IR 05000244/2008009
| ML082210463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/2008 |
| From: | Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | John Carlin Ginna |
| References | |
| IR-08-009 | |
| Download: ML082210463 (17) | |
Text
August 8, 2008
SUBJECT:
R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000244/2008009
Dear Mr. Carlin:
June 27, 2008
SUBJECT:
R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000244/2008009
Dear M
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000244/2008009; 06/09/2008 - 06/27/2008; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant;
Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Report
The report covers a two week inspection of the evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications. It was conducted by three region based engineering inspectors, and one inspector in-training. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
==1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (IP 71111.17)
==
.1 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments
(21 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed six safety evaluations to determine whether the changes to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. In addition, the team determined whether Constellation had been required to obtain NRC approval prior to implementing the changes. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information, including calculations, analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR and technical specifications, to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluations.
The team compared the safety evaluations and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluations.
The team also reviewed a sample of fifteen 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and applicability determinations for which Constellation had concluded that no safety evaluation was required. These reviews were performed to assess whether Constellations threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample of issues inspected that had been screened out by Constellation included design changes, procedure changes and setpoint changes.
The screenings and applicability determinations were selected based on the risk significance of the associated structures, systems, and components (SSCs).
In addition, the team compared Constellations administrative procedures, used to control the screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations, to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The reviewed safety evaluation, screenings, and applicability determinations are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Permanent Plant Modifications
(8 samples)
.2.1 Bus 14 & 16 Supply Breaker Amptector Setting Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed plant change request (PCR 2007-0030) associated with safety related 480V Bus 14 and 16 supply breaker amptector setting changes.
The function of the bus 14 and 16 normal supply breakers is to provide power to the buses, protect the buses in the event of an overload condition and to isolate the buses from offsite power in the event of a loss-of-offsite power. The design change revised the long time pickup (LTPU) setting on Bus 14 and 16 supply breakers and added process computer monitoring capability of Bus 14 and 16 current when supplied from offsite power. The design change provided margin for Bus 14 and 16 during degraded voltage operations to prevent an inadvertent trip of these breakers during a design basis large break loss-of-coolant accident, which represented the maximum loading condition. The team assessed whether the design and licensing bases, and performance capability of the safeguard buses and the offsite power supply had been degraded by the modification. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screen associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report.
The team assessed selected attributes to determine whether they were consistent with the design and licensing bases. These attributes included design tolerance bands for pick up settings, time-current response characteristics, maintenance procedure acceptance criteria, and breaker current sensor accuracy. Design assumptions such as worst case accident loading were reviewed to evaluate whether they were technically appropriate, conservative and consistent with the UFSAR and emergency operating procedures. The team evaluated the post-modification testing to verify that the breaker current sensors performed in accordance with the design change assumptions. The team also discussed the breaker amptector setting change with design engineers to discuss the history of the issue and overall design implementation. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2 Reconfiguration of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to Safety Injection (SI) Flow
Loops F-931A and F-931B Circuitry
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed PCR 2006-0023 which reconfigured the power supply to the RHR to SI flow transmitters. These transmitters were previously powered by the opposite electrical train such that on failure of the opposite train no flowrate indication would be available for the unaffected RHR train. The FT-931A was powered by a B train power supply component and the FT-931B was powered by an A train power supply component. This PCR swapped wiring at the transmitters and indicators FI-931A and FI-931B to correct the power source concern. The team reviewed the modification to determine if the Updated Final Safety Analyses Report had been adequately revised to reflect the modification and that appropriate drawings for the power supply racks had been revised in accordance with the design change.
The team reviewed post modification testing which included verification of correct power and calibration of the flow loops per procedures CPI-FLO-931A and 931B to verify their operability. The team also verified that the plant simulator model was modified to correct the power lineup for these flow transmitters. The team verified that a test was performed on the simulator by failing instrument busses and verifying that the flow transmitter values failed appropriately.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Tank Fuel Oil Level Setpoint Change
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed Setpoint Change Request (SPCR) 2007-001 to determine whether it was technically adequate. The team assessed whether the design and licensing bases, and performance capability of the diesel generator fuel oil system had been degraded by the change in diesel generator fuel oil storage tank level. SPCR 2007-001 increased the minimum acceptable volume in the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks to account for measurement uncertainty and the unusable portion of each storage tank. The setpoint change raised the minimum acceptable volume of fuel in the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks to 5357 gallons (80 inches) to ensure that the Technical Specification requirement of 5,000 gallons of fuel was available for use in each tank. The team evaluated the change to determine that the design attribute of preventing vortex conditions was also accounted for and the change was consistent with design assumptions within calculation DA-EE-99-097, Diesel Generator Tank Fuel Oil Level. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screen associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report.
The team reviewed procedure O-6.11, Surveillance Requirement/ Routine Operations Check Sheet, to determine whether it was properly updated with the new minimum acceptable diesel generator fuel oil storage tank volume of 5357 gallons. The team walked down accessible portions of the diesel generator fuel oil system associated with the setpoint change. The team also discussed the setpoint change with design engineers and system engineers to ensure that the licensing bases, procedures and training documents were consistent and reflected the change. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.4 Screenhouse Recirculation Gate Valve Motor/ Actuator Modification
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a modification to motor operated valve (MOV) 3184, screenhouse recirculation motor operated gate valve, to determine whether it was technically adequate and consistent with the intent of the design package.
The function of MOV-3184 is to open the discharge canal sluice gate to allow warm discharge water into the screenhouse inlet plenum to prevent the buildup of ice in cold weather conditions and maintain screenhouse bay temperatures at a level optimum for condenser performance. The modification replaced the motor/actuator and support structure of the gate valve to improve its design margin and reliability. The team reviewed the change to determine whether the performance capability of the circulating water system had been degraded by the modification with respect to preventing plant transients during plant operation.
Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screen associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report.
The team evaluated design assumptions in the supporting calculations and analyses to determine whether they were technically appropriate. The team reviewed selected calculations, analysis, and procedures to determine whether they were properly updated with any revised design information such as valve actuator thrust capability and margin. In addition, the team interviewed the responsible design engineer and walked down the screenhouse recirculation gate valve to detect possible abnormal installation conditions. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.5 Emergency Diesel Generator, A,
Steady State Loading Analysis
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a revised analysis associated with calculation DA-EE-92-098-01, Diesel Generator A Steady State Loading Analysis, to determine whether it was technically adequate. The change evaluated the worst case accident diesel loading at an increased frequency of 60.8 Hz. The team assessed whether the design and licensing bases, and performance capability of the A emergency diesel generator had been degraded by the design input change in diesel generator frequency. In addition, the team evaluated the analysis to determine whether it was consistent with design calculation ME-91-0011, Diesel Fuel Oil Minimum Onsite Storage Requirements. This review was performed to ensure that the Technical Specification requirement of 5,000 gallons for each diesel fuel oil storage tank provided sufficient margin to operate the A EDG for the design basis assumption of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> at the most conservative accident loading profile for the new frequency of 60.8 Hz.
The team evaluated the calculation to determine whether the design inputs were appropriate and valid, and to determine the accuracy and acceptability of the analysis. The team reviewed emergency operating procedures (EOPs) to ensure that the assumed loads listed in the analysis were consistent with the procedural direction provided to the operators with respect to operating equipment in response to postulated accidents. The team ensured that the existing procedures bounded the increased assumed EDG loading with respect to preventing overloading of the EDG during accident conditions. The inspectors also discussed the diesel loading change with design engineers. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Inventory Requirements for Extended Power
Uprate (EPU)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed changes associated with condensate storage tank (CST)volume and level requirements that were made in support of Ginnas extended power uprate (EPU). The review was performed to verify that sufficient CST volume was available to meet the requirements of Ginnas design and licensing bases. The team evaluated physical modifications to the CST overflow piping, as well as revisions to several calculations including the required CST volume, CST volume uncertainty, and minimum suction pipe submergence to preclude vortex formation. The team reviewed abnormal and emergency operating procedures in detail to ensure the maximum expected flowrates used in calculating vortex and submergence criteria were appropriate and conservative. This review was also performed to ensure timing considerations for aligning backup water sources were conservative given the volume of water in the CST and expected draindown rates. The existing methodology for calculating minimum required submergence was reviewed to ensure margin was maintained.
Additionally, the team reviewed applicable system operating, maintenance, and surveillance procedures, and conducted interviews with engineering and operations staff, to verify that the CST design and licensing bases were properly translated into plant procedures. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.7 Standby Auxiliary Feedwater (SAFW) Pump Supply Piping Check Valve
Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed design change package, PCR 2006-0012, associated with the replacement and relocation of supply check valves in the standby auxiliary feedwater (SAFW) system. The modifications were made to address water hammer concerns resulting from water column separation in a portion of the service water supply piping to the SAFW system. The team reviewed valve design documents, seismic calculations, pipe stress analysis, and post modification test results to ensure the valves would be able to perform their intended function. The inspectors verified that maintenance and operating procedures such as venting operations had been revised to address the revised locations of the valves. The inspectors walked down the design change to verify the installation was in accordance with the design change package.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.8 Replacement of Motor Operated Service Water Gate Valve with Butterfly Valve
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a design change associated with the replacement of a motor-operated gate valve, MOV 4663, with a butterfly valve in the service water system. The team assessed whether the performance capability of the valve had been degraded by the modification and evaluated whether the new valve was consistent with the service water design and licensing bases assumptions. The team assessed design attributes associated with the impact of the new valve on the service water hydraulic analysis, revised stroke time requirements, and seismic considerations.
The team reviewed selected calculations, drawings, and procedures to determine whether they were properly updated with revised design information and operating guidance. The team reviewed the post-modification testing to determine whether the valve would function consistent with the design change package assumptions and whether any changes were required to the plant simulator. The team walked down the valve to ensure the installation was in accordance with the design change package instructions. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
(IP 71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to determine whether Constellation was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The condition reports reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
The team presented the inspection results to Mr. J. T. Carlin, Site Vice President, and other members of Constellations staff at an exit meeting on June 27, 2008.
The inspectors verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
J. Carlin
Vice President, Ginna
T. Harding
Licensing Engineer
T. Miller
Design Engineering
J. Pacher
Manager, Nuclear Engineering Services
M. Ruby
Licensing Engineer
P. Swift
I&C/Electrical Engineering Supervisor
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
None.