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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY IhRMATION DISTRIBUTION SYST (R IDS)>g ACCESSION NBR: 8705290244 DOC.DATE: 87/05/22 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY   IhRMATION DISTRIBUTION SYST               (R IDS)
NO DOCKET FAC IL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Qinna Nuc lear P lant>Unit 1>Roc h e ster'0 05000244 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BACKUS W.H.Rochester Gas 8c Electric Corp.KOBER>R.W.Rochester Gas 8c Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUB JECT: LER 87-004-00:
>g ACCESSION NBR: 8705290244           DOC. DATE: 87/05/22           NOTARIZED: NO           DOCKET FAC IL: 50-244 Robert     Emmet Qinna Nuc lear     P lant>   Unit 1> Roc h e ster '0 05000244 AUTH. NAME             AUTHOR   AFFILIATION BACKUS W. H.           Rochester Gas 8c Electric Corp.
on 870424>during iul 1 power>Train B containment isolation occur r ed.Caused by personnel accidental 1!)bumping relay in saieguards cabinet during electrical
KOBER> R. W.           Rochester Gas 8c Electric Corp.
!!!ire checkout.Personnel counseled.
RECIP. NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUB JECT:   LER   87-004-00: on 870424> during iul 1 power> Train B containment isolation occur r ed. Caused by personnel accidental 1!) bumping relay in saieguards cabinet during electrical !!!ire checkout. Personnel counseled. W/870522 itr.
W/870522 itr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVEl):
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVEl): LTR                     ENCL     SIZE:
LTR ENCL SIZE: TlTLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Repor t (LF'R)>Incident Rpt>etc.NOTES: License Exp date in accordance i ith 10CFR2>2.109(9/19/72).
TlTLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Repor t (LF'R) Incident Rpt> etc.
05000244 INTERNAL: C a EXTERNAL: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 LA STAHLE>C ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEBT/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/PTSB RES DgPV GI ai EGaG GROH,M LPDR NSI,C HARRIS, J COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PDi-3 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/ROAB DEXTRO NHR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELO NRR/DEST/MEO VHR/DEST/PSB ted%R/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRP/DREP/RAB
                                                          >
/ILRB RED FILE 02 RGi I LE 01 H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR N IC MAYS, G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COP lES REQUIRED: LT I R 42 ENCL 40  
NOTES: License Exp date in accordance           i ith     10CFR2> 2. 109(9/19/72).     05000244 RECIPIENT           COPIES                  RECIPIENT          COPIES ID CODE/NAME         LTTR ENCL            ID CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL PD1-3 LA                       1        PDi-3    PD              1      1 STAHLE> C               1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON             1    1        ACRS MOELLER              2    2 AEOD/DOA                 1    1        AEOD/DSP/ROAB              2    2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB           1    1        DEXTRO                            1 NRR/DEST/ADE                   0        NHR/DEST/ADS              1      0 NRR/DEST/CEB                            NRR/DEST/ELO              1 NRR/DEST/ICSB            1     1         NRR/DEST/MEO              1      1 NRR/DEST/MTB            1              VHR/DEST/PSB               1      1 NRR/DEBT/RSB            1    1        ted% R /DEST/ SGB                 1 a
NRR/DLPG/HFB            1    1        NRR/DLPG/GAB               1      1 C
NRR/DOEA/EAB            1              NRP/DREP/RAB               1 NRR/DREP/RPB            2    2                      /ILRB         1 NRR/PMAS/PTSB                  1        RED     FILE       02 RES DgPV GI              1              RGi         I LE 01             1 ai EXTERNAL: EGaG GROH,M                  5    5        H ST LOBBY WARD           1     1 LPDR                    1     1         NRC PDR                    1     1 NSI,C HARRIS,  J        1     1         N IC MAYS, G              1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COP lES REQUIRED:         LT I R       42   ENCL     40


UCENSEE EVENT REPORT LER)U4.Sh)CLEAN htOULATONY CCMI~AOTNOVSD OSN NO.0)CLOlOS tXOINEL SO I M OOCXET~h Ol OACILITY NAME (ll R.E.Ginn Nuclear Power Plant 0 5 0 0 0 Of Inadvertent Containaent Isolation Due To Personnel Error During Electrical Wire ecti EVENT OATS Ol Lth)NNNSh (0)htOONT DATE (T)OTHth f ACILmtt INVOLVED Itl MONTH DAY YEAN YEAN j@~(IIrseeTIAL"y.eeveeosh OAY YEAh oACILITY HAIICS DOCKET HUMSS 1(S)0 6 0 0 0 0424 8787 0 0 4 0 0052 287 0 5 0 0 0 DOE SAT)ND MOOS N)~ONE 1 LEVtL ISN~HIHS N)A(NW(1)O)
U4. Sh)CLEAN htOULATONY           CCMI~
SSA4)(INN)
AOTNOVSD OSN NO. 0) CLOlOS tXOINEL SO I     M UCENSEE EVENT REPORT LER)
S(LSSS(e l(1)(srl SS~)Ill(el~SAQel()l~S~O)M.TSslO)ll
OACILITY NAME (ll OOCXET   ~h         Ol R.E. Ginn             Nuclear Power Plant                                                                                     0     5   0   0     0                         Of Inadvertent Containaent Isolation                                         Due To     Personnel Error During                           Electrical Wire ecti                                                         OTHth fACILmtt INVOLVED Itl EVENT OATS   Ol                   Lth )NNNSh (0)                       htOONT DATE (T)
~SPSQHSO)NPSsHS)(N)OOh T)IN Lth lit)~S.TSs)OHHI O.TSslOHe)
                                                ~ (IIrseeTIAL  "y.                       OAY   YEAh                   oACILITYHAIICS                  DOCKET HUMSS 1(S)
N.TS(s)O))et)~S.TSWO)(eN)(Al N.TSW Ol)shill~S.TSW OXs)Ts(N 1 ERONT N SUNIITTSD KINSUA)IT TO T)N hs(x)lhtMENTE oo 10 coh f.(esses oeo or sees oe'so ooooe4es(lll 7&1 W TARSI W OTHE h (Soossl (o Aseosrt~sieeroeeO Se Tert.N1C Sorer TSLEOHOHS HUMSth W.H.Backus Technical Assistant to the ations Mana r Ah COOS 315 524-44 46 COSNLETt ONS LINt OOII EACH COSNONSNT OA(LUht~NEO IN Tl(N htSONT (IS)CAUSE SYSTtM COMPONENT MANU)eAC TUhth tsDIITAs Lt TO HONDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMOOH tHT MAHUOAC TU 1th~OONTASL TO HONDS MJSOLEMSNTAL htOOAT SXSECTSO IIS)YES lll yer.serene CXPSCTSD SUSMISS(Der DA Tfl AssTNAOT (Llrsr(Io to00 Moose, le., eooroesseeory re(sees~oNeooeo Iyorw(INs llseel (10)MONTH EXOECTtO'USM I St)OH OATS IIS)DAY YEAII On April 24, 1987 at 1130 EDST with the unit at 100't reactor power, a Train B Containment Isolation occurred due to personnel inadvertently bumping a relay in the safeguards cabinets while performing a field walkdown for the electrical drawing upgrade program.All Containment Isolation valves required to close, operated as designed.Immediate correction action taken was: after the cause of the Containment Isolation was determined, Operations restored all systems affected to their pre-event status.The root cause of the event was personnel error by the Electrical Engineer who bumped the relay.in the performance of work in these cabinets.Corrective action taken to prevent recurrence was to reinforce, with all personnel who have to work in safeguards cabinets, the precautions that must be taken and to minimize access to these cabinets during power operation.
MONTH      DAY      YEAN    YEAN      j@        eeveeosh 0     6     0   0   0 0424 8787                                   0 0         4       0     0052 287                                                 oe'so ooooe4es(  lll 0     5   0     0   0 DOE SAT) ND Ts(N 1 ERONT N SUNIITTSD KINSUA)ITTO T)N hs(x)lhtMENTE oo 10 coh              f. (esses  oeo or sees MOOS N)                                                                                                   ~ S.TSs) OHHI                              7&1 W
All access will be supervised by trained plant personnel.
    ~ ONE 1                        ~HIHS    Ill(el
8705290244 870522 PDR ADOCK 05000244 8 PDR NNC Osroe~(04$)
                                                                            ~ SAQel() l                           O.TSslOHe)                                 TARSI  W LEVtL ISN                          N)A(NW(1)O)                             ~ S~O)                                N.TS(s)O) )et)                             OTHE  h (Soossl (o Aseosrt
NRC FOUR 366A (9.83(LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION V.S, NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMM(SSION ACCROV EO OMB NO 3150-0(04 EXPIRES 8(3(F85 FACILITY NAME (I)OOCKET NUMBER (2(YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEOUENTIAL i, REViSION NUMBER'UMBER~AOE (31 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT lll mom SPoco ie coqoired, v(o oddemol Nl(C%%dnn 36(SA'cl 021 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 7 0 0 4 OF PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The unit was at 100%reactor power and two Electrical Engineers were performing field walkdowns of electrical systems as part of the on-going electrical drawing upgrade program.They had started this work on April 22, 1987 and their intentions were to review the field conditions in nine electrical cabinets in the Relay Room: Ml, M2, RAl, RA2, RA3, SIA1, SIA2, SIBl, and SIB2.Prior to starting the work the two Electrical Engineers reviewed the proposed work scope with the Instrument and Control Supervisor and the Shift Supervisor and were given permission to proceed with the following restrictions:
                                                                                                                                                              ~ sieeroeeO Se Tert. N1C Sorer SSA4)(INN)                               M.TSslO)ll                            ~ S.TSWO)(eN)(Al S(LSSS(e l(1 )(srl                      ~ SPSQHSO)                            N.TSW Ol )shill SS~)                                     NPSsHS) (N)                           ~ S.TSW OXs)
Only one cabinet be open at at time and that no tie wraps or wires be touched.Prior to the event work had successfully been completed on seven of the nine electrical cabinets.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.EVENT: On April 24, 1987 at 1130 EDST, while the two Electri-cal Engineers were performing their inspection of electrical cabinet SIB1, a Train B Containment Isolation (CI)occurred.All Containment Isolation valves not required to be'pen during accident conditions closed as designed.B.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None.NRC CORM SBBA (9.83(
OOh T)IN Lth lit)
NRC FOIIR 366A (9831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U 5, NUCLEAR REGULATORV COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO 3150&104 EKPIRE5 8/31I85 FACILITY NAME lll DOCKET NUMBER 13l VEAA LER NUMBER l6I SLOUENTIAL NUMaSR REVISION NUMBFR PACE 13)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT (If moso apso is IoqoiRRL o>>pffOORof fffIC Ferns 8R'A'll 1171 o s o o o2 44 0 0 4 0 003 0 6 C.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
TSLEOHOHS      HUMSth Ah    COOS W.H. Backus                Technical Assistant to the                                      ations      Mana          r            315 524 -44 46 COSNLETt ONS LINt OOII EACH COSNONSNT OA(LUht          ~NEO IN Tl(N htSONT (IS)
o April 24, 1987, 1130 EDST: Event date and time.o April 24, 1987, 1130 EDST: Discovery date and time.o April 24, 1987, 1137 EDST: All Train B CI relays reset and all CI valves returned to normal position.D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: With the Train B CI, the following major systems lines were isolated: o Instrument Air to the Containment Vessel (CV)E.o Reactor Coolant System (RCS)Letdown Line o Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP)gl Seal Return Line o Containment Ventilation o Steam Generator Blowdown METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
SYSTtM      COMPONENT MANU)eAC            tsDIITAs Lt                      CAUSE              COMOOH tHT MAHUOAC            ~ OONTASL CAUSE                                      TUhth            TO HONDS                                SYSTEM                            TU 1th          TO HONDS MJSOLEMSNTAL htOOAT SXSECTSO IIS)                                                                                MONTH      DAY    YEAII EXOECTtO
The event was immediately apparent due to a control board annunciator, Train B CI relay indication, and CI valve positions indication in the Control Room.F~OPERATOR ACTION: Operations and an Instrument and Control (1&C)Technician immediately checked out the reason for the CI.After finding all relays in their normal status, Operations restored all systems affected by the B Train CI to their pre-event status.NSIC FOAM 366A 19 83 I 0
                                                                                                                                          'USM I St)OH OATS IIS)
r 6EI NRC Fosm 366A I9 83I'LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROYED OM8 NO 3I50 DIOS EXPIRES 8/3Ii85 FACILITY NAME III DOCKET NUMSER I?I YEAss LER NUMSER ISI SEQUENTIAL NUMSSR REVISION NUMSSA PAGE I3)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT Ill more spesoie seoosod, we~HAC Form 3SSA'sl (17)0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 8 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 OF 0 6 CAUSE OF EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: B Train CI relay C-2 actuated due, to being inadver-tently bumped by Engineering personnel inspecting electrical cabinet SIB1.B.ROOT CAUSE: The root cause was determined to be personnel error by the Electrical Engineer by not being more careful when working in the electrical cabinets.IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires reporting of"any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)" in that Containment Isolation is a ESF sub-system.
YES lllyer. serene CXPSCTSD SUSMISS(Der DA Tfl AssTNAOT (Llrsr( Io to00 Moose, le., eooroesseeory re(sees  ~  oNeooeo Iyorw(INs llseel (10)
An assessment was performed of the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
On      April 24, 1987 at 1130 EDST with the unit at 100't reactor power, a Train B Containment Isolation occurred due to personnel inadvertently bumping a relay in the safeguards cabinets while performing a field walkdown for the electrical drawing                                                                                          upgrade program.
There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the inadvertent CI because;0 The CI system operated as designed.0 0 The systems affected were restored to normal status very quickly (within approximately 7 minutes).The systems affected were capable of withstanding the isolation for a short period of time.NAC CORM 366A I883I NRC Form 3ddA 19431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROUEO OM8 NO 3150M(Cd EXPIRES 8131'85 FACILITY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMSER (2(YEAR LE R NUM8 E R (dl EEOUENTrAL NUMEER rl E v I 5 ro N NUM ER PAGE (31 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT ill more Trrooo lr eoerr'eoo, rroo~HRC Form 3684'Fl (LT(0 6 0 0 0 2 4 4 004-0 0 05 oF 0 6 V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: o Operations, after finding that the cause for the CI was inadvertent, restored all systems affected by the event to their pre-event status.B.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
All        Containment                    Isolation valves required to close, operated                                                                        as designed.
I'The Operations Manager has sent a letter to all Sections Managers affected, that states to the extent practical, work in all electrical safe-guards and protection cabinets will be minimized while the plant is at power..Both of the Electrical Engineers involved with the event have had their awareness reinforced as to the precautions which must be taken while working in electrical safeguards and protection cabinets.0 0 All Engineering personnel requiring access to electrical safeguards and protection cabinets have been made aware of this event by their managers.Placards will be'ade and attached to all electrical safeguard cabinets that read: During power operations
Immediate correction action taken was: after the cause of the Containment Isolation was determined, Operations                                                                                restored all systems affected to their pre-event status.
-access will be supervised by Operations, I&C personnel, or Test and Results'ersonnel.
The      root cause of the event was personnel error                                                                                  Electrical Engineer who bumped the relay. in the performance byof the                                                                      work in these cabinets.
NRC FORM 3ddA (9 831 NRC Farm 36SA (943 I FACILITY NAME (II r~V.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OOCKET NVMSER (2(YEAR LER NUMBER (SI SSQUSNTrAL a88r.4UMes/I APPROVEO OMS NO.3(50&(04 EXPIRES 8(3(r85.'svrsro4 4UMes4~AGE (3l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT Ill more sirese is eyvr(erS vse~rYRC%%dmr 3554'sl (It(p g p p p 24 487-0 0 4 0 0 06 oFo 6 VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS:
Corrective action taken to prevent with all personnel who have to work recurrence                                                                        was to reinforce, in safeguards cabinets, the precautions that must be taken and to minimize access to these cabinets during power operation. All access will be supervised by trained plant personnel.
B.There were no component failures that contributed to this event.r PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events could be identified.
8705290244 870522 PDR        ADOCK 05000244 8                                        PDR NNC Osroe (04$ )
4 R C s 0 8 M 36 (I A Ia 831 ROCHES'ri"',.-rt s 89 EAS'T AVEh!UEr ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649.000' la%~C.aA May 22, 1987 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555  
          ~
 
V.S, NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMM(SSION NRC FOUR 366A (9.83(
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                             ACCROV EO OMB NO 3150-0(04 EXPIRES 8(3(F85 FACILITY NAME (I)                                                 OOCKET NUMBER (2(             LER NUMBER (6)                   ~ AOE (31 YEAR    SEOUENTIAL NUMBER i, REViSION
                                                                                                                'UMBER OF R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                 0  5  0  0    0  2 4 4    7      0 0    4 TEXT lllmom SPoco ie coqoired, v(o oddemol Nl(C %%dnn 36(SA'cl 021 PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The      unit was at 100% reactor power and two Electrical Engineers were performing field walkdowns of electrical systems as part of the on-going electrical drawing upgrade program. They had started this work on April 22, 1987 and their intentions were to review the field conditions in nine electrical cabinets in the Relay Room: Ml, M2, RAl, RA2, RA3, SIA1, SIA2,             SIBl, and SIB2.
Prior to starting the               work the two Electrical Engineers reviewed the proposed work scope with the Instrument and Control Supervisor and the Shift Supervisor and were given permission to proceed with the following restrictions:
Only one cabinet be open at at time and that no                             tie     wraps or wires be touched.
Prior to the event work had successfully                     been completed on seven of the nine electrical cabinets.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.         EVENT:
On     April 24, 1987 at 1130 EDST, while the two Electri-cal Engineers were performing their inspection of electrical cabinet SIB1, a Train B Containment Isolation (CI) occurred. All Containment Isolation valves not required to be'pen during accident conditions closed as designed.
B.         INOPERABLE STRUCTURES,                 COMPONENTS   OR   SYSTEMS           THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:
None.
NRC CORM SBBA (9.83(
 
NRC FOIIR 366A                                                                                                 U 5, NUCLEAR REGULATORV COMMISSION (9831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                 APPROVEO OMB NO 3150&104 EKPIRE5 8/31I85 FACILITY NAME   lll                                                     DOCKET NUMBER 13l         LER NUMBER l6I                 PACE 13)
VEAA  SLOUENTIAL       REVISION NUMaSR       NUMBFR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                         o  s  o  o  o2 44          0 0    4      0    003            0 6 TEXT (Ifmoso apso is IoqoiRRL o>> pffOORof fffIC Ferns 8R'A'll 1171 C.         DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
o           April     24, 1987, 1130 EDST:       Event date and time.
o           April       24, 1987,     1130 EDST:   Discovery date and time.
o           April       24, 1987,       1137 EDST:   All Train             B     CI relays reset and normal position.
all CI valves     returned to D.         OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
With the Train               B CI, the following major systems lines         were     isolated:
o           Instrument Air to the Containment Vessel (CV) o           Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Letdown Line o           Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) gl Seal Return Line o           Containment Ventilation o           Steam Generator         Blowdown E.          METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
The event               was immediately apparent due to a control board annunciator, Train B CI relay indication, CI valve positions indication in the Control Room. and F~         OPERATOR ACTION:
Operations and an Instrument and Control (1&C)
Technician immediately checked out the reason for the CI. After finding all relays in their normal Operations restored all systems affected bystatus,                          the B Train CI to their pre-event status.
NSIC FOAM 366A 19 83 I
 
0 6EI r
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Fosm 366A I9 83I
                                    'LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                   APPROYED OM8 NO 3I50 DIOS EXPIRES 8/3Ii85 DOCKET NUMSER I?I               LER NUMSER ISI                 PAGE I3)
FACILITY NAME III SEQUENTIAL       REVISION YEAss        NUMSSR       NUMSSA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT Illmore spesoie seoosod, we ~     HAC Form 3SSA'sl (17) 0 5   0 0   0 2 4 4 8   7       0 0     4       0   0 0 4     OF   0 6 CAUSE OF EVENT A.     IMMEDIATE CAUSE:
B   Train CI relay           C-2 actuated       due,   to being inadver-tently bumped by Engineering personnel inspecting electrical cabinet SIB1.
B.     ROOT CAUSE:
The root cause was determined to be personnel error by the Electrical Engineer by not being more careful when working in the electrical cabinets.
IV.             ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires reporting of "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)" in that Containment Isolation is a ESF sub-system.
An assessment               was performed of the safety consequences                         and implications of this event with the following results                                         and conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences                                               or implications attributed to the inadvertent CI because; 0       The CI system operated                 as designed.
0       The systems             affected were restored to normal status very quickly (within approximately 7 minutes).
0      The systems           affected were capable of withstanding the isolation for           a short period of time.
NAC CORM 366A I883I
 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 3ddA 19431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                   APPROUEO OM8 NO 3150M(Cd EXPIRES 8131'85 OOCKET NUMSER (2(               LE R NUM8 E R (dl                                       PAGE (31 FACILITY NAME (11 EEOUENTrAL                       rl E v I 5 ro N YEAR      NUMEER                        NUM ER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT illmore Trrooo lr eoerr'eoo, rroo ~   HRC Form 3684'Fl (LT(
0 6   0 0   0 2 4 4             004 0                                       0 05   oF 0   6 V.                   CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:
o         Operations, after finding that the cause for the CI was inadvertent, restored all systems affected by the event to their pre-event status.
B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
I' The     Operations Manager has sent a letter to all Sections Managers affected, that states to the extent practical, work in all electrical safe-guards and protection cabinets will be minimized while the plant is at power..
Both of the Electrical Engineers involved with the event have had their awareness reinforced as to the precautions which must be taken while working in electrical safeguards and protection cabinets.
0         All Engineering             personnel       requiring access                                       to electrical safeguards               and protection cabinets have been         made   aware     of this event by their managers.
0          Placards       will be'ade             and attached                               to             all electrical safeguard             cabinets that read:                                 During power operations               access will be supervised by Operations, I&C personnel, or Test and                             Results'ersonnel.
NRC FORM 3ddA (9 831
 
r
                                                                                                      ~
NRC Farm 36SA                                                                                               V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                              APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(50&(04 EXPIRES 8(3( r85 FACILITY NAME (II                                                OOCKET NVMSER (2(               LER NUMBER (SI                    ~ AGE (3l YEAR      SSQUSNTrAL    .'svrsro4 a88r. 4UMes/I        4UMes4 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT Illmore sirese is eyvr(erS vse ~   rYRC %%dmr 3554'sl (It(
p   g   p p   p 24 487 0             0 4           0 0     06   oFo   6 VI.             ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.     FAILED COMPONENTS:
There were no component               failures that contributed to this event.
r B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
A     similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation                                       of similar LER events could be identified.
4 R C s 0 8 M 36 (IA Ia 831
 
ROCHES'ri "', .-                       rt s 89 EAS'T AVEh!UEr ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649.000' la% ~
C.
aA May 22, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document       Control Desk Washington,       DC 20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
LER 87-004, Inadvertent Containment Isolation Due to Personnel Error During Electrical Wire Checkout of Safety Injection Relay Cabinet.R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv) which requires a report of,"any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 87-004 is hereby submitted.
LER 87-004, Inadvertent Containment Isolation Due to Personnel Error During Electrical Wire Checkout of Safety Injection Relay Cabinet.
This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.V ry truly yours, d./c Rog r W.Kober xc U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Resident Inspector}}
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System,     item (a)(2)(iv) which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 87-004   is hereby submitted.
This event has in       no way affected the public's health         and safety.
V ry   truly yours,
: d. /c Rog   r W. Kober xc       U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna     USNRC Resident Inspector}}

Revision as of 17:58, 29 October 2019

LER 87-004-00:on 870424,during Full Power,Train B Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Accidentally Bumping Relay in Safeguards Cabinet During Electrical Wire Checkout.Personnel counseled.W/870522 Ltr
ML17261A484
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1987
From: Backus W, Kober R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-004, LER-87-4, NUDOCS 8705290244
Download: ML17261A484 (10)
v • d • e


Text

REGULATORY IhRMATION DISTRIBUTION SYST (R IDS)

>g ACCESSION NBR: 8705290244 DOC. DATE: 87/05/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FAC IL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Qinna Nuc lear P lant> Unit 1> Roc h e ster '0 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BACKUS W. H. Rochester Gas 8c Electric Corp.

KOBER> R. W. Rochester Gas 8c Electric Corp.

RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUB JECT: LER 87-004-00: on 870424> during iul 1 power> Train B containment isolation occur r ed. Caused by personnel accidental 1!) bumping relay in saieguards cabinet during electrical !!!ire checkout. Personnel counseled. W/870522 itr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVEl): LTR ENCL SIZE:

TlTLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Repor t (LF'R) Incident Rpt> etc.

>

NOTES: License Exp date in accordance i ith 10CFR2> 2. 109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 LA 1 PDi-3 PD 1 1 STAHLE> C 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEXTRO 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 0 NHR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ELO 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEO 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 VHR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/RSB 1 1 ted% R /DEST/ SGB 1 a

NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 C

NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 NRP/DREP/RAB 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 /ILRB 1 NRR/PMAS/PTSB 1 RED FILE 02 RES DgPV GI 1 RGi I LE 01 1 ai EXTERNAL: EGaG GROH,M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSI,C HARRIS, J 1 1 N IC MAYS, G 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COP lES REQUIRED: LT I R 42 ENCL 40

U4. Sh)CLEAN htOULATONY CCMI~

AOTNOVSD OSN NO. 0) CLOlOS tXOINEL SO I M UCENSEE EVENT REPORT LER)

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TSLEOHOHS HUMSth Ah COOS W.H. Backus Technical Assistant to the ations Mana r 315 524 -44 46 COSNLETt ONS LINt OOII EACH COSNONSNT OA(LUht ~NEO IN Tl(N htSONT (IS)

SYSTtM COMPONENT MANU)eAC tsDIITAs Lt CAUSE COMOOH tHT MAHUOAC ~ OONTASL CAUSE TUhth TO HONDS SYSTEM TU 1th TO HONDS MJSOLEMSNTAL htOOAT SXSECTSO IIS) MONTH DAY YEAII EXOECTtO

'USM I St)OH OATS IIS)

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On April 24, 1987 at 1130 EDST with the unit at 100't reactor power, a Train B Containment Isolation occurred due to personnel inadvertently bumping a relay in the safeguards cabinets while performing a field walkdown for the electrical drawing upgrade program.

All Containment Isolation valves required to close, operated as designed.

Immediate correction action taken was: after the cause of the Containment Isolation was determined, Operations restored all systems affected to their pre-event status.

The root cause of the event was personnel error Electrical Engineer who bumped the relay. in the performance byof the work in these cabinets.

Corrective action taken to prevent with all personnel who have to work recurrence was to reinforce, in safeguards cabinets, the precautions that must be taken and to minimize access to these cabinets during power operation. All access will be supervised by trained plant personnel.

8705290244 870522 PDR ADOCK 05000244 8 PDR NNC Osroe (04$ )

~

V.S, NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMM(SSION NRC FOUR 366A (9.83(

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ACCROV EO OMB NO 3150-0(04 EXPIRES 8(3(F85 FACILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2( LER NUMBER (6) ~ AOE (31 YEAR SEOUENTIAL NUMBER i, REViSION

'UMBER OF R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 7 0 0 4 TEXT lllmom SPoco ie coqoired, v(o oddemol Nl(C %%dnn 36(SA'cl 021 PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The unit was at 100% reactor power and two Electrical Engineers were performing field walkdowns of electrical systems as part of the on-going electrical drawing upgrade program. They had started this work on April 22, 1987 and their intentions were to review the field conditions in nine electrical cabinets in the Relay Room: Ml, M2, RAl, RA2, RA3, SIA1, SIA2, SIBl, and SIB2.

Prior to starting the work the two Electrical Engineers reviewed the proposed work scope with the Instrument and Control Supervisor and the Shift Supervisor and were given permission to proceed with the following restrictions:

Only one cabinet be open at at time and that no tie wraps or wires be touched.

Prior to the event work had successfully been completed on seven of the nine electrical cabinets.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. EVENT:

On April 24, 1987 at 1130 EDST, while the two Electri-cal Engineers were performing their inspection of electrical cabinet SIB1, a Train B Containment Isolation (CI) occurred. All Containment Isolation valves not required to be'pen during accident conditions closed as designed.

B. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None.

NRC CORM SBBA (9.83(

NRC FOIIR 366A U 5, NUCLEAR REGULATORV COMMISSION (9831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO 3150&104 EKPIRE5 8/31I85 FACILITY NAME lll DOCKET NUMBER 13l LER NUMBER l6I PACE 13)

VEAA SLOUENTIAL REVISION NUMaSR NUMBFR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o s o o o2 44 0 0 4 0 003 0 6 TEXT (Ifmoso apso is IoqoiRRL o>> pffOORof fffIC Ferns 8R'A'll 1171 C. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o April 24, 1987, 1130 EDST: Event date and time.

o April 24, 1987, 1130 EDST: Discovery date and time.

o April 24, 1987, 1137 EDST: All Train B CI relays reset and normal position.

all CI valves returned to D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

With the Train B CI, the following major systems lines were isolated:

o Instrument Air to the Containment Vessel (CV) o Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Letdown Line o Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) gl Seal Return Line o Containment Ventilation o Steam Generator Blowdown E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

The event was immediately apparent due to a control board annunciator, Train B CI relay indication, CI valve positions indication in the Control Room. and F~ OPERATOR ACTION:

Operations and an Instrument and Control (1&C)

Technician immediately checked out the reason for the CI. After finding all relays in their normal Operations restored all systems affected bystatus, the B Train CI to their pre-event status.

NSIC FOAM 366A 19 83 I

0 6EI r

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Fosm 366A I9 83I

'LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROYED OM8 NO 3I50 DIOS EXPIRES 8/3Ii85 DOCKET NUMSER I?I LER NUMSER ISI PAGE I3)

FACILITY NAME III SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAss NUMSSR NUMSSA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT Illmore spesoie seoosod, we ~ HAC Form 3SSA'sl (17) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 8 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 OF 0 6 CAUSE OF EVENT A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

B Train CI relay C-2 actuated due, to being inadver-tently bumped by Engineering personnel inspecting electrical cabinet SIB1.

B. ROOT CAUSE:

The root cause was determined to be personnel error by the Electrical Engineer by not being more careful when working in the electrical cabinets.

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires reporting of "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)" in that Containment Isolation is a ESF sub-system.

An assessment was performed of the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the inadvertent CI because; 0 The CI system operated as designed.

0 The systems affected were restored to normal status very quickly (within approximately 7 minutes).

0 The systems affected were capable of withstanding the isolation for a short period of time.

NAC CORM 366A I883I

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 3ddA 19431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROUEO OM8 NO 3150M(Cd EXPIRES 8131'85 OOCKET NUMSER (2( LE R NUM8 E R (dl PAGE (31 FACILITY NAME (11 EEOUENTrAL rl E v I 5 ro N YEAR NUMEER NUM ER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT illmore Trrooo lr eoerr'eoo, rroo ~ HRC Form 3684'Fl (LT(

0 6 0 0 0 2 4 4 004 0 0 05 oF 0 6 V. CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

o Operations, after finding that the cause for the CI was inadvertent, restored all systems affected by the event to their pre-event status.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

I' The Operations Manager has sent a letter to all Sections Managers affected, that states to the extent practical, work in all electrical safe-guards and protection cabinets will be minimized while the plant is at power..

Both of the Electrical Engineers involved with the event have had their awareness reinforced as to the precautions which must be taken while working in electrical safeguards and protection cabinets.

0 All Engineering personnel requiring access to electrical safeguards and protection cabinets have been made aware of this event by their managers.

0 Placards will be'ade and attached to all electrical safeguard cabinets that read: During power operations access will be supervised by Operations, I&C personnel, or Test and Results'ersonnel.

NRC FORM 3ddA (9 831

r

~

NRC Farm 36SA V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(50&(04 EXPIRES 8(3( r85 FACILITY NAME (II OOCKET NVMSER (2( LER NUMBER (SI ~ AGE (3l YEAR SSQUSNTrAL .'svrsro4 a88r. 4UMes/I 4UMes4 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT Illmore sirese is eyvr(erS vse ~ rYRC %%dmr 3554'sl (It(

p g p p p 24 487 0 0 4 0 0 06 oFo 6 VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

There were no component failures that contributed to this event.

r B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events could be identified.

4 R C s 0 8 M 36 (IA Ia 831

ROCHES'ri "', .- rt s 89 EAS'T AVEh!UEr ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649.000' la% ~

C.

aA May 22, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 87-004, Inadvertent Containment Isolation Due to Personnel Error During Electrical Wire Checkout of Safety Injection Relay Cabinet.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv) which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 87-004 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

V ry truly yours,

d. /c Rog r W. Kober xc U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Resident Inspector
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