Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 6
| page count = 6
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001February 9, 2007NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2007-05: VERTICAL DEEP DRAFT PUMP SHAFT AND COUPLING FAILURES
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 9, 2007 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2007-05:                 VERTICAL DEEP DRAFT PUMP SHAFT AND
 
COUPLING FAILURES


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of operating licensees for nuclear power reactors, except those who havepermanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed
All holders of operating licensees for nuclear power reactors, except those who have
 
permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed


from the reactor vessel.
from the reactor vessel.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Information Notice (IN) to alertlicensees to vertical deep draft pump shaft and coupling failures from intergranular stress
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Information Notice (IN) to alert
 
licensees to vertical deep draft pump shaft and coupling failures from intergranular stress


corrosion cracking (IGSCC). It is expected that recipients will review the information for
corrosion cracking (IGSCC). It is expected that recipients will review the information for


applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
Line 33: Line 45:


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
Service Water Pump Shaft Failures at Columbia Generating StationAt Columbia Generating Station on June 14, 2005, following a start of the Service Water Pump1A (SW-P-1A), control room operators noted that service water (SW) flow to the Division 1 residual heat removal heat exchanger was out of specification. Operators also noted the pump
Service Water Pump Shaft Failures at Columbia Generating Station
 
At Columbia Generating Station on June 14, 2005, following a start of the Service Water Pump
 
1A (SW-P-1A), control room operators noted that service water (SW) flow to the Division 1 residual heat removal heat exchanger was out of specification. Operators also noted the pump


discharge head and pump motor current were lower than normal and declared the SW-P-1A
discharge head and pump motor current were lower than normal and declared the SW-P-1A


inoperable. A subsequent surveillance test on SW-P-1A determined that pump performance
inoperable. A subsequent surveillance test on SW-P-1A determined that pump performance


had degraded and was operating at the intersection of the alert and action ranges of its
had degraded and was operating at the intersection of the alert and action ranges of its


performance curve. Energy Northwest, the licensee, proceeded to replace SW-P-1A with an
performance curve. Energy Northwest, the licensee, proceeded to replace SW-P-1A with an
 
available spare pump.
 
During disassembly of SW-P-1A, Energy Northwest determined that IGSCC failed the pump


available spare pump.During disassembly of SW-P-1A, Energy Northwest determined that IGSCC failed the pumpshaft end flanges on two of the shaft sections allowing the shaft sections to drop. This
shaft end flanges on two of the shaft sections allowing the shaft sections to drop. This


condition caused the pump impeller to contact the pump suction casing, which resulted in
condition caused the pump impeller to contact the pump suction casing, which resulted in


substantial wear of the pump impellers and degraded pump performance. The shaft drive keys
substantial wear of the pump impellers and degraded pump performance. The shaft drive keys


remained captured between the shaft keyways and coupling sleeves such that the shaft
remained captured between the shaft keyways and coupling sleeves such that the shaft


segments and impeller continued to rotate. Energy Northwest conducted a metallurgical
segments and impeller continued to rotate. Energy Northwest conducted a metallurgical


examination of the damaged pump shaft and also identified axial cracking on the impeller pump
examination of the damaged pump shaft and also identified axial cracking on the impeller pump


shaft segment and two diagonal cracks on the top column shaft. The metallurgical examination determined that the shaft material, TP410 martensitic stainlesssteel, was susceptible to tempering embrittlement (shaft material was tempered at 970 degrees
shaft segment and two diagonal cracks on the top column shaft.
 
The metallurgical examination determined that the shaft material, TP410 martensitic stainless
 
steel, was susceptible to tempering embrittlement (shaft material was tempered at 970 degrees
 
Fahrenheit, which was conducive to tempering embrittlement). Tempering embrittlement
 
reduced the corrosion resistance of the shaft material, thereby, increasing the materials


Fahrenheit, which was conducive to tempering embrittlement).  Tempering embrittlement
susceptibility to IGSCC. Energy Northwest determined that SW-P-1B was also susceptible to


reduced the corrosion resistance of the shaft material, thereby, increasing the material's
the same failure mechanism as identified in SW-P-1A. However, it had not exhibited


susceptibility to IGSCC. Energy Northwest determined that SW-P-1B was also susceptible to
performance degradation based on past surveillance test results.


the same failure mechanism as identified in SW-P-1A.  However, it had not exhibited
Interim corrective actions included additional monitoring of SW-P-1B to verify pump


performance degradation based on past surveillance test results. Interim corrective actions included additional monitoring of SW-P-1B to verify pumpperformance until a replacement pump could be procured and installed. A subsequent
performance until a replacement pump could be procured and installed. A subsequent


inspection of the as-found condition of SW-P-1B determined that the pump shaft had degraded
inspection of the as-found condition of SW-P-1B determined that the pump shaft had degraded
Line 71: Line 99:
in a manner similar to SW-P-1A, due to IGSCC, and that the pump impeller had degraded due
in a manner similar to SW-P-1A, due to IGSCC, and that the pump impeller had degraded due


to wearing on the suction casing. A detailed evaluation of SW-P-1A historical computer data determined that although pumpperformance had met surveillance test acceptance criteria, pump performance had slowly
to wearing on the suction casing.
 
A detailed evaluation of SW-P-1A historical computer data determined that although pump
 
performance had met surveillance test acceptance criteria, pump performance had slowly


degraded from as early as August 2000 and as late as December 2001. Similarly, a detailed
degraded from as early as August 2000 and as late as December 2001. Similarly, a detailed


evaluation of SW-P-1B historical computer data revealed that SW-P-1B had slowly degraded
evaluation of SW-P-1B historical computer data revealed that SW-P-1B had slowly degraded


since August 2003.Safety Function of SW-P-1A and SW-P-1B and Design InformationThe standby SW system and ultimate heat sink function is to supply cooling water toremove heat from all nuclear plant equipment that are essential for safe and orderly shutdown
since August 2003.
 
Safety Function of SW-P-1A and SW-P-1B and Design Information
 
The standby SW system and ultimate heat sink function is to supply cooling water to
 
remove heat from all nuclear plant equipment that are essential for safe and orderly shutdown


of the reactor, to maintain it in a safe condition, and to remove decay heat from the reactor
of the reactor, to maintain it in a safe condition, and to remove decay heat from the reactor


during shutdown conditions. During all normal operating conditions, including normal shutdown
during shutdown conditions. During all normal operating conditions, including normal shutdown


as well as emergency conditions, waste heat from the reactor auxiliary systems is transferred to
as well as emergency conditions, waste heat from the reactor auxiliary systems is transferred to


the ultimate heat sink via the standby SW system.SW-P-1A and SW-P-1B are deep draft vertical pumps manufactured by Byron Jackson, Model28KXH3, and were originally designed to provide a minimum of 10,500 gpm rated flow at 500 ft
the ultimate heat sink via the standby SW system.
 
SW-P-1A and SW-P-1B are deep draft vertical pumps manufactured by Byron Jackson, Model
 
28KXH3, and were originally designed to provide a minimum of 10,500 gpm rated flow at 500 ft
 
of discharge head. Both pumps were installed in 1979 and, prior to the failure of SW-P-1A, had
 
not been replaced, refurbished, removed, or opened for inspection since initial installation. Both


of discharge head.  Both pumps were installed in 1979 and, prior to the failure of SW-P-1A, had
pumps are exposed to the same environmental and physical conditions.


not been replaced, refurbished, removed, or opened for inspection since initial installation.  Both
The standby SW pump design consists of five sections of shaft with four sets of shaft


pumps are exposed to the same environmental and physical conditions.The standby SW pump design consists of five sections of shaft with four sets of shaftcoupling components. Each set of shaft coupling components consists of two drive keys and a
coupling components. Each set of shaft coupling components consists of two drive keys and a


pair of split rings that are held by a shaft coupling (sleeve) which is located by two gib keys. At
pair of split rings that are held by a shaft coupling (sleeve) which is located by two gib keys. At


the point where two shaft sections join, the split rings are installed over mating shaft shoulder
the point where two shaft sections join, the split rings are installed over mating shaft shoulder


flanges. The shaft shoulder flanges were the failed components which allowed the pump shaft
flanges. The shaft shoulder flanges were the failed components which allowed the pump shaft


to drop, causing the pump impeller to rest on the casing bowl, thereby, resulting in milling and
to drop, causing the pump impeller to rest on the casing bowl, thereby, resulting in milling and


wear of the impeller into the bowl during operation.Additional Service Water Pump Shaft and Shaft Coupling FailuresNRC review of Operating Experience records identified at least 23 essential SW pump shaftand coupling failures since 1983 involving more than six different pump manufacturers. Many
wear of the impeller into the bowl during operation.
 
Additional Service Water Pump Shaft and Shaft Coupling Failures
 
NRC review of Operating Experience records identified at least 23 essential SW pump shaft
 
and coupling failures since 1983 involving more than six different pump manufacturers. Many
 
of these failures involved IGSCC as a primary cause. Other causes of shaft and coupling
 
failures included: misalignment, imbalance, installation errors, and deferred maintenance. Two


of these failures involved IGSCC as a primary cause.  Other causes of shaft and couplingfailures included:  misalignment, imbalance, installation errors, and deferred maintenance.  Two
incidents since 2001, involving IGSCC are: (1) Perry experienced SW pump shaft coupling failures due to IGSCC in September 2003 and


incidents since 2001, involving IGSCC are: (1)  Perry experienced SW pump shaft coupling failures due to IGSCC in September 2003 andMay 2004. These failures are described in NRC Inspection Reports 05000440/200401, dated
May 2004. These failures are described in NRC Inspection Reports 05000440/200401, dated


July 2, 2004, and 050000440/2004008, dated August 4, 2004, (Agencywide Documents Access
July 2, 2004, and 050000440/2004008, dated August 4, 2004, (Agencywide Documents Access
Line 111: Line 167:
and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML041900080 and ML042250254).
and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML041900080 and ML042250254).


(2) VC Summer experienced SW pump shaft coupling failure during testing due to IGSCC in
(2) VC Summer experienced SW pump shaft coupling failure during testing due to IGSCC in


May 2001. This failure is described in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/02-06, dated April 1,
May 2001. This failure is described in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/02-06, dated April 1,
2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020920543).
2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020920543).


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
Applicable Regulatory DocumentsGeneral Design Criterion (GDC) 1 (defined in Appendix A to Title10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,")and Criterion Xl (defined in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50) requires that all components (such
 
===Applicable Regulatory Documents===
General Design Criterion (GDC) 1 (defined in Appendix A to Title10 of the Code of Federal
 
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,")
and Criterion Xl (defined in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50) requires that all components (such


as pumps and valves) that are necessary for safe operation be tested to demonstrate that they
as pumps and valves) that are necessary for safe operation be tested to demonstrate that they


will perform satisfactorily in service. GDC 1 requires that components important to safety be
will perform satisfactorily in service. GDC 1 requires that components important to safety be


tested to quality standards that are commensurate with the importance of the safety function(s)
tested to quality standards that are commensurate with the importance of the safety function(s)
to be performed. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 describes the requisite quality assurance
to be performed. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 describes the requisite quality assurance
 
program, which includes testing for safety-related components.


program, which includes testing for safety-related components. 10 CFR 50.55a defines the requirements for applying industry codes and standards to boiling orpressurized water-cooled nuclear power facilities. This section requires that certain American
10 CFR 50.55a defines the requirements for applying industry codes and standards to boiling or
 
pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facilities. This section requires that certain American


Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Vessel Pressure (ASME Code) Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves be designed to enable inservice test (IST) and that testing be performed to
Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Vessel Pressure (ASME Code) Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves be designed to enable inservice test (IST) and that testing be performed to
Line 132: Line 197:
assess operational readiness in accordance with the ASME Code for Operation and
assess operational readiness in accordance with the ASME Code for Operation and


Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code).   IST is intended to detect degradation
Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code). IST is intended to detect degradation


affecting operation and assess whether adequate margins are maintained. The OM Code
affecting operation and assess whether adequate margins are maintained. The OM Code


requires the licensee to show that the overall pump performance has not degraded from that
requires the licensee to show that the overall pump performance has not degraded from that


required to meet its intended function. Establishing limits that are more conservative than the
required to meet its intended function. Establishing limits that are more conservative than the


OM Code limits may be necessary to ensure that design limits are met. NRC IN 97-90
OM Code limits may be necessary to ensure that design limits are met. NRC IN 97-90
describes situations where ASME acceptance ranges were greater than those assumed in the
describes situations where ASME acceptance ranges were greater than those assumed in the


accident analysis. OM Code acceptance criteria do not supersede the requirements delineated
accident analysis. OM Code acceptance criteria do not supersede the requirements delineated


in a licensee's design or license basis. Components within the scope of 10 CFR 50.55a are included in the scope of 10 CFR 50.65,"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants" (the
in a licensee's design or license basis.


"Maintenance Rule"). The Maintenance Rule requires that licensees monitor the performance
Components within the scope of 10 CFR 50.55a are included in the scope of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants" (the
 
"Maintenance Rule"). The Maintenance Rule requires that licensees monitor the performance


or condition of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) against licensee-established goals
or condition of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) against licensee-established goals
Line 153: Line 220:
in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling
in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling


their intended function. Such goals are to be established, where practicable, commensurate
their intended function. Such goals are to be established, where practicable, commensurate


with safety, and they are to take into account industry-wide operating experience. When the
with safety, and they are to take into account industry-wide operating experience. When the


performance or condition of a component does not meet established goals, appropriate
performance or condition of a component does not meet established goals, appropriate


corrective actions are to be taken.Operability limits of pumps must always meet, or be consistent with, licensing-basisassumptions in a plant's safety analysis. NRC Generic Letter 91-18 (replaced by
corrective actions are to be taken.
 
Operability limits of pumps must always meet, or be consistent with, licensing-basis
 
assumptions in a plant's safety analysis. NRC Generic Letter 91-18 (replaced by


Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20) provides additional guidance on operability of
Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20) provides additional guidance on operability of


components. NUREG-1482, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants" provides licensees guidelines and recommendations for developing and implementingprograms for the IST of pumps and valves at commercial nuclear power plants.Applicable NRC Information NoticesNRC IN 93-68, "Failure of Pump Shaft Coupling Caused by Temper Embrittlement DuringManufacture," dated September 1, 1993, in part, described that type 410 stainless steel used in
components. NUREG-1482, Revision 1, Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants provides licensees guidelines and recommendations for developing and implementing
 
programs for the IST of pumps and valves at commercial nuclear power plants.
 
===Applicable NRC Information Notices===
NRC IN 93-68, Failure of Pump Shaft Coupling Caused by Temper Embrittlement During
 
Manufacture, dated September 1, 1993, in part, described that type 410 stainless steel used in


the manufacture of Byron Jackson pump shaft couplings may have low-impact strength due to
the manufacture of Byron Jackson pump shaft couplings may have low-impact strength due to
Line 169: Line 247:
inadequate heat treatment during manufacture, rendering the component susceptible to
inadequate heat treatment during manufacture, rendering the component susceptible to


tempering embrittlement. Pump shafts containing temper-embrittled couplings could fail during
tempering embrittlement. Pump shafts containing temper-embrittled couplings could fail during


operation if the pump has worn bearings, if the shaft is misaligned, or if shaft motion is impeded
operation if the pump has worn bearings, if the shaft is misaligned, or if shaft motion is impeded


by silt or debris ingestion. NRC IN 94-45, "Potential Common-Mode Failure Mechanism for Large Vertical Pumps," datedJune 17, 1994, described a problem where differing coupling materials could experience
by silt or debris ingestion.
 
NRC IN 94-45, Potential Common-Mode Failure Mechanism for Large Vertical Pumps, dated
 
June 17, 1994, described a problem where differing coupling materials could experience


galvanic corrosion resulting in a failure of the shaft coupling and subsequent failure of long
galvanic corrosion resulting in a failure of the shaft coupling and subsequent failure of long


shaft vertical pumps. NRC IN 94-45 also generally addressed a concern that current testing
shaft vertical pumps. NRC IN 94-45 also generally addressed a concern that current testing


methodologies of vertical line shaft pump hydraulic and mechanical performance may not
methodologies of vertical line shaft pump hydraulic and mechanical performance may not
Line 183: Line 265:
identify interference, before damage occurs, between the pump impellers and bowls caused by
identify interference, before damage occurs, between the pump impellers and bowls caused by


a change in shaft length. NRC IN 97-90, "Use of Nonconservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related PumpSurveillance Tests," dated December 30, 1997, describes examples that identify inadequacies
a change in shaft length.
 
NRC IN 97-90, Use of Nonconservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump
 
Surveillance Tests, dated December 30, 1997, describes examples that identify inadequacies


in surveillance test procedure acceptance criteria that had the potential for, and in some cases
in surveillance test procedure acceptance criteria that had the potential for, and in some cases


did result in, pumps not meeting their accident analysis acceptance criteria. Applicable NRC Inspection ProceduresNRC inspection guidance for SW pumps at operating nuclear plants is provided in: (1) Attachment 22, "Surveillance Testing," to NRC Inspection Manual IP 71111, "Reactor Safety:  
did result in, pumps not meeting their accident analysis acceptance criteria.
 
===Applicable NRC Inspection Procedures===
NRC inspection guidance for SW pumps at operating nuclear plants is provided in: (1)
Attachment 22, "Surveillance Testing," to NRC Inspection Manual IP 71111, "Reactor Safety:
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity," available on the NRC's public Web site
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity," available on the NRC's public Web site


at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html;and in (2) Inspection Procedure 73756, "IST of Pumps and Valves," July 27, 1995, available on
at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html;
and in (2) Inspection Procedure 73756, "IST of Pumps and Valves," July 27, 1995, available on


the NRC's public Web site at:
the NRC's public Web site at:
Line 196: Line 287:


==DISCUSSION==
==DISCUSSION==
The SW pump shaft failure events at Columbia Generating Station and related industryoperating experience demonstrate that IST alone might not be sufficient to ensure that pumps
The SW pump shaft failure events at Columbia Generating Station and related industry
 
operating experience demonstrate that IST alone might not be sufficient to ensure that pumps


meet their accident analysis acceptance criteria. These failures might not be detected by
meet their accident analysis acceptance criteria. These failures might not be detected by


commonly employed condition monitoring, during routine operations, or from surveillance test or
commonly employed condition monitoring, during routine operations, or from surveillance test or


IST results. Pump shaft and coupling failures can challenge operability even though
IST results. Pump shaft and coupling failures can challenge operability even though


performance degradation over time may appear consistent with normal wear. Operating
performance degradation over time may appear consistent with normal wear. Operating


experience also shows that pump shaft failures and coupling failures can result in sudden total
experience also shows that pump shaft failures and coupling failures can result in sudden total
Line 210: Line 303:
loss of flow before standard performance monitoring techniques alert plant staff to the
loss of flow before standard performance monitoring techniques alert plant staff to the


impending failure. Inspection and refurbishment of deep draft pumps on a periodic basis may
impending failure. Inspection and refurbishment of deep draft pumps on a periodic basis may


reveal some of these failure mechanisms. Vibration analysis using more sophisticated tools
reveal some of these failure mechanisms. Vibration analysis using more sophisticated tools


(i.e., transducer on pump bowl, phase angle analysis) may be capable of identifying similar
(i.e., transducer on pump bowl, phase angle analysis) may be capable of identifying similar


future failures. Enhanced condition-monitoring techniques or time-based inspections, may
future failures. Enhanced condition-monitoring techniques or time-based inspections, may


enhance early detection of degradation before failures in large vertical deep draft pumps occur.
enhance early detection of degradation before failures in large vertical deep draft pumps occur.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
S This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about thismatter to the technical contacts./TQuay for MCase/Michael J. Case, DirectorDivision of Policy & Rulemaking
S
 
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
 
matter to the technical contacts.
 
/TQuay for MCase/
                                      Michael J. Case, Director


Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: John McHale, NRR/DCI, 301-415-1261, JJM1@nrc.govTim Mitts, NRR/DIRS,  
Division of Policy & Rulemaking
301-415-4067, TMM5@nrc.govNote: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public web site, http://www.nrc.gov under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:   John McHale, NRR/DCI,
                      301-415-1261, JJM1@nrc.gov
 
Tim Mitts, NRR/DIRS,
                      301-415-4067, TMM5@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public web site, http://www.nrc.gov under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
S This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about thismatter to the technical contacts./TQuay for MCase/Michael J. Case, DirectorDivision of Policy & Rulemaking
S
 
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
 
matter to the technical contacts.
 
/TQuay for MCase/
                                        Michael J. Case, Director
 
Division of Policy & Rulemaking
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:    John McHale, NRR/DCI,
                        301-415-1261, JJM1@nrc.gov
 
Tim Mitts, NRR/DIRS,
                        301-415-4067, TMM5@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public web site, http://www.nrc.gov under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
DISTRIBUTION:
 
===IN Reading File===
ADAMS Accession Number: ML063110327 OFFICE        DIRS:IOEB          DCI:CPTB              Tech.Editor            TL:DIRS:IOEB
 
NAME          TMitts            JMcHale                Cbladey (by e-mail)    JThorp
 
DATE          /  /2007        11/13/2006            10/6/2006              11/17/2006 OFFICE        PGCB:DPR          PGCB:DPR        ADES:DSS:SBP        BC:PGCB:DPR      D:DPR


Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: John McHale, NRR/DCI, 301-415-1261, JJM1@nrc.govTim Mitts, NRR/DIRS,
NAME          CHawes CMH        JRobinson      JSegala            CJackson        MJCase
301-415-4067, TMM5@nrc.govNote:  NRC  generic communications may be found on the NRC public web site, http://www.nrc.gov under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.DISTRIBUTION


:IN Reading FileADAMS Accession Number: ML063110327OFFICEDIRS:IOEBDCI:CPTBTech.EditorTL:DIRS:IOEBNAMETMittsJMcHaleCbladey (by e-mail)JThorpDATE  /    /2007 11/13/200610/6/200611/17/2006 OFFICEPGCB:DPRPGCB:DPRADES:DSS:SBPBC:PGCB:DPRD:DPRNAMECHawes  CMHJRobinsonJSegalaCJacksonMJCaseDATE 1/25/2007 12/19/200602/02/200702/08/200702/09/2007OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}
DATE          1/25/2007           12/19/2006    02/02/2007          02/08/2007      02/09/2007 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 13:17, 23 November 2019

Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures
ML063110327
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 02/09/2007
From: Michael Case
NRC/NRR/ADRA/DPR
To:
Timothy Mitts, NRR/DIRS/IOEB
References
IN-07-005
Download: ML063110327 (6)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 9, 2007 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2007-05: VERTICAL DEEP DRAFT PUMP SHAFT AND

COUPLING FAILURES

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licensees for nuclear power reactors, except those who have

permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed

from the reactor vessel.

PURPOSE

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Information Notice (IN) to alert

licensees to vertical deep draft pump shaft and coupling failures from intergranular stress

corrosion cracking (IGSCC). It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Service Water Pump Shaft Failures at Columbia Generating Station

At Columbia Generating Station on June 14, 2005, following a start of the Service Water Pump

1A (SW-P-1A), control room operators noted that service water (SW) flow to the Division 1 residual heat removal heat exchanger was out of specification. Operators also noted the pump

discharge head and pump motor current were lower than normal and declared the SW-P-1A

inoperable. A subsequent surveillance test on SW-P-1A determined that pump performance

had degraded and was operating at the intersection of the alert and action ranges of its

performance curve. Energy Northwest, the licensee, proceeded to replace SW-P-1A with an

available spare pump.

During disassembly of SW-P-1A, Energy Northwest determined that IGSCC failed the pump

shaft end flanges on two of the shaft sections allowing the shaft sections to drop. This

condition caused the pump impeller to contact the pump suction casing, which resulted in

substantial wear of the pump impellers and degraded pump performance. The shaft drive keys

remained captured between the shaft keyways and coupling sleeves such that the shaft

segments and impeller continued to rotate. Energy Northwest conducted a metallurgical

examination of the damaged pump shaft and also identified axial cracking on the impeller pump

shaft segment and two diagonal cracks on the top column shaft.

The metallurgical examination determined that the shaft material, TP410 martensitic stainless

steel, was susceptible to tempering embrittlement (shaft material was tempered at 970 degrees

Fahrenheit, which was conducive to tempering embrittlement). Tempering embrittlement

reduced the corrosion resistance of the shaft material, thereby, increasing the materials

susceptibility to IGSCC. Energy Northwest determined that SW-P-1B was also susceptible to

the same failure mechanism as identified in SW-P-1A. However, it had not exhibited

performance degradation based on past surveillance test results.

Interim corrective actions included additional monitoring of SW-P-1B to verify pump

performance until a replacement pump could be procured and installed. A subsequent

inspection of the as-found condition of SW-P-1B determined that the pump shaft had degraded

in a manner similar to SW-P-1A, due to IGSCC, and that the pump impeller had degraded due

to wearing on the suction casing.

A detailed evaluation of SW-P-1A historical computer data determined that although pump

performance had met surveillance test acceptance criteria, pump performance had slowly

degraded from as early as August 2000 and as late as December 2001. Similarly, a detailed

evaluation of SW-P-1B historical computer data revealed that SW-P-1B had slowly degraded

since August 2003.

Safety Function of SW-P-1A and SW-P-1B and Design Information

The standby SW system and ultimate heat sink function is to supply cooling water to

remove heat from all nuclear plant equipment that are essential for safe and orderly shutdown

of the reactor, to maintain it in a safe condition, and to remove decay heat from the reactor

during shutdown conditions. During all normal operating conditions, including normal shutdown

as well as emergency conditions, waste heat from the reactor auxiliary systems is transferred to

the ultimate heat sink via the standby SW system.

SW-P-1A and SW-P-1B are deep draft vertical pumps manufactured by Byron Jackson, Model

28KXH3, and were originally designed to provide a minimum of 10,500 gpm rated flow at 500 ft

of discharge head. Both pumps were installed in 1979 and, prior to the failure of SW-P-1A, had

not been replaced, refurbished, removed, or opened for inspection since initial installation. Both

pumps are exposed to the same environmental and physical conditions.

The standby SW pump design consists of five sections of shaft with four sets of shaft

coupling components. Each set of shaft coupling components consists of two drive keys and a

pair of split rings that are held by a shaft coupling (sleeve) which is located by two gib keys. At

the point where two shaft sections join, the split rings are installed over mating shaft shoulder

flanges. The shaft shoulder flanges were the failed components which allowed the pump shaft

to drop, causing the pump impeller to rest on the casing bowl, thereby, resulting in milling and

wear of the impeller into the bowl during operation.

Additional Service Water Pump Shaft and Shaft Coupling Failures

NRC review of Operating Experience records identified at least 23 essential SW pump shaft

and coupling failures since 1983 involving more than six different pump manufacturers. Many

of these failures involved IGSCC as a primary cause. Other causes of shaft and coupling

failures included: misalignment, imbalance, installation errors, and deferred maintenance. Two

incidents since 2001, involving IGSCC are: (1) Perry experienced SW pump shaft coupling failures due to IGSCC in September 2003 and

May 2004. These failures are described in NRC Inspection Reports 05000440/200401, dated

July 2, 2004, and 050000440/2004008, dated August 4, 2004, (Agencywide Documents Access

and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML041900080 and ML042250254).

(2) VC Summer experienced SW pump shaft coupling failure during testing due to IGSCC in

May 2001. This failure is described in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/02-06, dated April 1,

2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020920543).

BACKGROUND

Applicable Regulatory Documents

General Design Criterion (GDC) 1 (defined in Appendix A to Title10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,")

and Criterion Xl (defined in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50) requires that all components (such

as pumps and valves) that are necessary for safe operation be tested to demonstrate that they

will perform satisfactorily in service. GDC 1 requires that components important to safety be

tested to quality standards that are commensurate with the importance of the safety function(s)

to be performed. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 describes the requisite quality assurance

program, which includes testing for safety-related components.

10 CFR 50.55a defines the requirements for applying industry codes and standards to boiling or

pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facilities. This section requires that certain American

Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Vessel Pressure (ASME Code) Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves be designed to enable inservice test (IST) and that testing be performed to

assess operational readiness in accordance with the ASME Code for Operation and

Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code). IST is intended to detect degradation

affecting operation and assess whether adequate margins are maintained. The OM Code

requires the licensee to show that the overall pump performance has not degraded from that

required to meet its intended function. Establishing limits that are more conservative than the

OM Code limits may be necessary to ensure that design limits are met. NRC IN 97-90

describes situations where ASME acceptance ranges were greater than those assumed in the

accident analysis. OM Code acceptance criteria do not supersede the requirements delineated

in a licensee's design or license basis.

Components within the scope of 10 CFR 50.55a are included in the scope of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants" (the

"Maintenance Rule"). The Maintenance Rule requires that licensees monitor the performance

or condition of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) against licensee-established goals

in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling

their intended function. Such goals are to be established, where practicable, commensurate

with safety, and they are to take into account industry-wide operating experience. When the

performance or condition of a component does not meet established goals, appropriate

corrective actions are to be taken.

Operability limits of pumps must always meet, or be consistent with, licensing-basis

assumptions in a plant's safety analysis. NRC Generic Letter 91-18 (replaced by

Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20) provides additional guidance on operability of

components. NUREG-1482, Revision 1, Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants provides licensees guidelines and recommendations for developing and implementing

programs for the IST of pumps and valves at commercial nuclear power plants.

Applicable NRC Information Notices

NRC IN 93-68, Failure of Pump Shaft Coupling Caused by Temper Embrittlement During

Manufacture, dated September 1, 1993, in part, described that type 410 stainless steel used in

the manufacture of Byron Jackson pump shaft couplings may have low-impact strength due to

inadequate heat treatment during manufacture, rendering the component susceptible to

tempering embrittlement. Pump shafts containing temper-embrittled couplings could fail during

operation if the pump has worn bearings, if the shaft is misaligned, or if shaft motion is impeded

by silt or debris ingestion.

NRC IN 94-45, Potential Common-Mode Failure Mechanism for Large Vertical Pumps, dated

June 17, 1994, described a problem where differing coupling materials could experience

galvanic corrosion resulting in a failure of the shaft coupling and subsequent failure of long

shaft vertical pumps. NRC IN 94-45 also generally addressed a concern that current testing

methodologies of vertical line shaft pump hydraulic and mechanical performance may not

identify interference, before damage occurs, between the pump impellers and bowls caused by

a change in shaft length.

NRC IN 97-90, Use of Nonconservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump

Surveillance Tests, dated December 30, 1997, describes examples that identify inadequacies

in surveillance test procedure acceptance criteria that had the potential for, and in some cases

did result in, pumps not meeting their accident analysis acceptance criteria.

Applicable NRC Inspection Procedures

NRC inspection guidance for SW pumps at operating nuclear plants is provided in: (1)

Attachment 22, "Surveillance Testing," to NRC Inspection Manual IP 71111, "Reactor Safety:

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity," available on the NRC's public Web site

at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html;

and in (2) Inspection Procedure 73756, "IST of Pumps and Valves," July 27, 1995, available on

the NRC's public Web site at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/ip73756.pdf

DISCUSSION

The SW pump shaft failure events at Columbia Generating Station and related industry

operating experience demonstrate that IST alone might not be sufficient to ensure that pumps

meet their accident analysis acceptance criteria. These failures might not be detected by

commonly employed condition monitoring, during routine operations, or from surveillance test or

IST results. Pump shaft and coupling failures can challenge operability even though

performance degradation over time may appear consistent with normal wear. Operating

experience also shows that pump shaft failures and coupling failures can result in sudden total

loss of flow before standard performance monitoring techniques alert plant staff to the

impending failure. Inspection and refurbishment of deep draft pumps on a periodic basis may

reveal some of these failure mechanisms. Vibration analysis using more sophisticated tools

(i.e., transducer on pump bowl, phase angle analysis) may be capable of identifying similar

future failures. Enhanced condition-monitoring techniques or time-based inspections, may

enhance early detection of degradation before failures in large vertical deep draft pumps occur.

CONTACT

S

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts.

/TQuay for MCase/

Michael J. Case, Director

Division of Policy & Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: John McHale, NRR/DCI,

301-415-1261, JJM1@nrc.gov

Tim Mitts, NRR/DIRS,

301-415-4067, TMM5@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public web site, http://www.nrc.gov under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

CONTACT

S

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts.

/TQuay for MCase/

Michael J. Case, Director

Division of Policy & Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: John McHale, NRR/DCI,

301-415-1261, JJM1@nrc.gov

Tim Mitts, NRR/DIRS,

301-415-4067, TMM5@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public web site, http://www.nrc.gov under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

DISTRIBUTION:

IN Reading File

ADAMS Accession Number: ML063110327 OFFICE DIRS:IOEB DCI:CPTB Tech.Editor TL:DIRS:IOEB

NAME TMitts JMcHale Cbladey (by e-mail) JThorp

DATE / /2007 11/13/2006 10/6/2006 11/17/2006 OFFICE PGCB:DPR PGCB:DPR ADES:DSS:SBP BC:PGCB:DPR D:DPR

NAME CHawes CMH JRobinson JSegala CJackson MJCase

DATE 1/25/2007 12/19/2006 02/02/2007 02/08/2007 02/09/2007 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY