Text

Emergency Plan, Rev. 58. Page J-12 Through End
	ML13037A440
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	01/10/2013
From:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NL-13-0053, FOIA/PA-2015-0025
	Download: ML13037A440 (218)
	v • d • e

C. Technical Assistant (TA)

The Technical Assistant (TA) supports the Nuclear Spokesperson by gathering accurate and timely information about the event and the plants status. Information is gathered via WebEOC, the plant status loop, and via direct contact with the EOC Manager - which the TA should maintain throughout an event. TAs may do media interviews at the discretion and direction of the PID.

D. CMC Manager The CMC Manager will report to the CMC where he/she will coordinate activities. The CMC Manager may assume the PID role while a PID is en-route to the JIC. After JIC activation, the CMC Manager will assume full responsibility for CMC activities and maintain contact with the PID.

The CMC Manager has responsibility for ensuring that the actions of the CMC positions are carried out.

E. CMC/JIC Public Response Coordinator The CMC/JIC Public Response Coordinator will direct facility public response activities, keeping staff advised of current information and obtaining responses for questions they cannot answer. This includes referring specific inquiries to the proper person. The Coordinator is responsible for tracking rumors and ensuring that the Public Response team members have updated information on the rumor responses.

F. CMC Financial Response Liaison The CMC Financial Response Liaison responds to financial inquiries from financial analysts, the public, media and stockholders regarding the effects a nuclear incident might have on Southern Companys financial position. This role identifies and establishes contact with key financial leaders and provides them updated information. The position maintains contact with the CMC Public Response Coordinator.

G. Government Relations Liaison The Government Relations Liaison responds to inquiries from governmental sources. The role identifies and establishes contact with key government officials and provides them with updated information.

The position maintains contact with the CMC Public Response Coordinator.

J-12 Rev. 56

H. SNC News Writer The SNC News Writer gathers information and prepares all news releases for the duration of an event. The News Writer coordinates technical approval with the SNC EOF Manager. This position works in the SNC EOF.

I. JIC Manager The JIC Manager is responsible for coordinating operations of the facility and has responsibility for ensuring that the actions of the JIC positions represented on Attachment 1 are carried out. The position may assume Emergency Communications approval authority at the direction of the PID.

J. CMC/JIC Media Relations Representative(s)

The CMC/JIC Media Relations Representative(s) report to the CMC/JIC Manager and are responsible for implementing utility media response.

K. CMC/JIC Facility Coordinator The CMC/JIC Facility Coordinator is responsible for setting up the facility and ensuring ongoing operability. The position supports the CMC/JIC Manager L. Community Relations Coordinator The Community Relations Coordinator identifies and initiates contacts with local public officials and leaders who need to be aware of the latest information about events. The position should advise the Public Response Coordinator and Governmental Relations Liaison of activities and contacts as appropriate M. CMC/JIC Assistant The CMC/JIC Assistant supports the PID and staff, coordinates approval and distribution of news releases, directs activities of the support staff and maintains an accurate record of JIC activities N. CMC/JIC Support Staff The CMC/JIC Support Staff provides administrative support for the facility.

J-13 Rev. 56

O. Employee Communications Coordinator The Employee Communications Coordinator disseminates plant status updates to Southern Company employees and customer service centers through a variety of means.

P. Internet Coordinator The Internet Coordinator is responsible for updating and maintaining the companys external emergency page and monitoring the web for external coverage of the event.

Q. CMC/JIC Public Response Team The CMC/JIC Public Response Team is responsible for responding to public inquiries. The team may include Telephone Responders, Media Monitor, Internet Coordinator, Employee Communications Coordinator, Financial Response Liaison and Governmental Relations Liaison.

8.0 NEWS RELEASES The Utility will issue news releases concerning events, conditions and actions at the Plant. News releases are designed to be a written confirmation of events and public information which has been issued.

The SNC News Writer will write news releases in the EOF and obtain nuclear approval from the EOF Manager, then forward them to the CMC or JIC as appropriate. The Facility Manager at that location will obtain communications approval and direct distribution of the release.

9.0 PRESS BRIEFINGS In the event of an incident at a nuclear plant media attention would be quick and overwhelming. Press briefings will be conducted to keep the media informed of events and activities relating to the emergency. Briefings will provide the most current, up-to-date information about events and response to the incident. They are also a primary means of addressing rumors or inaccurate information identified in our publics.

Public Information Officers (PIOs) from all offsite agencies responding to the emergency will be encouraged to participate in the briefings to discuss their particular activities.

The emphasis of the briefings will be on public safety J-14 Rev. 56

10.0 PUBLIC RESPONSE Upon announcement of an emergency situation, misinformation and rumors can be expected to evolve. The following Public Response policies shall be instituted and followed upon the activation of the ECP.

Rumors will be addressed through a policy of open and candid communications with the news media and general public.

A. All appropriate information will be released as clearly, concisely and quickly as possible. Public announcements will be made on a frequent and regular basis.

B. An official Utility spokesperson will be designated as the source of new or updated official information about the incident.

C. Public response will encompass a number of activities to ensure accurate information is disseminated. These may include:

Recorded messages containing the most current information,

Interaction with callers,

Proactively providing information to the media and responding to their needs,

Monitoring media broadcasts/outlets

Employee communications

Identifying, notifying and constantly updating specific publics, (i.e.

financial centers, governmental Officials, etc.)

Internet coordination Public response activities will be coordinated with state agencies. The Prompt Notification System (PNS) will be activated by state or local EMA officials.

PNS will direct area residents to local news broadcasts and/or the Emergency Alert System (EAS), which will serve as the primary source of official information for the public.

11.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS A. The CMC/JIC Facility Coordinator will be responsible for resolving problems and obtaining additional equipment needed for the facility.

B. Lines will be made available to the extent possible for off-site agency staff who bring fax machines, computers, and other equipment.

C. Telephone lines and equipment discussed above will be tested quarterly.

J-15 Rev. 56

12.0 TRANSPORTATION A. If directed, the CMC Assistant will arrange for ground transportation services for Emergency Communication Organization staff relocating to the JIC.

B. Special transportation arrangements, such as helicopter service between Birmingham, Atlanta, the affected plant, and the JIC, may be made available in an emergency.

13.0 SECURITY A. APC/GPC corporate security will coordinate 24-hour security support at the CMC during an emergency.

B. At GPC JICs, GPC corporate security will coordinate security coverage. At Plant Vogtle, local law enforcement may supplement coverage until regular uniform coverage is available or as needed. At Plant Farley, Houston County EMA will arrange for staffing by Houston County Sheriffs Dept.

C. Company personnel, news personnel, industry representatives, government officials, and visitors will be asked to present identification and will be given an identification badge for admittance to the facility. This ID badge should be visible at all times.

14.0 PRINT AND AUDIOVISUAL AIDS A. Press kits are stored at the JICs and at the CMCs. These kits will be updated regularly and will be available to all news media.

B. An emergency web page will be activated and will replace the normal web page on the operating companys Internet site in the event of an incident.

The emergency page includes plant schematics, background information and directions to the JIC. News releases about the event will also be available here.

C. Maps, photographs, and schematics of the plant are stored at the CMCs and JICs for use during news briefings.

D. Videotape cassettes of plant exterior and interior views will be maintained and made available for distribution upon request to television stations.

J-16 Rev. 56

15.0 SPECIAL REQUESTS A. A Media Relations Representative will respond to requests for special interviews, films, photos, videotapes, etc.

B. Special requests may be refused either for safety or security reasons. In such cases, the reason for refusal will be clearly explained.

C. JIC staff personnel will accommodate photographers at the plant site as conditions warrant. Media escorts will be coordinated with AEMA/GEMA.

D. A Media Relations Representative or his designee will be present at all special interviews. Briefings and special interviews should be videotaped.

E. Industry experts from appropriate agencies (e.g. NEI, INPO) may be called upon to provide general background information to reporters but will not comment on the Plants status. With knowledge of the PI Director, interviews with these individual will be arranged by the Media Relations Representative.

16.0 PUBLIC INFORMATION PLAN FOR RECOVERY A. The lead emergency communications representative in the Recovery Organization will be the PI Director. This person, or his designee, will maintain close contact with the Recovery Manager. Emergency communications response will follow the guidelines and procedures described for accident response.

B. As conditions and public interest warrant, additional emergency communications personnel will be assigned to support information dissemination concerning recovery operations.

C. Information for possible release will be cleared with the Recovery manager and the PI Director and given to the media through established procedures.

D. All information will be released through established channels of communication to federal and state authorities, the utility industry, the public, and employees.

E. Advance notice will be given to the public through the media of any Utility action that will or may affect the health and safety of the plume exposure pathway EPZ residents. Information will be followed up with a news release as soon as possible.

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17.0 TRAINING A. Emergency Communications Staff Training The APC/GPC Emergency Communications Coordinator will coordinate training for applicable emergency communications personnel once per calendar year. Training will provide an overview of the Emergency Communications Plan and specific staff position responsibilities. (See Table 1)

Individuals assigned key positions on the Emergency Communications staff will participate in training. GPC responders with duties directly related to their daily jobs may be exempted from review. Training documentation and records will be held at APC/GPC by the Emergency Communications Coordinator.

Evaluation of individual and team performance during exercises will also be used to measure training program effectiveness and to adjust course content.

B. News Media Training A program will be offered each calendar year to acquaint the news media with the process for obtaining information during an emergency and with overall emergency preparedness at APC/GPC nuclear plants, as appropriate. The training will include information about the plant, radiation, and the role of the JIC.

Media participation as observers or reporter players during exercises can effectively enhance training. Media may be invited to participate in annual exercises.

18.0 PUBLIC INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM The goal of the public information program is to acquaint the general public with the emergency plans for the operation of APC/GPC nuclear plants, as appropriate, and actions the general public should take if a radiological emergency occurs. Such a program is essential to the overall welfare of area citizens. Any incident involving a nuclear plant or nuclear materials can easily become a "crisis" in the minds of those living in the area, unless they understand the plans and programs in place to respond should an emergency occur.

J-18 Rev. 56

Only by keeping the public well informed will the Plants be able to operate for the maximum benefit of all concerned. The Public Education and Information Program will seek to:

Explain to the public how they will be notified should an emergency occur at the plant. This will include instructions in the use of the Tone Alert Radio notification system and information on the siren notification system as appropriate.

Educate the public about radiation and contamination.

Help the public understand what their initial actions should be in an emergency.

Familiarize the public with protective actions, e.g. evacuation routes and relocation centers, and sheltering which may be required and rationale behind recommendations for these actions.

Provide information concerning methods for receiving additional information

Ensure that special needs of the handicapped are understood A. In order to help assure proper public reaction to an emergency notification, Alabama Power, Georgia Power and Southern Nuclear will keep state and local officials continuously informed of all details related to any emergency.

B. Several communications methods may be used to acquaint the public with plans for their protection during a Plant emergency. Means for accomplishing these methods will include one or more of the following activities as listed below. Effort will be concentrated upon providing information to the public by written material that is likely to be available in the residence and in locations frequented by transients. The information will also provide instructions as to what local media (radio and television stations) will be providing additional information in the event of an emergency.

1. Placement of an advertisement in local telephone directories.

2. Information in utility bills, J-19 Rev. 42

3. Signs displayed in public areas within the plume exposure EPZ. (e.g.,

commercial establishments, areas used by sportsmen, motels, gasoline stations, phone booths, etc.) Sign content and location distribution will be revised and redistributed as needed,

4. Distribution of an emergency information publications/leaflets,

5. Television or Radio,

6. Emergency Calendars,

7. Direct Mail-Newsletters,

8. Visitor Center availability to the public (when not restricted for Security reasons),

9. Information exchange meetings with government agencies and local officials as needed.

19.0 PROCEDURES Implementing procedures (listed below) exist which will provide guidance and direction for carrying out the activities and responsibilities listed in this Plan.

These procedures cover, but are not limited to, emergency communications staffing, activation of emergency communication facilities, development and issue of news releases, conduct of news briefings/media response, public response and public education/information dissemination.

NMP-EP-201, Emergency Communications Administration

NMP-EP-202, Emergency Communications Organization Activation and Notification

NMP-EP-203, Corporate Media Center Operations

NMP-EP-204, Emergency News Center Operations

NMP-EP-205, Emergency Communications News Releases

NMP-EP-206, Emergency Communications News Briefings J-20 Rev. 56

Emergency Response Training Subject Areas Organization Position Emergency Media Position Spokesperson Training Public Information X X Director CMC Manager X X JIC Manager X X Nuclear Spokesperson X X X CMC/JIC Media Relations X X Representative SNC News Writer X X Employee Communications X X Coordinator Public Response Teams X X CMC/JIC Public Response X X Coordinator Community Relations X X Coordinator CMC/JIC Assistant X X CMC/JIC Support Staff X X CMC/JIC Facility X X Coordinator Internet Coordinator X X News Media X EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION ORGANIZATION TRAINING MATRIX TABLE 1 J-21 Rev. 56

CONTROL ROOM EMPLOYEES TSC PUBLIC CALLS CORPORATE MEDIA CALLS EOF MEDIA INDUSTRY CALLS CENTER OWNERS GOVT. OFFICIALS STOCKHOLDERS PSC OFF SITE INTERNET AGENCIES JIC MEDIA PUBLIC FLOW OF PUBLIC INFORMATION DURING AN EMERGENCY Figure A J-22 Rev. 56

PLANT CORPORATE DUTY MANAGER EOF MANAGER NUCLEAR SPOKESPERSON SNC ON-CALL CORPORATE COMM PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA/

DIRECTOR/CMC PUBLIC MANAGER VRU GPC/APC ON-CALL MEDIA REP CMC MEDIA RELATIONS REP GPC/APC AREA CORPORATE PUBLIC OFFICES RESPONSE STAFF*

LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS Includes Corp Public Response Team, Employee Communications Internet Activities, Financial Response & Government Relations, Community Relations INITIAL/ EARLY FLOW OF EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION AT CORPORATE MEDIA CENTER (PRIOR TO JIC ACTIVATION)

Figure B J-23 Rev. 56

EOF CORPORATE MEDIA CENTER EOF MANAGER CMC MANAGER JOINT INFORMATION CENTER CMC PUBLIC CMC MEDIA RESPONSE RELATIONS STAFF*

GOV'T NUCLEAR REP PIOs SPOKESPERSO N

PI DIRECTOR JIC PUBLIC

RESPONSE

STAFF* JIC CMC MEDIA MANAGER RELATIONS REP EMPLOYEES VRU INTERNET MEDIA / GOV'T OFFICIALS PUBLIC

INCLUDES TELEPHONE RESPONSE TEAMS, COMMUNITY RELATIONS COORD., STATE RESPONSE TEAMS EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION FLOW AFTER JIC ACTIVATION Figure C J-24 Rev. 56

CORPORATE MEDIA CENTER JOINT INFORMATION CENTER CMC MANAGER JIC MANAGER GOV'T PIOs CMC PUBLIC RESPONSE COORDINATOR PUBLIC RESPONSE STATE &

COORDINATOR COUNTY PHONE INTERNET TEAMS CORPORATE EMPLOYEE RUMOR VRU COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSE TEAM, FINANCIAL VOICE RESP. UNIT PUBLIC RESPONSE TEAM RELATIONS COMMUNITY RELATIONS COORDINATOR STATE RUMOR CONTROL STAFF PUBLIC AND MEDIA PUBLIC RESPONSE FLOW CHART Figure D J-25 Rev. 56

Public APC/GPC Emergency Information -----

Communications Director Coordinators Nuclear CMC Manager JIC Manager SNC News Writer Spokesperson I I Technical Assistant CMC Facility coordinatorl JIC Facility Coordinator I ISNC Support Staff CMC Media Relations I JIC Media Relations I Reps Reps Financial Response I JIC Assistant JIC Admin Staff Liaison Governmental Relations I Public Response Public Response Liaison Coordinator Team Employee Communications I Community Relations I Coordinator Coordinator Internet Coordinator I CMC Assistant CMC Admin Staff I Public Response Coordinator I Employee Financial Response Government Public Response Internet Liaison Communications Relations Liaison Team Coordinator Coordinator EMERGENCY COMMNICATIONS REPORTING STRUCTURE FIGURE E J-26 Rev. 56

APPENDIX 11(K)

ASSESSMENT ACTIONS K-i Rev 48

ASSESSMENT ACTIONS

1. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES The classification system is based on the four emergency classes described in 10CFR50 Appendix E and NUREG 0654, established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),

for grouping off-normal nuclear power plant conditions according to (1) their relative radiological seriousness, and (2) the time-sensitive onsite and off-site radiological emergency preparedness actions necessary to respond to such conditions. The existing radiological emergency classes, in ascending order of seriousness, are called:

Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE)

Alert

Site Area Emergency (SAE)

General Emergency (GE)

The classes, therefore, determine initial steps to be taken by on site and by corporate emergency response personnel. The emergency classes are used by offsite authorities to determine which of the preplanned actions to be taken by their emergency organizations.

An emergency classification is indicative of the status of the plant. Inputs to the emergency classification system include the status of various plant systems, radiation levels in and around plant areas, and the rate of release of radioactivity from the plant. These are termed Initiating Conditions which are a predetermined subset of nuclear power plant conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency, or such an emergency has occurred.

The SNC classification scheme is based on NEI 99-01, Rev 4, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, January 2003 endorsed by Reg Guide 1.101, Rev 4, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors. The Initiating Conditions lead each plant to a classification Implementing Procedure which contains the Threshold values for each Initiating Condition.

Each Initiating Condition has specific conditions associated that are termed Threshold Values. When an Initiating Condition is observed and the criteria of its associated Threshold Values are met, an Emergency Action Level is met and the event is then classified and declared at the appropriate level.

The SNC Classification procedures are written to classify events based on meeting the Initiating Condition (IC) and a Threshold Value (TV) for an EAL considering each Unit independently. During events, the ICs and TVs are monitored and if conditions meet another higher EAL, that higher emergency classification is declared and appropriate notifications made. Notifications are made on a site basis. If both units are in concurrent classifications, the highest classification would be used for the notification and the other unit classification noted on the notification form.

At all times, when conditions present themselves that are not explicitly provided in the EAL scheme the Emergency Director has discretion to declare an event based on his knowledge of the emergency classes and judgment of the situation or condition.

K-1 Rev. 52

Once an emergency classification is made, it cannot be downgraded to a lower classification. All the actions associated with the emergency classification level must be completed and then a termination of the event can be affected. At termination, on an event specific basis, the site can either enter normal operating conditions or enter a recovery condition with a recovery organization established for turnover from the ERO.

The described emergency classes and the emergency action levels which determine them are agreed on by SNC and State and local authorities. The emergency action levels will be reviewed by these officials annually.

a. Notification of Unusual Event

1. Description The classification of Notification of Unusual Event applies to situations in which events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

2. Response In the event of a Notification of Unusual Event, the Shift Manager will assesses the conditions and implement the Classification EIP.

The Emergency Organization will perform the following:

1) Inform State and local offsite authorities of the nature of the unusual event within 15 min. of classifying the emergency. Notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as soon as possible (ASAP) but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following classification of the emergency.

2) Augment on-shift resources, as needed.

3) Assess and respond to the event.

4) Escalate to a more severe class, if appropriate, or close out with a verbal summary to offsite authorities followed by a written summary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b. Alert

1. Description The classification of Alert applies to situations in which events are in process or have occurred which involve an, actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of intentional malicious dedicated efforts of hostile action. Any releases of K-2 Rev. 48

radioactive material for the Alert classification are expected to be limited to small fractions of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels. The purpose of offsite alert is to assure that emergency personnel are readily available to respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required and to provide offsite authorities current status information.

2. Response In the event of an Alert the Shift Manager will assess the conditions and implement the Classification EIP.

The Emergency Organization will then perform the following:

1) Within 15 min. of classification, inform State and local offsite authorities of Alert Emergency and reasons for emergency. Notify the NRC ASAP but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following classification of the emergency.

2) Augment resources and activate the emergency response facilities (e.g.

Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)). These actions may be delayed for security based events at the discretion of the emergency director.

3) Assess and respond to the emergency.

4) Mobilize, and dispatch if necessary, onsite survey teams.

5) Provide periodic plant status updates to offsite authorities.

6) Provide periodic meteorological assessments to offsite authorities and, if any emergency releases are occurring, field monitoring team readings or dose estimates for actual releases.

7) Activate the Emergency Response Data System for the affected unit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following declaration of the Alert.

8) Escalate to a more severe class, if appropriate, or close out the emergency class by verbal summary to offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of closeout.

c. Site Area Emergency

1. Description The classification of Site Area Emergency applies to those events which are in progress or have occurred that involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public from radiation or contamination or security events that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) prevent effective access to, equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases of radioactive material for the Site Area Emergency classification are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

K-3 Rev. 48

2. Response In the event of a Site Area Emergency, the Shift Manager will assess the conditions and implement the Classification EIP.

The Emergency Organization will perform the following:

1) Within 15 min. of classification, inform State and local offsite authorities of Site Area Emergency and reasons for emergency. Notify the NRC ASAP but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following classification of the emergency.

2) If necessary, provide protective action recommendations to State and local authorities.

3) Augment resources and activate the emergency response facilities (e.g.

Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF)). These actions may be delayed for security based events at the discretion of the emergency director.

4) Assess and respond to the emergency.

5) Dispatch as necessary onsite and offsite survey teams.

6) Dedicate individuals for plant status updates to offsite authorities and periodic press briefings.

7) On a periodic basis, make senior technical and management staff available for consultation with the NRC and State officials.

8) Provide meteorological information and dose estimates to offsite authorities for actual releases via a dedicated individual.

8) Provide release and dose projections based on available plant condition information and foreseeable contingencies.

10) Activate the Emergency Response Data System for the affected unit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following declaration of the Site Area Emergency.

11) Escalate to General Emergency, if appropriate, or close out the emergency class by briefing of offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of closeout.

d. General Emergency

1. Description The classification of General Emergency applies to those events which are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential loss of containment integrity or security events that result in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Release of radioactive material for the General Emergency classification can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

K-4 Rev. 48

2. Response In the event of a General Emergency the Shift Manager will assess the conditions and implement the Classification EIP.

The Emergency Organization will then perform the following:

1) Within 15 min. of classification, inform State and local offsite authorities of General Emergency and reason for emergency. Notify the NRC ASAP but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following classification of the emergency.

2) Provide protective action recommendations to State and local authorities based upon plant conditions and/or actual or projected releases of radioactive material.

3) Augment resources and activate the emergency response facilities (e.g.

Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF)). These actions may be delayed for security based events at the discretion of the emergency director.

4) Assess and respond to the emergency

5) Dispatch onsite and offsite survey teams.

6) Dedicate an individual for plant status updates to offsite authorities and periodic press briefings.

7) On a periodic basis, make senior technical and management staff available for consultation with the NRC and State officials..

8) Provide meteorological data and field monitoring team readings or dose estimates to offsite authorities for actual releases.

9) Provide release and dose projections based on plant condition and foreseeable contingencies.

10) Activate the Emergency Response Data System for the affected unit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following declaration of the General Emergency.

11) Close out the emergency class by briefing of offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of closeout.

K-5 Rev. 48

2. CLASSIFICATION PROCESS The Classification Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure is used to classify the emergency condition upon recognition of an off- normal condition relative to an Initiating Condition.

Two Initiating Condition Matrices and a Fission Product Barrier Evaluation table are used depending on the initial mode of the unit. The Hot Initiating Condition matrix and the Fission Product Barrier Evaluation table are used when the unit is in the Technical Specification defined modes of Hot Shutdown, Hot Standby , Startup and Power Operation. A Cold Initiating Condition matrix is used when the unit is in the Cold Shutdown, Refueling, or Defueled modes. The IC Matrices are human factored to read from top to bottom General Emergency to Notification of Unusual Event within a category or subcategory.

To facilitate the expeditious classification of emergencies, the various initiating conditions which may result in an emergency class are grouped into six recognition categories as follows:

Radiological (Hot and Cold - R series)

Fission Product Barriers (Hot - F series)

System Malfunctions (Hot - S series)

System Malfunctions (Cold - C series)

ISFSI (Hot and Cold - E series)

Hazards (Hot and Cold - H series)

Within each category, sub categories and specific Initiating Conditions are identified. Each Initiating Condition has specific conditions associated that are termed Threshold Values.

These Initiating Conditions, Threshold Values, and bases are provided in this Appendix.

The capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an EAL has been exceeded has been established and is outlined in applicable procedures. Emergency conditions are classified promptly upon identification that an emergency action level (EAL) threshold has been exceeded.

The 15-minute period encompasses all assessment, classification, and declaration actions associated with making an emergency declaration from the first availability of a plant indication or receipt of a report of an off-normal condition by plant operators up to and including the declaration of the emergency. If classifications and declarations are performed away from the CR, all delays incurred in transferring information from the CR (where the alarms, indications, and reports are first received) to the ERF (at which declarations are made) are included within the 15-minute criterion.

K-6 Rev. 55

Hot Initiating Condition Matrix - Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 Categories / Subcategories Radiological System Malfunctions Fission Product Barriers Communicati Nat Release Rad Levels AC/DC Power Rx and Core Annunciators RCS ons Dest RG1- Offsite Dose FG1 - Loss of ANY Two SG1 - Prolonged Loss SG2 - Failure of the Resulting from an Actual or Barriers AND Loss or of All Offsite Power Reactor Protection General Emergency IS Imminent Release of Potential Loss of Third AND Prolonged Loss of System to Complete an Gaseous Radioactivity Barrier All Onsite AC Power Automatic Trip and Exceeds 1000 mR TEDE Manual Trip was NOT OR 5000 mR Thyroid CDE Successful AND there is for the Actual or Projected Indication of an Duration of the Release Extreme Challenge to Using Actual Meteorology. the Ability to Cool the Core.

RS1 - Offsite Dose FS1 - Loss or Potential Loss SS1 - Loss of All SS2 - Failure of Reactor SS6Inability to Resulting from an Actual or of ANY Two Barriers Offsite Power AND Protection System Monitor a Imminent Release of Loss of All Onsite AC Instrumentation to SIGNIFICANT Gaseous Radioactivity Power to Essential Complete or Initiate an TRANSIENT in Site Area Emergency Exceeds 100 mR TEDE OR Busses Automatic Reactor Trip Progress 500 mR Thyroid CDE for Once a Reactor the Actual or Projected Protection System Duration of the Release. Setpoint Has Been Exceeded AND Manual Trip Was NOT Successful.

SS3 - Loss of All Vital SS4 - Complete Loss of DC Power Heat Removal Capability RA1 - Any UNPLANNED RA2 - Damage to FA1 - ANY Loss or ANY SA5 - AC power SA2 - Failure of Reactor SA4 - HA1 -

Release of Gaseous or Irradiated Fuel OR Loss Potential Loss of EITHER capability to essential Protection System UNPLANNED and Des Liquid Radioactivity to the of Water Level that Has Fuel Clad OR RCS busses reduced to a Instrumentation to Loss of Most or Phenom Environment that Exceeds or Will Result in the single power source for Complete or Initiate an All Annunciation Affectin 200 Times the Radiological Uncovering of Irradiated greater than 15 minutes Automatic Reactor Trip or Indication in Plant V Effluent Technical Fuel Outside the Reactor such that any additional Once a Reactor the control room AREA Specifications for 15 Vessel single failure would Protection System With EITHER a Minutes or Longer. result in station Setpoint Has Been (1) a RA3 - Release of Alert blackout. Exceeded AND Manual SIGNIFICANT Radioactive Material or TRANSIENT in Trip Was Successful.

Rises in Radiation Levels Progress, OR (2)

Within the Facility That Compensatory Impedes Operation of Non-Alarming Systems Required to Indicators are Maintain Safe Operations Unavailable or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown RU1 - Any UNPLANNED RU2 - Unexpected Rise FU1 - ANY Loss OR ANY SU1 - Loss of All SU2 - Inability to Reach SU3 - SU5 - RCS SU6 - HU1 -

sual Event Release of Gaseous or in Plant Radiation Potential Loss of Offsite Power to Required Shutdown UNPLANNED Leakage UNPLANNED and Des Liquid Radioactivity to the Containment Essential Busses for Within Technical Loss of Most or Loss of All Phenom Environment that Exceeds GREATER THAN 15 Specification Limits All Safety System Onsite OR Affectin Two Times the Radiological Minutes Annunciation or Offsite PROTE

Cold Initiating Condition Matrix - Modes 5, 6 and Defueled Categories / Subcategories Radiological System Malfunctions Release Rad levels AC/DC Power Rx and Core Heat Removal RCS Communi- Natural/

cations Destructive RG1- Offsite Dose CG1 - Loss of RPV Resulting from an Actual Inventory Affecting General Emergency ISFSI or Imminent Release of Fuel Clad Integrity Gaseous Radioactivity with Containment Exceeds 1000 mR TEDE Challenged with OR 5000 mR Thyroid Irradiated Fuel in the CDE for the Actual or RPV.

Projected Duration of the Release Using Actual Meteorology.

RS1 - Offsite Dose CS2 - Loss of RPV CS1 - Loss of RPV Site Area Emergency Resulting from an Actual Inventory Affecting Inventory Affecting or Imminent Release of Core Decay Heat Core Decay Heat Gaseous Radioactivity Removal Capability Removal Capability.

Exceeds 100 mR TEDE with Irradiated Fuel Mode 5 only OR 500 mR Thyroid in the RPV.

CDE for the Actual or Mode 6 only Projected Duration of the Release.

RA1 - Any RA2 - Damage to Irradiated CA3 - Loss of All CA2 - Loss of RPV CA4 - Inability to CA1 - Loss of RCS HA1 - Natural and UNPLANNED Release Fuel OR Loss of Water Offsite Power AND Inventory with Maintain Plant in Cold Inventory. Destructive of Gaseous or Liquid Level that Has or Will Loss of All Onsite Irradiated Fuel in the Shutdown with Mode 5 only Phenomena Affecting Radioactivity to the Result in the Uncovering of AC Power to RPV. Irradiated Fuel in the the Plant VITAL Environment that Irradiated Fuel Outside the Essential Busses. Mode 6 only RPV. AREA Exceeds 200 Times the Reactor Vessel Radiological Effluent RA3 - Release of Alert Technical Specifications for 15 Minutes or Radioactive Material or Longer. Rises in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown RU1 - Any RU2 - Unexpected Rise in CU3 - Loss of All CU8 - Inadvertent CU4 - Unplanned CU1 - RCS Leakage CU6 - HU1 - Natural and UNPLANNED Release Plant Radiation Offsite Power to Criticality Loss of Decay Heat Mode 5 only UNPLANNED Destructive of Gaseous or Liquid Essential Busses for Removal Capability Loss of All Onsite Phenomena Affecting Radioactivity to the Greater Than 15 with Irradiated Fuel in OR Offsite the PROTECTED Notification of Environment that Minutes. the RPV. Communications AREA Exceeds Two Times the Capabilities Radiological Effluent Unusual Event Technical Specifications CU7 - Unplanned CU2 - Unplanned Loss E-HU1 - Damage to a for 60 Minutes or Loss of Required DC of RCS Inventory with loaded cask Longer. Power for Greater Irradiated Fuel in the CONFINEMENT than 15 Minutes. RPV BOUNDARY Mode 6 only

Not Applicable RCS Integrity-RED OR Heat Sink-RED

2. RCS Leak Rate 2. RCS Leak Rate RCS subcooling less than 16°F {less than 45° F Adverse} due to an RCS leak greater Non-isolable RCS leak (including SG tube Leakage) great than Charging / RHR capacity

3. SG Tube Rupture 3. SG Tube Rupture EEP-3.0 entered due to SG tube rupture resulting in an ECCS actuation Not Applicable

4. Containment Radiation Monitoring 4. Containment Radiation Monitoring CTMT Rad Monitor RE-2 greater than 100 mR/hr OR CTMT Radiation Monitor RE-7 Not Applicable greater than 200 mR/hr

5. Other Indications 5. Other Indications Not applicable Unexplained level rise in ANY of the following:

Containment sump Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT)

Waste Holdup Tank (WHT)

6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment Judgment by the ED that the RCS Barrier is lost. Consider conditions not addressed and Judgment by the ED that the RCS Barrier is potentially lo inability to determine the status of the RCS Barrier addressed and inability to determine the status of the RCS Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss

1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status Not Applicable Containment-RED

2. Containment Pressure 2. Containment Pressure Rapid unexplained CTMT pressure lowering following initial pressure rise CTMT pressure greater than 54 psig and rising OR OR Intersystem LOCA indicated by CTMT pressure or sump level response not consistent CTMT hydrogen concentration greater than 6%

with a loss of primary or secondary coolant OR CTMT CSF - ORANGE AND Less than the following minimum operable equipment:

One CTMT fan cooler AND One train of CTMT spray

3. Core Exit Thermocouple Reading 3. Core Exit Thermocouple Reading Not applicable CORE COOLING CSF - RED OR - ORANGE for greater AND RVLS LEVEL less than 0%

4. SG Secondary Side Release with Primary to Secondary Leakage 4. SG Secondary Side Release with P-to-S Leakage RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside of containment Not applicable OR Primary-to-Secondary leakrate greater than 10 gpm with nonisolable steam release from affected S/G to the environment

5. CNMT Isolation Valves Status After CNMT Isolation 5. CNMT Isolation Valves Status After CNMT Isolation CTMT isolation valves OR dampers NOT closed AND downstream pathway to Not Applicable the environment exists after Containment Isolation

6. Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment 6. Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment Not Applicable CTMT Rad monitor RE-27 A OR B greater than 3000 R/h

7. Other Indications 7. Other Indications Pathway to the environment exists based on VALID RE-10, RE-14, RE-21, OR RE-22 Not applicable Alarms

8. Emergency Director Judgment 8. Emergency Director Judgment Judgment by the ED that the CTMT Barrier is lost. Consider conditions not addressed Judgment by the ED that the CTMT Barrier is potentially and inability to determine the status of the CTMT Barrier addressed and inability to determine the status of the CTM K-9 Rev. 48

RG1 Initiating Condition Offsite Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds 1000 mR TEDE OR 5000 mR Thyroid CDE for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Using Actual Meteorology.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2 OR 3)

NOTE: If dose assessment results are available at the time of declaration, the classification should be based on Threshold Value #2 instead of Threshold Value

1.While necessary declarations should not be delayed awaiting results, the dose assessment should be initiated / completed in order to determine if the classification should be subsequently escalated.

NOTE: The Emergency Director should not wait until 15 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

1. VALID reading on any of the following radiation monitors that exceeds OR expected to exceed the reading shown for 15 minutes OR longer:

Steam jet Air Ejector RE-15C Off scale high Plant Vent Stack RE-29B (NG) 60 Ci/cc Steam Generator Relief RE-60A,B,C 70 Ci/cc ( 67 R/hr)

TDAFW Steam Exhaust RE-60D 800 Ci/cc ( 770 R/hr)

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1,000 mR TEDE OR 5,000 mR thyroid CDE at OR beyond the site boundary.

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates exceeding 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE of 5,000 mR for one hour of inhalation, at OR beyond site boundary.

Basis:

VALID: an indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

K-10 Rev. 48

This IC addresses radioactivity releases that result in doses at or beyond the site boundary that exceed the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Public protective actions will be necessary.

Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public and likely involve fuel damage. While these failures are addressed by other ICs, this IC provides appropriate diversity and addresses events which may not be able to be classified on the basis of plant status alone. It is important to note that, for the more severe accidents, the release may be unmonitored or there may be large uncertainties associated with the source term and/or meteorology.

The Emergency Director should not wait until 15 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

The monitor reading Threshold Values are determined using a dose assessment method that back calculates from the dose values specified in the IC. The meteorology and source term (noble gases, particulates, and halogens) used are the same as those used for determining the monitor reading Threshold Values in ICs RU1 and RA1. This protocol will maintain intervals between the Threshold Values for the four classifications. Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed, and that the Threshold Values are based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 1,000 mR/hour whole body or 5,000 mR/hour thyroid, whichever is more limiting.

Since dose assessment is based on actual meteorology, whereas the monitor reading Threshold Values are not, the results from these assessments may indicate that the classification is not warranted, or may indicate that a higher classification is warranted. For this reason, emergency implementing procedures call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual meteorology and release information. If the results of these dose assessments are available when the classification is made the dose assessment results override the monitor reading Threshold Values. Classification should not be delayed pending the results of these dose assessments.

K-11 Rev. 48

¶ RS1 Initiating Condition Offsite Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mR TEDE OR 500 mR Thyroid CDE for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2 OR 3)

NOTE: If dose assessment results are available at the time of declaration, the classification should be based on Threshold Value #2 instead of Threshold Value

1.While necessary declarations should not be delayed awaiting results, the dose assessment should be initiated / completed in order to determine if the classification should be subsequently escalated.

NOTE: The Emergency Director should not wait until 15 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

1. VALID reading on any of the following radiation monitors that exceeds OR is expected to exceed the reading shown for 15 minutes OR longer:

Steam jet Air Ejector RE-15C 800 Ci/cc ( 770 R/hr)

Plant Vent Stack RE-29B (NG) 6 Ci/cc Steam Generator Relief RE-60A,B,C 7 Ci/cc ( 6.7 R/hr)

TDAFW Steam Exhaust RE-60D 80 Ci/cc ( 77 R/hr)

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mR TEDE OR 500 mR thyroid CDE at OR beyond the site boundary.

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates exceeding 100 mR/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE of 500 mR for one hour of inhalation, at OR beyond the site boundary.

Basis:

VALID: an indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

K-12 Rev. 48

This IC addresses radioactivity releases that result in doses at or beyond the site boundary that exceed a small fraction of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.

The Emergency Director should not wait until 15 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

The monitor reading Threshold Values are determined using a dose assessment method that back calculates from the dose values specified in the IC. The meteorology and source term (noble gases, particulates, and halogens) used is the same as those used for determining the monitor reading Threshold Values in ICs RU1 and RA1. This protocol maintains intervals between the Threshold Values for the four classifications. Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed, and that the Threshold Values be based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 100 mR/hour whole body or 500 mR/hour thyroid, whichever is more limiting.

The release rates which result in site boundary doses of 100 mR TEDE are in excess of the range of the monitors listed in RU1 and RA1.

Since dose assessment is based on actual meteorology, whereas the monitor reading Threshold Values are not, the results from these assessments may indicate that the classification is not warranted, or may indicate that a higher classification is warranted. For this reason, emergency implementing procedures should call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual meteorology and release information. If the results of these dose assessments are available when the classification is made (e.g., initiated at a lower classification level), the dose assessment results override the monitor reading Threshold Values. Classification should not be delayed pending the results of these dose assessments.

K-13 Rev. 48

¶RA1 Initiating Condition Any UNPLANNED Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications for 15 Minutes or Longer.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2 OR 3)

NOTE: The Emergency Director should not wait until 15 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

1.VALID reading on any effluent monitor that exceeds 200 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 15 minutes OR longer.

2.

Monitor 200 X Setpoint Value Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (RE-18) Greater than OR equal to 1x106 cpm.

Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line 5 2.80 x 10 cpm (RE-23B)

Steam Jet Air Ejector RE-15A Greater than OR equal to 1 x106 cpm Plant Vent Gas RE-14 Greater than OR equal to 1 x106 cpm.

4 RE-22 4.36 x 10 cpm RE-29B (NG) -2 8.88 x 10 Ci/ml

2. VALID reading on any of the following radiation monitors that exceeds the reading shown for 15 minutes OR longer:

4 Main Steam Atmos Relief (R60A,B,C) 1.42 x 10 mR/hr 4

TDAFW Exhaust (R60D) 1.42 x 10 mR/hr

3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations OR release rates in excess of 200 times Technical Specification 5.5.4.b as confirmed by ODCM , with a release duration of 15 minutes OR longer.

K-14 Rev. 48

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

VALID: an indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

This IC addresses a potential or actual decline in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time. The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment is indicative of a degradation in these features and/or controls.

UNPLANNED, as used in this context, includes any release for which a radioactivity discharge permit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit. The Emergency Director should not wait until 15 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

Also, if an ongoing release is detected and the starting time for that release is unknown, the Emergency Director should, in the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release has exceeded 15 minutes.

Threshold Value #1 addresses radioactivity releases that for whatever reason cause effluent radiation monitor readings that exceed two hundred times the alarm setpoint established by the radioactivity discharge permit. This alarm setpoint may be associated with a planned batch release, or a continuous release path.

Threshold Value #2 is similar to Threshold Value #1, but is intended to address effluent or accident radiation monitors on non-routine release pathways for which a discharge permit would not normally be prepared.

Threshold Value #3 addresses uncontrolled releases that are detected by sample analyses, particularly on unmonitored pathways, e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.

Threshold Values #1 and #2 directly correlate with the IC since annual average meteorology is required to be used in showing compliance with the RECP and is used in calculating the alarm setpoints.

Due to the uncertainty associated with meteorology, emergency implementing procedures should call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual (real-time) meteorology in the event of a gaseous radioactivity release of this magnitude. The results of these assessments should be compared to the ICs RS1 and RG1 to determine if the event classification should be escalated.

K-15 Rev. 48

¶RA2 Initiating Condition Damage to Irradiated Fuel OR Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. UNPLANNED VALID alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:

Drumming Station RE-0008 Containment Purge Ventilation Monitor RE-24A OR B Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Monitor RE-25A OR B Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor RE-5

2. Loss of water level that has or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the Reactor Vessel as indicated by ANY of the following:

Report of personnel during fuel assembly movements.

Spent Fuel Pool Storage Less than El 129 Transfer Canal Less than El 116.

Reactor Core Elevation Less than El 118 Basis:

VALID: an indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

This IC addresses specific events that have resulted, or may result, in unexpected rises in radiation dose rates within plant buildings, and may be a precursor to a radioactivity release to the environment. These events represent a loss of control over radioactive material and represent a degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

Threshold Value #1 addresses radiation monitor indications of fuel uncovery and/or fuel damage. Raised readings on ventilation monitors may be indication of a radioactivity release K-16 Rev. 48

from the fuel, confirming that damage has occurred. Raised background at the monitor due to water level lowering may mask raised ventilation exhaust airborne activity and needs to be considered. Application of these Initiating Conditions requires understanding of the actual radiological conditions present in the vicinity of the monitor.

In Threshold Value #2, indications include water level and personnel reports. Visual observation will be the primary indicator for spent fuel pool and fuel movement activities.

Personnel report during fuel assembly movements is included to ensure that reports of actual or potential fuel uncovery is classified. If available, video cameras may allow remote observation.

Depending on available level indication, the declaration threshold may need to be based on indications of water makeup rate or lowering in refueling water storage tank level.

K-17 Rev. 48

¶RA3 Initiating Condition Release of Radioactive Material or Rises in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. VALID radiation monitor readings greater than 15 mR/hr in areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions:

Control Room radiation monitor RE-1A

2. UNPLANNED VALID radiation readings greater than 1 R/hr values in the following areas requiring infrequent access to maintain plant safety functions.

RadioChemistry Lab Area RE-3 Electrical And Piping Penetration Rooms Charging Pump Room Area RE-4 VCT Valve Room Sample Room Area RE-6 Seal Water HX Room Lower Equipment Room CCW HX Room Main Steam Valve Room Turbine Building Air Compressor Area 4160 Volt ESF Bus Rooms DC Switchgear Rooms Control Rod Drive Room Valve Box 1, 2, 3 and 4 Diesel Building Service Water Intake Structure Hot shutdown Panels Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

VALID: an indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

This IC addresses raised radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually or that requires local K-18 Rev. 48

monitoring, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The cause and/or magnitude of the rise in radiation levels is not a concern of this IC. The Emergency Director must consider the source or cause of the raised radiation levels and determine if any other IC may be involved.

This IC is not meant to apply to anticipated temporary rises due to planned events.

The area requiring continuous occupancy is the control room and the central alarm station. The Central Alarm Station is in the Control Room envelope. The value of 15mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times.

For areas requiring infrequent access, the 1 R/hr (Locked High Rad Area) is based on radiation levels which result in exposure control measures intended to maintain doses within normal occupational exposure guidelines and limits (i.e., 10 CFR 20), and in doing so, will impede necessary access. As used here, impede, includes hindering or interfering provided that the interference or delay is sufficient to significantly threaten the safe operation of the plant.

K-19 Rev. 48

¶RU1 Initiating Condition Any UNPLANNED Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications for 60 Minutes or Longer.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2 OR 3)

NOTE: The Emergency Director should not wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

1.VALID reading on any effluent monitor that exceeds two times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes OR longer.

2.

Monitor 2 X Setpoint Value 2.00 x 105 cpm (planned release)

Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line RE-18 4 1.58 x 10 cpm (no planned release) 3 Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line 2.80 x 10 cpm RE-23B 2

Steam Jet Air Ejector RE-15 3.54 x 10 cpm 4

Plant Vent Gas RE-14 3.64 x 10 cpm RE-22 2 4.36 x 10 cpm RE-29B (NG) -4 8.88 x 10 Ci/ml

2. VALID reading on any of the following radiation monitors that exceeds the reading shown for 60 minutes OR longer:

Main Steam Atmos Relief R60A,B,C 142 mR/hr TDAFW Exhaust R60D 142 mR/hr

3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous OR liquid releases indicates concentrations OR release rates, with a release duration of 60 minutes OR longer, in excess of two times Technical Specification 5.5.4.b, as confirmed by the ODCM.

K-20 Rev. 48

Basis:

UNPLANNED, as used in this context, includes any release for which a radioactivity discharge permit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit. The Emergency Director should not wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes. Also, if an ongoing release is detected and the starting time for that release is unknown, the Emergency Director should, in the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release has exceeded 60 minutes.

VALID: an indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

This IC addresses a potential or actual decline in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time.

Nuclear power plants incorporate features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases, or control and monitor intentional releases. These controls are located in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Ref 2. The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment is indicative of a degradation in these features and/or controls.

Threshold Value #1 addresses radioactivity releases, that for whatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed two times the Technical Specification limit and releases are not terminated within 60 minutes. This alarm setpoint may be associated with a planned batch release, or a continuous release path. In either case, the setpoint is established by the ODCM to warn of a release that is not in compliance with the TS 5.5.4. Indexing the Threshold Value to the ODCM setpoints in this manner ensures that the Threshold Value will never be less than the setpoint established by a specific discharge permit.

Threshold Value #2 is intended for effluent monitoring on non-routine release pathways for which a discharge permit would not normally be prepared. The ODCM establishes a methodology for determining effluent radiation monitor setpoints. The ODCM specifies default source terms and, for gaseous releases, prescribes the use of pre-determined annual average meteorology in the most limiting downwind sector for showing compliance with the regulatory commitments. These monitor reading Threshold Values are determined using this methodology.

Threshold Value #3 addresses uncontrolled releases that are detected by sample analyses, particularly on unmonitored pathways, e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.

K-21 Rev. 48

¶RU2 Initiating Condition Unexpected Rise in Plant Radiation.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1.a AND b. OR 2)

1. a. VALID indication of uncontrolled water level lowering in the reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, OR fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

Personnel report of low water level Annunciator EH2 SFP LVL HI/LO Personnel report of cavitation OR low discharge pressure for SFP Pump Discharge Pressure AND/OR RHR Pump Discharge Pressure AND

b. UNPLANNED VALID Direct Area Radiation Monitor readings rise on any of the following:

RE-0005 in the fuel building RE-0002 in containment RE-0027A OR B in containment

2. UNPLANNED VALID Direct Area Radiation Monitor readings rise by a factor of 1000 over normal* levels.

Normal levels can be considered as the highest reading in the past twenty-four hours excluding the current peak value.

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

VALID: an indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

K-22 Rev. 48

This IC addresses raised radiation levels as a result of water level lowering above the RPV flange or events that have resulted, or may result, in unexpected rises in radiation dose rates within plant buildings. These radiation rises represent a loss of control over radioactive material and may represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

Classification as a NOUE is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event. Indications include instrumentation such as water level and local area radiation monitors, equipment parameters and personnel (e.g. , refueling crew) reports . If available, video cameras may allow remote observation. Depending on available level instrumentation, the declaration threshold may need to be based on indications of water makeup rate or lowering in refueling water storage tank level.

Threshold Value 1a: Personnel report of low water level is the primary indicator.

Threshold Value 1b limits:

FSAR 9.1.3.1.2 indicates that 12 feet of water above the stored fuel yields a dose rate of about 2.5 mRlhr. These monitors do not directly see the fuel, but see the dose reflected from the ceiling or containment dome, A conservative reduction on reflection is 10-2 (Ref. 10). Thus when on-scale, the lowest reading monitor (RE-0005, 104 mRlhr, Ref. 8, Table 3.3-6) equivalent read ing at the pool surface would be 106 m R/hr. Then a rise from a general area dose rate of 2.5 mRlhr represents log (10 6/2 .5) =5.6 1/1 Oth thicknesses. Assuming a 1/10 th thickness is 2 feet (Ref. 11), the monitor reading rise is equivalent to a water level lowering of 5.6 x 2 = 11.2 feet. Thus the fuel would have at least 6 inches of water cover.

Threshold Value #2 addresses UNPLANNED VALID Direct Area Radiation Monitor readings indicating rises in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material , and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

"Direct Radiation Area Monitors" include installed Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs) but does not include effluent monitors (which are addressed in separate EALs) or process monitors.

K-23 Rev. 58

Fission Product Barrier Degradation NOUE ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY FU1 ANY Loss or FA1 ANY Loss or FS1 Loss or Potential FG1 Loss of ANY Two Barriers ANY Potential ANY Potential Loss of ANY Two AND Loss or Potential Loss Loss of Loss of EITHER Barriers of Third Barrier Containment Fuel Clad OR RCS Op. Modes: Power Op. Modes: Power Op. Modes: Operation, Hot Operation, Hot Standby, Power Op. Modes: Standby, Startup, Startup, Hot Shutdown Operation, Power Hot Shutdown Hot Standby, Operation, Hot Startup, Hot Standby, Shutdown Startup, Hot Shutdown NOTES

1. The logic used for these initiating conditions reflects the following considerations:

The Fuel Clad Barrier and the RCS Barrier are weighted more heavily than the Containment Barrier. NOUE ICs associated with RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers are addressed under System Malfunction ICs.

At the Site Area Emergency level, there must be some ability to dynamically assess how far present conditions are from the threshold for a General Emergency. For example, if Fuel Clad and RCS Barrier Loss Threshold Values existed, that, in addition to offsite dose assessments, would require continual assessments of radioactive inventory and containment integrity.

Alternatively, if both Fuel Clad and RCS Barrier Potential Loss Threshold Values existed, the Emergency Director would have more assurance that there was no immediate need to escalate to a General Emergency.

The ability to escalate to higher emergency classes as an event deteriorates must be maintained. For example, RCS leakage steadily increasing would represent an increasing risk to public health and safety.

K-24 Rev. 48

Farley Fission Product Barrier Evaluation FUEL CLAD BARRIER Threshold Values:

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy or stainless steel tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

1. Critical Safety Function Status NOTE: Heat Sink CSF should not be considered -RED if total AFW flow is less than 395 gpm due to operator action.

RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function. ORANGE path indicates a severe challenge to the safety function.

Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge and thus these two items indicate potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Core Cooling - RED indicates significant superheating and core uncovery and is considered to indicate loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level The 300 Ci/gm I131 equivalent. Assessment by the NUMARC EAL Task Force indicates that this amount of coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to less than 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of radioactivity indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost. (Figure 4 may be used to evaluate)

There is no equivalent "Potential Loss" Threshold Value for this item.

3. Core Exit Thermocouple Readings Core Exit Thermocouple Readings are included in addition to the Critical Safety Functions to include conditions when the CSFs may not be in use.

The "Loss" Threshold Value of 1200 degrees F corresponds to significant superheating of the coolant. This value corresponds to the temperature reading that indicates core cooling - RED in Fuel Clad Barrier Threshold Value #1.

The "Potential Loss" Threshold Value of 700 degrees F corresponds to loss of subcooling. This value corresponds to the temperature reading that indicates core cooling - ORANGE in Fuel Clad Barrier Threshold Value #1.

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level There is no "Loss" Threshold Value corresponding to this item because it is better covered by the other Fuel Clad Barrier "Loss" Threshold Values.

The 0% RVLIS value for the "Potential Loss" Threshold Value corresponds to the top of the active fuel. The "Potential Loss" Threshold Value is defined by the Core Cooling - ORANGE path.

K-25 Rev. 48

5. Containment Radiation Monitoring The greater than 80 R/hr reading is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment. The reading is calculated assuming the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with a concentration of 300 Ci/gm dose equivalent I-131 into the containment atmosphere. Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage. This value is higher than that specified for RCS barrier Loss Threshold Value #4. Thus, this Threshold Value indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of RCS barrier.

There is no "Potential Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item.

7. Emergency Director Judgment This Threshold Value addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier is incorporated in this Threshold Value as a factor in Emergency Director judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

RCS BARRIER Threshold Values:

The RCS Barrier includes the RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

1. Critical Safety Function Status There is no "Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item.

NOTE: Heat Sink CSF should not be considered -RED if total AFW flow is less than 395 gpm due to operator action.

This Threshold Value uses the Critical Safety Function Status Tree (CSFST) monitoring and functional restoration procedures. An RCS Integrity RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function derived from appropriate instrument readings, and these CSFs indicate a potential loss of RCS barrier.

2. RCS Leak Rate The "Loss" Threshold Value addresses conditions where leakage from the RCS is greater than available inventory control capacity such that a loss of subcooling has occurred. The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory control systems are inadequate in maintaining RCS pressure and inventory against the mass loss through the leak.

The "Potential Loss" Threshold Value is based on the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to K-26 Rev. 48

the charging header. A second charg ing pump being required is indicative of a substantial RCS leak providing the 120 GPM value .

3. SG Tube Rupture This Threshold Value is intended to address the full spectrum of Steam Generator (SG) tube rupture events in conjunction with Containment Barrier "Loss" Threshold Value #4 and Fuel Clad Barrier Threshold Values. The "Loss" Threshold Value addresses RUPTURED SG(s) for which the leakage is large enough to cause actuation of ECCS (SI). This is consistent to the RCS Barrier "Potential Loss" Threshold Value #2. This condition is described by EEP-3.0 entered. By itself, this Threshold Value will result in the declaration of an Alert. However, if the SG is also FAULTED (i.e ., two barriers failed), the declaration escalates to a Site Area Emergency per Containment Barrier "Loss" Threshold Value #4.

There is no "Potential Loss" Threshold Value.

4. Containment Radiation Monitoring The RE-2 greater than 100 mRlhr and RE-7 greater than 200 mRlhr threshold is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. The reading is calculated assuming the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with normal operating concentrations (i.e. , within TIS) into the containment atmosphere. This value is less than that specified for Fuel Clad Barrier Threshold Value #5 .

Thus , this Threshold Value would be indicative of a RCS leak only. If the radiation monitor reading rise to that specified by Fuel Clad Barrier Threshold Value #5, fuel damage would also be indicated.

There is no "Potential Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item .

5. Other Indications There is no "Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item.

An unexplained level rise in the containment sump, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank or the Waste Holdup Tank could indicate a RCS leak and is therefore included as a Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier. Rises in the containment sump levels, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank, or the Waste Holdup Tank that are anticipated as part of a planned evolution (or have already been identified by other leak assessment measures and accounted for in other threshold values) do not meet this threshold.

Likewise, rises in containment sump levels, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank, or the Waste Holdup Tank that can be readily attributed to a source other than the RCS would also not meet the threshold.

Sump and tank level increases must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

6. Emergency Director Judgment This Threshold Value addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the RCS barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this Threshold Value as a factor in Emergency Director judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

CONTAINMENT BARRIER Threshold Values:

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam ,

feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

K-27 Rev. 58

1. Critical Safety Function Status There is no "Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item.

This Threshold Value uses Critical Safety Function Status Tree (CSFST) monitoring and functional restoration procedures. Containment RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function derived from appropriate instrument readings and/or sampling results, and thus represents a potential loss of containment. Conditions leading to a containment RED path result from RCS barrier and/or Fuel Clad Barrier Loss. Thus, this Threshold Value is primarily a discriminator between Site Area Emergency and General Emergency representing a potential loss of the third barrier.

2. Containment Pressure Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure rise indicates a loss of containment integrity. Containment pressure and sump levels should rise as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a LOCA. Thus, sump level or pressure not increasing indicates containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity.

The 27 PSIG for potential loss of containment is based on one-half the containment design pressure. Existence of an explosive mixture means a hydrogen and oxygen concentration of at least the lower deflagration limit (greater than 6%) curve exists. The indications of potential loss under this Threshold Value corresponds to some of those leading to the RED path in Threshold Value #1 above and may be declared. As described above, this Threshold Value is primarily a discriminator between Site Area Emergency and General Emergency representing a potential loss of the third barrier.

The second potential loss Threshold Value represents a potential loss of containment in that the containment heat removal/depressurization system (e.g., containment sprays, fan coolers, etc.,

but not including containment venting strategies) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner, as indicated by containment pressure greater than the setpoint at which the equipment was supposed to have actuated.

3. Core Exit Thermocouples There is no "Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item.

In this Threshold Value, the function restoration procedures are those emergency operating procedures that address the recovery of the core cooling critical safety functions. The procedure is considered effective if the temperature is decreasing or if the vessel water level is increasing.

For units using the CSF status trees a direct correlation to those status trees can be made if the effectiveness of the restoration procedures is also evaluated as stated below.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency Director should make the declaration as K-28 Rev. 48

soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be ineffective. The reactor vessel level chosen should be consistent with the emergency response guides applicable to the facility.

The conditions in this potential loss Threshold Value represent an imminent core melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to vessel failure and an raised potential for containment failure. In conjunction with the Core Cooling and Heat Sink criteria in the Fuel and RCS barrier columns, this Threshold Value would result in the declaration of a General Emergency -- loss of two barriers and the potential loss of a third. If the function restoration procedures are ineffective, there is no "success" path.

4. SG Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage This loss Threshold Value recognizes that SG tube leakage can represent a bypass of the containment barrier as well as a loss of the RCS barrier. The loss Threshold Value addresses the condition in which a RUPTURED steam generator is also FAULTED. This condition represents a bypass of the RCS and containment barriers. In conjunction with RCS Barrier loss Threshold Value #3, this would always result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

The other leakage loss Threshold Value addresses SG tube leaks that exceed 10 gpm in conjunction with a nonisolable release path to the environment from the affected steam generator. The threshold for establishing the nonisolable secondary side release is intended to be a prolonged release of radioactivity from the RUPTURED steam generator directly to the environment. This could be expected to occur when the main condenser is unavailable to accept the contaminated steam (i.e., SGTR with concurrent loss of offsite power and the RUPTURED steam generator is required for plant cooldown or a stuck open relief valve). If the main condenser is available, there may be releases via air ejectors, gland seal exhausters, and other similar controlled, and often monitored, pathways. These pathways do not meet the intent of a nonisolable release path to the environment. These minor releases are assessed using Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent ICs.

5. Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation This Threshold Value addresses incomplete containment isolation that allows direct release to the environment. It represents a loss of the containment barrier.

The use of the modifier direct in defining the release path discriminates against release paths through interfacing liquid systems. The existence of an in-line charcoal filter does not make a release path indirect since the filter is not effective at removing fission noble gases. Typical filters have an efficiency of 95-99% removal of iodine. Given the magnitude of the core inventory of iodine, significant releases could still occur. In addition, since the fission product release would be driven by boiling in the reactor vessel, the high humidity in the release stream can be expected to render the filters ineffective in a short period.

There is no "Potential Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item.

6. Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment There is no "Loss" Threshold Value associated with this item.

The greater than 3000 R/hr value indicates significant fuel damage well in excess of the Threshold Values associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of RCS Barriers. A major K-29 Rev. 48

release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions from core damage is not possible unless a major failure of fuel cladding allows radioactive material to be released from the core into the reactor coolant.

Regardless of whether containment is challenged, this amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment, such that a General Emergency declaration is warranted. NUREG-1228, "Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents,"

indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%. A radiation monitor reading corresponding to 20% fuel clad damage is specified here.

7. Other Indications Leakage from the Containment would be routed through various ventilation systems where the specific monitors would indicate a release. R10, R14, R21, OR R22 Alarms would indicate a breach in containment.

8. Emergency Director Judgment This Threshold Value addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Containment barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this Threshold Value as a factor in Emergency Director judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

K-30 Rev. 48

SG1 Initiating Condition Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power AND Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1 AND EITHER 2 OR 3)

1. Loss of ALL AC power indicated by:

a. Loss of offsite power to OR from Start Up Transformers 1(2)A AND 1(2)B resulting in loss of all offsite electrical power to BOTH 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G for greater than 15 minutes AND

b. Failure of emergency diesel generators to supply power to emergency busses.

AND EITHER

2. Restoration of at least one 4160V ESF bus, 1(2)F OR 1(2)G, within 4 hr. of time of loss is NOT likely OR

3. Fuel Clad Barrier Evaluation indicates continuing degradation (Loss or Potential Loss) due to core cooling.

Basis:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment. The 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to restore AC power is based on a site blackout coping analysis. Appropriate allowance for offsite emergency response including evacuation of surrounding areas should be considered. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

This IC is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout, timely recognition of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency occurs as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory.

K-31 Rev. 48

The likelihood of restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is imminent?

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Director judgment as it relates to imminent Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

K-32 Rev. 48

¶SG2 Initiating Condition Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip AND Manual Trip was NOT Successful AND there is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Threshold Value: (1 AND EITHER a OR b)

NOTE: A successful manual trip for purposes of declaration is any action taken from the MCB that rapidly inserts the control rods. This can be accomplished by tripping the reactor using the Reactor Trip switches on the MCB OR by de-energizing both Rod Drive Motor Generator sets from the MCB.

NOTE: Heat Sink CSF should not be considered RED if total AFW flow is less than 395 gpm due to operator action.

NOTE Failure of both MCB Rx Trip switches to trip the reactor meets the TV criteria of a setpoint being exceeded with no automatic trip occurring.

1. Indications exist that a reactor protection system setpoint was exceeded and automatic trip did not occur, and a manual trip did not result in the reactor being made subcritical.

AND EITHER

a. Core Cooling CSF - RED OR

b. Heat Sink CSF - RED Basis:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor. Under the conditions of this IC and its associated Threshold Values, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed. Although there are capabilities away from the reactor control console, such as emergency boration, the continuing temperature rise indicates that these capabilities are not effective. This situation could be a precursor for a core melt sequence. This Threshold Value equates to a Subcriticality RED condition.

K-33 Rev. 48

The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200 degrees F or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of active fuel. This Threshold Value equates to a Core Cooling RED condition.

Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence. If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist.

This Threshold Value equates to a Heat Sink RED condition.

In the event either of these challenges exist at a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design (typically 3 to 5% power) a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

K-34 Rev. 48

¶SS1 Initiating Condition Loss of All Offsite Power AND Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1a AND 1b AND 1c)

1. Loss of all AC power indicated by:

a. Loss of offsite power to OR from Start Up Transformers 1(2)A AND 1(2)B resulting in loss of all offsite electrical power to BOTH 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G for greater than 15 minutes AND

b. Failure of emergency diesel generators to supply power to emergency busses.

AND

c. Restoration of at least one 4160V ESF bus, F OR G, has NOT occurred within 15 minutes of time of loss of all AC power Basis:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency. The 15 minute time duration is selected to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Consideration should be given to operable loads necessary to remove decay heat or provide Reactor Vessel makeup capability when evaluating loss of AC power to essential busses. Even though an essential bus may be energized, if necessary loads are not operable on the energized bus then the bus should not be considered operable.

K-35 Rev. 48

¶SS2 Initiating Condition Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded AND Manual Trip Was NOT Successful.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Threshold Value: (1)

NOTE: A successful manual trip for purposes of declaration is any action taken from the MCB that rapidly inserts the control rods. This can be accomplished by tripping the reactor using the Reactor Trip switches on the MCB OR by de-energizing both Rod Drive Motor Generator sets from the MCB.

NOTE Failure of both MCB Rx Trip switches to trip the reactor meets the TV criteria of a setpoint being exceeded with no automatic trip occurring.

1. Indications exist that a reactor protection system setpoint was exceeded and automatic trip did not occur, and a manual trip did not result in the reactor being made subcritical. (NOTE)

Basis:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console was required to trip the reactor.

The Reactor should be considered subcritical when reactor power level has been reduced to less than 5% power and SUR is negative.

Under these continued power generation conditions, the reactor may be producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that may lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency Director Judgment ICs. A manual reactor trip is considered to be a trip input to the automatic Reactor Protection System.

K-36 Rev. 48

¶SS3 Initiating Condition Loss of All Vital DC Power.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1)

1. Loss of all Vital DC power to 125 VDC Bus A AND B indicated by bus voltage indications less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Basis:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system.

105 VDC bus voltage is based on the minimum bus voltage necessary for the operation of safety related equipment. This voltage value incorporates a margin of at least 15 minutes of operation before the onset of inability to operate those loads.

K-37 Rev. 48

¶SS4 Initiating Condition Complete Loss of Heat Removal Capability.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1a AND 1b)

NOTE: Heat Sink CSF should not be considered -RED if total AFW flow is less than 395 gpm due to operator action.

1. Complete Loss of Heat Removal Capability as indicated by:

a. Core Cooling CSF - ORANGE AND

b. Heat Sink CSF - RED Basis:

This Threshold Value addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink (NSCW), required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Reactivity control is addressed in other Threshold Values.

Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted.

K-38 Rev. 48

¶SS6 Initiating Condition Inability to Monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1a AND 1b AND 1c AND 1d)

1. a. A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress AND

b. Loss of most OR all (approximately 75% of the MCB) annunciators OR indicators associated with safety systems AND

c. Compensatory non-alarming indications are NOT available AND

d. Indications needed to monitor the Critical Safety Function Status Tree parameters are NOT available Basis:

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: is an UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) automatic turbine runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection Activation, or (5) thermal power oscillations greater than 10%.

This IC and its associated Threshold Value are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

The annunciators for this Threshold Value are limited to include those identified in the Abnormal Operating Procedures, in the Emergency Operating Procedures, and in other Threshold Values.

"Compensatory non-alarming indications" in this context includes computer based information such as SPDS.

The indications needed to monitor safety functions necessary for protection of the public must include control room indications, computer generated indications and dedicated annunciation K-39 Rev. 48

capability. The specific indications are those used to determine such functions as the ability to shut down the reactor, maintain the core cooled, to maintain the reactor coolant system intact, and to maintain containment intact.

"Planned" and UNPLANNED actions are not differentiated since the loss of instrumentation of this magnitude is of such significance during a transient that the cause of the loss is not an ameliorating factor.

Quantification of "Most" is arbitrary, however, it is estimated that if approximately 75% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is a greater risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgment threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions. It is also not intended that the Shift Supervisor be tasked with making a judgment decision as to whether additional personnel are required to provide augmented monitoring of system operation.

K-40 Rev. 48

¶SA2 Initiating Condition Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded AND Manual Trip Was Successful.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Threshold Value: (1)

NOTE: A successful manual trip for purposes of declaration is any action taken from the MCB that rapidly inserts the control rods. This can be accomplished by tripping the reactor using the Reactor Trip switches on the MCB OR by de-energizing both Rod Drive Motor Generator sets from the MCB.

NOTE Failure of both MCB Rx Trip switches to trip the reactor meets the TV criteria of a setpoint being exceeded with no automatic trip occurring.

1. Indication(s) exist that a reactor protection setpoint was exceeded and an automatic trip did not occur, and a manual trip resulted in the reactor being subcritical.

Basis:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded, rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded, is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual reactor trip is considered to be a trip input to the automatic Reactor Protection System or de-energizing the MG sets should initiate a manual trip.

The Reactor should be considered subcritical when reactor power level has been reduced to less than 5% power and SUR is negative.

K-41 Rev. 48

¶SA4 Initiating Condition UNPLANNED Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room With EITHER (1) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress, OR (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators are Unavailable.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1 AND EITHER a OR b)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most OR all (approximately 75% of the MCB) annunciators OR indicators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes AND EITHER

a. A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT is in progress OR

b. Compensatory non-alarming indications are NOT available Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: is an UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) automatic turbine runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection Activation, or (5) thermal power oscillations greater than 10%.

This IC and its associated Threshold Values are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient. Recognition of the availability of computer based indication equipment is considered. A "planned" loss of annunciators or indicators includes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

Quantification of "Most" is arbitrary, however, it is estimated that if approximately 75% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is a greater risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgment threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions. It is also not intended that the Shift Supervisor be tasked with making a K-42 Rev. 48

judgment decision as to whether additional personnel are required to provide augmented monitoring of system operation.

It is further recognized that most plant designs provide redundant safety system indication powered from separate uninterruptible power supplies. While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure of a large portion of indications, the concern is included in this Threshold Value due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions.

The annunciators or indicators for this Threshold Value include those identified in the Abnormal Operating Procedures, in the Emergency Operating Procedures, and in other Threshold Values.

"Compensatory non-alarming indications" in this context includes computer based information such as SPDS. This should include all computer systems available for this use depending on specific plant design and subsequent retrofits. If both a major portion of the annunciation system and all computer monitoring are unavailable, the Alert is required.

K-43 Rev. 48

¶SA5 Initiating Condition AC power capability to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that any additional single failure would result in station blackout.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1a AND 1b)

1. a. AC power capability to 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes AND

b. ANY additional single failure will result in station blackout.

Basis:

This IC and the associated Threshold Values are intended to provide an escalation from IC SU1, "Loss of All Offsite Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its emergency busses. Another related condition could be the loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of emergency busses being backfed from the SAT, or the loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of emergency busses being backfed from offsite power. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC SS1, "Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses."

The Threshold Values allow credit for operation of installed design features, such as cross-ties or swing diesels, provided that abnormal or emergency operating procedures address their use.

K-44 Rev. 48

¶ SU1 Initiating Condition Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1a AND 1b)

1. a. Loss of offsite power to OR from Start Up Transformers 1(2)A AND 1(2)B resulting in loss of all offsite electrical power to BOTH 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G for greater than 15 minutes AND

b. Emergency diesel generators supplying power to BOTH 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G.

Basis:

Prolonged loss of Offsite AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (e.g., Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

K-45 Rev. 48

¶SU2 Initiating Condition Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1)

1. Plant is NOT brought to required operating mode within FNP Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time limit.

Basis:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate NOUE is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of a NOUE is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

K-46 Rev. 48

¶SU3 Initiating Condition UNPLANNED Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in The Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most OR all (approximately 75% of the MCB annunciators) OR indicators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

This IC and its associated Threshold Value are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment.

Recognition of the availability of computer based indication equipment is considered.

Quantification of "Most" is arbitrary, however, it is estimated that if approximately 75% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is a greater risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgment threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions.

It is further recognized that most plant designs provide redundant safety system indication powered from separate uninterruptible power supplies. While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure of a large portion of indications, the concern is included in this Threshold Value due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions.

The annunciators or indicators for this Threshold Value include those identified in the Abnormal Operating Procedures, in the Emergency Operating Procedures, and in other Threshold Values.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

K-47 Rev. 48

¶SU4 Initiating Condition Fuel Clad Degradation.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Values: (1)

1. RCS coolant sample activity value indicating fuel clad degradation greater than Technical Specification allowable limits as indicated by ANY of the following:

Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than 0.5 Ci/gm for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than Technical Specification figure 3.4.16-1.

IF less than 20% power, THEN use the Dose Equivalent I-131 20% power limit on Technical Specification figure 3.4.16-1 RCS gross specific activity greater than 100/ Ci/gm.

Basis:

This IC is included as a NOUE because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems.

The Threshold Value addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs. Though the referenced Technical Specification limits are mode dependent, it is appropriate that the Threshold Values be applicable in all modes, as they indicate a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

K-48 Rev. 48

¶SU5 Initiating Condition RCS Leakage.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. RCS Unidentified OR pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm.

2. RCS Identified leakage greater than 25 gpm.

Basis:

This IC is included as a NOUE because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g., mass balances). The Threshold Value for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.

K-49 Rev. 48

¶SU6 Initiating Condition UNPLANNED Loss of All Onsite OR Offsite Communications Capabilities.

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operation (Mode 1)

Startup (Mode 2)

Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. UNPLANNED loss of ALL of the following on-site communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations:

In plant telephones Public Address System Plant radio systems

2. UNPLANNED loss of ALL of the following off-site communications capability:

ENN (Emergency Notification Network)

ENS (Emergency Notification System)

Commercial phones (Radio, PBX, Satellite, Wireless)

VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol)

OPX (Off Premise Extension)

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

The purpose of this IC and its associated Threshold Values is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities.

The availability of one method of ordinary offsite communications is sufficient to inform state and local authorities of plant conditions. This Threshold Value is intended to be used only when extraordinary means (e.g., relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.) are being used to make communications possible. The list for onsite communications loss encompasses the loss of all means of routine communications.

The list for offsite communications loss encompasses the loss of all means of communications with offsite authorities.

K-50 Rev. 48

¶SU8 Initiating Condition Inadvertent Criticality.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY Hot Standby (Mode 3)

Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Threshold Value: (1)

1. An UNPLANNED sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation.

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

This IC addresses inadvertent criticality events. While the primary concern of this IC is criticality events that occur in Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes (NUREG 1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States), the IC is applicable in other modes in which inadvertent criticalities are possible. This IC indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, warranting a NOUE classification. This IC excludes inadvertent criticalities that occur during planned reactivity changes associated with reactor startups.

This condition is identified using the startup rate monitor. The term sustained is used in order to allow exclusion of expected short term positive startup rates from planned control rod movements. These short term positive startup rates are the result of the rise in neutron population due to subcritical multiplication.

K-51 Rev. 48

HG1 Initiating Condition HOSTILE ACTION Resulting in Loss Of Physical Control of the Facility.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. A HOSTILE Action has occured such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions..

2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

VITAL AREAS: any areas, normally within the PROTECTED AREA, that contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

IMMINENT: Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur.

This IC encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of VITAL AREAs (containing vital equipment or controls of vital equipment) required to maintain safety functions and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location. These safety functions are reactivity control, RCS inventory, and secondary heat removal. If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain safety functions can be transferred to another location, then the above initiating condition is not met.

Threshold Value 2 should also address loss of physical control of spent fuel pool cooling systems if imminent fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool). If the calculated SFP time to boil is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or less, spent fuel damage is likely.

K-52 Rev. 50

Intentionally Left Blank K-53 Rev. 50

¶HG2 Initiating Condition Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity OR HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, takes hostages, and /or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non- terrorism-based Threshold Values should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.)

This Threshold Value is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

K-54 Rev. 48

Intentionally Left Blank K-55 Rev.50

¶HS2 Initiating Condition Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated AND Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1a AND 1b)

1. a. Control Room evacuation has been initiated AND

b. Control of the plant can NOT be established per AOP-28.0, Control Room Inaccessibility, within 15 minutes.

Basis:

Expeditious transfer of safety systems has not occurred but fission product barrier damage may not yet be indicated. The intent of this IC is to capture those events where control of the plant cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. The time for transfer is based on analysis or assessments as to how quickly control must be reestablished without core uncovering and/or core damage. The determination of whether or not control is established at the remote shutdown panel is based on Emergency Director (ED) judgment. The ED is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within the time for transfer that the operators have control of the plant.

The intent of the Threshold Value is to establish control of important plant equipment and knowledge of important plant parameters in a timely manner. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that supply protection for and information about safety functions. These safety functions are reactivity control, RCS inventory, and secondary heat removal.

K-56 Rev. 48

¶HS3 Initiating Condition Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in process OR have occurred which involve actual OR likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public OR HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels that exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and /or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using weapons, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based Threshold Values should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.)

This Threshold Value is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

K-57 Rev. 48

¶HS4 Initiating Condition HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the site security force..

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and /or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using weapons, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based Threshold Values should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a HOSTILE ACTION has progressed from the Owner Controlled Area to the Protected Area.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires Offsite Response Organizations readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on actual plant status after impact or progression of attack.

K-58 Rev. 50

Intentionally Left Blank K-59 Rev. 50

¶HA1 Initiating Condition Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant VITAL AREA.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1, OR 2, OR 3, OR 4, OR 5, OR 6)

1. A felt earthquake validated in accordance with FNP-1-ARP-1.12, LOCATION MK5 indicates Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE).

2. Tornado OR high winds greater than 115 mph within the PROTECTED AREA boundary AND resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following plant structures/equipment OR the Control Room has indication of degraded performance of any listed systems:

Containment Auxiliary Building Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) Service Water Pond Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

Diesel Generator Building

3. Vehicle crash within PROTECTED AREA boundary AND resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following plant structures OR equipment therein OR Control Room has indication of degraded performance of those systems:

Containment Auxiliary Building Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) Service Water Pond Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

Diesel Generator Building

4. Turbine failure-generated missiles result in any VISIBLE DAMAGE to OR penetration of any of the following plant areas containing safety-related equipment, their controls OR their power supplies.

Containment Auxiliary Building Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

Diesel Generator Building Control Room

5. Uncontrolled flooding in the following areas that results in degraded safety system performance as indicated in the control room OR that creates industrial safety hazards (e.g., electric shock) that precludes access necessary to operate OR monitor safety equipment.

Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS)

Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Basement

6. Sustained hurricane winds greater than 74 mph onsite resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant structures within the PROTECTED AREA boundary containing equipment necessary for safe shutdown, or has caused damage as evidenced by control room indication of degraded performance of those systems K-60 Rev. 48

1f Basis:

PROTECTED AREA: the area wh ich normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: is damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing , or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting , penetration, rupture, cracking ,

paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

The Threshold Values in this IC escalate from the NOUE Threshold Values in HU1 in that the occurrence of the event has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant structures or areas containing equipment necessary for a safe shutdown , or has caused damage to the safety systems in those structures evidenced by control indications of degraded system response or performance. The occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system response is intended to discriminate against lesser events. The initial "report" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification . No attempt is made in this Threshold Value to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The significance here is not that a particular system or structure was damaged, but rather, that the event was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation.

Threshold Value #1 is based on the OBE earthquake FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude can result in a plant VITAL AREA being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems.

Threshold Value #2 is based on the FSAR design basis. Wind loads greater than 115 mph can cause damage to safety functions and is read from the plant meteorological tower.

Threshold Value #3 addresses crashes of vehicle types large enough to cause significant damage to plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

Threshold Value #4 addresses the threat to safety related equipment imposed by missiles generated by main turbine rotating component failures. This list of areas include areas containing safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This Threshold Value is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if missiles have damaged or penetrated areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

K-61 Rev. 58

Threshold Value #5 addresses the effect of internal flooding that has resulted in degraded performance of systems affected by the flooding, or has created industrial safety hazards (e.g. ,

electrical shock) that preclude necessary access to operate or monitor safety equipment. The inability to operate or monitor safety equipment represents a potential for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. This flooding may have been caused by internal events such as component failures, equ ipment misalignment, or outage activity mishaps. TS-PSA-001, Table 3.3.6-4 provides that the SWIS is vulnerable due to failure of the cooling water lines or discharge expansion joints. The Auxiliary Building is vulnerable due to failure of the Service Water piping. The Turbine Building basement is vulnerable to Circulating Water line breaks. The areas include those areas that contain systems required for safe shutdown of the plant, that are not designed to be wetted or submerged .

Threshold Value #6 covers site-specific phenomena of a hurricane. The Threshold Value is based on damage attributable to the wind .

K-62 Rev. 58

¶HA2 Initiating Condition FIRE OR EXPLOSION Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. FIRE OR EXPLOSION AND affected system parameter indications show degraded performance OR plant personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures OR safety related equipment in any of the following VITAL AREAs Containment Auxiliary Building Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) Service Water Pond Storage Pond Dam and Dike Pond Spillway Structure Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

Diesel Generator Building Control Room Basis:

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIREs. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

EXPLOSION: is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

VITAL AREA: any area, normally within the PROTECTED AREA, which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: is damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

The areas listed contain functions and systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant to determine if the FIRE or EXPLOSION is potentially affecting any redundant trains of safety systems.

This Threshold Value addresses a FIRE / EXPLOSION and not the degradation in performance of affected systems. The reference to damage of systems is used to identify the magnitude of the FIRE / EXPLOSION and to discriminate against minor FIREs / EXPLOSIONs. The K-63 Rev. 48

significance here is not that a safety system was degraded but the fact that the FIRE /

EXPLOSION was large enough to cause damage to these systems. Thus, the designation of a single train was intentional and is appropriate when the FIRE / EXPLOSION is large enough to affect more than one component.

The inclusion of a "report of VISIBLE DAMAGE" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. The occurrence of the EXPLOSION with reports of evidence of damage is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the EXPLOSIONs, if applicable.

K-64 Rev. 48

¶HA3 Initiating Condition Release of Toxic, Asphyxiant or Flammable Gases Within or Contiguous to a VITAL AREA Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. Report OR detection of toxic OR asphyxiant gas within OR contiguous to a VITAL AREA in concentrations that may result in an atmosphere IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE AND HEALTH (IDLH).

2. Report OR detection of flammable gases in concentration greater than the LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT within OR contiguous to a VITAL AREA.

Basis:

VITAL AREA: any area, normally within the PROTECTED AREA, which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE AND HEALTH (IDLH): A condition that either poses an immediate threat to life and health or an immediate threat of severe exposure to contaminants which are likely to have adverse delayed effects on health.

LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT (LFL): The minimum concentration of a combustible substance that is capable of propagating a flame through a homogenous mixture of the combustible and a gaseous oxidizer.

CONTIGUOUS: being in actual contact: touching along a boundary or at a point.

This IC is based on gases that affect the safe operation of the plant. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant VITAL AREAs or other significant buildings or areas (i.e., service water pump house). The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (e.g., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant VITAL AREAs.

Threshold Value #1 is met if measurement of toxic gas concentration results in an atmosphere that is IDLH within a VITAL AREA or any area or building contiguous to VITAL AREA. Exposure to an IDLH atmosphere will result in immediate harm to unprotected personnel, and would preclude access to any such affected areas.

Threshold Value #2 is met when the flammable gas concentration in a VITAL AREA or any building or area contiguous to a VITAL AREA exceed the LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT. This Threshold Value addresses concentrations at which gases can ignite/support combustion. An K-65 Rev. 48

uncontrolled release of flammable gasses within a facility structure has the potential to affect safe operation of the plant by limiting either operator or equipment operations due to the potential for ignition and resulting equipment damage/personnel injury. Once it has been determined that an uncontrolled release is occurring, then sampling must be done to determine if the concentration of the released gas is within this range.

K-66 Rev. 48

¶HA4 Initiating Condition HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or Airborne Attack Threat.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA as reported by the security shift supervision.

2. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

Basis:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

These EALs address the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land, or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal, or sheltering).

Threshold 1 addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the OCA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Threshold 2 addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the airliner attack threat are made in a timely manner and that Offsite Response Organizations and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. Airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

K-67 Rev. 50

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an airliner attack threat from NRC and the airliner is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

K-68 Rev. 50

¶HA5 Initiating Condition Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. Entry into AOP-28.0, Control Room Inaccessibility, for Control Room evacuation.

Basis:

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or other emergency response facility is necessary. Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

K-69 Rev. 48

¶HA6 Initiating Condition Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in process OR have occurred which involve actual OR likely potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant OR a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of intentional malicious dedicated efforts of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION - An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and /or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using weapons, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based Threshold Values should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.)

This Threshold Value is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the Alert emergency class.

K-70 Rev. 48

¶Intentionally Left Blank K-71 Rev. 50

Intentionally Left Blank K-72 Rev. 50

Intentionally Left Blank K-73 Rev. 50

¶HU1 Initiating Condition Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the PROTECTED AREA.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4 OR 5 OR 6 OR 7)

1. A felt earthquake validated in accordance with FNP-1-ARP-1.12, LOCATION MK5.

2. Report by plant personnel of tornado OR high winds greater than 115 mph striking within the PROTECTED AREA boundary.

3. Crash of vehicle, large enough to cause significant damage, into plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown within the PROTECTED AREA boundary.

4. Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA boundary resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures OR equipment.

5. Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration OR damage to turbine OR generator seals.

6. Uncontrolled flooding in the following areas:

Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS)

Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Basement

7. Sustained hurricane force winds greater than 74 mph forecast to be at the plant site in the next four hours in accordance with FNP-0-AOP-21.0.

Basis:

PROTECTED AREA: the area which normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence.

EXPLOSION: is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: is damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

K-74 Rev. 48

These ICs are categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern to plant operators. Areas identified in the Threshold Values define the location of the event based on the potential for damage to equipment contained therein.

Threshold Value #1 - As defined in the EPRI-sponsored "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is:

An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators on duty at the time, and (b) for plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismic switches of the plant are activated. For most plants with seismic instrumentation, the seismic switches are set at an acceleration of about 0.01g.

Threshold Value #2 is based on the assumption that a tornado striking (touching down) or high winds within the PROTECTED AREA may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. The high wind 115 mph value is based on FSAR design basis. If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.

Threshold Value #3 addresses crashes of vehicle types large enough to cause significant damage to plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

For Threshold Value #4 only those EXPLOSIONs of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the PROTECTED AREA should be considered. No attempt is made in this Threshold Value to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the EXPLOSION with reports of evidence of damage is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency director also needs to consider any security aspects of the EXPLOSION, if applicable.

Threshold Value #5 addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Generator seal damage observed after generator purge does not meet the intent of this Threshold Value because it did not impact normal operation of the plant. This Threshold Value is consistent with the definition of a NOUE while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment.

Threshold Value #6 addresses the effect of flooding caused by internal events such as component failures, equipment misalignment, or outage activity mishaps. The areas included are those areas that contain systems required for safe shutdown of the plant, that are not designed to be wetted or submerged. TS-PSA-001, Table 3.3.6-4 provides that the SWIS is vulnerable due to failure of the cooling water lines or discharge expansion joints. The Auxiliary Building is vulnerable due to failure of the Service Water piping. The Turbine Building basement is vulnerable to Circulating Water line breaks causing loss of Service Air. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on the damage caused or by access restrictions that prevent necessary plant operations or systems monitoring.

Threshold Value #7 covers site-specific phenomena of the hurricane based on the severe weather mitigation procedure.

K-75 Rev. 48

¶HU2 Initiating Condition FIRE Within PROTECTED AREA Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

NOTE: A fire alarm can be disproved by personnel observation of the affected area, or by resetting the PYRO panel for that alarm or for a containment fire alarm performing appropriate steps of FNP-1(2)-ARP-1.12, (MH1).

1. FIRE in buildings OR areas contiguous to any of the following areas NOT extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification OR control room alarm unless disproved by personnel observation within 15 minutes of the alarm:

Containment Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS)

Auxiliary Building Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

Diesel Generator Building Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

Control Room Basis:

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIREs. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

CONTIGUOUS: being in actual contact: touching along a boundary or at a point.

PROTECTED AREA: the area which normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence.

CONTIGUOUS: being in actual contact: touching along a boundary or at a point.

The purpose of this IC is to address the magnitude and extent of FIREs that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. As used here, Detection is visual observation and report by plant personnel or sensor alarm indication.

The 15 minute time period begins with a credible notification that a FIRE is occurring, or indication of a VALID fire detection system alarm. Verification of a fire detection system alarm includes actions that can be taken with the control room or other nearby site-specific location to K-76 Rev. 48

ensure that the alarm is not spurious. The alarm can be determined to be spurious if it can be reset on the Pyro Panel. A verified alarm is assumed to be an indication of a FIRE unless it is disproved within the 15 minute period by personnel dispatched to the scene. In other words, a personnel report from the scene may be used to disprove a sensor alarm if received within 15 minutes of the alarm, but shall not be required to verify the alarm.

The intent of this 15 minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate against small FIREs that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). The site-specific list should be limited and applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant VITAL AREAs or other significant buildings or areas.

K-77 Rev. 48

¶HU3 Initiating Condition Release of Toxic, Asphyxiant, or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Normal Operation of the Plant.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. Report OR detection of toxic, asphyxiant, OR flammable gas that has OR could enter the Owner Controlled Area in amounts greater than life threatening OR flammable concentrations that can affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

2. Report by Local, County, OR State Officials for evacuation OR sheltering of site personnel based on an offsite toxic, asphyxiant, OR flammable gas event.

Basis:

NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS: activities at the plant site associated with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment operations, in accordance with normal operating or administrative procedures. Entry into abnormal or emergency operating procedures, or deviation from normal security or radiological controls posture, is a departure from NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONs.

This IC is based on the existence of uncontrolled releases of toxic, asphyxiant, or flammable gas that may enter the Owner Controlled Area and affect normal plant operations. It is intended that releases of toxic or flammable gases are of sufficient quantity, and the release point of such gases is such that normal plant operations would be affected. Offsite events are included through a warning by local officials as the resultant affect on NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS would be the same. This would preclude small or incidental releases, or releases that do not impact structures needed for plant operation. The Threshold Values are not intended to require significant assessment or quantification. The IC assumes an uncontrolled process that has the potential to affect plant operations, or personnel safety.

K-78 Rev. 48

¶HU4 Initiating Condition Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Values: (1 OR 2 OR 3)

1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by security shift supervision.

2. A CREDIBLE FNP security THREAT notification.

3. A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

Basis:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

CREDIBLE THREAT: A threat is considered credible through use of FNP-0-SP-37, Threat Assessment and Security Force Protection Recommendations.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under HA4, HS4 and HG1.

A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the security threat and potential consequences. The licensee shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification level in accordance with the sites Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan.

In Threshold #1 reference is made to security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event classification confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the plant FNP Safeguards Contingency Plan.

This threshold is based on site specific security plans. Site specific Safeguards Contingency Plans are based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12.

K-79 Rev. 50

The intent of Threshold Value 2 is to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a CREDIBLE THREAT. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Notification of an Unusual Event.

The intent of Threshold Value 3 is to ensure that notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner and that Offsite Response Organizations and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. It is not the intent of this EAL to replace existing non-hostile related EALs involving aircraft.

This Threshold Value is met when a plant receives information regarding an aircraft threat from NRC. Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Unusual Event.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation to Alert emergency classification level would be via HA4 would be appropriate if the threat involves an airliner within 30 minutes of the plant.

A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences. The Emergency Director shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification in accordance with the FNP Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan implementing Procedures.

K-80 Rev. 50

¶HU5 Initiating Condition Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of a NOUE.

Operating Mode Applicability: All Threshold Value: (1)

1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in process OR have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant OR indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response OR monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Basis:

This Threshold Value is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the NOUE emergency class.

From a broad perspective, one area that may warrant Emergency Director judgment is related to likely or actual breakdown of site-specific event mitigating actions. Examples to consider include inadequate emergency response procedures, transient response either unexpected or not understood, failure or unavailability of emergency systems during an accident in excess of that assumed in accident analysis, or insufficient availability of equipment and/or support personnel.

K-81 Rev. 48

¶E-HU1 Initiating Condition Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.

Operating Mode Applicability: Not applicable Threshold Value: (1)

1. Damage to a loaded dry fuel storage cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY due to natural phenomena events, accident conditions OR any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that affects OR causes a loss of loaded dry fuel storage cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.

Basis:

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: is the barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment.

A NOUE in this IC is categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude that a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is damaged or violated. This includes classification based on a loaded fuel storage cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY loss leading to the degradation of the fuel during storage or posing an operational safety problem with respect to its removal from storage.

Any condition, which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, is a potential degradation in the level of safety of the ISFSI. Emergency Director judgment is to be based on known conditions and the expected response to mitigating activities within a short time period.

K-82 Rev. 48

CG1 Initiating Condition Loss of RPV Inventory Affecting Fuel Clad Integrity with Containment Challenged with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1 AND 2 AND 3)

1. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by ANY of the following:

Unexplained Containment sump level rise Unexplained Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) level rise Unexplained Waste Holdup Tank (WHT) level rise AND

2. RPV Level:

a. Less than elevation 118 (Top of Active Fuel) for greater than 30 minutes OR

b. RPV level CANNOT be monitored WITH indication of core uncovery for greater than 30 minutes as evidenced by ANY of the following:

Incore Seal Table RE7 greater than 450 mR/hr Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication AND

3. Containment challenged as indicated by ANY of the following:

Explosive mixture inside containment greater than OR equal to 6% H2 Pressure greater than OR equal to 5 psig WITH CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established greater than OR equal to 54 psig WITH Tech Spec containment integrity intact CONTAINMENT CLOSURE NOT established Basis:

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: per FNP-1-STP-18.4, Containment Integrity Verification and Closure.

For Threshold Value 1 in the cold shutdown mode, normal RCS level and RPV level instrumentation systems will normally be available. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that RPV inventory loss was occurring by observing sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

For Threshold Value 1 in the refueling mode, normal means of RPV level indication may not be available. Redundant means of RPV level indication will be normally installed to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that RPV inventory loss was occurring K-83 Rev. 48

by observing sump and tank level changes. For both cold shutdown and refueling modes sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

Threshold Value 2 represents the inability to restore and maintain RPV level to above the top of active fuel. Fuel damage is probable if RPV level cannot be restored, as available decay heat will cause boiling, further reducing the RPV level.

Analysis in appropriate references indicates that core damage may occur within an hour following continued core uncovery therefore, conservatively, 30 minutes was chosen.

The GE is declared on the occurrence of the loss or imminent loss of function of all three barriers.

Based on the above discussion, RCS barrier failure resulting in core uncovery for 30 minutes or more may cause fuel clad failure. With the CONTAINMENT breached or challenged then the potential for unmonitored fission product release to the environment is high. This represents a direct path for radioactive inventory to be released to the environment. This is consistent with the definition of a GE.

In the context of Threshold Value 3, CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is the action taken to secure containment and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under existing plant conditions. If the closure is re-established prior to exceeding the temperature or level thresholds of the RCS Barrier and Fuel Clad Barrier Threshold Values, escalation to GE would not occur.

The site-specific pressure at which CONTAINMENT is considered challenged may change based on the condition of the CONTAINMENT. If the Unit is in the cold shutdown mode and the CONTAINMENT is fully intact then the site-specific setpoint is the CONTAINMENT design pressure (54 psig). This is consistent with typical owners groups Emergency Response Procedures. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established intentionally by the plant staff in preparations for inspection, maintenance, or refueling the setpoint is based on the penetration seals design of 5 psig.

In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive mixture of dissolved gasses in CONTAINMENT. However, CONTAINMENT monitoring and/or sampling should be performed to verify this assumption and a General Emergency declared if it is determined that an explosive mixture exists.

K-84 Rev. 48

¶CS1 Initiating Condition Loss of RPV Inventory Affecting Core Decay Heat Removal Capability.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. Loss of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE NOT established as indicated by:

a. RPV level less than 121 (6 below Bottom ID of RCS loop)

OR

b. RPV level CANNOT be monitored for greater than 30 minutes with a possible loss of RPV inventory as indicated by unexplained level rise in any of the following:

Containment sump Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT)

Waste Holdup Tank (WHT)

2. Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established as indicated by:

a. RPV level less than 118 (Top of Active Fuel (TOAF))

OR

b. RPV level CANNOT be monitored for greater than 30 minutes with a possible loss of RPV inventory as indicated by ANY of the following:

Containment sump level rise Unexplained Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) level rise Unexplained Waste Holdup Tank (WHT) level rise Erratic Source Range monitor indication Basis:

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: per FNP-1-STP-18.4, Containment Integrity Verification and Closure.

Under the conditions specified by this IC, continued lowering in RPV level is indicative of a loss of inventory control. Inventory loss may be due to an RPV breach, pressure boundary leakage, or continued boiling in the RPV.

In the cold shutdown mode, normal RCS level and reactor vessel level indication systems (RVLIS) will normally be available. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that RPV inventory loss was occurring by observing sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential K-85 Rev. 48

sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

The 30 minute duration allows sufficient time for actions to be performed to recover needed cooling equipment. The effluent release path is not expected with closure established.

K-86 Rev. 48

¶CS2 Initiating Condition Loss of RPV Inventory Affecting Core Decay Heat Removal Capability with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Operating Mode Applicability: Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. WITH CONTAINMENT CLOSURE NOT established:

a. RPV level less than elevation 121 (6 below Bottom ID of RCS loop).

OR

b. RPV level CANNOT be monitored WITH indication of core uncovery as evidenced by ANY of the following:

Incore Seal Table R7 greater than 6.5 mR/hr Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication

2. WITH CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established

a. RPV level less than elevation 118 (Top of Active Fuel).

OR

b. RPV level CANNOT be monitored WITH Indication of core uncovery as evidenced by ANY of the following:

Containment High Range Radiation Monitor R27 A OR B greater than 390 R/hr Incore Seal Table R7 greater than 450 mR/hr Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication Basis:

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: per FNP-1-STP-18.4, Containment Integrity Verification and Closure.

Under the conditions specified by this IC, continued lowering in RPV level is indicative of a loss of inventory control. Inventory loss may be due to an RPV breach or continued boiling in the RPV.

As water level in the RPV lowers, the dose rate above the core will rise. The dose rate due to this core shine should result in up-scaled Containment High Range Monitor indication and possible alarm.

Additionally, post-TMI studies indicated that the installed nuclear instrumentation will operate K-87 Rev. 48

erratically when the core is uncovered and that this should be used as a tool for making such determinations.

For Threshold Value 2 in the refueling mode, normal means of RPV level indication may not be available. Redundant means of RPV level indication will be normally installed (including the ability to monitor level visually) to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted.

This effluent release is not expected with closure established.

K-88 Rev. 48

¶CA1 Initiating Condition Loss of RCS Inventory.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. Loss of RCS inventory as indicated by RPV level less than 121 6 (bottom ID of RCS loop)

2. a. RCS level CANNOT be monitored for greater than 15 minutes AND

b. A possible loss of RCS inventory may be occurring as indicated by unexplained level rise in ANY of the following:

Containment sump Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT)

Waste Holdup Tank (WHT)

Basis:

These Threshold Values serve as precursors to a loss of ability to adequately cool the fuel. The magnitude of this loss of water indicates that makeup systems have not been effective and may not be capable of preventing further RPV level lowering and potential core uncovery.

The Bottom ID of the RCS Loop Setpoint was chosen because at this level remote RCS level indication may be lost and loss of suction to decay heat removal systems has occurred. The inability to restore and maintain level after reaching this setpoint would therefore be indicative of a failure of the RCS barrier.

In the cold shutdown mode, normal RCS level and RPV level instrumentation systems will normally be available. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that RPV inventory loss was occurring by observing sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage. The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the CS1 Site Area Emergency Threshold Value duration.

The difference between CA1 and CA2 deals with the RCS conditions that exist between cold shutdown and refueling mode applicability. In cold shutdown the RCS will normally be intact and standard RCS inventory and level monitoring means are available. In the refueling mode the RCS is not intact and RPV level and inventory are monitored by different means.

¶CA2 K-89 Rev. 48

Initiating Condition Loss of RPV Inventory with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Operating Mode Applicability: Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. Loss of inventory as indicated by RPV level less than 121 6 (bottom ID of RCS loop)

2. a. RPV level CANNOT be monitored for greater than 15 minutes AND

b. A possible loss of RCS inventory may be occurring as indicated by unexplained level rise in ANY of the following:

Containment sump Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT)

Waste Holdup Tank (WHT)

Basis:

These Threshold Values serve as precursors to a loss of heat removal. The magnitude of this loss of water indicates that makeup systems have not been effective and may not be capable of preventing further RPV level lowering and potential core uncovery. This condition will result in a minimum classification of Alert.

The Bottom ID of the RCS Loop Setpoint was chosen because at this level remote RCS level indication may be lost and loss of suction to decay heat removal systems may occur. The inability to restore and maintain level after reaching this setpoint would therefore be indicative of a failure of the RCS barrier.

In the refueling mode, normal means of RPV level indication may not be available. Redundant means of RPV level indication will be normally installed to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

The 15-minute duration allows CA2 to be an effective precursor to CS2.

The difference between CA1 and CA2 deals with the RCS conditions that exist between cold shutdown and refueling mode applicability. In cold shutdown the RCS will normally be intact and standard RCS inventory and level monitoring means are available. In the refueling mode the RCS is not intact and RPV level and inventory are monitored by different means.

K-90 Rev. 48

¶CA3 Initiating Condition Loss of All Offsite Power AND Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

Defueled Threshold Value:

1. a. Loss of offsite power to OR from Start Up Transformers 1(2)A AND 1(2)B resulting in loss of all offsite electrical power to BOTH 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G AND

b. Failure of emergency diesel generators to supply power to emergency busses.

AND

c. Failure to restore power to at least one emergency bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.

Basis:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Consideration should be given to operable loads necessary to remove decay heat or provide Reactor Vessel makeup capability when evaluating loss of AC power to essential busses. Even though an essential bus may be energized, if necessary loads (i.e., loads that if lost would inhibit decay heat removal capability or Reactor Vessel makeup capability) are not operable on the energized bus then the bus should not be considered operable.

K-91 Rev. 48

¶CA4 Initiating Condition Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: ( 1 OR 2 OR 3)

1. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature exceeding 200°F with:

a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE NOT established AND

b. RCS integrity NOT established NOTE 1 The Emergency Director should not wait until the indicated time of Threshold Values 2 or 3 has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the duration has or will likely be exceeded.

NOTE 2 If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced then Threshold Values 2 and 3 are not applicable

2. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature exceeding 200°F for greater than 20 minutes (Note) with:

a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established AND

b. RCS integrity NOT established OR

c. RCS inventory reduced.

3. An UNPLANNED event results in:

a. RCS temperature exceeding 200°F for greater than 60 minutes (Note)

OR

b. RCS pressure increasing greater than 10 psig Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: per FNP-1-STP-18.4, Containment Integrity Verification and Closure.

Threshold Value 1 addresses complete loss of functions required for core cooling during refueling and cold shutdown modes when neither CONTAINMENT CLOSURE nor RCS integrity are established.

RCS integrity is in place when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the cold shutdown mode of operation (e.g., no freeze seals or nozzle dams). No delay time is allowed for Threshold Value1 because the evaporated reactor coolant that may be released into the Containment during this heatup condition could also be directly released to the environment.

K-92 Rev. 48

Threshold Value 2 addresses the complete loss of functions required for core cooling for greater than 20 minutes during refueling and cold shutdown modes when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but RCS integrity is not established or RCS inventory is reduced. As in Threshold Value 1, RCS integrity should be assumed to be in place when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the cold shutdown mode of operation (e.g., no freeze seals or nozzle dams). The allowed 20 minute time frame was included to allow operator action to restore the heat removal function, if possible.

Threshold Value 3 addresses complete loss of functions required for core cooling for greater than 60 minutes during refueling and cold shutdown modes when RCS integrity is established. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE in this Threshold Value is immaterial given that the RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to fission product release to the environment. The 60 minute time frame should allow sufficient time to restore cooling without there being a substantial degradation in plant safety.

The 10 psig pressure rise covers situations where, due to high decay heat loads, the time provided to restore temperature control, should be less than 60 minutes.

The Emergency Director must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the Threshold Value is imminent. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the threshold has been exceeded.

K-93 Rev. 48

¶CU1 Initiating Condition RCS Leakage.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Threshold Values:

1. Unable to establish or maintain pressurizer level greater than 15%.

Basis:

This IC is included as a NOUE because it is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The inability to establish and maintain level is indicative of loss of RCS inventory.

Prolonged loss of RCS Inventory may result in escalation to the Alert level via either IC CA1 (Loss of RCS) or CA4 (Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV).

The difference between CU1 and CU2 deals with the RCS conditions that exist between cold shutdown and refueling mode applicability. In cold shutdown the RCS will normally be intact and RCS inventory and level monitoring means such as Pressurizer level indication and makeup volume control tank levels are normally available. In the refueling mode the RCS is not intact and RPV level and inventory are monitored by different means.

K-94 Rev. 48

¶CU2 Initiating Condition UNPLANNED Loss of RCS Inventory with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Operating Mode Applicability: Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. UNPLANNED RCS level lowering below 129 (RPV flange) for greater than OR equal to 15 minutes

2. a. RPV level CANNOT be monitored AND

b. A possible loss of RPV inventory may be occurring as indicated by unexplained level rise in ANY of the following:

Containment sump Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT)

Waste Holdup Tank (WHT)

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

This IC is included as a NOUE because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Refueling evolutions that lower RCS water level below the RPV flange are carefully planned and procedurally controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below the RPV flange warrants declaration of a NOUE due to the reduced RCS inventory that is available to keep the core covered. The allowance of 15 minutes was chosen because it is reasonable to assume that level can be restored within this time frame using any of the redundant means of refill that should be available.

The difference between CU1 and CU2 deals with the RCS conditions that exist between cold shutdown and refueling modes. In cold shutdown the RCS will normally be intact and standard RCS inventory and level monitoring means are available. In the refueling mode the RCS is not intact and RPV level and inventory are monitored by different means.

In the refueling mode, normal means of core temperature indication and RCS level indication may not be available. Redundant means of RPV level indication will normally be installed to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

Threshold Value 1 involves a lowering in RCS level below the top of the RPV flange that continues for 15 minutes due to an UNPLANNED event.

K-95 Rev. 48

¶CU3 Initiating Condition Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

NOTE: A NOUE should not be made for pre-planned testing such as SI/LOSP testing.

Threshold Value:

1. a. Loss of offsite power to OR from Start Up Transformers 1(2)A AND 1(2)B resulting in loss of all offsite electrical power to BOTH 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G for greater than 15 minutes AND

b. At least one emergency diesel generator supplying power to EITHER 4160V ESF buss 1(2)F OR 1(2)G.

Basis:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (e.g., Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

K-96 Rev. 48

¶ CU4 Initiating Condition UNPLANNED Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

NOTE: The Emergency Director should not wait until 15 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the duration has or will likely exceed the Threshold Value.

1. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature exceeding 200°F.

2. Loss of all RCS temperature AND RPV level indication for greater than 15 minutes.

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

This IC is included as a NOUE because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. In cold shutdown the ability to remove decay heat relies primarily on forced cooling flow. Operation of the systems that provide this forced cooling may be jeopardized due to the unlikely loss of electrical power or RCS inventory. Since the RCS usually remains intact in the cold shutdown mode a large inventory of water is available to keep the core covered. In cold shutdown the decay heat available to raise RCS temperature during a loss of inventory or heat removal event may be significantly greater than in the refueling mode.

During refueling the level in the RPV will normally be maintained above the RPV flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the RPV flange are carefully planned and procedurally controlled. Loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in more rapid rises in RCS/RPV temperatures depending on the time since shutdown.

Unlike the cold shutdown mode, normal means of core temperature indication and RCS level indication may not be available in the refueling mode. Redundant means of RPV level indication are therefore procedurally installed to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted.

However, if all level and temperature indication were to be lost in either the cold shutdown of refueling modes, Threshold Value 2 would result in declaration of a NOUE if either temperature or level indication cannot be restored within 15 minutes from the loss of both means of indication.

The Emergency Director must remain attentive to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the Threshold Value is imminent. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the threshold has been exceeded.

K-97 Rev. 48

¶CU6 Initiating Condition UNPLANNED Loss of All Onsite OR Offsite Communications Capabilities.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1 OR 2)

1. UNPLANNED loss of ALL of the following on-site communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations:

In plant telephones Public address system Plant radio systems

2. UNPLANNED loss of ALL of the following off-site communications capability:

ENN (Emergency Notification Network)

ENS (Emergency Notification System)

Commercial phones (Radio, PBX, Satellite, Wireless)

VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol)

OPX (Off Premise Extension)

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

The purpose of this IC and its associated Threshold Values is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities.

The availability of one method of ordinary offsite communications is sufficient to inform state and local authorities of plant problems. This Threshold Value is intended to be used only when extraordinary means (e.g., relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.) are being utilized to make communications possible.

K-98 Rev. 48

¶CU7 Initiating Condition UNPLANNED Loss of Required DC Power for Greater than 15 Minutes.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1a AND 1b)

1. a. UNPLANNED loss of Vital DC power to 125 VDC Bus A AND B indicated by bus voltage indications less than 105 VDC AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

The purpose of this IC and its associated Threshold Values is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This Threshold Value is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

105 VDC bus voltage is based on the minimum bus voltage necessary for the operation of safety related equipment. This voltage value incorporates a margin of at least 15 minutes of operation before the onset of inability to operate those loads.

K-99 Rev. 48

¶ CU8 Initiating Condition Inadvertent Criticality.

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Refueling (Mode 6)

Threshold Values: (1)

1. An UNPLANNED sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation.

Basis:

UNPLANNED: a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

This IC addresses criticality events that occur in Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes such as fuel mis-loading events and inadvertent dilution events. This IC indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, warranting a NOUE classification.

The term sustained is used in order to allow exclusion of expected short term positive startup rates from planned fuel bundle or control rod movements during core alterations. These short term positive startup rates are the result of the rise in neutron population due to subcritical multiplication.

K-100 Rev. 48

EMERGENCY PLAN Part II MEDICAL PLAN Rev. 56

INDEX OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PART II - MEDICAL PLAN PAGE REV. NO. PAGE REV. NO. PAGE REV. NO.

i 55 B-20b DEL C-35 52 ii 55 B-20c DEL C-36 52 iii 55 B-21 DEL C-37 52 1 7 B-22 DEL C-38 52 2 30 B-23 DEL C-39 52 3 53 B-24 DEL C-40 52 4 53 B-25 DEL C-41 52 5 53 B-26 DEL C-42 52 6 53 B-27 DEL C-43 52 7 52 B-28 DEL C-44 52 8 24 B-29A DEL C-45 52 9 27 B-29B DEL C-46 52 10 39 B-30 DEL C-47 52 11 27 B-31 DEL C-48 52 12 24 B-32 DEL C-49 52 13 47 B-33 DEL C-50 52 14 27 APPENDIX C C-51 52 15 19 C-1 52 C-52 52 16 27 C-2 52 C-53 52 17 52 C-3 52 C-54 52 18 7 C-4 52 C-55 52 APPENDIX A C-5 52 C-56 52 A-1 47 C-6 52 C-57 52 C-7 52 C-58 52 APPENDIX B C-8 52 C-59 52 C-9 52 C-60 52 B-i DEL C-10 52 C-61 52 B-1 52 C-11 52 C-62 52 B-2 DEL C-12 52 C-63 52 B-3 DEL C-13 52 C-64 52 B-4 DEL C-14 52 C-65 52 B-5 DEL C-15 52 APPENDIX D B-6 DEL C-16 52 D-1 55 B-7 DEL C-17 52 D-2 55 B-8 DEL C-18 52 D-3 55 B-9 DEL C-19 52 D-4 55 B-10 DEL C-20 52 D-5 55 B-10a DEL C-21 52 D-6 55 B-10b DEL C-22 52 D-7 55 B-10c DEL C-23 52 D-8 55 B-11 DEL C-24 52 D-9 DEL B-12 DEL C-25 52 D-10 DEL B-13 DEL C-26 52 D-11 DEL B-14 DEL C-27 52 D-12 DEL B-15 DEL C-28 52 D-13 DEL B-16 DEL C-29 52 D-14 DEL B-17 DEL C-30 52 D-15 DEL B-18 DEL C-31 52 D-16 DEL B-19 DEL C-32 52 D-17 DEL B-20 DEL C-33 52 D-18 DEL B-20a DEL C-34 52 D-19 DEL Page 1 of 2 Rev. 55

INDEX OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PART II - MEDICAL PLAN PAGE REV. NO. PAGE REV. NO. PAGE REV. NO.

APPENDIX D (CONTD) D-68 DEL D-20 DEL D-69 DEL D-21 DEL D-70 DEL D-22 DEL D-71 DEL D-23 DEL D-72 DEL D-24 DEL D-73 DEL D-25 DEL D-74 DEL D-26 DEL D-75 DEL D-27 DEL D-76 DEL D-28 DEL D-77 DEL D-29 DEL D-78 DEL D-30 DEL D-79 DEL D-31 DEL D-80 DEL D-32 DEL D-81 DEL D-33 DEL D-82 DEL D-34 DEL D-83 DEL D-35 DEL D-84 DEL D-36 DEL D-85 DEL D-37 DEL D-86 DEL D-38 DEL D-87 DEL D-39 DEL D-88 DEL D-40 DEL D-89 DEL D-41 DEL D-90 DEL D-42 DEL D-91 DEL D-43 DEL APPENDIX E D-44 DEL E-1 56 D-45 DEL E-2 56 D-46 DEL APPENDIX F D-47 DEL F-1 49 D-48 DEL D-49 DEL D-50 DEL D-51 DEL D-52 DEL D-53 DEL D-54 DEL D-55 DEL D-56 DEL D-57 DEL D-58 DEL D-59 DEL D-60 DEL D-61 DEL D-62 DEL D-63 DEL D-64 DEL D-65 DEL D-66 DEL D-67 DEL Page 2 of 2 Rev. 56

RADIATION EMERGENCY MEDICAL PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. Purpose.. 1 B. Scope. 1 II. MEDICAL SUPPORT AND FACILITIES. 1 A. Plant Site.1 B. Southeast Alabama Medical Center (SAMC).. 2 C. The University of Alabama Hospital (RCTF) 8 D. Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education (ORISE) 8 III. RADIATION CASUALTY HANDLING PROCEDURE.. 8 A. Notification 8 B. Onsite Responsive Action.. 9 C. SAMC Responsive Action.. 12 D. RCTF Responsive Action 13 IV. TRANSPORTATION.. 13 A. Services Available 13 B. Routes 14 V. DRILLS 14 VI. TRAINING 14 VII. RADIATION EXPOSURE GUIDELINES 15 i Rev. 55

RADIATION EMERGENCY MEDICAL PLAN APPENDICES APPENDIX PAGE APPENDIX A Emergency Equipment and Supplies. A-1 Appendix B Letters of Agreement on File B-1 Appendix C Southeast Alabama Medical Center Radiation Accident Plan. C-1 Apendix D University of Alabama Hospital Radiation Casualty Treatment Facility (RCTF).. D-1 Appendix E Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Engineering, Description of Facilities E-1 Appendix F Roster of Medical Consultants F-1 ii Rev. 55

RADIATION EMERGENCY MEDICAL PLAN List of Figures APPENDIX PAGE Figure 1 Aerial view of plant site 3 Figure 2 Health Physics Office, Decontamination Facility and First Aid Room; Elevation 155. 4 Figure 3 Health Physics Office, Decontamination Facility and First Aid Room; Elevation 155. 5 Figure 4 FNP Training Facility Nursing Station 6 Figure 5 Southeast Alabama Medical Center Floor Plan.. 7 Figure 6 Medical Notification Order. 10 Figure 7 Major Routes to Southeast Alabama Medical Center 16 Figure 8 Radiation Casualty Entrance to SAMC 17 Figure 9 Major Routes to Birmingham and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 18 iii Rev. 55

RADIATION EMERGENCY MEDICAL PLAN I. INTRODUCTION A. PURPOSE It is the objective of the Radiation Emergency Medical Plan to provide for the selection and delivery of appropriate medical care for personnel who may have been exposed to serious radioactive contamination or radiation injury, possibly concomitant with other injuries, at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. In the event of an accident, to ensure a smooth flow of action from initial evaluation and treatment through final disposition, knowledgeable decision making regarding medical priorities is required. Adequate arrangements for transportation of injured personnel and assurance that proper facilities as well as expert professional and paramedical services are immediately available are necessary. Through careful planning, training and practice, this objective will be accomplished.

B. SCOPE The plan provides for onsite medical support and offsite medical support at three levels: primary care, definitive care, and back-up definitive care. A description of casualty flow to these facilities including action levels, transportation available and notification procedures, is given.

Provisions are made for training at the local level of support to minimize the chance of an accident and to ensure that, in the event of an accident, affected personnel onsite and offsite respond appropriately without compounding the medical or radiological problems present.

II. MEDICAL SUPPORT AND FACILITIES A. PLANT SITE

1. General Onsite emergency medical activities are performed by trained and qualified persons immediately available under the direction of the Emergency Director and will consist of:

a. Removal of personnel from hazardous area (high radiation level or contamination levels)

b. First aid for severe physical injuries

c. Personnel decontamination

d. Evaluation of radiation exposure Rev. 7

e. Triage of personnel An aerial view of the plant site is shown in FIGURE 1.

2. Facilities The health physics and decontamination facility is located at elevation 155 of the Auxiliary Building as shown in FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3.

This facility is located near potentially contaminated and high radiation areas so that health physics support, first aid, and personnel decontamination can be effectively administered. A Health Physics technician will normally be available at this facility.

In the event of a Site Area or General Emergency when the health physics and decontamination facility might become untenable, the Nursing Station (FIGURE 4) at the Training/Visitors Center will normally become the center for personnel first aid and decontamination activity. The necessary first aid and decontamination supplies for these facilities are listed in APPENDIX A.

B. SOUTHEAST ALABAMA MEDICAL CENTER (SAMC)

The Southeast Alabama Medical Center (SAMC) of Dothan, Alabama, has agreed to accept injured, contaminated and/or irradiated casualties (APPENDIX B). This hospital is a 400 bed general hospital fully accredited by the State Hospital Association and Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospitals and Organizations. It has a modern fully equipped emergency room of sixteen suites with provisions to perform all necessary procedures; complete laboratory and diagnostic x-ray capabilities; and 13 major and 1 minor surgical suites. There are approximately 100+ members on the active staff, the majority board certified or qualified representing all major medical specialties.

Space (FIGURE 5) at the hospital provides a receiving area for potentially contaminated and/or irradiated patients and has a separate entrance from the normally used emergency entrance. This facility is adequate for:

1. Personnel decontamination

2. Emergency treatment

3. Storage of emergency equipment and supplies A permanent helipad exists for air evacuation of injured or irradiated personnel via helicopter. Communications can be established by FNP with SAMC through the hospital's switchboard or directly with the hospital emergency room.

Rev. 30

Contractor Parking Lot Fabrication Warehouse N Shop High Voltage Parking Unit 2Cooling Towers Switchyard Lot Alabama 95 See Switch House Detail A Unit 1Cooling Towers CSC Utility Building Water Treatment Plant Detail A County 42 Outage Support Building Turbine Building Training Center Auxiliary Building Protected Area Control Room Service Building Diesel OSC and TSC Building Sec Diesel PAP FIGURE 1 Aerial view of plant site Rev. 53

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C. THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA HOSPITAL (RCTF)

The University of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama, has agreed to admit and provide on a priority basis definitive care for contaminated and/or irradiated casualties (APPENDIX B). This hospital is a 639 bed teaching institution affiliated with the University of Alabama in Birmingham School of Medicine. It is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and Organizations and is licensed by the Alabama State Board of Health.

It is a member of the American Hospital Association, the Council of Teaching Hospitals and the Alabama Hospital Association. Its specialists in oncology, hematology, infectious disease, endocrinology, gastroenterology, nuclear medicine, radiology, and the surgical specialties render it fully capable of providing effective medical care. Already in existence are portable and fixed isolation units capable of maintaining a sterile environment.

Facilities for the care of radiation emergency casualties have been developed to provide a Radiation Casualty Treatment Facility (RCTF).

The RCTF consists of a nine bed unit, a nursing station, utility room, storage room, and a treatment and examination room.

D. OAK RIDGE Institute of Science and Education (ORISE)

Oak Ridge Associated Universities operates a Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Its specialized facilities and staff are available for the care and treatment of possible radiation casualties from the Joseph M.

Farley Nuclear Plant of Alabama Power Company in Dothan, Alabama (APPENDIX B). The ORISE-REAC/TS can accommodate approximately 20 patients who are contaminated or have received external radiation.

A laminar flow facility with two sterile rooms is available for patients requiring isolation. Sophisticated whole-body counting equipment, probes for locating radioactive particles in wounds, and computer-based monitoring services are also available. The staff of the ORISE-REAC/TS has considerable experience in total-body irradiation and several have participated in the handling of previous radiation accident casualties. The nursing staff, aides and orderlies, likewise, are experienced in handling patients who have been treated with or accidentally exposed to both external and internal radiation. Full diagnostic laboratory and radiographic back-up facilities are available. A description of their facilities is given in APPENDIX E.

III. RADIATION CASUALTY HANDLING PROCEDURE A. NOTIFICATION A general order of notification in the event of an incident at the Farley Nuclear Plant is given in PART I, FIGURE 24. Detailed lines of notification and communication concerning medical support are given in FIGURE 6 of this plan.

Rev. 24

B. ONSITE RESPONSIVE ACTION Actual or suspected radiation casualties, with or without concomitant trauma, will be moved to the primary onsite decontamination area as shown in FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3. If this primary onsite decontamination area is unavailable as a result of the emergency, the casualties will be moved to the secondary onsite decontamination area as shown in FIGURE 4. The priority order of onsite medical emergency action will then be:

1) First aid of life-threatening or severe physical injury;

2) Personnel decontamination, to the extent that trauma is aggravated;

3) Evaluation of radiation exposure, external and internal, with concomitant first aid of other injuries.

The actual or suspected casualties may be grouped into three classes for triage considerations.

Class I Criteria

1) Estimated radiation dose greater than applicable 10CFR20 limits but less than 5 Rem to whole body (including eyes, gonads, and blood-forming organs); or

2) Estimated radiation dose to the skin of the whole body greater than the 10CFR20 limit but less than 30 Rem; or

3) Estimated radiation dose to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms greater than the 10CFR20 limit but less than 75 Rem.

ACTION

1) Without trauma - Send to Southeast Alabama Medical Center (SAMC) for evaluation after clearance by Health Physics for contamination.

2) With trauma - Apply appropriate first aid then send to SAMC for evaluation. Monitoring for contamination is desirable prior to sending the casualty to SAMC.

Class II Criteria

1) Estimated radiation dose to the whole body (including eyes, gonads, and blood-forming organs) greater than 5 Rem but less than 25 Rem, or Rev. 27

MEDICAL NOTIFICATION ORDER SURGEON AMBULANC SAM RCT SHIF EMERGENCY EO MEDICAL SN SUPERVISO DIRECTO MANAGE ADVISO PROJEC MEDICAL DIRECTO STATE ALABAM ORISE-NR

If injury involves contamination, excessive exposure or if it is anticipated that injured will be admitted to the hospital for observation or treatment in excess of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months duration.

FIGURE 6 - MEDICAL NOTIFICATION ORDER Gen. Rev. 39

2) Estimated radiation dose to the skin of the whole body greater than 30 Rem but less than 150 Rem; or

3) Estimated radiation dose to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms greater than 75 Rem but less than 375 rem.

Action

1) Without trauma send to SAMC for evaluation after clearance by Health Physics for contamination.

2) With trauma apply appropriate first aid, then send to SAMC for evaluation. Monitoring for contamination is desirable prior to sending the casualty to SAMC.

Class III Criteria

1) Estimated radiation dose to the whole body (including eyes, gonads, and blood-forming organs) of 25 Rem or more; or

2) Estimated radiation dose to the skin of the whole body of 150 Rem or more; or

3) Estimated radiation dose to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms of 375 Rem or more.

4) Internal radiation exposure estimated to be significant.

Action

1) Without trauma - after proper decontamination by Health Physics, send to SAMC for evaluation and potential transfer to the Radiation Casualty Treatment Facility (RCTF) in Birmingham or to ORISE-REAC/TS in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

2) With trauma - appropriate first aid, decontamination, and send to SAMC for treatment and potential transfer to RCTF or REAC/TS.

The above estimates of external and internal radiation exposures will be performed by the Health Physics staff on the basis of all available information, including dosimeters, area monitors, air monitors, and survey instruments.

Contaminated casualties sent to SAMC, RCTF, or REAC/TS will be accompanied by a person who is qualified in radiological monitoring and will stay in attendance and maintain radiological control until decontamination is complete. Contaminated casualties will be covered with suitable protective clothing or plastic sheets so as to prevent or minimize the spread of radioactive material. Radiation exposure to the vehicle operator and any attendant personnel will be Rev. 27

minimized to the extent possible, and shadow shields may be used.

Inhalation of airborne radioactive material may be minimized through the use of respiratory protective devices.

Each casualty will be identified before leaving the plant with a nonremovable hospital type wristband showing his name and an identification number for use for reference purposes in all communications, to avoid possible confusion in reporting estimates of radiation dose and similar matters.

C. SAMC RESPONSIVE ACTION All casualties sent to SAMC will enter the Radiation Casualty/Decon-tamination area and be surveyed by qualified personnel assigned for that purpose. Emergency medical care will be provided if required together with further decontamination.

1) Criteria Those casualties with estimated radiation doses less than 25 Rem to the whole body (including eyes, gonads, and blood-forming organs) and estimated from bioassay measurements and other reasons not to be bearing significant quantities of internal emitters.

Action Hospitalize if necessary for continued treatment of trauma or illness; otherwise continue minor treatment, observation and evaluation on out-patient basis, after release by Health Physics personnel. Observation and evaluation will include hematological surveys, bioassays of urine and feces, and general physical condition, including opthalmological and dermatological examinations. If evaluation so indicates (e.g.,

leukopenia), transfer to RCTF or REAC/TS.

2) Criteria Those casualties with estimated radiation doses of greater than 25 Rem to whole body, or thought from bioassay measurements and other reasons to be bearing significant quantities of internal emitters.

Action Transfer to RCTF or REAC/TS (after emergency treatment of trauma or illness).

In the event of mass casualties, a decision will be made as to which casualties will be sent from SAMC to RCTF, or directly to ORISE REAC/TS. This decision will be made by the Medical Director of the Southern Nuclear Operating Company or his designated alternate, with the advise of staff and consultants.

Rev. 24

Contaminated and/or irradiated casualties sent from SAMC to RCTF, ORISE-REAC/TS or elsewhere, will be accompanied by a person qualified in radiological monitoring. This person will stay in attendance and maintain radiological control until the patient is transferred to a similarly qualified person at the receiving institution.

All rooms, equipment, and supplies used to treat contaminated personnel will be made controlled areas and considered to be contaminated until released by the Health Physics staff.

D. RCTF RESPONSIVE ACTION Casualties sent to RCTF will be met outside the building by an individual qualified in radiological monitoring, will enter through the appropriate emergency room entrance of the University of Alabama Hospital, be surveyed and then transported directly to the RCTF. The staff of the RCTF will have been previously notified and will be ready to accept the patients.

IV. TRANSPORTATION A. SERVICES AVAILABLE

1. Local Rescue Squads Ashford Rescue Squad has agreed to transport contaminated and/or irradiated casualties from the plant site to Southeast Alabama Medical Center (SAMC) in Dothan, Alabama.

Columbia Rescue Squad has agreed to transport contaminated and/or irradiated casualties from the plant site to Southeast Alabama Medical Center (SAMC).

2. Dothan Ambulance Service (Pilchers Ambulance Service), Inc.

Dothan Ambulance Service, Inc. has agreed to transport potentially contaminated and/or irradiated casualties from the plant site to SAMC and on to the University of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama or Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REAC/TS) of Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee ORISE-REAC/TS. Their ambulances are equipped with radios so they can be in communication through SAMC with the Control Room (Letter of Agreement -

APPENDIX B).

3. American Medical Response Ambulance Service American Medical Response Ambulance Service in Birmingham, Alabama (formerly Careline Ambulance Service) has agreed to transport contaminated and/or irradiated casualties from the Birmingham Airport or helipad to the University of Alabama Hospital (Letter of Agreement - APPENDIX B).

Rev. 47

B. ROUTES

1. Plant Site to SAMC (Figure 7, 8)

Normally, emergency vehicles will proceed west on County Road 42 to County Road 33; southwest on County Road 33 to County Road 55; south on County Road 55 to U.S. 84, west on U.S. 84, until its junction with State Highway 210 (Ross Clark Circle) at which point the Medical Center is located.

If the normal route is unavailable then an alternate route will be directed by the control room. Two such alternate routes are shown on Figure 7.

2. Plant Site or SAMC to the University of Alabama Hospital (FIGURE 9)

As in 1 above, to State Highway 210 (Ross Clark Circle); then north on 210 to its junction with U.S. Highway 231; Highway 231 north to Montgomery and junction with Interstate 65 then north on Interstate 65 to Birmingham. Exit Interstate 65 at 8th Avenue South; east to 19th Street; north to 6th Avenue South; east to University Hospital Emergency Room.

3. SAMC to Oak Ridge, Tennessee (FIGURE 9)

As in 2 above on Interstate 65 to Interstate 59 north to Chattanooga, Tennessee; north on Interstate 75 to Interstate 40; west on Interstate 40 to State Highway 95; north on State Highway 95 to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, then north on New York Avenue to West Tennessee Avenue; east to ORISE-REAC/TS.

V. DRILLS Radiation emergency practice drills will be conducted annually to maintain the proficiency of the organization and personnel at the plant, SAMC and at the RCTF and to verify the arrangements made with other groups. Drills will be arranged so as to provide quantitative data on response times for each communication, decision and action element of the overall Radiation Emergency Medical Plan. These response times will be used to predict the effectiveness of the Plan and to disclose areas where improvement in training, equipment or organization is needed. Management review of critique comments obtained from drill monitors will be conducted.

Identified, necessary, or required alterations in training or for the Emergency Plan/EIPs will be implemented in a timely manner.

VI. TRAINING A. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL Permanently assigned personnel will undergo radiation protection training, the extent of which will depend on the nature of the Rev. 27

specific job. Each employee will be required as part of his training to be familiar with radiation protection practices, facilities and equipment at the plant as described in the Health Physics Manual. At least one person on each shift will be qualified to perform first aid.

B. HEALTH PHYSICS PERSONNEL All Health Physics Technicians will be thoroughly trained in the principles of radiation protection including personnel dosimetry, decontamination and monitoring.

C. PHYSICIANS Several physicians in the Houston County area have been retrained to provide care for injured, contaminated, and/or irradiated victims. These physicians are encouraged to attend a training seminar on the care of radiation injuries. The Medical Director for the Southern Nuclear Operating Company has also attended this seminar.

D. PARAMEDICAL PERSONNEL Ambulance attendants, nurses and hospital technicians will be encouraged to attend annual training sessions. These sessions will be conducted under the direction of the Training Director. Training will include a description of the facility, its health physics program, the spectrum of possible accidents with emphasis on potential resulting casualties and procedures for implementing the Radiation Emergency Medical Plan.

VII. RADIATION EXPOSURE GUIDELINES The following guidelines are given for the exposure of hospital and ambulance service personnel:

A. 3 REM If there is an adequate number of attendants such that rotation may be accomplished without further endangering the patient(s).

B. 5 REM If the number of attendants is limited such that personnel cannot be rotated.

C. 25 REM To save a life.

The above guideline numbers refer to whole body penetrating radiation.

When careful monitoring is provided, the extremities dose may be up to 5 times the value given and the skin dose may be up to 2 times the value given.

Rev. 19

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RADIATION CASUALTY ENTRANCE TO SAMC FIGURE 8 Rev. 52

F1IU:. 9. Major lout.. to 11rm1Daham aDd Oak R1aa. TaDDesse.

18 'Rp.v. 7

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES I. HP OFFICE Blankets First Aid Supplies Protective Clothing and Supplies Decontamination Supplies Wristbands Survey Meter II. NURSING STATION Audiometric Testing Equipment Pulmonary Testing Equipment Vision Testing Equipment Physical Examination Equipment First Aid Supplies III. PEV DELETED IV. AMBULANCE KIT Protective Clothing Lead Covering Material Blankets Signs and Labels Wristbands Dosimetry Devices V. SOUTHEAST ALABAMA MEDICAL CENTER Survey Meters and Supplies Dosimetry Devices Signs and Labels Protective Clothing Surgical Clothing Decontamination Supplies Specimen Containers Disposable Cartons Logbook and Pencil A-1 Rev. 47

APPENDIX B Letters of Agreement on File The following letters of agreement and memorandums of understanding are maintained on file with the Emergency Planning Coordinator:

Agreement Between Southern Nuclear Operating Company and the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for a Radiation Casualty Treatment Facility at University Hospital, Birmingham (11-15-99)

Letter of Agreement Between Careline of Alabama Ambulance Service and SNC (1-10-95)

Letter - Southeast Alabama Medical Center (02-12-2004)

Letter - Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site(REAC/TS)(12-18-2000)

Letter of Agreement Between Dothan Ambulance Service, Inc. and APCo (10-01-1986)

Assignment of Emergency Planning Agreements Letter of Agreement between Ashford Rescue Squad and Southern Nuclear Operating Company Letter of Agreement between Columbia Rescue Squad and Southern Nuclear Operating Company B-1 Rev. 52

SOUTHEAST ALABAMA EMERGENCY ACTION MANUAL MEDICAL CENTER POLICY & PROCEDURE TITLE: Table of Contents - Radiation Accident Plan EFFECTIVE DATE:

RADIATION ACCIDENT PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Section 9 . 1 INTRODUCTION ......................... page 1 LOCATION OF DECONTAMINATION AREA .......... 1 9.2 COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Communication receipt form policy ......... 2 Communication receipt form ................ 3 9 . 21 Notificat i on Process ...................... 4 9 .22 Decontamination area phones ............... 5 9 . 23 Sources of Assistance ..................... 5 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY .............. 6 Emergency Department Staff ................ 6 Operator .................................. 7 Fairview Clinic Physicians ................ 7 Shift Coordinator/Ass . Adm . Nursing ....... 7 Security Services ......................... 8 Plant Safety Director ..................... 9 Engineering ............................... 9 Administ r ation ........................... 10 Radiation Specialists .................... 11 Central Sterile .......................... 12 Laboratory ............................... 13 Community Relations ...................... 14 Social Services .................... .. .... 15 Admission/Discharges ..................... 15 Radiology ................................ 16 Dothan Police ............................ 16 9 . 31 Surgical Services ....................... . 17 9.4 SIGN USAGE ............................... 18 9 . 41 PREGNANCY PROTOCOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9 . 42 ELEVATOR USE ............................. 18 9.5 PROTECTIVE ATTIRE FOR PERSONNEL .......... 19 Procedure for exiting Radiation area ..... 19

9. 6 DECONTAMINATION OF RADIATION PATIENT ..... 20 General body ............................ 20 Wounds ................................... 21 Body orifices ............................ 22 I ntact skin .............................. 23 Hairy areas .............................. 23 I nternal contamination ................... 24 9.7 EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ................... 25 , 26 9.8 RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT FORMS ......... 27 , 28 , 29 PART I CI PANT LOG .......................... 30

9. 9 TDL Assignment LOG ....................... 31 9 . 10 Radiation Decontam . Area Floor Plan ...... 32 C-1 REV. 52

Radiation Disaster Plan (Contd)

TABLE OF CONTENTS ATTACHMENT....ALABAMA POWER COMPANY EMERGENCY PLAN TRAINING Types of Radiation injury.....................page 3 Radiation Protection Principles....................7 Radiological and Clinical Laboratory Assessment...19 Decoporation of internal contamination............22 Sources of assistance.............................25 Glossary..........................................39 C-2 REV. 52

SO UTHEA ST A LABAMA EMERGENCY ACTION MANUAL POLICY & PROCEDURE MEDICAL CENTER TITLE: Radiation Accident Plan EFFECTIVE DATE :

RADIATION ACCIDENT PLAN Section

9.1 INTRODUCTION

It is imperative that Southeast Alabama Medical Center have an operational plan to safely handle any radiation accidents , even though the possibility of such occurrences is remote .

Because of t he proximity to Farley Nuclear Plant , Southeast Alabama Medical Center has a written agreement with the Southern Nuclear Operating Company to act as a casualty treatment center for any events occurring at that facility . The hospital , medical staff and multidisciplinary staff will be available to persons who have been exposed to serious radioactive contamination or suffer from radiation injury .

This plan will be written for radiation injury patients in general, and any policies specific to the treatment of Farley Nuclear Plant occurrences will be written in parentheses , and can be ignored if the injury was sustained elsewhere .

LOCATION OF THE DECONTAMINATION AREA 1 ) Two designated areas have been established to handle injured patients with radiation contamination . The morgue , as well as the Emergency Center decontamination room , has been designated as areas fo r decontamination and treatment of radiation victims . If an alternate location for decontamination needs to be used , t he Emergency Center Physician will so designate .

2 ) The Emergency Center Physic ian will identify which decon area will be established. In the event of multip le contaminated patients , bo th decon areas may be established .

3) The radiation decon supply room , l ocated outside t he Morgue ,

will serve as the supply room fo r both des igned areas .

4) The hallway outside the decontamination area wi ll be used as a ho lding area .

5) Overflow patients are to be transported to the University of Alabama Hospital in Bi r mingham via MAST .

6 ) Large numbers of contaminated victims will be treated or held in the Wiregrass Rec reati on Center , located on Sixth Avenue ,

Dothan , Alabama .

C- 3 REV . 52

Section 9.2 COMMUNICATION E.D. COMMUNICATIONS RECEIPT FORM POLICY Upon receipt of information regarding radiation accident occurrence, the person receiving the information shall be responsible for the completion of the E.D. Communications Receipt Form. (next page)

1) Verify the validity of the accident by returning a call to the reporting person or company.

2) Complete the form with as much information as available.

3) Forward the completed form promptly to the shift coordinator.

C-4 REV. 52

Section 9.2 (con't)

ED COMMUNICATION RECEIPT FORM Obtain the following information from the radiation accident scene:

1. Number of casualties: _______________________________________

2. Estimate of the severity of injuries: (Notify Fairview Clinic Physician of this estimate):

3. Name(s), age(s), sex(s) of casualties (if possible):

NAME AGE/SEX

4. Method of transport to Southeast Alabama Medical Center:

5. Present Location of Casualties: _____________________________

6. Estimated Time of Arrival: __________________________________

ED STAFF TO VERIFY NOTIFICATION BY IMMEDIATELY RETURNING CALL TO RADIATION ACCIDENT SCENE: (IF AT FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT: 793-2255, (334)899-5156, EXT. 2355 UNIT I, EXT. 2353 UNIT II).

C-5 REV. 52

Section 9.21 COMMUNICATION NOTIFICATION PROCESS RADIATION ACCIDENT SCENE PERSONNEL D. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT STAFF (WILL NOTIFY THE FOLLOWING)

1. ED Physician

2. Operator (request operator to initiate the announcement/notification process for a radiation accident.)

3. (Fairview Clinic Physician on call, 8697 or 794-3192 IF Radiation Exposure involves Farley Nuclear Plant)

4. Shift coordinator D. OPERATOR (WILL NOTIFY THE FOLLOWING)

D. Security (8014)

D. Plant Safety Director (8920)

D. Engineering (8766)

D. Administrator (8701) or Administrator on call from list

5. Technical Director Radiation Oncology (8080)

D. Radiation Oncology Physicist (8080)

7. Radiology Technical Director (8843)

D. Nuclear Medicine Technical Director (8077)

D. Central Sterile (8075)

D. Laboratory (8045)

D. Community Relations (8107)

D. Social Services (8070)

D. Admitting and Discharge (8754)

D. Quality Management Director (8862)

D. Risk Management-Hannah (8705)

D. Behavioral Medicine (8858)

D. SHIFT COORDINATOR (WILL NOTIFY THE FOLLOWING)

1. Patient Care Services Administration (8734)

2. Unit Director or designee of designated area receiving patient

3. Surgical services (if surgery is indicated: 8033)

D. ADMINISTRATOR (WILL NOTIFY THE FOLLOWING)

1. Dothan Police (if necessary; 911 or 615-3000)

2. Alabama Health Department, Radiation Control division 334-206-5391). After hours, use the Radiological Emergency Assistance telephone directory, published by the Alabama State Board of Health (page 34) or call 334-242-4378 and ask operator to page 971)

C-6 REV. 52

RADIATION ACCIDENT PLAN (Contd)

Section 9.22 COMMUNICATION DECONTAMINATION AREA PHONES Inside morgue 8935 Radiation supply room 8745 Emergency Center Decon room 712-3326 ADDITIONAL DISASTER CONTROL AREA PHONES Disaster Control Center 8909 Media Control Center 3402 Family Receiving Control 3401 Employee Pool 3403 Dissemination of information: All information released must come directly from the administrator on call.

C-7 REV. 52

Section 9.23 COMMUNICATION: SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) maintains the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan to assist state and local personnel in handling radiological incidents and accidents. Regional offices are located in Oak Ridge, TN.

The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/ Training Site, Oak Ridge, TN (REAC/TS) is part of the DOE response network. REAC/TS provides treatment capabilities and consultation assistance on a 24-hour basis, and can be reached through the Oak Ridge Hospital of the Methodist Church, 615-482-2441.

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES A. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT STAFF

1. Complete notification process Section 9.2, (page 4)

2. Bring stretchers from ED to radiation decontamination area.

Drape stretchers with plastic sheets, move to decontamination entrance. Request additional stretchers from escort as needed.

Insure all wheels on stretchers used in contaminated area are covered.

3. Assign a TLD badge to each individual who shall come in contact with the patient. Record name and badge number on RADIATION ACCIDENT PARTICIPANTS LOG. (page 30)

4. One ED person shall be assigned to stay outside the decontamination area and act as liaison between the decontamination area and all supplies needed.

5. Two ED nurses shall be assigned to prepare the room and assist as needed. (Any female must comply with pregnancy protocol, (page 18) a) Remove all equipment and supplies that are not to be used.

b) Prepare charts and record all information c) Locate and display medical supplies, open as needed.

d) Dress in protective attire as listed in Section 9.5, (page 19) e) Notify ED Physician when patient arrives.

f) All contaminated clothing and belongings shall be placed in 30 gallon drums.

g) Assist in collecting and properly labeling all lab specimens.

Place all specimens in lead containers. All lead containers must be checked and labeled for radiation contamination levels by the Radiation Safety Specialist in charge, before leaving the morgue.

h) Retain and store all body excreta. Identify, date, and seal containers. Place RADIOACTIVE sticker on each.

C-8 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES B. OPERATOR

1. Complete notification process, (page 4)

2. Know phone numbers assigned to decontamination area to assist in outside communication. (page 5)

3. Notify shift coordinator of any Radiation Accident Personnel you are unable to locate, or who are unable to respond.

C. FAIRVIEW CLINIC PHYSICIAN ON CALL (IF radiation exposure involves Farley Nuclear Plant.)

1. Attire in surgical cap, gown, mask, plastic gloves, and plastic shoe covers before entering decontamination area. See Section 9.5, (page 19)

2. Diagnose patient's condition. If patient is stable and ambulatory, direct patient to shower. If patient's condition prevents showering, physician shall direct the decontamination and monitoring process.

3. Proceed with patient care and orders as needed.

4. Decide on disposition: Admission, transfer or release.

5. (For radiation exposure excluding Farley occurrences, the ED Physician shall assume this role.)

D. SHIFT COORDINATOR/ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR/PATIENT CARE SERVICES

1. Complete notification process. (page 4)

2. Assist operator in her notification process if necessary.

3. Insure adequate staffing in ED and other affected areas.

4. Insure readiness of decontamination area (morgue)

5. Secure a copy of the ED Communication Receipt Form, and provide information to the Administrator and Social Service Worker.

C-9 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES D. SECURITY SERVICES

1. Two or Three Security Services Representatives should report to the Radiation Accident Triage Area. Notify Director, Supervisors or designee of the incident. Call-in procedure should be followed when appropriate.

2. Lock stairwell as needed to block access to Morgue Decontamination room. Rope-off hallway area as appropriate to keep unauthorized person(s) from entering.

3. One Representative should open outside door to the decontamination area, and leave it ajar. Then maintain vigilance immediately outside door to assist as needed.

Control entry into Radiation area. Monitor unauthorized activity around Radiation vehicles and parking area.

4. One Representative should set up a monitor area in the hallway at the entrance to the morgue or EC decontamination room. Control authorized entry. One Representative is stationed inside the double door entrance to provide back-up assistance to the two other representatives as needed.

5. YOUR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO CONTROL ENTRY INTO THE DECONTAMINATION AREA. ENTRY IS DENIED IF THE PERSON IS NOT PROPERLY ATTIRED. SEE SECTION 9.5 (page 19). NO ONE IMPROPERLY ATTIRED SHOULD CROSS THE CONTROL LINE.

6. Assist in transporting patient to designated area, room, Unit or MAST pad as needed.

7. Security Services should maintain vigilance until the Nuclear Medicine Director has declared the area free of radioactivity.

8. Notify the Community Relations representatives in the media Control Center when members of the media arrives.

The media should not be allowed in the area.

C-10 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES E. PLANT SAFETY DIRECTOR

1. Inspect the Radiation Accident Triage Area for readiness and compliance to written protocols. Carry disaster phone to Decontamination Area and plug into spare jack.

2. Distribute monitor badges (NOTE: This is for drills only).

3. Assign responsibilities to designated drill monitors (Quality Management Personnel or Risk Management Personnel. See that someone takes responsibility for each department assigned specific tasks.

4. Ensure that written documentation of entire process is being undertaken by designated monitors.

5. Assist as necessary. Assume the position of Public Informations Officer if no one is available from Community Relations. (See section 9.3 K, page 13)

6. Schedule and conduct a follow-up Critique Committee for recommendations and action to improve the effectiveness of the plan. Assign minutes to be taken to record problems identified and action plan to correct them.

F. ENGINEERING

1. Install and set-up portable containment and decon systems.

(Portable patient basket and plastic containment jug/drum.

2. Place 30 gallon waste container outside the hospital at the decontamination entrance. Tape a large plastic bag to wall near entrance.

3. Place two 30 gallon containers in the decontamination area and label them (CLOTHING /BELONGINGS) and (TRASH)

4. Place plastic sheeting on floor of the decontamination area and corridor to exit. Cut plastic sheeting around floor drains and tape in place. Tape all seams. Cover commode [unit not connected to containment tank]). Place step-off pads at decontamination area door and corridor to exit.

5. TAPE OFF LINE ON FLOOR OUTSIDE DECONTAMINATION AREA (THE CONTROL LINE) TO DELINEATE CONTROLLED ACCESS AREA.

C-11 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES F. ENGINEERING (continued)

6. Cover wheels of all carts, stretchers, portable x-ray equipment, etc., in contaminated area.

7. Ask Nuclear Medicine Director whether to seal off floor drains and ventilator system or not.

1) When a concern of major airborne radiation contamination exists:

a) Switch off air returns b) Switch off heating/cooling system

8. Setup air sampler and load sample filter in filter head.

9. Set up portable ventilator unit and ventilator duct.

10. Assist as needed throughout Radiation Disaster.

11. ALL waste materials are to be secured and disposed of as directed by the Nuclear Medicine Director.

12. After the area has been declared radiation free, insure that the ventilator and water system have been properly returned to normal operation.

G. ADMINISTRATOR

1. Complete notification procedure (page 4) Verify attendance to accident by SAMC team of Radiation Specialists.

2. Establish the Control Center in the Emergency Services Conference Room for any necessary administrative decisions. (extension 8909 Dedicated Line.)

3. Coordinate Dothan Police Department assistance as needed.

4. Disseminate information to news media. (FOR EVENTS INVOLVING FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, COORDINATE PRESS RELEASES WITH THE ALABAMA POWER COMPANY (APC) CORPORATE INFORMATION MANAGER (Office 1-205-257-2386) THE SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANAGER (Office 1-205-992-5752), OR THE SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY EMERGENCY PLANNING COORDINATOR (Office 1-205-992-5627, Home 205-987-1672, Pager 1-205-992-7243 #5627) prior to release. Information releases by SAMC should relate only to patient condition and/or prognosis.

C-12 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES H. RADIATION SPECIALISTS

1. The Radiation specialist team shall consist of the Nuclear Medicine Technical Director, the Radiology Technical Director, the Radiation Oncology Technical Director and the Radiation Oncology Physicist. (IF EVENT INVOLVES FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, THE SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIAN(S) SHALL ALSO BE A PART OF THIS TEAM.)

2. The Nuclear Medicine Technical Director shall be responsible for the decision making, assigning duties as needed. If he is unavailable, the Radiation Oncology Physicist shall assume his responsibility.

3. Assignments of responsibility shall include the following:

A. EMPLOYEE SAFETY: This person is responsible for recording the names of all persons coming into contact with the radiation victim, or entering the Radiation Decontamination room. He shall record their radiation exposure as measured by direct reading dosimeters, personnel monitors or film badges. He shall make decisions regarding exposure based on the following the limits:

1) 3 remIf there is an adequate number of attendants such that rotation may be accomplished without further endangering the patient.

2) 5 remIf the number of attendants is limited such that personnel cannot be rotated.

3) 25 remto save a life.

B. VICTIM SAFETY: This person is responsible for continual radiation readings on the injured patient, and assisting in decisions regarding the decontamination procedures in his best interest. This person will assist the nurse in labeling all samples taken from the patient for diagnosis and treatment, with appropriate radiation levels recorded.

C-13 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES C. RADIATION CONTAINMENT: This person shall be responsible for measuring radiation levels on all people and specimens leaving the Decontamination area, and shall oversee decontamination to acceptable levels. Position yourself at or near the Control Line.

1) Personnel and equipment shall be decontaminated so that no radiation in excess of 100 cpm above background is detectable by a GM Survey Meter.

2) Contaminated specimens shall be placed in lead containers and labeled before leaving the area. The outside of the lead container shall be checked for radiation and, if necessary, decontaminated with water before leaving the area. Any specimens sent to the lab must have amount of radiation each specimen is releasing listed on the lab request form.

3) Should the physician decide that the victim must be sent to the OR, or any other area, without first being decontaminated, the following procedure shall apply:

(THE RADIATION CONTAINMENT SPECIALIST SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING) a) The contaminated portions of the victim shall be covered with two layers of protective covering, such as one cotton sheet and one plastic sheet.

b) If the victim is exhaling radiation, the victim and all attending personnel must wear surgical masks.

c) The victim shall be transferred to a clean stretcher prior to transport.

d) Hallways and all areas affected by transport shall be monitored for radiation and levels recorded.

I. CENTRAL STERILE

1. Bring crash cart to ED personnel outside of decontamination area door, as soon as notification is received of Radiation accident.

C-14 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES J. LABORATORY

1. Report to the Radiation Accident Decontamination Area with any equipment needed for specimen collection.

2. Specimens shall be collected by nurse inside decontamination area. If absolutely necessary for Lab Tech to enter, he must don proper attire (see page 19)

3. All specimens shall be monitored for radioactivity and labeled before leaving decontamination area. Transport in lead container if Radiation specialist deems necessary.

4. All Lab Techs handling the sample must wear monitoring devices.

5. (IF FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT OCCURRENCE, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIAN(S)

SHOULDACCOMPANY THE SAMPLE TO AND THROUGH THE LAB IF SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL AVAILABLE.)

K. COMMUNITY RELATIONS

1. Establish a Media Control Center on the first floor of the Volunteer Services Department where a representative will act as liaison between the media and the Disaster Control Center.

2. Notify Security Services and Communications of the location of the Media Control Center. Advise Security Services to direct/escort the media to the media Control Center. Communications is to direct all media-related calls to the Community Relations Representative in the Media Control Center.

3. Assign another Community Relations Representative to the Emergency Department where they will serve as the link from the ED to the Media Control Center. This individual will be responsible for furnishing regular disaster updates.

4. (IF FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT OCCURRENCE, REFER INQUIRIES TO ALABAMA POWER COMPANY PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT (1-205-257-2386)

5. Keep Disaster Control Center (8909/8918/8919) advised of any changes in condition of radiation accident.

6. Submit all information to Disaster Control Center prior to release to media.

Reviewed/revised 01/2000 C-15 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

7. If the Community Relations Director cannot be reached, attempts to contact an alternate person from Community Relations. If no one available from this department, the Safety Director shall assume the role of Public Relations Information Officer.

C-16 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES L. SOCIAL SERVICES AND CASE MANAGEMENT

1. Report to the Disaster Control Center, and check in with the administrator on call.

2. Serve as liaison between patients, families, friends and disaster relief agencies. Ameliorate psychosocial problems related to emergency hospitalization.

3. Specially prepared packets containing emergency information shall be used to aid disaster victims.

M. REGISTRATION AREAS

1. Contact the Nursing Administrator in the Control Center to assess need for rooms. If necessary:

a) Provide for the availability of rooms designated for radiation decontamination patients.

b) If patient is critical, provide for availability of Room

1 in ICU.

c) Notify housekeeping to remove all nonessential furniture and/or equipment from needed rooms.

2. Upon admission of the patient:

a) Complete necessary admission paperwork with family member or ED staff.

b) If this is a simulation only, do not enter in computer.

C-17 REV. 52

Section 9.3 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES O. RADIOLOGY

1. Radiology need not report until notified of necessity by Control Center.

2. Report to ED triage area with portable x-ray equipment.

3. Don proper protective attire (see page 19). Also wear a lead apron and lead gloves.

4. If x-raying an imbedded radioactive object or an area containing radioactive contamination, two pictures at 90 degree angles shall be made.

5. The portable equipment shall remain in the triage area until it can be decontaminated to a safe level.

6. Should the physician order an x-ray other than on portable equipment, the patient shall be transported to the Emergency Department x-ray room.

O. DOTHAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. Administrator shall notify the Dothan Police if their assistance is needed for the following:

a) Traffic control outside the physical plant.

b) Traffic control within the hospital.

c) To secure patient vehicle after transport.

C-18 REV. 52

Section 9.31 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES in the event of surgery P. SURGICAL SERVICES

1. If surgery is necessary, the physician shall notify the anesthesiologist, and the director of Surgical Services to inform them of the estimated time of arrival to the OR.

2. Patient shall be transported to OR #2.

3. ALL personnel entering the OR shall be required to wear one surgical gown and one scrub suit in addition to shoe covers, mask and cap. Pant legs or scrub suits shall be taped snugly around the ankle.

4. ALL unnecessary equipment and supplies shall be removed from the OR before the patient arrives.

5. Once the patient has entered the room, no instruments, equipment, specimens, or personnel are to leave the room without being monitored, radiation levels documented, and disposition dictated by the Radiation Specialist.

6. One circulating nurse shall remain outside the OR to assist.

7. The patient shall be recovered in the OR before transport to room or ICU.

8. After recovery, the patient shall be transferred to a clean stretcher. Radiation Specialist shall accompany patient.

9. The Radiation Specialist shall monitor each person that leaves the room for contamination.

10. ALL instruments, equipment, soiled linen, trash, and scrubs shall remain in the OR to be bagged and disposed of by Radiation Specialist.

11. The door of the operating room shall be closed and the room "OFF LIMITS" until deemed safe to re-enter by the Radiation Specialist.

C-19 REV. 52

Section 9.4 SIGN USAGE In the event of a radiation accident, a copy of the universally adopted yellow radioactive materials CAUTION sign shall be posted by the Security Services Personnel.

Section 9.41 PREGNANCY PROTOCOLS Any female who is pregnant and/or has the possibility of being pregnant should not participate in the Radiation Accident Plan.

It is the responsibility of the supervisor of each service involved in the Radiation Accident Plan to be selective in his/her assignments and to question the pregnancy status of any female involved.

Section 9.42 ELEVATOR USE During the activation of the Radiation Accident Plan, elevator use should be kept to a minimum to allow for patient transport and movement of supplies or equipment.

1. Elevator "M" shall be used for transport of radiation victim to OR, ICU, or a room. The elevator shall then be marked off limits until radiation levels in that unit are cleared with the Radiation Specialist.

2. Elevator "I" shall be used as a back up if needed.

Revised 02/04 C-20 REV. 52

Section 9.5 PROTECTIVE ATTIRE FOR PERSONNEL All personnel coming in contact with the radiation victim, or entering the Decontamination Area must dress in protective attire before crossing the "CONTROL LINE."

A. PROTECTIVE ATTIRE INCLUDES:

1. Surgical clothing (scrub suit, gown, mask, and head cover.)

2. Waterproof shoe covers

3. Cover all seams and cuffs with masking or adhesive tape.

4. Two pair of surgical gloves shall be worn. The first pair should be under the arm cuffs and taped securely.

5. The second pair of gloves should be easily removable and be replaced when they become contaminated.

6. A radiation dosimeter shall be assigned to each team member, attached to the outside of the surgical gown at the neck where it can be easily read and removed.

7. If available, a film badge can be worn under the surgical gown.

8. Waterproof aprons should be worn by any team members using liquid in the decontamination process.

9. THIS PROTECTIVE CLOTHING IS EFFECTIVE IN STOPPING ALPHA AND BETA PARTICLES BUT NOT GAMMA RAYS.

10. Decrease your chances of radiation contamination by limiting the time, distance, and quantity of exposure to the sources of radiation as much as possible.

B. PROCEDURE FOR EXITING DECONTAMINATION AREA:

1. Remove outer gloves, turning them inside-out as they are pulled off.

2. Give dosimeter to Radiation Specialist. Ensure final dose data is recorded.

3. Remove all tape at pants cuffs and sleeves.

4. Remove coveralls turning them inside out. Avoid shaking.

5. Remove headcover and mask.

6. Remove shoe cover from one foot and get it monitored. If foot is clean, step the verified clean foot only over the control line and onto a clean step-off pad.

7. Repeat step 6 for other foot.

8. Remove inner gloves

9. Conduct total-body radiological survey of each team member

10. If directed by the Radiation Specialist, take shower at the specified location, after exiting.

C-21 REV. 52

Section 9.6 DECONTAMINATION OF THE RADIATION PATIENT In general, contaminated wounds and body orifices are decontaminated first, followed by areas of highest contamination levels on the intact skin. The purpose of decontamination is to prevent or reduce incorporation of the material (internal contamination), to reduce the radiation dose from the contaminated site to the rest of the body, to contain contamination, and to prevent its spread.

A. GENERAL BODY DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURE

1. Survey the entire body and record findings on anatomical chart.

2. Visibly mark (as with lipstick or marker) very high level areas to receive priority.

3. Contaminated patients should shower if able, using detergent of a decontaminate solution. Caution them to avoid getting water in body orifices, or to spread contamination to hairy areas initially free from radioactivity.

4. Repeat above steps.

5. Proceed to next pages as needed.

C-22 REV. 52

Section 9.6 DECONTAMINATION OF THE RADIATION PATIENT B. TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED WOUNDS

1. Assume wounds are contaminated until proven otherwise.

2. It is important to consult experts as soon as possible and to initiate measures that prevent or minimize uptake of the radioactive material into body cells or tissues.

3. Drape the wound with waterproof material

4. Gently irrigate with Normal Saline, or a 3% hydrogen peroxide solution. Collect all irrigation fluid for radiation monitoring.

5. More than one irrigation is usually necessary. Monitor or radiation levels after each irrigation.

6. Continue process until no change is seen in radiation levels.

7. After medical treatment is completed, cover wound with waterproof covering to prevent further spread of contamination.

8. If radiation levels are still dangerously high, surgical decontamination may be indicated (surgical debridement.)

C-23 REV. 52

Section 9.6 DECONTAMINATION OF THE RADIATION PATIENT C. DECONTAMINATION OF BODY ORIFICES

1. Contaminated body orifices, such as the mouth, nose, eyes, and ears, need special attention because absorption of radioactive material is likely to be much more rapid in these areas than through the skin.

2. If radiation is detected in oral cavity, have patient brush teeth with toothpaste, and rinse mouth with 3%

citric acid solution.

3. Contaminated pharyngeal region may be treated by gargling with 3% hydrogen peroxide solution.

4. If radiation has been swallowed, gastric lavage may be indicated.

5. Nose may be rinsed out with normal saline or tap water.

6. Eyes should be flushed generously with normal saline, from inner to outer aspect.

7. Ears should be irrigated using ear syringe, if tympanic membrane is intact.

8. Reserve all irrigants for radiation detection, and continue irrigating until readings no longer improve.

C-24 REV. 52

Section 9.6 DECONTAMINATION OF THE RADIATION PATIENT D. DECONTAMINATION OF INTACT SKIN

1. Begin with the least aggressive method, and progress to more aggressive methods as needed.

2. Limit mechanical and chemical abrasion to the skin as much as possible.

3. Use warm solutions. Cold solutions will close the pores and trap radioactive material within them. Hot solutions increases blood flow and would enhance absorption of radioactive material.

4. Use warm water and surgical brush first. Scrub for 3 to 4 minutes. Rinse for 2 to 3 minutes. Dry. Check for radiation levels. Repeat.

5. Ph neutral soap, sodium hypochlorite (diluted 1/10 in water), powdered detergent mixed with cornmeal and made into a paste by adding water, or more aggressive measures (see Farley Emergency Plan Training page 20) may be tried.

6. The decontamination process stops when the radioactive level cannot be reduced to a lower level.

E. DECONTAMINATION OF INTACT SKIN IN HAIRY AREAS

1. Wrap or position patient to avoid spread of contamination.

2. Wash with Phisohex

3. Dry with an uncontaminated towel

4. Do not shave hair (unless area is contaminated with an alpha-emitter, such as plutonium, then only as a last resort.) Hair may be cut, but do not injure skin.

C-25 REV. 52

Section 9.6 DECONTAMINATION OF THE RADIATION PATIENT E. TREATMENT OF PATIENT WITH INTERNAL CONTAMINATION

1. See Farley Emergency Plan Training page 22, for specific agents used to decorporate various radionuclides.

2. Time may be a vital element in treatment of patients with internal contamination, since radioactive materials cross cell membranes at different rates.

3. The physician or Radiation Safety Officer shall request samples of urine, feces, vomitus, or wound secretions, as well as whole body assays, if internal contamination is suspected.

C-26 REV. 52

Section 9.7 EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES location--morgue area Description Quantity Applicators, cotton tip, pkg. 1 Bags, Plastic 20 Basin 1 Blankets 6 Brushes, hand 2 Charger, Dosimeter 1 Battery Compartment operational Clippers, Hair 1 Containers, specimen 10 Cotton Balls, box 1 Decontaminating solution, bottle 1 Detergent soap, box 1 Dosimeter, Pocket (5R) 5 Drums, waste 3 Filter paper, box 2 IV Poles 2 Knifeblades #11 and #15 2 Labels, self sticking Radioactive roll 1 Lead container pig 1 Mask, surgeons, face 4 Needles, pkg 1 Paper, absorbent, roll 1 Poly sheets, roll 1 Protective Clothing:

Lab Coats 6 Rubber gloves, pr 20 Surgeon gloves, pr 8 Plastic shoe covers, pr 20 Surgeons Cap 4 Surgeons gown 4 Plastic surgical drape with adhesive 1 Record Materials Clipboard, paper, pencil 3 Logbook 1 Pen, with waterproof ink 1 Survey forms, 1 set 1 Rope, Radiation 100 1 Scissors, Metzenbalm, small 1 Scissors, sewing 1 Signs, Radiation 10 Specimen bottle, sterile 1 Specimen bottle 1 Suits, surgical 10 Survey Meter, G.M. 1 Pancake probe 1 C-27 REV. 52

Section 9.7 EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES Location - Morgue area Description Quanitity Medical probe 1 Calibration O.K. 1 Survey instrumentIon chamber 1 Calibration O.K. 1 Suture4 Ethicon 1 Suture set 1 Syringe bulb 1 Tags 10 Tape, masking, roll 2 TLDs 20 Calibration O.K. 1 Murphy Kelly forceps, curved 5 1/2 3 Murphy Kelly forceps, straight 5 1/2 2 Dressing forceps, no teeth 1 Adron forceps, with mouse teeth 1 Adron forceps, without teeth 1 Needle holder 5 1 Needle holder 6 1 Mosquito forceps, straight 3 Towel clips, Backhaus 2 Allis forceps (4X5) 5 1/2 1 Operating scissors S&B 5 1/2 1

3 Knife Handle 1 Butcher Tray 19X132 1/2X 5/8 1 Medicine cup 1 Syringe 2cc 1 Syringe 10cc 1 Hyponeedle, reusable 22 G 1 Hyponeedle, reusable 25 G 1 Red bags 4 Step-off pads 2 Herculite 1 Tyyveks coveralls (white) case 2 Bandage scissors 2 Utility scissors 1 BP Cuff 3 Stethoscope 3 Oral thermometer box 1 Pen light 4 Sample bucket 1 Sample bottle 4 Xylocaine 2% with Epinephrine, bottle 1 C-28 REV. 52

RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT DATA Section 9.8 FORM

1. Nature of INCIDENT:

2. Number of Casualties:

3. Extent of Injuries:

4. Level of Radioactivity:

5. Personnel Involved:

C-29 REV. 52

RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT DATA FORM Section 9.8 (con't)

6. Routing System Utilized:

7. Procedural Errors:

8. Communications

9. Involvement of Outside Agencies:

C-30 REV. 52

RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT FORM Section 9.8 (cont)

10. Additional Comments:

RECOMMENTATIONS:

SIGNED: ___________________ DATE: __________________

Drill Monitor SIGNED: ____________________ DATE: __________________

Director, Quality Review C-31 REV. 52

RADIATION ACCIDENT DRILL PARTICIPANT LOG Section 9.8 (cont'd)

EMPLOYEE DEPARTMENT 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

C-32 REV. 52

Section 9.9 TLD ASSIGNMENT BADGE NUMBER NAME/TITLE DOSIMETER TOTAL SOCIAL SECURITY # READING ITLD I RING I DOSIM. I IIN I OUT I I C-33 REV. 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) e II J0 e

r-----

(")

0

~ F~~~~~~~~~?~

~~

'" "d!)! ....

~

"'0 cJ ~ ~ ~ e COl .Ii 8:z: 2 e I

II II

~

~0

£ J

~

111~ f) 0

~

en

~

en S COl

~

COl

§

§ '"

C- 34 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

PAGE 32A C- 35 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Contd)

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY USE FOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL INCLUDING VEHICLES OR PACKAGES MARKED "RADIOACTIVE" OR "CAUTION RADIOACTIVE" In the event of a Radiation Emergency during normal office hours (weekdays 8:00 am - 5:00 pm) please call . . . . . 334-206-5391 or 1-800-582-1866 (8am-5pm)

FAX 334-206-5387 At all other times (after business hours, weekends, holidays) please contact one of the following:

Kirksey W. Whatley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334-288-7207 James L. McNees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334-277-1380 Mike Cash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334-277-0750 William Eden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334-286-9548 If the above are unavailable, call . . . . . . . . 334-242-4378 and ask operator to page 971.

C-36 REV. 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Contd)

ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH RADIATION CONTROL DIVISION MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA Central Safety Committee / Policy & Procedure Review Committee Approved By:

Date Reviewed/Revised: 02/04, 01/06, 01/07, 01/08, 01/09, 03/10, 01/11 File: Emergency Action Manual Retrieval: C:\Word\My Documents\Safety Manuals\Emergency Action Manual\Radiation Accident Plan C-37 REV. 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Contd)

HO1A1 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN TRAINING Southeast Alabama Medical Center C-38 REV. 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont' d) aw;-22'

~by Oak Rdgs Assoc:iaIed

~

Prepared fa Th8 F<<leraI Emen;)ency ~ HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT Aoercy MANAGEMENT OF RADIATION ACCIDENTS Repnnted by 1M Ala b<ome Depanrnenl of """he Health Robert C. RIcks, Ph.D.

If' C- 39 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

Introduction This book coven the- basic principles of medical patient contaminated with radioactive materiaL and nur<>ing care for radiation accident victims in including organization of the radiological emer-the hospital emergency department. Procedures gency response team. facility and staff prepara-described in the text apply to the management of tion. patient reception and triage. medical and peacetime radiation accidents in industry. decontamination procedures. contamination con-research. transportation. and hospitals. Although trol. radiological monitoring. bioassay sampling.

the use of radiation and radioactive materials has patient transfer. and postemergency activities. The Increased in recent years. history has shown that importance of health physics support and sources the probability of providing emergency medical of assistance are also covered. Basic information and nursing care to a radiation accident victim about radiation. radiobiology. radiological moni-patIent is very low. Nevertheless. federal. state. toring equipment. and principl~ of radiation pro-and local agencies. as well as medical accrediting tection are discussed.

groups. have encouraged better overall prepared- This book is designed to complement a ness for radiological emergencies. Written emer- 25-minute videotape enlitled -Hospital Emergency gency response plans should be developed. incor- Department Response to Radiation Accidents.*

porated with your overall hospital disaster plan. which depicts a case study of emergency depart-and supported with inservice training and dnlls. ment response to both injured and uninjured con-TlJis book WIll suggest ways of adapting ) our aminated patients. Either the text or the video-eme rgency response plans for radiation aCCIdent tape can. however. be used ind.;pendently.

.;nr-: .. ~11. E;:,;: 11'::5.5 .s ~ :J.: d en car: .. g ;v r : ~ e C- 40 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) 1.

Types of Radiation Injury Regardless of where or how an accident involv. combination and can be complicated by physical ing radiation happens. t"ret types 0/ injury or illness. Table 1 summarizC3 the types of radiatiorr-induad injury can occur. tXlunal irra- radiation injuries.

diatiolt, contaminalion with rodjOOCli'llt moun*ols.

and incorporation 0/ radioacti'lle material into body cells. tissues. or orgalU.

T~ 1. Ty".. of RadlaUott InJury.

1. External i7'adiation-whoie-body or partial-body External Irradiation

2. Cootaminstioll by radioactive materials-

£xltrna/ irradiation occurs when all or part of external (deposited on the skin) or intemaJ the body is exposed to penetrating radiation from Oma1ed. swaJowed. absorbed Itvough skin. or an external source. During exposure this radiation introduced ttvough wounds) can be absorbed by the body or it can pass com-pletely through. A similar thing occurs during an 3. Incorporation 01 racf'J08ct1ve materisJ9-ordinary chest :<-ray. Following external exposure. uptake by body ceIb. tissues. or Of'98nS (bone, an individual is not radioactive and can be treatC1i liver. kidney. atc.)

like any other patient. 4 C'lfTlbif'led (aollJliorr injuf)"--i:ombina tion of \he

,,:,ova "'htCh may be comprlCated by trauma o"'t'1 min tion The second type of radialion injury Involves Irradiation of the whole body or some specific conrominOflon with radioactive materials. Con- body part does not constitute a medical emergency tamination means that radioactive materials in the even if the amount of radiation received is high.

form of gases. liquids. or solids are released into The effects of irradiation usually are not evident the environment and contaminate people eltter- for days to weeb and while medical treatment is nally. internally. or both. An eltternal surface of needed, it is not needed on an emergency basis.

the body. such as the skin. can become contami- On the other hand. contamination accidents mUJt nated, and if radioactive materials get inside the be considered medical emergencies since they body through the lungs. gut. or wounds. tbe con- might lead to internal contamination and subse-taminant can become deposited internally. quent incorporation. Incorporation can result i.n adverse health effects several years laler if the Incorporation amount of incorporated radioactive material is I

.' high. ;J~: ,.

The third type of radiation injury that can Hospital emergency department personnel occur is incorporation of radioactive material should aJways usc proper prioritiC3 in caring for rncorpvrallon refers to the uptake of radioactive accident victims where potential radiation bazarch materials by body cells. tissues. and target orgaN exist: treat life-threatening problems first, limit such as bone. liver, thyroid. or leidney. In genenl, the radiation dose to both victim and personnel.

radioactive materials are distributed throughout and control the spread 0( radioactive cont.am-the body based upon tbeir chemical properties. inanu. Serious medical probltm.f alwayJ hav.

Incorporation cannot occur unless contamination priority over COnctr1LJ aboul radiatio1t, sue" as has occurred. radial ion mol'lilon*nt. conlaminatiOil control. and These three types o( accidents can happen in dtconlam ilUllioll.

C- 41 REV . 52

Radi ation Acci dent Plan (Con t'd) 2.

Bac kgro und Rad iatio n and Radiobiology Background RadiatloD Radioac tivity has existed for millions or years in TIIb~ 2. TypkM Av<<~ Annual Expo4u r.. to the crust of the earth. in bUilding materials. in the IndJvId~ from s.ckgro und RedJatJon food we eat. the air we breathe. and in virtually In tM UnIted Slat...

everything that surrounds us. Radiation from these materia ls. as well as cosmic radiation from Radiation 00" the sun and universe. makes up the natural back- In Mllllrems ground radiatio n to which we are constantly (plorate d over Cltposed. The average individual in the United Natural Source . total population)

States receives a radiation dose of approximately Externa l 85 millirem per year from natural sources. From cosmic radiation 26 Because natural background radiation varies with From the earth 26 altitude. it is lower than average at sea level. but From build'1OIiJ materiaJa 3 higher than average at high altitudes. Internal Sources (elements found The average annual radiation dose from man- naturally in ':'Uman tissues) 28 made sources is about 103 millirem. with medical

't-ra~s and n"clear medical diagnostic tests con- Total. Natural Sources as

,nh.\Itln g th(' lugest amounts (a pproltimately 79

II. re

":1 ;sna \ .. m!lhrem respectively). Therefore.

Man-ma de SolJrcH In the United Stales. lhe typical annual individual Medical Procedures exposure to radiation from natural and man-made Oiagnostic x-rays 79 sources totals appro;umately 188 miJIirem. Table 2 summartzes typical background radiation levels in Radlopharmaceuticals 1.

the United States. Nuclear industry <1 A few regions around the world have back-ground radiatio n that is quite high (up to 2.500 Consumer product s 3-4 millirem per year). Especially notable areas Radioac tive fallout 4-5 include the Kerala region of India and the states of Esplrlto Santo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. Total. Man-made Sources 103 Human populat ions in these regions have been Total. Natural end Man-made Soulc " 188 studied for specific diseases that might be associ-ated with high background radiation levels: how-ever, no statistic al evidence has been found to cor-

'0 -Gata"" The E1'IwIcm 0tI PopJatiOtItJ cI ~ 10 Low ~

... 01 bItzino ~tIon. Iype6c:I'1pt ecttIon (wuNngt on. C.C.:

relate Increased background radiation with any NatloMl ~ 01 Soercee. 1080). t.bll1I-:l3 .

specific disease . Studies in the United States also have resulted in similar findings. millirem per year.

Occupa tional ellp05ure to ionizing radiation is limited to 5,000 millirem per year for persons who IUdiobiology work with radioac tive materials or radiation-gen- Signs and symptoms associated with radiation erating devices and who wear dosimeters. For exposure or contamination vary depending upon those persons who do not wear dosimeters. safety the total dose and the dose rale to the body. Also.

precaut ions direct that exposure be limited to 500 the effects of ionizing radiation on biological C- 42 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

'y,tems can be manlfesled as both urly and laIc 2 to 8 week period. For .xample. epilation C&ft drects.. In lIeneral. the higher tbc dose Ihe iTcalcr occur in 2 10 3 weeks (o\lowin, )00 rem.

Ihe severity of early e(feets and Ihe gTeater the erythema ill I to 1 weeks faUowin, 600 rem. dry possibility of late .(fCClS. dC$quamltlon ill 2 to J weeks (oUowin, 1.200 to Exposure of the whole body to a dose iTealer I.SOO rem. and bli,terine or wet desquamation ill than 100 rem rcsullS in a predictable set of sians 1 \0 S weeks (oUowine doses greater than 2.S00 and symptoms I hal develop wilhin a f..... bours, rem. RadionCCTOSa can occur follow inS

5.000 days. or up 10 4 weeks laler, depending on Ihe rem or larser dose. E>ttrcmely bi,h doses (greater dose. ThC$C signs and symptoms are collectivcly than 10.000 rem) of ioniziae radiation \0 localized called Ihe acul~ radlarioll syndrom~. whicb ia UUJ of the body wiJI accel,rate Ibo e~pression 01 characlerized by four disl;"ct phases: a prodromal injury associated with tbe radiation insult. Lib period, a lalenl period. a period of illness. and one the person su(ferina from the acute radiation syn-of recovery or death. During Ihe prodromal drome. the individual experiendnS localized radia-period patients might experience loss of appelile. tion problems is not radioactive and does nOl nausea. vomilina. fatigu ** and diarrhea; after require &/ly em.reency medical Intervention. Pbys-e~lremely high doses. addilional symploms such as ical trauma to the irradiated area should be revcr. prOlilration. respiratory dutress. and avoided.

h)\>erexcitabilily can occur. Ho .... ever. all of these Followinl external contamination. onrt signs or symptoms usually disappear in a day or two. and symptoms are rarely _n in patients entering the 3 symptom-rree. Ialenl period rollows. "aeying in hospital emergency department. However. e"ter-I.nglh depending upon the size of the radiation nally deposited radionuclides should be removed dose. as soon a.s possible. Internal colUamination with A. period or Overt illn.ss follows. and can be radioactive materials can result in biological dam-characterized by inrection. ckctrolyle imbalance. age. The $Cverity of the damage depends on tbc diarrhea. bleeding. cardiovascular collapse. and amoun t of radionuelide depotited. its chemical sometimcs short periods of unconsciousness. Death (arm. tbe target organ. and the rate of elimination or a period of recovery follow. lh. period of ov.rt from the body. Each radioouclide has an adminis-dlnes.s. Patients sufferin g from the acutc radiation tratively delermined maximum sa'e intake limit..

sy ndrome arc generally .dmined to the em.rgency based on the typcs of radiations .milled and their

~epartme nt during th. prodromal period. No energies.. This limit is delined as the maximum

.," ~~y medic. I It.3lment IS required fo r IhlS permj$sibl. body burd." (MPBB) or mayjmum

, '.Jlh:IH. lnd th e pat ient LS nOl radioactive. Init ial p",mi$Jiblt 0'8= bu,d." (MPOB). Exact le"els Iteatment .s directed to prodromal signs and of ioternally deposited radioactive materials arc sym ptoms. and a good history is taken. The defini- difficult to a.sse:ss. especially in the emergency tive treatment of the acute radiation syndrome a medical sellinll. The important poiot is that every beyond Ihe scope of this book. er(ort .hould be made to decontaminate accident E"posure ->f some limited area of tbe body yictims as thorouehly a.s possible whether they are (hands, feet. elc. ) 10 ionizin g radiation also results e<temally or intemaUy contaminated.

in a prediclable clinical course that unfolds over a 6

C- 43 REV. 5 2

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) 3.

Radiation Protection Principles There are four basic radiation protection princi- mR/hr to 32 mR/hr, a factor of four. Figure t ples that can be employed to reduce exposure to illustrates the inverse square law.

ioniling radiation. These principles are based on consideration of Jour radiation prouctionJactors Shielding that alter radiation dose: time, distance, shielding, and quantity. The third radiation prote<:tioa factor is shielding. The principle follows that the denser a Time material, the greater is it" ability to stop the pas-sage of radiation. [n most cases, high-density Time is an important factor in radiation protec* materials such as lead are used as shields against tion. This pnnciple states that the shorter the time radiation. Portable lead or concrete shields are spent in a radiation fie ld. the less radiation wm be sometimes used when responding to accidents accum ula ted. Depending on the activity present., where contamination levels are very high. [n addi-radioac tive material will emit a known amount of tion, some specialty centers for radiation aCCldent radiat ion per unit time. Many radiation mon itor- management have constructed shielded surgical ing de\lces measure exposure in milliroentgens tables for prote<:tion. Such measures are. howe\'er.

(mR) ::'Cr hou r. An exposure rate of 60 mR / hr not re~ommended in the community hospital.

r;ieJI' '3 t fur elch mlllu te ;pen t in a rad iatIO n 1:1 emergency management of the contaminated l1eld. ._:~'l ..... 111 rece Ive a l-mR expos ure (60 pallent. shIelding is limited to standard surgical l1R,j" . 00' ., h r .. I mR ,'mi n). Ob\:c u*l y. clothing with slight modifications (sec page 12).

the IO'l~<!r a ~:son remain s in a radiation field, S urgical clothing will prote<:t tbe individual the more radiation that person will accumulate. against contamillation, and also will stop the pas-A rotating team approach can be us~ to keep sage of all alpha and some beta radiation. How-individual radiation exposures to a minimum as ever, it does not stop penetrating gamma radia-long as patient care is not compromi~ and if tion. In the hospital emergency department shield-personnel are available. ing is actually limited to anticoDtamiaation mea-sures, and the principles of time and distance are Distance u~ to reduce radiation exposure.

The ~cond radiation protection factor is Quantity distance. and tbe principle is the farther a person is from a source of radiation, the lower the radia- The fourth radiation protection ractor is tion dose. This erinciw,e is known as the inverse quam;t}'. Because the aposure rate from a given square law. By measuling the radiation exposure radioactive material is directly related to the rate at a given distance from a source of radiation amount or quutity of the material present, the and then do ubling the distance from the source, principle involvC$ limiting the qlWltity of radioac-the intensity of the radiation is decreased by a tive material in the working area to decrease radi-factor of four. for example, a source of radiation ation exposure. Any technique that reduces the that measur"C$ 8 mRjbr at 2 feet from a source amount of radiatioD or radioactive material in the would measure only 2 mR/hr at 4 feet. Con- treatment area is very u.sefliL versely. when the distance from the source of radi- By using these radiation protection principles, ation is reduced by half. for example, from 2 feet emergency department personnel can adequately to I foot, the exposure rate increases from 8 care ror the patient's medical needs while keeping 7

C- 44 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) their own radiation exposure u low as reasonably ... UJ, Wn,-Juwiled ffNctpl to ftlW)W COlI--

achievable. This concept is known u ALARA and tamiMltd partlc1u. contam(Mltd dteu-is summarized below: intI. ,tc. (DISTANCE)

ALARA Tcchnique1: (keepinl radiation exposures S. Rtmow COlllomiMttd mattrlalJ from .:

As Low As Re350nably ~chievable) trtatmtnl arta (QUANTITY, DIS-TANCE)

I . Work quickly and tfflcftntly (TIME) 6. Put C'OntamilUlud metal or gla.u In IttUi

., Rotaft pusoflf1.t1 ,[ quafjfitd rtpfact- *pigs- oIJtaiMd from fludtar mtdiciIV m~n/s art availablt (TIME) tkpGl1mtlfl (SHIELDING)

3. When flCt involved ill pal/elll can. nm4i1t a lew Ittt away from tM patitnl (DIS-TANCE)

C- 45 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) 4.

Preparing to Receive the Radiation Accident Victim Norification and Accident Verification lists members o( the radiological response team.

When the hospital receives a call that a radia- Preparation of the Radiation tion accident victim is to be admitted, a planned Emergency Area (REA) course of action should be followed. The individ-ual receiving the call should get as much informa- Following verification of a radiation accident tion as possible, including the following: involving contamination, the radiological emer-gency response team should prepare (or patient I . Number of accident victims reception. Special preparation tcchniques are

2. Each victim's medical status designed to protect the attending staff, hospital

3. If victims have been surveyed for contami-facility, and equipment while preventing the spread nation of contamination outside a designated decontami-

4. Radiological status of victims (ell:posed vs.

nation area. Procedures used in the handling of contaminated) contaminated accident victims are similar to strict

5. Identity of contaminant, if known isolation precautions and to the protocol for

6. Estimated time of arrival

-dirty* surgical cases.

ff any do u bt about contamination ellists. assume WhC ll radioactive contaminatIon is suspected, the '(iI-l im IS : .. n ~ mlOated until proven ot erv.ise, stnct isolat ion prec3utions are supplemented with A. dvise J- ' ;" ~ : ~ :-e~ "' 1~el of ar.y s ~c;al contamination control techniques. This wiJl e ntra nce to th e emergency department for the prevent the spread of contaminants to the hospital radiallon accIdent victim. If the accident notifica- environment aDd simplify cleanup.

tion comes from a source other than usual emer- Any victim of a radiation accident must be con-gency communications, get a call-back number sidered contaminated until proven otherwise. Con-and verify the accident prior to assembling the sequently, assume that the route taleen from the radiological emergency response team and prepar- ambulance to the radiatioa emergency area ing for patient admission. (REA) can become contaminated. Patients.

uncontaminated victims, and no~ntial person-The Radiological Emergency nel should be removed (rom the area be!'ore use.

Response Team A specific area in tbe REA should be desig-nated (or patient decontamination. It should be Each member of tbis team should be familiar large enough to hold coe or more victims and the with the hospital's written plan and be required to necessary medical personnel. Ventilation in tbe participate in scbeduled drills. More freq1Jent REA can be turned off by the hospital engineer-drills (quarterly or semiannually) should be ing department. Also. return air ducts can be considered by subgroups such as decontamination, closed or covered with filters. Altbough airborne triage. or radiololPcal monitoring. Special traininl contamination is unlikely, its removal from the must be instituted to accommodate staff turnover. air-<:ooditionml system would be difficult.

Trainina should also be part of tbe hospital inser- Rolls of brown wrappins pa~ ot butcher paper vice program and should include EMTs and l- to 4-feet wide can be unroBed tci*malee a path paramedics since they play an important role in from tbe ambal.ance entrance to tile decontamina-assisting the emergency department staff through tion room. Ordinary cloth sheets Of' square absorb-notification procedures before arrival and proper ent pads can be used if paper is oiiavailable.

transport of radiation accident victims. Table 1 Whatever tbe floor covenn .. It Jltould ~ tQ~d II C- 46 REV . 52

Radi ation Acci dent Plan (Con t'd)

Pers<>nnM Team COOfdinatOf LeadS. acMsee. and coordin ate.

Olaonoses. tre&ta. and provtde s emefQenC Y mec:IcaI care: can abo function as team ~tot Of triage ~

Triage otflcet Peffonna tr1ege Nurse Aaaiats physician with medical procedw ... coIectIon of sped-mens. ritdlo'ogieal monitoring, and ~ &aaesaM patient's needs and Interven es appropriatel1 l r; ". ' ...~ ... ,.,: U ( .1" Technical (&CO(der Records and docume nts medblJ and (~ glcll data

,J.

Rad'l8tion safety office( MonitOl'$ patient and area and ecM.set on c:ontarr*\atlon and exposure c:ocrtrol; maintaill S SW'Vey equipment Public intonnat ion officer Releases acciden t informat ion to pubic mecta Adminis trator Coordinates nospitaJ respons e and assures nonnaI hospital opera-tions Secure the radIation emefgen cy aree and control crowd4 Maintenal'lCe personn el AId in preparation of the radiation em&Ig8Il C) ar. for contasruna-tSon control l.aborat ory tecl'lthc;.an Provides routine clinical analysis of ~ sampIee

. ___ *_._ .6_____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ __

ucurel y fO the floor. This route should tben be migbt be spread by hand. Lilt supporr aNi othu roped orr and marked "radiati on are&.

The noor tsu,.Il'a l medfca l equlpmtlll aNI Juppllu should of the deconta minatio n room or treatnleot area be available intmedl auly artd naily lor use.

sho uld be covered in a similar way. A decontamination table caD be prepared In

A control line should be establish ed at the variety of ways. For example.

standard treat-entranc e to the decontamination room. A wide ment table can be draped with a waterproo{

stri p of tape 00 the noor at the entnloce to the coverin&- a dispcsable surgical pack cover (rota room should be marked clearly to differentiate the the operatin g room is ideal. A bum table or spe-controll ed (contaminated) from the DOQCOfllrolled cially designed decontamination tray also can ~

(uncon tamina ted) side. Once the patient is in the I1Sed.. If desired, shccts can be rolled leDgtb~

deconta minatio n room. no person or ~uipmenl and placed along tbe cdaes ola treatmeot table, should leave the deContamination area until moni- then <:overed with plastic shedin. fonned into a tored at this control point (or contamioation. ..

trough ror nuid drainag e.

Tec hniques for contamination control arc sum- A complete listing of the it.enu needed to pre-m3rized in Table 4. Proper tapin& 01 noor cover- pare the emersc nq departm ent is liven iJI Ing and establis bmeDt of a c:oouol tiDe are illus- Table ~_

tratcO in FiIUR 2. . "' . ....

Once aU nonesse ntial cqllipment in \he room is Respoose Team PreparadOil .

remove d or covered . door baodlea and lilht switche s can be covered by tapiD, plutic sand- While the faality is beiDa prepared. membe n 0(

wicb bags over them to reduce contamination that the radiological emergency respocue teams should 12 C-4 7 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) be drtsaio,iD ~ cIotbina (saub suit. IOW1l.

mask. cap. aDd Jioves). Waterproof shoe CO¥etS of ContatnIMt1on C<>ntroL T~ 4. T~

also should be used. All open ~ and cum should be taped usi.na mums or adbesive tape.

1. Set up a controlled aIee large enough to hold Foldovcr tabs at tbc end or each taped area will the anticipated IUTlber of vIctIma aid removal. Two pairs of suraicaJ &loves should area.

2. Prev6f1t tracking of contaminants by covering I'IoOf be worn. The first pair of glovcs should be under the arm cufJ' and secured by la pe. The second pair

3. RestJ1ct ~ to the controlled aree or gloves should be easily removable and replaced ir they become contaminated. A radiation dosime-

. Monitor *'YOM Of IInything leaving the c0n- ter should be usiped to each team mcmbcf and trolled area attached to the outside or tbe surpcal sown at the necle where it can be euily removed and read. Ir

5. Use strict i80'8t1on precautions, including protec-tive clothing and double bagging available. a mm badge can be worn under the sur-gical gown. A waterproof apron can also be worn

6. Use a buffer zone Of secondary control Qne fOf by any member of the team using liquids (or added security decontamination purposes. Proper allire is showa in figure 3.

7. Control waste by u.slng large, plastJc-lined con- This protective c10thinS is effective in stopping tainefS for clothing, linens, dressings, etc. alpba and some beta particles but not gamma rays. Lead aprons. such as tbose used in the x-ray

8. Control ventilation department. are not recommended since they give

9. 0'Ia.nQe instruments. out&( gJoV9$, drapes. etc. a false sense o( sccurity-they will Dot stop most when they become contaminated gamma rays.

10. Use w8te<"'p(oof maten&s to rmt the spread of Preparation for Radiological cootamnated rlQ\Jids; for example, waterproof Monitoring aperture drapes Prior to patieDt arrival, check radiation moni-3 FIgure 2. Prop<< T~ of F1o<< eo",*", Mtd btab6hmenf 01

CcntroI UN.

1. ~ tapng of $MtnI 01 edQM of IIoot ~ UIhg rnuIdnQ ~ 01 ~

2. ~ barrier ~ colltroied ar.. 3. T~ IIoot to eetabIeh con1rOI . .

13 C- 48 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

Table 5. ~ IIHded to Ptepere the ~i ~ _'0 '

~ C.e 01 the Contamlturt~ PIItNttI,

I. ElMf'gency o.parun..,t Pr~ 4. Povidone iodine IOIution 0( other ....

A. Rolla of 3- 10 Hoot wide brown wrapping gIcaI eo.p paper (butch<< peper) 0( square abeorbent

5. Abrutve aoap padding sut1IcIent to cover the !loot from the ambulance entr ance to the decontaIri- S. Soft scrub bruahee nation room, as wei as cover the entire tIoor of the decontamination room 7. Mxt1n of on&-haIf powdered deter*

gent and one-nd conmMI. kept U*

B. Rob of 2~ wide masking tape to tight or refrigerated secure the floor coverino. tape decontanj.

nation team's sleeves and cuffs, cover 8. . 3-pefcent hydrOQ8tl peroxide IOkJtIon handles in the decontamination room, and 9. Shampoo make a "control line" al door to ,decontam-inatlon room J. AI necessary emergency medical supplies and equipment (suction, oxygen. aiways, C. Rope to delineate route from ambulance intubation. N solutions. etc.)

entrance to decontamil\8000 room K. Sheets, blankets. low., and patient O. "Cavffon-Rsdistion Area" siQM to place on gowns rope and on door to decon1aminatloo room III. o.conblmfnatlon Te8m II. o.contamlnatJon Room A. Oecontaminatlon table with waterpfoof A. Scrub suits cover, bum table, or other specia.Iy B. Gown.

designed table C. Surgical hoods B. Three 5-gaRon containers lor wash water O. MasKa C. Three lar~e wbste containers flned with

1st',c Oags E. Sur9ical Illov~ of various !izes O. Various $izes 01 plastic bags foe' samples, F. Waterproof shoe covers clothes, &te. G. Film badgee E. Conan-tipped applicators H. Dosimeters F. Stoppered containers for swabs of c0n-

l A.Ibber 0( plastic aprons (flQhtwelQht. not taminated areas Jeed.III8d, x-ray type) ~

G. Small lead storage contai'lers (pIga) for J. Maakhg tape or equivalent holding radloactlYe foreq, bodies removed from wounds-ootakt from Nudeat Meet-IV. RedIdon Safety Of'ncw cine Department H. Chart with drawing of patient ootIne, front A. G-M .....ey met~

and back, for recording contarmated 8.

areas C. (optional)

I. Solutions or materials lor decontamination:

D. Extra batteries lor survey meters

1. saAne St~

e. "RadIoectIve-1abels CK sticlters to martt

2. St~ wat. 00I'ItUlIiI. hokIno contaminated spedmena 0( IW8be

3. SodIum hypocNorite 0( household , ....--

bleach F. Wax CK felt penIS to mark \&bela 14 C- 49 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) 2

....'",~t'.~-:~..

"""?"-

F/gur. 3. Prop.( Dr. . . out.

1. Radiological emerQGnCy r~ earn members a&MeO-oot in waterproof gowna and other standard SYtgical attn.

2. Cuffs ar.d iM8( glo\l9S are taped fo( cootarlI4r\atlon control ~. Note tabe on tape for quid< remov ...

ors as descnb~ on paze 29 . CO\let the probe

"-lIh 1 SUI gi\:al llove ar,d secu re with tape, making If P adJoacd'c Con(.mll.\adoD Is Olseo! tred 1 lri b fur t_~j ;\.f'-Jonl, Z '.1 ':!JCC( to e lLSUle ,hat After Padent Ha.s Iken Admitted no 6:ove lingers are canglin g. This will protect the probe in the event that it touches a ccotaminated I. Continue alleNiing 10 the patient'S mtdical area. A con taminated surgical glove can easily be nud.J removed and replaced while a contaminated probe ca.onot. Finally, chtcle and record Iht baclegrouNi 1. Stcwe enliTt area when victim and alltNilnr radiation I~tl in the decontamination room (see staff lurve lHell procedure on page 30). The baCKground meas-urement will serve a.s a reference point in assess- 3. Do 1101 allow anYOM 01' anything to leaw area ing levels of contamination. The radiological ufUiI cleared by Ihe radiation safety offlceT emergency response team is now ready to receive 4. Establl.slt cOnJrol/iMI. aNi prtvtnJ the sprtad the accident victims. of conJanu'fUJtioli

" J. Co~/eltIY (Wesl JXllitlll'l radiological slallU

6. PtrsollMl should remove cOnJamifUJltd c/Ollt*

Ing be/ore exitlttg area; th~ should ~

Jurvtyed.. sho'tIH', dnsl In cltan cloIM"8-aNi IH re~td ~/ort Itaving ana C- 50 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) 5.

Hospital Emergency Care of the Radiation Accident Patient Patient ArriYal and Triage to medkaJ nceds. question the patient to detennioo tho pouibility 0( radiation exposure Meet the radiation acddent victim at the ambu- from aD external source. Remember, the victim of lance or other transporting vehicle. Instruct ambu- ex.posure witbout coatamination poses no radiolog-lance personnel to stay with the vehicle until they ical hazard to anyooe. If exposure is Icnown or and their vehicle an surveyed and released by l suspected. a stat CBC should be ordered with radiation safety officer. - particular atteotion given to determining the abso-Immediate assessment of the victim's airway, lute Iympbocyte count. Be sure to record tbe time breathing, and circulation should be made and any the blood sample is takeo.

necessary lifesaving measures performed. The crit*

ically injured patient should be taken immediately Assessment and Treatment of the into the prepared emergency areL If the victim's Contaminated Patient condition allows, an initial, bri~f radiologic:aJ sur-vey can be performed to determine if the victim is Contaminated patienu can have radioactive contaminated. Any radiation survey meter reading materials deposited on sJells surfaces. in wounds, or above background radiation levels indicates the internally (ingested, inhaled., or absorbed).

possibility of contamination. A more thorough sur- Reassessment of the coataminated patient'! air-vey will be performed in the decontamination way, breatbins. and circulatioo are done in the room (see page 18 ). Ir the victim's contaminated decor.tamination room prior to attention to the c!othng has not 'c n remov~. remove it in or pa tient's radiological status. It is unlikely that n'3 r !" -:- ~rrt:-u'anc e dnd place it in a la.<tic bag. c"rdiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) will be

-' _is .. ! ': >.:Ionglngs and items used in patient care r:;quired on a victim wbose only problem is inha la*

should be bagged, labeled, and saved for examina- tion or ingestion of radioactive materials. How-tion by the radiation safety officer. ever, tbe emergency physician or nurse migbt be A lriage area should be establisbed near the concerned with becoming contaminated (lips, treatment area. Duriog triage, consideration ia mouth. lunp. or gut) when performing mouth-to-given to medical and radiolosical problems. mouth resuscitation. Since serious cootamination Serious m~dical prob/~m.s a/ways hav~ priority is unlikely, mouth-to-mouth breathing shouJd not ovu radiological COlluntr, and immediate atteo- be withheld if a bag-mask. arnbu-bag. or positive tion is directed to life-threatening problems. Radi* pressure ventilator is not available to support ation injury rarely causes uncoruciousncss or b rea th ina.

immediat.e visible signs of injury and is DOt imme* M in other cases of emergeoq medical care.

diately life-threatening; therefore, other causes 0( many procedures are accomplished simultaneously injury or illness must be considered. Noocontam- or when time is at a premium. Level consciousness ioated pati~ are.a;dmitted to the 'usual treat- and vital signs are UCcssed promptly and the ment area.. while carilarninated patienu mwt be patieot's cooditioa is stabilized. Aller examining admi t t'd to tbe specially prepared area. the entire patient and identifying all injuries, a complete radiological survey should be done. The Assessment and Treatment of the procedure for' this swvcy is showa in Table 6.

Noncontammated Patient The patieal should be q1IeItiooed about aller-gies. currently wed medic:atioaa. &111 history of Noncontaminated individuals can be cared Cor chtOClic or ~t iIloess, aad n<<1ft true/ear IlUdi.

like any other emergenq case. follow in &attention CiM IUU. The patient', ~ of anxiety sbouJd be 17 C- 51 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) to ~ the bioloii~ eiTecu or radiatioD injurY.

T.tJ~ ~. How To s.vv.y

Pnl<<rt to Identity abnormalities that might complicate treatment; to locate. ideality, an<1 quantify for ContamfMtion.

radionuctide contaminatioa; IlId to provide infer-A patient SU/'\ley can be done simultaneously with malioo ILSefw in accident llIa1yais. The bioloaicaJ Olher emeI"gency procedures, provided there Is no and physical samples noedecl. why they ate takea t interlerence with needed emergency care. and bow they are handled are reviewed in Tablo 7.

1. Use a Iowofange survey meter, suctl as

CO V-TOO. DeconWninadon of the

2. Before entering the deoontaInN.don room Of Contaminated Patient befC)(e patient arrtvaJ, perlonn opei_1IoneI check of instrument and determine bacKground Iewt Good judl1llent is esseotial i.o determining (see page 30 ); open the stieId on the probe; dccootamioalion priorities. Siocc some radioactive and cover the probe with a small pIaatIc be{;! 01 materials. are corrOl~ve or toxic becalUe or. their plastic glove. chemical properties, medical attention might have to be directed fl11t to a oooradiological problem if

3. Set instrument selector switch to the x 1 range radioactive materials were shipped as acids, (CO Y'TOO) 0( most sensitive scale of the instru-fluorides (uranium hexafluoride-UF,), mercury, ment. or lead compouada.

... When necassary, adjust !he range 01 the. In general, contaminated wou~ds and body ori.

instrument by moving the selecto( switch. Meter fices are decontaminated flI'St. followed by areas r8IJdlf'IfP should not be taJ<en when the dlsllndl- or hi8h~t contamination levels 00 the intact skin.

catot r88d!J in the lower 10 pefCfJllt 01 the ~ The purpose of decontamination is to prevent or when on the x 100 8I'td x 10 rant;H. Tum the reduce incorporation of the material (ioternal con-selector switch to the next I'f)()$f S6IISitfve range tamioatioo). to reduce the radiation dose from the to measure the exposure rate more 8CCIrBte/y. contaminated site to the rest of the body. to coo-tain the contamination, and to prevent its spread.

5. Holding the probe approximately 1 inch from the patient's skin. systema'icaJly survey the entire Extunal Contamination tody rrom head to toe on all sides. Move the ~conlaminatiOIl of tM intact skin i.s a rela-probe slowly (atxxlt 1 inch per second) and pay tively simple procedure. Complete decontamina-particular atlention to wounds. oriflces, body tion, which returns the area to a background sur-folds, hairy ar88S and hands.

vey readinl. is not always possible because some

6. An increase in count rale 0( exp0$X'8 ""Ie above radioactive material can remain rIXed on the slcin bect<.ground indicates the presence 01 radiation. surfac:e. Decontamination should be only as thor-ough as practical.

7. Document time and radiation measurements on Decontamination should begin with the least an anatomk:a.l drawing; each subsequent SUNeY aggressive metbod aDd prosress to more aggressive result should be documented. ones. Wbatever the procedure, talce care to limit

8. The usa oj headphones with the CO Y*TOO faei1-mechanical or chemical irritation of tbe skin. The simplest procedure is to wash the contaminated tates mOllitoring.

area gently unde-r a stream or wate-r (do not

- splash) and scrub at the same time using a soft brush or surlical sponge. Warm. never hot, tap waler i.s used. Cold watet' tends to close the pores.

noted. and psychological support offered. A com- trapping radioactive material wilhin them. Hot plete and detailed medical. occupational. and water cau~ v:lSOdilation wilh increaSed area accident history should be taken. and a physical blood now. opens the poreS.. \iKl eittiina;, the examination completed. chance 0( absorption of the radioactive material Certain clinical and radiological laboratory through tbe skin. AggnsslW ruM(n, tendJ to analyses are essential to the care of tbe radiation caus~ ab,asion and trytMtM"and sholl/d ~

accident patienL These laboratory tests are done avoided.

18 C- 52 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

All samples mU$' be placed in separate. IabeJed contalnen that tpecify name. date, time of sampIinI;j. area of samples, and size of area samples. Medlcal, 1eQaJ. and other ~ InveetIgations requh thai no blood.

urine. feces, or other samples taken in the emergency treatment period be <Iaposed of without authorization.

SAMPlES NEEDED HOW?

In sI casas 01 ~tIon i'jury:

cae and differential STAT (folow To usesa the radlatton do$e; lni- Oloose a noncootaminated area with absolute lymphocyte counts tial counts eatabbh

baaeIne. tor '1eni-punct\re; cover punc1\U't every 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months when subsequent COtJtrta r9ftect the site after CQIIection history indicates po$Sibility of degree of injury totaJ-body irradiation)

Routine urinalysis To determine if kidneys are func* Avoid contaminating specimen tIoning normally and establish a during collection: if necessary, baseline of urinary conatituent8; give the patient plastic gloves espec!aJ!y important if internal wear for collection of specimen cootamination Is a possibiity label specimen "Number 1," WIt date and time When extemaJ contaminstion is suspec18d:

Swabs from body onfk:es To a.ssG$.S poMibirrty non 0' internal Use separate saline- or water-coo1amina moistened swabs 10 wipe the it,ner 8spac1 of each nostril. e

,o ar. mouth, etc .

Swabs from wounds To detennine if wounds are c0n- lJ$e moist or dry swabs 10 sam taminated pie secretioM from each wounc or coDect

few drops of secnt' tion from eech uaIog a dropper syringe: for wounds with visible debria, use applicator 0( long tweezara or forcepa to transfer sampIee to ~ comalner:'3 which are placed in lead Slorag.

containers (pigs)

Skin wipes To locate contaminated areea Uae filter paper. smear peds, 01

,. COI1lpr8S3eS to wipe sample areu lOem )( lOem in sIz.

When interns) contamination is ~

Urine: 24-hOur specimen J( .. daya Body excreta may c:ontU\ U. 24-how urine collection con radIonuc:Idee If InterrW COIICM'III.. takw Uon haa oc::curred 19 C- 53 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) rablt 7. conmued Body excreta may contaln Sa.,. excreta k'I P'ut'c con-racIcnddea If Intemal c0ntamIna- f.aN(t In refrtgntor Of freew tion hat oc::curTed Vomitus Body excreta may ~ Save IXcreta In pIaatIc con-radlooddes If 1n1ema1 contamlna* taJI'Ie(' In refrigerator Of freezer tIon tIu occurred Sputum To aaaeaa respiratOfY tract con-tamNtion If inhalation of contain-i\ant was

pos.sibiIty Serum creatinine To aaeess kJdney function If che-lation Is indica ted Other samples ne6d6d:

AU i rriga~ nuids Save In S681ed and labeled. glasa*

Of plastJc.Qned container s If washing with plain water il ineffective, I The procedures described above also apply to mild soap (neutral pH) or surgical scrub soap can the decontamination of uninjured accident victims.

be used. The area should be scrubbed for 3 to 4 ~ntaminat i on of an uninjured patient can be minutes, then rinsed for 2 to 3 minutes and dried, accomplished on a treatment table if necessary.

re pea ting if necessary. &tween each scrub and Small areas (banw, feet , etc.) can be decontami-nnse, check tbe t:Ontaminated area to sec if radia- nated using a sink: or basin. If extensive body tion levels are decreasing. Sod iu m hypochlorite, areas are contaminated. the patient can be

iluted 1 to 10 with water. is an effective decon- showered under the dir~l io n or with the assis-f:'. I*P ti n agent. A mildly a rlsive soap; a I to I tlnce of a radia lion safelY officer. Caution the

11' ( re of powde red deter gent and cornmeal patient to avoid splashing water into tbe eyes, mixed with water into a plUte; a paste of sawdust nose, mouth, or ears. Repeated showers might be l nd water; or a mixture of 65 percent NaPO" 5 neccsMry. and clean lowets provided for drying percent carboxylmethycellulose. and )0 percent after each shower. Again. decontamination should detergent as a S-percent solution in water can be be ~ thorough as practical. Contaminated water used. cadOc released directly into the hospital sanitary More aggressive measures for decontamination drain system. S'pecial storage or holding tanles include procedures tbat remove cornified epithe- are recommended.

lium. Very fine sandpaper can be used 00 hands or feet. Potassium pennanganate (4 percent) fol- Trtatmem of Contaminaltd Wounds lowed by sodium bisulfite (4 percent) also can be used with caution. The decontamination procedure In a contamination accident, ally wound must stops whtn 1M radioactivity (~I COMO' b.

reduced to a (o~r In-el. Expert advice might be needed to determine an appropriate stopping be considered cc.. taminated UJltil proven otherwise and should be decontam/nattd pM'or to dtcorUam~

il1Qting intact skilL When wounw are contami-tt point. Contaminated hairy areas can be nated, the physician must assume that uptalce shampooed several times and then rinsed in a (internal contamination) has occurred. Appro-

)

percent citric acid solution. Contaminated hair priate action is based on h,tr-tiCc, radiotollicity, can be clipped if shampooinl is ineffective. SbaY- and the maximum pcnnissible body burden o( tbe ing should be avoided since small nicks or abra- radioac:tive material. It is importallt to COlUwt sions can lead to internal contamination. Wbeo expertS* u ~ u possible and to initiate meas-shampooing the head, avoid getting any nui<il into ures that prevent or minimize uptake of tbe radi~

the ears, eycs, nose. or mouth. active material into body cells or tissucs.

20 C- 54 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

Contaminated wounds are first draped, pre(era. ity, encourage bNshins the tccth \ I toothpaste bly with a waterproof material, to limit the spread and frequent rinsin. of the mouth .h a l-per-of radioactivity. Wound decontamination is ceat citric acid solution. I( the phal) ngeal region accomplished by eently irrigating with saline. is also contaminated. gargling with a J-percent water. or a )-percent hydrogen peroxide rolution. H 20 2 solution might be helpful. G astric lavage Irrigation nuid should be collected and checked can be used if radioactivc materials wm: swal-with a radiation monitor to judge the effectiveness lowed. Rinsing lbe nose with tapwater or physio-of decontamination. More thaD one irrigation is logical saline should be tried if the nose is contarr usually necessary. The wound should be monitored inated. Likewise. contaminated eyes should be after each irrigation. Contaminated drapes. dIeu* rinsed by directin8 a stream o( water from the ings, etc. should be removed before each monitor* inner canthus to the o}ltcr canthus o( the eye ing (or accurate resulu. Wben monitoring coatam* whilc avoiding contamination o( the nuolacrimal inateo wounds or irrigation nuids, gamma radia* duct. Contaminated ean require external riMing.

tion is easily detected while beta radiation may and an ear syringe can be used to rinse the audi-prove more difficult to detect. Without special, tory canal, provided the tympanic membrane is highly sophisticated wound probes, alpha contami* intact.

nation will not be detected. Following irrigation, the wound is treated like any other wound. Ir the Treatment of Inurnal Contamination preceding decontamination procedures are not successful, apply a constriction band to increase Once radioactive materials cross oell mem-blood flow and to help remove contamination from branes, they are said to be incorporated. Incor-the wound. If this is unsuccessful and the poration is a time-dependent, physiological phe*

contamination level is still seriously high, surgical nomenon related to both the physical and cbenu-decontamination. which is identical to conven* cal natures of the contaminant. The rate of incor tional debridement of a wound. must be consid- poration can be quite rapid, occurring in minutes.

ered. Debridem~nt should not be initiated until or it can t.aJce days to months. Thus., time can be expert medical or health physics advice is critical and treatment (decorporation) urgenL obtained. Debrided or excised tissue should be Seyeral methods of preventing incorporation (e.g.

retained for healtb physics assessment. catl:.arsis, gastric lavage) might be applicable a!"c En;l.¢':ded r:>c icJclj\'e particles. if visible. can can be prescribed by a physician. Some of the

~-P. i "" OV:e ~ . t, ~ : .. :~~ vr ':l:; ,<:r g a w3~e :*p l k.. :" ~ :C'at!o ns or preparations used 'n decor;- ,,3' Puncture wouncs cont ai ning radioactive particles, might not be available locally and should be especially in the fingers, can be decontaminated stocked when a decontamination station is being by using an Men bloc* full thicknCS3 skin biopsy planned and equipped. The different methods using a punch biopsy instrument. available and the specific agents used for various After the wound has been decontaminated, it radionuclides are given in Table 8.

should be covered with a waterproof dressing. The If internal contamination is suspected or has area around the wound is decontaminated as octurred, the physician or radiation safety offiCer thoroughly as possible before suturing or' other should request samples o( urine, feces, vomitus, treatment. wound secretions. etc. Whole-body counting an.:!

Contaminated bums (chemical. thermal) are radioassay also can help evaluate the magnitude treated lilce any other bum. ContaminanLS will of the problem and the effect or any treatment.

slough off with the burn eschar. However, dress- The contaminated patient admitted with an air.

ings and bed linens can become contaminated and way or endotracheal tube must be considered to should be handled appropriately. be internally contaminated. (sofl'ableQ.

D~t: o n(aminatiofl of Body Orifictl Padent Comfort and Emotional Support Contaminated body orifices, such as the mouth, nose. eyes, and ears, need special attention be- A patient involved in a radiation accident need!

cause absorption of radioactive material is likely explanatious of procedures and actioDs beinl to be much more rapid in these areas thaa takeD (isolatioo. lAIC of survey meters, ta.lcing of through the skin. samples, decontamination, etc.) in the radiation If radioactive material bu entered thc oral cay- ~mcrgency area.. A knowledgeable person should 21 C- 55 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

Tabl. 8. II~' Mtd ~ of o.c~.tIoft. ""7"-.. ".

(ModIff..:l from S.f.ty s.rt.. 47, IAEAJ Wound ~ofAc~

130 mg (labO eta!. IcIowed by Same 130 mg q.d. lC T if rdcated OTPA 1 ~ Ca-<lTPA n 500 m 5- hlgate WO\.IId ..." Q\elellon pen:ent O/W I. v. oyw eo min: 1 ~ 01 Ce-OTPA In CIT I gin (~In em 5-pelceld 250m 06W O/W by slow I.v. Injection (1 rml SAL One ampule (-300 mg) I.m. Promot .. excretion q4 hra. lor 3 days-(Ilnt lnt for S80SItivity wrttt \4 ~. )

Urancum 8ic&rbona I. Slow I. v. in1u.sion oj bar* $Ow l 't . InfIIaion 01 AlkaInIzation 01 bonaled ph~ solution bicatbonated ~ un-..; rec10cea (2.50 mI all" perceot) oIogicaI solution cNnce 01 ATN (250 mI II 14 per.

ceot) IIId we" wiU\

bIcar1xlN~

~ Prussoan Blue' 1 gm in 100-200 mI W8191' p.o. Same MobtIlz.atiOn !rom Rubidum (l"ernhexacyftllO' t.1.d. for $6Y9faJ days orQIlIlS and

~!lium Fenate (11>>) tIsauea-r&d~tiOn and absorpbon

~OIUlTl Caijlucone te May be tried; 2Oi><<cent C. Same Dlaplacement gQJconat. 10 mI i.v. once CIT twice daly Strontium Arrvnoc1ium cHoridI 3 ~ t.l.d. p.o. Same TntUn Waler Have patient drink &-12 Itera Same 01 water per day Strontium BaSO. 100 gin BaSO. in 250 mI 01 Same AadhJm watw CaIcIurn SodIum alginate 10 ~ nI large glasa 01 WIt. Same BarUn Copper D~ 1 gin i.v. q.d. or 0 .9 gm p.o. Same Polonium q4~ In.

Lead Mwcwy Gold 22 C- 56 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) answer the patient's questions and provide reassur-* covenn, is laid from the c1eao area to the patient ance. For example. explain tlIe u.se of protective stretcher. A ckan stretcher is brouaht in. the clothing and surgical masks during treatment. fol- patient ia lta..IlSfernd to it by cleaa att.enda.ots lowing initial care and treatment. someone with a (those involved in the decontamination procedure knowledge of radiation effects should spend ade- may now be contaminated). and the patient is quate time dnswering the patient's qucstions. wheded to the door. After the radiation safety Preferahly. thiS person should be the attendin, officer makes a finaJ ched of the patient and the physician who ..:ontinues to treat the patient until stretcher (especially the wh~ls), the patient is

,oes discharge . Reporters and newsbunten should get taken rrom the room.

their repom from the hospital's public informa- Each member of the decontamination team tion officer. to the control line and removes his protective clothes as described below:

Patient Safety I. Remove outer gloves fint. turning tlIem Routine precautions for patient safety should inside-out as they arc pulled off not be forgollen. Be espedally alert for potential 2. Give dosimeter to radiation safety officer falls or slips on wet noon. excessive heating or 3. Remove all tape at trouser cuffs and chLlling, and electrical hazards. sleeves

4. Remove outer surgical gown. turning it Documenta tion inside-out-avoid shaking

5. Pull surgical trou.sen off over shoe coven rn addition to routine medical records. note sur- 6. Remove head cover and mask vey readings. samples taken (and time). 7. Remove shoe cover from one foot and let descriptions of the accident. and the effectiveness radiation safety officer monitor shoe; If of decontamination. Take care to note pre-existing shoe is clean, step over control line, theD conditions such as rashes. healing wounds, or remove other shoe cover and monitor scars. This infonnation will be extremely valuable other shoe to medical consultants and health physicists in 8. Remove inner gloves reconstruc:ing the accident accurately and making 9. Do total-body radiologicaJ survey of eacb a prognosis. team member

10. T 1 lee shower Po tem rgency Patient Transfer aDd Afler staff exit, the decontamination room Staff Exit from the Controlled Area should be secured and a sign reading

-CAUTION-IUD/ATION AREA- should be A final complete*body survey is perfonncd fol- postC1:l. Unless it is needed for emergency medical lowing decontamination procedures. The patient's reasons, the decontamination room remains body should be thoroughly dry and all prt:viously secured until it can be checked and decontami-contaminated areas reswabbed with cotton-tipped nated. if necessary. by the radiatioo safety officer applicators which are then marked ~postdecoDtam or other health physics expert.

ination" and stored for later analysis. A new noor

..r.-

t 23 C- 57 REV _ 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont' d) 6.

Sources of Assistance A number of authorities ca.n provide advice and land. CA; and Richland, W A.

assistance when radiation accidents ocx:ur. In REAC/TS, the Radiatioo Emergency addition. some authorities have been assigned Assistance Center/Training Site., Oak responsibilities (or resolving radiological incidents. Ridge., TN, is part of the DOE response Hospital emergency department pe~nnel should netwOrL REAC/TS~c;,u,reatment be aware of these sources of assistance. However. capabiliti~ and, ~~ul~~ce-oll promptly needed treatment must not be com- a 24-bour basis, and can ~. reac&ed

promised by attempts to notify specific authorities. through the Oak Ridge Hospital 0( tbe Sources of assistance emt at the local, state, Methodist Church. 615/482.i44i. ."

and national levels. Call lists should be prepared S. The Federal Emergency Management to include Agency's (FEMA) generic hazardoUJ I. Local medical facility starred by pe~nnel materials program encompasses both trained in aspects of radiation accident radiological and nonradioIogica1 hazards.

management. including those originating from rued

2. Local civil defense. emergency prepared* facilities and those in transit. The objec-nes5, or disaster office. tive of this program is to enbance state

3. State radiological health office (title and local government capabilities in prep-varies by Slate) might be able to provide aration for and response to bazardous rapid . ';i\slte a~:;i ~ * ~l ce . ma erials inc idents. While the U.S.

J (. S. c:,a.:n ~i : vf t:'erD' (DOE)- DOE E:1vironmental Protection Agency as the maIntains the Federal Radiological Moni* lea d rederal role for non radiological con-IOrlflg afld AsstJsmtfll PftJrl to assist state ti ngencies under tbe Superfund and other and local personnel in handling radiologi- environmental legislation. FEMA has the cal incidenu and accidenu. Regional lead federal role for coordinating offsite DOE offices arc located in Upton, NY; radiological emergency preparednes5 and Oak Ridge. TN; Aiken. SC; Albuquerque. response.

NM; Argonne., II...; Idaho Falls, 10; Oak-

" h C- 58 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

Glossary Words Ie boldface type are also separate eatries ID this &IO$W'}.

The energy imparted to matter by ionizinl radiation per unit mua of irra-diated material at the place o( interest. The unit of absorbed dose is the radiation absorbed dose (rad). (see bel; Dose).

Acdrity The ratc of decay of radioactive material. expressed as the average number of nuclear duintegiations per second. (see Curle).

Acute radiadoa The collective term for the hematopoietic, tbe gastro.intestioal, and the car-syudrome diovascular/central nervous system (orms of response to rad.iation, it is a group of signs and symptoms tbat develop as a result of an acute, or in some cases subacute. exposure of the whole body or a significant portion of it to an appreciable dose (> 100 rads) of ionizing radiation. The syndrome is a clinical manifestation of the re3ponses of the individual constituents of the body systems to an acute exposure to radiation. The clinical course is predictable and is divided into prodromal latent., manifest illness, and recovery or death states that are of variable duration (a few hours to sev-eral weeks) depeoding 00 the nature of the exposure.

AJpha particle A specific particle ejected spontaneously from tbe nucleus of some radioac-tive ele ments. It is identical to a belium nucleus (He). which has an atomic rrass of 4 :\;)d an e!l!'(;trostatic c ar&e of +2. It has low pent~r3ting fJ'. er and short nnge. The most energetic alpha particle will generally fall to penetrate tbe skin. The danger occurs when matter containing alpba-emitting radionuclides are introduced into the lungs or wounds. Symbol: a.

Atom The smallest particle of an element which cannot be divided or broken up by chemical means. It consists o( a central core called the Hcleus, whicb contains protons and neutrons. Electrons revolve in orbits around tbe nucleus.

Atomic nwnber Thoe number of protons in the nucleus o( an atom, and also its positive charge. Each chemical element has its characteristic atomic number. and the atomic numbers o( the known clements (orm a complete series from 1 (hydrogen) to 103 (lawrencium). Elements with atomic numbers 104 and lOS are presently unnamed. Symbol: Z.

The radiation in man's oatural environment., including cosmic rays and radiation from tbe natllraUy radioactive elements, both outside and inside the bodies of men and animals. It is also called aatllral radiatioo.. Man-made sources ol radioactiYity cootn'bute to total background radiation lev-els. Approximately 90 percent ~ bacqrou,nd radiatioo rrom man-made sources is related to tbe UIC o( iooizinl ndiatioD in medicine and dentistry.

Beta particle A smaU particle ejected spontaneously (rom a nucleus of a radioactive ele-ment. It bas the mass ol an electron and has a charge or minus one or plus 39 C- 59 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) one. It bLS medium or inlermediate penetratinl power a.od a ru.ao of up to a few meters in air. Beta particles will penetrate 001)' a rrKtion olin inch of skin tissue. Symbol: ~- , or ~ *.

C'b&r&ed parttcle An Ion; an elementary particle tblt carries a positive or ncptive electrical charge.

Coo trolled area An area where entry, activities, and eltit are controUed to assure radiation protection and prevent the spread of contamination.

Cosmic rays High-energy particulate and electromagnetic radiations whi~h ori~att out-side tbe earth's atmosphere.

Contamlnadoa. Deposition of radioactive material in any place where it is not desired. pat-rldloacd,. ticularly where its presence can be harmful Curie The basic measuring unit used to describe tbe amount of rad.loacdYi!f in I sample of material. One curie is equal to 37 billion disintegrations ~r sec-ond. SymboL: Ci.

Deuy, radloacthe Disintegration of tbe nucleus of unstable atoms by spontaneous e~i.ssioQ of charged particles, electromagnetic radiation, or both. .L' .

Dec on tamina tloa The reduction or removal of contaminating radioactive material from.

structure, area, object. or person.

A malerial or device that is sensitive to radiation and can produce a response signal suitable for measurement or analysis. A radiation det~tion instrument A general term for denot ing the quantity of radiation or energy absorbed.

If unqualified, it refers to absorbed dose. For special purposes it must be approp riately qualified. If used to represent eJl.posure expressed in roetlt&~

(R). it i3 a measure of the total a.mount of lon.lution tbat the quantity of radia tion could produce in air (see Absorbed dose).

Dose equhaJcat A quantity of measurement used in radiation protection. This term expresses all radiations on a commOli scale for evaluating and comparin, the effects of radladoo in man. It is defined as tbe product of the absorbed dose in racb and certain modifying factors. The unit of dose equivalent it the retIL Dose CIte The absorbed dose delivered per unit time. It is usually expres.sed as racia per bour, or in multiples or submultiples of this unit, sucb as millirads per bour. The dose rate is commonly used to indicate the level of bazard from I radioactive source. (see R&d; Dose).

A small, pocket-sized ionization chamber used (or monitoring radiation exposure of penonneL Before use it is given a charge, and the amount if.

dis<:barge tbat ()(Xurs is a measure of the accumulated radiation exposure.

Electromagnetic A traveling wave motion that results from changing electric and magnetic radialioa fields. Familiar electromagentic: radiations range (rom those of short wavelenstbs. like ,,-raJa and paa rara. throup the ultraviolet. visible, and infrared regions. to radar aDd radio waves of relatively Ioog wavelengths.

Elect10e All elementary particle with a Dcaative electrical charae. Electrons sur-round the positively cbarged MIdea and determine the chemical prope:ties of the atom. SymboL Coo.

C-60 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

EXpo5W't A quantity used to indicate the &mount of ioaludOll in air produced by l-or ,amma radiation. The unit is the roetltaen (R). For practical purposes.

one roetItae- i.s comparable to I rd or I I'ttII for 1- and gamma radiation.

Gamma rays. or Electromagnetic radiation or hip enerc, originating in atomic nuclei and

,aruma radlatloa accompanying many nue/ear reactions. including rwioo, radioactive decay, and neutron capture. Gamma rays are identical with x-rays of high energy, the only essential difference being that the x-rays do not originate from atomic nuclei but are produced in other ways; (or instance, by slowing down fast. high-energy electrons. Gamma rays are the most penetrating type of radiation a.nd represent the major external hazard. Symbol: 'r_

Celler cocmter, or C-M An instrumetlt used to detect a.nd measure radiation. The detecting element meIer i.s a gas-fined chamber operated by

voltage whose electrical discbarge will spr"d over the entire anode when triggered by a primary ionizing event.

HaJf-lire (pbyslcal) The time required (or the activity of

given quantity of a radioactive ele-ment to decrease to balf of its initial value due' to radioactive decay. The balf-life i.s a characteristic property of each radioactive element and is inde-pendent of its amount or condition. TM effective half-life of a given radlo-actiw tltmt1tl [3 tM 111M In 'MIlt/eli Iltt quantfly in 1M body will decrease

/0 half as a resu/~ of botlt radlooctiw decay and biological tlimiTUw*on.

In,use square law The relationship which slates that -gamma radiation intensity i.s inversely proportional to the square of the distance from a point source.

100 Atomic particle, atom, or cbemical radical bearing an electrical charge.

either negative or positive.

lonwtloa The separation of a nonnally electricaUy neutral atom or molecule into electrically charged component~. The term is also employed to describe the degree or extent to which this separatjon occu~. Ionization is the removal of an electron (a negative charge) from an atom or molc-cule, either directlv or i.rIdirectly, leavlng a positively charged ion. The scparated el¢<;tron and ion are referred to as an ion pair.

lonizinl ndladoa Electromagnetic radiation (x-ny and pmma-ray photons) or particulate radiation (electrons. positrons. protons, neutrons, and heavy particles) capa-ble of producing ions by di.tect or secoodary processes.

IrndladOil Exposure to ionizing radiation.

Isotopes Forms of the same clement baving identical chemical properties but differ-ing in their atomic masses., due to different numbers of neutrons in tbeir respective nuclei and in their" nuclear properties. For example, bydrogen bas three isotopes, with one, two, and three atomic mass units_ H-t is normal hydroaen. while H-2 and H-) are commonly called deuterium and tritium.

respectively. The (U"St two of these are stable (nonradioa~), ~t the third (tritium) i.s a radioactive isotope. Other examples are the eommlJd' isotopes of uranium, with masses of 235 and 238 units, respectively. Both are radio-active and emit alpha particles;but the balf-life or each i.s different.

Mass Dumbft The sum of the neutrons and protOQS in a DGdeas, the mass num~ is the nearest whole number to a.n atom's atomic weight. For instance, the mass number of uranium-23S is 23S. Symbol: A-MoaJtoriDI Periodic or continuous determination 01 tho amount of ionizing radiation or radioactive contamination rreacDt roc purposes of hcaJth protection. Also referred to as *surve)'inl-*

4\

C- 61 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

The small. positively characd core of IJl atom. It is only~ about l/IOO~

diameter of the itom bur cOo"t.i.Jiit nearly &lI the atom', IDUI. AU DUA:let . ',J contain both protons aild Dcutlonl, except the nucleU$ 0( ordinary hydJ'oaetl.

which consbts of a sinile protOll. ;

Protoo An elemeatAry particle with. Uncle positive electrical charre. ProtOl1l ~

constituents or aD DUclei. The atomic 8nm", (Z) at an atom is equal to the number of protOIlS ill its audea R&d Radiation absorbed dose.. A (r&d) is the unit of absorbed dose. Tho rad is a measure of the energy imparted to matter by ionizing particles per writ mass of irradiated material at tho place or interest. A rad is approlilnately equaJ to the absorbed dose in tissue when the expos~ in air ia 000 roent.

gen (R) of medium-voltaic x-radiatioa.

The energy propagated through space or througb a materialmcdium such as waves; for example, ~~ergy ~ ~ ronn of electromagcntic}r&ves or 01 elartie waves. Radiation, !>f radiant energy, when unqualified. usually refell to electromagnetic radiation; such radiation commonly is classified. accord-ing to frequency, as Hertzian. infrared, visible (light). ultraviolet.. * ..,.,.

and pIDIDA raJ. A..bo, particles sucb u aJpba and beta radiation, or rays of mixed or unknown type-Cor instance, cosmic rays - can be caUed radiation.

Radladoa accident An accident in whicb there is an unintended exposure to ionizinl radiation or radioactive contamination.

The prodromal manifestations of acute radiation injury. varying in severity.

scope. and cause. depending ()(I the conditions of cJtp05ure to looizIDC radla-don (sec Acute radJadoa syndromes).

Radloacdrity The spontaneous emission of radiation. generally alpha or bell particles often accompanied by &a.mma rays, Crom the nuclcU! of an unstable atom.

As a result of tbis emission. tbe radioactive atom is converted, or decaY'.

illiO an atom of a difrerent element that migbt or mi ght not be radioactive.

Ultimately, as a result of one or more stages of radioactive decay. a slable.

nonradioactive atom is formed.

Rem Rocntgen equivalent maJl-a special unit of radiation dose equivalent. The dose equivalent in rem.s is numericaUy equal to the absorbed dose multiplied by the quality factor (Q). the distn"bution factor. and any necessary modify*

~~~ .

The unit of exposure from I- or gamma rays. (see Exposan).

A radioactive sourc:e, sealed in an impervious container, which bas suffi-cient mechanical strength to prevent contact with and dispcnion of the radioaaivc material undcr the conditions of usc and wear ror whicb it was designed. Gcacrally used ror radi9Jrapby nr radiation therapy.

'f4 4.'

Sbippiog papers. or Fol'llU containing a description at the malerials being transported which shippinC documentS must accompany aU packages 0( radioactive material.

A poru.ble instrument used (or detecting and measuring radiatioa WIder varied pbysicaJ c:ooditiooa. Tho term 00YetI a wide rangc 0( devices.

r* , .~

Mole-body (total) expo- An exposure 0( the body 10 ~xterul radiation. where tbe cntire body rather scare tban an i$olated part is irradiated. Wben

radioactive material ill1ni-

fonnly distributed throughout the body tissues rather thaa bcinl OOOCCD-42 C- 62 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd) trated in certain organs, the irradiatioa can be cooa.idcrcd whole-body ex~

sure..

I X-rays Penetrating electromagnetic radiation whose wave len&ths are shorter than those of visible light. They ate usually produced by bombarding a metallic target with fast el<<:trons in a higb vacuum. In nuclear reactions, il is cus-tomary to refer to photons originating in the nucleus as gamma ray'. and 10 those originating in the extranuclear parts as l*rays. Th~ rays are sometimes called roentgen rays after their discoverer, W. C. Rocntgca.

C- 63 REV. 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

Selected Bibliography Andrews. G. A . "Medical Management of Grimes, B. K... and McConnell. J. W. Criteria fOl Accidental Total-Body Irradiation." In The Medi- Pltparalion and Evaluation 0/ RadiolOgical cal Ra.sis for Radiation Accident Prtparedness. Enurgency RtspollSt PllUU and Prepartd1WS in Proceedings of a Conference, Oak Ridge, TN, Suppon 0/ Nuclear POVHr PIQllu. NUREG-06 ~4 October 1979. New York: Elsevier North- FEMA-REP-I, Rev. 1., Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Holland, 1980. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1980.

Beeson. P. B.* and McDermott. W., cds. "Radia-tion Injury.* Tarbook of Medicine, 14th ed., Vol. Hodges. H. D.* and Gibbs. W. D. "Participation 1.66-72. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders. 1975. of Nuclear Medicine Technologists in Radiation Accident Management.* Journal of Nuclear Med Berger. M. E.* Thompson. D. W., Ricks. R. c.. ical Technology, (Mar. 1977): 46-49. Includes and Kaufmann, D. "Medical Technologist and the details on how to perform whole-body counts Wll Radiation Accident Victim.* Amen'can Journal of generally available equipment.

Medical Technology, No. 47 (Oct. 1981):

829-834. HUbner. K. F .* and Fry. S. A.* eds. The Mtdical Ra.sis for Radialioll Accidefll Preparedness.

Brodsky. A.* ed. CRC Handbook of Radiation Proce~ings of a Conference, Oak Ridge. TN,

.' {~asiJrl!ment and Prottetion. Boca Raton, FL:

(-~C p~ *- <s. 19 ~

October 19 9. New York: Elsevier North-

~{ol:3nd. 19 O.

Casarelt. G. W. Radiatiofl Histopathology. 'ols. 1 and 2. Boca Raton. FL: CRC Press. 1982. International Atomic Energy Agency. Halldliflg 0, Radiation Accidents. Vienna: 1969.

Chesemore. K. F. Radiological Health Trainiflg Resources Catalog 1981. FDA 81-8023. Washing- - -Evaluation of Radiation Emergencies and ton. D.C. : U.S. Department of Health and Human Accldeflts: Selected Criteria aruJ Dala. IAEA Services. 1981. Report No. 152. Vienna: 1974.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. "Radio- --Manual 011 Early Medical Treatmeflt of Pos*

logical Emergency Planning and Preparedness; sible Radialion Injury. Safety Series No. 487.

Final Regulations." Federal Register. Vol. 47 Vienna: 1978.

(Mar. t I. 1982): 10758-10762.

Jankowski, C. B. "Radiation Emergency.*

Fullerton. Gary D., Kopp. David T.* Waggener, American Journal 0/ NurSing, No. I (Jan. 1982):

Robert G.~ , and .fIebster, Edward W. "Biological 90-97. I ..

Risks or Medid1 Irradiations." Medical Physics Monograph No.5. AAPM Spring Symposium. Kelly, F. J .. and Lemons. B. D. "Radiation March 26-28. 1980. San Antonio. Texas: Univer- Decontamination Facility for t~e Community sity of Texas Healtb Science Center. 1980. Hospital." Journal of Occupational MediciM. No 114 (Dec. 1972): 904-907.

Food and Drug Administration. "Potassium Iodide as a ~yroid Blocking Agent in a Radiation Langham. Wright H.* cd. RadiobioloK/'ca/ FactOfJ Emergency; Final R~mmendations on Use.* in Mal1lltd Space Fligltt. Publication No. 1487.

F~deral Register. Vol. 47 (June 29. 1982): Washington. D.C.: National Academy of Sciences 28158-28159. . National Researcb Council. 1967.

C- 64 REV . 52

Radiation Accident Plan (Cont'd)

Leonard, R. 8. and Ricks, R. C. "Emergency Ellect* on POp"'GtiofLS 01 Exposure /0 Low Ln'els Department Radiation AccIdent Protocol.* Altltufs ol l""iting Rt. Jiotlon. BE IR III . Washington, of Emugefl4)' MtdldM. No. 9 (Sept 1980): DC .. National Academy Press. 1980.

462.-.10.

Poda. G. A. -Decontaminallon and Decorporation:

LIncoln, T A. -Imponance of Initial Managemeat the Clinical Experience.' In Medical 8a.sis for of Persons Internally Contaminated with Radionu- Radiation Accident Prtpartdness, Proceedings of elides." Amtrican Indusln'af HygitM Association a Conference. Oak Ridge. TN. October 1979, Journal, No. 37 (Jan. 1976): 16-21. edited by K. F. HUbner and S. A. Fry, 327-332.

New York: Elsevier Notth*HoUand, 1980.

Linnemann, R. E. -A Systems Approach to the Initial Management of Radiation Injuries.* In Ricks. R. C .* Beck. w. lo. Jr., and Berger. J. D.

Systtl7U Approach to Emtrgtncy Mtdicaf ('art. Rad{oactiv~ Materials Transportation In!or111ll-New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts (in press). tion and Incidtnt Guidance. DOT /RSPA/MTB 81 / 4. Washington. D.C.: U.S. Depanment of Lushbaugh, C. C., HUbner, K. F., and Ricks. R. Transportation. 1979.

C. -Medical AspectS of Nuclear Radiation Emer-gencies.- Emtrgtncy. No. 10 (Sept. 1978): 32-lS. Saenger. E. L. -Hospital Planning to Combat Radioactive Contaminat ion.* Journal of Ihe Mettler. F. A.* and Ricb. R. C. "Medical Amtrican Mtdical Association. No. 18S (Aug.

Management of Radiation AccIdents.* 1963): 578- 581.

Conttmporary Diagnostic Radiology, No.5 (May 1982): 1-6. US. Depanment of Energy. Emergency Handling of Radiation Accident CastS for Hospital National Council on Radiation Protection and Administrators (in cooperation with American MeasuremenL Prtcautions in tht Managtl71tnl of Public Health Assoclallon). DOE/EV 0019.

Patimts Who Havt Rtctived Thtraptutic Washington. D.C.: 1979 .

.4mounts 01 Radionue/ides. NCRp* )7. Washing-ton. D.C.: 1970. - -Emtrgency Handling of Radiation Accidtnt Casts for Nursts (In cooperation with American

- 8lJJic Radialiolt Prolulion Cfiftn*a. CRp* Public Health Associallon). DOE/ EV 0018.

19 . Washington . DC.: 1971. Washi ngton. D.c.. 19 9 Rodjologicul FtJctors AlfUling Decision* - - Emergency Handling of Radiation ACCl dt nt

.\faking In a .Vuclear Allack . . CRP*42. Wasb* Cases for PhYSIcians (In cooperallon with Ameri*

ington. DC.. 1974. can Public Health Association). DOE/ EV 0017 Alpha*Emllting Particlts in Lungs. NCRP* Washington. D.c.: 1979.

46. Washington, D.C.: 1975. US. Nuclear Re&ulatory Commission. Rtactor

- - Instrumentation and Monitorinl Methods for Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risk in Radiation Protection. NCRP*57. Washington. US. Commtrcial .'Vue/ear Power Plants. Main D.C.: 1978. Report. Repon No. WASH-I400. Washington.

D.C.: 1975.

- -Management of Ptrsons Accidentally Con-taminattd with Radionuclides. NCRP*65. Wash- Vassar. C. I. Directory of Pef!1J1tltt1 Responsiblt ington. D.C. 1980. for RadiolOgical Htallh P,o!"ams. FDA 82-8027.

WaShington. D.C.: U.S. Depanment of Health National Research Council. Committee on the -, and Human Services. 1982.

BiologIcal Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Tht C-65 REV . 5 2

EXHIBIT 1 EMERG ENCY MANAGEMENT Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants Purpose The purpose of this guideline is to further define readiness and treatment protocols for the intake and treatment of potentially contaminated patients following an incident at the Joseph M Farley Nuclear Plant near Dothan, Alabama.

This guideline establishes roles and responsibilities of medical staff and radiation safety personnel in the event the hospital is activated as a Radiation Casualty Treatment Facility (RCTF) as defined in agreements executed between UAB Hospita l and Southern Nuclear Operating Company.

Situations and Assumptions Southern Nuclear Operating Company ("Southern") and UAB Hospital ("UAB") have a long-standing agreement that provides that the hospital will serve as the RCTF following an incident at one or more nuclear power plants operated by Southern. UAB is obligated in that agreement to maintain a level of readiness that is adequate to receive and provide treatment to nine (9) patients transported to the hospital.

Plant Farley is approximately two hundred (200) miles from UAB. Plant Hatch is approximately three hundred fifty (3S0) miles from UAB. Plant Vogtle is approximately three hundred fifteen (31S) miles from UAB. Ground ambulance transportation from any of these locations would require several hours; air ambulance transport in critical situations would decrease that time considerably. Notwithstanding the method of transportation, there is likely to be adequate notice of patient severity and condition prior to arrival.

It is anticipated that gross decont amination of patients will occur prior to transport. However, UAB will maintain sufficient resources and training to allow evaluation and further decontamination if necessary.

UAB Hospital has sufficient staffing, facilities and equipment to provide medical care and treatment to patients under the agreement, including personal protective equipment, radiation monitoring and evaluation devices and instrumentation, and shielded areas constructed to isolate and protect from harm patients, employees and the public. The agreement allows for period ic evaluation of technology and equipment and requests for funding to purchase and maintain additional equipment.

Although treatment of the patient may occur elsewhere if the threat of public and occupational exposure can be sufficiently mitigated, the following nine (9) "lead-lined" rooms are designed and constructed to reduce exposure level outside the treatment area:

Spain Wallace - Rooms W622 and W624S, W918, W920, W922, W924, W926 Women's and In/ants Center - Rooms 7265 and 7261 0 -1 Rev. 55

UAB Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants The following equipment used in the decontamination of victims shall be maintained by the facility in close proximity to the emergency department.

Category Supplies Clothing Complete protective clothing for each member of the decontamination team:

Tyvek coveralls

Surgical gloves

Shoe coverings

Surgical masks

Surgical caps Detection equipment

Personnel dosimeters (pocket ionization type)

Thermoluminiscent dosimeters

Film badges

Geiger-Mueller meters (2) - Ludlum Model #5 with pancake probe (stored in nuclear medicine department)

Decontamination

Cotton applicators equipment

Large plastic bags (collection of clothes)

Adhesive tape and labels

Large towels

Soft scrub brushes

Plastic sheets

General cleansing agents: chlorine bleach, radiac wash (not to be used for patient decontamination), soap

Radiation warning signs

Copy of radiation accident standard protocol

Assorted pens

Specimen bottles (with and without heparin and ethylenediamine tetra acetic acid)

Kitty litter

Emesis basins

Fifty (50) feet of rope or flagging tape to identify restricted areas

Plastic tarpaulin or other plastic coverings for the floor Incident Command and Control When notice is received that patients are incoming, the hospital Administrator on Call will determine the extent to which the Emergency Operations Plan is activated and whether to establish the Hospital Incident Command System and Command Center. Guidance for activation criteria is set out in the EOP, and will include, for the purpose of this guideline, consideration of the number of patient to be received, the reported extent and severity of injuries, and probability of unmitigated gross contamination.

D-2 Rev. 55

UAB Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants It is critical to obtain the following information from Southern or the transporting EMS agency:

- Number of accident victims

- Each victim's medical status and mechanism of injury

- If victims have been surveyed for contamination (mR/hr)

- Radiological status of victims (exposed vs. contaminated) - If any doubt about contamination exists, assume the victim is contaminated until proven otherwise.

- Identity of contaminant/isotope, if known

- Estimated time of arrival

- Communication line with EMS crew to provide further instructions The Incident Commander shall activate such plans and resources as are necessary to assure the prompt evaluation, further decontamination, admission and treatment of Southern patients. These may include, but are not limited to the following:

- Type D - Code H

- Hazardous Materials Decontamination Assistance EPP#39r2

- Hazardous Material Incident Response EPP#22r3

- Establish an evaluation/decontamination area and communicate the location to arriving EMS

- Initiate response from the Radiation Safety Program (Page 8744)

- In consultation with the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), consider requesting additional resources if the number of patients and contamination potential warrants

- Ensure isolation of the decontamination area from the public and non-essential employees

- Provide for the collection and recovery of potentially contaminated clothing, supplies and equipment.

- Evacuate, transfer, or discharge of patients in areas necessary to the treatment of radiological patients, including those in designated shielded or isolated rooms.

- Notify Bone Marrow Transplant Unit of incoming patients and request assistance from Radiation Injury Treatment Network (RITN) team members The UAB Radiation Safety Officer supervises all aspects or patient contamination and exposure monitoring, decontamination, and collection and recovery of radioactive materials.

Staffing Assignments Nothing in these guidelines is intended to restrict the discretion of the Incident Command and Radiation Safety Officer in the development and implementation of decontamination, evaluation, and treatment protocols.

D-3 Rev. 55

UAB Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants Role - Assignment Radiation safety - Primary individual responsible for radiologic monitoring officer - Assists emergency department and triage staff in determination of the classification of victims

- Provides guidance and preparation of decontamination space

- Directs and conducts survey, monitoring, and decontamination

- Estimates risk by measurement of dose rate,

- Documents and records all measurements

- Conveys information of dose and risk to medical caregivers

- Directs collection of blood and other biologic samples that might be required

- Considers obtaining informed consent before allowing ED staff to work in high or very high dose rate areas

- Directs monitoring radiation doses of patients and response personnel (issuing badges to all workers in moderate to high dose rate areas)

- Assesses contamination of areas used in the administration of care to patients

- Reports of level of risk to clinicians and medical caregivers

- Considers reclassifying dose rate each hour and rotating staff if indicated Emergency - Primary individuals responsible for the care of the patient are the emergency department department medical director or, if unavailable, the emergency department personnel: physician assigned to trauma cases.

physicians/nurses - Physician is responsible for assuring that medical and surgical care is administered in a timely and effective manner.

- Nurse is usually the primary individual responsible for initial activation of the radiation event hospital protocol is usually the emergency department nurse supervisor.

- Nurse supervisor is responsible for assuring that the various aspects of the pre-approved radiation event protocol are properly implemented.

Nuclear medicine - Assists the Radiation Safety Staff in the collection, storage, and analysis of personnel samples, provide assistance and routine monitoring of personnel and equipment in the decontamination area

- Assists in the analysis of area and personnel contamination wipe tests, provide assistance in the monitoring of emergency transportation vehicles, and perform other duties related to radiation safety and protection, as directed by the radiation safety officer.

Hospital - Oversees the security operation to restrict unauthorized personnel from safety/security entering the hospital radiation decontamination area or other critical areas of coordinator the hospital, (Administrator on - Notifies state or federal officials if the situation requires assistance in excess of call) the hospitals capacity

- Assigns adequate personnel at the entrance of the hospital to restrict entry to the hospital to only those persons that are required for either operation of the hospital or implementation of the radiation disaster protocol

- Directs incoming ambulances to the proper hospital entrance as directed by the emergency department physician, radiation safety officer, or designees

- Secures the emergency medical services vehicle and prevents removal from hospital grounds until cleared by radiation safety staff, and reserves designated routes as needed.

Nursing staff - Provides staffing in the emergency department, operating room, and D-4 Rev. 55

UAB Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants elsewhere in the hospital

- Assists in decontamination, treatment, and psychological support of victims under the direction of radiation safety staff, emergency department staff, and hospital staff Physician and Allied - Radiation Oncologists Health specialists - Medical Oncologists/Hematologists with relevant - Pediatric Oncologists expertise who must - Psychiatrists be part of the - Blood Bank personnel response teams - Psychologists

- Social Workers

- Trauma and Burn Care

- Pulmonary

- Toxicology

- Pharmacy Engineering/ - Organizes and sets up decontamination area housekeeping staff - Provide plastic-lined waste containers and other supplies as needed in the emergency department for decontamination, with assistance from operating room personnel, radiation oncology personnel, and laboratory personnel will assist as indicated, following the radiation protocol and direction of radiation safety staff

- Will remove nonessential items of furniture from the decontamination area before arrival of the accident victims. They will participate in space clean-up as directed by radiation safety staff.

Public Information - Releases approved incident information to the public, media Officer Security - Secures hospital grounds, perimeter, ED access, contaminated and uncontaminated areas of the ED, and hospital including Radiology, OR etc.

Preparing the Treatment Area for Contamination Control If possible, select a treatment room near an outside entrance. Clear the area of visitors and patients.

Remove or cover equipment that will not be needed during emergency care of the radiation accident victim.

Several large plastic-lined waste containers will be needed. The treatment table should be covered with several layers of waterproof, disposable sheeting. Plastic bags in all sizes will be needed and should be readily available.

Survey instruments should be checked and ready for use before the patient arrives. Background radiation levels should be documented.

D-5 Rev. 55

UAB Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants The treatment team should be prepared to meet the patient at the ambulance where the patient can be transferred to the prepared treatment gurney.

Covering Floor Areas Rolls of brown wrapping paper or butcher paper three to four feet wide can be unrolled to make a path from the ambulance entrance to the decontamination room. Ordinary cloth sheets or square absorbent pads can be used if paper is unavailable. Whatever the floor covering, it should be taped securely to the floor. This route should then be roped off and marked to prevent unauthorized entry. The floor of the decontamination room or treatment area should be covered in a similar way if time allows. This will make cleanup of the area easier.

A control line should be established at the entrance to the decontamination room. A wide strip of tape on the floor at the entrance to the room should be marked clearly to differentiate the controlled (contaminated) from the non-controlled (uncontaminated) side.

Ventilation Control It is not likely that contaminants will become suspended in air and enter the ventilation system.

No special precautions are required.

Contamination Control Techniques Before and during patient treatment

- Set up a controlled area large enough to hold the anticipated number of victims.

- Prevent tracking of contaminants by covering floor areas and monitoring at exits of controlled areas.

- Restrict access to the controlled area.

- Monitoring anyone or anything leaving the controlled area.

- Use strict isolation precautions, including protective clothing and double bagging.

- Use a buffer zone or secondary control line for added security.

- Control waste by using large, plastic-lined containers for clothing, linens, dressings, etc.

- Control ventilation.

- Change instruments, outer gloves, drapes, etc., when they become contaminated.

- Use waterproof materials to limit the spread of contaminated liquids; for example, waterproof aperture drapes.

Following treatment of a contaminated patient

- Before leaving the decontamination area or after completion of handling and decontamination of victims of a radiation accident, all personnel of the medical triage team and equipment used will be surveyed by radiation staff.

D-6 Rev. 55

UAB Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants

- At the end of the event or work shift, personal monitoring devices will be provided to the radiation safety officer for processing.

- The victims must also be surveyed by the radiation safety officer or designee.

- If precise dosimetry is not immediately available, radiation safety staff will estimate patient and staff dosimetry.

- The radiation safety officer and security personnel will determine the best route to be used in transporting patients who might not be fully decontaminated to various treatment areas of the hospital.

- The decontamination space and other spaces in contact with contaminated victims will be surveyed and wipe-tested for contamination and decontaminated as needed.

- Radiation safety staff will direct decontamination of emergency transport vehicles, operating room, and elevators as needed.

- Hospitalized victims with persistent contamination will be surveyed daily and assessed for potential spread of contamination.

- Bed linen, bedclothes, and supplies will be bagged and surveyed.

- Personnel radiation monitoring devices carried by members of the team will be collected and analyzed.

- The radiation safety staff will identify these monitors and record exposures as available.

- All contaminated items will be bagged, labeled, and stored in the appropriate storage area under the direction of the radiation safety staff.

- No person or equipment shall be allowed to exit from the decontamination area without appropriate monitoring.

Guidance for Continuing Treatment Radiological Imaging

- After all clothing has been removed and gross decontamination has occurred, the patient can be X-rayed.

- If the patient is sufficiently decontaminated to be removed from the decontamination area, radiographic procedures can be performed within the emergency department or radiology department.

- If the treating physician believes that moving the patient from the decontamination area is unsafe, radiography can be performed with use of a portable X-ray unit.

- If the patient's condition warrants, radiographic procedures can be performed before complete decontamination.

Operating Room Considerations

- A victim of a radiation accident who requires surgery who has been exposed only to external radiation but no contamination requires no special care in the operating room.

D-7 Rev. 55

UAB Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines for the Intake and Treatment of Patients from Southern Nuclear Power Plants

- For those accident victims who require surgery and who might be externally or internally contaminated with radioactive materials, the staff of the operating room should take the following precautions to minimize the spread of contamination.

- A conventional operating room can be used, provided that there is adequate room to accommodate additional personnel along with the standard operating room staff.

- Everything within the operating room (i.e., operating table, smaller tables, and floor) should be covered with disposable plastic coverings.

- Routine antisepsis measures ensure adequate protection of the operating room staff against contamination.

- Unless otherwise instructed by the radiation safety officer (RSO), there is no danger of contamination to the anesthesia and breathing equipment. Other items (i.e., surgical equipment and instruments, and gloves) should be frequently changed to avoid the spread of contamination. An adequate supply of surgical equipment should be present (i.e.,

triplicate).

- Equipment should be monitored, surveyed, and wipe-tested by the RSO or his/her designee after use. Contaminated items will be placed in a container and stored in the nuclear medicine department. Areas of gross bodily contamination will be delineated and, if possible, covered with a plastic covering before surgery.

- If an area of bodily contamination is to be surgically incised, it should be washed with normal saline, Betadine, and/or hydrogen peroxide (according to preference of attending surgeon). For persistent contamination, consultation with the RSO might be appropriate regarding the use of diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (DTPA) (1 ampule of DTPA per 100 mL of water) or other chelating agent.

- Contaminated tissue removed from the victim should be placed in an appropriately labeled container and stored in the nuclear medicine department or other area of the hospital designated to be appropriate for storage of radioactive waste. The RSO should be notified of the location and type of stored tissue.

- Upon completion of the surgical procedure, the RSO or his/her designee will survey and wipe-test the remaining surgical equipment, surgical garb, and the plastic coverings of the operating room floor to ascertain contamination. Any items that are found to be contaminated will be placed in a container and transported to the nuclear medicine department for storage until adequately decayed. All personnel should be monitored with a standard Geiger-Mueller meter before exiting the operating room suite.

D-8 Rev. 55

APPENDIX E ORAU Medical Division Hospital: Daytime (615)483-8411 Extension 215 Night (615)483-6351

1. Hospital Facilities & Equipment

a. The Medical Division has facilities for accommodating approximately 20 patients who are contaminated or have received high doses of external radiation. A laminar flow facility with two sterile rooms is available for patients requiring isolation. The hospital has whole-body counters capable of evaluating internal contamination ranging from 1 nanocurie to 150 millicuries. Linear, Area, and Total-Body scanners, as well as an Angor Camera, can be used for scanning studies. Probes are available for locating radioactive particles in wounds. The hospital also is equipped with physiological monitoring equipment on a computer hookup for automatically evaluating respiratory and cardiac changes.

b. A suitable area for performing decontamination can be provided. Disposal of both liquid and solid radioactive wastes can be handled. Shields and remote handling equipment are available for the protection of staff and visitors from high radiation levels if the patient is highly contaminated or radioactive.

2. Medical and Technical Staff

a. The Medical Division staff of about ten physicians has considerable experience in total-body irradiation. Several have participated in the handling of previous radiation accidents. Experience in treatment procedures such as bone marrow transplants and platelet and white cell transfusions is also represented by this staff. In addition to the physicians on the ORAU staff, other specialists from Oak Ridge Hospital of the Methodist Church, hospitals in Knoxville, and the Health Physics Division and the Biology Division of Oak Ridge National Laboratory are available for consultation and assistance.

b. Nursing Staff Nurses, nurses aides, and orderlies provide patient care. Like the physicians at the Medical Division, the staff is experienced in handling patients who have been treated with or accidentally exposed to both external and internal radiation.

c. Auxiliary Services Support services available at the Medical Division Hospital include bacteriology, cytogenetics, clinical chemistry, hematology, radiology, scanning, whole-body scanning, radiation dosimetry, and pathology.

E-1 Rev. 56

APPENDIX E

3. Health Physics Services

a. The Health Physicists at ORAU are certified by the American Board of Health Physics. These Health Physicists and their technical staff have several years of experience with patients who have received radiation exposure in varying amounts.

b. Equipment includes a variety of frequently calibrated survey instruments, air sampling equipment, personnel monitoring devices, area monitoring devices, counting equipment for alpha, low-energy beta, beta-gamma, and gamma radiation, and a multichannel analyzer. Additional equipment is also available from other ORAU divisions.

c. In addition to the ORAU health physics staff, ORNL and AEC/ORO health physicists are also available for consultation and assistance. The protection of ORAU personnel and facilities will be the responsibility of the ORAU Radiation and Chemical Safety Office, and Operations will be performed in accordance with the requirements of the ORAU Radiation Safety Manual.

E-2 Rev. 56

APPENDIX F ROSTER OF MEDICAL CONSULTANTS I. SOUTHERN NUCLEAR MEDICAL DIRECTOR C. Calvert Dodson, III, M.D.

II. SNC CONTRACT PHYSICIANS (FAIRVIEW CLINIC, DOTHAN)

Earl F. Mazyck, M.D.

James A. Robeson, Jr. M.D.

J. Ryan Conner, M.D.

Christopher L. Miller, M.D.

III. SAMC STAFF James C. Jones, D.O., Director, Emergency Room IV. UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA MEDICAL CENTER STAFF Chris Roskoe, M.D., Medical Director, Emergency Room F-1 Rev. 49

NL-13-0053, Emergency Plan, Rev. 58. Page J-12 Through End

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