ML17263A812

LER 94-011-00:on 940917,indicating Lamp on B Train Safeguards Initiation Cabinet Failed.Caused by Loss of 125 Vdc Control Power.Burned Out Indicating Lamp & Blown Fuse replaced.W/941017 Ltr

ML17263A812
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/17/1994
From:	Mecredy R, St Martin J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Andrea Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER-94-011, LER-94-11, NUDOCS 9410270370
Download: ML17263A812 (13)

Text

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'Y REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9410270370 DOC.DATE: 94/10/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. P RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 94-011-00:on 940917,indicating lamp on "B" train safeguards initiation cabinet failed. Caused by loss of 125 VDC control power. Burned out indicating lamp & blown fuse replaced.W/941017 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR I ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

i SIZE: l 05000244 R

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 PD 1 1 JOHNSON,A 1 1 INTERNA EOD/~OA'B/D 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 FILE CMTER 02 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 E EMEB 1 1 NRR/DORS/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB 2 2 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/IRCB-E 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 D EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE I J ~ H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1

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U YOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO RFDUCE iVASTE! CONTACT'I'IIE DOCl'iIEiTCONTROL DESk. ROOXI Pl-37 (EXT. 504-20S3 ) TO FLIXIliATEO'OI:R XAXILZFROiI DISTRIBUTION LIS'I'S I'OR l)OCl iIEi'I'S 5'OL')Oi "IL'I'.II)!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

~v ~ v I ~ v I soac 7 s1<TC ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89-EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y. 14649.0001 ROBERTC MECRfOY TELEPHONE Vice President AREA CODE 716 546 2700 Cinna Nuclear Producrion October 17, 1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R. Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-3 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

LER 94-011, Short Circuit in Indicating Lamp Causes Blown Fuse, Resulting in Disabling of Automatic Actuation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System for "B" Safeguards Logic Train Components R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (i) (B), which requires a report of, "any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 94-011 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Me edy xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector svrQ L )

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9410270370 941017 PDR ADDCK 05000244 S PDR

NRC FORH 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO BR'ORWARD THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) R.E ~ Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) 05000244 1 OF 9 TITLE (4) Short Circuit in Indicating Lamp Causes Blown Fuse, Resulting in Disabling of Automatic Actuation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System for "B" Safeguards Logic Train Components EVENT DATE (5) LER NUHBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAHE DOCKET HUHBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUHBER NUHBER 09 17 94 94 --011-- 00 10 17 94 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUHBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMIlTED PURSUANT TO THE RE UIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)

HODE (9) N 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POMER 098 20.405(a )(l)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a)(l)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(I) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract below and in Text, 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) ~

NAHE John T. St. Hartin - Director, Operating Experience TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)

(315) 524-4446 COHPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT HANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COHPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS XOOO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).

X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 17, 1994, at approximately 1224 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 98% steady state power, an indicating lamp on the "B" train safeguards initiation cabinet failed in a manner that caused a short circuit that blew a 10 ampere fuse in the "B" 125 VDC control power circuit.

This disabled the automatic actuation of train safeguards components.

Immediate corrective action was to replace the burned out indicating lamp and blown fuse.

The underlying cause of the event was determined to be a shorting out of the low resistance leads that connect the indicating lamp base to the lamp filaments. This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code "B".

Corrective action to preclude repetition is outlined in Section V. B.

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.

FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (HNBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3110-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

Plant'OCKET YEAR E REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power 05000244 2 OF 9 94 -- 011-- 00 TEXT (tf more space is required, use additionat copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 98~ steady state reactor power with no major operational activities in progress. While making a routine tour of the Relay Room, a licensed reactor operator observed that a normally lit indicating lamp for "Safeguard DC Failure", on the "Safeguards Initiation SI-B2" cabinet, was extinguished. He noted that another normally lit illuminated, and concluded that power was indicating lamp on this cabinet was still available to this cabinet. Since replacement of burned out light bulbs for these indicating lamps is a normal responsibility of the licensed operators, he made preparations to replace the lamp.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o September 17, 1994, 1224 EDST: Event date and time.

September 17, 1994, 1224 EDST: Discovery date and time.

li 0 September 17, 1994, 1346 EDST: Indicating lamp and fuses replaced and "B" train of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) components restored to operable status.

B. EVENT:

On September 17, 1994, at approximately 1224 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 98% steady state reactor power, the licensed reactor operator had returned to the Relay Room with a new indicating lamp for replacement of the burned out lamp. As he unscrewed the burned out lamp from the 'socket, he observed a flash. He also saw that the other indicating lamp (that had been illuminated) was now extinguished. He immediately proceeded to the Control Room.

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5.92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATIOH AHD RECORDS HAHAGEHEHT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (HNBB 7714), U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 3 OF 9 94 011 00 TEXT (tf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The Control Room operators were immediately made aware of the problem when Main Control Board (MCB) Annunciator L-31, "Safeguard DC Failure", alarmed. The Control Room operators immediately performed the appropriate actions of Alarm Response procedure AR-L-31, and also reviewed appropriate electrical drawings to determine the effect on the plant. They concluded that 125 VDC control power had been lost to a part of the "Safeguards Initiation SI-B2" cabinet.

Loss of this DC control power resulted in the disabling of the "B" safeguards logic train, which would prevent the automatic actuation of engineered safety features (ESF) components for the "B" safeguards logic train. However, the components remained capable of being manually operated by operator action at the Main Control Board or by local operator action in the field.

The plant's Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed, and the Control Room operators did not locate an applicable specification or Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) that had been exceeded.

However, the Control Room operators recognized that LCOs existed for components which are actuated by ESFAS signals. The Shift Supervisor then made a conservative decision to enter TS 3.0 and directed that actions be initiated to place the plant in hot shutdown.

An Instrument and Control (IIC) technician responded to the announcement of the event. The ISC technician and Shift Technical Advisor assisted the Control Room operators in troubleshooting the event. Operations procedure P-ll, "Electrical Distribution Panel Reference Manual", was consulted, and the Control Room operators also referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.2, "Recovery From Loss of A or B DC Bus", for guidance. It was determined'hat a 125 VDC 10 ampere fuse (FUSIB1/SIBF1-P on the positive leg of the DC circuit) had blown. This fuse caused the disabling of 125 VDC control power to the "B" safeguards logic train.

The burned out lamp was replaced, and the blown fuse (and the other 10 ampere fuse FUSIB1/SIBF2-N on the negative leg of the DC circuit) was replaced. When the fuses were replaced, Annunciator L-31 cleared. The "B" train of ESFAS components was restored to operable status at approximately 1346 EDST.

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE IHFORHATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (HHBB 7l'14), U-S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 4 OF 9 94 011 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

C INOPERABLE STRUCTURES I COMPONENTS I OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

Train "B" ESFAS components would not have actuated from ESF actuation signals from approximately 1224 EDST to 1346 EDST on "

September 17, 1994. However, manual operation of individual components by Control Room operators at the Main Control Board and local operation of components in the field was not affected.

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

This event was immediately apparent to the Control Room operators due to receipt of Annunciator L-31, "Safeguard DC Failure".

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

The Control Room operators responded to Annunciator L-31 and performed the actions of Alarm Response procedure AR-L-31. The Control Room operators reviewed'he TS and did not locate an applicable specification or LCO that had been exceeded. However, the Control Room operators recognized that LCOs existed for components which are actuated by ESFAS signals. The Shift Supervisor made a conservative decision to enter TS 3.0.1, and directed that actions be initiated to place the plant in hot shutdown prior to 1924 EDST on September 17, 1994, as required by TS 3.0.1.

The Control Room operators consulted Operations procedure P-11 for the effect of the blown fuse on the plant. Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.2 was referred to for additional guidance.

HRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONIISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150 ~ 0104 (5.92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORHARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRAHCH TEXT CONTINUATION (MHBB 7714), UPS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, llASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERHORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140 0104), OFFICE OF MAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET llASHIHGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 5 OF 9 94 -- 011-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaL copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

When the cause of Annunciator L-31 was determined and corrective actions to replace the fuse were in progress, the Shift Supervisor discussed the situation with plant management. A decision was made to continue to take appropriate actions to place the plant in hot shutdown by 1924 EDST, but actual reduction of reactor power was deferred, pending the imminent replacement of the fuses.

At approximately 1545 EDST on September 16, 1994, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC per 10CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (iii) (D).

G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

None III. CAUSE OF EVENT A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

The immediate cause of the disabling of the "B" safeguards logic train from any ESF actuation signal was loss of 125 VDC control power due to a blown fuse in the 125 VDC control power circuit.

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The intermediate cause of the blown fuse was a short circuit in the burned out indicating lamp.

HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

ll NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5.92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS ~

FORWARD COMHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HAHAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION, WASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUEHTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 6 OF 9 94 011-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The underlying cause of the short circuit in the burned out indicating lamp was the internal shorting out of the low resistance leads that connect the lamp base to the lamp filament.

This occurred when the licensed operator was removing the burned out lamp from the socket. The low resistance caused increased current in the lamp, which resulted in sufficient current to blow the 10 ampere fuse. This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code "B",

Design, Manufacturing, Construction / Installation. This loss of power does not meet the NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a "Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (i) (B), in 'that the disabling of the automatic actuation of ESF components for the "B" safeguards logic train resulted in two HEPA filter units and associated recirculation fan coolers being inoperable, which is more than allowed by the LCO for TS 3 '.2.2.a. This is a condition prohibited by TS 3.3.2.2.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and- implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

o During this event, automatic actuation of ESF components for the "B" safeguards logic train was disabled. However, the components were still capable of being manually operated by operator action at the Main Control Board and also locally in the field at the appropriate Motor Control Center and/or 480 Volt bus.

HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH PROVED BY OHB NO. 3150 ~ 0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/3'I/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.

FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATION AHD RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (HNBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 7 OF 9 94 -- 011-- pp TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17) 0 The ESFAS is intended to provide protection against the release of radioactive materials in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or secondary line break. The ESFAS provides actuation of the following functions (or components): safety injection (SI), containment (CNMT) isolation, CNMT spray, auxiliary feedwater (AFW), diesel generators, and main steam and main feedwater isolation. The loss of'fuse FUSIBl/SIBF1-P caused the loss of automatic actuation of the following items:

o SI train "B" o CNMT spray train "B" o CNMT isolation train "B" o Main steam and main feedwater isolation (one of two channels for each isolation and/or bypass valve) 0 The "B" Emergency diesel generator (D/G) and "B" motor-driven AFW pump train would still actuate from signals such as undervoltage or low steam generator level. However, the loss of automatic actuation of SI train "B" prevented the "B" Emergency D/G and "B" motor-driven AFW pump train from starting due to an SI signal.

0 As shown above, the loss of fuse FUSIB1/SIBF1-P resulted in the loss of one multi-function train; however, the redundant train was available if an accident were to occur during the approximately one and one half hours that the single train 'was inoperable. The loss of a single train is considered in the design of the ESFAS, which utilizes independent trains and channels for each function. This independence is maintained from the process sensors to the signal output relays and includes the channel power supplies. Thus, no single failure can cause the loss of function.

0 The Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse reactors (NUREG-1431) allows six hours to restore an inoperable channel to operable status before requiring a plant shutdown. Entering TS 3.0 1 is more conservative than following the requirements of

~

NUREG-1431, since the redundant trains were available to perform their intended function.

Based on the above, safety was assured at all times.

it can be concluded that the public's health and NRC FORH 366A (5 92)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY IIITN THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 COHHEHTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO MRS'ORHARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHEHT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (HHBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, IIASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET IIASHIHGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 8 OF 9 94 -- 011-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

V. CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

o The burned out indicating lamp was replaced.

o The blown fuse (and associated negative fuse) were replaced.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

o Operations supervision notified all operations personnel not to change any indicating lamps on the cabinets in the Relay Room. Operators are to submit a trouble report for IEC to change the lamps.

o All 120 Volt indicating lamps on site are being replaced with 155 Volt lamps. When a 120 Volt lamp requires replacement, it will be replaced with a to increase the life of these 155 Volt lamp.

lamps, and decrease This is intended the frequency of replacement.

o NRC Information Notice 94-68, "Safety-Related Equipment Failures Caused by Faulted Indicating Lamps", will be assessed as part of the Operational Assessment program.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

The burned out indicating lamp was a Sylvania incandescent lamp, Model 6S6 120V, with a design rating of 6 watts.

HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150.0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEH ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATIOH AHD RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31/0-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 'WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUHBER (6 PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 00 9 OF 9 94 011 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant could be iden-tified.

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

This event of September 17, 1994 is similar to events described in NRC Information Notice 94-68, which is dated September 27, 1994, and was received by Rochester Gas 6 Electric on October 4, 1994.

HRC FORM 366A (5-92)