IR 05000482/2013010

Errata for Wolf Creek Generating Station - NRC Inspection Procedure 95002 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000482/2013010 and Assessment Follow-Up Letter

ML13255A273
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	09/12/2013
From:	O'Keefe N F NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To:	Sunseri M W Wolf Creek
Bloodgood M
References
EA-12-152 IR-13-010
Download: ML13255A273 (6)

Text

September 12, 2013 EA-12-152 Matthew Sunseri, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Subject: ERRATA FOR WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION NRC INSPECTION PROCEDURE 95002 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2013010 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Dear Mr. Sunseri:

Please remove page 1 of the cover letter and pages 2, 4 and A1-2 from the Wolf Creek Generating Station - NRC Inspection Procedure 95002 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000482/2012002 and Assessment Follow-up Letter (ADAMS ML#13203A329), and replace them with the pages enclosed with this letter. The purpose of this change is to add the Enforcement Action (EA) number associated with the Yellow finding. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one for cases where a response is not required, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42 Enclosures: 1.ERRATA - WC NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2013010, Pages 1, 2, 4, A1-2 Electronic Distribution by RIV: Acting Regional Administrator (Steven.Reynolds@nrc.gov) Acting Deputy Regional Administrator (Thomas.Bergman@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov) DRP Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov) DRS Director (Thomas.Blount@nrc.gov) DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov) Senior Resident Inspector (Charles.Peabody@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (Raja.Stroble@nrc.gov) Site Administrative Assistant (Carey.Spoon@nrc.gov) Branch Chief / B (Neil.OKeefe@nrc.gov) Senior Project Engineer (Michael.Bloodgood@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov) Regional State Liaison Officer (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov) Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov) NRR Project Manager (Fred.Lyon@nrc.gov) RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov) TSB Technical Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov) ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov) Branch Chief, IPAB, NRR (Rani.Franovich@nrc.gov) Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov) RIV/ETA: OEDO (Daniel.Rich@nrc.gov) ROPreports@nrc.gov SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials MRB Publicly Available Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials MRB SPE:DRP/B DRP:TL C:ACES C:DRP/B MBloodgood CYoung HGepford NOKeefe /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/MBloodgood for 9/5/2013 9/5/2013 9/6/2013 9/12/13 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

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-2- Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000482/2013010, 06/03/2013 - 06/07/2013, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Supplemental Inspection (IP 95002); Independent Safety Culture Assessment Follow-up (IP 40100); Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Follow-up. This supplemental inspection was conducted by four region-based inspectors and a senior resident inspector. No findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

The NRC staff performed this supplemental inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95002, "Supplemental Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," to assess the licensee's evaluation associated with the failure of a startup transformer due to a failure to follow maintenance procedures, which resulted in a loss of offsite power event at the station in January 2012. The NRC staff previously characterized this issue as having substantial safety significance (Yellow), as documented in NRC Inspection Reports 05000482/2012009 and 05000482/2012010 (EA 12-152). A follow-up assessment letter dated September 21, 2012, transitioned Wolf Creek to the Degraded Cornerstone Column beginning August 6, 2012, due to one Yellow input in the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and identified the intention to perform Inspection Procedure 95002. The inspectors determined that the licensee performed a comprehensive evaluation of the issues related to the Yellow finding, which appropriately identified the root cause of the issue to be the failure to recognize the risk/consequence of having a vendor perform work, in accordance with vendor procedures and processes, without an established verification method for ensuring work quality, resulting in an undetected human performance error. The failure to follow maintenance procedures during a maintenance activity in April 2011, resulted in a subsequent failure of the startup transformer and a loss of offsite power during an event on January 13, 2012. The inspectors determined that the licensee identified appropriate corrective actions to enhance the oversight of supplemental workers performing work activities, which appear to be adequate to address the identified performance issue. In addition to assessing the licensee's evaluations, the inspection team performed an independent extent of condition and extent of cause review and a focused inspection of the site safety culture as it related to the root cause evaluation. The team concluded planned, adequately addressed the extent of condition and extent of cause, and were adequate to address the cause and prevent recurrence. Based on independent inspection, the team also determined that the licensee's assessment of site safety culture contribution to the issue was adequate.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA4 Supplemental Inspection

.01 Inspection Scope

The NRC staff performed this supplemental inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95002, "Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs which affected the initiating events cornerstone in the reactor safety strategic performance area. The inspection objectives were to: provide assurance that the root and contributing causes of risk-significant issues were understood provide assurance that the extent of condition and extent of cause of risk- significant issues were identified and to independently assess the extent of condition and extent of cause of individual and collective risk-significant issues independently determine if safety culture components caused or significantly contributed to the risk significant issues provide assurance that the licensee's corrective actions for risk-significant issues were or will be sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and to preclude repetition the third quarter of 2012 as a result of one inspection finding of substantial safety significance (Yellow). The finding was associated with the failure of a startup transformer during a power transient which occurred on January 13, 2012, resulting in a loss of offsite power event at the station. The startup transformer failure was the result of an inadequately performed maintenance activity conducted by contracted workers in April 2011, in which maintenance procedure requirements were not adequately followed. The finding was characterized as having Yellow safety significance, as discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 05000482/2012009 and 05000482/2012010. (EA-12-152) The licensee staff informed the NRC on April 30, 2013, that Wolf Creek was ready for the supplemental inspection. In preparation for the inspection, the licensee performed a root cause evaluation (RCE) to identify weaknesses that existed, which allowed for a risk- significant finding and Degraded Cornerstone, and to determine the organizational attributes that resulted in the Yellow finding. The licensee also conducted assessments to determine whether safety culture aspects contributed to the performance issues that led to the Yellow finding.

A1-2 Attachment LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Open None Closed 05000482/2012009-01 NOV Failure to Provide Adequate Oversight of Contractors During Maintenance on the Startup Transformer (EA-12-152) (Section 4OA4) Discussed 05000482/2012007-03 NOV Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition (Section 4OA4) LIST OF

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION AP 15C-001 Procedure Writers Guide 26 AP 15C-002 Procedure Use and Adherence AP 22C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment 27 AP 27-007 Nonconforming and Degraded Conditions 9 AI 28A-018 Corrective Action Review Board 0 AI 22C-010 Operation Work Control 16 AI 22C-012 Quality Review Team (QRT) for Maintenance Work Planning 3 AP 09F-001 Business Planning Draft GEN 00-003 Hot Standby to Minimum Load 91 AI 28A-018 Corrective Action Review Board 0 AI 36-001 Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring 1 (with OTSC 13- 0022) AP 36-001 Nuclear Safety Culture 3 AP 20B-001 Plant Safety Review Committee 12 AI 13E-015 Wolf Creek Leadership and Accountability Model 5A AI 13E-015 Wolf Creek Leadership and Accountability Model 0 AI 34-010 Human Performance Tools 0 AP 28A-100 Condition Reports 20A AI 28A-100 Cause Analysis 4 AI 28A-010 Screening Condition Reports 15