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| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY | | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES |
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| COMMISSION | | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
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| ===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
| | OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION |
| WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 18, 1990 NRC INFORMATION
| |
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| NOTICE NO. 90-78: PREVIOUSLY | | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 18, 1990 |
| | NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-78: PREVIOUSLY UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH FROM |
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| UNIDENTIFIED
| | BOILING WATER REACTOR CONTROL ROD HYDRAULIC |
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| RELEASE PATH FROM BOILING WATER REACTOR CONTROL ROD HYDRAULIC UNITS
| | UNITS |
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| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| : | | : |
| All holders of operating | | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for boiling water |
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| |
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| licenses or construction
| | reactors (BWRs). |
| | |
| permits for boiling water reactors (BWRs).
| |
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|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| : This information | | : |
| | This information notice is intended to alert addressees to potential problems |
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| |
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| notice is intended to alert addressees
| | pertaining to a previously unidentified release path from the control rod drive |
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| |
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| to potential | | hydraulic systems in boiling water reactors that may lead to design basis |
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| problems pertaining
| | accident radiation doses significantly exceeding the values specified in the |
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| to a previously
| | Final Safety Analysis Report. It is expected that recipients will review the |
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| |
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| unidentified
| | information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as |
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| release path from the control rod drive hydraulic
| | appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this |
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| systems in boiling water reactors that may lead to design basis accident radiation
| | information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific |
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| |
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| doses significantly
| | action or written response is required. |
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| |
|
| exceeding
| | ==Description of Circumstances== |
| | : |
| | In June 1989, a design review for unmonitored release paths at Washington |
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| the values specified | | Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 resulted in the discovery of a previously unidenti- fied radiation release path in the control rod drive hydraulic system. This |
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| in the Final Safety Analysis Report. It is expected that recipients
| | path is postulated to result from the following sequence of conditions. The |
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| |
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| will review the information
| | two control rod drive pumps are shut down following a design basis accident. |
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| for applicability
| | There is a break outside of the reactor building (secondary containment) in |
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| to their facilities | | the non-seismically qualified piping or tankage to which the control rod |
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| and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
| | hydraulic system is connected (see Figure 1). Reactor coolant leaks past the |
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| |
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| However, suggestions
| | double seals in any of the 185 control rod drives and the valves in their |
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| contained
| | associated hydraulic control units. The leakage flows back through one or |
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| in this information
| | more of the four headers connecting each of the 185 hydraulic control units to |
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| notice do not constitute
| | the common control rod drive (CRD) pump header. The leakage then flows through |
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| NRC requirements;
| | the CRD pump header and the control rod drive pumps to the break or the conden- sate storage tank located outside of the reactor building. |
| therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
| |
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| |
|
| of Circumstances: | | Much of the pathway to the condensate storage tank lies outside of the reactor |
| In June 1989, a design review for unmonitored
| |
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| |
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| release paths at Washington
| | building and includes piping that is not seismically qualified. In addition, this piping passes close to the air intakes for the control room ventilation |
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| |
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| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 resulted in the discovery
| | system. Consequently, a failure of the supply piping for the drive pumps |
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| of a previously
| | s3 -1D8W- /'C |
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| unidenti-fied radiation
| | IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 during an accident would not only greatly increase the potential external |
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| release path in the control rod drive hydraulic | | release, but could increase the radiation dose to the control room operators. |
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| system. This path is postulated
| | General Electric-Nuclear Energy performed calculations for the newly postulated |
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| to result from the following
| | release path for a design basis accident with concurrent failure of the |
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| sequence of conditions.
| | non-seismically qualified supply piping for the control rod drive system at |
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| The two control rod drive pumps are shut down following | | Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2. The calculations incorporated the |
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| a design basis accident.There is a break outside of the reactor building (secondary
| | source terms specified in Regulatory Guide 1.3 and assumed that 10% of the |
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| |
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| containment)
| | iodine would escape as a gas from the liquid release. These calculations |
| in the non-seismically
| |
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| |
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| qualified
| | produced a 30-day thyroid dose for control room operators of 121 rem per gpm of |
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| piping or tankage to which the control rod hydraulic
| | leakage, a 30-day thyroid dose at the outer boundary of the low-population zone |
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| |
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| system is connected (see Figure 1). Reactor coolant leaks past the double seals in any of the 185 control rod drives and the valves in their associated
| | of 86 rem per gpm of leakage, and a 2-hour thyroid dose at the exclusion zone |
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| |
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| hydraulic
| | boundary of 36 rem per gpm of leakage. A generic communication discussing this |
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| |
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| control units. The leakage flows back through one or more of the four headers connecting
| | concern was sent by General Electric-Nuclear Energy to each BWR utility in |
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| |
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| each of the 185 hydraulic
| | July 1989. |
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| |
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| control units to the common control rod drive (CRD) pump header. The leakage then flows through the CRD pump header and the control rod drive pumps to the break or the conden-sate storage tank located outside of the reactor building.Much of the pathway to the condensate
| | Discussion: |
| | For the control rod hydraulic systems at General Electric boiling water reac- tors, the inboard isolation for the primary containment is provided by the |
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| |
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| storage tank lies outside of the reactor building and includes piping that is not seismically
| | double seals in the control rod drives, and the outboard isolation for the |
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| |
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| qualified.
| | primary containment is provided by valves within the hydraulic control units. |
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| |
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| In addition, this piping passes close to the air intakes for the control room ventilation
| | However, past leak tests of the rod drive seals that were performed by General |
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| |
|
| system. Consequently, a failure of the supply piping for the drive pumps s3 -1D8W- /'C
| | Electric produced a maximum of 5 gpm per drive. Leakage from the hydraulic |
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| |
|
| IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 during an accident would not only greatly increase the potential
| | control units can also be significant. |
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| |
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| external release, but could increase the radiation
| | As shown in Figure 1, four paths lead from each of the 185 hydraulic control |
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| |
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| dose to the control room operators.
| | units to the common CRD pump header. Three of these paths, the accumulator |
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|
| General Electric-Nuclear
| | charging header, the drive header and the cooling header include check valves |
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| Energy performed
| | to prevent the return of water from the hydraulic units. In addition, water |
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| |
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| calculations
| | escaping through the accumulator charging header must leak through the insert |
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| |
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| for the newly postulated
| | side scram valve, and water escaping through the drive header must leak through |
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| release path for a design basis accident with concurrent
| | one of the directional control valves. However, the check valve in the exhaust |
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| |
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| failure of the non-seismically
| | header is oriented so as to permit the flow of water back to the CRD pump header. |
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| |
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| qualified
| | The exhaust water then flows via the CRD pump header back to the reactor vessel |
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| supply piping for the control rod drive system at Washington
| | (or, as at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2, to the reactor water cleanup |
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| |
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| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2. The calculations
| | system) along with the excess pump flow. Therefore, only one normally closed |
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| |
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| incorporated
| | valve prevents water that is leaking out of each of the 185 control rod drives |
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| |
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| the source terms specified | | from returning through the associated exhaust header to the CRD pump header. |
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|
| in Regulatory
| | During startup testing at Limerick Unit 1, and at Susquehanna Unit 1, the total |
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| |
|
| Guide 1.3 and assumed that 10% of the iodine would escape as a gas from the liquid release. These calculations
| | leakage from all of the hydraulic control units combined was measured at 5 gpm |
|
| |
|
| produced a 30-day thyroid dose for control room operators
| | and 11 gpm, respectively. Both of these reactors include additional check valves |
|
| |
|
| of 121 rem per gpm of leakage, a 30-day thyroid dose at the outer boundary of the low-population
| | at the discharge of the control'rod drive pump (area A in Figure 1). A partial |
|
| |
|
| zone of 86 rem per gpm of leakage, and a 2-hour thyroid dose at the exclusion
| | audit by the NRC staff indicates that many of the newer BWR plants have check |
|
| |
|
| zone boundary of 36 rem per gpm of leakage. A generic communication
| | valves installed in the discharge pipe of the control rod drive pumps. However, this audit also showed that other BWR plants, mostly the earlier ones, did not |
|
| |
|
| discussing
| | have such check valves. The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is de- signed with a testable check valve and a motor-operated isolation valve. There- fore, this pathway is applicable to pre-BWR/6 plants only. |
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| |
|
| this concern was sent by General Electric-Nuclear
| | Ie |
|
| |
|
| Energy to each BWR utility in July 1989.Discussion:
| | IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining the General Electric dose calculations for the postulated path with |
| For the control rod hydraulic
| |
|
| |
|
| systems at General Electric boiling water reac-tors, the inboard isolation
| | the leak rates measured from the hydraulic units at either Limerick or |
|
| |
|
| for the primary containment
| | Susquehanna produces dose rates significantly in excess of the values in the |
|
| |
|
| is provided by the double seals in the control rod drives, and the outboard isolation
| | Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent calculations by the NRC staff pro- duced offsite dose values that were comparable to the General Electric results. |
|
| |
|
| for the primary containment
| | Radiation release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive |
|
| |
|
| is provided by valves within the hydraulic
| | pumps are kept running. However, continued operation of these pumps following |
|
| |
|
| control units.However, past leak tests of the rod drive seals that were performed
| | an accident cannot be assured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified |
|
| |
|
| by General Electric produced a maximum of 5 gpm per drive. Leakage from the hydraulic control units can also be significant.
| | suction piping were to fail. |
|
| |
|
| As shown in Figure 1, four paths lead from each of the 185 hydraulic
| | This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the |
|
| |
|
| control units to the common CRD pump header. Three of these paths, the accumulator
| | installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from |
|
| |
|
| charging header, the drive header and the cooling header include check valves to prevent the return of water from the hydraulic
| | the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of |
|
| |
|
| units. In addition, water escaping through the accumulator
| | the reactor building (secondary containment). The Washington Nuclear Power |
|
| |
|
| charging header must leak through the insert side scram valve, and water escaping through the drive header must leak through one of the directional
| | Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions for leak testing the valves and |
|
| |
|
| control valves. However, the check valve in the exhaust header is oriented so as to permit the flow of water back to the CRD pump header.The exhaust water then flows via the CRD pump header back to the reactor vessel (or, as at Washington
| | a leak rate criterion of 0.01 gpm was established for these valves. |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2, to the reactor water cleanup system) along with the excess pump flow. Therefore, only one normally closed valve prevents water that is leaking out of each of the 185 control rod drives from returning
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| through the associated
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one |
|
| |
|
| exhaust header to the CRD pump header.During startup testing at Limerick Unit 1, and at Susquehanna
| | of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager. |
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| |
|
| Unit 1, the total leakage from all of the hydraulic
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
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| |
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| control units combined was measured at 5 gpm and 11 gpm, respectively.
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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| |
|
| Both of these reactors include additional
| | Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR |
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| |
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| check valves at the discharge
| | (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR |
|
| |
|
| of the control'rod
| | (301) 492-1849 Attachments: |
| | 1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System |
|
| |
|
| drive pump (area A in Figure 1). A partial audit by the NRC staff indicates
| | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| that many of the newer BWR plants have check valves installed
| | Note: At Washington Nuclear Power |
|
| |
|
| in the discharge
| | Plant, Unit 2, the control rod drive |
|
| |
|
| pipe of the control rod drive pumps. However, this audit also showed that other BWR plants, mostly the earlier ones, did not have such check valves. The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is de-signed with a testable check valve and a motor-operated
| | return water Is piped to the reactor w |
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| |
|
| isolation
| | water cleanup system |
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| |
|
| valve. There-fore, this pathway is applicable
| | SvITE..t. .... \SECONDONDARY |
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| |
|
| to pre-BWR/6 plants only.
| | OAin4Z( EXHAUST CWHIOL VALV(S CONTAINMENT |
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| |
|
| Ie IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining
| | ~I ~>*PCV "(E |
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|
| the General Electric dose calculations
| | S CU |
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| |
|
| for the postulated
| | OUTSIDE OF DRV |
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| |
|
| path with the leak rates measured from the hydraulic
| | BUILDINGA-H |
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| |
|
| units at either Limerick or Susquehanna
| | AREA |
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| |
|
| produces dose rates significantly
| | A SCIM VALVIE |
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| |
|
| in excess of the values in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent
| | 6TaLQUT1 COTROL4MmuMRG |
|
| |
|
| calculations
| | RMOO140MIX ROD |
|
| |
|
| by the NRC staff pro-duced offsite dose values that were comparable
| | To OTHE |
|
| |
|
| to the General Electric results.Radiation
| | CONTARNEN R-OD -. I.-AJ___ |
| | CrI |
|
| |
|
| release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
| | DRIVEPUMPSM |
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| |
|
| operation
| | 0 |
| | ~j |
|
| |
|
| of these pumps following an accident cannot be assured, particularly
| | c |
|
| |
|
| if the non-seismically
| | Figure 1. BWR CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM |
|
| |
|
| qualified suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
| | Attachment 2 IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
| | NRC INFORMATION NOTICES |
|
| |
|
| of two check valves in series in the common discharge | | Information Date of |
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| |
|
| pipe from the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of the reactor building (secondary
| | Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to |
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| |
|
| containment).
| | 90-77 Inadvertent Removal of Fuel 12/12/90 All holders of OLs or |
|
| |
|
| The Washington
| | Assemblies from the Reactor CPs for pressurized- Core water reactors (PWRS). |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
| | 88-23, Potential for Gas Binding of 12/10/90 All holders of OLs or |
|
| |
|
| includes provisions
| | Supp. 3 High-Pressure Safety Injection CPs for pressurized- Pumps During A Loss-Of-Coolant water reactors (PWRs). |
|
| |
|
| for leak testing the valves and a leak rate criterion
| | Accident |
|
| |
|
| of 0.01 gpm was established | | 90-76 Failure Of Turbine Overspeed 12/7/90 All holders of OLs or |
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| |
|
| for these valves.This information | | Trip Mechanism Because Of CPs for nuclear power |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| | Inadequate Spring Tension reactors. |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions
| | 90-75 Denial Of Access To Current 12/5/90 All Michigan holders |
|
| |
|
| about the information
| | Low-Level Radioactive Waste of NRC licenses. |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact one of the technical
| | Disposal Facilities |
|
| |
|
| contacts listed below or the appropriate
| | 90-74 Information on Precursors To 12/4/90 All holders of OLs or |
|
| |
|
| NRR project manager.Division of Operational
| | Severe Accidents CPs for nuclear power |
|
| |
|
| ===Events Assessment===
| | reactors. |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
| |
|
| |
|
| Technical
| | 90-73 Corrosion Of Valve-To- 11/29/90 All holders of OLs or |
|
| |
|
| Contacts:
| | Torque Tube Keys In CPs for nuclear power |
| Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments:
| |
| 1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
|
| |
|
| Notices
| | Spray Pond Cross Connect reactors. |
|
| |
|
| Note: At Washington
| | Valves |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, the control rod drive return water Is piped to the reactor w water cleanup system SvITE..t.
| | 90-72 Testing of Parallel Disc 11/28/90 All holders of OLs or |
|
| |
|
| .... \SECONDONDARY
| | Gate Valves In Europe CPs for nuclear power |
|
| |
|
| OAin4Z( EXHAUST CWHIOL VALV(S CONTAINMENT
| | reactors. |
|
| |
|
| ~I ~>*PCV "(E S CU OUTSIDE OF DRV BUILDINGA-H
| | 90-71 Effective Use of Radi- 11/6/90 All NRC licensees |
|
| |
|
| ===AREA A SCIM VALVIE 6TaLQUT1 COTROL4MmuMRG===
| | ation Safety Committees authorized to use by- to Exercise Control Over product material for |
| RMOO140MIX
| |
|
| |
|
| ROD To OTHE CONTARNEN
| | Medical Use Programs medical purposes. |
|
| |
|
| R-OD I.-AJ___ -. CrI DRIVEPUMPSM
| | 90-70 Pump Explosions Involving 11/6/90 All uranium fuel |
|
| |
|
| ~j 0 c Figure 1. BWR CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM
| | Ammonium Nitrate fabrication and |
|
| |
|
| Attachment
| | conversion facilities. |
|
| |
|
| 2 IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
| | 90-38, License and Fee Require- 11/6/90 All fuel facility and |
|
| |
|
| NOTICES Information
| | Supp. 1 ments for Processing Fin- materials licensees. |
|
| |
|
| Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 90-77 88-23, Supp. 3 90-76 90-75 90-74 90-73 90-72 90-71 90-70 90-38, Supp. 1 Inadvertent
| | ancial Assurance Submittals |
| | |
| Removal of Fuel Assemblies
| |
| | |
| from the Reactor Core Potential
| |
| | |
| for Gas Binding of High-Pressure
| |
| | |
| Safety Injection Pumps During A Loss-Of-Coolant
| |
| | |
| Accident Failure Of Turbine Overspeed Trip Mechanism
| |
| | |
| Because Of Inadequate
| |
| | |
| Spring Tension Denial Of Access To Current Low-Level
| |
| | |
| Radioactive
| |
| | |
| ===Waste Disposal Facilities===
| |
| Information
| |
| | |
| on Precursors
| |
| | |
| To Severe Accidents Corrosion
| |
| | |
| Of Valve-To-Torque Tube Keys In Spray Pond Cross Connect Valves Testing of Parallel Disc Gate Valves In Europe Effective
| |
| | |
| Use of Radi-ation Safety Committees
| |
| | |
| to Exercise Control Over Medical Use Programs Pump Explosions
| |
| | |
| Involving Ammonium Nitrate License and Fee Require-ments for Processing
| |
| | |
| Fin-ancial Assurance
| |
| | |
| Submittals | |
|
| |
|
| for Decommissioning | | for Decommissioning |
|
| |
|
| 12/12/90 12/10/90 12/7/90 12/5/90 12/4/90 11/29/90 11/28/90 11/6/90 11/6/90 11/6/90 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized- water reactors (PWRS).All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized- water reactors (PWRs).All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All Michigan holders of NRC licenses.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees authorized
| | OL = Operating License |
|
| |
|
| to use by-product material for medical purposes.All uranium fuel fabrication
| | CP = Construction Permit |
|
| |
|
| and conversion
| | IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining the General Electric dose calculations for the postulated path with |
|
| |
|
| facilities.
| | the leak rates measured from the hydraulic units at either Limerick or |
|
| |
|
| All fuel facility and materials
| | Susquehanna produces dose rates significantly in excess of the values in the |
|
| |
|
| licensees.
| | Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent calculations by the NRC staff pro- duced offsite dose values that were comparable to the General Electric results. |
|
| |
|
| OL = Operating
| | Radiation release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive |
|
| |
|
| License CP = Construction
| | pumps are kept running. However, continued operation of these pumps following |
|
| |
|
| Permit
| | an accident cannot be assured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified |
|
| |
|
| IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining
| | suction piping were to fail. |
|
| |
|
| the General Electric dose calculations | | This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the |
|
| |
|
| for the postulated
| | installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from |
|
| |
|
| path with the leak rates measured from the hydraulic
| | the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of |
|
| |
|
| units at either Limerick or Susquehanna
| | the reactor building (secondary containment). The Washington Nuclear Power |
|
| |
|
| produces dose rates significantly
| | Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions for leak testing the valves and |
|
| |
|
| in excess of the values in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent
| | a leak rate criterion of 0.01 gpm was established for these valves. |
|
| |
|
| calculations
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| by the NRC staff pro-duced offsite dose values that were comparable
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one |
|
| |
|
| to the General Electric results.Radiation
| | of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager. |
|
| |
|
| release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
| | Origina Signkd IN |
|
| |
|
| operation
| | Charles E Rossi |
|
| |
|
| of these pumps following an accident cannot be assured, particularly
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
|
| |
|
| if the non-seismically
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
|
| |
|
| qualified suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
| |
| | |
| of two check valves in series in the common discharge
| |
| | |
| pipe from the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of the reactor building (secondary
| |
| | |
| containment).
| |
| | |
| The Washington
| |
| | |
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation | |
| | |
| includes provisions
| |
| | |
| for leak testing the valves and a leak rate criterion
| |
| | |
| of 0.01 gpm was established
| |
| | |
| for these valves.This information
| |
| | |
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| |
| | |
| If you have any questions
| |
| | |
| about the information
| |
| | |
| in this notice, please contact one of the technical
| |
|
| |
|
| contacts listed below or the appropriate
| | Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR |
|
| |
|
| NRR project manager.Origina Signkd IN Charles E Rossi Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
| | (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR |
|
| |
|
| ===Events Assessment===
| | (301) 492-1849 Attachments: |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
| | 1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System |
|
| |
|
| Technical
| | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| Contacts:
| | *12/11/90 |
| Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments:
| | NJDi*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR |
| 1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
| | |
| Notices*12/11/90 NJDi *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| |
|
| |
|
| CHBerlinger | | CHBerlinger |
|
| |
|
| 12/L~/jW 111/09/90*OGCB:DOEA:NRR | | 12/L~/jW 111/09/90 |
| | *OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DST:NRR *C/SPLB:DST:NRR *D/U ST:NRR *RPB:ADM |
|
| |
|
| *SPLB:DST:NRR
| | DCKirkpatrick CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani TechEd |
|
| |
|
| *C/SPLB:DST:NRR
| | 08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10/30/90 08/06/90 |
| | DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-78 |
|
| |
|
| *D/U ST:NRR *RPB:ADM DCKirkpatrick
| | IN 90-XX |
|
| |
|
| CRNichols
| | August xx, 1990 for these and other plants produced offsite dose values that were comparable |
|
| |
|
| CMcCracken
| | to the General Electric results and that could also significantly exceed the |
|
| |
|
| AThadani TechEd 08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10/30/90 08/06/90 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-78 IN 90-XX August xx, 1990 for these and other plants produced offsite dose values that were comparable
| | values specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation release by |
|
| |
|
| to the General Electric results and that could also significantly
| | this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept |
|
| |
|
| exceed the values specified
| | running. However, continued operation of these pumps following an accident |
|
| |
|
| in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation
| | cannot be ensured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified suction piping |
|
| |
|
| release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
| | were to fall. |
|
| |
|
| operation
| | This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the |
|
| |
|
| of these pumps following | | installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from |
|
| |
|
| an accident cannot be ensured, particularly
| | the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary contain- ment. The Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions |
|
| |
|
| if the non-seismically
| | for leak testing the valves. Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to |
|
| |
|
| qualified
| | establish a leak rate criterion for these valves of 0.01 gpm. |
|
| |
|
| suction piping were to fall.This problem was resolved at Washington
| | The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is designed with a testable |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
| | check valve and a motor-operated isolation valve, therefore this pathway is |
|
| |
|
| of two check valves in series in the common discharge
| | applicable to only pre-BWR/6 plants. |
|
| |
|
| pipe from the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| contain-ment. The Washington
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
| | technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager. |
|
| |
|
| includes provisions
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
|
| |
|
| for leak testing the valves. Washington
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to establish
| |
|
| |
| a leak rate criterion
| |
|
| |
| for these valves of 0.01 gpm.The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is designed with a testable check valve and a motor-operated
| |
|
| |
| isolation
| |
|
| |
| valve, therefore
| |
|
| |
| this pathway is applicable
| |
|
| |
| to only pre-BWR/6 plants.This information
| |
|
| |
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| |
|
| |
| If you have any questions
| |
|
| |
| about the information
| |
|
| |
| in this notice, please contact the technical
| |
|
| |
| contact listed below or the appropriate
| |
|
| |
| NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
| |
|
| |
| ===Events Assessment===
| |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| Technical | | Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR |
| | |
| Contacts: | |
| Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments: | |
| 1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic
| |
| | |
| System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
| | |
| Notices Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED
| |
| | |
| RELEASE PATH IN*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
| |
| | |
| D/DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| ===CERossi CHBerlinger===
| |
| 10/ /90 10/ /90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| SPLB:DST:NRR
| |
| | |
| C/SPLB:DST:NRR
| |
| | |
| D/DST:NRRK4 RPB:ADM DCKirkpatrick*
| |
| CRNichols*
| |
| CMcCracken*
| |
| AThadani TechEd*08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10M /90 08/06/90
| |
| 1990 Page 3 f 3 Combining
| |
|
| |
|
| the General Electric dose calculations
| | (301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR |
|
| |
|
| for the postulated
| | (301) 492-1849 Attachments: |
| | 1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic System |
|
| |
|
| path with the leak rates measured from the hydraulic
| | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| units at either Limerick or Susquehanna
| | Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH IN |
|
| |
|
| produces dose rates significantly
| | *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES |
|
| |
|
| in excess of the values specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent
| | D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR |
|
| |
|
| calculations
| | CERossi CHBerlinger |
|
| |
|
| by the NRC staff produced offsite dose values that were comparable
| | 10/ /90 10/ /90 |
| | OGCB:DOEA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR C/SPLB:DST:NRR D/DST:NRRK4 RPB:ADM |
|
| |
|
| to the General Electric results and that could also significantly
| | DCKirkpatrick* CRNichols* CMcCracken* AThadani TechEd* |
| | 08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10M /90 08/06/90 |
|
| |
|
| exceed the values specified
| | 1990 |
| | Page 3 f 3 Combining the General Electric dose calculations for the postulated path with |
|
| |
|
| in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation
| | at either Limerick or |
|
| |
|
| release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued operation
| | the leak rates measured from the hydraulic units in excess of the values specified |
|
| |
|
| of these pumps following
| | Susquehanna produces dose rates significantly calculations by the NRC staff |
|
| |
|
| an accident cannot be assured, particularly
| | in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent to the General Electric |
|
| |
|
| if the non-seismically
| | produced offsite dose values that were comparable the values specified in the |
|
| |
|
| qualified
| | results and that could also significantly exceed by this path is not possible |
|
| |
|
| suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
| | Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation release running. However, continued |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
| | as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept cannot be assured, particularly |
|
| |
|
| of two check valves in series in the common discharge | | operation of these pumps following an accident were to fail. |
|
| |
|
| pipe from the control rod drive pumps (at area A) to prevent backflow out of the reactor building secondary
| | if the non-seismically qualified suction piping |
|
| |
|
| containment.
| | This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the |
|
| |
|
| The Washington
| | installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
| | the control rod drive pumps (at area A) to prevent backflow out of the reactor |
|
| |
|
| includes provisions
| | building secondary containment. The Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 and a leak rate |
|
| |
|
| for leak testing the valves and a leak rate criterion | | installation includes provisions for leak testing the valves |
|
| |
|
| of 0.01 gpm was established | | criterion of 0.01 gpm was established for these valves. |
|
| |
|
| for these valves.This information
| | or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| notice requires you have any questions | | This information notice requires no specific action |
|
| |
|
| about the of the technical
| | in this notice, please contact one |
|
| |
|
| contacts listed no specific action or written response.
| | you have any questions about the information appropriate NRR project manager. |
|
| |
|
| If information
| | of the technical contacts listed below or the |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
|
| |
|
| NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
|
| |
|
| ===Events Assessment===
| |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| Technical | | Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR |
| | |
| Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments: | |
| 1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
| | |
| Notices Document Name: RELEASE PATH NOTICE D/DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| CERossi 11/ /90*D/DST:NRR
| |
| | |
| AThadani 10/30/90 ok 1vko .*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| CHBerlinger
| |
|
| |
|
| 11/09/90*RPB:ADM TechEd 08/06/90*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| | (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR |
|
| |
|
| ===DCKirkpatrick===
| | (301) 492-1849 Attachments: |
| 08/17/90*SPLB:DST:NRR
| | 1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System |
|
| |
|
| CRNichols 08/20/90*C/SPLB:DST:NRR
| | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| CMcCracken
| | Document Name: RELEASE PATH NOTICE ok 1vko . |
|
| |
|
| 09/24/90
| | D/DOEA:NRR *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR |
| IN 90-XX August xx, 1990 this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
| |
|
| |
|
| operation
| | CERossi CHBerlinger |
|
| |
|
| of these pumps following
| | 11/ /90 11/09/90 |
| | *C/SPLB:DST:NRR *D/DST:NRR *RPB:ADM |
|
| |
|
| an accident cannot be ensured, particularly
| | *OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DST:NRR TechEd |
|
| |
|
| if the non-seismically
| | DCKirkpatrick CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani |
|
| |
|
| qualified
| | 08/20/90 09/24/90 10/30/90 08/06/90 |
| | 08/17/90 |
|
| |
|
| suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
| | IN 90-XX |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
| | August xx, 1990 this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept |
|
| |
|
| of two check valves in series in the common discharge | | running. However, continued operation of these pumps following an accident |
|
| |
|
| pipe from the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary
| | cannot be ensured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified suction piping |
|
| |
|
| contain-ment. The Washington
| | were to fail. |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation | | This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the |
|
| |
|
| includes provisions
| | installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from |
|
| |
|
| for leak testing the valves. Washington
| | the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary contain- ment. The Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to establish | | for leak testing the valves. Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to |
|
| |
|
| a leak rate criterion | | establish a leak rate criterion for these valves of 0.01 gpm. |
|
| |
|
| for these valves of 0.01 gpm.This information
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response. | | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions
| | technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager. |
|
| |
|
| about the information
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact the technical
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
|
| |
|
| contact listed below or the appropriate
| |
|
| |
| NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
| |
|
| |
| ===Events Assessment===
| |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| Technical | | Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR |
| | |
| Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments: | |
| 1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic
| |
| | |
| System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
|
| |
|
| Notices Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED
| | (301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR |
|
| |
|
| RELEASE PATH IN*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
| | (301) 492-1849 Attachments: |
| | 1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic System |
|
| |
|
| OGCB:W EA:NRR DOrirkpathick
| | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| 08/e 9/90 VC<SPLB:DST:NRR
| | Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH IN |
|
| |
|
| CRNichols 08AV2/9M;*^
| | *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES |
| CISPLB:DST:NRR
| |
|
| |
|
| CMcCracken
| | D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR |
| | |
| OF/p/90 D/DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| CERossi 08/ /90 D/DST:NRR AThadani 408/ /90 V1 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| CHBerlinger
| |
|
| |
|
| 08/ /90*RPB:ADM TechEd 08/06/90
| | CERossi CHBerlinger |
| IN 90-XX August xx, 1990 The Washington
| |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear power installation
| | 08/ /90 08/ /90 |
| | OGCB:W EA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR CISPLB:DST:NRR D/DST:NRR *RPB:ADM |
|
| |
|
| includes provisions
| | DOrirkpathick CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani TechEd |
|
| |
|
| for leak testing the valves. Washington
| | 08/e 9/90VC< 08AV2/9M;*^ OF/p/90 408/ /90 08/06/90 |
| | V1 |
|
| |
|
| Nuclear Power has established
| | IN 90-XX |
|
| |
|
| a very low leak rate criterion
| | August xx, 1990 The Washington Nuclear power installation includes provisions for leak testing |
|
| |
|
| for these valves (.01 gpm was indicated).
| | the valves. Washington Nuclear Power has established a very low leak rate |
|
| |
|
| A partial check by the NRC staff indicates | | criterion for these valves (.01 gpm was indicated). A partial check by the NRC |
|
| |
|
| that many of the newer BWR plants already have check valves installed | | staff indicates that many of the newer BWR plants already have check valves |
|
| |
|
| in the control rod drive pump discharge | | installed in the control rod drive pump discharge pipe. However, this check |
|
| |
|
| pipe. However, this check also showed that other BWR plants, mainly the earlier ones, did not have such check valves.This information
| | also showed that other BWR plants, mainly the earlier ones, did not have such |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| | check valves. |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions | | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| about the information | | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact the technical
| | technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager. |
|
| |
|
| contact listed below or the appropriate
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
|
| |
|
| NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
|
| |
|
| ===Events Assessment===
| |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| Technical | | ===Technical Contact:=== |
| | |
| Contact: Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Attachments: | |
| 1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic
| |
|
| |
|
| System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| | ===Charles R. Nichols, NRR=== |
| | (301) 492-0854 Attachments: |
| | 1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic System |
|
| |
|
| Notices Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED | | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
| | |
| RELEASE PATH IN D/DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| CERossi 08/ /90 D/DST:NRR AThadani 08/ /90 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| |
| | |
| CHBerlinger
| |
|
| |
|
| 08/ /90 RPB:ADM TechEd J ai P 08/C /90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
| | Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH IN |
|
| |
|
| SPLB:DST:NRR
| | D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR |
|
| |
|
| DCKirkpatyi
| | CERossi CHBerlinger |
|
| |
|
| .- CRNichols 08/' /9 xF 08/ /go C/SPLB:DST:NRR
| | 08/ /90 08/ /90 |
| | OGCB:DOEA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR C/SPLB:DST:NRR D/DST:NRR RPB:ADM |
|
| |
|
| CMcCracken | | DCKirkpatyi .-CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani TechEd J ai P |
|
| |
|
| 08/ /90}} | | 08/' /9 xF 08/ /go 08/ /90 08/ /90 08/C /90}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Previously Unidentified Release Path from Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Hydraulic UnitsML031130145 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
---|
Issue date: |
12/18/1990 |
---|
From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-90-078, NUDOCS 9012120148 |
Download: ML031130145 (11) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. Information Notice 2011-20, NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011)2019-07-24024 July 2019 NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011) ML19196A2452019-07-15015 July 2019 Public Notice - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Exigent Amendment to Facility Operating License Information Notice 2019-01, Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations2019-03-12012 March 2019 Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations ML16028A3082016-04-27027 April 2016 NRC Information Notice; IN 2016-05: Operating Experience Regarding Complications From a Loss of Instrumentation Air Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2013-20, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-20, Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-11, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2013-11, Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 18, 1990
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-78: PREVIOUSLY UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH FROM
BOILING WATER REACTOR CONTROL ROD HYDRAULIC
UNITS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for boiling water
reactors (BWRs).
Purpose
This information notice is intended to alert addressees to potential problems
pertaining to a previously unidentified release path from the control rod drive
hydraulic systems in boiling water reactors that may lead to design basis
accident radiation doses significantly exceeding the values specified in the
Final Safety Analysis Report. It is expected that recipients will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this
information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
In June 1989, a design review for unmonitored release paths at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 resulted in the discovery of a previously unidenti- fied radiation release path in the control rod drive hydraulic system. This
path is postulated to result from the following sequence of conditions. The
two control rod drive pumps are shut down following a design basis accident.
There is a break outside of the reactor building (secondary containment) in
the non-seismically qualified piping or tankage to which the control rod
hydraulic system is connected (see Figure 1). Reactor coolant leaks past the
double seals in any of the 185 control rod drives and the valves in their
associated hydraulic control units. The leakage flows back through one or
more of the four headers connecting each of the 185 hydraulic control units to
the common control rod drive (CRD) pump header. The leakage then flows through
the CRD pump header and the control rod drive pumps to the break or the conden- sate storage tank located outside of the reactor building.
Much of the pathway to the condensate storage tank lies outside of the reactor
building and includes piping that is not seismically qualified. In addition, this piping passes close to the air intakes for the control room ventilation
system. Consequently, a failure of the supply piping for the drive pumps
s3 -1D8W- /'C
IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 during an accident would not only greatly increase the potential external
release, but could increase the radiation dose to the control room operators.
General Electric-Nuclear Energy performed calculations for the newly postulated
release path for a design basis accident with concurrent failure of the
non-seismically qualified supply piping for the control rod drive system at
Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2. The calculations incorporated the
source terms specified in Regulatory Guide 1.3 and assumed that 10% of the
iodine would escape as a gas from the liquid release. These calculations
produced a 30-day thyroid dose for control room operators of 121 rem per gpm of
leakage, a 30-day thyroid dose at the outer boundary of the low-population zone
of 86 rem per gpm of leakage, and a 2-hour thyroid dose at the exclusion zone
boundary of 36 rem per gpm of leakage. A generic communication discussing this
concern was sent by General Electric-Nuclear Energy to each BWR utility in
July 1989.
Discussion:
For the control rod hydraulic systems at General Electric boiling water reac- tors, the inboard isolation for the primary containment is provided by the
double seals in the control rod drives, and the outboard isolation for the
primary containment is provided by valves within the hydraulic control units.
However, past leak tests of the rod drive seals that were performed by General
Electric produced a maximum of 5 gpm per drive. Leakage from the hydraulic
control units can also be significant.
As shown in Figure 1, four paths lead from each of the 185 hydraulic control
units to the common CRD pump header. Three of these paths, the accumulator
charging header, the drive header and the cooling header include check valves
to prevent the return of water from the hydraulic units. In addition, water
escaping through the accumulator charging header must leak through the insert
side scram valve, and water escaping through the drive header must leak through
one of the directional control valves. However, the check valve in the exhaust
header is oriented so as to permit the flow of water back to the CRD pump header.
The exhaust water then flows via the CRD pump header back to the reactor vessel
(or, as at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2, to the reactor water cleanup
system) along with the excess pump flow. Therefore, only one normally closed
valve prevents water that is leaking out of each of the 185 control rod drives
from returning through the associated exhaust header to the CRD pump header.
During startup testing at Limerick Unit 1, and at Susquehanna Unit 1, the total
leakage from all of the hydraulic control units combined was measured at 5 gpm
and 11 gpm, respectively. Both of these reactors include additional check valves
at the discharge of the control'rod drive pump (area A in Figure 1). A partial
audit by the NRC staff indicates that many of the newer BWR plants have check
valves installed in the discharge pipe of the control rod drive pumps. However, this audit also showed that other BWR plants, mostly the earlier ones, did not
have such check valves. The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is de- signed with a testable check valve and a motor-operated isolation valve. There- fore, this pathway is applicable to pre-BWR/6 plants only.
Ie
IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining the General Electric dose calculations for the postulated path with
the leak rates measured from the hydraulic units at either Limerick or
Susquehanna produces dose rates significantly in excess of the values in the
Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent calculations by the NRC staff pro- duced offsite dose values that were comparable to the General Electric results.
Radiation release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive
pumps are kept running. However, continued operation of these pumps following
an accident cannot be assured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified
suction piping were to fail.
This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the
installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from
the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of
the reactor building (secondary containment). The Washington Nuclear Power
Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions for leak testing the valves and
a leak rate criterion of 0.01 gpm was established for these valves.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR
(301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR
(301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Note: At Washington Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit 2, the control rod drive
return water Is piped to the reactor w
water cleanup system
SvITE..t. .... \SECONDONDARY
OAin4Z( EXHAUST CWHIOL VALV(S CONTAINMENT
~I ~>*PCV "(E
S CU
OUTSIDE OF DRV
BUILDINGA-H
AREA
A SCIM VALVIE
6TaLQUT1 COTROL4MmuMRG
RMOO140MIX ROD
To OTHE
CONTARNEN R-OD -. I.-AJ___
CrI
DRIVEPUMPSM
0
~j
c
Figure 1. BWR CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM
Attachment 2 IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
90-77 Inadvertent Removal of Fuel 12/12/90 All holders of OLs or
Assemblies from the Reactor CPs for pressurized- Core water reactors (PWRS).
88-23, Potential for Gas Binding of 12/10/90 All holders of OLs or
Supp. 3 High-Pressure Safety Injection CPs for pressurized- Pumps During A Loss-Of-Coolant water reactors (PWRs).
Accident
90-76 Failure Of Turbine Overspeed 12/7/90 All holders of OLs or
Trip Mechanism Because Of CPs for nuclear power
Inadequate Spring Tension reactors.
90-75 Denial Of Access To Current 12/5/90 All Michigan holders
Low-Level Radioactive Waste of NRC licenses.
Disposal Facilities
90-74 Information on Precursors To 12/4/90 All holders of OLs or
Severe Accidents CPs for nuclear power
reactors.
90-73 Corrosion Of Valve-To- 11/29/90 All holders of OLs or
Torque Tube Keys In CPs for nuclear power
Spray Pond Cross Connect reactors.
Valves
90-72 Testing of Parallel Disc 11/28/90 All holders of OLs or
Gate Valves In Europe CPs for nuclear power
reactors.
90-71 Effective Use of Radi- 11/6/90 All NRC licensees
ation Safety Committees authorized to use by- to Exercise Control Over product material for
Medical Use Programs medical purposes.
90-70 Pump Explosions Involving 11/6/90 All uranium fuel
Ammonium Nitrate fabrication and
conversion facilities.
90-38, License and Fee Require- 11/6/90 All fuel facility and
Supp. 1 ments for Processing Fin- materials licensees.
ancial Assurance Submittals
for Decommissioning
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining the General Electric dose calculations for the postulated path with
the leak rates measured from the hydraulic units at either Limerick or
Susquehanna produces dose rates significantly in excess of the values in the
Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent calculations by the NRC staff pro- duced offsite dose values that were comparable to the General Electric results.
Radiation release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive
pumps are kept running. However, continued operation of these pumps following
an accident cannot be assured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified
suction piping were to fail.
This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the
installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from
the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of
the reactor building (secondary containment). The Washington Nuclear Power
Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions for leak testing the valves and
a leak rate criterion of 0.01 gpm was established for these valves.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Origina Signkd IN
Charles E Rossi
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR
(301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR
(301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
NJDi*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
12/L~/jW 111/09/90
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DST:NRR *C/SPLB:DST:NRR *D/U ST:NRR *RPB:ADM
DCKirkpatrick CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani TechEd
08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10/30/90 08/06/90
DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-78
IN 90-XX
August xx, 1990 for these and other plants produced offsite dose values that were comparable
to the General Electric results and that could also significantly exceed the
values specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation release by
this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept
running. However, continued operation of these pumps following an accident
cannot be ensured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified suction piping
were to fall.
This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the
installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from
the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary contain- ment. The Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions
for leak testing the valves. Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to
establish a leak rate criterion for these valves of 0.01 gpm.
The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is designed with a testable
check valve and a motor-operated isolation valve, therefore this pathway is
applicable to only pre-BWR/6 plants.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR
(301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR
(301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic System
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CERossi CHBerlinger
10/ /90 10/ /90
OGCB:DOEA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR C/SPLB:DST:NRR D/DST:NRRK4 RPB:ADM
DCKirkpatrick* CRNichols* CMcCracken* AThadani TechEd*
08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10M /90 08/06/90
1990
Page 3 f 3 Combining the General Electric dose calculations for the postulated path with
at either Limerick or
the leak rates measured from the hydraulic units in excess of the values specified
Susquehanna produces dose rates significantly calculations by the NRC staff
in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent to the General Electric
produced offsite dose values that were comparable the values specified in the
results and that could also significantly exceed by this path is not possible
Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation release running. However, continued
as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept cannot be assured, particularly
operation of these pumps following an accident were to fail.
if the non-seismically qualified suction piping
This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the
installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from
the control rod drive pumps (at area A) to prevent backflow out of the reactor
building secondary containment. The Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 and a leak rate
installation includes provisions for leak testing the valves
criterion of 0.01 gpm was established for these valves.
or written response. If
This information notice requires no specific action
in this notice, please contact one
you have any questions about the information appropriate NRR project manager.
of the technical contacts listed below or the
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR
(301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR
(301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: RELEASE PATH NOTICE ok 1vko .
D/DOEA:NRR *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CERossi CHBerlinger
11/ /90 11/09/90
- C/SPLB:DST:NRR *D/DST:NRR *RPB:ADM
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DST:NRR TechEd
DCKirkpatrick CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani
08/20/90 09/24/90 10/30/90 08/06/90
08/17/90
IN 90-XX
August xx, 1990 this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept
running. However, continued operation of these pumps following an accident
cannot be ensured, particularly if the non-seismically qualified suction piping
were to fail.
This problem was resolved at Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the
installation of two check valves in series in the common discharge pipe from
the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary contain- ment. The Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation includes provisions
for leak testing the valves. Washington Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to
establish a leak rate criterion for these valves of 0.01 gpm.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR
(301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR
(301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic System
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CERossi CHBerlinger
08/ /90 08/ /90
OGCB:W EA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR CISPLB:DST:NRR D/DST:NRR *RPB:ADM
DOrirkpathick CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani TechEd
08/e 9/90VC< 08AV2/9M;*^ OF/p/90 408/ /90 08/06/90
V1
IN 90-XX
August xx, 1990 The Washington Nuclear power installation includes provisions for leak testing
the valves. Washington Nuclear Power has established a very low leak rate
criterion for these valves (.01 gpm was indicated). A partial check by the NRC
staff indicates that many of the newer BWR plants already have check valves
installed in the control rod drive pump discharge pipe. However, this check
also showed that other BWR plants, mainly the earlier ones, did not have such
check valves.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Charles R. Nichols, NRR
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic System
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED RELEASE PATH IN
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CERossi CHBerlinger
08/ /90 08/ /90
OGCB:DOEA:NRR SPLB:DST:NRR C/SPLB:DST:NRR D/DST:NRR RPB:ADM
DCKirkpatyi .-CRNichols CMcCracken AThadani TechEd J ai P
08/' /9 xF 08/ /go 08/ /90 08/ /90 08/C /90
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list | - Information Notice 1990-01, Importance of Proper Response to Self-Identified Violations by Licensees (12 January 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-02, Potential Degradation of Secondary Containment (22 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-03, Malfunction of Borg-Warner Bolted Bonnet Check Valves Caused by Failure of the Swing Arm (23 January 1990, Topic: Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-04, Cracking of the Upper Shell-to-Transition Cone Girth Welds in Steam Generators, (26 January 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1990-05, Inter-System Discharge of Reactor Coolant (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-06, Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-07, New Information Regarding Insulation Material Performance and Debris Blockage of PWR Containment Sumps (30 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards From Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-09, Extended Interim Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Waste by Fuel Cycle and Materials Licensees (5 February 1990, Topic: Decommissioning Funding Plan)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-11, Maintenance Deficiency Associated with Solenoid-Operated Valves (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-12, Monitoring or Interruption of Plant Communications (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-13, Importance of Review and Analysis of Safeguards Event Logs (5 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-14, Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials (6 March 1990, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1990-15, Reciprocity Notification of Agreement State Radiation Control Directors Before Beginning Work in Agreement States (17 March 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-16, Compliance with New Decommissioning Rule (7 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-17, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Valves (8 March 1990, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems With Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-19, Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR Facilities (14 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-20, Personnel Injuries Resulting from Improper Operation of Radwaste Incinerators (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction Was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-22, Unanticipated Equipment Actuations Following Restoration of Power to Rosemount Transmitter Trip Units (23 March 1990, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1990-23, Improper Installation of Patel Conduit Seals (4 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model SPEC 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power With Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems (24 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-27, Clarification of the Recent Revisions to the Regulatory Requirements for Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) for Transportation (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error In High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error in High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-29, Cracking of Cladding and Its Heat-Affected Zone in the Base Metal of a Reactor Vessel Head (30 April 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-30, Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Welds (1 May 1999, Topic: Dissimilar Metal Weld)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste Form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-32, Surface Crack and Subsurface Indications in the Weld of a Reactor Vessel Head (3 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-33, Sources of Unexpected Occupational Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel Storage Pools (9 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-34, Response to False Siren Activations (10 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-35, Transportation of Type a Quantities of Non-Fissile Radioactive Materials (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-37, Sheared Pinion Gear-To-Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-38, License and Fee Requirements for Processing Financial Assurance Submittals for Decommissioning (6 November 1990, Topic: Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1990-39, Recent Problems with Service Water Systems (1 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-40, Results of NRC-Sponsored Testing of Motor-Operated Valves (5 June 1990, Topic: Weak link)
- Information Notice 1990-41, Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and Ak Circuit Breakers (12 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-42, Failure of Electrical Power Equipment Due to Solar Magnetic Disturbances (19 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-43, Mechanical Interference with Thermal Trip Function in GE Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (29 June 1990)
... further results |
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