ML071280764

License Amendment, Issuance of Amendment 175 Re Technical Specifications Change Regarding Mode Change Limitations (TSTF-359) Using Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, & Correct Example 1.4-1 (TSTF-485)

ML071280764
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/30/2007
From:	Bhalchandra Vaidya NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLIV
To:	Brian W Entergy Operations
Vaidya B, NRR/DORL/LP4, 415-3308
Shared Package
ML071280778	List: ML071280764 ML071290008
References
TAC MD4276
Download: ML071280764 (29)

Text

May 30, 2007Mr. William R. BrianVice President of Operations Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150

SUBJECT:

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTRE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REGARDING MODE CHANGE LIMITATIONS (TSTF-359) USING THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM IMPROVEMENT PROCESS, AND CORRECT EXAMPLE 1.4-1 (TSTF-485)

(TAC NO. MD4276)

Dear Mr. Brian:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 175 toFacility Operating License No. NPF-29 for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (GGNS). This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to yourapplication dated February 8, 2007, under the NRC's Consolidated Line Item Improvement

Process. The amendment modified GGNS TS requirements for MODE change limitations in LimitingCondition of Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4. The TS changes are consistent with Revision 9 of NRC-approved Industry TS Task Force (TSTF) Standard TS Change Traveler, TSTF-359, "Increase Flexibility in MODE Restraints." In addition, consistent with NRC-approved TSTF-485, Revision 0, "Correct Example 1.4-1," the amendment also changed TS Section 1.4, "Frequency," Example 1.4-1, "Surveillance Requirements," to accurately reflect the changes made by TSTF-359.

W. R. Brian-2-A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will beincluded in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice. Sincerely,/RA/Bhalchandra Vaidya, Project ManagerPlant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationDocket No. 50-416

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 175 to NPF-29 2. Safety Evaluationcc w/encls: See next page

Pkg ML071280778 (Amendment/License ML071280764, TS ML071290008)(*) No substantial changes to SE Input(**) Not Required per SE Input Memo from ITSBOFFICENRR/LPL4/PMNRR/LPL4/LANRR/ITSB/BC(*)OGC(**)NRR/LPL4/BCNAMEBVaidya:spJBurkhardtTKobetzNot Required THiltz DATE5/29/075/17/074/3/074/3/075/29/07 November 2006Grand Gulf Nuclear Station cc:Executive Vice President

& Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 ChiefEnergy and Transportation Branch Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Division Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality P.O. Box 10385 Jackson, MS 39289-0385PresidentClaiborne County Board of Supervisors P.O. Box 339 Port Gibson, MS 39150Regional Administrator, Region IVU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 399 Port Gibson, MS 39150 General Plant ManagerOperations Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150Attorney GeneralDepartment of Justice State of Louisiana P.O. Box 94005 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005State Health Officer State Board of Health P.O. Box 139 Jackson, MS 39205Office of the Governor State of Mississippi Jackson, MS 39201Attorney GeneralAsst. Attorney General State of Mississippi P.O. Box 22947 Jackson, MS 39225-2947Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995DirectorNuclear Safety Assurance Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150DirectorNuclear Safety & Licensing Entergy Operations, Inc.

1340 Echelon Parkway Jackson, MS 39213-8298Manager, LicensingEntergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150Richard Penrod, Senior Environmental Scientist/State Liaison Officer Office of Environmental Services Northwestern State University Russell Hall, Room 201 Natchitoches, LA 71497 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCES, INC.SOUTH MISSISSIPPI ELECTRIC POWER ASSOCIATIONENTERGY MISSISSIPPI, INC.DOCKET NO. 50-416GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSEAmendment No. 175License No. NPF-291.The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:A.The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) datedFebruary 8, 2007 , complies with the standards and requirements of the AtomicEnergy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules andregulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of theAct, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;C.There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by thisamendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;D.The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense andsecurity or to the health and safety of the public; andE.The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of theCommission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2.Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications andparagraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-29, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.3.This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implementedwithin 60 days from the date of issuance.FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/RA/Thomas G. Hiltz, ChiefPlant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 and the Technical SpecificationsDate of Issuance: May 30, 2007 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 175FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-29DOCKET NO. 50-416Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 and the Appendix A,Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. Facility Operating LicenseRemoveInsert 44Technical SpecificationsRemoveInsert1.0-261.0-263.0-13.0-1 3.0-23.0-2 3.0-53.0-5 3.3-193.3-19 3.3-233.3-23 3.4-163.4-16 3.4-193.4-19 3.4-213.4-21 3.5-13.5-1

--3.5-1a 3.5-103.5-10 3.6-373.6-37 3.6-403.6-40 3.8-13.8-1 (b)SERI is required to notify the NRC in writing prior to any change in (i) the terms or

conditions of any new or existing sale or lease

agreements executed as part of the above

authorized financial transactions, (ii) the

GGNS Unit 1 operating agreement, (iii) the

existing property insurance coverage for GGNS

Unit 1 that would materially alter the

representations and conditions set forth in the

Staff's Safety Evaluation Report dated

December 19, 1988 attached to Amendment No. 54.

In addition, SERI is required to notify the NRC

of any action by a lessor or other successor in

interest to SERI that may have an effect on the

operation of the facility. C.The license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the

Commission's regulations set forth in 10CFR Chapter

I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the

Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is

subject to the additional conditions specified or

incorporated below:(1)Maximum Power Level Entergy Operations, Inc. is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in

excess of 3898 megawatts thermal (100 percent power)

in accordance with the conditions specified herein.(2)Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in

Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 175 are lhereby incorporated into this license. Entergy

Operations, Inc. shall operate the facility in

accordance with the Technical Specifications and the

Environmental Protection Plan.

The Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for Diesel Generator 12 contained in the Technical Specifications

and listed below, are not required to be performed

immediately upon implementation of Amendment No. 169 The SRs listed below shall be successfully demonstrated

at the next regularly scheduled performance.

SR 3.8.1.9, SR 3.8.1.10, and

SR 3.8.1.14 Amendment 175 4

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONRELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 175 TOFACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-29ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC., ET AL.GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1DOCKET NO. 50-41

61.0INTRODUCTION

By application dated February 8, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and ManagementSystem (ADAMS) Accession No. ML070400447), Entergy Operations, Inc., et al. (Entergy, the licensee), requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Grand Gulf NuclearStation, Unit 1 (GGNS). The proposed amendment would modify GGNS TS requirements for MODE change limitationsin Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4. The proposed TS changes are consistent with Revision 9 of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved Industry TS Task Force (TSTF) Standard TS (STS) Change Traveler, TSTF-359, "Increase Flexibility in MODE Restraints." The availability of TSTF-359 for adoption by licensees was announced in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579), using theConsolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). In addition, the proposed amendment would also change TS Section 1.4, Frequency,Example 1.4-1, "Surveillance Requirements," to accurately reflect the changes made to LCO 3.0.4. This change is consistent with NRC-approved TSTF-485, Revision 0, "Correct Example 1.4-1" and has been incorporated into the STS, Revision 3.1. Also, consistent with changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4, the licensee proposed changes in various other relevant TS sections, as summarized in Table 1 in section 1.2 of this Safety Evaluation (SE). 1.1Optional Changes and VariationsThe licensee's application for the amendment to the facility operating license (FOL) adopted theTS changes described in TSTF-359, Revision 9, and the NRC staff's model SE published on April 4, 2003, including the following variations:1.Due to differences between the GGNS TS and TS Bases and theircorresponding model Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR)/6 STS (NUREG-1434), in some cases variations from the TSTF marked-up changes are made. These variations are discussed below and do not affect the adoption or application ofTSTF-359, Revision 9.In the TSTF [markups], BWR/6 STS 3.6.3.1, Primary Containment HydrogenRecombiners, the NOTE "LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable," was removed from REQUIRED ACTION A. The GGNS equivalent TS was deleted per TS Amendment 166, issued in NRC letter dated June 16, 2004. Therefore, GGNS TS 3.6.3.1 markups are not included in this package. 2.TS Section 1.4 FrequencySection 1.4, Frequency, Example 1.4-1, is revised to be consistent with thechanges to SR 3.0.4. SR 3.0.4 was revised by TSTF- 359, Revision 9, and the current example is not consistent with the Technical Specification requirements.

The second paragraph of Example 1.4-1 is revised to reflect the changes made to SR 3.0.4. Justification: The changes made in TSTF 359 to SR 3.0.4 have made certainstatements in Example 1.4-1 incorrect. This change is consistent with TSTF-485, Rev. 0.1.2Changes to Other TS SectionsAs a result of the changes to TS LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4, the notes in the various related TSsections were revised as administrative changes. They are summarized in Table 1 below:TABLE 1 Item No.GGNS TS No.GGNS TS TitleDescription of Change11.4 FrequencyThe second paragraph of Example 1.4-1 isrevised to reflect the changes made to

SR 3.0.4.2LCO 3.0.4No TitleExisting LCO has been replaced in itsentirety. Adopted the TSTF-359 wording for LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4. 3SR 3.0.4No TitleExisting SR has been replaced in its entirety. Adopted the TSTF-359 wording for LCO 3.0.4

and SR 3.0.4. 43.3.3.1Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)InstrumentationThe ACTIONS NOTE stating "LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable" has been deleted and the remaining NOTE renumbered.53.3.3.2Remote Shutdown SystemThe ACTIONS NOTE stating "LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable" has been deleted and the remaining NOTE renumbered. Item No.GGNS TS No.GGNS TS TitleDescription of Change63.4.7RCS [Reactor Coolant System]Leakage Detection InstrumentationThe ACTIONS NOTE stating "LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable" has been deleted.73.4.8RCS Specific ActivityThe existing NOTE for REQUIRED ACTIONSis replaced with a NOTE stating "LCO 3.0.4.c is not applicable."83.4.9Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling System - Hot ShutdownThe ACTIONS NOTE stating "LCO 3.0.4 isnot applicable" has been deleted and the remaining NOTE renumbered.93.5.1ECCS [Emergency Core CoolingSystems] - OperatingA NOTE is added to the ACTIONS stating"LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCS."103.5.3ECCS - ShutdownA NOTE is added to the ACTIONS stating"LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC."113.6.3.1Deleted by Amendment No. 166,dated June 16, 2004.Not applicable.123.6.3.2Primary Containment and DrywellHydrogen IgnitersThe REQUIRED ACTION A.1 NOTE stating"LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable" has been

deleted.133.6.3.3Drywell Purge SystemThe REQUIRED ACTION A.1 NOTE stating"LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable." has been

deleted.143.8.1A.C. [Alternating Current] Sources- OperatingA NOTE is added to the ACTIONS stating"LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs [Diesel Generators]."1.3Verification and CommitmentsAs discussed in the notice of availability, "Applicability" section, published in the FederalRegister on April 4, 2003, (68 FR 16579) for this TS improvement, GGNS TS has incorporatedthe TS Bases Control Program (TS 5.5.1.1) and has adopted the requirements of SR 3.0.1 and associated bases in its TS. Further, the licensee, in its submission, the licensee stated that the following plant-specificverifications were performed as follows:[Entergy] has proposed changes to the TS Bases for LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4which state that use of the TS mode change limitation flexibility established by LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 is not to be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to operable status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the TS Applicability.The proposed changes to the TS Bases for LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 providedetails on how to implement the new requirements. The Bases changes provide guidance for changing Modes or other specified conditions in the Applicabilitywhen an LCO is not met. The Bases changes describe in detail how:

LCO 3.0.4.a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; LCO 3.0.4.b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; and LCO 3.0.4.c allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met based on a Note in the Specification, which is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., RCS Specific Activity) though it may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval. The Bases also state that any risk impact should be managed through the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

[paragraph 50.65(a)(4) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)]and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants," and that the results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the LCO is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification. The Bases also state that SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the LCO not met has been delayed in accordance with SR 3.0.3. Finally, as noted in Section 1.0 above [of the licensee's February 8, 2007, application], the GGNS TS already contain a TS Bases Control Program (TS 5.5.1.1) and SR 3.0.1, thus these requirements do not need to be added to the TS.1.4BackgroundOn July 17, 2002, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk-Informed Technical SpecificationsTask Force (RITSTF) submitted proposed change, TSTF-359, Revision 7, to the STS (NUREGs 1430-1434) on behalf of the industry. TSTF-359, Revision 7, is a proposal to change the STS LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 requirements regarding mode change limitations by risk-informing limitations on entering the mode of applicability of an LCO. The Notice of Opportunity to Comment on the model SE using the CLIIP with respect to this change was published in the Federal Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR 50475). The NRC staff prepared a model SEincorporating changes resulting from public comments. The NRC staff has since made minor editorial changes to the SE. TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified, provides the complete approved change as discussed in the Federal Register notice dated April 4, 2003. The RITSTF (1)MODE numbers decrease in the transition "up to a higher mode of operation"; poweroperation is MODE 1.subsequently incorporated the modifications identified in the April 4, 2003, notice intoTSTF-359, Revision 9.This proposal is one of the industry's initiatives under the risk-informed TS program. Theseinitiatives are intended to maintain or improve safety while reducing unnecessary burden and to make TS requirements consistent with the Commission's other risk-informed regulatory requirements, in particular, 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants," or the Maintenance Rule. The current GGNS TS LCO 3.0.4 specifies that the plant cannot go to higher modes of operation(1) (i.e., move towardspower operation) except "when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time." In addition, GGNS TS SR 3.0.4 restricts mode changes "unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified surveillance Frequency." The industry believes that this requirement is unnecessarily restrictive and can unduly delayplant startup while considerable resources are being used to resolve startup issues that are risk insignificant or low risk. A maintenance activity that takes longer than planned can delay a mode change and adversely impact a utility's orderly plant startup and return to power operation. In Revision 3.1 of NUREG-1434, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric BWR/6 [Boiling-Water Reactor Plants]," dated December 1, 2005, LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 were revised to allow entry into a mode without meeting its LCO after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, and establishment of appropriate risk management actions. The licensee proposes to adopt the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 in NUREG-1434, STS, Revision 3.1. The objective of the proposed change is to provide additional operational flexibility without compromising plant safety.The proposed changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 would allow, for systems and components,mode changes into a TS condition that has a specific required action and completion time (CT).

The licensee will utilize the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 allowances only when they determine that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied within the LCO CT after the mode change. In addition, the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 allowances can be applied to values and parameters in specifications when explicitly stated in the TSs (non-system/component TSs such as RCS Specific Activity). These changes are in addition to the current mode change allowance when a required action has an indefinite CT. The LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 mode change allowances are not permitted for the systems and components (termed "higher risk")

listed in Section 3.1.2, "Identification of Risk-Important TS Systems and Components," for the modes specified. Two examples are: (1) BWR plants cannot transition up into any mode with an inoperable Diesel Generator (including other emergency/shutdown AC [alternating current]

power supplies); and (2) BWR plants cannot transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without operable required RHR system loops.

2.0REGULATORY EVALUATION

In 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," the Commission established its regulatoryrequirements related to the content of TSs. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TSs are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings, (2) LCOs, (3) SRs, (4) design features, and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TSs. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the "Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications . . . ." By convention, the LCOs and related SRs are contained in Sections 3.1 through 3.10 of the STSs. STS Section 3.0, on "LCO and SR Applicability,"

provides details or ground rules for complying with the LCOs and related SRs. STS LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 address requirements for LCO compliance when transitioning between modes of operation.TSs have taken advantage of risk technology as experience and capability have increased.Since the mid-1980s, the NRC has been reviewing and granting improvements to the TSs that are based, at least in part, on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) insights. In its final policy statement on TS improvements of July 22, 1993, the Commission stated that it expects that licensees will utilize any plant-specific PRA or risk survey in preparing their TS-related submittals. In evaluating these submittals, the NRC staff applies the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," dated November 2002, and in RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision-making: Technical Specifications," dated August 1998. The NRC staff has appropriately adapted this guidance to assess the acceptability of upward mode changes with equipment inoperable. This review had the following objectives:*To ensure that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during theactual implementation of the proposed change (e.g., when the plant enters a higher mode while an LCO is not met). This risk increase is referred to as "temporary." *To compare and assess the risk impact of the proposed change to theacceptance guidelines of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement, as documented in RG 1.174. The risk impact, which is measured by the average yearly risk increase associated with the change, aims at minimizing the "cumulative" risk associated with the proposed change so that the plant's average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range.*To assess the licensee's ability to identify risk-significant configurationsresulting from maintenance or other operational activities and take appropriate compensatory measures to avoid such configurations. The NRC staff reviewed the reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the non-higher-risk systemsand components, and related guidance to assess and manage the risk of upward mode changes. The Commission has found that compliance with the industry guidance for implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as endorsed by RG 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants," and mandated by STS LCO 3.0.4, SR 3.0.4, and SR 3.0.3, satisfies the configuration risk management objectives of RG 1.177 for TS surveillance interval and CT extensions. Reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes that are consistent with the provisions of the NRC-endorsed industry guidance was also found adequate for managing risk of missed surveillances as described in the Federal Register onSeptember 28, 2001 (66 FR 49714).The NRC staff review also had the objective of ensuring that existing inspection programs havethe necessary controls in place to allow NRC staff to oversee the implementation of the proposed change and reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes or programs. The inspection program also allows the NRC staff to adequately assess the licensee's performance associated with risk assessments. The review encompassed inspection procedures (IPs) (i.e., NRC IP 62709, dated December 28, 2000, "Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk Management Process," and NRC IP 71111.13, dated January 17, 2002, "Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control"), the significance determination process (SDP) (i.e., Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix K, dated May 19, 2005, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process"), enforcement guidance (i.e., draft Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.11, "Actions Involving the Maintenance Rule"), and the associated reactor oversight process (ROP).2.1Proposed Change to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4Currently, LCO 3.0.4 does not allow entrance into a higher mode (or other specified condition)in the applicability when an LCO is not met, except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in that mode or condition indefinitely or a specific exception is granted. Similarly, when an LCO's surveillances have not been met within their specified frequency, entry into a higher mode (or other specified condition) is not allowed by SR 3.0.4.The current GGNS TS LCO 3.0.4 reads:When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in theApplicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition inthe Applicability in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The revised LCO 3.0.4 will read:When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in theApplicability shall only be made: a.When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continuedoperation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time,b.After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperablesystems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications, orc.When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, orother Specification.This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specifiedconditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.The current GGNS TS SR 3.0.4 reads:Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCOshall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition inthe Applicability in MODES 1, 2, and 3.The revised SR 3.0.4 will conform to the changes to LCO 3.0.4 and read:Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCOshall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions inthe Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.The proposed LCO 3.0.4(a) retains the current allowance for when the required actions allowindefinite operation. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allows entering modes or other specified conditions in the applicability except when higher-risk systems and components (listed inSection 3.1.1), for the mode being entered, are inoperable. The decision for entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability of the LCO will be made by plant management after the required risk assessment has been performed and requisite risk management actions established, through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Entry into the modes or other specified conditions in the applicability of the TS shall be for no more than the duration of the applicable required actions CT, or until the LCO is met. Current notes in individual specifications that permitted mode changes are now encompassed by LCO 3.0.4(b) and can be removed. Notes that prohibit mode changes under LCO 3.0.4(b) must be added (i.e., for higher-risk systems and components). The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance can involve multiple components in a single LCO or inmultiple LCOs; however, use of the LCO 3.0.4(b) provisions are always contingent upon completion of a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)-based risk assessment. The notes limiting the applicability of LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are no longer needed and areremoved by TSTF-359, Revision 8. Adding notes to various TS, as defined by the tables of higher-risk systems, precluding entry into Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs is unnecessary by action statements that require immediate CTs, which means that entry into the Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability is not allowed and the notes would be superfluous.

LCO 3.0.4 allowances related to values and parameters of TS are not typically addressed by LCO 3.0.4(b) risk assessments, and are, therefore, addressed by a new LCO 3.0.4 (c).

LCO 3.0.4 (c) refers to allowances already in the TS and annotated in the individual TS.

LCO 3.0.4 (c) also allows for entry into the modes or other specified conditions in the applicability of a TS for no more than the duration of the applicable required actions CT or until the LCO is met or the unit is not within the Applicability of the TS.2.2Proposed Change to TS 1.4, Example 1.4-1, FrequencyThe first paragraph of the current TS 1.4, Example 1.4-1 states:If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE orother specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, the Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2 prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition. Failure to do so would result in a violation of SR 3.0.4.The proposed changes to the Example 1.4-1 conform to the changes in TSTF-485, Revision 0,that was approved by the staff on December 6, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML053460302).

The revised Example 1.4-1 would state:If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE orother specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, then SR 3.0.4 becomes applicable. The Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, as modified by SR 3.0.3, prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition, or the LCO is considered not met (in accordance with SR 3.0.1) and LCO 3.0.4 becomes applicable. This change is being made to correct the Example 1.4-1 to conform to the changes made toLCO 3.0.4.

3.0TECHNICAL EVALUATION

During the development of the current STS, improvements were made to LCO 3.0.4, such asclarifying its applicability with respect to plant shutdowns, cold shutdown mode and refueling mode. In addition, during the STS development, almost all the LCOs with CTs greater than or equal to 30 days, and many LCOs with CTs greater than or equal to 7 days, were given individual LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. During some conversions to the STS, individual plantsprovided acceptable justifications for other LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. All of these specific LCO 3.0.4 exceptions allow entry into a mode or other specified condition in the TS applicability while relying on the TS required actions and associated CTs. The proposed change under evaluation would provide standardization and consistency to the use and application of LCO 3.0.4, both internal to and between each of the specifications and STS NUREGs. This proposed change will also ensure consistency through the utilization of appropriate levels of risk assessment of plant configurations for application of LCO 3.0.4.

However, nothing in this SE should be interpreted as encouraging upward mode transition with inoperable equipment. Good practice should dictate that such transitions should normally be initiated only when all required equipment is operable and that mode transition with inoperable equipment should be the exception rather than the rule.The current LCO 3.0.4(a) allowances are retained in the proposal and do not represent achange in risk from the current situation. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances apply to systems and components, and require a risk assessment prior to utilization to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(c) allowances apply to parameters and values which have been previously approved by the NRC in a plant's specific TS. In its submission, the licensee has provided in their proposed revisions to TS Bases a discussion and list of each NRC-approved, LCO 3.0.4(c)-specific value and parameter allowance and revised the TA Bases of LCO 3.0.4, to explain the new allowances and their utilization.The NRC staff did a qualitative assessment of the risk impact of the proposed change inLCO 3.0.4(b) allowances by evaluating how the licensee's implementation of the proposed risk-informed approach is expected to meet the requirements of the applicable RGs. The NRC staff referred to the guidance provided in RG 1.174, and RG 1.177. RG 1.177 provides the NRC staff's recommendations on utilizing risk information to assess the impact of proposed changes to nuclear power plant technical specifications on the risk associated with plant operation. Although RG 1.177 does not specifically address the type of generic change in this proposal, the NRC staff considered the approach documented in RG 1.177 in evaluating the risk information provided in support of the proposed changes in LCO 3.0.4. The NRC staff's evaluation of how the implementation of the proposed risk-informed approach,used to justify LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, agrees with the objectives of the guidance outlined in RG 1.177, is discussed in Section 3.1. Oversight of the risk-informed approach associated with the LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances is discussed in Sections 3.2. 3.1Evaluation of Risk ManagementBoth the temporary and cumulative risk of the proposed change are adequately limited. Thetemporary risk is limited by the exclusion of higher-risk systems and components, and CTslimits contained in TS (see discussion in SE Section 3.1.1). The cumulative risk is limited by the temporary risk limitations and by the expected low frequency of the proposed mode changes with inoperable equipment (see discussion in SE Section 3.1.4). Adequate NRC oversight of the licensee's ability to use the LCO 3.0.4(b) provisions under appropriate circumstances, i.e., to identify risk-significant configurations when entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO (Section 3.1.5) is provided by NRC inspection of the licensee's implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) as applied to the proposed change. 3.1.1Temporary Risk IncreasesRG 1.177 proposes the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and theincremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) as appropriate measures of the increase in probability of core damage and large early release, respectively, during the period of implementation of a proposed TS change. In addition, RG 1.177 stresses the need to preclude potentially high risk configurations introduced by the proposed change. The ICCDP associated with any specified plant condition, such as the condition introduced by entering a higher mode with plant equipment inoperable, is expressed by the following equation:ICCDP = R d = (R1 - Ro) d (1)where:

R=the conditional risk increase, in terms of core damage frequency (CDF), causedby the specified conditiond=the duration of the specified plant condition R1=the plant CDF with the specified condition permanently present Ro=the plant CDF without the specified conditionThe same expression can be used for ICLERP by substituting the measure of risk, i.e., largeearly release frequency (LERF) for CDF. The magnitude of the ICCDP and ICLERP values associated with plant conditions applicable to LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances can be managed by controlling the conditional risk increase, R (in terms of both CDF and LERF) and the duration,d, of such conditions. The following sections discuss how the key elements of the proposed risk-informed approach, used to justify LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, are expected to limit R and dand, thus, prevent any significant temporary risk increases.3.1.2Identification of Risk-Important TS Systems and ComponentsA major element that limits the risk of the proposed mode change flexibility is the exclusion ofcertain systems and associated LCOs for the mode change allowance. Technical specifications allow operation in Mode 1 (power operation) with specified levels of inoperability for specified times. This provides a benchmark of currently acceptable risk against which to measure any incremental risk inherent in the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b). If a system inoperability accrues risk at a higher rate in one or more of the transition modes than it would in Mode 1, then an upward transition into that mode should not be allowed without demonstration of a high degree ofexperience and sophistication in risk management. However, the risk management process evaluated in Section 3.1.5 is adequate if higher-risk systems/components are excluded from the scope of LCO 3.0.4(b).The importance of most TS systems in mitigating accidents increases as power increases.However, some TS systems are relatively more important during lower power and shutdown operations, because:*certain events are peculiar to modes of plant operation other than poweroperation,*certain events are more probable at modes of plant operation other thanpower operation,*some modes of plant operation have less mitigation system capabilitythan power operation.The risk information submitted in support of the proposed changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4includes qualitative risk assessments performed by each owners group to identify higher risk systems and components at the various modes of operation, including transitions between modes, as the plant moves upward from the refueling mode of operation toward power operation. The owners groups' generic qualitative risk assessments are included as attachments to TSTF-359, Revision 8. Each of the owners groups' generic qualitative risk assessments discuss the technical approach used and the systems/components subsequently determined to be of higher risk significance; the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 allowances for the various modes are listed. The BWR owners groups generic qualitative risk assessments are:*BWR owners' group Risk-Informed Technical Specification Committee,"Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Improvements to Technical Specification Mode Restraints for BWR Plants," General Electric Company GE-NE A13-00464 (Rev. 2).Following interactions with the NRC staff, all owners groups used the same systematicapproach in their qualitative risk assessments to identify the higher-risk systems in the STS,consisting of the following steps:*identification of plant conditions (i.e., plant parameters and availability ofkey mitigation systems) associated with changes in plant operating modes while returning to power*identification of key activities that have the potential to impact risk andwhich are in progress during transitions between modes while the plant is returning to power

• identification of applicable accident initiating events for each mode orother specified condition in the applicability *identification of the higher-risk systems and components by combiningthe information in the first three steps (qualitative risk assessment)The risk assessments properly used the results and insights from previous deterministic andprobabilistic studies to systematically search for plant conditions in which certain key plant components are more important in mitigating accidents than during operation at power (Mode 1). This search was systematic, taking the following factors into account for the various stages of returning the plant to power:*the status of accident mitigation and normally operating systems

• the status of key plant parameters such as RCS pressure

• the key activities that are in progress during transitions between modeswhich have the potential to impact risk (e.g., the transfer from auxiliary to main feedwater at some PWR plants when Mode 1 is entered)*the applicable accident initiating events for each mode of plant operation

• design and operational differences among plants or groups of plantsThe following systems and components were identified by the BWR Owners Group (BWROG)as higher-risk systems and components, when the plant is entering a new mode:BWROG PlantsSystemBWR Type Entering ModeHigh Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System BWR 3 & 4 2, 1High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) BWR 5 & 6 2, 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System BWR 3, 4, 5 & 6 2, 1 Isolation Condenser BWR 2 2, 1 Diesel Generators (including other Emergency/Shutdown AC Power Supplies) All All Hardened Wetwell Vent System BWR 2, 3 & 4 with Mark IContainment 3, 2, 1RHR System All 4If a licensee identifies a higher-risk system for only some of the modes of applicability, the TSfor that system would be modified by a note that reads, for example, "LCO 3.0.4(b) is not applicable when entering MODE 1 from MODE 2." Systems identified as higher risk for Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs, are also excluded from transitioning up to the mode of higher risk, and as previously discussed, notes for those transitions are superfluous. In addition, mode transitions for Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs, will be addressed by administrative controls.Table 1 in SE Section 1.2, provides a summary of the changes proposed by the licensee. The licensee has adopted the TSTF-359 wording for LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4. Existing notesstating that "LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable" have been deleted from various TS LCOs as described in TSTF-359 and the supporting documentation. The format and numbering of the GGNS TS vary from the STS, but the changes proposed are consistent with TSTF-359 and this SE. LCO 3.0.4(c) has been referenced appropriately for the TS defining limits on parameters and values. The licensee has, consistent with the Table 1 in SE Section 1.2, added notes to the appropriate TS to state that the revised LCO 3.0.4(b) allowing mode changes with inoperable equipment is not applicable to the identified higher-risk systems.In summary, the NRC staff's review of the BWROG's qualitative risk assessments finds thatthey are of adequate quality to support the application (i.e., they identify the higher-risk systems and components) associated with entering higher modes of plant operation with equipment inoperable while returning to power.3.1.3Limited Time in TS Required ActionsAny temporary risk increase will be limited by, among other factors, duration constraintsimposed by the TS CTs of the inoperable systems. For the systems and components which are not higher risk, any temporary risk increase associated with the proposed allowance will be smaller than what is considered acceptable when the same systems and components are inoperable at power. This is due to the fact that CTs associated with the majority of TS systems and components were developed for power operation and pose a smaller plant risk for action statement entries initiated or occurring at lower modes of operation as compared to power operation.The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be used only when the licensee determines that there is a highlikelihood that the LCO will be satisfied following the mode change. This will minimize the likelihood of additional temporary risk increases associated with the need to exit a mode due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. In most cases, licensees will enter into a higher mode with the intent to move up to Mode 1 (power operation). As discussed in Section 3.2, the revised ROP monitors unplanned power changes as a performance indicator.

The ROP thus discourages licensees from entering a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of an LCO, and moving up in power, when there is a likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. Another disincentive for licensees to enter a higher mode when an LCO is not met is related to reporting requirements. 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 make it clear that a report is required when a nuclear plant shutdown or mode change is required by TS. The NRC's oversight program will provide the framework for inspectors and other staff to follow the history at a specific plant of entering higher modes while an LCO is not met, and use such information in assessing the licensee's actions and performance.3.1.4Cumulative Risk IncreasesThe cumulative risk impact of the change to allow the plant to enter a higher mode of operationwith one or more safety-related components unavailable (as proposed here), is measured by the average yearly risk increase associated with the change. In general, this cumulative risk increase is assessed in terms of both CDF and LERF (i.e., CDF and LERF, respectively).The increase in CDF due to the proposed change is expressed by the following equation, which integrates the risk impact from all expected specified conditions (i.e., all expected plantconditions caused by mode changes with various TS systems and components unavailable).CDF= (CDF i) = ICCDP i f i (2)whereCDF i=the CDF increase due to specified condition iICCDP i=the ICCDP associated with specified condition i f i =the average yearly frequency of occurrence of specified condition iA similar expression can be used for LERF by substituting the measure of risk, i.e., LERF forCDF. The magnitude of the CDF and LERF values associated with plant conditionsapplicable to LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances can be managed by controlling the temporary risk increases, in terms of both CDF and LERF (i.e., ICCDP and ICLERP), and the frequency (f), of each of such conditions. In addition to the points made in the previous section regarding temporary risk increases, the following points put into perspective how the key elements of the proposed risk-informed approach, used to justify an LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance, are expected to prevent significant cumulative risk increases by limiting the frequency of its use:*The frequency of risk significant conditions will be limited by not providingthe LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances to the higher risk systems and components.*The frequency of risk significant conditions will be limited by therequirement to assess the likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied following the mode change.*The frequency of risk significant conditions is limited by the fact that suchconditions can occur only when the plant is returning to power following shutdown, i.e., during a small fraction of time per year (data over the past five years indicate that the plants are averaging 2.1 startups per year).The addition of the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances to the plant maintenance activities is notexpected to change the plant's average (cumulative) risk significantly.3.1.5Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Mode ChangesWith all safety systems and components operable, a plant can transition up in mode to poweroperation. With one or more system(s) or component(s) inoperable, this change permits a plant to transition up in mode to power operation if the inoperable system(s) or component(s) are not in the pre-analyzed higher risk category, a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based risk assessment is performed prior to the mode transition, and the requisite risk management actions are taken.The proposed TS Bases state,When an LCO is not met, LCO 3.0.4 also allows entering MODES or otherspecified conditions in the Applicability following assessment of the risk impact and determination that the impact can be managed. The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment willbe conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities to be assessed and managed. It should be noted that, the risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4(b), must take intoaccount all inoperable TS equipment regardless whether the equipment is included in the licensee's normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by RG 1.182. The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. A risk assessment and establishment of risk management actions, as appropriate, are required for determination of acceptable risk for entering MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. Elements of acceptable risk assessment and risk management actions are included in Section 11 of Nuclear Management and Resources Council document (NUMARC) 93-01 "Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities," as endorsed by RG 1.182, which addresses general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, gives quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and provides example risk management actions. These risk management actions include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, actions to increase risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the conditions, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and actions to ensure that a determination is made that the proposed MODE change is acceptable.The guidance references in RG 1.182, state that a licensee's risk assessment process shouldbe sufficiently robust and comprehensive to assess risk associated with maintenance activities during power operation, low power and shutdown conditions (all modes of operation), including changes in plant conditions. NUMARC 93-01 states that the risk assessment should include consideration of: (1) the degree of redundancy available for performance of the safety function(s) served by the out-of-service equipment, (2) the duration of the out-of-service condition, (3) component and system dependencies that are affected, (4) the risk impact of performing the maintenance during shutdown versus at power; and, (5) the impact of mode transition risk. For power operation, key plant safety functions are those that ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, ensure the capability to shut down and maintain the reactor in safe shutdown condition, and ensure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potentially significant offsite exposures.While the inoperabilities permitted by the CTs of TS-required actions take into consideration thesafety significance and redundancy of the system or components within the scope of an LCO, the CTs generally do not address or consider concurrent system or component inoperabilities in multiple LCOs. Therefore, the performance of the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment which looks at the entire plant configuration is essential (and required) prior to changing operational mode. The 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based risk assessment will be used to confirm (or reject) the appropriateness of transitioning up in mode given the actual status of plant safety equipment.The risk impact on the plant condition of invoking an LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be assessedand managed through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This program is consistent with RG 1.177 and RG 1.174 in its approach. The implementationguidance for paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule addresses controlling temporary risk increases resulting from maintenance activities. This guidance, consistent with guidance inRG 1.177, establishes action thresholds based on qualitative and quantitative considerationsand risk management actions. Significant temporary risk increases following an LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance are unlikely to occur unless:*high-risk configurations are allowed (e.g., certain combinations of multiplecomponent outages), or*risk management of plant operation activities is inadequate.The requirements associated with the proposed change are established to ensure that suchconditions will not occur.The thresholds of the cumulative (aggregate) risk impacts, assessed pursuant to 10 CFR50.65(a)(4) and the associated implementation guidance, are based on the permanent change guidelines in NRC RG 1.174. Therefore, licensees will manage the risk exercising LCO 3.0.4 in conjunction with the risk from other concurrent plant activities to ensure that any increase, in terms of CDF and LERF) will be small and consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement.3.2OversightThe ROP provides a means for assessing the licensee's performance in the application of theproposed mode change flexibility. The adequacy of the licensee's assessment and management of maintenance-related risk is addressed by existing inspection programs and guidance for 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Although the current versions of that guidance do not specifically address application of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) program to support risk-informed technical specifications, it is expected that in most cases, risk assessment and management associated with risk-informed technical specifications would be required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) anyway because maintenance activities will be involved.Adoption of the proposed change will make failure to assess and manage the risk of an upwardmode change with inoperable equipment covered by TSs, prior to commencing such a mode change, a violation of TSs. Further, as explained above in general, under most foreseeable circumstances, such a change in configuration would also require a risk assessment under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Inoperable systems or components will necessitate maintenance to restore them to operability, and hence a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment would be performed prior to the performance of those maintenance actions (except for immediate plant stabilization and restoration actions if necessary). Further, before altering the plant's configuration, including plant configuration changes associated with mode changes, the licensee must update the existing 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment to reflect those changes. The Federal Register Notice July 19, 1999 (64 FR 38553), issuing a revision to themaintenance rule, along with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.13, and Section 11, of NUMARC 93-01, indicate that to determine the safety impact of a change in plant conditions during maintenance, a risk assessment must be performed before changing plant conditions.The Bases for the proposed TS change mandate that the risk assessment and management of upward mode changes will be conducted under the licensee's program and process for meeting 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Oversight of licensee performance in assessing and managing the risk of plant maintenance activities is conducted principally by inspection in accordance with ROP Baseline IP 71111.13. Supplemental IP 62709, "Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk Management Process," is utilized to evaluate the licensee's process, when necessary.The overview of ROP is described in NUREG-1649, Rev 3, "Reactor Oversight Process," and indetail in the NRC Inspection Manual. IP 71111.13 requires verification of performance of risk assessments when they are required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and in accordance with licensee procedures. The procedure also requires verification of the adequacy of those risk assessments and verification of effective implementation of licensee-prescribed risk management actions. The rule itself requires such assessment and management of risk prior to maintenance activities, including preventive maintenance, surveillance and testing, (and promptly for emergent work) during all modes of plant operation. The guidance documents for both industry implementation of (a)(4) and NRC oversight of that implementation indicate that changes in plant configuration (which would include mode changes) in support of maintenance activities must be taken into account in the risk assessment and management process.

Revisions to NRC inspection guidance and licensee implementation procedures will be needed to address oversight of risk assessment and management required by TS in support of mode changes that are not already required under the circumstances by (a)(4). This consideration provides performance-based regulatory oversight of the use of the proposed flexibility, and a disincentive to use the flexibility without the requisite care in planning.In addition, the NRC staff has developed detailed SDP guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix K,dated May 19, 2005, for use in assessing inspection findings related to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).

The ROP considers inspection findings and performance indicators in evaluating licensee ability to operate safely. The SDP is used to determine the significance of inspection findings related to licensee's assessment and management of the risk associated with performing maintenance activities under all plant operating or shutdown conditions. Unplanned reactor scrams and unplanned power changes are two of the Reactor Safety Performance Indicators that the ROP utilizes to assess licensee performance and inform the public. The ROP will provide a disincentive to entering into power operation (Mode 1), when there is a significant likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT.3.3Evaluation of Verifications and CommitmentsWhile the changes to TS Bases are not in the scope of the NRC Staff's review, the staff findsthat the licensee has performed the plant-specific verifications required by the notice of availability published in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579), for this TSImprovement. Also, the Regulatory Commitment mentioned in 68 FR 16579 is not necessary because GGNS TSs already contain a TS Bases Control Program (TS 5.5.1.1) and SR 3.0.1. 3.4Summary - Technical EvaluationThe industry, through the NEI RITSTF, has submitted a proposed TS change to allow entry intoa higher mode of operation, or other specified condition in the TS applicability, while relying on the TS conditions, and associated required actions and CTs, provided a risk assessment is performed to confirm the acceptability of that action. The proposal revises TS LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4, and their application to the TS, including revisions to the notes in TS sections. New paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) are proposed for LCO 3.0.4.The proposed LCO 3.0.4(a) retains the current allowance, permitting the mode change whenthe TS required actions allow indefinite operation.Proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) is the change to allow entry into a higher mode of operation, or otherspecified condition in the TS applicability, while relying on the TS conditions and associated required actions and CTs, provided a risk assessment is performed to confirm the acceptability of that action for the existing plant configuration. The NRC staff review finds that the process proposed by industry and the licensee for assessing and managing risk during the implementation of the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, meets Commission guidance for technical specification changes. Key elements of this process are listed below:*A risk assessment shall be performed before any LCO 3.0.4(b) allowanceis invoked.*The risk impact on the plant condition of invoking an LCO 3.0.4(b)allowance will be assessed and managed through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the associated guidance in RG 1.182. Allowing entry into a higher mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO after an 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based risk assessment and appropriate risk management actions are taken for the existing plant configuration will ensure that plant safety is maintained.*The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be used only when the licenseedetermines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied within the required action's CT.*TS systems and components which may be of higher risk during modechanges have been identified generically by each owner's group for each plant operational mode or condition. Licensees will identify such plant-specific systems and components in the individual plant TS. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance does not apply to these systems and components for the mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO at which they are of higher risk.*Plants adopting LCO 3.0.4(b) will ensure that plant procedures in place toimplement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) address the situation where entering a mode or other specified condition in the applicability is contemplated with plant equipment inoperable. Such plant procedures typically follow the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as revised in February 2000and endorsed by NRC RG 1.182.*The NRC's ROP provides the framework for inspectors and other staff tooversee the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements at a specific plant and assess the licensee's actions and performance.*The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance does not apply to values and parameters of the TSsthat have their own respective LCOs (e.g., RCS Specific Activity), but instead those values and parameters are addressed by LCO 3.0.4(c). The TS values and parameters for which mode transition allowances apply, will have a note that states LCO 3.0.4(c) is applicable.*The objective of the proposed change is to provide additional operationalflexibility without compromising plant safety.Also, the proposed revisions to TS 1.4, Example 1.4-1 are acceptable to the NRC staff becausethey are consistent with the changes made to LCO 3.0.4.3.5Conclusion - Technical EvaluationThe NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's application, dated February 8, 2007, using CLIIP, foran amendment to FOL to modify: (1) GGNS TS LCO 3.0.4, SR 3.0.4, and TS 1.4, Example 1.4-1, (2) the other appropriate TS sections, and (3) the variations to required changes described in the NRC-approved TSTF-359 and TSTF-485. Based on the above discussions in Sections 1.0 through 3.4, the NRC staff finds that the licensee's proposed changes to GGNS TS LCO 3.0.4, SR 3.0.4, and changes to other appropriate TS sections as described in the licensee's submission, including the variations, are consistent with the NRC-approved model SE published in the notice of availability in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579) andtherefore, the changes are acceptable.

4.0STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Mississippi official was notified ofthe proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official receiving the notification had no

comments.

5.0ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirements with respect to installation or use of a facilitycomponent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change SRs.

The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published March 27, 2007 (72 FR 14304). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be preparedin connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) thereis reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.Principal Contributor: T. Wertz, ITSB Date: May 30, 2007