RA-18-080, License Amendment Request: License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements

License Amendment Request: License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements

ML18317A022
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	11/12/2018
From:	Gallagher M Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RA-18-080
Download: ML18317A022 (16)

Text

Michael P. Gallagher Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation{., Vice President Lrcense Rene wal and Decomm1ssronrng 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 610 765 5958 Offrce 610 765 5658 Fax www.exeloncorp.com michael p .galla gher@exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.90 10 CFR 50.54(p)

RA-18-080 November 12, 2018 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 USNRC Docket No. 50-219 and 72-15

Subject:

License Amendment Request - License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements

References:

1. NRC Letter to Exelon, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station -

Issuance of Amendment Re: License Amendment Request to Revise the Cyber Security Milestone 8 Completion Date (CAC No. MF9550: EPID L-2017-LLA-0193)," dated December 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17289A222)

2. Exelon Letter to NRC, "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Operations for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated February 14, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18045A084)

3. Exelon Letter to NRC, "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258)

4. NRC Memorandum, Executive Director for Operations to NRC Commissioners, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated December 5, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16172A284)

5. NRC letter to Crystal River Nuclear Plant, "Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant - Issuance of Amendment Approving Removal of the Existing Cyber Security License Condition from the Facility Operating License (TAC No. L53155)," dated June 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17096A280)

6. NRC Letter to Entergy Nuclear Operations, "Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station - Issuance of Amendment for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements," dated June 27, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18145A208)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 November 12, 2018 Page2

7. Exelon Letter to NRC, "Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E," dated August 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17234A082)

8. NRC Letter to Exelon, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station -

Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (CAC No. MG0153: EPID L-2017-LLE-0020)," dated October 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18220A980)

9. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request -

Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated October 22, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18295A384)

10. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request Supplement - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated November 6, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 1831 OA306)

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon),

is submitting a request for an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (RFOL) No.

DPR-16 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). Specifically, this license amendment request (LAR) is for the removal of the existing Cyber Security Plan (CSP) requirements contained in License Condition 2.C.(4) of the OCNGS RFOL and removal of the commitment to fully implement the CSP by the Milestone 8 (MS8) commitment date of August 31, 2021 (Reference 1).

In a letter dated February 14, 2018 (Reference 2), Exelon notified the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations at OCNGS no later than October 31, 2018, at the end of the current two-year operating cycle. On September 17, 2018, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at OCNGS. On September 25, 2018, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(ii) and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(9), Exelon provided certification to the NRC that all fuel had been permanently removed from the OCNGS reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) (Reference 3). As stated in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), upon docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations (Reference 2) and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel (Reference 3), the 10 CFR Part 50 license for OCNGS no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.

With the fuel permanently removed from the reactor vessel, spent fuel will be stored onsite in the SFP and/or in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

The NRC staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks," does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 ), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 November 12, 2018 Page 3 to clad ignition temperature within 1O hours (Reference 4).

The regulatory and technical evaluations included in this LAA are consistent with recent NRC guidance on cyber security requirements for decommissioning facilities (Reference 4). In addition, the NRC staff has recently approved similar amendment requests to delete the cyber security license condition from the Crystal River Unit 3 and the Vermont Yankee facility operating licenses (References 5 and 6). Attachment 1 provides an analysis, including the regulatory and technical evaluations, of the proposed change. Attachment 2 contains the marked-up OCNGS AFOL page for the proposed change to license condition 2.C.(4).

In Reference 1, the NRC issued a license amendment revising the completion date for MS8 of the OCNGS CSP from December 31, 2017, to August 31, 2021.

By letter dated August 22, 2017 (Reference 7) Exelon provided the NRC with an OCNGS site-specific analysis (Calculation C-1302-226-E310-457, Revision O, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool (OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis) supporting the time period when sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 1O hours (Zirconium-Fire Window) for specific exemptions from specific Emergency Planning (EP) requirements. The NRC approved the requested EP exemptions on October 16, 2018 (Reference 8), based, in part, on the provided OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis.

The OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis submitted with Reference 7, determined the minimum cooling time (Zirconium-Fire Window) to be 12 months1 after permanent cessation from power operation.

Based on the Zirconium-Fire Analysis provided in Reference 7 and NRC's approval of the EP Exemption Request (Reference 8), the anticipated date when all the spent fuel will have decayed beyond the minimum cooling time that would allow sufficient time (1 O hours) to mitigate a SFP drain down in the adiabatic case (Zirconium-Fire Window) will occur September 17, 2019, which is prior to the current OCNGS MS8 implementation date of August 31, 2021. Subsequent to the end of the Zirconium-Fire Window, the Cyber Security regulation, 1O CFA 73.54, no longer applies to OCNGS and the MS8 CSP implementation commitment is no longer needed. As such, Exelon is also requesting withdrawal of this commitment concurrent with approval of this LAA.

These proposed changes have been reviewed and approved by the OCNGS Safety Review Committee in accordance with the requirements of the Exelon Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program.

Exelon requests approval of the proposed license amendment by September 17, 2019. The requested LAA approval date is prior to the anticipated completion of the transfer of all spent fuel to dry storage within the ISFSI, and after the appropriate cooling period for spent fuel in the SFP after the OCNGS reactor has been permanently shut down. Once approved, the license amendment will be implemented within 60 days of the later of either the date of the license amendment or the date when all the spent fuel has decayed beyond the minimum cooling time that would allow sufficient time (1 O hours) to mitigate a SFP drain down in the adiabatic case.

1 Exelon has subsequently submitted a revised OCNGS site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis (Reference 9 and 1O) that supports that the minimum cooling time may be reduced to 9.38 months (235 days).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 November 12, 2018 Page 4 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this license amendment request, with attachments, is being provided to the designated State Official.

If you should have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. David Neff at 61 0-765-5631 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 121h day of November 2018.

Respectfully, Attachments: 1. Evaluation of Proposed Change - License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements

2. Proposed Facility Operating License Change (Mark-Up) cc: USNRC Region I, Regional Administrator USNRC Project Manager, NRR - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Director, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection Mayor of Lacey Township, Forked River, NJ

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 1 of 9 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon), is submitting a request for an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (RFOL) No. DPR-16 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). Specifically, this license amendment request (LAA) is for the removal of the existing Cyber Security Plan (CSP) requirements contained in license condition 2.C.(4) of the OCNGS RFOL and removal of the commitment to fully implement the CSP by the Milestone 8 (MS8) commitment date of August 31, 2021 (Reference 1). This change is requested to support the decommissioning of OCNGS.

Attachment 2 contains the existing RFOL marked up to show the proposed change.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION The OCNGS CSP and implementation schedule, as required by 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks," consists of eight Milestones.

Interim Milestones 1 through 7 were completed by December 31, 2012 and continue to be maintained. As approved by Reference 1, CSP Milestone 8 implementation (full implementation of the CSP) is required to be completed by August 31, 2021. Cyber security requirements are described in the second paragraph of license condition 2.C.(4), which states:

"Exelon Generation Company shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Exelon Generation Company CSP was approved by Renewed License Amendment No. 280 and modified by License Amendment Nos. 288 and 292."

In a letter dated February 14, 2018 (Reference 2), Exelon notified the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations at OCNGS no later than October 31, 2018, at the end of the current two-year operating cycle. On September 17, 2018, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at OCNGS. On September 25, 2018, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(ii) and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(9), Exelon provided certification to the NRC that all fuel had been permanently removed from the OCNGS reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) (Reference 3). As stated in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), upon docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations (Reference 2) and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel (Reference 3), the 10 CFR Part 50 license for OCNGS no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. With the fuel permanently removed from the reactor vessel, spent fuel will be stored onsite in the SFP and/or in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

The NRC staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 ), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 1O hours (Reference 4).

By letter dated August 22, 2017 (Reference 5), Exelon provided the NRC with an OCNGS site-specific analysis (Calculation C-1302-226-E310-457, Revision 0, "Oyster Creek Nuclear

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 2 of 9 Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool') (OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis) supporting the time period when sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 1O hours (Zirconium-Fire Window) for specific exemptions from specific Emergency Planning (EP) requirements. The NRC approved the requested EP exemptions on October 16, 2018 (Reference 6), based, in part, on the provided OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis. The OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis submitted with Reference 5, determined the minimum cooling time (Zirconium-Fire Window) to be 12 months1 after permanent cessation from power operation.

To support the decommissioning of OCNGS, this LAA is being submitted to remove the existing cyber security requirements from license condition 2.C.(4), prior to the completion of the transfer of spent fuel from the SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI. This request considers the cooling period for spent fuel stored in the SFP after the OCNGS reactor has been permanently shut down. The evaluations included in this LAA are consistent with recent NRC guidance on cyber security requirements for decommissioning facilities (Reference 4).

Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.90, Exelon is submitting this request to amend the OCNGS RFOL to remove the existing cyber security requirements from license condition 2.C.(4) (stated above).

The proposed change has been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(1) using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and it has been determined that the proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration, as discussed in Section 4.3 below. Attachment 2 contains the marked-up OCNGS RFOL pages for the proposed change to license condition 2.C.(4).

By letter dated December 22, 2017 (Reference 1), the NRC issued license amendment 292 pertaining to the OCNGS CSP implementation schedule, which approved a schedule change for implementation of CSP MS8 from December 31, 2017 to August 31, 2021. The approved MS8 implementation date of August 31, 2021 (Reference 1) is beyond the anticipated date of September 17, 2019, when all the spent fuel will have decayed beyond the minimum cooling time that would allow sufficient time (1 O hours) to mitigate a SFP drain down in the adiabatic case (Reference 5). Based on the Zirconium-Fire Analysis provided in support of the EP exemption Request (Reference 5) and the NRC approval of the EP Exemption Request (Reference 6), the anticipated date when all the spent fuel will have decayed beyond the minimum cooling time that would allow sufficient time (1 O hours) to mitigate a SFP drain down in the adiabatic case will occur prior to the current OCNGS MS8 implementation date.

Subsequent to the Zirconium-Fire Window, the Cyber Security regulation, 10 CFR 73.54, would no longer apply to OCNGS and the MS8 CSP implementation commitment would no longer be needed and, as such, Exelon is requesting withdrawal of this commitment concurrent with approval of this LAR.

1 Exelon has subsequently submitted a revised OCNGS site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis (References 7 and 8) that supports that the minimum cooling time may be reduced to 9.38 months (235 days).

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 3 of 9

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The proposed license amendment to remove the CSP requirements from license condition 2.C.(4) is based on the significantly reduced risks for a nuclear power facility that has permanently ceased operations, has removed all fuel from the reactor vessel, and where the spent fuel has had sufficient time to cool down such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 1O hours. Compared to an operating nuclear power reactor, for a decommissioning facility with a permanently defueled reactor, the spectrum of possible accidents is significantly reduced, and the risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower. Correspondingly, cyber security risk is reduced due, in part, to the fact that there are significantly fewer critical digital assets (CDAs) needed to protect against and assess radiological events at a decommissioning facility than in comparison to the number at an operating reactor.

OCNGS has permanently ceased power operations and all fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel, the digital computer and communication systems, and networks that require cyber protection are primarily those associated with security and emergency preparedness functions, and the functioning of safety systems that support operation of the SFP. However, once the recently irradiated spent fuel that is stored in the SFP has sufficiently decayed, the potential consequences of a cyber-attack are significantly reduced.

As documented in Reference 5, with OCNGS permanently shut down, the only design basis accident that could potentially result in a radiological release at OCNGS is the fuel handling accident (FHA). This analysis shows that 33 days after shutdown, the radiological consequence of the FHA would not exceed the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. OCNGS has been permanently shut down for greater than 33 days, therefore, the possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis accident that could exceed the EPA PAGs is significantly reduced. With the significant reduction in radiological risk for OCNGS, the consequences of a cyber-attack will be significantly reduced.

The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might occur involves the very unlikely (beyond-design-basis) event where the SFP drains in such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heat-up of the spent fuel. The analysis for this event, the Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool for the OCNGS (Zirconium-Fire Analysis), was previously submitted to the NRC staff in support of requested exemptions from specific requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for certain emergency planning requirements as appropriate for a decommissioning facility (Reference 5). The exemption requests associated with this analysis have been approved by the NRC in Reference 6. This OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis determined that 12 months2 after shutdown, the spent fuel stored in the SFP has decayed to a point where a fire in the zirconium fuel cladding following a postulated beyond-design-basis event involving the loss of SFP water inventory is unlikely prior to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (Zirconium-Fire Window); where 1O hours provides sufficient time for mitigative actions to be 2 Exelon has subsequently submitted a revised OCNGS site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis (References 7 and 8) that supports that the minimum cooling time may be reduced to 9.38 months (235 days).

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 4 of 9 taken to prevent spent fuel heat-up damage. The rationale to remove the cyber security requirements after the Zirconium-Fire Window is similar to the rationale used to justify a reduction of emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning, as documented in the safety evaluation associated with decommissioning plant emergency preparedness exemption requests.

A summary of the Zirconium-Fire Analysis and conclusions is as follows:

1. The analysis conservatively assumes that there is no radiative or air cooling of the assemblies (adiabatic heat-up); the flow paths that would provide natural circulation cooling are assumed to be blocked.

2. The analysis conservatively assumes that the heat-up time starts when the SFP has been completely drained. This is conservative as it does not include the period of time from the postulated initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost, and it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when drain-down starts.

3. Due to the slow rate of SFP water boil-off, adequate time will be available to restore cooling or makeup, either through restoration of normal systems or through readily available mitigation measures, without significant radiological consequences for plant workers in the reactor building.

4. Furthermore, because of the slow rate of the event scenario and because the duties of the on-shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating reactor, significant time is available to complete actions necessary to mitigate an emergency.

5. A temperature of 900°C is the temperature associated with rapid fuel cladding oxidation used to assess the potential onset of fission product release.

6. Adiabatic heat-up analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat shows that, after 12 months3 following shutdown, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900°C is 1O hours after the assemblies have been uncovered.

7. Therefore, due to the length of time it would take for the adiabatic heat-up to occur, once all the spent fuel has decayed for at least 12 months3 (per References 5 and 6) following shutdown, there is ample time to respond to any partial drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup or providing spray.

As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not deemed credible.

Therefore, based on there being (1) no design basis events that could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAG limits and consequently a significant reduction in radiological risk including consequences of a potential cyber-attack, and (2) sufficient time (at least 1O hours) to take prompt mitigative actions in response to a postulated zirconium fire accident scenario in the SFP, the elimination of the cyber security requirements from license 3 Exelon has subsequently submitted a revised OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis (References 7 and 8) that supports that the minimum cooling time may be reduced to 9.38 months (235 days).

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 5 of 9 condition 2.C.(4) is appropriate for the ONCGS. This rationale is similar to that used to justify a reduction in emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning, that has been approved by the NRG in Exemption Safety Evaluation (Reference 6).

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks,"

establishes the requirements for licensees to maintain and implement a Cyber Security Program (CSP). This regulation at§ 73.54(a) specifically states "... each licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under part 50 of this chapter shall submit, as specified in § 50.4 and § 50.90 of this chapter, a cyber security plan that satisfies the requirements of this section for Commission review and approval." In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses," upon approval the CSP becomes a condition in the operating license. ONCGS has an approved CSP as described in the OCNGS RFOL license condition 2.C.(4).

License condition 2.C.(4) requires OCNGS to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved CSP, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The CSP provisions contained in this license condition continues to apply to OCNGS until the license condition is removed pursuant to a 10 CFR 50.90 license amendment request.

Exelon notified the NRG of Exelon's plans to permanently cease operations at OCNGS, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) (ADAMS Accession No. ML18045A084) (Reference 2). On September 17, 2018, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at OCNGS. By letter dated September 25, 2018, Exelon submitted to the NRG the certification of permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel at OCNGS pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(ii) and 50.4(b)(9) (Reference 3). As stated in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2) upon docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations (Reference 2) and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel (Reference 3), the OCNGS 10 CFR Part 50 license no longer authorize operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.

When the final rule for 10 CFR 73.54 was issued in March 2009, neither ISFSl-only facilities nor other facilities that were in the process of decommissioning were required to comply with the cyber security requirements. The NRG specifically limited cyber security requirements to a "licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under part 50. " Additionally, the NRG staff has previously concluded in a December 5, 2017 NRG Memorandum, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 4), that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 ), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRG, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 6 of 9 4.2 Precedent The NRG staff has recently approved similar license amendment requests to delete the cyber security license condition from the Crystal River Unit 3 operating license and the Vermont Yankee operating license (References 9 and 10).

4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) is requesting a license amendment to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (ONCGS} Renewed Facility Operating License (RFOL} to remove license condition 2.C.(4) as it relates to the Cyber Security Plan (CSP}. This license condition requires ONCGS to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved CSP, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p}. Specifically, the proposed change is to amend license condition 2.C.(4} to remove the cyber security requirements.

Exelon has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed license amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No Following cessation of power operations and removal of all spent fuel from the reactor, spent fuel at OCNGS will be stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP} and in the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI}. In this configuration, the spectrum of possible transients and accidents is significantly reduced compared to an operating nuclear power reactor. The only design basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological release at OCNGS is the fuel handling accident (FHA}, which is predicated on spent fuel being stored in the SFP. An analysis has been performed that concludes that once OCNGS has be permanently shut down for 33 days, there is no longer any possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis accident that could exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's} Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs}. The results of this analysis have been previously submitted to the NRG (ADAMS Accession No. ML17234A082} (Reference 5). With the significant reduction in radiological risk based on OCNGS being shut down for more than 33 days, the consequences of a cyber-attack are also significantly reduced.

Additionally, per an NRG Memorandum, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 4, ADAMS Accession No. ML16172A284}, the NRG staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a}(1 }, and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRG (1 O CFR 50.82(a}(2} (References 2 and 3, Accession Nos. ML18045A084 and ML18268A258), once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Exelon has provided a site-specific analysis, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool," in Reference 5 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 1723A082), that

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 7 of 9 provides the determination that sufficient time will have passed prior to the requested implementation date such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 1O hours. Exelon has subsequently submitted a revised OCNGS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis (References 7 and 8, ML18295A384 and ML 1831 OA306} that supports that the minimum cooling time may be reduced to 9.38 months {235 days).

This proposed change does not alter previously evaluated accident analysis assumptions, introduce or alter any initiators, or affect the function of facility structures, systems, and components (SSCs) relied upon to prevent or mitigate any previously evaluated accident or the manner in which these SSCs are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not involve any facility modifications which affect the performance capability of any SSCs relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any previously evaluated accidents.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, introduce or alter any initiators, or affect the function of facility SSCs relied upon to prevent or mitigate any previously evaluated accident, or the manner in which these SSCs are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not involve any facility modifications which affect the performance capability of any SSCs relied upon to mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation and design features specified in the OCNGS Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications that were approved by the NRC Safety Evaluation dated October 26, 2018 (Reference 11, ADAMS Accession No. ML18220A338). The proposed change does not involve any changes to the initial conditions that establish safety margins and does not involve modifications to any SSCs which are relied upon to provide a margin of safety. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this proposed change, no significant reduction in a margin of safety is involved.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 8 of 9 Based on the above, Exelon concludes that the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

4.4 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The proposed change removes the existing cyber security license condition from the facility operating license. The proposed change is confined to safeguards matters and does not involve any significant construction impacts. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(12}. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b}, no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter to Exelon, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment Re: License Amendment Request to Revise the Cyber Security Milestone 8 Completion Date (CAC No. MF9550: EPID L-2017-LLA-0193)", dated December 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17289A222).

2. Exelon Letter to NRC, "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Operations for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated February 14, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18045A084).

3. Exelon Letter to NRC, "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258)

4. NRC Memorandum, Executive Director for Operations to NRC Commissioners, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants", dated December 5, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16172A284).

5. Exelon Letter to NRC, "Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E," dated August 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17234A082).

6. NRC Letter to Exelon, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (CAC No. MG0153: EPID L-2017-LLE-0020)," dated October 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18220A980}.

7. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated October 22, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18295A384)

License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Attachment 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 9 of 9

8. Letter from Michael P. Gallagher, Exelon Generation Company, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - "License Amendment Request Supplement - Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme," dated November 6, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 1831 OA306)

9. NRG letter to Crystal River Nuclear Plant, "Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant -

Issuance of Amendment Approving Removal of the Existing Cyber Security License Condition from the Facility Operating License (TAC No. L53155)," dated June 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17096A280).

10. NRG Letter to Entergy Nuclear Operations, "Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station -

Issuance of Amendment for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements," dated June 27, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18145A208).

11. NRC Letter to Exelon, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment Re: License Amendment Request for Proposed Defueled Technical Specifications and Revised License Conditions for Permanently Defueled Condition (EPID L-2017-LLA-0395),"

dated October 26, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18227A338).

ATTACHMENT2 License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Proposed Facility Operating License Change (Mark-Up)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16

(4) Exelon Generation Company shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822), and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans\ submitted by letter dated May 17, 2006, is entitled: "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 5."

The set contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21.

Exelon Generation Company sl=lall fully implement and maintain in effect all pro11isions of tt:1e Commission appro11ed cyber security plan (CSP),

including cl=langes made puFSuant to the authority of 10 CISR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.64(p). n1e E>Eelon Generatian Campany CSP was approved by license Amendment No. 280 and modified by license Amendment Nos. 288 and 292.

(5) Inspections of core spray spargers, piping and associated components will be performed in accordance with BWRVIP-18, "BWR Core Spray Internals Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," as approved by NRC staff's Final Safety Evaluation Report dated December 2, 1999.

(6) Long Range Planning Program - Deleted (7) Reactor Vessel Integrated Surveillance Program Exelon Generation Company is authorized to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to allow implementation of the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project reactor pressure vessel Integrated Surveillance Program as the basis for demonstrating compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements,* as set forth in the licensee's application dated December 20, 2002, and as supplemented on May 30, September 10, and November 3, 2003.

All capsules in the reactor vessel that are removed and tested must meet the test procedures and reporting requirements of the most recent NRC-approved version of the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project Integrated Surveillance Program appropriate for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. Any changes to the capsule withdrawal schedule, including spare capsules, must be approved by the NRC prior to implementation. All capsules placed in storage must be maintained for future insertion. Any changes to storage requirements must be approved by the NRC, as required by 10CFR Part 50, Appendix H.

1 The Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan are Appendices to the Security Plan.

Renewed License No. DPR-16 Amendment No. 292