Voltage Reg Local Control Panel).
RO (Step 19) Check voltage regulator IN - NOTE: The Voltage Regulator AUTO. is NOT in AUTO.
RO (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following:
Notify SOC of the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP will contact SOC.
Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.
. Unit 1 voltage regulator is in manual.
. Ensure Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) considers status of the Unit 1 voltage regulator.
WHEN Engineering or Maintenance NOTE: The investigation will directs restoring voltage regulator to continue.
AUTO, THEN perform the following:
. IF voltage regulator READY light is dark, THEN do not continue unless directed by maintenance.
. Place voltage regulator to AUTO.
. Notify SOC that Unit 1 voltage regulator has been placed in AUTO and to ensure Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) considers status of the voltage regulator.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 19 of 73 Event
Description:
Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 20) Check if TCC or SOC has reported any of the following:
Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicated that switchyard voltage would not be adequate should the unit trip.
OR Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicates that switchyard voltage would not be adequate if further grid degradation occurs.
. Red grid condition exists or is predicted within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
. Degraded 230 KV switchyard (grid) NOTE: SOC has NOT voltage or frequency condition exists. reported any of the listed conditions.
CRS (Step 20 RNO) GO TO Step 27.
CRS (Step 27) WHEN conditions return to normal, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.
. Check Generator frequency HAS REMAINED GREATER THAN 58.5 HZ.
. Check Unit 1 Generator TIED TO GRID.
. Ensure Unit 1 Generator Bus Voltage is adjusted PER Data Book, Enclosure 4.3, Table 3.1 .3, Generator Voltage Operating Schedule, including any operational restrictions.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Next, the 1 B RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP111A15500120, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating).
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-RNOO7B = TRUE (lB RN Pump trips)
Indications Available:
. 1 B RN Pump Motor breaker Green status light is LIT
. lB RN Pump Motor amps indicating 0
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 2/A-3 A RN PMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 2/A-4 B RN PMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS AP111A15500120, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check for potential loss of LLI as follows:
. Check Unit 2 RN pump(s) that are Floor Instructor: If asked, As aligned to LLI OPERATING U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is PROPERLY. running properly.
. Check suction flowpath AVAILABLE.
CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 3) Check if adequate NPSH exists to running RN Pumps as follows:
. Any RN pump ON. NOTE: Both RN Pumps are OFF.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 6.
BOP (Step 6) Place idle RN train in service as follows:
- Check idle RN train AVAILABLE TO START.
- Start one train of RN as follows:
. To start 1A RN pump perform the following:
- Place manual loader for 1 RN 89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to 10% OPEN.
- Start 1A RN pump. NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A RN Pump.
- Ensure the following valve for train being started OPEN.
- 1 RN-86A (A KG Hx Inlet Isol).
- Check the following cross-tie valves
-OPEN:
- 1 RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol)
- 1 RN-41 B (Train B TO Non Ess Hdr Isol)
- 1 RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol).
- Ensure malfunctioning RN pump is off.
- Check if local venting of RN pump NOTE: Local venting of RN has been performed PER one of the pump has NOT been following: performed.
- Enclosure 6 (1A RN Pump Venting)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 22 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Enclosure 7 (1 B RN Pump Venting).
CRS (Step 6.f RNO) GO TO Step 6.h.
BOP . Check Enclosure 8 (NV Pump NOTE: Enclosure 8 has NOT Cooling Via Gravity Drain To Sump) been performed.
- HAS BEEN PERFORMED.
CRS (Step 6.h RNO) GO TO Sep 6.j.
BOP . Check Case II (Loss of Low Level or NOTE: Case II has NOT been RC Supply Crossover) HAS BEEN performed.
IMPLEMENTED.
CRS (Step 6.j RNO) GO TO Step 7.
BOP (Step 7) Ensure cooling to KC as follows:
BOP . Check 1A KC pump(s) RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train of KC is operating.
CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f.
- ChecklBKCpump(s)RUNNING.
- Ensure lB KC pumps aligned to reactor bldg non essential header as follows:
- OPEN the following valves:
- 1 KC-1 8B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
- 1KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
- CLOSE the following valves:
- 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 23 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
. 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
BOP . Check 1 B RN pump OFF.
BOP . Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet NOTE: 1RN-187B has NOT Isol) LOCALLY THROTTLED been locally throttled.
DURING THIS PROCEDURE.
BOP (Step 7.i RNO) Perform the following:
. Place 1RN-187B MODE SELECT switch to manual.
. OPEN 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol).
BOP (Step 8) Perform the following on operating train:
. A Train:
IF 1A RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN THROTTLE 1 RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow while attempting to maintain 1A RN pump flow less than 16,000 GPM.
BOPI (Step 9) Investigate reason for loss of RN CRS train as follows:
. Dispatch operator to check RN pump. NOTE: The BOP/CRS will dispatch an AC.
Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes, as AO, report that the 51 Relay on the 1 B RN Pump breaker has operated.
. Dispatch operator to check RN pump breaker.
. Check suction flowpath alignment.
. Check discharge flowpath alignment. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Pump malfunction.
if so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 24 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavIor Comments CRS (Step 10) Ensure Control Room Area Chiller NOTE: The CRS may assign in service PER Enclosure 3 (VC!YC the RO to perform this action, Operation). or have the BOP perform these actions prior to continuing with Step 1 1.
If actions are performed in parallel, Appropriate Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.
Other Examiners follow AP 20 Actions, Step 11, below.
APIIIAI5500!20, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 3, VCIYC OPERATION Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.
RO! (Step 1) Check train selected Control Room NOTE: The Chiller is Area Chiller ON.
expected to be ON. If not, the BOP RO/BOP will take action per the RNO to restart the Chiller.
AP111A15500120, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP continue HERE.
BOP (Step 1 1) Align operating train of equipment with running RN pump as follows:
. Check 1A RN pump ON.
. Check the following equipment ON:
. 1A1 and 1A2 KC pumps - ON CRS (Step 11 .b RNO) GO TO Step 11
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 25 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 11 .i) Perform one of the following as necessary to align operating RN train with train of equipment cooled by RN:
. Swap operating equipment to opposite train as follows:
. IF desired to swap KC trains, THEN perform Enclosure 2 (Shifting KC Trains).
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 2.
AP111A15500120, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 2, SHIFTING KC TRAINS BOP (Step 1) Limit KC flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in subsequent steps.
BOP (Step 2) Check the following:
. 1 RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) -
OPEN
. 1 RN-41 B (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) -
OPEN
. 1 RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) -
OPEN
. Any KC pump RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train KC Pumps are operating.
BOP (Step 3) Check both ND pumps OFF.
CRS (Step 4) Perform the following:
. IF shifting from 1A KC Train to 1 B KC NOTE: The crew will be Train,... shiftingfrom lB KCTrain to 1A KC Train.
. IFshiftingfrom lBKCTrainto 1AKC Train, THEN GO TO Step 20.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 26 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 20) Maintain the following limits in next steps:
. IF 1A RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN maintain 1A pump flow less than 16,000 GPM.
BOP (Step 21) Perform the following to establish RN flow to 1A KC Hx:
. Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol)
Mode Select switch is in manual.
. IF required to reduce RN flow to 1 B KC NOTE: It is NOT required to Hx,... reduce RN flow to 1 B KC Hx.
THROTTLE OPEN 1 RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow to 1A KC Hx, while maintaining 1A RN pump within flow limit of Step 20.
BOP (Step 22) Perform the following:
. Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the AUTO position.
. Ensure 1KC-51A OPENS.
BOP (Step 23) Start 1A1 KC pump.
BOP (Step 24) Start 1A2 KC pump.
BOP (Step 25) Align Reactor Bldg header to 1 A Train as follows:
. OPEN the following valves:
. 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol)
. 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
. CLOSE the following valves:
. 1 KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg non Ess Sup_Isol)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 27 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
BOP (Step 26) Check both ND pumps OFF.
BOP (Step 27) Place 1 RN-i 87B MODE SELECT switch to auto.
BOP (Step 28) Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet 1501) CLOSED.
BOP (Step 29) WHEN RN flow through the 1 B KC Hx begins to go down, THEN THROTTLE OPEN 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to achieve desired flow rate while maintaining iA RN pump within the following flow limit:
. IF iA RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN maintain 1A RN pump flow less than 16,000 GPM.
BOP (Step 30) Place 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in CLOSE.
BOP (Step 31) Ensure 1 KC-54B is CLOSED.
BOP (Step 32) Stop the following pumps:
. 1B1 KCpump
. lB2KCpump.
BOP (Step 33) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves are OPEN.
BOP (Step 34) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 28 of 73 Event
Description:
I B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will return to the main body of AP-20.
Examiner NOTE: Because there are still AP-related actions to take with this procedure, the CRS may NOT address the TS at the time.
Consequently, it may be necessary to move to next event, and address the TS after the scenario.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CRS 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)
CRS LCD 3.7.7 Two NSWS trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One NSWS A. 1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train NSWS train inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.2, ECCS - OPERATING CRS LCD 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 29 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trains trains to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM CRS 3.6.6 Containment Spray System CRS LCO 3.6.6 Two Containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. one A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> containment containment spray train spray train inoperable, to OPERABLE status.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM CRS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 30 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TI ME NOTE: The entry into B. One AFW B.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train AFW train to Condition B is for the 1 B MD inoperable in OPERABLE AND CA Pump.
MODE 1,2, status. 10 days from or 3 for discovery of reasons failure to meet other than the LCO.
Condition A.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)
SYSTEM CRS 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW)
System CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One CCW A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train CCW train inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 31 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS 3.8.1 AC Source Operating CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND
. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND
. The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 32 of 73 Event
Description:
lB RN Pump Trip Time Pos Expeci d ActionslB iavior Comments B.1 Perform 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B. OneDG SR 3.8.1.1 inoperable, for the offsite AND circuit(s).
Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND B.2 Declare 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from required discovery of feature(s) Condition B supported by concurrent with the inoperability of inoperable redundant DG required inoperable feature(s) when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.
AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> inoperable due to common cause failure.
OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for OPERABLE DG.
AND B.4 Restore DG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to OPERABLE status. AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.9, BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATH (OPERATING)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 33 of 73 Event
Description:
I B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS 16.9.9 Boration Systems Flow Path (Operating)
CRS LCO 16.9.9 Two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
The flow path from a boric acid tank via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the reactor coolant system, AND Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the reactor coolant system.
Note: An OPERABLE charging pump used to satisfy OPERABLITY requirements of one boration flow path may not be used to satisfy OPERABILITY requirements for a second boration flow path.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One required A.1 Restore the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> boron required injection flow boron path injection inoperable, flow path to OPERABLE status.
NOTE: The CRS will identify that entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required because of two inoperable ECCS Trains.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 34 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection. During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position. While the plant is stabilizing a Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail As-Is causing Pzr pressure to lower, and requiring the operator to manually close the Spray Valve. After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address API1/A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod and/or AP/1/ASSOO/l 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, to address the failed Pressurizer Spray Valve. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-EPOO3C = ACTIVE delay = 10 seconds insert MAL-IREOO9 = FAIL_OF_AUTO insert MAL IREOI 0012 =TRUE Indications Available:
. MCB Annunciator lAD-i, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms.
. Turbine Generator MWe lowering.
. Tavg-Tref deviation with no Auto Rod motion.
. MCB Annunciator lAD-li, K3, UNIT 1 LOCKOUT, alarms.
. 1 of 2 Main Generator Breakers is OPEN.
. PCB-11 and 12 OPEN.
AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto. Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RO will inform the CRS of the situation, and the CRS will direct that the RO control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 35 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:
. Check Generator TIED TO GRID.
. Check Generator output GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.
RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:
. Check control banks MOVING IN AS NOTE: The Control Rods will REQUIRED. NOT be moving in as required.
RO (Step 3a RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:
. Place Control Rods in manual.
. Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref.
. If no rods will move, THEN NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.
RO . Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.
RO (Step 3b RNO) IF two or more control rods NOTE: Only one Control Rod are misaligned greater that 24 steps... (D12) is misaligned from Group D.
BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:
. Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps RUNNING.
. 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection_Bypass_control) OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 36 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRocis fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF runback to 56% power in effect, THEN ensure turbine inlet pressure going down to less than or equal to 500 PS 1G.
CRS (Step 6) Announce: UNIT 1 LOAD NOTE: CRS mayask U2 RO REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL to make Plant Announcement.
PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 If so, Floor Instructor TURBINE BLDG.
acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters LESS THAN 20%.
CRS / (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:
. Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.
. IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to Action. The CRS will stabilize reactor power. designate the RO to observe this action.
- GOTOStep9.
RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves MODULATING OPEN.
BOP (Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (lAD-il, J-5) DARK.
RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PB cooling as follows:
. IF MAIN GENERATOR less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps... NOT < 10,000 amps.
- Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The CRS will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an AO.
Room of results within 5 minutes:
- 1A Main Step Up Transformer
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 37 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
. 1 B Main Step Up Transformer
. Unit 1 IPB Fan Enclosure area.
- Record approximate time lockout occurred.
- Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor:
given sufficient time (approximately 5 Within 3 minutes, as AO minutes) to complete fire inspection, report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.
- IF operator confirms a fire has NOTE: No fire has occurred.
occurred...
- IF operator confirms no fire has NOTE: The CRS will dispatch occurred, THEN dispatch operator to an AO.
perform the following at the Unit I IPB ALARM PANEL:
- Depress LOCKOUT OVERRIDE on Booth Instructor:
the fan in MAN.
Insert LOA-IPBOO3 OVERRIDE
- IF IPB fan in MAN cannot be Booth Instructor:
started, Within 3 minutes, as AO report that the Lockout Override has been pressed, and the IA IPB Fan is running.
- IF neither IPB fan can be started NOTE: The 1A IPB Fan is running.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 38 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-NC0027C = 0.1 delay0 rampl0 SECONDS REM-NCOO27C =0 delay5 cdX10_605_1 EQ 1, (Delete Remote function when Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE)
Indications Available:
. The 1NC-27C SLIMS indicates that the 1NC-27C is in the intermediate position.
. Pzr Pressure is lowering.
. OAC NCS, Pressurizer and PRT Graphic shows 1 NC-27C in the intermediate position.
BOP (Step 1 1) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:
. Ensure Pzr heater are in auto.
. Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.
. Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
. Check Pzr spray control valves - NOTE: The BOP will need to CLOSED use the 1 NC-27 Emergency Close Switch to close the stuck open Pzr Spray valve.
RO (Step 12) Check load rejection DUE TO NOTE: The load rejection was LOSS OF CF PUMP. NOT due toa Loss of CF Pump.
CRS (Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 15 RO (Step 15) Check turbine inlet pressure NOTE: Turbine Inlet pressure LESS THAN 330 PSIG. is 470 psig.
RO (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF AT ANY TIME turbine inlet pressure drops to less than 330 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 16.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 39 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS . GOTOStepl9.
RD (Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows:
. Check Generator Breakers EITHER GENERATOR BREAKERS CLOSED.
. Check Generator TIED TO GRID.
. Check generator power factor 0.9 TO 1.0 LAGGING.
CRS . GO TO Step 20.
CRS (Step 20) Ensure the following have been NOTE: The CRS may ask implemented: OSM to address.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
. RPIOIAJ5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)
. RPIOIAI5700IO1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).
RD (Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following:
. Check reactor power GREATER THAN 40%.
. Check the following on in service CF pump(s):
. Low pressure governor control IN AUTO
. High pressure governor control IN AUTO.
. Check SM flow on all S/Gs LESS NOTE: SM flow is 58%.
THAN 75%.
. Check SM flow on all S/Gs LESS NOTE: SM flow is 58%.
THAN 25%.
RD (Step 21d RNO) Perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 40 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments
. Check the following CF control bypass valves CLOSED:
. iCE-i O4AB (1A SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED
. iCE-i O5AB (lB SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED
. iCE-i O6AB (1C SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED
. iCE-i O7AB (1D SIG CF Control Bypass) CLOSED RO
- GOTOStep2l.f.
Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure.
- IF thermal power is greater than 15%,
THEN within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance.
- Check T-AvgGREATER THAN 561°F.
- Check CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, 8-9) DARK.
. Check CONTROL ROD BANK LO NOTE: 1AD-2, A-9 may be LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, A-9) DARK.
LIT. If so, the operator will perform Step 21.1 RNO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 41 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments RO (Step 21 .1 RNO) Ensure the CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT alarm clears as Xenon builds in.
RO (Step 22) Check load rejection DUE TO NOTE: The load rejection was LOSS OF CF PUMP. NOT due to a Loss of CF Pump.
CRS (Step 22 RNO) GO TO Step 24.
BOP (Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running NOTE: The CRS may plant equipment as follows: transition to AP-14 based on the failure of Rods to move in AUTO, and the stuck rod.
BOP . Condensate Booster pumps and place in NOTE: The BOP may stop auto. one Condensate Booster Pump.
. Hotwell pumps and place in auto. NOTE: The BOP may stop one Hotwell Pump.
. IF desired to secure, THEN dispatch operator to shutdown PER 0P111B162501004 (Feedwater Heater Vents, Drains and Bleed System)
Enclosure 4.2 (System Shutdown) the following:
. Unit 1 C Heater Drain Tank pumps
. Unit 1 G Heater Drain Tank pumps.
CRS (Step 25) IF power change greater than 15% NOTE: The CRS may call in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry Chemistry to address the to perform required Tech Spec sampling. power decrease.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.
RO (Step 26) WHEN condenser dump valves closed AND no longer required for temperature control, THEN reset C-7A using STEAM DUMP SELECT switch.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni 4-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 42 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may transition to AP-14 based on the failure of Rods to move in AUTO, and the stuck rod; OR AP-1 1 based on the Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction.
AP/IIA!5500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either Immediate Action dropped OR misaligned by great than 24 NOTE: Only one Rod is steps,...
misaligned during this event.
RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will place the rods in Manual.
RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED. Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.
RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following.
. IF misaligned rod(s) due to DRPI NOTE: Only one rod is indication failure only,... misaligned.
. IF T-Avg has gone down NOTE: The RO may adjust load on the Turbine to maintain Tavg-Tref = 1°F.
. GO TO Enclosure 1 (Response To Dropped or Misaligned_Rod)
NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 1.
AP111A15500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 1, RESPONSE TO DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 43 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
CRS (Step 2) Dispatch rod control system NOTE: The CRS may call qualified IAE to perform the following: WCC/IAE to address.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE as appropriate.
. Correct cause of misaligned rod.
. Notify Control Room operators when auto or manual rod motion is available for reactivity control.
RO (Step 3) Do not move rods until IAE determines rod movement is available.
CRS (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: A runback has already while in this procedure, THEN occurred, and the Control Rods have been moved in MANUAL.
RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-b) DARK.
RO (Step 6) Use OAC point M1P1 385 (Reactor Thermal Power, Best Estimate) to determine reactor power in subsequent steps.
RO (Step 7) Check AFD (Tech Spec 3.2.3)
WITHIN TECH SPEC LIMITS.
CRS (Step 8) REFER TO the following Tech Specs while continuing in the enclosure:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 44 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Tech Spec 3.1 .4 (Rod Group Alignment NOTE: The CRS may check Limits). the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.1 .4 must be entered.
. Tech Spec 3.1 .5 (Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits).
. Tech Spec 3.1 .6 (Control Bank Insertion Lim its).
. Tech Spec 3.2.4 (QPTR) NOTE: The CRS may check the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.2.4 must be entered.
. Ensure shutdown margin calculation is performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Examiner NOTE: It is intended that the CRS evaluate the TS at this point.
If the CRS requests the WCC evaluate the TS, and continues with Enclosure 1 of AP14, move to the next event, and evaluate the TS after the exam has been completed.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4, ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS CRS LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 45 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO!Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos Expec d ActiorisIB iavior Comments B. One rod not B.lRestore rod 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> within to within alignment alignment limits, limits.
OR B.2.1.1 Verify SDM is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> within the limit specified in the COLR.
OR B.2.1.2 Initiate boration to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore SDM to within limit.
AND B.2.2 Reduce 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> THERMAL POWER to
<75% RTP.
AND B.2.3 Verify SDM is within the Once per limit specified 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in the COLR.
AND B.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND B.2.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate safety 5 days analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 32.4, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO CRS LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be 1 .02.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 46 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 with THERMAL POWER >50% RTP.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TI ME A.1 Reduce 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> A. QPTR not THERMAL within limit. POWER 3% from RTP for each 1%ofQPTR
>1.02.
AND A.2 Perform SR Once per 12 3.2.4.1 and hours reduce THERMAL POWER 3% from RTP for each 1%ofQPTR
>1.02.
AND A.3 Perform SR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1. AND Once per 7 AND days thereafter A.4 Reduce Power 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint 3%
for each 1%
of QPTR>
1.02.
AND A.5 Reevaluate safety Prior to analyses and increasing
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 47 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Ruriback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expec ?d ActionslB avior Comments confirm THERMAL results POWER above remain valid the more for duration restrictive limit of operation of Required under this Action A.1 or condition. A.2 AND A.6 Calibrate Prior to excore increasing detectors to THERMAL show zero POWER above QPT. the more restrictive limit of Required Action A.1 or A.2 AND A.7 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SR 3.2.2.1. after reaching RTP OR Within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after increasing THERMAL POWER above the more restrictive limit of Required Action A.1 or A.2 NOTE: The BOP may take all the necessary actions in the Immediate Actions, before CRS reads AOP.
APII/A15500!l1, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE Immediate Action DOWN.
BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED - Immediate Action
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 48 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTOIStuck Rodi Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 3 RNO) CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s). NOTE: The BOP will recognize that the SLIMs is NOT effective at controlling the valve, and operate the EMERG SWITCH.
BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves NOTE: IF the BOP has already CLOSED. used the EMERG SWITCH, the CRS may answer YES, and continue to Step 6.
If NOT, the Step 5 RNO will be performed.
NOTE: When the BOP uses this switch the Spray Valve will Close.
CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 7) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray to PZR Isol) CLOSED.
BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters ON:
. 1A
. lB
. 1D BOP (Step 9) Check 1 C Pzr heaters ON.
BOP (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER IN AUTO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 49 of 73 Event
Description:
Zone lB Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Pzr Spray Valve Malfunction Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 11) Check 1 NC-27 PRESSURIZER NOTE: In order to close the SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch - malfunctioning Spray Valve, S ELECTED TO NORMAL. the BOP had to take the EM ERG SWITCH to CLOSE.
CRS (Step 1 1 RNO) Notify station management to NOTE: The CRS may call ensure switch restored to NORMAL once WCC/Station Management to spray valve is repaired. address the switch position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
BOP (Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch -
SELECTED TO NORMAL.
80P (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.
CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve failure.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 50 of 73 Event
Description:
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failurelA EDG fails to start automatically Shortly afterwards, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will fail to start automatically, and the lB DG will fail to start at all. The operator will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EP/lIA5000/ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power. Within ECA-O.O, the operator will take action to manually start the 1A DG. Upon restoration of power to 1 ETA, the operator will transition to E-O.
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-EPOOI ACTIVE (Loss of Offsite PowerISBO) insert MAL-DGOOIB = TRUE (lB DIG Fails to Auto Start) insert MAL-EQBOO3A = ON_BLACKOUT (IA DG fails in AUTO due to a Sequencer failure)
Indications Available:
. Main Control Room lights DIM
. 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE X is LIT
. 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Y is LIT
. 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Z is LIT
. 1 B EDG not running
. Both Trains of DRPI DARK EP/11A15000/ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER CRS (Step 1) CSF Status trees should be NOTE: Crew will carry out monitored for information only. EPs Immediate Actions of ECA-0.0, referenced by them should not be prior to the CRS addressing implemented. the EP.
RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION
. All rod bottom lights LIT NOTE: DRPI is NOT available on the LOOP.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
. hR amps - GOING DOWN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 51 of 73 Event
Description:
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failure/A EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2 RNO) Trip reactor. IMMEDIATE ACTION NOTE: other indications are used to determine that the reactor has tripped.
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
CRS (Step 4) Establish NC pump seal injection from the SSF as follows:
- Immediately dispatch operator to SSF to NOTE: The CRS will dispatch perform the following: an AO to complete Enclosure 1.
Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, however, do not take actions (It is expected that these directions will be subsequently stopped).
- Obtain Brown Folder at SSF and complete Enclosure 1 CRS
- Dispatch operator to 1 ETA room as follows:
- Check if operator will enter aux bldg
- FROM MG SET ROOM.
- Give operator dosimeter from Unit 2 SRO desk.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 52 of 73 Event
Description:
LOOPIB EDG Sequencer failure/A EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS . Dispatch operator to perform NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Enclosure 2 (Unit 1 ETA And ETB an A0 to complete Enclosure Rooms ECA-0.0 Actions).
2.
If so, Booth Instructor Instructor acknowledge as appropriate.
Booth Instructor: wait 2 minutes, then insertLOA EP057 OPEN_BOTH (IEXMA-4 Bkrs IA, IEXMA2-OIB and 3A SMXG-FO2C NormIAIt Sup) i nsertLOA-EP057 CLOSE_ALT Delay 10 seconds (IEXMA-4 Bkrs IA, I EXMA2-O1 B and 3A SMXG FO2C NormIAlt Sup)
CRS Use any of the following to notify security NOTE: The CRS will dispatch to immediately dispatch officer with key a Security Officer to the SSF.
to SSF to ensure operator can access Booth Instructor:
SSF:
Acknowledge as Security.
. Security ringdown phone (located on Unit 2 SRO desk)
. 2688
. 4900. Floor Instructor: If asked, U2 does NOT have normal power, and both DGs are running.
BOP (Step 5) Check NC System ISOLATED:
- Check the following letdown orifice isolation valves CLOSED.
- 1NV-458A (Ui 75 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).
- 1NV-457A (Ui 45 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).
- 1 NV-35A (Ui Variable LID Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).
- CLOSE the following valves:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 53 of 73 Event
Description:
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failure/A EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1NV-1A (Ui NC LID isol To Regenerative Hx)
. 1 NV-2A (Ui NC L/D iso! To Regenerative Hx).
BOP . Check the following excess letdown isolation valves CLOSED:
. 1 NV-24B (1 C NC Loop To Excess LID Hx iso!)
. 1 NV-25B (1 C NC Loop To Excess LID Hx isol).
BOP . Check 1NV-121 (Ui ND Letdown Control) CLOSED.
RO (Step 6) Check total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
BOP (Step 7) Try to restore power to 1 ETA or 1 ETB as foilows:
. Place both trains D/G mode select switches to control room.
. Perform the following for any D/G(s) that are off:
. Depress, then release, RESET on sequencer.
. Start D/G. NOTE: This action will start the 1A D/G.
. Check both D/Gs RUNNiNG.
BOP (Step 7.c RNO) Perform the following:
. initiate S/i
. Notify Unit 2 to immediateiy ensure flow NOTE: The CRS will notify path for 2B RN pump PER Enciosure 6 U2.
(Unit 2 Actions).
Floor Instructor:
Acknowiedge as U2 RO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 54 of 73 Event
Description:
LOOP/B EDG Sequencer failurelA EDG fails to start automatically Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS . IF at least one DIG starts, THEN GO TO NOTE: The 1A DIG will be Step 7.d. running after this action.
BOP * (Step 7.d).Check bus energized and NOTE: Neither Sequencer will sequencer applying loads, be applying loads automatically.
- Notify dispatched operators at 1 EMXA-4 and SSF to stop where they are at.
- Check status of the following local actions:
CRITICAL TASK:
(E-O C) Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA-O.O.
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS.
. SSF D/G OFF
. 1 EMXA-4 normal incoming breaker
-CLOSED.
. Notify dispatched operators that actions at SSF and 1 EMXA-4 are not required.
CRS . Implement EP/1/A15000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).
CRS . RETURN TO procedure and step in NOTE: The CRS will transition effect. to E-O.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 55 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space Break/INI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Upon return to E-0, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Safety Injection. Upon the trip, 1 NI-9 and 10 will fail to auto open, and the operator will be required to open at least one of these valves manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EP/1 /A15000/ES-1 .2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-NCOI4A 1.5 delayO ramp45 (PZR Steam Space Leak)
Indications Available:
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 3/B-3, CONT PRESSURE ALERT HI
. Pzr level lowers
. Containment pressure starts to rise
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-6/A-6, PZR LO PRESSPORV NC34 BLOCKED
. MOB Annunciator 1AD-61B-6. PZR LO PRESSPORV NC32 & 36 BLOCKED Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.
EPIIIAJ5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO! (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
. All rod bottom lights LIT
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
. hR amps - GOING DOWN.
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 56 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space Break/lNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF both busses de-energized,...
WHEN time allows, THEN try to restore power to de-energized bus PER AP111A15500107 (Loss of Electrical Power) while continuing with this procedure.
RO! (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP
. SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT.
. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1 SI-i 4) LIT.
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) LIT.
BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK.
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):
. Groups 1,2, 5DARK.
. Group3LIT.
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED.
(Step 9d RNO) Align or start components as required.
. Group 6 LIT. NOTE: I KC-332B is OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 57 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically
. GOTOSteplO.
NOTE: The crew will attempt to close 1 KC-332, however, the valve will NOT close.
RO! (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status: NOTE: The B Train is de BOP energized.
. MDCApumps-ON (Step lOa RNO) Start pumps.
. NIR level in at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%,
BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON NOTE: The B Train is de energized.
(Step 1 1 RNO) Perform the following:
. Start pumps
. IF all KC pumps running....
. If any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD-6...
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON. NOTE: The B Train is de energized.
(Step 12 RNO) Perform the following:
. Start pump(s).
. IF any RN pump off, THEN perform the following:
. lFlARNpumpisoff...
. IF affected train is deenergized, AND its DIG is off, THEN GO TO Step 13.
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 6&7 Page 58 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space Breakll NI-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically Start 2A RN pump.
THROTTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:
for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay0 rampl0 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)
RO (Step 14) Check all SIG pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.
BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is 2.0 psig, and slowly rising due to the LOCA.
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:
- Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.
- Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PS 1G.
- Check NI pumps INDICATING FLOW.
(Step 16c RNO) Start NI pumps and align NOTE: The B Train is de valves, energized.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 59 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakllNl-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:
(E-O J) Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-O.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation (1 N 1-9/10) constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 275 PS 1G.
80P (Step 1 6.d RNO) Perform the following:
- Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:
- 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)
- IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
ROl (Step 18) Check CA flow:
- Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 60 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pose Expected ActionslBehavior Comments WHEN each SIG N/R level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that SIG NIR level both board operators aware.
between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.
NOTE: The use of adverse Containment numbers is required if Containment Pressure is > 3 psig.
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:
. IF all NC pumps on, THEN check NC T NOTE: The NC Pumps are Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO OFF.
557°F.
. IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T NOTE: Tavg and/Tcolds may Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO
- be < 557° F, but also stable. If 557°F. so, Examiners move to Step 20 of E-0.
RO (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:
. IF temperature less than 557° F AND NOTE: The cooldown may be going down, THEN attempt to stop under control, and Enclosure 3 cooldown PER Enclosure 3 may NOT be needed.
(Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).
NOTE: If needed, the CRS may assign the RO to perform this action.
If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.
Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 62.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 61 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically RO (Step 1 RNO) CLOSE steam dump valves as follows:
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in manual.
. Adjust STM PRESS CONTROLLER output to 0%.
. Place STEAM DUMP SELECT in steam pressure mode.
. IF steam dumps still open... NOTE: The Steam Dump Valves will be CLOSED.
RD (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED.
RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT.
RD (Step 4) Check any NC pump ON. NOTE: It is likely that the NCPs will be OFF at this time.
RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.
RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:
. IF SIG N/R level is less than 11% (32%
ACC) in all S/Gs...
. WHEN N/R level is greater than 11%
(32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to:
. Minimize cooldown
. Maintain at least one SIC N/R level greater than 1 1% (32%_ACC).
RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSIVs are CLOSED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 62 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 8) CLOSE 1SM-15 (Ui SM TO MSR 2 Stg Tube Bundles Isol).
RO (Step 9) Check any NC pump ON -
RO (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF any NC T-Cold is still going down,... NOTE: It is expected that NC Tcolds will be stabilized.
. IF cooldown stopped, THEN exit this enclosure.
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP continue HERE.
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED. NOTE: 1 NC-34A previously failed OPEN.
NOTE: 1NC-270 is CLOSED.
NOTE: 1NC-34A isolation valve is CLOSED.
NOTE: 1 NC-34A isolation valve is CLOSED.
BOP (Step 20.b) Normal Pzr spray valves -
CLOSED BOP (Step 20.c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
RO (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on NOTE: NCS Subcooling is core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
NEGATIVE 1 5°F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 63 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 21 RNO) IF at least one NV or NI NOTE: If not already pump on, THEN stop all NC pumps while accomplished the NC Pumps maintaining seal injection flow. should be stopped here.
RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP
. All SIGs PRESSURIZED.
ROI (Step 23) Check if SIG tubes intact:
. The following secondary EMFs NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)
. 1 EMF-34(L) (SIG Sample (Lo Range))
. 1 EMF-24 (SIG A)
. 1EMF-25 (SIG B)
. 1EMF-26(S/GC)
. 1EMF-27(S/GD)
. SIG levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.
BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows:
. 1 EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR)) NORMAL
. 1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) NORMAL
. 1 EMF-40 (Containment Iodine) -
NORMAL
. Check containment pressure LESS NOTE: Containment pressure THAN 1 PSIG. is rising slowly and likely will exceed 3 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 64 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
. Check containment sump level NORMAL.
BOP (Step 24 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF H 2 Igniters are off, THEN perform the NOTE: The H2 Igniters are following: OFF.
. Energize H2 Igniters by depressing ON and OVERRIDE.
. Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NOTE: The CRS will dispatch NE AHUs PER EPI1IAI5000/G-l an AC.
(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 Booth Instructor: as AO, (De-energizing Ice Condenser k wI d g AHU) insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU StartlStop)
- IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN perform Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start And Isolating RV Cooling):
- Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG
. Containment pressure is between 1 NOTE: These conditions may PSIG and 3 PSIG. exist.
If so, the BOP may perform Enclosure 4 (BOP Examiner proceed to Page 71).
- Implement EPI1IAI5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).
- GO TO EPIIIAI5000/E-1 (Loss OF Reactor Or Secondary Coolant).
NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-1.
EPIIIAI5000IE-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 65 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check NC subcooling based on core NOTE: NCS subcooling will exit TICs GREATER THAN 0°F.
most likely be less than 0°F.
BOP (Step 2 RNO) IF any NV OR NI pump is on, THEN perform the following:
. Ensure all NC pumps are off.
. Maintain seal injection flow.
RO (Step 3) Check main steamlines intact as follows:
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP
. All SIGs PRESSURIZED.
RO (Step 4) Control intact SIG levels as follows:
. Check N/R level in any intact SIG NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC). Numbers may be used if pressure has risen > 3 psig.
BOP . Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.
RO . THROTTLE feed flow to maintain all NOTE: Adverse Containment intact SIG N/R levels between 1 1% (32% Numbers may be used if ACC) and 50%. pressure has risen > 3 psig.
BOP (Step 5) Check secondary radiation normal as follows:
. Check all SIGs INTACT.
. Notify RP to perform the following: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the need for local surveys.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCIRP.
. Frisk all Unit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly_higher for any SIG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 66 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space Break/INI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Notify Control Room of survey results.
. WHEN all survey results reported, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.
. Check all SIG(s) activity levels NORMAL.
- Check secondary EMFs NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)
- 1 EMF-34(L) (S!G Sample (Lo Range))
- 1EMF-24(S/GA)
. 1EMF-25(S/GB)
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG C)
. 1EMF-27 (SIG D).
BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:
- Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves NOTE: The B Train is de AVAILABLE, energized.
(Step 6a RNO) Evaluate cause of power loss and initiate actions to restore power to affected isolation valve(s).
(Step 6b) All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
BOP (Step 6c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
BOP (Step 6d) IF AT ANY TIME any Pzr PORV NOTE: This is a Continuous opens due to high pressure, THEN after Action. The CRS will make pressure goes below 2315 PSIG, ensure both board operators aware.
PORV CLOSES or is isolated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 67 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 7) Check S/I termination criteria:
. NC subcooling based on core exit TICs NOTE: NCS subcooling will GREATER THAN 0°F. most likely be less than 0°F.
CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f.
RO/ (Step 7.f) Monitor S/I termination criteria PER NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP Enclosure 2 (S/I Termination Criteria) while Action. The CRS will make in the procedure. both board operators aware.
BOP (Step 8) Check if ND pumps should be stopped:
. NC pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG.
. NC Pressure STABLE OR GOING UP. NOTE: With the NC pressure stable, the ND Pumps will be stopped.
(Step 8b RNO) GO TO Step 9.
RO (Step 9) Check NC and SIG pressures:
- All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING UP.
- NC pressure STABLE OR GOING DOWN.
BOP (Step 10) Check if D/Gs should be stopped.
- Any D/G ON. NOTE: The 1A DG is running.
- Check 1 ETA energized by offsite power as follows:
- 1 ETA Emergency Breaker OPEN.
- 1ETAENERGIZED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 68 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNl-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step lOb RNO) Attempt to restore offsite power to affected switchgear PER AP111A15500107 (Loss of Electrical Power).
(Step 1 Oc) Check 1 ETB energized of offsite power as follows:
. 1 ETB Emergency Breaker OPEN.
. 1ETBENERGIZED.
(Step lOc RNO) Attempt to restore offsite power to affected switchgear PER API1/A15500107 (Loss of Electrical Power).
(Step lOd) Reset the following:
. S/I.
. Sequencers.
(Step 1 Od RNO) Dispatch operator to open affected sequencer control power breaker:
. A Train - 1 EVDA Breaker 6
. B Train - 1 EVDD Breaker 8. NOTE: CRS will dispatch an AC to take this action.
Floor Instructor acknowledge as the AC.
. IF AT ANY TIME a B/C signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on. both board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 69 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space Break/I NI-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Dispatch operator to stop unloaded NOTE: The CRS will dispatch D/G(s) and place in standby readiness an AC.
PER 0P111A163501002 (Diesel Generator): Booth Instructor acknowledge as AC.
Booth Instructor:
insert LOA-DGOO4 STOP_DSG (StartlStop I B Diesel Generator), and report upon completion
- Enclosure 4.3 (1A DIG Shutdown).
. Enclosure 4.4 (1 B D/G Shutdown).
BOP (Step 1 1) Check containment H 2 concentration:
- Ensure operator dispatched to stop Unit NOTE: This action was likely 1 NE AHUs PER EPI1IAI5000IG-1 taken previously.
(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-If NOT the CRS will dispatch energizing Ice Condenser AHU5).
an AC.
Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge insert LOA-NFOI6 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)
- Check H 2 analyzers IN SERVICE. NOTE: The H 2 Analyzers have NOT been placed in service.
BOP (Step 1 lb RNO) Perform the following:
- Dispatch operator to place H 2 analyzers NOTE: The CRS will dispatch in service PER EP/l/AJ5000IG-l an AC.
(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 5 Booth Instructor: as AO (Placing H2 Analyzers In Service),
acknowledge.
Booth Instructor:
insert LOA-VXOO9 enabled deIay300 (H2 Analyzer IA) insert LOA-VXOIO ENABLED delay600 (H2 Analyzer I B)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 2 Event# 6&7 Page 70 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space Break/I Nl-9A/IOB fail to OPEN automatically
. WHEN H 2 analyzers in service, THEN complete Steps 11 .c and 1 1 .d.
- GOTOStepl2.
RO/ (Step 12) Initiate evaluation of plant status as follows:
- Check Cold Leg Recirc capability from at least on train as follows:
- Train A:
- 1A ND pump AVAILABLE
BOP (Step 1 2.b) Check for potential leak in aux bldg as follows:
- Check aux bldg radiation:
- All area monitor EMFs -
NORMAL
- EMF-41 (Aux Bldg Ventilation)
NORMAL.
- Check NC to ND pressure boundary intact as follows:
- ND Temperature NORMAL
- ND Flow - NORMAL
- ND Pressure NORMAL.
CRS (Step 12.c) WHEN TSC staffed, THEN have NOTE: This is a Continuous TSC perform EPI1IAI5000IG-1 (Generic Action. The CRS will make Enclosures), Enclosure 30 (Evaluation of both board operators aware.
Plant Status During LOCAs by TSC).
NOTE: The TSC is NOT staffed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 71 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIlNI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 13) Check if NC System cooldown and depressurization is required:
. NC pressure GREATER THAN 275 PS 1G.
. GO TO EPI1IAJ5000!ES-1 .2 (Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization).
NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.2.
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 4, VX MANUAL START AND ISOALTING RV COOLING BOP (Step 1) IF containment pressure has gone NOTE: Containment pressure above 3 PSIG is likely to be < 3 psig.
BOP (Step 2) IF NC leak exists, THEN GO TO Step 4.
BOP (Step 4) Start one train of VX containment air return fan as follows:
. Train A:
. OPEN 1 RAF-D-2 (1A Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A).
. WHEN 1 RAF-D-2 is open, THEN start 1A Cont Air Return fan.
. Train B:
. OPEN 1 RAF-D-4 (1 B Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A).
. WHEN 1 RAF-D-4 is open, THEN start 1 B Cont Air Return fan.
BOP (Step 5) Isolate RV cooling to containment ventilation units as follows:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 72 of 73 Event
Description:
Pzr Steam Space BreakIINI-9AIIOB fail to OPEN automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. CLOSE 1 RV-79A (Ui VU AHUS RV Cont Outside Supply Hdr Isol).
. CLOSE 1RV-1O1A (Ui VU AHUS RV Cant Inside Return Hdr Isol).
. CLOSE 1 RV-32A (Ui VLNT AHUS RV Cont Outside Supply Hdr Isol).
. CLOSE 1RV-76A(U1 VL/VTAHUS RV Cant Inside Return Hdr sal).
. CLOSE 1 RV-808 (UI VU AHUS RV Cont Inside Supply Hdr Isol).
. CLOSE 1RV-102B (Ui VU AHUS RV Cant Outside Return Hdr Isol).
. CLOSE 1 RV-33B (Ui VLNT AHUS RV Cant Inside Supply Hdr Isol).
. CLOSE 1RV-77B(Ui VLNTAHUSRV Cant Outside Return Hdr Isol).
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
UNIT I STATUS:
Power Level: 75% NCS [B] 1037 ppm Pzr [B]: 1034 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 12 days Core Burnup: 251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: 0P111A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:
- The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:
- The 1A NI Pump is OOS due to shaft seal replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A.
- 1EMF34, SIG Sample Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).
- MCB Annunciator lAD-b, E-2, LOWER CONT AIRLOCK AUX DOOR OPEN, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).
Crew Directions:
- The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover starting with Step 3.36.10 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/N6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.
- Use of Alternate Dilute has been approved.
- RE has recommended an initial Alternate Dilution of 200 gallons.
- Turbine loading rate will be 2MWe/minute.
Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214)
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-il) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-li, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating).
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAL 2 C-BOP Pzr PORV fails OPEN N0003B C TS SRO NCO12B -
MAL 3 C-RO SG 1 B PORV fails OPEN SMOO1B C-SRO 4 MAL C-BOP Steam Generator Tube Leak SGOO1B C(TS)-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion IREOO3A C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGOO1B M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA Failure of the C-9 Interlock IPEOO4H REM 8 NA Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN NC0027 N00029 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214)
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-il) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i 1, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%
starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/i/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/i /A/6300/00 1 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
During the power increase, Pzr PORV 1 NC34A will fail partially OPEN, and fail in this position. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/i/A/5500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS).
Next, the lB Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/i/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORV5), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
Subsequently, a 100 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur (over 10 minutes) on the lB Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/i/A/5500/i0, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The crew will be directed by AP/i/A/5500/i0 to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/l/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower.
During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/N5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.
After this, the leak will develop into a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EP/i/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the lB Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. While performing an NCS cooldown the C-9 Interlock will fail and Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050214) result in a loss of the steam dumps. The operator will be required to re-initiate the cooldown using the available SG PORVs. During the NCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will fail to open. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using the last available Pzr PORV.
The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System.
Critical Tasks:
E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of z\P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of i.P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.
E-3C Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO.cts).
Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-3
REFERENCES:
- 1. AP/l/A/5500/l 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies (Rev 11)
- 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)
(Amendment 221/203)
- 3. OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Rev 185)
- 4. OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121)
- 5. OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11)
- 6. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits (Amendment 219/201)
- 7. AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak (Rev 18)
- 8. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORV5) (Amendment 221/203)
- 9. AP/1/A15500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps (Rev 23)
- 10. OP/0/A6450/01 1, Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System (Rev 97)
- 11. AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower (Rev 24)
- 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage (Amendment 237/21 9)
- 13. SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System (Rev 133)
- 14. AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction (Rev 16)
- 15. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33)
- 16. EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Rev 23)
Validation Time: 106 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.
Facility Review:
Rev. 050214 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-Il) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-li, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating).
Event Maif. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAL 2 C-BOP Pzr PORV fails OPEN NCOO3B C(TS)-SRO NCO12B MAL 3 C-RO SG 1 B PORV fails OPEN SMOO1B C-SRO 4 MAL C-BOP Steam Generator Tube Leak SGOO1B C(TS)-SRO MAL 5 C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion IREOO3A C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGOO1B M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA Failure of the C-9 Interlock IPEOO4H REM 8 NA Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN NC0027 NC0029 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 40% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-1 1) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A. OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-il, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with .4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A16300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
During the power increase, Pzr PORV 1NC34A will fail partially OPEN, and fail in this position.
The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS).
Next, the 18 Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
Subsequently, a 100 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur (over 10 minutes) on the lB Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The crew will be directed by AP/1/A15500/10 to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A15500/04, Rapid Downpower.
During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.
After this, the leak will develop into a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EP/1/N5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. While performing an NCS cooldown the C-9 Interlock will fail and result in a loss of the steam dumps.
The operator will be required to re-initiate the cooldown using the available SG PORVs. During the NCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will fail to open. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using the last available Pzr PORV.
The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Tasks:
E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of zP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of AP, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.
E-3C Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO.cts).
Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.
-4,-
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS D Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q Reset to Temp IC 242 T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-18):
(Originally IC-18).
Place INC3IB to CLOSE; (Pzr PORV INC-32B is OOS) insert XMT-KR_OKRP_5040 = 0 (OKRP-5040, KR Tank Level is OOS)
From lC-242:
T0 MAL-IPEOO4H = True (C-9 fails),
cdH_X01_094_2 = I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON)
REM-NCOO27C = 0 (A Spray Valve fails closed)
REM-NCOO29C 0 (B Spray Valve fails closed) cd=H_XOI_094_2 I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON)
Q RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:
I NC-32B (Tagout)
Reset all SLIMs OKRP-5040 (0-stick)
MCB Annunciator lAD-Il, E-2 (0-stick)
Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.
Setup OAC Q Freeze.
Q Update Fresh Tech.
Spec. Log.
Q Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase.
- 4. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of 0P111A161001003 marked up as follows:
- Step 2.3 initialed.
- Note prior to Step 3.1 checked.
- Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.2 initialed.
- Step 3.3 initialed.
- Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.34.15 is entered.
- Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.3.4 Initialed.
- Step 3.34 circled.
- Step 3.34.1 initialed (Person Notified/Todays time and date filled in).
- Step 3.34.2 Checkbox is checked.
- Note prior to Step34.4 is checked.
- Step 3.34.4 is NA.
- Step 3.34.5 is initialed (Person Notified/Todays time and date filled in).
- Step 3.34.6 is circled.
- Step 3.34.7 is initialed.
- Step 3.34.8 is initialed.
- Step 3.34.9 is initialed.
- Step 3.34.10 is initialed.
- Note prior to Step 3.34.11 is checked.
- Step 3.34.11 is initialed.
- Step 3.34.11.1 All four checkboxes are checked, BB flow is recorded for each.
- Step 3.34.11.2 All four Bullets are initialed.
- Step 3.34.11.3 is initialed.
- Step 3.34.11.4 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.34.11 .5 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.34.11.6 All four Bullets are initialed.
- Step 3.34.12 All four Bullets are initialed.
- Step 3.34.13.1 All three Checkboxes are Checked, (Person Notified/Todays time and date filled in).
- Step 3.34.13.2 Checkbox is checked.
- Note prior to Step 3.34.14 is checked.
- Step 3.34.14 is initialed.
- 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q T-O Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N14-1-3.
Q At direction of Event I Power Increase examiner Q At direction of Event 2 Pzr PORV fails OPEN examiner i nsertMAL NCNCO03B=30 NOTE: insert LOA-NCO34A = RACKED_OUT insertMAL-NCOI2B = when directed.
25 Q At direction of Event 3 SG 1 B PORV fails OPEN examiner insert MAL-SMOOIB 100 rampl0 Q At direction of Event 4 Steam Generator Tube Leak examiner insert MAL-SGOOIB 100 ramp600 Q At direction of Event 5 Continuous inward Rod Motion examiner insertMAL-IREOO3A =
IN Q At direction of Event 6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture examiner insert MAL-SGOOIB NOTE: insertLOA-RN087 0N and LOA-RN083 500 rampl2O 8000 when directed.
NOTE: insertREM-5A0002 =0 and REM-00078 =
0 when directed.
Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Failure of the C-9 Interlock dunrNCS InsertMAL-IPEOO4H NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip True (C-9 fails),
cdH_X01_094_2 = I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Post-Rx Trip Event 8 Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN insertREM-NCOO27C = NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip deress 0 (A Spray Valve fails closed) insertREM-NC0029C =
0 (B Spray Valve fails closed) cdH_X01_094_2 = I (IA RTB Open indicating lamp ON)
Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 60 Event
Description:
Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%
starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with 0P111A163001001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.34) Increase power to 50% RTP. NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 Mwe/minute.
ROl (Step 3.34.15) WHEN Turbine load greater that 40% (360 psig Turbine Inlet Pressure)
BOP begin aligning MSRs per 0P111B16250101 1 (Moisture Separator Reheater Operation).
0P111A161501009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor NOTE: The BOP may repeat makeup water needed to obtain desired this task as needed during the boron concentration using McGuire Data power increase.
Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)
. Total Reactor Makeup Water:
BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero:
(R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
. Boric Acid Flow Counter
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 3 Event# I Page 11 of 60 Event
Description:
Power Increase BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller.
BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control).
BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.
desired flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:
(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.
(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:
(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.
(Step 3.1 3.2) Select HUT on 1 NV-i 37A (Ui NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level.
Contrl).
(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.
(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1 NV-I 37A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 12 of 60 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:
(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)
(Step 3.14.2) IF INV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.
BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.
BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-171A is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO.
check 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.
BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.
BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:
. Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 60 Event
Description:
Power Increase OR
. Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)
(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:
. 1A Rx M/U Water Pump
. 1 B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:
. 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control)
. 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl)
. 1NV-171A(Ui Boric Acid BlenderTo VCT Inlet Control)
BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.1 i ... Flow Control was NOT adjusted.
BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1 NV-i 37A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender.... NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 60 Event
Description:
Power Increase BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.
BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.
BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.
OP/I 1A163001001 A, TURBI N E-GEN ERATOR STARTUPISHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following:
(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.
(Step 3.5.1 .2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.
(Step 3.5.1 .3)_Depress LOAD RATE.
(Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 VARIABLE DISPLAY. Mwe/Min loading rate.
(Step_3.5.1.5)_Depress ENTER.
(Step 3.5.1 .6)_Depress REFERENCE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 15 of 60 Event
Description:
Power Increase (Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.
(Step_3.5.1.8)_Depress ENTER.
(Step_3.5.1.9)_Depress GO (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.
0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 41, POWER INCREASE RO/ (Step 3.34.16) WHEN Turbine Inlet Pressure NOTE: Based on the extent of 365 367 psig, check AMSAC ACTUATION the power increase, this action BOP BLOCK/UNBLOCK as follows: may or may not be taken.
. IF UNBLOCK dark, reset as follows:
. Check all AMSAC S/G LOW FLOW status lights dark.
. Check SIG PATH CLSD>30 SEC dark.
. Depress UNBLOCK for AMSAC ACTUATION BLOCK/UNBLOCK.
. Check UNBLOCK lit.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 16 of 60 Event
Description:
Pzr PORV fails OPEN During the power increase, Pzr PORV 1NC34A will fail partially OPEN, and fail in this position. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/11A15500111, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS).
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-NCOO3B = 30 (PZR PORV INC-34A fails OPEN)
Insert MAL-NCOI2B =25 (PZR PORV INC-34A sticks OPEN on CLOSE)
Indications Available:
- OAC Alarm: Ui PZR PRESS I through IV
- 1 NC-34A dual status light indication (Red and Green status lights LIT)
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-61B-9 PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/C-6 PZR LO PRESS CONTROL
- Pzr Pressure is lowering
- Expected ActionslBehavior NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the Pzr PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.
APII 1150011, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE Immediate Action DOWN.
BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 17 of 60 Event
Description:
Pzr PORV fails OPEN SOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED. Immediate Action SOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:
. CLOSE associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:
. IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, NOTE: 1NC-34A has failed THEN CLOSE 1 NC-270 (PZR PORV OPEN.
Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A).
SOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED.
CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.
BOP (Step 7) Check 1 NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) CLOSED.
SOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters ON:
- 1A
- lB
- 1D SOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters ON.
SOP (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER IN AUTO.
SOP (Step 11) Check 1 NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch SELECTED TO NORMAL.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 18 of 60 Event
Description:
Pzr PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 12) Check 1 NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch SELECTED TO NORMAL.
BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.
CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
Booth Instructor: insert LOA-NC034 = Racked Out, delay = 10 minutes.
As AO call and report.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)
CRS LCO 3.4.1 1 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 AND 3.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 60 Event
Description:
Pzr PORV fails OPEN CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME recognize that Actions B.1 and B. One or two 8.1 Close 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B.2 are now applicable.
PORV5 associated inoperable block valves.
and not capable of AND being 8.2 Remove 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> manually power from cycled, associated block valves.
AND 8.3 Restore one 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> PORVto OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure or parameter(s)
RCS average to within limit.
temperature DNB parameters not within limits.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 3 Page 20 of 60 Event
Description:
SO lB PORV fails OPEN Next, the 18 Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1IA/5500101, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SMOOIB 100 delayo ramplo (SIG PORV ISVI3 SOB fails OPEN)
Indications Available:
- iSV-i 3AB Red status light LIT
- 1 SV-1 3AB Black needle indication at 100%
- OAC Alarm: TM FREEZE M1D3499-VLVSV13B SM PORV
- Core AT5 rising
- Rx Power rising
- Steam flow on 1 B steam line risinq NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the 1 B SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.
(Step 13)
CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred NOTE: The crew may immediately reduce 2OMwe and then diagnose an overpower reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less condition and adjust turbine than pre-transient condition. After the initial load per the Crew Expectation 20 Mwe load reduction, it is preferred that the Manual.
operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced.
APIIIAJ5500IOI, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 21 of 60 Event
Description:
SG I B PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:
. Excore Nis LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.
. NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F D/T
. T-Avg AT T-REF.
CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS. NOT in progress.
CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.
BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event GREATER THAN P-il (1955 PSIG).
BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware.
CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.
CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:
. (Step 1 3a) Check SM PORVs NOTE: The 1 B SG PORV is CLOSED. Open.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 22 of 60 Event
Description:
SO lB PORV fails OPEN RO (Step 13a RNO) IF SIG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:
. Close affected S/G SM PORV manual NOTE: Closing the Manual loader. Loader will have no effect.
. IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform NOTE: The lB SG PORV the following: Isolation Valve will need to be closed.
. Close SM PORV isolation valve.
. IF SM PORV isolation valve still NOTE: The PORV Isolation open valve is closed.
RO * (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED.
BOP * (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL:
. Containment temperature
- Containment pressure
. Containment humidity
. Containment floor and equipment sump level.
RU I * (Step 1 3.d) Check TD CA pump OFF.
BOP BOP * (Step 1 3.e) Check valves on STEAM NOTE: One or more of these LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1 MC-9) valves may be cycling. The CLOSED. RNO will direct closing the valves.
CRS * (Step 1 3.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE for AS Header pressure.
GREATER THAN 200 PSIG. If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is lOOO psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 23 of 60 Event
Description:
SG lB PORV fails OPEN CRS * (Step 1 3.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks. an AC to look for leaks.
If so, Floor Instructor:
acknowledge.
Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.
NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.
BOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP.
CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:
- Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2.
- Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria: the startup.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
- Size of leak
- Location of leak
- Rate of depletion of secondary inventory
. IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve...
- IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak...
- Check unit shutdown or load reduction NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED. Reduction will NOT be required.
CRS (Step 1 5.c RNO) Perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 24 of 60 Event
Description:
SG lB PORV fails OPEN Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.
Exit this procedure.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.4, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)
CRS LCD 3.7.4 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE NOTE: After evaluation, the 4 when steam generator is relied upon for CRS will determine that iSV-heat removal. 7ABC is OPERABLE and that LCD 3.7.4 is NOT entered.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCD 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-i. entered and exited during the transient.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 25 of 60 Event
Description:
SG lB PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expec ed ActionslBE lavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure or parameter(s)
RCS average to within limit.
temperature DNB parameters not within limits.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 26 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Subsequently, a 100 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur (over 10 minutes) on the 1 B Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1 1A15500/l 0, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. The crew will be directed by API1IAI5500I1O to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with API1!A15500104, Rapid Downpower.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SGOOIB 100 delayo ramp600 (SIG lB Tube Leak)
Indications Available:
- Pzr level is lowering
- Charging starts to rise
- MOB Annunciator 1AD-61E-7, PZR LO LEVEL DEVIATION
- Trip 1 on EMF 72 Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments APIIIAI5500IIO, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr Level will be slowly GOING UP. lowering.
BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:
- Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent_steps.
- Ensure 1 NV-238 (Ui Charging Hdr NOTE: The BOP may take Control) OPENING.
manual control of 1 NV-238.
- OPEN 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water lnj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.
- Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: The BOP may reduce letdown flow to 45 gpm, or isolate it altogether.
- Start additional NV pump. NOTE: The BOP will NOT need to start an additional NV Pump.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 27 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. IF CLAs are isolated NOTE: The CLAs are NOT isolated.
. IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater NOTE: The Pzr level is NOT <
than 4% .... 4%, or decreasing with maximum Charging flow.
RO! (Step 2) IF AT ANY TIME Pzr level goes NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP down in an uncontrolled manner OR cannot Action. The CRS will make be maintained greater than 4%, THEN both board operators aware.
perform Step 1.
RO! (Step 3) Identify affected SIG as follows:
. Any SIG NIR level GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.
. Check any of the following EMFs ABOVE NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-24 (S/G A Steamline Hi Rad)
. 1 EMF-25 (SIG B Steamline Hi Rad)
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG C Steamline Hi Rad)
. 1 EMF-27 (SIG D Steamline Hi Rad)
. 1 EMF-71 (S/G A Leakage Hi Rad)
. 1 EMF-72 (S/G B Leakage Hi Rad) NOTE: This rad monitor will be rising, and could be in either Trip 1 or TRIP 2.
. 1EMF-73 (SIG C Leakage Hi Rad)
. 1 EMF-74 (SIG D Leakage Hi Rad)
. Check CF Flow LOWER IN ANY SIG COMPARED TO ALL.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 28 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 4) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
CRS (Step 5) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
. RP/01A15700/000 (Classification of Emergency)
. RP/0!A/5700/O1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).
CRS (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage NOTE: The CRS will exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the determine that Leakage has following: exceeded the TS Limits.
Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 in service PER OPIO/A16450/O1 1 BOP to take this action.
(Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water If so, Floor Instructor System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room acknowledge as U2 BOP and Atmosphere Pressurization During perform actions Abnormal Conditions).
Have another SRO evaluate if leakage NOTE: The CRS may ask exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits OSM, STA, or Plant SRO to and immediately notify security if SSF is perform this action.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge accordingly.
NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.
If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.4.
Other Examiners follow AP 10 Actions, Step 7, on Page 30.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 29 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/01A16450101 1, CONTROL AREA VENTILATIONICHILLED WATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, CONTROL ROOM ATMOSPHERE PRESSURIZATION DURING ABNORMAL CONDITIONS (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.
(Step 3.2) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:
(Step 3.2.1) Ensure at least one of the following groups of intake valves open:
. 1VC-IA (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)
. 1VC-2A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)
. 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)
. 1VC-48 (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)
. 1VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2)
. 1VC-1OA (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2)
. 1VC-I1B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2)
. 1VC-12B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2)
(Step 3.2.2) IF A Train VC/YC operating, place A Train CR Outside Air Press Fan to ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 30 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.2.3) IF B Train VC/YC operating, place B Train CR Outside Air Press Fan to (Step 3.2.4) Depress MAN for the following (to ensure fans off):
. #1 CRA Otsd Air Fan
. #2 CRA Otsd Air Fan (Step 3.2.5) Depress OFF for the following:
. CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Dam per)
. CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Dam per)
(Step 3.2.6) Check the following dark:
. CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) OPEN light.
. CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) OPEN light.
APII/A15500110, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIRO continue HERE.
BOP (Step 7) Check if unit shutdown or reactor trip required as follows:
. Check VCT makeup IN PROGRESS. NOTE: A VCT makeup may be in progress.
. Check VCT level GOING UP.
- Check S/G tube leak size LESS THAN NOTE: The CRS will 90 GPM. determine the SGTL to be about 70-90 gpm.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 31 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Leakage in one SIG GREATER THAN 125 GPD (GALLON PER DAY).
CRS . Observe the following limits while reducing load in Step 8:
. Ensure reactor power is less than 50% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of exceeding 125 GPD.
. Be in Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of exceeding 125 GPD.
CRS (Step 8) Reduce load PER one of the following, while continuing with this AP as time allows beginning at Step 9.
CRS . AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Downpower) NOTE: The CRS will implement AP-4, and may continue with these actions after the downpower is started.
(Examiner Move forward to Page 34)
. OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation). Enclosure 4.2 (Power Reduction).
RO (Step 9) Minimize secondary side NOTE: The following actions contamination as follows: are scripted because as the plant power is reduced, the CRS may continue to perform actions within AP-lO.
Check affected SIG IDENTIFIED.
CLOSE the blowdown throttle control valve for affected SIG.
. 1A: 1BB-123(1AS/G Blowdown Throttle Control)
. 1B: 1BB-124 (lB SIG Blowdown Throttle Control)
. 1C: 1BB-125 (1C SIG Blowdown Throttle Control)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 32 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1D: IBB-126 (1D SIG Blowdown Throttle Control)
. Perform EP!1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic NOTE: The CRS may ask the Enclosures), Enclosure 15 (Minimizing U2 BOP to perform this action.
Secondary Side Contamination).
If so, Floor Instructor:
acknowledge as U2 BOP.
RD (Step 10) Check reactor trip breakers OPEN.
(Step 10 RNO) Do not continue in the procedure until the reactor is tripped PER Step 8.
Examiner NOTE: Based on the transient nature of evaluating this TS, the Examiner may need to question the CRS after the scenario.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS LCD 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
. 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through all steam generators (SGs): and
. 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG)
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 33 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Action and 3.
associated Completion AND Time of B.2 Be in MODE Condition A 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits.
SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 1&9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 34 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expec ed ActionslB ,avior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TI ME C. Total C.1 Declare the Immediately Unidentified Standby LEAKAGE, Makeup Identified Pump LEAKAGE, inoperable.
and reactor coolant pump AND seal leakoff> C.2 Enter 20 gpm. Condition A.
OR Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff
> 16.3 gpm.
OR Any reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff> 4.0 gpm.
NOTE:
Simulator Instructor Insert Event 5 upon crew entering AP-4.
AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER ROI (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RD to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RD.
RD (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO.
RD (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 35 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 DESIRED.
CRS (Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate:
. Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% NOTE: It is normal practice to Power DESIRED.
shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.
. At least two CA pumps - FUNCTIONAL CRS (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF Mode 3 is time critical AND the reactor will be shutdown by manually inserting control rods, THEN allow an additional 45 minutes to reach Mode 3 once turbine load reduction is complete.
. IF turbine will be shutdown during down power, THEN enter target load of 15 MWE in turbine control panel.
. Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.
CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/mm). load at 1 0-15 MWe/minute.
RO (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO.
BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge.
RO (Step 1 1) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.
BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 36 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Energize all backup Pzr heaters.
CRS . Check unit to be shutdown VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER. shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.
CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.
BOP . Determine boration amount based on the following:
. Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm)
. Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)
. Total Power change (%).
NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is 680-900 gallons.
RO . Check auto or manual rod control AVAILABLE.
BOP . Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/i /A161 50/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1 NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).
RO (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.
RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL.
RO (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD NOTE: This is a Continuous BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit Action. The CRS will make THEN comply with Tech Spec 3.1 .6 (Control both board operators aware.
Bank Insertion Limits):
RO (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during procedure NOTE: This is a Continuous C-7A is received, THEN insure Transient Action. The CRS will make Monitor freeze is triggered, both board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 37 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following:
. RPIOIAI5700I000 (Classification of Emergency)
. RPIOIAI5700/01O (NRC Immediate NOTE: The CRS may ask Notification Requirements). OSM to address.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.
CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of NOTE: The CRS may call load reduction. WCC!RE to address the switch position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE as appropriate.
When Rod Control Malfunction is diagnosed move to Event 5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 38 of 60 Event
Description:
Continuous inward Rod Motion During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/11A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.
Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-l REOO3A (IN)
Indications Available:
. Control Rods are moving inward in AUTO without a proper signal.
APII 1A15500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either Immediate Action dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 NOTE: No Rods have dropped steps...
in this event.
RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will place the rods in MANUAL.
RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED. Immediate Action NOTE: When the RO places the Rods to MANUAL, continual inward Rod Motion will stop.
RO (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.
RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-b) DARK.
RO (Step 6) Check T-AVGIT-REF FAILURE ROD STOP alarm (1AD-2, B-7) DARK.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 39 of 60 Event
Description:
Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to NOTE: The CRS will transition unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, to Enclosure 3 of AP-14.
THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response To Continuous Rod Movement).
ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 3 - RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RD system. to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RD.
CRS (Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
CRS (Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:
. Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.
. Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactors response.
RD (Step 4) Check T-Ref indication - NORMAL CRS! (Step 5) Do not move rods until IAE Booth Instructor: after 2 RD determines rod motion in permissible. minutes, as IAE, report that MANUAL rod control only is permissible.
RD (Step 6) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref as follows:
. Adjust Turbine load
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 40 of 60 Event
Description:
Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments OR
. Borate/dilute NC System.
RO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: This is a Continuous while in this procedure,... Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.
RO! (Step 8) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure a unit shutdown is required AND Action. The CRS will make BOP both board operators aware.
rods cannot be moved, THEN perform the following:
. Borate as required during shutdown to maintain T-Avg at T-Ref.
. Monitor AFD during load reduction.
. IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech Spec limit AND reactor power is greater than 50%,
. IF entry into Mode 3 is desired, THEN perform the following:
. WHEN the turbine is tripped OR at desired power level, THEN perform the following:
. Trip Reactor.
. GO TO EP/1/A15000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).
CRS (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired...
NOTE: The RO can move rods in MANUAL.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN After this, the leak will develop into a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. While performing an NCS cooldown the C-9 Interlock will fail and result in a loss of the steam dumps. The operator will be required to re-initiate the cooldown using the available SG PORVs. During the NCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will fail to open. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using the last available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SGO0IB 500 delay0 rampl2O (SIG lB Tube Rupture)
Indications Available:
. Pzr level lowers uncontrollably
. Pzr pressure lowers consistently with Pzr level NOTE: Upon changing plant conditions the crew will implement Continuous Action Step 2 of AP-lO, and return to Step 1 of AP-lO.
APIIIAI5500IIO, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr Level will be slowly GOING UP. lowering.
BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:
. Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent_steps.
. Ensure 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) OPENING.
- OPEN 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water lnj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP
- Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: If not isolated already the BOP isolate letdown.
- Start additional NV pump. NOTE: The BOP will need to start an additional NV Pump.
. IF CLAs are isolated NOTE: The CLAs are NOT isolated.
. IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater NOTE: The Pzr level is than 4% OR Pzr level going down with decreasing with maximum maximum charging flow, THEN perform Charging flow.
the following:
. IF lB OR 1C S/G identified as NOTE: The CRS will dispatch ruptured, THEN immediately two AOs.
dispatch two operators to isolate TD Floor Instructor:
CA pump steam supply from Acknowledge as AOs.
ruptured S/G PER Enclosure 3 (TD CA Pump Steam Supply Isolation) Booth Instructor:
insertREMSA0002 0 insertREMSAOO78 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as AO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the lB SG.
- Trip reactor.
RO/
- GO TO EP/l/A15000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection).
EPIIIAI5000IE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. NOTE: Crew will carry out BOP Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.
RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- All rod bottom lights LIT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
. hR amps - GOING DOWN.
NOTE: The reactor will trip manually.
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED.
RO! (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP
. SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT.
. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) LIT.
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 7) Check all Feed water Isolation status lights (1S1-4) LIT BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK.
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s):
. Groupsl,2,5DARK.
. Group 3 LIT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED.
BOP (Step 9c RNO) Align or start components as required.
. Group 6 LIT.
- GOTOSteplO.
RO (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:
. MDCApumps-ON.
. N/R level in at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%.
BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON.
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.
CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.
- Start2ARN pump.
. THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:
for existing plant condition. insei-t LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delayo rampl0 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)
RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.
BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PS 1G. is normal.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:
. Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.
BOP (Step 1 6b RNO) Perform the following:
. Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:
. 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)
. 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).
CRS . IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EPI1/AI5000IG-1 (Generic OSM to address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.
acknowledge as OSM.
RO/ (Step 18) Check CA flow:
. Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
BOP . Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.
RO/ WHEN each S/G NIR level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that S/G N/R level both board operators aware.
between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:
. IF any NC pumps on, THEN check NC NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF T-Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO due to the LOOP.
557°F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 46 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN NOTE: It is most likely that the cooldown will be under control.
If NOT, the CRS will assign the RO (BOP) to perform Enclosure 3 (Not Scripted),
and continue the performance of E-0 with the BOP (RO).
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray (RO) valves:
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
(Step 20a RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:
. CLOSE Pzr PORV(s).
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:
. CLOSE its isolation valve.
. CLOSE the following valve(s):
. IF 1 NC-34A (Ui Pzr PORV) failed, THEN CLOSE 1NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34).
. IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed...
. Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve-OPEN.
BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on (RO) core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:
(RO)
. All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING UP
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 47 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN
. All SIGs PRESSURIZED.
BOP (Step 23) Check if SIG tubes intact:
(RO)
. The following secondary EMFs NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)
. 1EMF-34(L) (SIG Sample (Lo Range))
. 1 EMF-24 (S!G_A)
. 1EMF-25 (SIG_8)
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG_C)
. 1 EMF-27 (S/G_D).
. SIG levels STABLE OR GOING NOTE: The 1 B SG Level is UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. increasing in an uncontrolled manner.
CRS (Step 21 RNO) IF S!G levels going up in an uncontrolled manner OR any EMF abnormal, THEN perform the following:
. Implement EP/1/AJ5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).
. GO TO EPI1IAI5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture).
NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-3.
EPIIIAI5000IE-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE ROl (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP BOP (Step 2) Identify ruptured SIG(s):
. Any SIG NIR level GOING UP IN AN NOTE: The 1 B SG Level is UNCONTROLLED MANNER increasing in an uncontrolled manner.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 48 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 Interlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN OR
. Chemistry or RP has determined NOTE: The CRS may contact ruptured SIG. Chemistry for sampling.
Booth Instructor:
Acknowledge as appropriate.
. Any of the following EMFs ABOVE NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-24 (SIG_A)
. 1 EMF-25 (SIC_B)
. 1 EMF-26 (SIC_C)
. 1 EMF-27 (SIC_D)
RO (Step 3) Check at least one SIG AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.
RO (Step 4) Isolate flow from ruptured SIG(s) as follows:
. Check ruptured S/C(s) PORV NOTE: This valve has CLOSED. previously failed open.
(Step 4a RNO) WHEN ruptured SIG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following on affected SM PORV:
. IF SM PORV is still open, THEN NOTE: Previous operation of CLOSE its manual loader, the Manual Loader has failed to close the 1 B SC PORV.
. IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform the following:
. CLOSE SM PORV isolation valve.
. IF SM PORV isolation valve cannot be closed...
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 49 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Check SIGs 1 B and 1 C INTACT. NOTE: The 1 B SG is NOT Intact.
CRS (Step 4b RNO) Isolate TD CA pump steam supply from ruptured SIG as follows:
IF TD CA pump is the only source of NOTE: The TD CA Pump is feedwater.... NOT the ONLY CA Source.
Ensure operators dispatched in next step immediately notify Control Room Supervisor when valves are closed.
Immediately dispatch 2 operators to NOTE: This step was most concurrently verify (CV), unlock and likely accomplished in AP-1 0 If CLOSE valves on ruptured S!G(s): NOT, the CRS will dispatch two AOs.
Floor Instructor:
Acknowledge as AOs.
For1BSIG:
. 1SA-78 (18 S/G SM Supply to Booth Instructor:
Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb insertREMSA0002 = 0 Loop Seal Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+1 0, FF-53). insertREMSAOO78 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as AO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the lB SG.
. 1SA-2 (lB SIG SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Maint Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+10, FF-53, above ladder).
- IF AT ANY TIME local closure of SA NOTE: Eight minutes will NOT valves takes over 8 minutes, THEN elapse before the valves are isolate TD CA pump steam supply closed.
PER Enclosure 2 (Tripping TD CA Pump Stop Valve or Alternate Steam Isolation).
- Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured SIGI(s) CLOSED.
- For1BS/G:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 50 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 Interlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1BB-2B (lB SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control)
. 1 BB-6A (B S!G BB Cont Inside Isol).
- CLOSE steam drain on ruptured SIG(s)
. 1SM-89 (B SM Line Drain lsol)
- CLOSE the following valves on ruptured SIG(s):
. MSIV bypass valve.
RO (Step 5) Control ruptured SIG(s) level as follows:
- Check ruptured SIG(s) NIR level GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).
- Isolate feed flow to ruptured SIG(s):
. ForlBS/G:
CLOSE 1CA-54AC (Ui TD CA Pump Disch TO 1 B SIG Isol).
. CLOSE 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1 B SIG Isol).
CRITICAL TASK:
(E-3A) Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of AP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 51 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN RD (Step 6) Check ruptured SIG(s) pressure GREATER THAN 280 PS 1G.
BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump RUNNING. NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF due to the LOOP.
BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG.
RD (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:
- Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured SIG pressure:
>1099 psig - 520°F NOTE: The CRS will determine the target 1000 1099 psig 508°F temperature to be between 508-520°F.
RD
- Check the following valves on ruptured SIG(s) CLOSED:
- MSIV bypass valve.
RD
(Step 9c RND) IF ruptured SIG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:
- Do not continue until affected SIG PORV is:
- Isolated
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 52 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN OR
. Determined to be unisolable.
- Check SIG(s) 1 B and 1 C INTACT. NOTE: The 1 B SG is ruptured.
RO (Step 9.d RNO) IF lB OR 1C SIG is ruptured, THEN perform the following:
- Ensure steam to TDCA pump is isolated from ruptured SIG per one of the following:
- Local isolation of SA line (per Step
- 4. b)
NOTE: If NOT already done, the CRS will direct two AOs to CLOSE 1SA-2 and 78.
Booth Instructor:
insertREMSA0002 = 0 insertREMSAOO78 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as AO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the lB SG.
RO * (Step 9e) Check condenser available as NOTE: Because of a C-9 follows: failure the Condenser is NOT available.
- C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1 SI-i 8)
LIT CRS (Step 9e RNO) GO TO RNO for Step 9.h.
BOP (Step 9h RNO) Perform the following:
- Ensure at least one Pzr PORV isolation valve is OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 53 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN
. IF VI is lost... NOTE: Neither condition has occurred.
. IF Pzr pressure is greater than 1955 NOTE: Pzr Pressure may be <
PSIG, THEN depressurize to 1900 PSIG 1955 psig. If pressure> 1955 using Pzr PORV. psig, the crew will have to depressurize.
- Depress BLOCK on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches.
- Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG.
- Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.
- IF any intact S/G SM PORV isolation NOTE: lB SO PORV has valves is closed AND associated SM previously failed OPEN.
PORV is operable THEN perform the following:
- CLOSE SM PORV manual NOTE: 18 SG PORV has loader on ruptured SIG(s). previously failed OPEN and has been isolated.
- Adjust manual loaders on intact SIG SM PORVs as required to control intact SIG depressurization rate at approximately 2 PSIG per second.
- IF no intact S/G available... NOTE: The 1A, 1C and 1D SC are available.
RO (Step 9i) Check Low Pressure Steamline Isolation BLOCKED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 54 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 9i RNO) Perform the following:
. Depressurize Pzr to less than 1955 PSIG using one of the following:
. Maximum available Pzr spray OR
. IF normal Pzr spray is not available, THEN use Pzr PORV.
. Do not continue until Pzr pressure is less than 1955 PSIG.
. Depress BLOCK on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches.
. CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s) and Pzr PORVs.
. Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSI G.
RO . (Step 9.j) Check Core exit T/Cs- LESS NOTE: it is likely that when the THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached.
RO (Step 9.j RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: This action will be taken after the target temperature has been achieved.
WHEN Core exit T/Cs are less than required temperature, THEN perform the following:
. Stop NC System cooldown.
. Maintain core exit T/Cs less than required temperature.
CRS NOTE: The CRS will proceed and return to this step when the target temperature has been achieved.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 55 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN RO (Step 10) Control intact SIG levels:
. Check NIR level in any intact SIG GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).
. Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact SIG NIR levels between 22% (32% ACC) and 50%.
BOP (Step 1 1) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:
. Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves AVAILABLE.
(Step 11 a RNO) Evaluate cause of power loss and initiate actions to restore power to affected isolation valve(s).
. All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
(Step 11 b RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:
. CLOSE Pzr PORV(s).
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN CLOSE it isolation valve.
. IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed...
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or isolated...
. IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN CLOSE the following valve(s):
IF 1 NC-34A (Ui Pzr PORV) failed, THEN CLOSE 1NC-.270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A).
(Step 1 1 c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 56 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 12) Reset the following:
. S/I
. Sequencers
. Phase A Isolation
. Phase B Isolation BOP (Step 13) Establish VI to containment as follows:
. Open the following valves:
. 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))
. 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))
. 1 VI-1 50B (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Isol).
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.
RO (Step 14) Check if NC System cooldown should be stopped as follows:
Check cooldown INITIATED PER STEP 9.
. Check Core exit T/Cs LESS THAN NOTE: It is likely that when the REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached.
CRS (Step 14b RNO) Perform the following:
. IF AT ANY TIME while in this step NOTE: This is a Continuous ruptured S/G pressure changes by over Action. The CRS will make 100 PSIG, AND ruptured S/G pressure is both board operators aware, greater than 400 PSIG, THEN select a and HOLD.
new target temperature from table in Step 9.a.
. Do not continue until core exit T/Cs are less than target temperature.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 57 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO . (Step 14c) Stop NC System cooldown.
. Maintain Core exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQURIED TEMPERATURE.
RO (Step 15) Check ruptured SIG(s) pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
RO (Step 16) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 20°F.
BOP (Step 17) Depressurize NC System using Pzr spray as follows:
. Check normal Pzr spray flow AVAILABLE.
. Initiate NC depressurization using NOTE: The Pzr Spray valves maximum available spray. will not open when operated.
IF AT ANY TIME during this step, spray valves are not effective in reducing NC pressure, OR ruptured SIG(s) NR level goes above 83% (73% ACC), THEN GO TO Step 18.
CRS (Step 1 7a RNO) GO TO Step 18.
BOP (Step 18) Depressurize NC System using Pzr PORV as follows:
. Check at least one Pzr PORV -
AVAILABLE.
. Open one Pzr PORV.
. Do not continue until any of the following conditions satisfied:
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs LESS THAN 0°F OR
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 58 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelFailure of the C-9 lnterlock/Pzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 76%
(58% ACC)
. Both of the following:
. NC pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SIG(s)
PRESSURE.
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29% ACC).
. Close Pzr PORV.
. Close Pzr spray valves.
BOP (Step 19) Check NC pressure GOING UP.
RO! (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria:
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
. Secondary heat sink:
. N/R level in at least one intact S/G GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC)
. NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11%
BOP (Step 21) Stop S/I pumps as follows:
. NI pumps.
. All but one NV pump.
BOP (Step 22) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:
. Check the following valves - OPEN
. 1NV-221A(U1 NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 59 of 60 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of the C-9 InterlocklPzr Spray Valves fail to OPEN Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1NV-222B (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol).
Check the following valves OPEN
. 1NV-150B (Ui NV Pump Recirc NOTE: Both valves are Isol). CLOSED (Due to Item #3 of the E-3 Foldout Page).
. 1NV-151A (Ui NV Pump Recirc lsol).
- Close the following valves:
- 1 Nl-9A (NC Cold Leg_Inj From NV)
- 1NI-1OB (NC Cold Leg_Inj From NV).
CRITICAL TASK:
(E-3C) Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO.cts).
Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
UNIT I STATUS:
Power Level: 39% NCS [B] 1894 ppm Pzr [B]: 1893 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: Raised from 30% on previous shift Core Burnup: 43 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/11A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:
- The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- The crew will be directed to raise power to 100% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:
- Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-1 1) due PORV leakage. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A.
- OKRP-5040, KR tank Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating)
- MCB Annunciator lAD-il, E-2, SEQB LOSS OF CONTROL PWR, spuriously alarmed several times during the shift (IAE is investigating).
Crew Directions:
- The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover starting with Step 3.34.15 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/i/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.
- Use of Alternate Dilute has been approved.
- RE has recommended an initial Alternate Dilution of 400 gallons.
- Turbine loading rate will be 2MWe/minute.
Work Control SROlOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050614)
Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i 3, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 X01_157 C-RO Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main C-SRO Generator Autosynch Circuit 2 NA R-RO Raise power to 1 2OMWe N-BOP N-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP 1A2 KC Pump trip KCO1OB C(TS)-SRO MAC 4 C-RO Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker LTOO2E Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure C-SRO EPOO4B REM SB000X MAL 5 C-BOP Loss of 1 ETA/Sequencer Failure EPOO9A C TS SRO EQBOO3A -
MAL 6 M-RO Steam Line Break Inside Containment SMOO7D M-BOP M-SRO MAC 7 NA SI fails to actuate automatically ISEOO2A ISEOO2B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev 050614)
McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-OfService: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Upon shift turnover, the operator will continue with the startup starting with Step 3.32.16 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, and continue with the Turbine startup starting with Step 3.13 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A16300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. The operator will place the Voltage Regulator in service and attempt to synchronize the Main Generator to the electrical grid. When the operator attempts to synchronize the Main Generator the autosynch circuit for the breaker that is attempted to be closed first, will fail. The operator will need to recognize the failure and attempt to close the other breaker in accordance with Step 3.14.12.3 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A16300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown.
Once the Main Generator is connected to the grid, the turbine will be loaded to 120 MWe, and the crew will realign the Steam Dump System from Steam Pressure Mode to Tavg Mode. It is expected that one or more boron concentration dilutions will be required.
Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, and LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System.
Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. Since the plant power is less than P-8, the Reactor will not trip. Simultaneously, the 1 B Main Generator Breaker will fail to trip and the Steam Dump Valves will fail to open as required. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1!A15500/02, Turbine Generator Trip.
Next, the normal supply breaker to 1ETA will trip open causing 1ETA to de-energize.
The 1A EDG will automatically start but not sequence its loads. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources Operating, and LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating.
Following this, a large steam rupture will occur inside Containment on the 1 D Steamline.
SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Draft (Rev 050614)
Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EP/1IA/50001E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition either to EPI1IAI5000IE-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or to EPI1IAI5000IES-i.i, SI Termination. If the crew transitions to E-i, the scenario will terminate upon transition. If the crew transitions to ES-i .1, the scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-i .i, after the crew has closed iNI-9A and iNI-iOB.
Critical Tasks:
E-O D Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition out of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid.
E-2A Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).
NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitor/control Reactor Power and Tavg. This is based on Steps 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of Enclosure 4.8 of OPIIIA/61001003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The RO candidate must be assigned to phase on the Turbine Generator to the electrical grid during event I and raise turbine load during event 2.
PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 30 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N14-1-4
REFERENCES:
- 1. OPI1IAI6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Rev 185)
- 2. OPI1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 121)
- 3. OP/1/A/6300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown (Rev 98)
- 4. OP/1/A16300/OO1A, Turbine Generator Load Change (Rev 11)
- 5. AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage (Rev 10)
- 8. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System (Amendment 265/245)
- 9. AP/1/A15500/2, Turbine Generator Trip (Rev 25)
- 10. AP/1/A15500/07, Loss of Electrical Power (Rev 32)
- 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating (Amendment 184/1 66)
- 14. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33)
- 15. EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 10)
- 16. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1 .2, Safety Injection Termination (Rev 26)
Validation Time: 128 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.
Facility Review:
Rev. 050314 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N14-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i 3, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 X0l.j57 C-RO Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit C-SRO 2 NA R-RO Raise power to 1 2OMWe N-BOP N-SRO MAL 3 C-BOP 1A2 KC Pump trip KCO1OB C(TS)-SRO MAL 4 C-RO Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker LTOO2E Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure C-SRO EPOO4B REM SB000X MAL C-BOP Loss of 1 ETA/Sequencer Failure EPOO9A C(TS)-SRO EQBOO3A MAL 6 M-RO Steam Line Break Inside Containment SMOO7D M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA SI fails to actuate automatically ISEOO2A ISEOO2B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 McGuire 2014 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A power ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1KCP -5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Upon shift turnover, the operator will continue with the startup starting with Step 3.32.16 of .1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, and continue with the Turbine startup starting with Step 3.13 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A/6300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. The operator will place the Voltage Regulator in service and attempt to synchronize the Main Generator to the electrical grid. When the operator attempts to synchronize the Main Generator the autosynch circuit for the breaker that is attempted to be closed first, will fail. The operator will need to recognize the failure and attempt to close the other breaker in accordance with Step 3.14.12.3 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A16300/001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown.
Once the Main Generator is connected to the grid, the turbine will be loaded to 120 MWe, and the crew will realign the Steam Dump System from Steam Pressure Mode to Tavg Mode. It is expected that one or more boron concentration dilutions will be required.
Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, and LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System.
Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. Since the plant power is less than P-8, the Reactor will not trip. Simultaneously, the 1 B Main Generator Breaker will fail to trip and the Steam Dump Valves will fail to open as required. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, Turbine Generator Trip.
Next, the normal supply breaker to 1ETA will trip open causing 1ETA to de-energize. The 1A EDG will automatically start but not sequence its loads. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources -
Operating, and LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating.
Following this, a large steam rupture will occur inside Containment on the 1 D Steamline. SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition either to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination. If the crew transitions to E-1, the scenario will terminate upon transition. If the Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 crew transitions to ES-i.1, the scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-ti, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-1OB.
Critical Tasks:
E-O D Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition out of E 0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid.
E-2A Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).
NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitorlcontrol Reactor Power and Tavg. This is based on Steps 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of Enclosure 4.8 of 0P111A161001003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The RO candidate must be assigned to phase on the Turbine Generator to the electrical grid during event I and raise turbine load during event 2.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 243 T 0 Malfunctions (From IC-15):
Q =
(Originally 15).
insert LOA-CM056 = Racked Out; insert LOA CMO56A = Racked Out; (IA Hotwell Pump is OOS) insert XMT-KC_IKCPT549O = 0 (PKC-5490 is OOS) insert OVR-IADI3_F07 = ON (MCB Annunciator IADI3IF7)
From IC-243 Per Lesson Plan 2014 NRC Exam Scenario 4 insert MAL-ISEOO2A AUTO (SI Train A Fails to Actuate in AUTO) insert MAL-ISEOO2B AUTO (SI Train B Fails to Actuate in AUTO)
RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:
Reset all SLIMs PKC-5490 (0-stick)
MCB Annunciator lAD-I 3, F-7 (0-stick)
Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.
Setup OAC Q Freeze.
Q Update Fresh Tech.
Spec. Log.
Q Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase.
- 4. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OPI1/A16l001003 marked up as follows:
- All Limits and Precautions (Including NOTEs) Checked
- Step 2.3 initialed.
- Note prior to Step 3.1 checked.
- Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.2 initialed.
- Step 3.3 initialed.
- Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.32.16 is entered.
- Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.3.4 is NA.
- Step 3.32.1 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.32.2 is initialed.
- Step 3.32.3 is initialed.
- Step 3.32.4 Checkbox is checked.
- Step 3.32.5 Checkbox is checked.
- Note prior to Step 3.32.6 checked.
- Step 3.32.6 is NA.
- Step 3.32.7 Checkbox is checked.
- Note prior to Step 3.32.8 checked.
- Step 3.32.8 is initialed.
- Step 3.32.9 is NA.
- Step 3.32.10 Checkbox is checked.
- Note prior to Step 3.32.11 checked.
- Step 3.32.11 is initialed (Person Notified Time and Date are entered).
- Step 3.32.12 is NA.
- Step 3.32.13 is NA.
- Step 3.32.14 is NA.
- Step 3.32.15 initialed.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION
- 5. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OPI1/AJ6300/001 marked up as follows:
. All Limits and Precautions (Including NOTEs) Checked.
. Step 2.1 is initialed.
. Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.
. Step 3.2 is circled.
. Step 3.3 is initialed.
. Step 3.1 1 is initialed.
. Step 3.1 1 .1 is NA.
. Step 3.11.2 is NA.
. Step 3.1 1 .3 is initialed.
st 1
. Step 3.11.4 Bullet initialed, 2 Bullet is NA.
. Step 3.11.5 1 st Bullet initialed, 2 Bullet initialed.
. Step 3.1 1 .6 is initialed.
. Step 3.1 1 .7 Checkbox is checked.
. Step 3.1 1 .8 is initialed.
. Step 3.1 1 .9 is initialed.
. Step 3.1 1 .10 Checkbox is checked.
. Step 3.1 1 .1 1 Checkbox is checked.
. Note prior to Step 3.12 is checked.
. Step 3.12 Checkbox is checked.
- 6. Prepare a copy of Enclosure 4.4 of OP/1/A16300/001 so that the Floor Instructor can provide a hard copy to the BOP during Event 2.
- 7. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Q At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N14-1-4.
Q At direction of Event I Synchronize the Main Generator to the examiner Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Insert XO1_157_2 I Delete XOI_157_2 2 (Delete After Opposite Breaker Selected)
Q At direction of Event 2 Raise power to 1 2OMWe examiner Q At direction of Event 3 1A2 KC Pump trip examiner Insert MAL-KCOIOB =
TRUE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 4 Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine examiner Trip/Generator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Insert MAL-LTOO2 =
Dump failure 6.0, Ramp = 120 Insert:
REM-SB0003=0 REM-SB0006=0 REM-SB0009=O REM-SBOOI 2=0 REM-SBOOI 5=0 REM-SBOOI 8=0 REM-SBOO2I =0 REM-SB0024=0 REM-SB0027=0 Delete:
REM-SB0003=2 REM-SB0006=2 REM-SB0009=2 REM-SBOOI 2=2 REM-SBOOI 5=2 REM-SBOOI 8=2 REM-SBOO2I =2 REM-SB0024=2 REM-SB00272 CdXO2_1 63_3 EQI insert MAL-EPOO4B ACTIVE (lB Generator Breaker fails to Trip on Turbine Trip) delete MAL- EPOO4B cdXOl_189_1 EQI and X01_189_1 EQI Q At direction of Event 5 Loss of 1 ETA/Sequencer Failure examiner insert MAL-EPOO9A = AP-7 Actions TRIP insertLOA-RN087 = ON delay = 60 seconds (Start 2A RN Pump) insert MALEQBOOIA = insertREM-RNOO4OA I = 0 (Close 1RN-40A)
ON_BLACKOUT Q At direction of Event 6 Steam Line Break Inside Containment examiner insert MAL-SMOO7D 2021250.000000 Ramp6O Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 SI fails to actuate automatically insert MAL-ISEOO2A Note: This event is set at T0.
AUTO (SI Train A Fails to Actuate in AUTO) E-O Actions Start 2A RN Pump and Throttle Flow insert MAL-ISEOO2B insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump)
AUTO (SI Train B Fails insert LOA-RN083 8000.000000 delayo to Actuate in AUTO) ramplo (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)
Stop All NF AHUs insert LOA-NFOI6 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU StartlStop)
Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 10 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the GridlFailure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Upon shift turnover, the operator will continue with the startup starting with Step 3.32.16 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OPI1IAI6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, and continue with the Turbine startup starting with Step 3.13 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/11A163001001, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown. The operator will place the Voltage Regulator in service and attempt to synchronize the Main Generator to the electrical grid. When the operator attempts to synchronize the Main Generator the autosynch circuit for the breaker that is attempted to be closed first, will fail. The operator will need to recognize the failure and attempt to close the other breaker in accordance with Step 3.14.12.3 of Enclosure 4.1, Startup with Turbine Control in Operator Auto, of OP/1/A/6300/0O1, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown.
Booth Operator Instructions: AO (Bill) is standing by at the Main Generator Voltage Regulator Panel.
Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The RO should be performing activities associated with the Main Turbine Generator during this event.
0P111A163001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FROR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.32.16) Ensure TV/GV Transfer complete and Voltage Regulator placed in service per OP/1/A16300/001 (Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown).
CRS (Step 3.32.17) Close Generator MODs per OP/1/A/6300/001 (Turbine Generator Startu p/Shutdown).
CRS (Step 3.32.18) Synchronize Generator and load Generator to 120 MWE per OP/1/A16300/001 (Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 11 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3.32.19) WHEN Main Generator Breakers closed, record the following values and notify Engineering:
. 1A Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor Pilot Valve Counter
. 1 B Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor Pilot Valve Counter
. Date/Time 1A Main Generator Breaker Closed
. Date/Time 1 B Main Generator Breaker Closed CRS (Step 3.32.20) IF performing NOTE: AVR Testing will NOT Generator/Automatic Voltage be performed.
Regulator(AVR) testing on line at 15%
RTP...
OPII IA/6300/OO1 , TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, STARTUP WITH TURBINE CONTROL IN OPERATOR AUTO RO (Step 3.13) Place Voltage Regulator in service as follows:
RO (Step 3.13.1) Check Turbine speed greater than 1710 rpm.
RO (Step 3.1 3.2) Locally check closed: NOTE: RO will contact AO (Bill).
Booth Operator: As AO (Bill) report Disconnects are CLOSED.
. 1 EGB-SX-Q701 (Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 1 Discon)
. 1 EGB-SX-Q702 (Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 2 Discon)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 12 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RD (Step 3.13.3) Check PMG voltage 120 140 VAC.
RD (Step 3.13.4) IF any Voltage Regulator NOTE: RD will contact AD Alarms are present at Local control Panel... (Bill).
Booth Operator: As AC (Bill) report There are NO alarms at local panel.
RD (Step 3.13.5) Check Voltage Regulator aligned for Control Room operation per one of the following:
. DAC Graphic MAINGEN
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Local Control Panel
. M1D2342 (Ui Gen Volt Reg in Local Cabinet Control)
RD (Step 3.13.6) Check one of the following:
. Mi D2348 (Ui Gen Voltage Regulator System) is normal DR
. Trouble alarms or faults have been reviewed on the following:
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Local Control Panel
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 1 Panel
. Ui Gen Voltage Reg Ch 2 Panel RD (Step 3.1 3.7) Ensure Voltage Regulator in MAN.
RD (Step 3.13.8) IF performing Generator I NOTE: Turnover has Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) indicated that this testing will testing,... not occur.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 13 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3.13.9) Ensure Excitation ON.
RO (Step 3.13.10) IF Generator! AVR personnel NOTE: Turnover has are performing post Turbine OPC and indicated that this testing will Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test tuning, ... not occur.
RO (Step 3.13.11) Check Generator Voltage 22.4 23.2 KV.
RO (Step 3.13.12) Check READY lit on Voltage Regulator.
RO (Step 13.13.13) IF auto Voltage Regulator operation is desired, perform the following:
. Ensure Voltage Regulator in AUTO.
. Notify SOC that McGu ire Unit 1 NOTE: RO will contact SOC.
Generator Voltage Regulator status is Booth Operator As SOC now in AUTO AND to update this status acknowledge in the EMS System. (Dispatcher Phone or 704-382-4413)
RO (Step 3.13.14) IF manual Voltage Regulator NOTE: Manual voltage operation is desired.... regulator operation is NOT desired.
RO (Step 3.13.15) Depress and hold SYNC on either Generator Breaker 1A or Generator Breaker lB.
RO (Step 3.13.16) Using Voltage Adjust, ensure Station Run Volts slightly higher than Generator Incoming Volts.
RO (Step 3.13.17) Release SYNC.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 14 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.13.18) Notify Engineering that Exciter NOTE: RO will contact field has been flashed. WCC/SE.
Booth Operator: As WCC/SE (Jim Allgood) acknowledge.
RO (Step 3.14) Close Generator MODs as follows:
RO (Step 3.14.1) Ensure Generator Frequency greater than or equal to 59.6 Hz.
RO (Step 3.14.2) IF both Generator Breakers are available to be placed in service and Control Room operation of Generator Breaker MODs is desired, close the following:
. MODs for Generator Breaker 1A
. MODs for Generator Breaker 1 B RO (Step 3.14.3) IF both Generator Breakers are NOTE: Both Generator NOT available to be placed in service Breakers are available.
(Step 3.14.4) Dispatch operator to locally NOTE: RO will dispatch AC.
check:
Booth Operator: As AC report MODs IA and lB CLOSED, no condensation in IPB Enclosures.
RO . MODs closed for Generator Breaker 1A (if closed)
. MODs closed for Generator Breaker 1 B (if closed)
. No condensation in IPB enclosures through windows at MODs RO (Step 3.14.5) IF local operation of MODs is NOTE: local operation will not required,... be required.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 15 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosyrich Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.15) IF auto synchronization of Generator to grid is desired, perform as follows:
RD (Step 3.15.1) Obtain a copy of OP/i /A16300100 1 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change).
RO (Step 3.15.2) Notify SOC (System Operation NOTE: RD will contact SOC.
Center) unit to be paralleled to the grid. (382-Booth Operator: As SOC 4413 or dispatcher phone) acknowledge.
RO (Step 3.15.3) Perform the following to limit Governor Valves travel:
. Depress Valve Position Limit Display
. Check Valve Position Limit Display lit.
. Depress Valve Position Limit Lower until Variable Display indicates 17%.
RO (Step 3.15.4) Check Voltage Regulator in AUTO.
RD (Step 3.1 5.5) Depress and hold SYNC for breaker to be closed.
RO (Step 3.15.6) Using Voltage Adjust, ensure Station Run Voltage is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage.
RO (Step 3.1 5.7) Adjust Generator speed per 0P111A163001001 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change) until Synchroscope hand moves smoothly and slowly in FAST direction.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 16 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the GridlFailure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RD (Step 3.1 5.8) IF a significant time delay (greater than 5 minutes) has occurred since performing Step 3.15.6, ensure Station Run Volts is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage RD (Step 3.15.9) Release SYNC.
RD (Step 3.15.10) Place Gen Auto/Man Sync BoothlFloor Instructor:
Select to Auto lA or Auto 1B. Observe Gen Auto/Man Sync Select position, and take following action:
If placed in AUTO IA: Delete DVR-MGO1 7B If placed in AUTO IB: Delete OVR-MGO1 7A RD (Step 3.15.1 1) WHEN selected Generator NOTE: The selected Breaker Breaker closes will NOT Close.
RD (Step 3.15.12) IF the selected Generator Breaker did NOT close, perform the following:
. Depress Auto Sync on DEH panel.
. WHEN time allows, notify Engineering of which Generator breaker(s) failed to auto sync.
IF selected Generator Breaker fails NOTE: The RD will attempt to to close within 5 minutes, perform close the other breaker.
Steps 3.15.5 3.1 5.12.2 for opposite breaker.
RD (Step 3.15.5) Depress and hold SYNC for breaker to be closed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 17 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3.15.6) Using Voltage Adjust, ensure Station Run Voltage is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage.
RO (Step 3.15.7) Adjust Generator speed per OP/i 11300101 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change) until Synchroscope hand moves smoothly and slowly in FAST direction.
RO (Step 3.15.8) IF a significant time delay (greater than 5 minutes) has occurred since performing Step 3.15.6, ensure Station Run Volts is slightly higher than Gen Incoming Voltage.
RO (Step 3.15.9) Release SYNC.
RO (Step 3.15.10) Place Gen Auto/Man Sync Select to Auto lA or Auto 1 B.
RO (Step 3.1 5.1 1) WHEN selected Generator NOTE: The selected Breaker Breaker closes immediately load the will Close.
Generator by performing the following: {PIP M-1 3-i 808}
. Using Voltage Adjust, maintain Pwr Fact 0.90-0.95 (Lag).
. Depress MW IN.
. Depress LOAD RATE.
. Enter a Load Rate of 25 in VARIABLE DISPLAY.
. Depress ENTER.
. Depress REFERENCE.
. Enter a Load of 50 in VARIABLE DISPLAY.
. Depress ENTER.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 18 of 67 Event
Description:
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid/Failure of Main Generator Autosynch Circuit
. Depress GD.
. Check Generator loaded by comparing actual load to Demand and Reference windows.
RD (Step 3.15.12) IF the selected Generator NOTE: The selected Breaker Breaker did NOT close.., did Close.
(Step 5.13.13) Place Gen Auto/Man Sync Select in Man.
RD (Step 3.15.14) IF neither Generator Breaker NOTE: One Breaker is Closed.
is closed,...
RD (Step 3.15.15) IF other Generator Breaker NOTE: The RD will Close the available, place in service as follows: 2 Generator Breaker.
. Depress and hold SYNC for selected breaker.
AFTER Synchroscope for selected breaker in 12 oclock position, depress CLOSE for selected breaker until CLSD light is lit.
. Release SYNC.
RD (Step 3.15.16) Perform the following to limit Governor Valve travel:
. Depress Valve Position Limit Display and check Valve Position Limit Display lit.
. Depress Valve Position Limit Raise until Variable Display indicates 120%.
RD (Step 3.16) IF manual synchronization of NOTE: The Generator is Generator to grid is desired.... already synched to the Grid.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 19 of 67 Event
Description:
Raise power to I2OMWe Once the Main Generator is connected to the grid, the turbine will be loaded to 120 MWe, and the crew will realign the Steam Dump System from Steam Pressure Mode to Tavg Mode. It is expected that one or more boron concentration dilutions will be required.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA 0P111A163001001, TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, STARTUP WITH TURBINE CONTROL IN OPERATOR AUTO RO (Step 3.17) Load Turbine to 120 MWE per OP/11A163001001 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change).
BOP (Step 3.18) Perform the following while continuing with unit startup:
. Maintain air temperature out of Exciter Air Cooler at 90-11 5°F by throttling 1 KR-i 78 (Exciter Air Cooler Throttle)._{PIP_00-0867}
. Place Turb Drn Vlvs Cntrl in AUTO.
. Place in AUTO:
. IF MSR Control System is in SYTSTEM MANUAL...
. Check all piston operated check NOTE: When the BOP seeks valves open per Enclosure 4.4 a copy of Enclosure 4.4 of (Piston Operated Check Valve OP/i /A16300100i, Floor Checklist), Instructor provide a hard copy.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 20 of 67 Event
Description:
Raise power to I2OMWe Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A163001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FROR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE BOP (Step 3.32.21) IF PT111A142501004 C (Turbine OPC and Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test) to be performed following load increase to greater than 112 MWe...
(Step 3.32.22) WHEN steam dumps close, perform the following:
. IF C-7A Loss of Load Intlk Cond Dump on 1SI-18 lit...
. Place Steam Dump Select to T AVG.
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER to auto.
. Set STM PRESS CONTROLLER setpoint at 1092 psig (1090-1095).
BOP (Step 3.32.23) Perform the following:
Monitor the following while opening iSP-i (Main Steam to 1A CF Pump Turb Isol) and 1SP-2 (Main Steam to 1 B CF Pump Turb Isol): (PIP 09-6340)
M1A0723 (Ui H/P Steam to 1A CFPT Press)
M1A0729 (Ui H/P Steam to lB CFPT Press)
If so, FloorlBooth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and wait 3 minutes and report that they are OPEN (NOT Modeled).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenano# 4 Event# 2 Page 21 of 67 Event
Description:
Raise power to I2OMWe Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
. isp-i (Main Steam to lACE Pump Turb Isol)
. 1SP-12 (Main Steam to lB CF Pump Turb Isol)
Check the following for corresponding increase in steam pressure with iSP-i (Main Steam to iA CF Pump Turb Isol) and iSP-2 (Main Steam to 1 B CF Pump Turb Isol) open: (PIP 09-6340)
. M1A0723 (Ui H/P Steam to 1A CFPT Press)
. M1A0729 (Ui H/P Steam to lB CFPT Press)
OPIIIA/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.
BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)
. Total Reactor Makeup Water: NOTE: Total makeup is 200 gallons.
BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero:
(R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 22 of 67 Event
Description:
Raise power to I2OMWe BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller.
BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A(U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control).
BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.
desired flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:
(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.
(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.
BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:
(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.
(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (Ui NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level.
Contrl).
(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.
(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1 NV-i 37A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).
BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 23 of 67 Event
Description:
Raise power to I2OMWe (Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)
(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters Otit to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.
BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.
BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-i7iA(Ui Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-l7iA is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO.
check 1NV-171A(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.
BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.
BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:
. Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR
. Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 24 of 67 Event
Description:
Raise power to I2OMWe BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)
(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:
. 1A Rx M/U Water Pump
. 1 B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:
. 1 NV-i 75A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control)
. 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl)
. 1NV-i7iA(Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control)
BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A(Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)
BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.1 1 ... Flow Control was NOT adjusted.
BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO.
BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender.... NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.
BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 25 of 67 Event
Description:
Raise power to I2OMWe BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.
BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.
BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)
. Total Make Up Flow Counter
. Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 26 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KC Pump trip Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, and LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-KCOIOB Indications Available:
- OAC Alarm: 1A2 KC Pump Trip
- 1A2 KC Pump Green Status light LIT
- 1A2 KC Pump amps go to 0
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, Bi through B4, A (B, C, and D) NC PUMP UPPER MTR BRG LO KC FLO, alarms (Delayed)
- MCB Annunciator 1 RAD1 1 EMF 46A, LOSS OF TRN A KC SAMPLE FLO (Delayed)
- MCB Annunciator 1 RAD1 1 EMF 46B, LOSS OF TRN B KC SAMPLE FLO (Delavedi NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an NEO to check out the 1A2 KC Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor, wait 3 minutes, and then report that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker shows a 51/50 Relay has operated, and the pump is NOT running.
NOTE: The CRS will transition toAP-21.
APIIIAI5500!21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump ON. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.
ROI (Step 2) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress. NOTE: A dilution may still be in progress.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 27 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KC Pump trip BOP (Step 4) Check ND IN RHR MODE. NOTE: ND is NOT in the RHR Mode.
CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7.
CRS (Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
BOP (Step 8) Check both trains KC Surge Tank level STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP (Step 9) Start standby KC train as follows:
. Check standby KC train AVAILABLE TO START.
. Check standby KC Surge Tank Level GREATER THAN 2 FT.
. Start standby KC train PER one of the following enclosures:
. To start 1 B Train, GO TO Enclosure 5 (Startup of 1 B KC Train).
AP/1/A15500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 5, STARTUP OF lB KC TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC-81B (lB ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) CLOSED.
BOP (Step 2) Check 1KC-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) CLOSED.
BOP (Step 3) Check 1A Train KC pumps OFF. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 28 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KC Pump trip CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.
BOP (Step 5) Check 1 B Train KC pumps OFF.
BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1 B KC Train is NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected.... suspected.
BOP (Step 7) Close the following:
. 1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).
. 1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. 1 KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).
. 1 KC-1 8B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
BOP (Step 8) Start 1 B RN pump.
BOP (Step 9) Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) OPENS.
BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the AUTO position.
BOP (Step 11) Ensure 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) OPENS.
BOP (Step 12) Start 1B1 KC pump.
BOP (Step 13) Check 1KC-12 (1B1 KC Pump NOTE: 1KC-12 was NOT Disch Isol) LOCALLY THROTTLED IN locally throttled in Step 6.
STEP 6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 29 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos._J Expected Actions/Behavior I Comments BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an AO to check out the B Train KC Pumps.
If so, Booth Instructor, as AO report that both pumps are operating normally.
. Start 1B2 KC pump.
CRS . GO TO Step 17.
BOP (Step 17) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF.
CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20.
BOP (Step 20) Check KC leak HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred.
BOP (Step 20 RNO) Perform the following:
. Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.
. OPEN the following valves:
. 1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. 1 KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
. CLOSE the following valves:
. 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
. 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).
. Open the following valves:
. 1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret sd).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 30 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KG Pump trip
. 1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).
- GO TO Step 25.
BOP (Step 25) Check 1A ND pump OFF.
BOP (Step 26) Check 1KC-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) CLOSED.
BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for 1 KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the CLOSE position.
BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) closes.
BOP (Step 29) Stop 1A1 and 1A2 Pumps. NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1A1 KC Pump.
BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.
BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF.
CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37.
BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred.
CRS (Step 37 RNO) GO TO Step 41 in body of this procedure.
AP/1/A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 31 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KC Pump trip BOP (Step 41) Check any letdown path IN NOTE: Normal Letdown is in SERVICE. service.
BOP (Step 42) Check NC pump thermal barrier valves OPEN:
. 1 KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)
. 1 KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt)
. 1 KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt)
. 1KC-413B(D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt).
BOP (Step 43) Check KC to Aux Bldg Non essential header ESTABLISHED.
BOP (Step 44) Check NM valves (on 1 MC-8) NOTE: NM Valves have NOT PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BY THIS been previously Closed by this PROCEDURE. procedure.
CRS (Step 44 RNO) GO TO Step 46.
CRS (Step 46) Check KC Surge Tank makeup HAS BEEN INITIATED.
NOTE: KC System makeup has NOT occurred.
(Step 46 RNO) GO TO Step 48. NOTE: There is NO NEED for KC System Feed and Bleed.
BOP (Step 48) Check both trains RN suction ALIGN ED TO LLI.
CRS (Step 49) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.
NOTE: The CRS will likely address Technical Specifications.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 32 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KC Pump trip TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3J.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will declare ACTION TIME the A KC Train inoperable.
A. One CCW A.1 Restore CCW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train train to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 35.2, ECCS OPERATING -
CRS LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.
CRS ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 33 of 67 Event
Description:
1A2 KC Pump trip CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trains train(s) to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
AND At least 100%
oftheECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTYEM CRS LCD 3.6.6 Two containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> containment containment spray train spray train to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 34 of 67 Event
Description:
Turbine Low Lube Oil PressurelTurbine Trip IGenerator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. Since the plant power is less than P-8, the Reactor will not trip. Simultaneously, the 1 B Main Generator Breaker will fail to trip and the Steam Dump Valves will fail to open as required. The operator will respond in accordance with API1/A15500102, Turbine Generator Trip.
Booth Operator Instructions: MAL-LTOO2 = 6.0, Ramp = 2 mm Insert:
REM-SB0003=0 REM-SB00060 REM-SB0009=0 REM-SB00120 REM-SBOOI 5=0 REM-SBOOI 8=0 REM-SBOO2I =0 REM-SB00240 REM-SB00270 insert MAL-EPOO4B ACTIVE (lB Generator Breaker fails to Trip on Turbine Trip)
Indications Available:
- OAC Alarm: Unit 1 Turbine Seal Oil Backup Pump On.
- Turbine bearing oil pressure starts to lower.
- MOB Annunciator 1AD-1/A-9 LO TURB BRG OIL PRESS TURB TRIP
- Turbine Trip Valves closed
- Turbine Governor Valves closed
- Rx does NOT trip (Rx Trip Breakers closed)
- 1 B Generator Breaker remains closed on Turbine Trip
- Steam Dump Valves do not open Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: If a AO is dispatched to investigate:
Wait 5 mm, then report there is a large oil leak on the discharge of the Main Turbine Oil Tank Eductor.
NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-02.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 35 of 67 Event
Description:
Turbine Low Lube Oil PressurelTurbine Trip IGenerator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure APIIIAI500IO2, TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP RO (Step 1) Check Turbine Trip:
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
RO (Step 2) Check PIR meters LESS THAN NOTE: PR indication is <
20%. 20%.
(Step 3) Stabilize reactor power as follows:
. Place control rods in manual. NOTE: The rods must be moved in MANUAL.
. Check P/R meters GREATER THAN NOTE: The CRS will 5%. designate the RO.
. Stabilize reactor power, as indicated on NOTE: This is a Continuous P/R meters, between 12%-i 5% with Action. The CRS will make control rods in manual. both board operators aware.
WHEN reactor power is stabilized between 12%-i 5%, THEN maintain hR startup rate at 0 to ensure a constant power level.
RO (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power NOTE: This is a Continuous goes below 5%, THEN perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.
RO . Do not pull control rods.
. Insert control rods as necessary to maintain negative SUR on hR startup rate meters.
RO (Step 5) Check C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1SI-18)
LIT.
BOP (Step 6) Check any CF pump IN SERVICE. NOTE: The 1A CF Pump is in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 36 of 67 Event
Description:
Turbine Low Lube Oil PressurelTurbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure RO (Step 7) Check both generator breakers NOTE: The lB Generator OPEN. Breaker is CLOSED.
(Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:
. Manually initiate turbine trip.
. IF any main turbine throttle valve is still open...
. IF both generator breakers open... NOTE: The lB Generator Breaker is CLOSED.
. IF Turbine Generator output less than or equal to zero MW, THEN perform the following:
. Open both generator breakers by depressing ENABLE and TRIP at the same time.
. GO TO Step 8.
RO (Step 8) Check EXCITATION OFF.
RO (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME T-Avg is less than NOTE: This is a Continuous 551°F AND going down, THEN perform the Action. The CRS will make following: both board operators aware.
. Trip reactor.
. GO TO EP/1IAI5000IE-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).
RO (Step 10) Check all control rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.
RO (Step 1 1) Check MSR RESET light LIT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 37 of 67 Event
Description:
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPENISteam Dump failure CRS (Step 12) Announce the following: Unit 1 NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO Turbine trip, non-essential personnel stay out to make Plant Announcement.
of Unit 1 turbine bldg.
If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO (Step 13) Check UNBLOCK light for AMSAC ACTUATION BLOCK/UNBLOCK switch (1 MC-2) DARK.
RO (Step 14) Check condenser dump valves NOTE: The condenser dump MODULATING OPEN. valves are CLOSED.
RO (Step 14 RNO) Transfer steam dumps to steam pressure mode as follows:
. Ensure STM PRESS CONTROLLER setpoint at 1090-1095 PSIG.
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in manual.
. Adjust STM PRESS CONTROLLER output to 0%.
. Using STEAM DUMP SELECT switch, perform the following:
. Ensure C-7A reset.
. Place steam dumps in steam pressure mode.
IF STEAM HEADER PRESSURE is greater than 1100 PSIG, THEN manually OPEN steam dumps to control pressure 1090-1 095 PSIG.
. Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in auto.
BOP (Step 15) Check Pzr pressure control response:
. Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 38 of 67 Event
Description:
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure
. Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.
. Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.
. Check Pzr spray control valves CLOSED.
BOP (Step 16) Check Pzr level TRENDING TO PROG RAM.
RD (Step 17) Ensure Bearing Lift Pump in AUTO.
RO (Step 18) WHEN bearing oil pressure goes down to 1 1-12 PSIG, THEN ensure AC Bearing Oil Pump starts.
RD (Step 19) Transfer AS header supply:
. CLOSE 1AS-9 (Ui C Htr Bleed To AS Hdr Isol).
. Check Unit 2 as follows:
. Unit 2 Reactor power GREATER NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to THAN 15% report power level.
If so, Floor Instructor report 100% as U2 RD.
. Unit 2 2AS-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to Control Inlet Isol) OPEN
- report valve position.
If so, Floor Instructor report 2AS-12 is OPEN.
. Unit 2 AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RD to HEADER. report U2 AS Availability.
If so, Floor Instructor report U2 AS is available.
RD
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 39 of 67 Event
Description:
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip IGenerator Breaker Fails to OPEN/Steam Dump failure
. IF AT ANY TIME AS pressure cannot NOTE: This is a Continuous be maintained greater than 140 Action. The CRS will make PSIG while performing the following both board operators aware.
step, THEN GO TO Step 19e.
. Slowly CLOSE 1AS-12 (Ui SM TO AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol) while monitoring AS header pressure.
- GO TO Step 20.
RO (Step 20) Remove one CF pump from service as follows:
. Check both CF pumps RESET.
CRS (Step 20 RNO) GO TO Step 21.
RO (Step 21) Check T-Avg GREATER THAN 561°F.
RO (Step 22) Check steam seal supply aligned to AS as follows:
CRS (Step 23) Check reactor shutdown to less than 5% power PLANNED OR HAS OCCURRED.
CRS (Step 23 RNO) IF reactor power to remain greater than or equal to 5%, THEN perform the following:
- IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that NOTE: This is a Continuous reactor power cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make greater than or equal to 5%, THEN both board operators aware.
RETURN TO Step 19.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 40 of 67 Event
Description:
Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip /Generator Breaker Fails to OPENISteam Dump failure
. Observe Caution prior to Step 31 and GOTO Step 31.
RO (Step 31) Monitor S/G levels as follows:
. IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level(s) NOTE: This is a Continuous cannot be controlled within +/- 10% of Action. The CRS will make setpoint, THEN control S/G level(s) both board operators aware.
manually PER Step 31c through 31e
. GO TO Step 32.
RO (Step 32) Swap CF pump steam supply as follows:
. Check 1 HM-95 (Ui Aux Steam Supply to CF Pumps Turbine Isol)
CLOSED.
CRS (Step 32a RNO) IF 1 HM-95 is full open, THEN GO TO Step 34.
crs (Step 34) IF AT ANY TIME CF control NOTE: This is a Continuous bypass valves are maintaining S/C levels Action. The CRS will make AND all CF control valves are closed, THEN both board operators aware.
perform the following:
. CLOSE 1CF-31 (1A S/C CF Control Inlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-22 (lB SIC CF Control Inlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-19 (1C S/G CF Control Inlet Isol).
. CLOSE 1CF-16 (1D S/C CF Control Inlet Isol).
. Place all S/G CF control valves in manual.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 41 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure Next, the normal supply breaker to 1ETA will trip open causing 1ETA to de-energize.
The 1A EDG will automatically start but not sequence its loads. The operator will enter API1/A5500107, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources Operating, and LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-EPOO9A = TRIP insert MAL-EQBOOIA = ON_BLACKOUT Indications Available:
. 1 SI-i 4 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE X is LIT
. 1SI-i4 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Y is LIT
. iSI-14 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Z is LIT
. MCB Annunciator lAD-i 1/A-i U ETA 4.16KV TROUBLE
. MCB Annunciator lAD-i 1/A-2U ETA 600V LC TROUBLE
. MOB Annunciator lAD-i 1/A-3U ETA 600 V/i 20V TROUBLE
. 1 ETA Normal Supply Breaker Green status light is LIT AP111A15500107, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER CASE II, LOSS OF NORMAL POWER TO EITHER IETA OR IETB BOP (Step 1) Check affected bus(s) -
ENERGIZED AND SEQUENCER APPLYING LOADS.
BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF both busses deenergized... NOTE: 1ETB is energized.
. Ensure the following pumps running on energized bus:
. NV pump NOTE: The BOP will start the lB NV Pump.
. KC pumps NOTE: The BOP will start the iBi and 1B2 KC Pumps
. RN pump. NOTE: The BOP will start the lB RN Pump.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 42 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of I ETA/Sequencer Failure BOP (Step 2) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves on energized train(s)
OPEN.
RO (Step 3) Maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB BOTH NOTE: ONLY1ETBis ENERGIZED. energized.
CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 6.
BOP (Step 6) Check S/I HAS OCCURRED NOTE: SI has NOT occurred.
DURING THIS EVENT.
BOP (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF both NV pumps off,... NOTE: The 1 B NV is running.
CRS . IF any pump was manually started per NOTE: The 1 B NV Pump was APO7 Immediate Actions, THEN GO TO manually started.
Step 8.
CRS (Step 8) Check D/Gs OFF. NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AC to check out the Diesel and the Sequencer.
If so, FloorlBooth Instructor acknowledge as AC. Report back within 10 minutes.
BOP (Step 9) Check ND System status:
. ND System - IN RHR MODE AT TIME NOTE: ND is NOT in RHR OF B/C. Mode.
CRS (Step 9a RNO) GO TO Step 10.
BOP (Step 10) Check any RN pump RUNNING. NOTE: The lB RN Pump is running.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 43 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure BOP (Step 1 1) Align KC as follows:
- Place recirc valve on operating train in AUTO:
- 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol).
- Ensure KC flow remains less than 4000 GPM per operating KC pump while performing next step.
- Ensure the following valves on energized train are OPEN:
- B Train:
- OPEN 1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol)
- OPEN 1KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol)
- OPEN 1KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)
- OPEN 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt).
BOP (Step 12) Check any charging pump RUNNING.
BOP (Step 13) Align RN as follows:
- Check 1A RN pump RUNNING. NOTE: The 1A RN is OFF.
BOP (Step 1 3a RNO) Align 1 B RN as follows:
- Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) is OPEN.
- THROTTLE 1RN-1 90B (RN To B KC Hx Control) for desired KC cooling, while maintaining the following:
- lB RN pump flowLESS THAN 14,000 GPM.
- 1 B RN pump discharge pressure GREATER THAN 50 PSIG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 44 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP . Start all available RV pumps. NOTE: Two additional RV pumps will be started.
CRS . GOTOStep14.
CRS (Step 14) Notify Unit 2 RO to start 2A RN Floor Instructor: As U2 RO pump. report 2A RN Pump is running.
Booth Instructor:
insertLOA-RN087 = ON delay 60 seconds (Start 2A RN Pump)
BOP (Step 15) Check VCT makeup control system.
. Ensure boric acid transfer pump on energized train running.
. Ensure NC System makeup controller in auto.
. Place NC System makeup switch to start.
BOP (Step 16) Check B/O ON 1 ETA.
BOP (Step 17) Check B and D Pzr heater group Examiner NOTE: IF NV Pump supply breakers on vertical board not started on B Train within CLOSED. 20 seconds of BO, loss of letdown! Pzr heaters off will occur, and require RNO actions.
If NV Pump started within 20 seconds, move forward to Step 18.
BOP (Step 17 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF Pzr level is less than 17% NOTE: Pzr level is most likely
> 17%.
. IF S/I has occurred NOTE: SI has NOT occurred.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 45 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of IETA/Sequencer Failure
. Place the following Pzr heater groups in manual:
. B
. D
. Close the following Pzr heater group supply breakers:
. B
. D
. Close C Pzr heater group supply breaker.
. Return the following Pzr heater groups to auto:
.8
. D BOP (Step 18) Perform one of the following to isolate RN train crosstie:
. Dispatch operator to close 1 RN-40A NOTE: The CRS will dispatch (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) (aux bldg, an AC to close I RN-40A.
716+7, GG-55 beside Unit 1 side Booth Instructor:
stairway to 695 elevation),
acknowledge as appropriate.
insertREM-RNOO4OA_1 = 0, delay = 5 mm (Close IRN 40A)
After closing valve, Booth Instructor report action taken to Control Room.
. Evaluate CLOSING 1 RN-41 B (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol).
CRS (Step 19) WHEN RN train crosstie is NOTE: This is a Continuous isolated, THEN 1 RN-i 90B (RN To B KC Hx Action. The CRS will make Control) may be throttled further OPEN, both board operators aware.
while maintaining the following:
. 1 B RN pump flow LESS THAN 14,000 GPM.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 46 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of I ETA/Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
. 1 B RN pump discharge pressure GREATER THAN 50 PSIG.
CRS (Step 20) Dispatch operator to close the NOTE: CRS will dispatch an following valves: NEC to close 1 KC-230A and 1 KC-3A.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as appropriate.
insert REM-KC0003A = 0, delay 5 mm (Close IKC 3A) insert REM-KCO23OA = 0, delay 5 mm (Close I KC 230A)
After closing valves, Booth Instructor report action taken to Control Room.
- 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) (aux bldg, 750+12, JJ-55, above north end of KC HX 1 A)
- 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) (aux bldg, 733+8, HH-55, north of column HH-55).
BOP (Step 21) Check 1A ND Train WAS IN RHR MODE.
CRS (Step 21 RNO) GO TO Step 36.
BOP (Step 36) Check normal letdown IN SERVICE.
CRS (Step 36 RNO) IF desired to establish normal or excess letdown, THEN have any available operator establish letdown PER AP/1/A/5500/12 (LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION) while continuing with this procedure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 47 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure NOTE: The CRS will NOT stop to look at Tech Specs while in AP-07. Tech Spec review should occur after completion of scenario. Therefore, at the discretion of the lead examiner, move to Event 6 (Page 52)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS 3.8.1 AC Source Operating CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND
. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND
. The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED I COMPLETION The operator will determine ACTION TIME
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 48 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of I ETAlSequencer Failure A. One offsite A.1 Perform SR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> that one offsite line and one circuit 3.8.1.1 for DG are inoperable because inoperable. OPERABLE AND neither are capable of offsite Once per 8 circuit. supplying the Emergency Bus hours thereafter (TS Basis pB3.8.1-2).
AND A.2 Declare 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from required discovery of no features offsite power to with no one train offsite concurrent with power inoperability of available redundant inoperable required with its feature(s).
redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
AND A.3 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> offsite circuit AND to OPERABLE 6 days from status. failure to meet LCO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 49 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure Time Pos Expé ed ActionslBe avior Comments B. One DG B.1 Perform SR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE AND offsite Once per 8 circuit. hours AND thereafter.
B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from features discovery of supported Condition B by the concurrent with inoperable inoperability of DG redundant inoperable required when its feature(s).
required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.
AND B.3.1 Determine inoperable DG is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> not inoperable due to common cause failure.
OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE DG.
AND B.4 Restore DG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to OPERABLE AND status 6 days from failure to meet LCO.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.4, DC SOURCES OPERATING -
CRS LCO 3.8.4 The four channels of DC sources shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 50 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of IETA/Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The operator will determine ACTION TIME that the AC Battery Chargers A.. One A.1 Restore 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> are inoperable. (TS Basis channel of channel of pB3.8.4-3).
DC source DC source to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
OR 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> A.2.1 Verify associated bus tie breakers are closed between DC channels.
AND A.2.2 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> channel of DC source to OPERABLE status.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 38.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS OPERATING -
CRS LCD 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, four channels of DC, and four AC vital buses electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 51 of 67 Event
Description:
Loss of lETAlSequencer Failure A. One or more A.1 Restore AC 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> The operator will determine AC electrical electrical that 1 ETA is inoperable.
power power AND distribution distribution 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from subsystem(s) subsystem(s) discove of inoperable, to failure to meet OPERABLE LCO.
status.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 52 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Following this, a large steam rupture will occur inside Containment on the 1 D Steamline.
SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EPI1IAI5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition either to EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or to EPI1IAI5000IES-i.1, SI Termination. If the crew transitions to E-i, the scenario will terminate upon transition. If the crew transitions to ES-i .1, the scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-i.1, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-1OB.
Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SMOO7D 2021250 Ram p60 Indications Available:
. Containment pressure rises to> 1 psig
. MCB Annunciator 1AD9 A-5, ICE CONDENSER DOORS INLET DOORS OPEN
. MCB Annunciator 1AD9 A-8, CONT .5 PSIG ALERT
. Tavg starts to lower.
NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.
EPIIIAI5000IE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action
. All rod bottom lights LIT
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN
. hR amps - GOING DOWN.
RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 53 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically
. All throttle valves CLOSED.
BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB Immediate Action ENERGIZED.
RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP NOTE: SI will fail to auto actuate, but may have been manually actuated by the time that the crew arrives at this Step.
If NOT, the RO/BOP will manually actuate SI.
A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1 SI-i 8) LIT.
Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1 SI-i 4) LIT.
NOTE: SI is required and will be actuated if NOT already done.
NOTE: SI has been actuated.
CRITICAL TASK:
(E-O D) Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition out of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid.
CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 54 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) LIT.
BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights DARK.
BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):
. Groupsl,2,5DARK.
. Group 3LIT.
. Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED.
. Group 6 - LIT
. GOTOStep10.
ROI (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:
. MDCApumps-ON N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.
BOP (Step 11)Check all KCpumpsON. NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump is OFF.
(Step 11 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: No attempt will be made to start the 1A2 KC Pump.
. Start pumps.
. IF all KC pumps running...
BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 55 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RD following: report 2A RN Pump is running.
. Start2ARN pump.
RD
- THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:
for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delayo rampl0 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)
RD (Step 14) Check all SIG pressures GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.
RD (Step 14 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: 1 D SG Pressure is decreasing uncontrollably.
- Check the following valves closed:
- AllMSIVs
- All MSIV Bypass Valves
- AIISMPDRVs
RO/ (Step 15) Check containment pressure NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is > 3 psig.
BOP BOP (Step 15 RND) Perform the following:
- Check Monitor Light Panel Group 7 lit.
- IF Group 7 window is dark on energized NOTE: Group 7 status lights train(s).., are LIT.
- Stop all NC pumps while maintaining seal injection flow.
- Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 56 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP . Energize H2 Igniters by depressing ON and OVERRIDE.
CRS . Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NE NOTE: The CRS will dispatch AHUs PER EPI1IAI5000IG-l (Generic AC.
Enclosures) Enclosure 28 (De-energizing Booth Instructor:
Ice Condenser AHU5).
Acknowledge as appropriate.
Booth Instructor:
insert LOA-NFOI6 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU StartlStop)
And then, report as AC that breakers are closed.
BOP . WHEN time allows, THEN check Phase NOTE: The CRS may assign B HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 2 the RO (BOP) to perform this (Phase B HVAC Equipment). action.
If so, RO (BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 2.
Other Examiners follow E-O Actions, Step 16, on Page 57.
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 2, PHASE B HVAC EQUIPMENT Examiner NOTE: Eollow the actions associated with Enclosure 2 if RO (BOP) is assigned by CRS to perform.
RO/ (Step 1) Check VE System in operation as BOP follows:
. VE Eans ON.
. Ensure all damper mode select switches in AUTO:
. 1AVS-D-7 Mode Select
. 1AVS-D-8 Mode Select
. 1AVS-D-2 Mode Select
. 1AVS-D-3 Mode Select
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 57 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Annulus pressure being maintained -
NEGATIVE.
RO! (Step 2) Check VX System in operation as BOP follows:
. Time since Phase B actuation - NOTE: It is likely that 10 GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES. minutes has NOT elapsed since the Phase B actuation.
ROI (Step 2 RNO) WHEN 10 minutes has BOP expired, THEN perform rest of this enclosure.
ROI (Step 2.b) Check the following dampers -
BOP OPEN:
. 1 RAF-D-4 (1 B Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A)
. 1VX-2B (lB H2 Skimmer Fan Isol Test A)
. 1 RAF-D-2 (1A Cont Air Ret Fan To Lwr Cont Test A)
. 1VX-1A (1A H2 Skimmer Fan Isol Test A).
RO/ (Step 2.c) Check Containment Air Return BOP fans-ON ROl (Step 2.d) Check H2 Skimmer fans ON. -
BOP E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP (RO) continue HERE.
BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:
. Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.
. Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 NOTE: NC Pressure is 1 400 PSIG. psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: N14-1 Scenario# 4 Event# 6&7 Page 58 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:
. Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:
. 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)
. 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).
- IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.
CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EPI1IAI5000IG-1 (Generic OSM to address.
Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.
acknowledge as OSM.
ROl (Step 18) Check CA flow:
- Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
- WHEN each SIG N/R level is greater NOTE: Adverse Containment than 1 1% (32% ACC), THEN control CA numbers will need to be used flow to maintain that SIG NIR level until Containment Pressure is between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%. < 3 pisg.
RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:
- IF all NC pumps on, THEN check NC T- NOTE: All NC Pumps will be Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO OFF.
557°F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 59 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based NOTE: The CRS may assign on plant conditions: the RO to perform this action.
If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.
Others should move ahead to Step 20 on Page 60 to continue in E-0.
IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.
RO (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED.
RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT.
RO (Step 4) Check any NC pump ON.
RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:
. IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.
RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 60 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically IF SIG NIR level is less than 11% (32% NOTE: Adverse Containment ACC) in all SIGs,... numbers will need to be used until Containment Pressure is
< 3 pisg.
WHEN NIR level is greater than 1 1 % NOTE: Adverse Containment (32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN numbers will need to be used THROTTLE feed flow further to: until Containment Pressure is
< 3 pisg.
. Minimize cooldown
. Maintain at least one S/G N/R level NOTE: The RD may stop feed greater than 11% (32% ACC). flow to 1 D SG.
RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSlVs will be closed.
RO (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:
. Close MSIV bypass valves.
. Exit this enclosure.
E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners NOT following RD actions in Enclosure 3, continue HERE.
BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PDRV and spray valves:
. All PzrPDRVsCLDSED.
BOP . Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.
. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve OPEN.
BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 61 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically
. All SIG pressures STABLE OR GOING NOTE: The 1 D SG is Faulted.
UP
. All S/Os PRESSURIZED.
BOP (Step 22 RNO) IF any SIG is faulted, THEN perform the following:
CRS . Implement EPI1IAI5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).
CRS . GO TO EP/1IAI5000IE-2 (Faulted Steam NOTE: The CRS will transition Generator Isolation). to E-2.
EPII IAI5000IE-2, FAULTED STEAM GEN ERATOR ISOLATION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted SIG or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.
RO (Step 3) Check the following CLOSED:
. AIIMSIVs
. All MSIV bypass valves.
RO (Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure NOTE: Although all SG STABLE OR GOING UP. pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG).
Otherwise a transition to ECA 2.1 will be made.
RO/ (Step 5) Identify faulted SIG(s): NOTE: The 1D SG is Faulted.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 62 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically
. Any SIG pressure GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
. Any SIG DEPRESSURIZED.
RO (Step 6) Maintain at least one SIG available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps.
RO (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV CLOSED.
BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.
RO/ (Step 9) Isolate faulted SIG(s) as follows:
- For1DS/G:
- Check SIG D FDW ISOLATED status light (1 SI-4) LIT.
- CLOSE 1CA-38B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Isol).
- CLOSE 1CA-42B (lB CA Pump Disch To 1 D SIG Isol).
- Check BB valves CLOSED:
- 1 BB-4B (1 D SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control).
- 1BB-8A (D SIG BB Cont Inside Isol).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 63 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:
(E-2 A) Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E 2.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).
RO (Step 10) Close 1AS-12 (Ui SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Iso!).
ROI (Step 11) Check SIG tubes intact as follows:
BOP Check the following EMFs NORMAL:
. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)
. 1EMF-25 (SIG_B)
. 1 EMF-26 (SIG_C)
. 1 EMF-27 (SIG_D).
IF any SIG has previously been identified NOTE: There have been no as ruptured SGTRs identified.
Notify RP to perform the following: NOTE: The CRS may call RP to perform surveys.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP.
. IF SIG(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation.
. Frisk all Unit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly_higher for any SIG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 64 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions.
. WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate SIG activity.
RO/ (Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria:
. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.
. Secondary heat sink:
. N/R level in at least one intact SIG NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC) numbers will need to be used.
. Total feed flow to intact S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 GPM.
. NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
. Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29% NOTE: Adverse Containment ACC). numbers will need to be used.
CRS (Step i 2.d RNO) GO TO Step 13. NOTE: Because of the Adverse Containment condition, the crew may NOT meet the Pzr Level threshold to terminate SI.
If NOT, the crew will go to E-1, and the exam should be terminated.
CRS (Step 12.e) GO TO EP/1/A15000/ES-1 .1 NOTE: The crew may meet (Safety Injection Termination), the Pzr Level threshold to terminate SI. If so, the CRS will transition to ES-i .1 EPIIIAI5000IES-1 .1, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N141 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 65 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containmentl SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO! (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.
BOP BOP (Step 2) Reset the following:
. S/I.
. Sequencers.
. Phase A Isolation.
. Phase B Isolation.
. IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on. both board operators aware.
BOP (Step 3) Establish VI to containment as follows:
. Open the following valves:
. 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)
. 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess Hdr Outside Isol)
. 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).
. Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.
BOP (Step 4) Stop all but one NV pump.
RO (Step 5 Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.
BOP (Step 6) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:
. Check the following valves OPEN:
. 1NV-221A (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N14-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 66 of 67 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break Inside Containment! SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
. 1NV-222B (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol)
. Check the following valves - OPEN NOTE: Both valves are CLOSED.
. 1NV-150B (Ui NV Pump Recirc Isol)
. 1NV-151A (Ui NV Pump Recirc Isol).
BOP (Step 6.b RNO) Perform the following:
. OPEN valves.
. IF both valves open, THEN GO TO Step 6.c.
(Step 6.c) CLOSE the following valves:
. 1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV)
. 1NI-1OB (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
UNIT I STATUS:
Power Level: 15% NCS [B] 1963 ppm Pzr [B]: 1974 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: Startup in progress Core Burnup: 25.1 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/l/A/6100/003, Enclosure 4.1, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.
OP/i /A16300/001, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:
- The plant is at 15% power (BOL) with the Main Turbine at 1800 RPM.
- The area has experienced severe weather over the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- Apower ascension is in progress and it is expected that the crew will phase the Main Generator to the Grid and raise power to 30% on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:
- The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement.
- MCB Annunciator lAD-i 3, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).
Crew Directions:
- Complete the Turbine startup and synchronize the main generator to the electrical grid.
- AO (Bill) is standing by at the Main Generator Voltage Regulator Panel.
- Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) testing and post Turbine OPC and Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test will NOT be conducted.
- Use of Alternate Dilute has been approved.
- RE has recommended an initial Alternate Dilution of 200 gallons.
- Turbine loading rate will be 5MWe/minute.
Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe AOs AVAILABLE Unitl Unit2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike th 5
Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya