RA-18-098, License Amendment Request Supplement - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme
| ML18310A306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2018 |
| From: | Gallagher M Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CAC MG0153, CAC MG0160, EPID L-2017-LLA-0307, EPID L-2017-LLE-0020, RA-18-098 | |
| Download: ML18310A306 (17) | |
Text
Michael P. Gallagher Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation . Vice President License Renewal and Decommissioning 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 610 765 5958 Office 610 765 5658 Fax www.exeloncorp.com michaelp.gallagher@exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.90 10 CFR 50.12 RA-18-098 November 6, 2018 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 NRC Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15
Subject:
License Amendment Request Supplement - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme
Reference:
- 1) Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No.
294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated October 22, 2018 (ML18295A384)
- 2) Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station -
Issuance of Amendment RE: Changes to the Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme (GAG NO. MG0160; EPID L-2017-LLA-0307)," dated October 17, 2018 (ML18221A400)
- 3) Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station -
Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (CAC NO. MG0153; EPID L-2017-LLE-0020)," dated October 16, 2018 (ML 182220A980)
- 4) Electronic Mail Capture from John Lamb (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to David Helker (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Oyster Creek Permanently Ceases Power Operations," dated September 17, 2018 (ML18263A163)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Supplement to LAA Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 November 6, 2018 Page 2
- 5) Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E," dated August 22, 2017 (ML17234A082)
By letter dated October 22, 2018 (Reference 1), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requested earlier effective and implementation dates for License Amendment No. 294, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) Changes to the Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) and associated Emergency Action Levels (EALs) Scheme" (Reference 2). The purpose of this letter is to provide the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with supplementary information to support the requested earlier effective date as it pertains to the previously approved Emergency Preparedness (EP) exemption from portions of 1o CFR 50.47(b),
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV (Reference 3).
Exelon requested in Reference 1 that License Amendment No. 294 (Reference 2) and the associated EP exemptions become effective 9.38 months (285 days) from the date of the permanent shut down of OCNGS, which occurred on September 17, 2018 (Reference 4). As provided in Reference 1, the PDEP and associated EAL scheme were predicated on approval of EP exemptions, which were approved in Reference 3. However, as stated in the NRC approval of the EP exemptions, the exemptions are not effective until 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations; which would be September 17, 2019. As a result of this EP exemption effective date limitation, Exelon would need to delay implementation of Amendment No. 294 for the PDEP; thereby, causing undue burden in support of plant decommissioning efforts because a supporting revised analysis would support an earlier effective date (Reference 1, Attachment 2).
This exemption request supplements the license amendment request in Reference 1 and is contained in the Attachment to this letter. As provided in Attachment 2 of Reference 1, Exelon reanalyzed the site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis. The results showed that 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent shutdown, instead of the 12 months provided in Reference 5, would be a sufficient decay time such that the hottest fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool (SFP) would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature (900°C) in fewer than 1O hours. This event assumes a loss of both water and air cooling of the spent fuel from a beyond-design-bases accident.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," Exelon requests an exemption from the portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E for OCNGS as previously approved in Reference 3. There are no changes to the previous application and supplements, and previously approved EP exemptions with the exception of the effective date of 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, as stated in Reference 3. This submittal requests the same regulatory exemptions but with an earlier effective date. An earlier date would allow Exelon to implement the EP exemptions approved in Reference 3 and License Amendment No. 294 (Reference 1) based on the revised site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis at 9.38 months (285 days) from the date of permanent shutdown.
The requested exemption is permissible under 10 CFR 50.12 because it is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, is consistent with the common defense and security, and present special circumstances.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 November 6, 2018 Page3 Exelon requests review and approval of this exemption request by April 30, 2019, to be effective June 29, 2019, because the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82 (a)(1 )(i) and (ii) that OCNGS has ceased power operations and has been permanently defueled have been docketed. Approval of this exemption by April 30, 2019, will allow Exelon adequate time to implement the changes from the LAA (Reference 1) by the requested effective date.
Exelon has provided information supporting a finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration and the Environmental Consideration provided to the NRC in the Reference 1, this supplement does not impact the conclusions provided in that document. "Justification for Exemptions and Special Circumstances" and "Environmental Assessment" are provided in the Attachment to this supplement. Furthermore, the supplemental information provided in this submittal does not affect the bases for concluding that neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
In accordance with 10CFR50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation, "paragraph (b),
Exelon is notifying the State of New Jersey of this supplemental response by transmitting a copy of this letter and the supporting attachments to the designated State Official.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.
If you have any questions concerning this submittal, then please contact Paul Bonnett at (610) 765-5264.
Respectfully, Michael P. Gallagher Vice President, License Renewal & Decommissioning Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Attachment:
Supplement to Request to Change License Amendment and Exemption Effective and Implementation Dates cc: w/Attachment Regional Administrator - NRC Region I NRC Resident Inspector - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station NRC Project Manager, NRA - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station NRC Project Manager, NMSS - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Director, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering - New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Mayor of Lacey Township, Forked River, NJ
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 November 6, 2018 Page 4 bee: w/o Attachment Senior Vice President Mid-Atlantic Operations Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Manager, Operations - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station w/Attachment Plant Manager - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Senior Manager, Decommissioning - Cantara Regulatory Assurance - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Manager, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs - KSA Licensing Records - KSA Commitment Tracking Coordinator - East
Attachment Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station Supplement to Request to Change License Amendment and Exemption Effective and Implementation Dates
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-1 of A-12 1.0 SPECIFIC EXEMPTION REQUEST By letter dated October 22, 2018 (Reference 1), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requested earlier implementation and effective dates for License Amendment No. 294, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) Changes to the Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) and associated Emergency Action Levels (EALs) Scheme" (Reference 2). The purpose of this supplement is to provide the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with supplementary information to support the requested early effective date as it pertains to the previously approved Emergency Preparedness (EP) exemptions from portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV (Reference 3).
Exelon requested in Reference 1 that License Amendment No. 294 (Reference 2) and the associated EP exemptions become effective 9.38 months (285 days) from the date of the permanent shut down of OCNGS, which occurred on September 17, 2018 (Reference 4). As provided in Reference 1, the PDEP and associated EAL scheme were predicated on approval of EP exemptions, which were approved in Reference 3. However, as stated in the NRC approval of the EP exemptions, the exemptions are not effective until 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations; which would be September 17, 2019.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," Exelon requests an exemption from the portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E for OCNGS as previously approved in Reference 3. There are no changes to the previous application and supplements, and previously approved EP exemptions apart from the effective date of 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, as stated in Reference 3. This submittal requests the same regulatory exemptions but with an earlier effective date. An earlier date would allow Exelon to implement the EP exemptions approved in Reference 3 and License Amendment No. 294 (Reference 2) based on the revised site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis at 9.38 months (285 days) from the date of permanent shutdown.
The requested exemption is permissible under 10 CFR 50.12 because it is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, is consistent with the common defense and security, and present special circumstances.
2.0 BACKGROUND
By letter dated January 7, 2011 (Reference 5), Exelon submitted, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i), formal notification to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power operations at OCNGS no later than December 31, 2019. By letter dated February 14, 2018 (Reference 6), Exelon subsequently notified the NRC of its plans to permanently cease power operations at OCNGS no later than October 31, 2018. Exelon permanently ceased power operations at OCNGS on September 17, 2018 (Reference 4), and certified, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), the permanent removal of fuel from the OCNGS reactor vessel by letter dated September 25, 2018 (Reference 7).
In support of the decommissioning efforts at OCNGS, by letter dated August 22, 2017 (Reference 8), as supplemented by letters dated December 6, 2017, and January 23, March 8, and March 19, 2018 (References 9, 10, 11, and 12, respectively), Exelon requested exemptions from specific emergency preparedness (EP) requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E for OCNGS. The NRC found the application complete, and Exelon's
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-2 of A-12 associated technical justification provided a basis for the Commission's approval of the previous EP exemptions (Reference 3).
Exelon submitted an associated License Amendment Request (LAR) by letter dated August 29, 2017 (Reference 13), for supporting changes related to EP requirements at OCNGS. The requested LAR supported by the EP exemptions would allow Exelon to revise the OCNGS Emergency Plan to a PDEP to reflect the permanently shut down and defueled condition of the facility. The EP exemptions maintain the requirements for an onsite radiological emergency plan and continued to ensure the capability to communicate and coordinate with offsite response authorities. Exelon requested that the effective date for the EP exemptions and associated LAR occur 12 months (365 days) following permanent cessation of power operations at OCNGS. This 12-month time-period was based on the results of an Zirconium Fire Analysis (adiabatic calculation) that Exelon performed considering data based on the projected December 2019 shutdown.
On October 16, 2018 (Reference 3), the NRC approved the EP exemptions from portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV requirements for OCNGS. The NRC concluded that the postulated dose to the general public from any remaining applicable design-basis accident would not exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAG) limits at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) and, for any highly unlikely beyond-design-basis events impacting spent fuel pool (SFP) integrity or the ability to cool spent fuel, the length of time available to implement pre-planned mitigation measures consistent with plant conditions and, if necessary, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP), "all-hazards" approach, provides confidence that offsite measures for the public could be taken without preplanning. The conclusion is consistent with the staff's evaluation, as provided to the Commission in SECY-18-0062 (Reference 14), which was approved by the Commission in the SRM to SECY-18-0062 (Reference 15).
On October 17, 2018, the NRC issued License Amendment No. 294, approving the OCNGS PDEP and Permanently Defueled EAL scheme (Reference 2). The PDEP and Permanently Defueled EAL scheme were predicated on approval of exemptions from specific 10 CFR Part 50 EP requirements for OCNGS which were approved on October 16, 2018 (Reference 3).
On October 22, 2018 (Reference 1), Exelon submitted a LAR to request an earlier effective and implementation date for License Amendment No. 294. The submittal also discussed the need for changing the effective date for approved supporting EP exemptions; however, it was later determined that additional information would be needed to supplement the request for supporting a change in the implementation period for the approved EP exemptions. Therefore, the information provide in this attachment supports that request.
3.0 DISCUSSION License Amendment No. 294 for OCNGS is predicated on the supporting Exemptions from portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which was approved on October 16, 2018 (Reference 3).
The safety evaluation (SE) issued with Reference 3, specified the EP exemptions would become effective 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations. As discussed in Exelon's original EP exemption request (Reference 8), a projected shutdown date of December
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-3 of A-12 31, 2019, was assumed in an analysis (Zirconium Fire Analysis) performed to evaluate the length of time it takes for the spent fuel to decay from permanent shutdown until an uncovered spent fuel assembly in the SFP would reach the temperature where the zirconium cladding would fail (900°C) in 1O hours (zirconium fire period). The results of the Zirconium Fire Analysis showed that 12 months after permanent cessation of power operations, the spent fuel stored in the SFP will have decayed to the extent that the requested EP exemptions may be implemented at OCNGS (end of the zirconium fire period).
The OCNGS permanent shutdown actually occurred on September 17, 2018 (Reference 4), and Exelon certified permanent cessation of operation and removal of fuel from the reactor vessel at OCNGS by letter dated September 25, 2018 (Reference 7). Two key assumptions considered in the original Zirconium Fire Analysis were impacted by the early shutdown. Exelon reevaluated the Zirconium Fire Analysis, as discussed in Attachment 2 of the LAR (Reference 1), using actual conditions and parameters based on the September 17, 2018, shutdown and concluded that the end of the zirconium fire period would occur in 9.38 months (285 days) after cessation from power operations.
The allowed implementation of License Amendment No. 294 (Reference 2) is predicated on the approved EP exemptions (Reference 3), which specifies that EP exemptions are not to be effective earlier than 12 months (365 days) from permanent cessation of power operations; which would be no earlier than September 17, 2019. As a result of this limitation, Exelon would need to delay implementation of Amendment No. 294 for the PDEP; thereby, causing undue burden in support of plant decommissioning efforts because a revised supporting analysis provides for earlier implementation (Reference 1, Attachment 2).
Therefore, based on the information provided in Attachment 2 of Reference 1 and this exemption request, Exelon is requesting an exemption from the portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E for OCNGS as previously approved in Reference
- 3. There are no changes to the previous application and supplements, and previously approved EP exemptions apart from the effective date for the approved EP exemptions (Reference 3) being changed based to the revised zirconium fire period, which has been reanalyzed to be 9.38 months (285 days) after cessation from power operations.
4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
As discussed above, Exelon is requesting the same EP exemptions that were previously approved in Reference 3 apart from the effective date of the EP exemptions being changed from 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, to account for the revised zirconium fire period. This request solely involves changing the schedule for implementing the EP exemptions to be based on the end of the zirconium fire period and does not impact or alter any of the criteria previously reviewed and approved by the NRC (Reference 3).
The NRC's approval of the EP exemptions (Reference 3) was based on Exelon demonstrating that: (1) the radiological consequences of design basis accidents (OBA) would not exceed the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the EAB; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident (BDBA) resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP), "all hazards" approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-4 of A-12 With respect to OBA, Exelon provided an analysis (Reference 16) in support of the requested EP exemptions (Reference 8) that demonstrated that the radiological consequences of the only remaining OBA with potential for offsite radiological release (i.e., the fuel handling accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building, where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB at 33 days following permanent cessation of power operations. This analysis (Reference
- 16) remains unchanged. Because the reanalyzed zirconium fire period is 285 days following permanent cessation of power operations, the requested effective date is beyond the 33-day time period where the EAB PAGs will not be exceeded. Therefore, the basis for the approved EP exemptions for the remaining OBA after permanent shutdown remains bounded.
With respect to the BDBA, in approving the EP exemptions, the NRC's safety evaluation indicted that Exelon analyzed a drain down of SFP water event that would effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrated that at 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations it would take 1O hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900°C, the temperature used to assess the potential onset of fission product release {zirconium fire period).
The analysis by which the NRC approved the EP exemptions was provided in Reference 8 ; specifically, Calculation C-1302-226-E310-457, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool," Revision O (OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis).
As discussed in Reference 1, since the time of the EP exemption request submittal (Reference 8), two key assumptions in the OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis have been reconsidered based on actual conditions at the time of final plant shutdown. First, the fuel in the reactor at the time of the final plant shutdown (Cycle 26) was considered instead of projected next cycle {Cycle 27) fuel.
This resulted in less decay heat in the most limiting fuel bundle assembly than the most limiting fuel bundle assembly from Cycle 27. Second, the masses of fuel bundle assembly hardware pieces, such as the channel box and tie plates are credited, which reduces the required decay time. The OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis, has been revised taking these assumptions into consideration. The revised OCNGS Zirconium Fire Analysis demonstrated that at 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations it would take 1O hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900°C, the temperature used to assess the potential onset of fission product release. The revised Zirconium Fire Analysis (Calculation C-1302-226-E310-457, Revision 1) has been provided to the NRC in Reference 1 (Attachment 2). See the discussion in Reference 1 for more detail.
The revised Zirconium Fire Analysis continues to support the conclusion in the NRC safety evaluation for the approved EP exemptions (Reference 3} that for the BDBA, where a drain down of SFP water would effectively impede any decay heat removal, it would still take 1O hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900°C. However, the revised Zirconium Fire Analysis provided in Reference 1 supports that this occurs at 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, rather than at 12 months (365 days) as provided in Reference 8.
In addition, as discussed in Reference 8, Exelon also analyzed the radiological consequences of a BDBA scenario to evaluate the effects of a loss of water inventory from the SFP (Calculation C-1302-226-E310-458, "Dose at Exclusion Area Boundary and Control Room Due to Shine from
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-5 of A-12 Drained Spent Fuel Pool During SAFSTOR"} (Reference 17). The primary purpose of this calculation was to determine the dose rates as a function of time at the EAB and in the control room due to loss of shielding for an event in which the spent fuel assemblies are uncovered following drain down of the SFP. The dose rates determined by this calculation are due to direct and indirect radiation shine from spent fuel assemblies. Exelon concluded that the gamma radiation dose rate at the EAB would be limited to small fractions of the EPA PAGs at 12 months.
Calculation C-1302-226-E310-458 (Reference 17} remains unchanged from the original EP exemption request submittal (Reference 8). Exelon has reviewed the calculation C-1302-226-E310-458 (Reference 17} and has determined that at 9.38 months (285 days} the dose rate at the EAB would be less than 3 mrem/hour and remains a small fraction of the EPA PAG limit of 1 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE}, and the control room dose rate would be less than 45 mrem/hour. The changes to the dose rates are not significant. The extended period required to exceed the EPA PAG limit of 1 rem TEDE would allow sufficient time to develop and implement onsite mitigative actions and provide confidence that additional offsite measures could be taken without planning if efforts to reestablish shielding over the fuel are delayed.
No other changes are being requested other than Exelon's request to revise the effective and implementation dates for Amendment No. 294, as well as the supporting approved EP exemptions based on the revised site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis. The revised Zirconium Fire Analysis, as provided in Reference 1, based on the earlier plant shutdown, provides the basis for requesting the changes in the implementation period to the end of the zirconium fire period, which occurs at 9.38 months (285 days} after permanent shutdown.
5.0 JUSTIFICATION FOR EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1} the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a}(2} are present. These special circumstances include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
5.1 Exemptions A. The exemptions are authorized by law 10 CFR 50.12 allows the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG} to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The proposed exemption would not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.
B. The exemptions will not present an undue risk to public health and safety The purpose is to request exemptions from the portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b}, 10 CFR 50.47(c}(2}, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E for OCNGS as previously approved in Reference 3 (ML 182220A980}. There are no changes to the previous application and supplements, and previously approved emergency preparedness (EP} exemptions with the exception that the effective date for the approved EP exemptions (Reference 3) be
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-6 of A-12 changed from 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, to account for the revised zirconium fire period, which has been reanalyzed to be 9.38 months (285 days) after cessation from power operations.
The approval of the EP exemptions (Reference 3) was based on demonstrating that: (1) the radiological consequences of design basis accidents (OBA) would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) limits at the exclusion area boundary (EAB); and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident (BOSA) resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP (instantaneous drain down of the SFP), there is sufficient time (1 O hours) to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to protect the health and safety of the public prior to the clad igniting (zirconium fire).
The OBA analysis remains unchanged from that submitted in Reference 8 (ML17234A082}. That analysis supports that 33 days after permanent cessation of power operations the only credible OBA, the fuel handling accident, will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB.
The BDBA portion of the approved EP exemptions is supported by two analyses; (1) an analysis that supports the time period after permanent shutdown when there would be more than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> prior to the fuel clad reaching the zirconium-clad ignition temperature (900°C) (Zirconium Fire Analysis) and (2) and an analysis to determine the dose rates at the EAB and in the control room due to loss of shielding from the water due to the spent fuel assemblies becoming uncovered (SFP Shine Analysis). The Zirconium Fire Analysis was revised to credit actual conditions at the time of final shutdown on September 17, 2018. The revised Zirconium Fire Analysis showed that at 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operation, the analyzed event is either not credible, is capable of being mitigated, or the radiological consequences of the event will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB. The SFP Shine analysis was not revised. The dose rates at the EAB and control room were evaluated at the earlier effective date and it was determined that there was an insignificant change to the dose rates and that they remain acceptable.
Therefore, the underlying purpose of the regulations will continue to be met with the revised effective date. Because the underlying purpose of the rules will continue to be met, the exemptions will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. The exemptions are consistent with the common defense and security The reduced consequences of radiological events that will remain possible at the site once it is in the permanently defueled condition allows for a corresponding reduction in the scope of the onsite emergency preparedness organization and associated reduction of requirements in the emergency plan. These reductions will not adversely affect Exelon's ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Physical security measures at OCNGS are not affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common defense and security.
5.2 Special Circumstances Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the NRC will not consider granting an exemption to its regulations unless special circumstances are present. Exelon has determined that special circumstances are present as discussed below.
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-7 of A-12 Special circumstances exist at OCNGS because the plant is permanently shut down and defueled and the radiological source term at the site is reduced from that associated with reactor power operation. With the reactor power plant permanently shut down and defueled, the DBAs and transients postulated to occur during reactor operation are no longer possible.
In particular, the potential for a release of a large radiological source term to the environment from the high pressures and temperatures associated with reactor operation no longer exist.
A. Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. (1 O CFR 50.12{a){2)(ii))
The EP exemptions do not impact the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which is to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite emergency plans. The standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV were developed taking into consideration the risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
The EP exemptions do not impact the radiological consequences of accidents that will remain possible at OCNGS, which are substantially lower than those at an operating plant.
The upper bound of offsite dose consequences limits the highest attainable emergency class to the Alert level. Thus, the underlying purpose of the regulations will not be adversely affected by eliminating offsite emergency planning activities or reducing the scope of onsite emergency planning as described in in the previously approved EP exemption request (Reference 3).
The EP exemptions do not impact the radiological analyses for the OBA that show that, 33 days after shutdown, the radiological consequences of design basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB. In addition, the BDBA event has been reevaluated and at the end of the revised zirconium fire period (9.38 months after shutdown), the analyzed event is either not credible, is capable of being mitigated, or the radiological consequences of the event will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB. Therefore, application of all the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV are not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of those rules.
Because the underlying purposes of the rules would continue to be achieved even with OCNGS being permitted to implement the EP exemptions, the special circumstances are present as defined in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii).
B. Compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated. (10 CFR 50.12{a)(2){iii))
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-8 of A-12 Implementation of License Amendment No. 294 (Reference 2) is predicated on the approved EP exemptions (Reference 3), which specify that implementation cannot occur earlier than 12 months (365 days) from permanent cessation of power operations; which would be no earlier than September 17, 2019. As a result of this limitation, Exelon would need to delay implementation of Amendment No. 294 for the PDEP; thereby, causing undue burden in support of plant decommissioning efforts because a revised supporting analysis would provide for an earlier implementation (Reference 1, Attachment 2).
Therefore, compliance with the original EP exemption effective date provided in Reference 3 would result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated and the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
C. The exemptions would result in benefit to the public health and safety that compensates for any decrease in safety that may result from the grant of the exemptions. (10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iv))
The plant is permanently shut down and defueled and the radiological source term at the site is reduced from that associated with reactor power operation. With the reactor power plant permanently shut down and defueled, the DBAs and transients postulated to occur during reactor operation are no longer possible. In particular, the potential for a release of a large radiological source term to the environment from the high pressures and temperatures associated with reactor operation will no longer exist.
The proposed exemption would allow Exelon to implement the PDEP and associated EALs, which support the reduced scope of remaining accidents and events at an earlier date. As such, the PDEP would no longer need to address response actions for events that would no longer be possible. The PDEP would thereby enhance the ability of the emergency response organization to respond to those scenarios that remain credible because emergency preparedness training and drills would focus only on applicable activities. Elimination of requirements for classification of emergency action levels for events that were no longer possible would enhance the ability of the emergency response organization (ERO) to correctly classify those events that remain credible. As the proposed exemption will allow an earlier implementation of the PDEP, the ERO organization's ability to respond to credible events would be enhanced, a resultant benefit to the public health and safety is realized.
Therefore, because the granting the exemption would result in benefit to the public health and safety and would not result in a decrease in safety, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iv) exist.
6.0 PRECEDENT The exemption requests for 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, requirements are consistent with exemptions on the same emergency planning requirements that recently have been issued by the NRC for other nuclear power reactor facilities beginning decommissioning. Specifically, the NRC recently granted EP exemptions to Exelon for OCNGS (Reference 3).
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-9 of A-12 7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT The proposed exemption meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), because the proposed exemption involves: (i) no significant hazards consideration; (ii) no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) no significant construction impact; (v) no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which the exemption is sought involve: requirements of an administrative, managerial, or organizational nature. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22{b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed exemption.
(i) No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Exelon has evaluated the proposed exemption to determine whether a significant hazards consideration is involved by focusing on the three standards set forth in 1o CFR 50.92 as discussed below:
- 1. Does the proposed exemption involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed exemption is administrative in nature. It has no effect on structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and no effect on the capability of any plant SSC to perform its design function. The proposed exemption would not increase the likelihood of the malfunction of any plant SSC.
When the exemptions become effective, there are no credible events that would result in doses to the public beyond the exclusion area boundary (EAB) that would exceed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). The probability of occurrence of previously evaluated accidents is not increased, because most previously analyzed accidents will no longer be able to occur and the probability and consequences of the remaining Fuel Handling Accident are unaffected by the proposed exemption.
In addition, the beyond-design-basis accident (BDBA) event has been reevaluated and at the end of the revised zirconium fire period (9.38 months after shutdown), the analyzed event is either not credible, is capable of being mitigated, or the radiological consequences of the event will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB.
Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Do the proposed exemptions create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed exemption does not involve a physical alteration of the plant. No new or different type of equipment will be installed and there are no physical modifications to existing equipment associated with the proposed exemption. Similarly, the proposed exemption will not physically change any SSCs involved in the mitigation of any accidents. Thus, no new initiators or precursors of a new or different kind of accident are created. Furthermore, the proposed exemption does not create the possibility of a
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-10 of A-12 new accident as a result of new failure modes associated with any equipment or personnel failures. No changes are being made to parameters within which the plant is normally operated, or in the setpoints which initiate protective or mitigative actions, and no new failure modes are being introduced.
Therefore, the proposed exemption does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. Do the proposed exemptions involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed exemption does not alter the design basis or any safety limits for the plant. The proposed exemption does not impact station operation or any plant SSC that is relied upon for accident mitigation.
Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, Exelon concludes that the proposed exemption presents no significant hazards consideration, and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.
(ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
There are no expected changes in the types, characteristics, or quantities of effluents discharged to the environment associated with the proposed exemption. There are no materials or chemicals introduced into the plant that could affect the characteristics or types of effluents released offsite. In addition, the method of operation of waste processing systems will not be affected by the exemption. The proposed exemption will not result in changes to the design basis requirements of SSCs that function to limit or monitor the release of effluents. All the SSCs associated with limiting the release of effluents will continue to be able to perform their functions. Therefore, the proposed exemption will result in no significant change to the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure.
The exemption will result in no expected increases in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure on either the workforce or the public. There are no expected changes in normal occupational doses. Likewise, design basis accident dose is not impacted by the proposed exemption.
(iv) There is no significant construction impact.
No construction activities are associated with the proposed exemption.
(v) There is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents.
See the no significant hazards considerations discussion in Item (i)(1) above.
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-11 of A-12
{vi) The requirements from which exemption is sought involve: {I) Other requirements of an administrative, managerial, or organizational nature.
The proposed exemption will allow an earlier implementation of the approved EP exemptions that form the basis for a reduction in size of the OCNGS emergency response organization commensurate with the reduction in consequences of radiological events at OCNGS because the facility is in the permanently defueled condition. Therefore, the exemption addresses the requirements of an administrative, managerial, or organizational nature.
8.0 CONCLUSION
The proposed exemption will allow an earlier implementation of the approved EP exemptions that form the basis for a reduction in size of the OCNGS emergency response organization commensurate with the reduction in consequences of radiological events at OCNGS because the facility is in the permanently defueled condition. Specifically, the requested exemption would allow Exelon to implement the exemptions approved in Reference 3 and License Amendment No. 294
{Reference 2) based on the revised end of zirconium fire period at 9.38 months (285 days) from the date of permanent shutdown.
9.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, {Exelon Generation Company, LLC} to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated October 22, 2018 {ADAMS Accession No. ML18295A384)
- 2. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson {Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment RE:
Changes to the Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme (GAG NO. MG0160; EPID L-2017-LLA-0307)," dated October 17, 2018 {ADAMS Accession No. ML18221A400)
- 3. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Bryan C. Hanson {Exelon Generation Company, LLC) - "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (GAG NO. MG0153; EPID L-2017-LLE-0020), "dated October 16, 2018 {ADAMS Accession No. ML 182220A980)
- 4. Electronic Mail Capture from John Lamb {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to David Helker {Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Oyster Creek Permanently Ceases Power Operations," dated September 17, 2018 {ADAMS Accession No. ML18263A163)
- 5. Letter from Keith R. Jury, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Permanent Cessation of Operations at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated January 7, 2011 {ADAMS Accession No. ML110070507}
- 6. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations for Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Station," dated February 14, 2018 {ADAMS Accession No. ML18045A084)
Attachment Supplement to LAR Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 Page A-12 of A-12
- 7. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258)
- 8. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E," dated August 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17234A082)
- 9. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Response to Request for Additional Information (RAJ) Regarding Request for Exemption from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,"
dated December 6, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17340A708)
- 10. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Supplement to Request for Exemption from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E," dated January 23, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18023A138)
- 11. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Supplement to Request for Exemption from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E," dated March 8, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18067A087)
- 12. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "Response to Request for Additional Information (RAJ) Related to Exemption Request from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part SO, Appendix E," dated March 19, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18078A146)
- 13. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request - Proposed Changes to the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated August 29, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17241A065)
- 14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY-18-0062, "Request by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML180308359)
- 15. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Staff Requirements - SECY-18-0062, Request by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated July 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18198A449)
Post Cessation of Power Operations," dated August 9, 2017
- 17. C-1302-226-E310-458, "Dose at Exclusion Area Boundary and Control Room Due to Shine from Drained Spent Fuel Pool During SAFSTOR, "dated June 16, 2017