IR 05000244/2008502: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams|number = ML080980289}}
{{Adams
| number = ML080990280
| issue date = 04/07/2008
| title = R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant - Notice of Violation, NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000244/2008502
| author name = Collins S
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/ORA
| addressee name = Carlin J
| addressee affiliation = R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
| docket = 05000244
| license number = DPR-018
| contact person =
| case reference number = EA-08-075
| document type = Enforcement Action, Letter, Notice of Violation
| page count = 6
}}


{{IR-Nav| site = 05000244 | year = 2008 | report number = 502 }}
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000244 | year = 2008 | report number = 502 }}


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:ril 7, 2008
[[Issue date::April 7, 2008]]


EA 08-075 Mr. John Vice President, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC 1503 Lake Road Ontario, New York 14519
==SUBJECT:==
 
R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000244/2008502
SUBJECT: R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000244/2008502


==Dear Mr. Carlin:==
==Dear Mr. Carlin:==
On February 22, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a supplemental inspection at your R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 22, 2008 with Mr. David Holm and other members of your staff. The purpose of this supplemental inspection, performed in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95002, was to examine your problem identification, root cause evaluation, extent-of-condition and extent-of-cause reviews, and corrective actions associated with the issues that led to a Yellow Emergency Preparedness (EP) performance indicator (PI) that placed Ginna in the Degraded Cornerstone column of the NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix for the first quarter of 2007. Specifically, the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation PI crossed the Yellow threshold during the first quarter of 2007, when Ginna staff identified that control room communicators, a key ERO position, did not receive the required drill or exercise opportunity after qualification. This inspection also included an independent NRC review of the extent-of-condition and extent-of-cause for the issues associated with the Yellow PI and an assessment of whether any safety culture component caused or significantly contributed to the issues. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
This letter refers to the supplemental inspection conducted on February 22, 2008, under Inspection Procedure 95002, Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna). The inspection was conducted to review your assessment of the root cause and corrective actions taken as a result of a Yellow performance indicator (PI) related to the Emergency Response Organization Drill (ERO) Participation. The results of the inspection were discussed with your staff at the exit meeting conducted at the conclusion of the inspection on February 22, 2008, and were documented in the report enclosed in our letter dated April 7, 2008.
 
The inspectors determined that Constellation identified the broad organizational issues that led to the Yellow EP PI, appropriately identified root and contributing causes of the issues, and had taken or planned actions to address the identified causes and prevent recurrence of the issues. The inspectors determined that your extent of condition and extent of cause evaluations did not systematically determine whether similar conditions actually existed or whether similar causes had actually impacted other plant programs. However, the NRC independent extent of condition and cause review did not identify any significant performance issues or plant impact that Constellation had not already recognized. Based on the actions taken and planned to address the EP program issues and broader organizational issues, the inspectors determined that agency follow-up beyond the baseline inspection program was not warranted for the EP and ERO issues.
 
Based on the results of this inspection, one violation was identified involving changes made to the Ginna Emergency Plan between 1996 and 2001. The violation has been considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. During your assessment of the Ginna EP organization following the Yellow PI for ERO drill participation, you identified a violation of NRC requirements for maintaining the Emergency Plan. The violation involved failure to obtain NRC approval for changes made to the Emergency Plan which decreased the effectiveness of the plan, contrary to 10 CFR 50.54(q). The changes involved revisions to the NRC-approved Emergency Action Levels (EALs). Six of the changes were determined to have resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, in that the changes could have caused incorrect event classification, or could have delayed the classification such that required notifications to offsite emergency response organizations may not have been timely. The violation is considered safety significant due to the potential for an incorrect event classification or an untimely notification to offsite authorities during an event such as a Site Area Emergency (SAE). The failure to obtain approval for the EAL changes had the potential to impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; therefore, the violation was considered under traditional enforcement. The circumstances surrounding this violation, the significance of the issue, and the need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with members of your staff at the inspection exit meeting on [[Exit meeting date::February 22, 2008]], and are described in section 03.b of the enclosed inspection report. On March 13, 2008, in discussion with Mr. Glenn Dentel of my staff, you declined the opportunity to respond in writing or attend a predecisional enforcement conference regarding this issue. As a result, it was not necessary to conduct a predecisional enforcement conference in order to enable the NRC to make an enforcement decision. You were advised by separate correspondence, dated April 7, 2008, of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
Sincerely,/RA/
David C. Lew, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report No. 05000244/2008502 w/
 
===Attachments:===
1. Supplemental Information 2. Table 1: Ginna EAL Decreases in Effectiveness cc w/encl: M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC J. M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer P. Eddy, Electric Division, NYS Department of Public Service C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law C. W. Fleming, Esquire, Senior Counsel, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. B. Weaver, Director, Licensing, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC P. Tonko, President and CEO, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority G. Bastedo, Director, Wayne County Emergency Management Office M. Meisenzahl, Administrator, Monroe County, Office of Emergency Preparedness T. Judson, Central New York Citizens Awareness Network
 
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000244/2008502; 1/28/2008 - 2/22/2008; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Supplemental
 
Inspection IP 95002 for Degraded Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone. The inspection was conducted by three region-based inspectors. One violation was identified during the inspection. This violation has been considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The significance of most findings is identified by the color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)."  Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
 
===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness===
 
The NRC performed this supplemental inspection to assess Constellation's evaluation associated with the performance indicator (PI) for Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill participation which crossed the Yellow threshold in the first quarter of 2007 when control room communicators did not receive the required drill or exercise opportunity after qualification.
 
The inspectors determined that Constellation identified the broad organizational issues that led to the Yellow PI, appropriately identified root and contributing causes of the issues, and had taken or planned actions to address the identified causes and prevent recurrence of the issues. However, the inspectors determined that Constellation was slow to recognize the extent of the organizational issues with the EP organization and ERO. Compensatory actions were taken, but implementation of broader corrective actions was delayed as a result of the time taken to complete the root cause evaluation. The inspectors determined that Constellation's extent of condition and extent of cause evaluations identified potential areas where similar problems might exist, but did not systematically determine whether similar conditions actually existed or whether similar causes had actually impacted other plant programs and processes. Additionally, Constellation did not clearly ensure that actions were in place or planned to specifically address any similar organizational issues outside of the EP and ERO programs. Although Constellation did not systematically evaluate the extent of organizational weaknesses, the NRC independent extent of condition and cause review did not identify any significant performance issues or plant impact that Constellation had not already recognized. The inspectors confirmed that the organizational issues that extended beyond the EP and ERO programs were being addressed through existing corrective action and improvement plans. Based on the actions taken and planned to address the EP program issues and broader organizational issues, the inspectors determined that agency follow-up beyond the baseline inspection program was not warranted.
 
3A. Findings  (TBD) A violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) was identified involving changes made to the NRC-approved emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) scheme between 1996 and 2001. The EAL changes involved a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan and were made without prior Commission approval. Specifically, the licensee made six changes to its EALs which limited the conditions under which the EAL applied. As a result, some initiating conditions that had been assumed in the NRC-approved EALs would not have resulted in emergency classification at the appropriate level. In November 2007, Constellation restored the Ginna EALs to the original configuration and conducted training for the staff. The failure to obtain NRC approval for the changes to the EALs had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; therefore, this violation was considered under traditional enforcement. The violation was safety significant due to the potential for an incorrect event classification or an untimely notification to offsite authorities during an event such as a site area emergency. The revised EALs could have adversely impacted Ginna's ability to assess and classify an event. The disposition of this violation, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, is addressed in a separate letter dated April 7, 2008.  (Section 03.b) 
 
===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
None.
 
4
 
=REPORT DETAILS=
01 INSPECTION SCOPE  The NRC conducted this supplemental inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 95002, "Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," to assess Constellation's evaluation associated with a degraded Emergency Preparedness (EP) cornerstone due to a Yellow performance indicator (PI) in the first quarter 2007. During the fourth quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2007, Constellation added 59 maintenance technicians to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) as control room communicators, a key ERO position, yet none of the new communicators participated in a drill during the first quarter of 2007. ERO Drill Participation is based on the number of key ERO members who have participated in an EP drill within the previous eight quarters compared to the total number of key ERO members. Addition of the communicators who had not participated in a drill to the ERO caused the PI to cross the Yellow threshold (60 percent).
 
The specific inspection objectives were to:
* provide assurance that root and contributing causes were understood for the risk significant performance issues;
* independently assess the extent of conditions and the extent of causes for the performance issues;
* independently determine if safety culture components caused or significantly contributed to the risk significant performance issues; and
* provide assurance that corrective actions taken and planned are sufficient to address the root causes and contributing causes, and to prevent recurrence. Constellation performed a root cause analysis (RCA) to identify weaknesses that existed in the EP organization that allowed for a degraded ROP cornerstone and to determine the organizational attributes that resulted in the Yellow PI for ERO drill participation. The inspectors reviewed that evaluation, reviewed additional evaluations conducted in support of or as a result of the RCA, and confirmed that corrective actions were taken or planned to address the identified causes. The inspectors also held discussions with Constellation personnel to ensure that the root and contributing causes were understood, including the contribution of safety culture components, and corrective actions taken or planned were appropriate to address the causes and prevent recurrence. The inspectors also independently assessed the extent of condition and extent of cause of the identified issues. A more detailed discussion of the activities associated with the independent review of extent of condition and cause is provided in section 02.04. The documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.
 
5 02 EVALUATION OF INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 02.01 Problem Identification  a. Determination of who identified the issue and under what conditions  While preparing the first-quarter 2007 EP PIs for submittal to the NRC, Constellation identified that the data for the ERO Drill Participation PI had crossed the Yellow threshold. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector of the PI changing color and reported the PI data to the NRC in April 2007. During evaluation of the issue, Constellation determined that incorrect PI data had been reported for the fourth quarter of 2006. Based on the corrected calculation, the ERO Drill Participation PI crossed the White threshold in the fourth quarter of 2006.
 
The inspectors determined that Constellation's analysis appropriately assessed the circumstances surrounding identification of the issue.
 
====b. Determination of how long the issue existed and prior opportunities for identification====
Constellation began to add on-shift maintenance technicians to the Ginna ERO as control room communicators in the fourth quarter of 2006 and continued to add technicians to the ERO through the first quarter of 2007. The maintenance technicians were added to the ERO as part of the transition to eliminate the contracted fire brigade.
 
The NRC had issued an answer to a frequently asked question (FAQ) concerning the ERO Drill Participation PI in June 2006. This answer had provided clarity to the industry by explaining that a drill used to qualify a person as a member of the ERO could not be used as a drill participation in the calculation of the PI. Constellation had not taken this FAQ answer into account and added technicians to the ERO without providing them a drill within the first quarter of their being on the ERO.
 
The inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately identified missed opportunities to identify the drill participation issue during transition from a contracted fire brigade.
 
c. Determination of the plant-specific risk consequences and compliance concerns associated with the issue  The EP drill program is implemented to train ERO members and to assess their capability to respond to an emergency. The ERO Drill Participation PI is meant as an indicator of the health of the licensee's effort in these areas. The NRC identified a Green finding in NRC Inspection report 05000244-2007002 for failure to fully train the maintenance technicians on the ERO communicator responsibilities. These training weaknesses could have been identified and addressed through performance of a drill during the newly qualified communicators' first quarter as members of the ERO.
 
602.02 Root Cause and Extent of Condition Evaluation a. Evaluation of methods used to identify the root causes and contributing causes  Several different root cause methodologies were used by Constellation to evaluate the cause of the issue. A Kepner-Tregoe/Stream Analysis/Why Staircase methodology was used to evaluate the EP program weaknesses and identify one of the root causes. A Barrier Analysis/Comparative Timeline/Why Staircase was used to assess the organizational decision-making weaknesses associated with the addition of maintenance technicians to the ERO and identify the second root cause.
 
The inspectors determined the evaluation methods used by the licensee to be appropriate.
 
b. Level of detail of the root cause evaluation    Constellation revised the root cause analysis several times in evaluating the issues associated with the ERO Drill Participation PI. On April 6, 2007, Constellation identified that the PI had crossed the Yellow threshold and initiated an investigation. The first root cause report was approved on May 21, 2007, and Revision 1 to the report was approved on July 23, 2007. The final Revision 2 was signed by the Plant General Manager on January 9, 2008. After Constellation produced the original root cause analysis and again after the first revision, the licensee arranged for an independent review by outside contractors. Both of these reviews determined that the licensee efforts had been too narrowly focused. Specifically, the original root cause analysis examined the specific event, but had not addressed potential EP organizational effectiveness gaps. Further, although Revision 1 assessed EP programmatic performance, it did not adequately consider the extent of cause and condition in other organizational performance areas at Ginna. The third root cause analysis and report addressed the shortcomings of the first two and identified two root causes.
 
1) Oversight by Corporate and station leadership was ineffective in monitoring program improvement efforts. Emergency Preparedness leadership failed to establish program expectations (clear roles and responsibilities), effectively address performance gaps through the corrective action program, and execute a strategy to achieve program improvements, resulting in a degraded NRC cornerstone. 2) The management failure to require formal change management practices with respect to organizational changes resulted in flawed implementation of the change of responsibilities for the control room communicator.
 
The final root cause report also identified a number of contributing causes related to the EP organization, the station's appreciation of the ERO and EP-related issues, and the station's use of performance indicators and performance improvement tools. The inspectors concluded Constellation was slow to recognize the broader organization issues associated with ERO drill participation issue, but ultimately conducted a thorough evaluation of the issue. Constellation initiated CR 2008-001446 to address the delayed 7recognition of the broader issues. The inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately expanded their reviews as the broader causes were recognized. For example, as part of the root cause analysis for the Yellow ERO Participation PI, a review of the current Ginna EALs and their bases, and a comparison to NRC-approved EALs, were conducted by consultants for Constellation. A violation of NRC requirements related to changes to the EALs, which decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan, was identified as a result of this review as described in section 03.
 
c. Consideration of prior occurrences of the problem and knowledge of prior operating experience  The final root cause effort identified a 2006 licensee investigation of problems related to failures of the Emergency Response call-out tests. One of the root causes identified in that investigation was "management failure to establish sufficient oversight to recognize fundamental weaknesses in the Emergency Response Organization."  The root cause analysis for the 2007 PI event determined that the corrective actions for the 2006 event were not fully effective. The 2007 root cause analysis also examined previous EP self assessments, and determined that the assessments and follow-through on associated corrective actions had been weak. These findings from the 2007 root cause effort resulted in some of the contributing causes cited in the final root cause report and the associated corrective actions. The inspectors concluded that Constellation's final root cause analysis had properly considered prior occurrences of events which had causal relations to the 2007 PI event. d. Determination of the extent of condition and the extent of cause of the problem.
 
As indicated in section 02.02.b, the inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately expanded their reviews as the broader organizational issues associated with the ERO drill participation issue were recognized. The inspectors determined that the additional reviews appropriately addressed the extent of condition and extent of cause within the EP department and ERO. For areas outside of the EP department and the ERO, Constellation primarily relied on the knowledge transfer and retention (KT&R) process to determine the extent of conditions and causes related to the organizational deficiencies identified in the station's root cause analysis for the Yellow EP PI and associated degraded EP cornerstone. Using the KT&R process, Constellation identified 37 programs or processes for assessment in 2007 based on a higher potential for programmatic weaknesses similar to those identified in the EP program. Constellation also credited the KT&R process for assessing the vulnerability to events caused by organizational changes that did not have a detailed change management plan. The inspectors determined that the KT&R process, while valid for determining organizational vulnerabilities similar to organizational shortcomings revealed as a result of the Yellow PI, was not of sufficient scope and was not implemented with sufficient rigor to determine all applicable aspects of the extent of condition and cause for the associated root causes as identified in the root cause analysis. The following issues 8highlight the inspectors' observations with respect to the station's usage of the KT&R process as the primary extent of condition and extent of cause assessment tool.
* The scope of the KT&R assessments was too narrowly focused in addressing key causal factors in the areas of performance monitoring and program improvement. While the KT&R assessments addressed most program and process issues, including process documentation, roles and responsibilities and training, most of the assessments did not consider factors that drive improvement of program health, including corrective action program effectiveness and performance improvement activities.
* The station criteria used in selecting the programs and processes for KT&R assessments did not consider all applicable conditions and causal factors and were not well documented. Specifically, causal factors associated with the EP and ERO performance issues included weaknesses in addressing industry operating experience (OE) and ineffective use of the Corrective Action Program (CAP). However, based on the subjective criteria used by the station, Constellation determined that neither the OE program nor CAP warranted a KT&R assessment in 2007 and, as a result, failed to thoroughly capture these specific programs in the extent of condition and cause evaluations.
* Although organizational changes were factored into the KT&R process rankings, Constellation did not do a rigorous review to determine if similar conditions or causal factors existed as a result of previous organizational changes, implemented prior to the improved change management process. For example, significant organizational changes, such as the restructuring of the performance monitoring group, were not reviewed specifically to determine if weaknesses or vulnerabilities similar to those associated with the ERO communicator and EP program had been introduced due to ineffective change management. Additionally, although the transfer of control room communicator responsibilities due to disbanding the fire brigade was appropriately assessed in the root cause analysis, no review was conducted to determine if other similar conditions or causes might exist due to ineffective management of the change in fire brigade staffing.
* The station did not perform a thorough review of the KT&R assessment results to determine the actual extent of conditions and causes that existed at the station. The station focused on trend codes resulting from the KT&R assessments. Those trend codes addressed only aspects of the broader organizational issues associated with documentation, staffing and training, but did not fully capture aspects associated with performance monitoring and program improvement. Additionally, the station did not correlate assessment results to determine the actual extent of conditions and causes as defined in the root cause analysis. By not correlating the KT&R assessment results, the KT&R output only gave the station an indication of potential vulnerable areas where the organizational issues existed.
* The inspectors determined that KT&R assessments performed in 2007 were not 9of consistent quality. The station did not consistently adhere to fleet or site processes for self-assessments to ensure actions to close gaps or improve performance were identified, implemented and tracked. The inspectors determined that there was less accountability for KT&R assessment actions and due dates. Several of the assessments lacked documented CAs for some identified deficiencies. Some assessment corrective actions and plans were handled outside the CAP with less oversight and rigor than those handled within the CAP.
 
The inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately performed a timely and extensive review of all NRC PIs to consider immediate extent of condition issues associated with NRC PI data. Constellation's review, which included gap analyses and challenge boards, appropriately identified issues that were not consistent with NRC reporting requirements and station expectations. Based on reviews of the root cause analysis for the Yellow PI and causal analyses for significant performance issues identified by the station in several areas in 2006 and 2007, the inspectors determined that, programmatically, the Constellation has been ineffective in performing and documenting thorough and rigorous extent of condition and extent of cause evaluations. Specifically, the inspectors determined that significant issues associated with Operations EOP usage, Operations Training performance issues, and Flow Accelerated Program implementation were examples of extent of condition and cause evaluations that did not fully capture the respective extent of issues. The inspectors noted that, in response to previously identified CAP issues, corrective actions and improvement plans were in progress that would address the issues.
 
Although Constellation did not systematically evaluate the extent of the organizational weaknesses that led to the Yellow PI and degraded EP cornerstone, the inspectors did not identify any significant performance issues or plant impact during their independent extent of condition and cause review (discussed in section 02.04) that Constellation had not recognized. Constellation initiated CR 2008-0638, 2008-1447, 2008-1449, 2008-1450, 2008-1452, and 2008-1453 to address the weaknesses associated with extent of condition and cause reviews identified during this inspection.
 
02.03 Corrective Actions  a. Appropriateness of corrective actions  The final root cause report identified corrective actions to address the identified root and contributing causes for the Yellow PI and degraded EP cornerstone. Immediate corrective actions taken by Constellation included: reporting the past inaccurate data and the new PI data to the NRC; reviewing the training received by ERO communicators; validating all other PI data at Ginna; and, replacing the maintenance technicians with control room Shift Managers as the ERO communicator. Longer-term corrective actions intended to prevent recurrence of this type event included: reorganization of the Ginna EP program and staff, along with the review and revision of a large number of EP procedures; development of EP health indicators and an EP Oversight Board; implementation of a new change management process; and training of all supervisors 10and managers in formal decision making and problem solving techniques.
 
The inspectors determined the corrective actions for the EP program and ERO issues were well-developed, but identified two shortcomings in the implemented actions: the EP health indicators intended to be presented to the EP Oversight Board did not have specified targets or goals by which the indicators could be appropriately and consistently assessed; and revisions to an EP training procedure did not include all of the intended elements. Constellation initiated CRs 2007-000701 and 2007-000702 to address these conditions.
 
Overall, the NRC determined the corrective actions specified in the final root cause report were appropriate to address the broader organizational issues. In particular, the inspectors observed that the new change management process was being rigorously implemented for significant changes being made at the station. b. Prioritization of corrective actions  As described above, Constellation took immediate corrective actions to rectify the ERO drill participation issues and ensure that the ERO was staffed with qualified control room communicators. Actions were taken in 2007 to reorganize the Ginna EP program, train supervisors and managers, and implement a formal change management process. Revised EP and ERO procedures were implemented during the first week of the supplemental inspection. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions were prioritized commensurate with their significance. However, the several iterations of the root cause analysis for the EP and ERO issues resulted in delayed implementation of the broader corrective actions. Constellation captured this concern in CR 2008-001446. Although the broader actions were delayed, the inspectors recognized that the additional time spent on fully evaluating the issues allowed the licensee to identify the full scope of the issues that led to the Yellow PI and degraded EP cornerstone. c. Schedule for implementing and completing the corrective actions  At the time of this supplemental inspection, all of the licensee's corrective actions had either been implemented or scheduled. The immediate corrective actions to correct the PI data and adequately staff the ERO Communicator position had been accomplished, as had a number of the corrective actions related to the EP processes. The broader root causes associated with station leadership and change management practices had been identified in the final root cause report, which had corrective actions identified and scheduled. All corrective actions to prevent recurrence, as well as all lower-tier corrective and preventive actions, identified in the report had been completed by the time of this inspection or had due dates required by the end of the first quarter of 2008. The inspectors considered the schedule for completion of the remainder of the corrective actions to be appropriate. d. Measures of success for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions to 11prevent recurrence  Ten effectiveness reviews and self-assessments were planned through the second and third quarters of 2008. These reviews are designed to provide further management follow-up and assessment of the EP and ERO program changes made in response to the ERO drill participation issues. Constellation planned to conduct effectiveness reviews in 2008 for the programs and processes that were assessed under the KT&R process in 2007 to assess the actions taken to address similar issues in other programs and processes.
 
The inspectors determined that Constellation's plans contained sufficient methods for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions associated with the EP program and ERO. However, the inspectors noted, without appropriate rigor in scope and conduct of the KT&R assessments, analysis of the results, and implementation of corrective actions (described in section 02.02.d), there was no assurance that the KT&R effectiveness reviews would address organizational issues of concern as identified in the root cause analysis. Constellation captured this concern in CR 2008-001452. 02.04 Independent Assessment of Extent of Condition and Extent of Cause
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors conducted an independent extent of condition and cause review of the performance issues associated with the Yellow PI for ERO drill participation to assess the validity of Constellation's conclusions regarding the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issues. The Yellow PI ultimately revealed significant and broad organizational issues associated with the station's management, leadership and performance monitoring of the EP and ERO organizations. The teams' independent review focused on the primary root causes associated with the Yellow PI described in Section 02.02.b. Additionally, due to the broad nature of the root causes, the inspectors' independent review and assessment encompassed the station's identified contributing causes that involved more specific aspects of the broader root causes. The inspectors' review approached the independent extent of condition and cause from two distinct aspects. First, the team assessed whether Constellation's extent of condition and cause sufficiently identified and bounded all EP and ERO organizational performance issues; and, second, the team assessed whether Constellation's extent of condition and cause sufficiently determined the actual extent of similar organizational issues that potentially existed in other station departments, programs and processes. In conducting this independent review, the team interviewed station management and personnel, reviewed program and process documentation, and reviewed existing station program monitoring and improvement efforts, including review of corrective action documents. Based on the root and contributing causes identified by Constellation, the inspectors focused their review on the following attributes of the programs and processes:
12* Program and process expectations that clearly delineated station management and personnel roles and responsibilities;
* Program and process performance monitoring efforts that included performance gap analyses;
* Program and process improvement efforts that included effective use of the CAP and existing station improvement plans; and
* Change management implementation for past program and process changes including organizational and staffing restructuring completed at the station.
 
====b. Findings====
and Assessment  Overall, the inspectors did not identify any substantive extent of condition and cause issues that the station was not aware of and had not already identified with corrective action plans in place. However, the team's independent extent of condition and cause review did determine existing organizational weaknesses that extended beyond EP and ERO issues and should have been captured in the station's extent of condition and cause reviews for the Yellow PI. These weaknesses were further described and documented in Section 02.02.d of this report. Based upon those weaknesses identified by the team, the scope of the team's independent review was expanded to provide further assurance that the station had adequately identified the extent of organizational issues that potentially were present in existing station programs and processes. The team's review and assessment of the extent of organizational issues determined that the following station programs and processes exhibited organizational and change management weaknesses similar to those identified by the station in the root cause analysis for the Yellow PI and degraded EP cornerstone:
* The inspectors determined that the Operations Training department has had similar challenges in the last three years with respect to organizational oversight and program improvement efforts. The Operations Training group has had significant challenges with oversight of the instructor training program. These challenges included ineffective management oversight evidenced by administrative shortcomings with instructor qualifications and recent audit exam performance issues in 2007. Additionally, the group has been challenged by high staff turnover. The inspectors concluded that these issues should have been identified and captured by the station's extent of condition and cause review. Based on independent review, the inspectors confirmed that the site had sufficient existing corrective actions planned or implemented to address these performance issues.
* The inspectors determined that the Operations department has had similar organizational challenges since early 2001 with respect to management oversight and establishing program expectations and standards. The Operations group has not effectively resolved emergency operating procedure usage issues that have existed at the site since early 2000 and program improvement efforts, 13including the CAP, have not been fully effective in resolving the issues. The inspectors confirmed that the station had sufficient existing corrective actions planned or implemented to address these issues.
* The inspectors noted several recent issues that have occurred, at least in part, due to ineffective change management of previous organizational changes. For example, in October 2007, Constellation identified that the calibration for a temporary flow meter for cooling water to an emergency diesel generator had expired. Although an alternate, more conservative method for monitoring cooling water flow was available, use of this method ultimately led to an unplanned entry into a Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for the emergency diesel generator. Previously, the dedicated performance monitoring group had been responsible for ensuring that the temporary flow meters were calibrated. When this group was disbanded, there was no formal change management plan. As a result, clear responsibility for calibration of the flow meters was not established. Although none of the identified issues had a significant adverse impact, the inspectors determined that issues associated with the restructuring of the performance monitoring group, work management, and security Instrumentation and Control (I&C) group were indicative of less than effective change management prior to implementation of the new change management process. Through interviews and existing documentation, the inspectors confirmed that appropriate actions were implemented or planned to address these areas.
* The inspectors determined that the Operating Experience (OE) program had weaknesses related to procedural guidance and performance improvement monitoring tools. Specifically, the OE procedural guidance had a single person vulnerability in that, potentially significant and valuable OE items relied on one individual to determine station applicability. Additionally, the OE program did not have sufficient performance monitoring tools to clearly monitor the effectiveness of program implementation. While the station's extent of condition and cause review did not evaluate and capture this issue, inspectors determined that existing condition reports had identified corrective actions to address the concerns.
 
02.05 Safety Culture Considerations  As part of the root cause evaluation for the Yellow PI and degraded EP cornerstone, Constellation evaluated the identified root and contributing causes against the safety culture components that could have contributed to the performance issues. Constellation determined that weaknesses in "Decision Making," "Continuous Learning Environment," and "Organizational Change Management" were the most prevalent safety culture attributes, and that "Corrective Action Program" and "Accountability" issues also contributed to the event. Constellation also considered the results of a safety culture assessment and safety conscious work environment (SCWE) survey, conducted in 2007, in the consideration of safety culture components. For each of the identified contributing components, Constellation confirmed that corrective actions were established to address the issues.
 
14 The inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately considered whether weaknesses in safety culture components were root or contributing causes for the performance issues. The identified root and contributing causes were broad and, therefore, encompassed the applicable safety culture attributes. The inspectors did not identify any safety culture component that could reasonably have been a root cause or significant contributing cause that had not been addressed in the root cause evaluation.
 
O3
 
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
As part of the root cause analysis for the Yellow ERO Drill Participation PI, a review of the current Ginna EALs and their bases, and a comparison to NRC-approved EALs, was conducted by consultants for Constellation. This review identified nineteen EALs that had been revised, six of which were determined to have resulted in a non-conservative change to the EAL. These six changes were also determined to have resulted in a decrease in effectiveness to the Ginna Emergency Plan. During the conduct of this supplemental inspection, the inspectors reviewed the root cause evaluation for the EAL changes, interviewed site operators and staff, and assessed the corrective actions taken and planned to address the issues associated with the EAL changes.
 
====b. Findings====
 
=====Introduction:=====
A violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) was identified involving changes made to the NRC-approved EALs between 1996 and 2001. The EAL changes involved a decrease in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan and were made without prior Commission approval. The failure to obtain NRC approval for the EAL changes had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; therefore, this violation was considered under traditional enforcement.
 
=====Description:=====
10 CFR 50.47(b) requires that the on-site emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors meet each of 16 planning standards, of which, Planning Standard 4 requires, in part, a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B requires, in part, that the means to be used for determining the magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans may not be implemented without application to and approval by the NRC. The licensee must determine if the change is a decrease in effectiveness and if it is, the licensee must obtain prior approval from the NRC before implementing the change.
 
In June 2007, as part the assessment of the Ginna EP organization following the Yellow PI event, an independent review identified that there were weaknesses in the Ginna 50.54(q) process. Subsequent follow-up by Constellation identified that, between 1996 15and 2001, Ginna had made 19 changes to the original EAL documents that were approved by the NRC in 1995 when Ginna implemented the NUMARC/NESP-007 Methodology for Development of EALs. The potential for a decrease in effectiveness was not recognized at the time of the changes and therefore prior NRC approval was not solicited as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q). Constellation's analysis of the nineteen EAL changes revealed that six of the changes had resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of the Ginna Emergency Plan. These six EALs and the changes made to them are summarized in Table 1 in Attachment 2.


The inspectors determined that Ginna failed to maintain the emergency plan's scheme of EALs such that all initiating conditions, which had been assumed in the approved EALs, would result in emergency classifications at appropriate levels. For example, the EAL for the Containment Integrity Status for a Site Area Emergency (CIS-SAE) was previously approved for any conditions causing a rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure following initial increase. The revised EAL for CIS-SAE was limited to conditions resulting from a loss of coolant accident. This limitation excluded other events, such as a main steam line break, which could challenge containment integrity. The changes to the EALs could have resulted in an incorrect or missed event classification, or could have delayed the classification such that required notifications to offsite emergency response organizations may not have been timely. The inspectors concluded that the failure to obtain NRC approval for the changes to the EALs, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), was a performance deficiency because the licensee should have recognized that the changes decreased the effectiveness of the Ginna Emergency Plan.
In a telephone conversation on March 13, 2008, Mr. Glenn Dentel of my staff informed you that as a result of this inspection, the NRC was considering escalated enforcement for an apparent violation involving the failure to obtain Commission approval prior to making changes to your emergency plan that decreased the effectiveness of your plan. This failure was contrary to 10 CFR 50.54(q). Mr. Dentel also informed you that we had sufficient information regarding this apparent violation and your corrective actions to make an enforcement decision without the need for a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) or a written response from you. You indicated that Ginna did not believe a PEC or written response was needed.


In November 2007, Constellation changed the Ginna EALs back to the original configuration and conducted site training for licensed operators and the site ERO. Additional corrective actions described in the final root cause report had been scheduled into the second quarter of 2008, with an effectiveness review for those corrective actions scheduled by the end of 2008.
As a result, based on the information developed during the inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Specifically, during your assessment of the Ginna Emergency Preparedness organization following the Yellow PI for ERO drill participation, you identified a violation of NRC requirements for maintaining the Emergency plan. The violation resulted from Ginnas failure to recognize that changes to the emergency plan that were made between 1996 and 2001, decreased the effectiveness of the plan. The specific changes involved revisions made to the NRC-approved emergency Action Levels (EALs). Six of the changes were determined to have resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, in that the changes could have caused incorrect event classification, or could have delayed the classification such that required notifications to offsite emergency response organizations may not have been timely. The most significant EAL change involved limiting a specific Site Area Emergency (SAE) EAL to a loss of coolant accident condition, instead of encompassing all events that cause a rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure, which would also include events such as main steam line breaks. The lack of consideration for, and declaration of, a SAE, for all events causing a rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure that could compromise containment integrity, could have prevented proper notification of offsite authorities.


=====Analysis:=====
The violation was considered safety significant due to the potential for an incorrect event classification or an untimely notification to offsite authorities during an event such as a SAE, as described above. The revised EALs could have adversely impacted the licensees ability to assess and classify an event. Therefore, this violation is categorized at Severity Level (SL) III in accordance with Section C.2 of Supplement VIII of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The violation for failure to obtain NRC approval for the changes to the EALs was considered under traditional enforcement because the failure had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The violation was safety significant due to the potential for an incorrect event classification or an untimely notification to offsite authorities during an event such as an SAE. The revised EALs could have adversely impacted Ginna's ability to assess and classify an event.


=====Enforcement:=====
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty is considered for a SLIII violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years or two inspections, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI of the Policy. Credit is warranted, because Ginnas corrective actions were considered to be prompt and comprehensive. These corrective actions included restoring the EALs to their original configurations and training the operators on the corrected EALs.
10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of 10 CFR 50. The licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans. Contrary to these requirements, between 1996 and 2001, the licensee made changes without NRC approval to the EALs in the Ginna Emergency Plan, required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), that decreased the effectiveness of the plan. Constellation entered this issue into the CAP as CR 2007-006123. The disposition of this violation, in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, is addressed in a separate letter dated 16April 7, 2008. (VIO 05000244/2008502-01: Failure to Obtain NRC Approval for EAL Changes Which Decreased the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan)
O4 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS  Exit Meeting Summary  The inspectors presented the results of the supplemental inspection to Mr. David Holm and other members of Constellation staff on February 22, 2008. The team manager discussed the conclusions regarding the EAL issue with Mr. John Carlin, Site Vice President, on March 13, 2008. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary material was examined during the inspection.


ATTACHMENT: 
Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in Inspection Report No.


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
05000244/2008502 attached to our April 7, 2008 letter, and in this letter. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions).


===Licensee Personnel===
Sincerely,
: [[contact::J. Carlin  Vice President]], Ginna
/RA/
: [[contact::A. Allen  Director]], Performance Improvement
Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 Enclosure: Notice of Violation cc w/encl:
: [[contact::D. Blankenship  General Supervisor]], Radiation Protection
M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC J. M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer P. Eddy, Electric Division, NYS Department of Public Service C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law C. W. Fleming, Esquire, Senior Counsel, Constellation Energy Group, Inc.
: [[contact::D. Dean  Assistant Operations Manager (Shift) M. Geckle  Manager]], Training and Performance Improvement
: [[contact::M. Giacini  Manager]], Integrated Work Management
: [[contact::E. Hedderman  General Supervisor]], Chemistry D. Holm  Plant Manager J. Jones  Emergency Preparedness Manager
: [[contact::D. Kieper  General Supervisor]], Technical Training
: [[contact::K. Knight  Consultant]], KT&R Project Manager
: [[contact::E. Larsen  Manager]], Maintenance
: [[contact::J. Neis    Sr. Engineer]], Licensing
: [[contact::J. Pacher  Manager]], Nuclear Engineering Services
: [[contact::B. Weaver  Director]], Licensing
: [[contact::J. Yoe    Manager]], Operations 
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==


===Opened===
B. Weaver, Director, Licensing, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC P. Tonko, President and CEO, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority G. Bastedo, Director, Wayne County Emergency Management Office M. Meisenzahl, Administrator, Monroe County, Office of Emergency Preparedness T. Judson, Central New York Citizens Awareness Network S. Kempf, Regional Director, DHS, Region II
VIO
: 05000244/2008502-01  Failure to Obtain NRC Approval for EAL Changes Which Decreased the Effectiveness of the
Emergency Plan
A-2
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
===Condition Reports===
: 2005-3152 2006-1993 2006-2160 2006-5594 2006-7201 2007-0012
: 2007-0023 2007-0104 2007-0137 2007-0193 2007-0520 2007-1359 
: 2007-1932 2007-2095 2007-2662 2007-2664 2007-2665 2007-2666
: 2007-2866 2007-2871 2007-2901 2007-2976 2007-3419 2007-3563
: 2007-3682 2007-3713 2007-3720 2007-3733 2007-3744 2007-3747
: 2007-3765 2007-3772 2007-3896 2007-4128 2007-4129 2007-4144
: 2007-4303 2007-4305 2007-4306 2007-4319 2007-4330 2007-4374 
: 2007-4520 2007-4545 2007-4570 2007-4651 2007-4894 2007-4895
: 2007-5422 2007-5428 2007-5429 2007-5552 2007-5620 2007-5638
: 2007-5781 2007-6123 2007-6359 2007-6660 2007-6674 2007-6807
: 2007-6839 2007-6840 2007-6890 2007-6930 2007-6997 2007-6996
: 2007-7098 2007-7100 2007-7293 2007-7711 2007-8504 2007-8563 2007-8576 2007-8610 2007-8715 2007-8778 2007-8887 2008-0178 2008-0576 2008-0591 2008-0625* 2008-0638* 2008-0701* 2008-0702* 
: 2008-0707* 2008-0711* 2008-0712* 2008-0743 2008-0744 2008-0746* 2008-1112 2008-1273 2008-1329* 2008-1334* 2008-1336 2008-1342 2008-1446* 2008-1447* 2008-1449* 2008-1450* 2008-1452* 2008-1453*
: Procedures:
: A-205.2, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Rev. 25
: CNG-AM-1.01-1017, Performance Monitoring Program, Rev. 0
: CNG-CA-1.01-1004, Root Cause Analysis, Rev. 1
: CNG-CA-1.01-1009, Change Management, Rev. 0
: CNG-CA-1.01-1010, Use of Operating Experience, Rev. 0
: CNG-TR-1.01-1001, Training Administration, Rev. 0
: CNG-TR-1.01-1000, Conduct of Training, Rev. 0 CCNPP Causal Analysis Handbook, Rev. 9 Change Management Website and Toolbox, Rev. 1
: EPG-5, Emergency Preparedness Training Program, Rev. 1 EPIP 5-11, Nuclear Emergency Response Plan Training Program, Rev. 1
: IP-EPP-5, Emergency Response Organization Expectations and Responsibilities, Rev. 4
: IP-EPP-8, Emergency Preparedness Program Responsibilities and Oversight, Rev. 0
: IP-EPP-9, Emergency Response Organization Performance Indicators, Rev. 0
: IP-MTE-1, Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment, Rev. 13 Root Cause Team Lead Toolbox, Rev. 0 Apparent Cause Evaluation Toolbox, Rev. 1
: Assessments and Audits:
: Audit
: MAI-07-01G, Maintenance, April 2007
: QPA Assessment Report 2007-0009, Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey,
: August 2007 QPA Assessment Report 2007-0026, Radiation Protection Training Program, September 2007 
: A-3QPA Assessment Report 2007-0072, Maintenance Supervisor Training, October 2007 QPA Assessment Report 2008-0001, Assessment of Ginna Emergency Preparedness
: Against Selected NRC Requirements, January 2008 QPA Assessment Report, Operator Initial License Class Oversight, November 2007 QPA Quarterly Reports - 2007 R. E. Ginna Change Management Assessment Team Report of Site Evaluation,
: June 18 - 22, 2007
: SA-2006-0073, Mid-Cycle Evaluation of R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station, July 2006
: SA-2007-0053, Outage Management Snapshot, April 2007
: SA-2007-0055, Snapshot Assessment of the Human Performance Program as Implemented in the Integrated Work Management Department, September 2007
: SA-2007-0056, Instruments and Dosimetry Snapshot, April 2007
: SA-2007-0057, Security Systems Maintenance Snapshot, April 2007
: SA-2007-0061, Component Health Snapshot, June 2007
: SA-2007-0065, Flow Accelerated Corrosion Snapshot, May 2007
: SA-2007-0070, Engineering Setpoint Control Program Snapshot, June 2007
: SA-2007-0071, Maintenance Rework Snapshot, June 2007
: SA-2007-0083, Snapshot Assessment of Unplanned LCOs, July 2007
: SA-2007-0084, Snubber Program Snapshot, July 2007
: SA-2007-0088, Measurement and Test Equipment Snapshot, July 2007
: SA-2007-0089, Valve Packing Snapshot, August 2007
: SA-2007-0100, OE program, November 2007
: SA-2007-0082, ISI Snapshot, July 2007
: SA-2007-0131, Operations Training Snapshot, October 2007
: SA-2007-0147, Licensed Operator Training Programs, November 2007
: SA-2007-0113, Mid-Cycle Assessment of Technical Training, November 2007
: SA-2007-0098, 2007 Fleet Instructor Training, August 2007
: SA-2007-0027, Licensed Operator Requalification Examination Development and Administration, February 2007 Safety Culture Assessment Report, Rev. 1, July 2007
: TQS-06-01-G, Nuclear Training, April 2006
===Miscellaneous===
: 2007 Ginna Program Health Reports (Multiple) 2007 Ginna Tier 1 - 4 Performance Indicators (Multiple) 2007 Operations Instructor Schedule Change Management Oversight Committee Team Charter Change Management Updates dated 9/14/07 - 1/10/08 Flow Accelerated Corrosion Improvement Plan, Rev. 0 Ginna Organizational Charts - 2005, 2006, and 2007 I&C Five Year Training Plan, March 2006 Nuclear Training Department Qualification Matrix - 2007 Operations Training Excellence Plan, Current Version Plant Change Record (PCR) 2005-0020, Install permanent SW flow indication to
: D/G coolers, Rev. 0 Technical Staff Request (TSR) 2006-0185, Evaluate Hardware Changes to Enhance
: EDG JW/LO Coolers Backflushing, dated 8/22/06 
: A-4
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
: [[ADAMS]] [[Agency-Wide Documents Access and Management System]]
: [[CAP]] [[Corrective Action Program]]
: [[CFR]] [[Code of Federal Regulations]]
: [[CIS]] [[-SAE  Containment Integrity Status for a Site Area Emergency]]
: [[CR]] [[condition report]]
: [[EALS]] [[Emergency Action Levels EP  Emergency Preparedness]]
: [[ERO]] [[Emergency Response Organization]]
: [[FAQ]] [[frequently asked question]]
: [[GINNA]] [[R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant]]
: [[KT&R]] [[knowledge transfer and retention]]
: [[I&C]] [[instrumentation and control]]
: [[IMC]] [[Inspection Manual Chapter IP  Inspection Procedure]]
: [[LCO]] [[Limiting Condition for Operation]]
: [[NEI]] [[Nuclear Energy Institute]]
: [[NCV]] [[non-cited violation]]
: [[NRC]] [[]]
: [[U.S.]] [[Nuclear Regulatory Commission]]
: [[OE]] [[operating experience]]
: [[PARS]] [[Publicly Available Records]]
: [[PI]] [[performance indicator]]
: [[RCA]] [[root cause analysis]]
: [[SAE]] [[Site Area Emergency SDP  Significance Determination Process]]
: [[TS]] [[Technical Specifications]]
UE  Unusual Event
A-5Table 1 Ginna
: [[EAL]] [[Decreases in Effectiveness]]
: [[EAL]] [[]]
: [[EAL]] [[Level]]
: [[EAL]] [[Approved by]]
: [[NRC]] [[(1995)]]
: [[EAL]] [[(]]
: [[EPIP]] [[1-0, Rev. 39) 2.2.1 Failed Fuel Detectors]]
: [[UE]] [[Letdown line monitor R-9 > 2 R/hr Letdown line monitor R-9 > 2 R/hr and Tavg > 500 deg F 2.3.1 Containment Radiation Alert Containment radiation monitor R-29/R-30 reading > 10 R/hr Containment radiation monitor R-29/R-30 reading > 10 R/hr due to]]
RCS leakage 3.2.1 Primary to Secondary Leakage UE Release of secondary side to atmosphere with primary to secondary leakage > 0.1 gpm per steam generator Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere with primary to secondary leakage greater than 150 gpd in the affected S/G 4.1.1 Containment
Integrity Status
(Alert condition for steam line break inappropriately moved to
: [[UE]] [[column)]]
: [[UE]] [[/ Alert Both doors open on containment airlock]]
: [[OR]] [[Inability to close containment pressure relief or purge valves which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment]]
: [[OR]] [[]]
: [[CI]] [[or]]
CIV valve(s) not closed
when required which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment Both doors open on containment airlock
: [[OR]] [[Inability to close containment pressure relief or purge valves which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment]]
: [[OR]] [[]]
: [[CI]] [[or]]
CIV valve(s) not closed
when required which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment OR Rapid uncontrolled pressure
decrease following initial increase due to steam line break 4.1.2 Containment
Integrity Status
: [[SAE]] [[Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure following initial increase]]
: [[OR...]] [[Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure following initial increase due to a]]
: [[LOCA]] [[]]
OR... 8.2.2
Fire or Explosion Alert
: [[...OR]] [[Which affects safety system operability as indicated by degraded system performance ...]]
: [[OR]] [[Loss of a safety system]]
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 18:02, 14 November 2019

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant - Notice of Violation, NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000244/2008502
ML080990280
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/07/2008
From: Collins S
Region 1 Administrator
To: John Carlin
Ginna, Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
References
EA-08-075
Download: ML080990280 (6)
v • d • e


Text

ril 7, 2008

SUBJECT:

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000244/2008502

Dear Mr. Carlin:

This letter refers to the supplemental inspection conducted on February 22, 2008, under Inspection Procedure 95002, Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna). The inspection was conducted to review your assessment of the root cause and corrective actions taken as a result of a Yellow performance indicator (PI) related to the Emergency Response Organization Drill (ERO) Participation. The results of the inspection were discussed with your staff at the exit meeting conducted at the conclusion of the inspection on February 22, 2008, and were documented in the report enclosed in our letter dated April 7, 2008.

In a telephone conversation on March 13, 2008, Mr. Glenn Dentel of my staff informed you that as a result of this inspection, the NRC was considering escalated enforcement for an apparent violation involving the failure to obtain Commission approval prior to making changes to your emergency plan that decreased the effectiveness of your plan. This failure was contrary to 10 CFR 50.54(q). Mr. Dentel also informed you that we had sufficient information regarding this apparent violation and your corrective actions to make an enforcement decision without the need for a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) or a written response from you. You indicated that Ginna did not believe a PEC or written response was needed.

As a result, based on the information developed during the inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Specifically, during your assessment of the Ginna Emergency Preparedness organization following the Yellow PI for ERO drill participation, you identified a violation of NRC requirements for maintaining the Emergency plan. The violation resulted from Ginnas failure to recognize that changes to the emergency plan that were made between 1996 and 2001, decreased the effectiveness of the plan. The specific changes involved revisions made to the NRC-approved emergency Action Levels (EALs). Six of the changes were determined to have resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, in that the changes could have caused incorrect event classification, or could have delayed the classification such that required notifications to offsite emergency response organizations may not have been timely. The most significant EAL change involved limiting a specific Site Area Emergency (SAE) EAL to a loss of coolant accident condition, instead of encompassing all events that cause a rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure, which would also include events such as main steam line breaks. The lack of consideration for, and declaration of, a SAE, for all events causing a rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure that could compromise containment integrity, could have prevented proper notification of offsite authorities.

The violation was considered safety significant due to the potential for an incorrect event classification or an untimely notification to offsite authorities during an event such as a SAE, as described above. The revised EALs could have adversely impacted the licensees ability to assess and classify an event. Therefore, this violation is categorized at Severity Level (SL) III in accordance with Section C.2 of Supplement VIII of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty is considered for a SLIII violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years or two inspections, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI of the Policy. Credit is warranted, because Ginnas corrective actions were considered to be prompt and comprehensive. These corrective actions included restoring the EALs to their original configurations and training the operators on the corrected EALs.

Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in Inspection Report No.

05000244/2008502 attached to our April 7, 2008 letter, and in this letter. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 Enclosure: Notice of Violation cc w/encl:

M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC J. M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer P. Eddy, Electric Division, NYS Department of Public Service C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law C. W. Fleming, Esquire, Senior Counsel, Constellation Energy Group, Inc.

B. Weaver, Director, Licensing, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC P. Tonko, President and CEO, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority G. Bastedo, Director, Wayne County Emergency Management Office M. Meisenzahl, Administrator, Monroe County, Office of Emergency Preparedness T. Judson, Central New York Citizens Awareness Network S. Kempf, Regional Director, DHS, Region II

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=IR_05000244/2008502&oldid=2158612"