Text

Issuance of Amendment Nos. 352 and 334 Adoption of TSTF-505, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B and TSTF-591, Revise RICT Program
	ML26023A048
Person / Time
Site:	Salem ; (DPR-070, DPR-075)
Issue date:	02/20/2026
From:	Richard Guzman; NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL1
To:	Mcfeaters C; Public Service Enterprise Group
References
	EPID L-2025-LLA-0021
	Download: ML26023A048 (0)
	v • d • e

February 20, 2026 Mr. Charles V. McFeaters President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT:

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 352 AND 334 RE: ADOPTION OF TSTF-505, PROVIDE RISK-INFORMED EXTENDED COMPLETION TIMES - RITSTF INITIATIVE 4B AND TSTF-591, REVISE RISK INFORMED COMPLETION TIME (RICT) PROGRAM (EPID L-2025-LLA-0021)

Dear Mr. McFeaters:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 352 and 334 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated January 31, 2025, as supplemented by letters dated October 10 and November 19, 2025.

The amendments adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Travelers TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b and TSTF-591, Revision 0, Revise Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program.

A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Richard Guzman, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 352 to DPR-70

2. Amendment No. 334 to DPR-75

3. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv

PSEG NUCLEAR LLC CONSTELLATION ENERGY GENERATION, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-272 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 352 Renewed License No. DPR-70

1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by PSEG Nuclear LLC dated January 31, 2025, as supplemented by letters dated October 10 and November 19, 2025, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 352, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Undine Shoop, Acting Chief Plant Licensing Branch I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 20, 2026 UNDINE SHOOP Digitally signed by UNDINE SHOOP Date: 2026.02.20 14:15:31 -05'00'

Renewed License No. DPR-70 Amendment No. 352 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 352 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Replace the following page of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 with the attached revised page as indicated. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert Page 3 Page 3 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 3-3 3/4 3-3 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-22 3/4 4-5 3/4 4-5 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 6-5a 3/4 6-5a 3/4 6-9 3/4 6-9 3/4 6-11 3/4 6-11 3/4 6-12 3/4 6-12 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-10 3/4 7-10 3/4 7-15 3/4 7-15 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-19 3/4 7-19 3/4 7-22 3/4 7-22 3/4 7-33a 3/4 7-33a 3/4 7-39 3/4 7-39 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-2a 3/4 8-2a 3/4 8-2b 3/4 8-2b 3/4 8-6 3/4 8-6 3/4 8-8 3/4 8-8 3/4 8-11 3/4 8-11 6-24c 6-24c 6-32 Renewed License No. DPR-70 Amendment No. 352 (4)

PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70 to receive, possess and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5)

PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6)

PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level PSEG Nuclear LLC is authorized to operate the facility at a steady state reactor core power level not in excess of 3459 megawatts (one hundred percent of rated core power).

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 352, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3)

Deleted Per Amendment 22, 11-20-79 (4)

Less than Four Loop Operation PSEG Nuclear LLC shall not operate the reactor at power levels above P-7 (as defined in Table 3.3-1 of Specification 3.3.1.1 of Appendix A to this renewed license) with less than four (4) reactor coolant loops in operation until safety analyses for less than four loop operation have been submitted by the licensees and approval for less than four loop operation at power levels above P-7 has been granted by the Commission by Amendment of this renewed license.

(5)

PSEG Nuclear LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A flow path from the boric acid tanks via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b.

Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 Each of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

By verifying in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program that:

(1)

The flow path from the boric acid tank to the boric acid transfer pump and from the recirculation line back to the boric acid tank is 63°F, and (2) the flow path between the boric acid tank recirculation line to the charging pump suction line is 50°F,

b.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 352

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% k/k at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS CHANNELS TO TRIP MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE MODES ACTION

11. Pressurizer Water Level--High 3

2 2

1, 2 6

12. Loss of Flow - Single Loop (Above P-8) 3/loop 2/loop in any operating loop 2/loop in each operating loop 1

6

13. Loss of Flow - Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8) 3/loop 2/loop in two operating loops 2/loop in each operating loop 1

15

14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low 3/loop 2/loop in any operating loops 2/loop in each operating loop 1, 2 6

15. Deleted

16. Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps 4-1/bus 1/2 twice 3

1 6

17. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps 4-1/bus 1/2 twice 3

1 6

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a)

Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b)

Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (c)

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

If ACTION Statement 1 is entered as a result of Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) or Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers (RTBB) maintenance testing results exceeding the following acceptance criteria, NRC reporting shall be made within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2:

1.

A RTB or RTBB trip failure during any surveillance test with less than or equal to 300 grams of weight added to the breaker trip bar.

2.

A RTB or RTBB time response failure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the Technical Specification limit.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel (RTB) to OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 2 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

c.

Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range, Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 3 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a.

One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or,

2. Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions** and,

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

ACTION 4 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a.

One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions**.

b.

Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 5 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

ACTION 6 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 7 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a.

One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement:

1. Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or

2. Initiate action to fully insert all rods within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months and place the Control Rod Drive System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the next hour.

b.

Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 8 -

NOT USED ACTION 9 -

NOT USED ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

ACTION 12 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and/or open the reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 14 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or declare the breaker inoperable and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS DESIGNATION CONDITION AND SETPOINT FUNCTION P-6 With 2 of 2 Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Channels

< 4.7x10-6 % of RTP.

P-6 prevents or defeats the manual block of source range reactor trip.

P-7 With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels 11% of RATED THERMAL POWER or 1 of 2 Turbine steam line input pressure channels a pressure equivalent to 11% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-7 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on: Low flow in more than one primary coolant loop, reactor coolant pump undervoltage and under-frequency, pressurizer low pressure, pressurizer high level, and the opening of more than one reactor coolant pump breaker.

P-8 With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron Flux channels 36% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-8 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on low coolant flow in a single loop.

P-9 With 2 of 4 Power Range neutron flux channels 50%

RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-9 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on turbine trip.

P-10 With 3 of 4 Power range neutron flux channels < 9% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-10 prevents or defeats the manual block of:

Power range low setpoint reactor trip, Intermediate range reactor trip, and intermediate range rod stops.

Provides input to P-7.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-11.

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-12.

Except when all main feedwater lines are isolated by (1) a closed and de-activated feedwater isolation valve, or (2) closed and de-activated feedwater regulating valve (FRV) and FRV bypass valves, or (3) a closed manual valve.

Applies to Functional Unit 8 items c and d.

The automatic actuation logic includes two redundant solenoid operated vent valves for each Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). Vent valves associated with an inoperable MSIV may be isolated provided that the MSIV is closed in accordance with actions of TS 3.7.1.5. One vent valve on any one of the remaining OPERABLE or open MSIVs may be isolated without affecting the function of the automatic actuation logic provided the remaining solenoid vent valves remain OPERABLE. The isolated MSIV vent valve shall be returned to OPERABLE status upon the first entry into MODE 5 following determination that the vent valve is inoperable. For any condition where more than one solenoid vent valve is inoperable for the OPERABLE or open MSIVs, entry into ACTION 20 is required.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

ACTION 15 - NOT USED ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated by CHANNEL CHECK within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operations may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-21 Amendment No. 352

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided that the inoperable channel is restored to OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

ACTION 22 - NOT USED ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-22 Amendment No. 352

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 Two power relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c.

With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Restore the remaining PORV to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from failure of that valve to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation.

d.

With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place the associated PORV in manual control; restore the block valve to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

e.

With both block valves inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore the block valves to OPERABLE status or place the associated PORVs in manual control; restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Restore the remaining block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from failure of that valve to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 4-5 Amendment No. 352

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg 350°F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of the following injection systems:

a.

One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump and associated flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the residual heat removal pump discharge piping and;

1.

Discharging into each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg.

b.

One OPERABLE safety injection pump and associated flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the residual heat removal pump discharge piping and;

1.

Discharging into each RCS cold leg, and; upon manual initiation,

2.

Discharging into its two associated RCS hot legs.

c.

One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump and associated residual heat removal heat exchanger and flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation and;

1.

Discharging into each RCS cold leg.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

c.

With both ECCS subsystems inoperable for surveillance testing; restore at least one subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 352

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONS (Continued)

c.

One or more containment air locks inoperable for reasons other than condition a.

or b.

1.

Immediately initiate action to evaluate overall containment leakage per LCO 3.6.1, and:

2.

Verify that at least one door is closed in the affected air lock within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and:

3.

Restore the air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

d.

If the ACTIONS and associated completion times of a., b., or c. cannot be met, be in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

By verifying seal leakage rate in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing program.

b.

By conducting an overall air lock leakage test in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

c.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 6-5a Amendment No. 352

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE with each spray system capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the RHR pump discharge.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 204 psid when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

c.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown, by:

1.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment High-High pressure test signal.

2.

Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a Containment High-High pressure test signal.

d.

Following activities that could result in nozzle blockage, either evaluate the work performed to determine the impact to the containment spray system, or perform an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 6-9 Amendment No. 352

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.3 Five containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one or two of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With three or more of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable, restore at least three cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY WITHIN the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore the remaining inoperable cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 14 days of initial loss or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.3 Each containment cooling fan shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 6-11 Amendment No. 352

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

NOTE 1 Penetration flow paths, except for the containment purge valves, may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

Note 2 A containment purge valve is not a required containment isolation valve when its flow path is isolated with a testable blind flange tested in accordance with SR 4.6.1.2.b. The required containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be closed. (Valves immobilized in shut position with control air to valve operators isolated and tagged out of service).

NOTE 3 The containment pressure-vacuum relief isolation valves may be opened on an intermittent basis, under administrative control, as necessary to satisfy the requirement of Specification 3.6.1.4.

1.

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

a.

Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or

b.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

2.

With one required containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve open, close the open valve(s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1.1 DELETED SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 6-12 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated manual activation switches in the control room and flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Two feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate vital busses, and

b.

One feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c.

With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective ACTION to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

d.

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:

1.

Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

2.

Verify the manual maintenance valves in the flow path to each steam generator are locked open.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 MODES 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed.

ACTION:

MODES 1 -

With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; otherwise, be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

MODES 2 -

With one or more main steam line isolation valve(s) inoperable, subsequent and 3 operation in MODES 2 or 3 may proceed provided;

a.

The isolation valve(s) is (are) maintained closed, and

b.

The isolation valve(s) is (are) verified closed once per 7 days.

Otherwise, be in MODE 3, HOT STANDBY, within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and MODE 4, HOT SHUTDOWN, within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-10 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3.1 At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3.1 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-15 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1 At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on Safeguards Initiation signal.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.1 The common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS)* shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Two independent air conditioning filtration trains (one from each unit) consisting of:

1.

Two fans and associated outlet dampers,

2.

One cooling coil,

3.

One charcoal adsorber and HEPA filter array,

4.

Return air isolation damper.

b.

All other automatic dampers required for operation in the pressurization or recirculation modes.

c.

The control room envelope intact.

NOTE: The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

a.

With one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation** within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , and restore the inoperable filtration train to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation and with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the inoperable fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With the Control Room Envelope boundary inoperable:

1.

Immediately, initiate action to implement mitigating actions, and

2.

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits, and

3.

Within 90 days, restore the Control Room Envelope boundary to OPERABLE status, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

The CREACS is a shared system with Salem Unit 2 Alignment only permitted if the Unit with the operable CREACS train is also in Chilled Water System LCO 3.7.10a configuration. Alignment is not permitted if in the LCO 3.7.10c configuration.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

d.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Refer to ACTION 25 of Table 3.3-6.)

e.

With one or both isolation damper(s) on an outside emergency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position and restore the damper(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies

a.

With one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation** within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

c.

With two filtration trains inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

d.

With the Control Room Envelope boundary inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

e.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal CAACS outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position. (Refer to ACTION 25 of Table 3.3-6.)

f.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on an outside emergency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position. To resume movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, at least one emergency air intake duct must be operable on each unit.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-19 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 At least two supply fans, and three exhaust fans shall be OPERABLE (*) to maintain the Auxiliary Building at slightly negative pressure.

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

The intermittent opening of the Auxiliary Building pressure boundary causing a loss of negative pressure may be performed under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY: At all times ACTION:

Modes 1 thru 4 a)

With one supply fan and/or one exhaust fan inoperable, restore the fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b)

With two supply and/or two exhaust fans inoperable restore at least one inoperable supply and two exhaust fans to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c)

With the Auxiliary Building pressure not maintained slightly negative, restore the Auxiliary Building to slightly negative pressure within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

During CORE ALTERATIONS d)

With the Auxiliary Building pressure not maintained slightly negative, restore the Auxiliary Building to slightly negative pressure within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS.

At all times e)

With the Auxiliary Building pressure not maintained slightly negative, suspend all operations involving radioactive gaseous releases via the Auxiliary Building immediately.

(*)

One of the supply fans may be considered OPERABLE with its auto start circuit administratively controlled (removed from service) to prevent more than one supply fan from operating at any time.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-22 Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION(3): MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

a.

With one of the required chillers inoperable:

1.

Remove(4) the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

2.

Restore the chiller to OPERABLE status within 14 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or;

3.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With two of the required chillers inoperable(5)(6):

1.

Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

2.

Align the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACs) for single filtration operation using the Salem Unit 2 train within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

3.

Restore at least one chiller to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or;

4.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With one chilled water pump inoperable, restore the chilled water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ACTION(3): MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. *

a.

With one of the required chillers inoperable:

1.

Remove(4) the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

2.

Restore the chiller to OPERABLE status within 14 days or;

3.

Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-33a Amendment No. 352

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.13 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (FIVS), MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES (FRVS), FRV BYPASS VALVES (FRVBVS), AND STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP (SGFP) TURBINE STEAM STOP VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (continued)

ACTION:

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition Entry is allowed for each valve

a.

With one or more FIVs inoperable, restore the inoperable FIV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FIV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify the inoperable FIV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

b.

With one or more FRVs inoperable, restore the inoperable FRV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FRV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify the inoperable FRV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

c.

With one or more FRVBV(s) inoperable, restore the inoperable FRVBV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FRVBV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify the inoperable FRVBV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

d.

With one or more SGFP turbine steam stop valves inoperable, restore the inoperable SGFP turbine stop valve(s) to OPERABLE status or isolate the associated steam supply to the SGFP turbine or isolate the SGFP flow path within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify that the inoperable SGFP steam stop valve is isolated or the SGFP flow path is isolated once per 7 days.

e.

With two (2) valves in the same feedwater flowpath inoperable resulting in a loss of feedwater isolation capability for a flow path, restore at least one valve to OPERABLE status or isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

f.

With the required ACTION requirements above not met, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.13.1 Each FIV, FRV, FRVBV and SGFP turbine steam stop valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by determining the isolation time of each valve to be within limits when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

4.7.13.2 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, verify each FIV, FRV, FRVBV and SGFP turbine steam stop valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-39 Amendment No. 352

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two physically independent A.C. circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system (vital bus system), and

b.

Three separate and independent diesel generators with:

1.

Separate day tanks containing a minimum volume of 130 gallons of fuel, and

2.

A common fuel storage system consisting of two storage tanks, each containing a minimum volume of 23,000 gallons of fuel, and two fuel transfer pumps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With an independent A.C. circuit of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:

1.

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; and

2.

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , declare required systems or components with no offsite power available inoperable when a redundant required system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; and

3.

Restore the inoperable independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:

1.

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; and SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 8-1 Amendment No. 352

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (Continued)

2.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable diesel generator inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; and

3.

Determine the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators are not inoperable due to common cause failure or perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . If the diesel generator is inoperable for preventive maintenance, the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators need not be tested nor the OPERABILITY evaluated; and

4.

In any case:

a) Restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status:

1. Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Or,

2. Within 14 days if the Supplemental Power Source (SPS) is available within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and verified once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter:

a. If at any time the availability of the SPS cannot be met, restore the SPS to available status or restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from entry into 3.8.1.1 Action b, or

b. If at any time the availability of the SPS cannot be met and 3.8.1.1 Action b has been entered for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , restore the SPS to available status or restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Or

3. In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.(1)

Otherwise,

4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

(1) The Risk Informed Completion Time Program cannot be applied to an unavailable SPS.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 8-2 Amendment No. 352

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (Continued)

c.

With one independent A.C. circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore at least two independent A.C. circuits and three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

d.

With two of the above required independent A.C. circuits inoperable:

1.

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of three diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , unless the diesel generators are already operating; and

2.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable offsite circuits inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; and

3.

Restore at least one of the inoperable independent A.C. circuits to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; and

4.

With only one of the independent A.C. circuits OPERABLE, restore the other independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from time of initial loss or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 8-2a Amendment No. 352

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (Continued)

e.

With two or more of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; restore at least two of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from time of initial loss or be in least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .(2)

f.

With one of the above required fuel transfer pumps inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

g.

With one of the above required fuel storage tanks inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

h.

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

(2) The Risk Informed Completion Time Program cannot be entered when a loss of function occurs.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 8-2b Amendment No. 352

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS A.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.1 The following A.C. electrical busses shall be OPERABLE and energized from sources of power other than the diesel generators:

4 kvolt Vital Bus # 1A 4 kvolt Vital Bus # 1B 4 kvolt Vital Bus # 1C 460 volt Vital Bus # 1A and associated control centers 460 volt Vital Bus # 1B and associated control centers 460 volt Vital Bus # 1C and associated control centers 230 volt Vital Bus # 1A and associated control centers 230 volt Vital Bus # 1B and associated control centers 230 volt Vital Bus # 1C and associated control centers 115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 1A and Inverter 115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 1B and Inverter 115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 1C and Inverter

115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 1D and Inverter

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With less than the above complement of A.C. busses OPERABLE or energized, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE and energized status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .(**)

b.

With one inverter inoperable, energize the associated A.C. Vital Bus within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; restore the inoperable inverter to OPERABLE and energized status within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.1 The specified A.C. busses shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from A.C.

sources other than the diesel generators in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

(*)

An inverter may be disconnected from its DC source for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for the purpose of performing an equalizing charge on its associated battery bank provided (1) its vital bus is OPERABLE and energized, and (2) the vital busses associated with the other battery banks are OPERABLE and energized.

(**)

The Risk Informed Completion Time Program cannot be entered when a loss of function occurs.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 8-6 Amendment No. 352

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 125-VOLT D.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.3 The following D.C. bus trains shall be OPERABLE and energized:

TRAIN 1A consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus No. 1A, 125-volt D.C. battery No. 1A and battery charger 1A1.

TRAIN 1B consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus No. 1B, 125-volt D.C. battery No. 1B and battery charger 1B1.

TRAIN 1C consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus No. 1C, 125-volt D.C. battery No. 1C and battery charger 1C1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one 125-volt D.C. bus inoperable or not energized, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE and energized status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one 125-volt D.C. battery charger inoperable, restore the inoperable charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or connect the backup charger for no more than 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With one or more 125-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within the Category A or B limits of Table 4.8.2.3-1:

1.

Verify within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , that the electrolyte level and float voltage for the pilot cell meets Table 4.8.2.3-1 Category C limits, and

2.

Verify within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , that the battery cell parameters of all connected cells meet Table 4.8.2.3-1 Category C limits, and

3.

Restore battery cell parameters to Category A and B limits of Table 4.8.2.3-1 within 31 days, and

4.

If any of the above listed requirements cannot be met, comply with the requirements of action f.

d.

With one or more 125-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Table 4.8.2.3-1 Category C values, comply with the requirements of action f.

e.

With average electrolyte temperature of representative cells less than 65°F, comply with the requirements of action f.

f.

Restore the battery to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 8-8 Amendment No. 352

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 28-VOLT D.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.5 The following D.C. bus trains shall be energized and OPERABLE:

TRAIN 1A consisting of 28-volt D.C. bus No. 1A, 28-volt D.C. battery No. 1A and battery charger 1A1.

TRAIN 1B consisting of 28-volt D.C. bus No. 1B, 28-volt D.C. battery No. 1B and battery charger 1B1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one 28-volt D.C. bus inoperable or not energized, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE and energized status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one required 28-volt D.C. battery charger inoperable, restore the inoperable battery charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or connect the backup charger for no more than 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With one or more 28-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within the Category A or B limits of Table 4.8.2.5-1:

1.

Verify within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , that the electrolyte level and float voltage for the pilot cell meets Table 4.8.2.5-1 Category C limits, and

2.

Verify within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , that the battery cell parameters of all connected cells meet Table 4.8.2.5-1 Category C limits, and

3.

Restore battery cell parameters to Category A and B limits of Table 4.8.2.5-1 within 31 days, and

4.

If any of the above listed requirements cannot be met, comply with the requirements of action f.

d.

With one or more 28-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Table 4.8.2.5-1 Category C values, comply with the requirements of action f.

e.

With average electrolyte temperature of representative cells less than 65°F, comply with the requirements of action f.

f.

Restore the battery to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 8-11 Amendment No. 352

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

c. The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluence period and for any revision or supplements thereto.

6.9.1.12 RISK INFORMED COMPLETION TIME (RICT) PROGRAM UPGRADE REPORT A report describing newly developed methods and their implementation must be submitted following a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) upgrade associated with newly developed methods and prior to the first use of those methods to calculate a RICT. The report shall include:

a. The PRA models upgraded to include newly developed methods;

b. A description of the acceptability of the newly developed methods consistent with Section 5.2 of PWROG-19027-NP, Revision 2, Newly Developed Method Requirements and Peer Review;

c. Any open findings from the peer-review of the implementation of the newly developed methods and how those findings were dispositioned; and

d. All changes to key assumptions related to newly developed methods or their implementation.

SPECIAL REPORTS 6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Administrator, USNRC Region I within the time period specified for each report.

6.9.3 DELETED 6.9.4 When a report is required by ACTION 1, 4, 8 or 9 of Table 3.3-11 "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation", a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring for inadequate core cooling, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument channels to OPERABLE status.

SALEM - UNIT 1 6-24c Amendment No. 352

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.19 RISK INFORMED COMPLETION TIME PROGRAM This program provides controls to calculate a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) and must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09-A, Revision 0, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines. The program shall include the following:

a.

The RICT may not exceed 30 days;

b.

A RICT may only be utilized in MODE 1 and 2;

c.

When a RICT is being used, any change to the plant configuration, as defined in NEI 06 09-A, Appendix A, must be considered for the effect on the RICT.

1.

For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration.

2.

For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

3.

Revising the RICT is not required if the plant configuration change would lower plant risk and would result in a longer RICT.

d.

For emergent conditions, if the extent of condition evaluation for inoperable structures, systems, or components (SSCs) is not complete prior to exceeding the Completion Time, the RICT shall account for the increased possibility of common cause failure (CCF) by either:

1.

Numerically accounting for the increased possibility of CCF in the RICT calculation; or

2.

Risk Management Actions (RMAs) not already credited in the RICT calculation shall be implemented that support redundant or diverse SSCs that perform the function(s) of the inoperable SSCs, and, if practicable, reduce the frequency of initiating events that challenge the function(s) performed by the inoperable SSCs.

e.

A RICT calculation must include the following hazard groups: internal flood and internal events PRA model, internal fire PRA model, seismic penalty factor, and tornado missile penalty factor. Changes to these means of assessing the hazard groups require prior NRC approval.

f.

The PRA models used to calculate a RICT shall be maintained and upgraded in accordance with the processes endorsed in the regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 3, "Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities."

g.

A report shall be submitted in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.12 before a newly developed method is used to calculate a RICT.

SALEM - UNIT 1 6-32 Amendment No. 352

PSEG NUCLEAR LLC CONSTELLATION ENERGY GENERATION, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-311 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 334 Renewed License No. DPR-75

1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by PSEG Nuclear LLC dated January 31, 2025, as supplemented by letters dated October 10 and November 19, 2025, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations, and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 334, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Undine Shoop, Acting Chief Plant Licensing Branch I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 20, 2026 UNDINE SHOOP Digitally signed by UNDINE SHOOP Date: 2026.02.20 14:16:46 -05'00'

Renewed License No. DPR-75 Amendment No. 334 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 334 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Replace the following page of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 with the attached revised page as indicated. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert Page 3 Page 3 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-10 3/4 1-10 3/4 3-3 3/4 3-3 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-23 3/4 4-8 3/4 4-8 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 6-5 3/4 6-5 3/4 6-10 3/4 6-10 3/4 6-12 3/4 6-12 3/4 6-14 3/4 6-14 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-15 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-10 3/4 7-10 3/4 7-12 3/4 7-12 3/4 7-13 3/4 7-13 3/4 7-15 3/4 7-15 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-28a 3/4 7-28a 3/4 7-34 3/4 7-34 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-2a 3/4 8-2a 3/4 8-2b 3/4 8-2b 3/4 8-8 3/4 8-8 3/4 8-10 3/4 8-10 3/4 8-11 3/4 8-11 3/4 8-13 3/4 8-13 6-24c 6-24c 6-31 6-31 6-32 Renewed License No. DPR-75 Amendment No. 334 (3)

PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended (4)

PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use at any time any byproduct, source or special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5)

PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6)

PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level PSEG Nuclear LLC is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts (thermal).

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 334, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A flow path from the boric acid tanks via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b.

Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 Each of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

By verifying in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program that:

(1)

The flow path from the boric acid tank to the boric acid transfer pump and from the recirculation line back to the boric acid tank is 63°F, and (2)

The flow path between the boric acid tank recirculation line to the charging pump suction line is 50°F,

b.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.

d.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2.a delivers at least 33 gpm to the Reactor Coolant System.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 334

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1%

delta k/k at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS CHANNELS TO TRIP MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE MODES ACTION

11. Pressurizer Water Level--High 3

2 2

1, 2 6

12. Loss of Flow -

Single Loop (Above P-8) 3/loop 2/loop in any operating loop 2/loop in each operating loop 1

6

13. Loss of Flow -

Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8) 3/loop 2/loop in two operating loops 2/loop in each operating loop 1

15

14. Steam Generator Water Level--

Low-Low 3/loop 2/loop in any operating loops 2/loop in each operating loop 1, 2 6

15. Deleted

16. Undevoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps 4-1/bus 1/2 twice 3

1 6

17. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps 4-1/bus 1/2 twice 3

1 6

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a)

Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b)

Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (c)

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

If ACTION Statement 1 is entered as a result of Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) or Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker (RTBB) maintenance testing results exceeding the following acceptance criteria, NRC reporting shall be made within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2:

1.

A RTB or RTBB trip failure during any surveillance test with less than or equal to 300 grams of weight added to the breaker trip bar.

2.

A RTB or RTBB time response failure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the Technical Specification limit.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel (RTB) to OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 2 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

c.

Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range, Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

d.

The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, as indicated by the remaining three detectors, is verified consistent with the normalized symmetric power distribution obtained by using either the movable in-core detectors in the four pairs of symmetric thimble locations or the power distribution monitoring system at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when THERMAL POWER is greater than 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION 3 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a.

One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or,

2. Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions** and,

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

ACTION 4 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a.

One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions**.

b.

Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 5 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

ACTION 6 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

b.

The Minimum Channel OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

ACTION 7 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a.

One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement:

1. Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or

2. Initiate action to fully insert all rods within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months and place the Control Rod Drive System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the next hour.

b.

Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 8 -

NOT USED ACTION 9 -

NOT USED ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

ACTION 12 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and/or open the reactor trip breakers.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 14 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or declare the breaker inoperable and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS DESIGNATION CONDITION AND SETPOINT FUNCTION P-6 With 2 of 2 Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Channels

< 4.7x10-6% of RTP.

P-6 prevents or defeats the manual block of source range reactor trip.

P-7 With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels 11% of RATED THERMAL POWER or 1 of 2 Turbine steam line inlet pressure channels a pressure equivalent to 11% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-7 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on: Low flow in more than one primary coolant loop, reactor coolant pump undervoltage and under-frequency, pressurizer low pressure, pressurizer high level, and the opening of more than one reactor coolant pump breaker.

P-8 With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron flux channels 36% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-8 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on low coolant flow in a single loop.

P-9 With 2 of 4 Power range neutron flux channels 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-9 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on turbine trip.

P-10 With 3 of 4 Power range neutron flux channels < 9% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

P-10 prevents or defeats the manual block of:

Power range low setpoint reactor trip, Intermediate range reactor trip, and intermediate range rod stops.

Provides input to P-7.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-11.

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-12.

Except when all main feedwater lines are isolated by (1) a closed and de-activated feedwater isolation valve, or (2) closed and de-activated feedwater regulating valve (FRV) and FRV bypass valves, or (3) a closed manual valve.

Applies to Functional Unit 8 items c and d.

The automatic actuation logic includes two redundant solenoid operated vent valves for each Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). Vent valves associated with an inoperable MSIV may be isolated provided that the MSIV is closed in accordance with actions of TS 3.7.1.5. One vent valve on any one of the remaining OPERABLE or open MSIVs may be isolated without affecting the function of the automatic actuation logic provided the remaining solenoid vent valves remain OPERABLE. The isolated MSIV vent valve shall be returned to OPERABLE status upon the first entry into MODE 5 following determination that the vent valve is inoperable. For any condition where more than one solenoid vent valve is inoperable for the OPERABLE or open MSIVs, entry into ACTION 20 is required.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

ACTION 15 - NOT USED ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated by CHANNEL CHECK within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-22 Amendment No. 334

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided that the inoperable channel is restored to OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

ACTION 22 - NOT USED ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 Amendment No. 334

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.5 Two power relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c.

With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Restore the remaining PORV to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from failure of that valve to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation.

d.

With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place the associated PORV in manual control; restore the block valve to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

e.

With both block valves inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore the block valves to OPERABLE status or place the associated PORVs in manual control; restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Restore the remaining block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from failure of that valve to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 4-8 Amendment No. 334

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg 350°F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of the following injection systems:

a.

One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump and associated flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the residual heat removal pump discharge piping and;

1.

Discharging into each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg.

b.

One OPERABLE safety injection pump and associated flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the residual heat removal pump discharge piping and;

1.

Discharging into each RCS cold leg, and; upon manual initiation,

2.

Discharging into its two associated RCS hot legs.

c.

One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump and associated residual heat removal heat exchanger and flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation and;

1.

Discharging into each RCS cold leg.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 334

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONS (Continued)

c.

One or more containment air locks inoperable for reasons other than condition a.

or b.

1.

Immediately initiate action to evaluate overall containment leakage per LCO 3.6.1, and:

2.

Verify that at least one door is closed in the affected air lock within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and:

3.

Restore the air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

d.

If the ACTIONS and associated completion times of a., b., or c. cannot be met, be in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

By verifying seal leakage rate in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing program.

b.

By conducting an overall air lock leakage test in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

c.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 6-5 Amendment No. 334

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE with each spray system capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the RHR pump discharge.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 204 psid when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

c.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown, by:

1.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment High-High pressure test signal.

2.

Verifying each spray pump starts automatically on a Containment High-High pressure test signal.

d.

Following activities that could result in nozzle blockage, either evaluate the work performed to determine the impact to the containment spray system, or perform an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 6-10 Amendment No. 334

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.3 Five containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one or two of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With three or more of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable, restore at least three cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY WITHIN the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore the remaining inoperable cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 14 days of initial loss or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.3 Each containment cooling fan shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 6-12 Amendment No. 334

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

NOTE 1 Penetration flow paths, except for the containment purge valves, may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

Note 2 A containment purge valve is not a required containment isolation valve when its flow path is isolated with a testable blind flange tested in accordance with SR 4.6.1.2.b. The required containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be closed. (Valves immobilized in shut position with control air to valve operators isolated and tagged out of service).

NOTE 3 The containment pressure-vacuum relief isolation valves may be opened on an intermittent basis, under administrative control, as necessary to satisfy the requirement of Specification 3.6.1.4.

1.

With one or more of the containment isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

a.

Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or

b.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

2.

With one required containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve open, close the open valve(s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 6-14 Amendment No. 334

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1 DELETED 4.6.3.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:

a.

Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal, each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b.

Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

c.

NOT USED

d.

Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relief isolation test signal, each required Purge and each Pressure-Vacuum Relief valve actuates to its isolation position.

e.

Verifying that the Containment Pressure-Vacuum Relief Isolation valves are limited to 60° opening angle.

4.6.3.3 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, verify that on a main steam isolation test signal, each main steam isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.4 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

4.6.3.5 Each required containment purge isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after each closing of the valve, except when the valve is being used for multiple cyclings, then in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, by verifying that when the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.b for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60La.

4.6.3.6 A pressure drop test to identify excessive degradation of resilient valve seals shall be conducted on the:

a.

Required Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Isolation Valves in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

b.

Deleted.

4.6.3.7 The required containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined closed in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated manual activation switches in the control room and flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Two feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate vital busses, and

b.

One feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c.

With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

d.

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:

1.

Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

2.

Verify the manual maintenance valves in the flow path to each steam generator are locked open.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 MODES 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed.

ACTION:

MODE 1 -

With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; Otherwise, be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

MODES 2 -

With one or more main steam line isolation valve(s) inoperable, subsequent and 3 operation in MODES 2 or 3 may proceed provided;

a.

The isolation valve(s) is (are) maintained closed, and

b.

The isolation valve(s) is (are) verified closed once per 7 days.

Otherwise, be in MODE 3, HOT STANDBY, within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and MODE 4, HOT SHUTDOWN, within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-10 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-12 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on Safeguards Initiation signal.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-13 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6 The common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS)* shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Two independent air conditioning filtration trains (one from each unit) consisting of:

1.

Two fans and associated outlet dampers,

2.

One cooling coil,

3.

One charcoal adsorber and HEPA filter array,

4.

Return air isolation damper.

b.

All other automatic dampers required for operation in the pressurization or recirculation modes.

c.

The control room envelope intact.

NOTE: The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

a.

With one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation** within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , and restore the inoperable filtration train to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation and with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the inoperable fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With the Control Room Envelope boundary inoperable:

1.

Immediately, initiate action to implement mitigating actions, and The CREACS is a shared system with Salem Unit 1 Alignment only permitted if the Unit with the operable CREACS train is also in Chilled Water System LCO 3.7.10a configuration. Alignment is not permitted if in the LCO 3.7.10c configuration.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-15 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

2.

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits, and

3.

Within 90 days, restore the Control Room Envelope boundary to OPERABLE status, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

d.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Refer to ACTION 28 of Table 3.3-6.)

e.

With one or both isolation damper(s) on an outside emergency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position and restore the damper(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies

a.

With one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation** within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

c.

With two filtration trains inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

d.

With the Control Room Envelope boundary inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

e.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal CAACS outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position. (Refer to ACTION 28 of Table 3.3-6.)

f.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on an outside emergency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position. To resume movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, at least one emergency air intake duct must be operable on each unit.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 At least two supply fans, and three exhaust fans shall be OPERABLE(*) to maintain the Auxiliary Building at slightly negative pressure.

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

The intermittent opening of the Auxiliary Building pressure boundary causing a loss of negative pressure may be performed under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

Modes 1 thru 4 a)

With one supply fan and/or one exhaust fan inoperable, restore the fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b)

With two supply and/or two exhaust fans inoperable restore at least one inoperable supply and two exhaust fans to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c)

With the Auxiliary Building pressure not maintained slightly negative, restore the building to slightly negative pressure within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

During CORE ALTERATIONS d)

With the Auxiliary Building pressure not maintained slightly negative, restore the Auxiliary Building to slightly negative pressure within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS.

At all times e)

With the Auxiliary Building pressure not maintained slightly negative, suspend all operations involving radioactive gaseous releases via the Auxiliary Building immediately.

(*)

One of the supply fans may be considered OPERABLE with its auto start circuit administratively controlled (removed form service) to prevent more than one supply fan from operating at any time.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-18 Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION(3): MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

a.

With one of the required chillers inoperable:

1.

Remove(4) the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

2.

Restore the chiller to OPERABLE status within 14 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or;

3.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With two of the required chillers inoperable(5)(6):

1.

Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

2.

Align the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACs) for single filtration operation using the Salem Unit 1 train within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

3.

Restore at least one chiller to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or;

4.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With one chilled water pump inoperable, restore the chilled water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ACTION(3): MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.*

a.

With one of the required chillers inoperable:

1.

Remove(4) the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the Chilled Water System within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and;

2.

Restore the chiller to OPERABLE status within 14 days or;

3.

Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-28a Amendment No. 334

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.13 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (FIVS), MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES (FRVS), FRV BYPASS VALVES (FRVBVS), AND STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP (SGFP) TURBINE STEAM STOP VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (continued)

ACTION:

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition Entry is allowed for each valve

a.

With one or more FIVs inoperable, restore the inoperable FIV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FIV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify the inoperable FIV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

b.

With one or more FRVs inoperable, restore the inoperable FRV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FRV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify the inoperable FRV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

c.

With one or more FRVBV(s) inoperable, restore the inoperable FRVBV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FRVBV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify the inoperable FRVBV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

d.

With one or more SGFP turbine steam stop valves inoperable, restore the inoperable SGFP turbine stop valve(s) to OPERABLE status or isolate the associated steam supply to the SGFP turbine or isolate the SGFP flow path within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program; verify that the inoperable SGFP steam stop valve is isolated or the SGFP flow path is isolated once per 7 days.

e.

With two (2) valves in the same feedwater flowpath inoperable resulting in a loss of feedwater isolation capability for a flow path, restore at least one valve to OPERABLE status or isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

f.

With the required ACTION requirements above not met, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.13.1 Each FIV, FRV, FRVBV and SGFP turbine steam stop valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by determining the isolation time of each valve to be within limits when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

4.7.13.2 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, verify each FIV, FRV, FRVBV and SGFP turbine steam stop valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-34 Amendment No. 334

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two physically independent A.C. circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system (vital bus system), and

b.

Three separate and independent diesel generators with:

1.

Separate day tanks containing a minimum volume of 130 gallons of fuel, and

2.

A common fuel storage system consisting of two storage tanks, each containing a minimum volume of 23,000 gallons of fuel, and two fuel transfer pumps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With an independent A.C. circuit of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:

1.

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; and

2.

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , declare required systems or components with no offsite power available inoperable when a redundant required system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; and

3.

Restore the inoperable independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:

1.

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; and SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-1 Amendment No. 334

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (Continued)

2.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable diesel generator inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; and

3.

Determine the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators are not inoperable due to common cause failure or perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . If the diesel generator is inoperable for preventive maintenance, the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators need not be tested nor the OPERABILITY evaluated; and

4.

In any case:

a) Restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status:

1. Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Or,

2. Within 14 days if the Supplemental Power Source (SPS) is available within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and verified once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter:

a. If at any time the availability of the SPS cannot be met, restore the SPS to available status or restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from entry into 3.8.1.1 Action b, or

b. If at any time the availability of the SPS cannot be met and 3.8.1.1 Action b has been entered for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , restore the SPS to available status or restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Or,

3. In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.(1)

Otherwise,

4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

(1) The Risk Informed Completion Time Program cannot be applied to an unavailable SPS.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-2 Amendment No. 334

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (Continued)

c.

With one independent A.C. circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore at least two independent A.C. circuits and three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

d.

With two of the above required independent A.C. circuits inoperable:

1.

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of three diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , unless the diesel generators are already operating; and

2.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable offsite circuits inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; and

3.

Restore at least one of the inoperable independent A.C. circuits to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; and

4.

With only one of the independent A.C. circuits OPERABLE, restore the other independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from time of initial loss or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-2a Amendment No. 334

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (Continued)

e.

With two or more of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; restore at least two of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program from time of initial loss or be in least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .(2)

f.

With one of the above required fuel transfer pumps inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

g.

With one of the above required fuel storage tanks inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

h.

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

(2) The Risk Informed Completion Time Program cannot be entered when a loss of function occurs.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-2b Amendment No. 334

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS A.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.1 The following A.C. electrical busses shall be OPERABLE and energized from sources of power other than the diesel generators:

4 kvolt Vital Bus # 2A 4 kvolt Vital Bus # 2B 4 kvolt Vital Bus # 2C 460 volt Vital Bus # 2A and associated control centers 460 volt Vital Bus # 2B and associated control centers 460 volt Vital Bus # 2C and associated control centers 230 volt Vital Bus # 2A and associated control centers 230 volt Vital Bus # 2B and associated control centers 230 volt Vital Bus # 2C and associated control centers 115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 2A and Inverter 115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 2B and Inverter 115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 2C and Inverter

115 volt Vital Instrument Bus # 2D and Inverter

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With less than the above complement of A.C. busses OPERABLE or energized, restore the inoperable busses to OPERABLE and energized status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .**

b.

With one inverter inoperable, energize the associated A.C. Vital Bus within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; restore the inoperable inverter to OPERABLE and energized status within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.1 The specified A.C. busses and inverters shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from A.C. sources other than the diesel generators in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

An inverter may be disconnected from its D.C. source for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for the purpose of performing an equalizing charge on its associated battery bank provided (1) its vital bus is OPERABLE and energized, and (2) the vital busses associated with the other battery banks are OPERABLE and energized.

- The Risk Informed Completion Time Program cannot be entered when a loss of function occurs.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-8 Amendment No. 334

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 125-VOLT D.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.3 The following D.C. bus trains shall be OPERABLE and energized:

TRAIN 2A consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus No. 2A, 125-volt D.C. battery No. 2A and battery charger 2A1.

TRAIN 2B consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus No. 2B, 125-volt D.C. battery No. 2B and battery charger 2B1.

TRAIN 2C consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus No. 2C, 125-volt D.C. battery No. 2C and battery charger 2C1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one 125-volt D.C. bus inoperable or not energized, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE and energized status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one 125-volt D.C. battery charger inoperable, restore the inoperable charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or connect the backup charger for no more than 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With one or more 125-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within the Category A or B limits of Table 4.8.2.3-1:

1.

Verify within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , that the electrolyte level and float voltage for the pilot cell meets Table 4.8.2.3-1 Category C limits, and

2.

Verify within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , that the battery cell parameters of all connected cells meet Table 4.8.2.3-1 Category C limits, and

3.

Restore battery cell parameters to Category A and B limits of Table 4.8.2.3-1 within 31 days, and

4.

If any of the above listed requirements cannot be met, comply with the requirements of action f.

d.

With one or more 125-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Table 4.8.2.3-1 Category C values, comply with the requirements of action f.

e.

With average electrolyte temperature of representative cells less than 65°F, comply with the requirements of action f.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-10 Amendment No. 334

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (Continued)

f.

Restore the battery to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.3.1 Each D.C. bus train shall be determined OPERABLE and energized in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and voltage on the bus.

4.8.2.3.2 Each required 125-volt battery and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that:

1.

The parameters in Table 4.8.2.3-1 meet Category A limits.

2.

The overall battery voltage is greater than or equal to 125 volts on float charge.

b.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program and once within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after a battery discharge < 110 V and once within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after a battery overcharge > 150 V by verifying that the parameters in Table 4.8.2.3-1 meet the Category B limits.

c.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that:

1.

There is no visible corrosion at terminals or connectors or the connection resistance is:

150 micro ohms for inter-cell connections, 350 micro ohms for inter-rack connections, 350 micro ohms for inter-tier connections, 70 micro ohms for field cable terminal connections, and 2500 micro ohms for the total battery connection resistance which includes all inter-cell connections (including bus bars), all inter-rack connections (including cable resistance), all inter-tier connections (including cable resistance), and all field terminal connections at the battery.

2.

The average electrolyte temperature of the representative cells is above 65°F.

d.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that:

1.

The cells, cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

2.

Remove visible terminal corrosion and verify cell-to-cell and terminal connections are coated with anti-corrosion material.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-11 Amendment No. 334

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 28-VOLT D.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.5 The following D.C. bus trains shall be energized and OPERABLE:

TRAIN 2A consisting of 28-volt D.C. bus No. 2A, 28-volt D.C. battery No. 2A and battery charger 2A1.

TRAIN 2B consisting of 28-volt D.C. bus No. 2B, 28-volt D.C. battery No. 2B, and battery charger 2B1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one 28-volt D.C. bus inoperable or not energized, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE and energized status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one required 28-volt D.C. battery charger inoperable, restore the inoperable charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program or connect the backup charger for no more than 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With one or more 28-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within the Category A or B limits of Table 4.8.2.5-1:

1.

Verify within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , that the electrolyte level and float voltage for the pilot cell meets Table 4.8.2.5-1 Category C limits, and

2.

Verify within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , that the battery cell parameters of all connected cells meet Table 4.8.2.5-1 Category C limits, and

3.

Restore battery cell parameters to Category A and B limits of Table 4.8.2.5-1 within 31 days, and

4.

If any of the above listed requirements cannot be met, comply with the requirements of action f.

d.

With one or more 28-volt D.C. batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Table 4.8.2.5-1 Category C values, comply with the requirements of action f.

e.

With average electrolyte temperature of representative cells less than 65°F, comply with the requirements of action f.

f.

Restore the battery to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 8-13 Amendment No. 334

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.9.1.12 RISK INFORMED COMPLETION TIME (RICT) PROGRAM UPGRADE REPORT A report describing newly developed methods and their implementation must be submitted following a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) upgrade associated with newly developed methods and prior to the first use of those methods to calculate a RICT. The report shall include:

a. The PRA models upgraded to include newly developed methods;

b. A description of the acceptability of the newly developed methods consistent with Section 5.2 of PWROG-19027-NP, Revision 2, Newly Developed Method Requirements and Peer Review;

c. Any open findings from the peer-review of the implementation of the newly developed methods and how those findings were dispositioned; and

d. All changes to key assumptions related to newly developed methods or their implementation.

SPECIAL REPORTS 6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Administrator, USNRC Region I within the time period specified for each report.

6.9.3 DELETED 6.9.4 When a report is required by ACTION 1, 4, 8 OR 9 of Table 3.3-11 "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation", a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring for inadequate core cooling, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument channels to OPERABLE status.

SALEM - UNIT 2 6-24c Amendment No. 334

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.17 CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE HABITABILITY PROGRAM A Control Room Envelope (CRE) Habitability Program shall be established and implemented to ensure that CRE habitability is maintained such that, with an OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS), CRE occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the duration of the accident. The program shall include the following elements:

a.

The definition of the CRE and the CRE boundary.

b.

Requirements for maintaining the CRE boundary in its design condition including configuration control and preventive maintenance.

c.

Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, "Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,"

Revision 0, May 2003, and (ii) assessing CRE habitability at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0.

d.

Measurement, at designated locations, of the CRE pressure relative to all external areas adjacent to the CRE boundary during the pressurization mode of operation by one train of the CREACS, operating at the flow rate required by the Surveillance Requirements, at a frequency of 36 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The results shall be trended and used as part of the 18 month assessment of the CRE boundary.

e.

The quantitative limits on unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE. These limits shall be stated in a manner to allow direct comparison to the unfiltered air inleakage measured by the testing described in paragraph c. The unfiltered air inleakage limit for radiological challenges is the inleakage flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. Unfiltered air inleakage limits for hazardous chemicals must ensure that exposure of CRE occupants to these hazards will be within the assumptions in the licensing basis.

f.

The provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.2 are applicable to the Frequencies for assessing CRE habitability, determining CRE unfiltered inleakage, and measuring CRE pressure and assessing the CRE boundary as required by paragraphs c and d, respectively.

6.18 Not Used SALEM - UNIT 2 6-31 Amendment No. 334

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.19 RISK INFORMED COMPLETION TIME PROGRAM This program provides controls to calculate a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) and must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09-A, Revision 0, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines. The program shall include the following:

a.

The RICT may not exceed 30 days;

b.

A RICT may only be utilized in MODE 1 and 2;

c.

When a RICT is being used, any change to the plant configuration, as defined in NEI 06 09-A, Appendix A, must be considered for the effect on the RICT.

1.

For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration.

2.

For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

3.

Revising the RICT is not required if the plant configuration change would lower plant risk and would result in a longer RICT.

d.

For emergent conditions, if the extent of condition evaluation for inoperable structures, systems, or components (SSCs) is not complete prior to exceeding the Completion Time, the RICT shall account for the increased possibility of common cause failure (CCF) by either:

1.

Numerically accounting for the increased possibility of CCF in the RICT calculation; or

2.

Risk Management Actions (RMAs) not already credited in the RICT calculation shall be implemented that support redundant or diverse SSCs that perform the function(s) of the inoperable SSCs, and, if practicable, reduce the frequency of initiating events that challenge the function(s) performed by the inoperable SSCs.

e.

A RICT calculation must include the following hazard groups: internal flood and internal events PRA model, internal fire PRA model, seismic penalty factor, and tornado missile penalty factor. Changes to these means of assessing the hazard groups require prior NRC approval.

f.

The PRA models used to calculate a RICT shall be maintained and upgraded in accordance with the processes endorsed in the regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 3, "Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities."

g.

A report shall be submitted in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.12 before a newly developed method is used to calculate a RICT.

SALEM - UNIT 2 6-32 Amendment No. 334

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 352 AND 334 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC CONSTELLATION ENERGY GENERATION, LLC SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated January 31, 2025 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML25031A416), as supplemented by letters dated October 10 and November 19, 2025 (ML25283A069 and ML25323A288, respectively), PSEG Nuclear LLC, (PSEG, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem).

The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to allow the use of Risk-Informed Completion Times (RICTs) for Required Actions when Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) are not met. The proposed changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, dated July 2, 2018 (ML18183A493). The U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) issued a final model safety evaluation (SE) approving TSTF-505, Revision 2, on November 21, 2018 (ML18269A041).

In addition, the licensee requested to adopt TSTF Traveler TSTF-591, Revision 0, Revise Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program, dated March 22, 2022 (ML22081A224).

The NRC approved TSTF-591 in an SE dated September 21, 2023 (ML23262B230). TSTF-591 revises TS Section 5.5 requirements related to changes to the risk assessment and adds a reporting requirement to TS Section 5.6.

The licensee proposed plant-specific variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-505, Revision 2. These variations are evaluated in Section 3.2.1 of this SE.

The NRC staff conducted a regulatory audit from April 28, 2025, to September 10, 2025, in accordance with a regulatory audit plan (ML25096A002), to obtain information necessary to support the review of the application and to develop requests for additional information, as needed. The staff documented the results of the audit in an audit summary dated December 15, 2025 (ML25342A446).

The supplemental letters dated October 10 and November 19, 2025, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register (FR) on May 14, 2025 (90 FR 20513).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Regulatory Review 2.1.1 Applicable Regulations Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, establishes the regulatory requirements applicable to the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, a licensee may request an amendment to its license, including changes to the Technical Specifications (TS),

by submitting an application that fully describes the proposed changes. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(a), the NRCs determination of whether to grant a license amendment is governed by the standards applicable to the issuance of an initial license or construction permit, to the extent such standards are applicable and appropriate.

The general standards in 10 CFR 50.40(a) and the operating license standards in 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3) require reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the amendment will not endanger the health and safety of the public. In addition, the following regulatory requirements are applicable to the proposed amendments:

10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, paragraph (b), (c)(2), Limiting conditions for operations, and (c)(5), Administrative controls 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and standards, paragraph (h), Protection and safety systems 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants (the Maintenance Rule) 2.1.2 Regulatory Guidance The NRC Regulatory Guides (RGs) describe methods that the NRC staff consider acceptable for complying with NRC regulations. In its review of the proposed changes, the NRC staff considered the following regulatory guidance and NRC-endorsed industry guidance:

RG 1.200, Revision 2, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, dated March 2009 (ML090410014), and RG 1.200, Revision 3, Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, dated December 2020 (ML20238B871)

RG 1.174, Revision 2, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, dated May 2011, and Revision 3, dated January 2018 (ML100910006 and ML17317A256, respectively)

RG 1.177, Revision 1, An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, dated May 2011, and Revision 2, dated January 2021 (ML100910008 and ML20164A034, respectively)

NUREG-1855, Revision 1, Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making, dated March 2017 (ML17062A466)

NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition, including Section 16.0, Technical Specifications, dated March 2010 (ML100351425); Section 16.1, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, dated March 2007 (ML070380228); and Section 19.2, Review of Risk Information Used to Support Permanent Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis: General Guidance, dated June 2007 (ML071700658)

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, Revision 0-A (NEI 06-09-A), Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, dated October 2012 (ML122860402). The NRC staff issued a final model SE approving NEI 06-09 on May 17, 2007 (ML071200238)

NEI Topical Report NEI 17-07, Revision 2, Performance of PRA [probabilistic risk assessment] Peer Reviews Using the ASME/ANS PRA Standard, dated August 2019 (ML19231A182)

Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG) Topical Report PWROG-19027-NP, Revision 2, Newly Developed Method Requirements and Peer Review, dated July 2020 (ML20213C660)

The licensees submittal references various earlier revisions of RG 1.200, RG 1.174, and RG 1.177. These RGs have since been updated to Revision 3 for RGs 1.200 and 1.174 and Revision 2 for RG 1.177. The NRC staff notes that these updates do not include technical changes that affect consistency with NEI 06-09-A. Accordingly, the NRC staff finds the updated revisions of these RGs applicable to the licensees adoption of TSTF-505, Revision 2, and TSTF-591, Revision 0.

2.2 Description of the RICT Program The TS LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO is not met, the licensee must shut down the reactor or follow any remedial or required action (e.g., testing, maintenance, or repair activity) permitted by the TSs until the condition can be met. The remedial actions associated with an LCO are specified in the ACTIONS, which identify Conditions describing the manner in which the LCO is not met and the corresponding Required Actions and Completion Times (CTs). For purposes of this SE, the CTs are referred to as the front-stop completion times. For certain Conditions, the TSs require exiting the Mode of Applicability of an LCO (e.g., shut down the reactor).

The licensee requested approval to add a RICT Program to the Administrative Controls section of the TSs and to modify selected CTs to permit extension of the CTs, provided that risk is assessed and managed in accordance with NEI 06-09-A. Consistent with Table 1 of TSTF-505, Revision 2, Conditions Requiring Additional Technical Justification, the LAR identified several plant-specific LCOs and associated Actions proposed for inclusion in the RICT Program and provided additional justification. The NRC staffs evaluation of these proposed variations and the associated justification is provided in Section 3.2.1 of this SE.

The licensee is not proposing changes to the plant design, operating parameters, or design basis. Implementation of the proposed changes would allow CTs to vary based on the risk significance of the plant configuration at the time an LCO is not met, considering the specific equipment that is out of service. The proposed RICT Program requires that the remaining equipment retains the capability to perform the applicable safety functions, assuming no additional failures (e.g., one train of a two-train system may be inoperable). These restrictions on inoperability of all required trains of a system ensure that the defense-in-depth (DID) philosophy is maintained by following existing guidance when the capability to perform TS safety function(s) is lost.

The proposed RICT Program relies on plant-specific operating experience to establish component reliability and availability data. Accordingly, the risk-informed allowances provided by the RICT Program reflect actual component performance and the risk significance of the affected components.

2.3 Description of TSTF-591, Revision 0 In the LAR, the licensee also proposed to adopt TSTF-591, Revision 0. The proposed changes would revise TS 6.19, Risk-Informed Completion Time Program, to update the referenced version of RG 1.200 from Revision 2 to Revision 3. In addition, the proposed changes would add a new specification, TS 6.9.1.12, Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT)

Program Upgrade Report, which would require the licensee to submit a report to the NRC prior to calculating a RICT using a newly developed method.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

An acceptable approach for making risk-informed decisions regarding proposed changes to the TS, including both permanent and temporary changes, is to demonstrate that the proposed licensing basis (LB) changes satisfy the five key principles described in Section C of RG 1.174, Revision 3, and the three-tiered approach described in Section C of RG 1.177, Revision 2. The five key principles and the three-tiered approach are summarized below.

Principle 1:

The proposed LB change meets the current regulations unless it is explicitly related to a requested exemption.

Principle 2:

The proposed LB change is consistent with the DID philosophy.

Principle 3:

The proposed LB change maintains sufficient safety margins.

Principle 4:

When the proposed LB change results in an increase in risk, the increase should be small and consistent with the intent of the Commissions policy statement on safety goals for the operations of nuclear power plants.

Tier 1: PRA Capability and Insights Tier 2: Avoidance of Risk-Significant Plant Configurations Tier 3: Risk-Informed Configuration Risk Management Principle 5:

The impact of the proposed LB change should be monitored by using performance measures strategies.

3.1 Method of NRC Staff Review The NRC staff notes that each of key principles and tiers described above is addressed in NEI Topical Report NEI 06-09-A, which was approved by the NRC in the final model SE issued for TSTF-505, Revision 2. NEI 06-09-A provides an acceptable methodology for extending existing CTs and, consequently, delaying plant shutdown or other Required Actions, provided that risk is assessed and managed within the limits and programmatic controls established by an approved RICT Program.

The NRC staffs evaluation of the licensees proposed use of RICTs against the key safety principles of RGs 1.174 and 1.177 are provided in the sections below.

3.2 Review of Key Principles 3.2.1 Key Principle 1: Evaluation of Compliance with Current Regulations Regulations in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) require that LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO for a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or take remedial actions permitted by the TS until the condition can be met.

The CTs in the current TSs were established using experiential data, risk insights, and engineering judgement. The RICT Program provides the necessary administrative controls to permit extension of CTs and, thereby, delay reactor shutdown or Required Actions if risk is assessed and managed appropriately within specified limits and programmatic requirements, and the safety margins and DID remain sufficient. The option to determine the extended CT in accordance with the RICT Program allows the licensee to perform an integrated evaluation in accordance with the methodology prescribed in NEI 06-09-A and proposed TS 6.19, Risk Informed Completion Time Program. The RICT is limited to a maximum of 30 days (termed the backstop).

The typical CT is modified by the application of the RICT Program as shown in the following example. The changed portion is indicated in italics.

In Attachment 1, Description and Assessment of the Proposed Change, Attachment 4, Cross-Reference of TSTF-505 and Salem Technical Specifications, and Enclosure 1, List of Revised Required Actions to Corresponding PRA Functions, to the LAR, as supplemented, the licensee identified the TSs, associated LCOs, and Required Actions for the CTs that included modifications and variations from the approved TSTF-505, Revision 2. The proposed changes consist of modifications to Required Actions and CTs, consistent with the implementation of a RICT Program.

In accordance with Table 1 of TSTF-505, Revision 2, the licensee provided additional technical justification for including the following TS LCOs and associated Actions within the scope of the RICT Program: TS 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3-1 Function Unit (FU) 2; TS 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3-1 FU 21; TS 3.5.2 Action a; TS 3.6.1.3; TS 3.6.2.1; TS 3.6.2.3 Actions a and b; and TS 3.7.1.5, as identified in Table E1-3 of Enclosure 1 to the LAR, as supplemented.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed TS changes, including the affected LCOs, Required Actions, and CTs, and determined that the implementation of the RICT Program does not alter the required functional capability or performance levels specified in the LCOs. Rather, the proposed changes modify only the CTs associated with Required Actions, consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2). Accordingly, the NRC staff finds that the proposed RICT Program, as described in Section 2.0 of this SE, continues to meet the applicable regulatory requirements and satisfies the first key principle of RGs 1.174 and 1.177.

3.2.2 Key Principle 2: Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth In RG 1.174, Revision 2, the NRC identified the following considerations used for evaluation of how the LB change is maintained for the DID philosophy:

Preserve a reasonable balance among the layers of defense.

Preserve adequate capability of design features without an overreliance on programmatic activities as compensatory measures.

Preserve system redundancy, independence, and diversity commensurate with the expected frequency and consequences of challenges to the system, including consideration of uncertainty.

Preserve adequate defense against potential CCFs [Common-Cause Failures].

Maintain multiple fission product barriers.

Preserve sufficient defense against human errors.

Continue to meet the intent of the plants design criteria.

The licensee proposed to use the RICT Program to extend existing CTs for the respective TS LCOs described in the LAR, as supplemented. For these TS LCOs, the licensee provided a description and assessment of the redundancy and diversity for the proposed changes. The NRC staffs evaluation of the proposed changes for these LCOs assessed the redundant or diverse means to mitigate accidents to ensure consistency with the Salem LB requirements using the guidance in RG 1.174, RG 1.177, and TSTF-505, to ensure adequate DID (for each of the functions) to operate the facility in the proposed manner (i.e., that the changes are consistent with the DID criteria).

to the LAR, as supplemented, provided information supporting the licensees evaluation of the redundancy, diversity, and DID for TS LCOs and Required Actions associated with instrumentation and controls (I&C) and electrical power systems. The NRC staff confirmed that the DID considerations listed above are applicable to the following TS LCOs, except for the criterion related to maintaining multiple fission product barriers:

TS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation TS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation For the I&C-related TS LCOs (TS 3.3.1.1 and TS 3.3.2.1), the NRC staff reviewed the specific trip logic arrangements, redundancy, backup systems, manual actions, and diverse trips specified for each of the protective safety functions and associated instrumentation, as described in the associated Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ML25324A037) sections, and as reflected in the LAR, as supplemented. The NRC staff verified that, in accordance with the Salem UFSAR and equipment and actions credited in Enclosure 1 to the LAR, as supplemented, in all applicable operating modes, the affected protective feature would perform its intended function by ensuring the ability to detect and mitigate the associated event or accident when the CT of a channel is extended.

The NRC staff further determined that there is sufficient redundancy, diversity, and DID to protect against CCFs and potential single failures for the Salem instrumentation systems evaluated in LAR, Enclosure 1, as supplemented, during a RICT. There is at least one diverse means specified by the licensee for initiating mitigating action for each accident event, thus providing DID against a failure of instrumentation during the RICT for each TS LCO. The NRC staff confirmed that the DID specified by the licensee does not overly rely on manual actions as the diverse means: therefore, there is not over-reliance of programmatic activities as compensatory measures. As a result, the NRC staff finds that the intent of the plants design criteria (e.g., safety functions) for the above TS LCOs related to I&C is maintained.

The NRC staff confirmed that the DID considerations listed above, except for the criterion related to maintaining multiple fission product barriers, are applicable to the following TS LCOs, as provided in Attachments 2.1 and 2.2 of the LAR and updated in the supplement dated October 10, 2025:

TS 3/4.8.1, A.C. Sources TS 3/4.8.2, Onsite Power Distribution Systems According to Section 8 of the Salem UFSAR, the stations electrical power system consists of three 500-kiloVolt (kV) offsite circuits, 500-kV switchyard, station power transformers, auxiliary power transformers, onsite alternating current (ac) power systems, onsite direct current (dc) power systems, and the ac and dc distribution systems. The onsite standby ac power source consists of three diesel generators (DGs) and supported systems. Each DG set supplies power to one 4160-Volt vital bus in the event of a loss of offsite power.

For DID evaluation, the NRC staff reviewed the information provided by the licensee in the LAR, as supplemented, including the proposed TS LCOs, TS Bases, and the UFSAR to verify the capability and capacity of the affected electrical power systems to perform their safety functions (assuming no additional failures) is maintained. To confirm that implementation of the RICT program would not result in a TS loss of function, the NRC staff reviewed the design success criteria corresponding to the electrical TS LCO conditions identified in LAR Table E1-1, In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions. The NRC staff finds that the design success criteria, as updated in the supplement dated October 10, 2025, identify the redundant or minimum required electrical power sources and subsystems necessary to support the safety functions for mitigating postulated design-basis accidents (DBAs),

achieving safe reactor shutdown, and maintaining the reactor in a safe shutdown condition.

Based on this review, the NRC staff finds that the proposed RICTs for TS LCOs associated with the electrical power systems, as provided in Attachments 2.1 and 2.2 of the LAR, would not result in a TS loss of function. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the intent of the plant design criteria applicable to the electrical TS LCOs, including associated safety functions, is maintained.

The NRC staff also evaluated the proposed RICTs associated with the electrical TS conditions for consistency with the scope of Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2. One of the TSTF-505 exclusion criteria states, in part, the traveler will only modify Required Actions that specify that a system be restored to OPERABLE status. Accordingly, a RICT cannot apply to Required Actions that specify that a system be restored to a status other than OPERABLE (e.g., available). As initially proposed, the RICTs applied to Salem TS Required Actions that required restoration of supplemental power sources to available status. This inconsistency was identified during the regulatory audit. In the supplement dated October 10, 2025, the licensee revised proposed TS 3.8.1.1, Action b.4, to remove the RICT applicability to actions restoring the supplemental power source to available status. The NRC staff finds that the proposed RICTs for the electrical TS conditions, as updated in the supplement, are consistent with the scope of Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2.

In addition, the NRC staff reviewed the risk management action (RMA) examples related to the electrical power systems provided in Section 4.2 of Enclosure 12, Risk Management Action Examples. The staff finds that these examples provide reasonable assurance that the appropriate RMAs will be implemented to monitor and control risk during the RICTs, thereby further enhancing defense in depth.

The NRC staff notes that while the plant is in a TS LCO condition, the redundancy of electrical equipment is temporarily reduced, and system reliability is correspondingly degraded. The NRC staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR design information and the proposed risk-informed TS LCO conditions applicable to the affected safety functions. Based on the information provided in the LAR, as supplemented, the NRC staff confirmed that, during the proposed completion time extensions, sufficient electrical power sources remain available to support the safety functions required to mitigate the DBAs evaluated in the Salem UFSAR, safely shut down the reactor, and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the affected protective features maintain adequate DID.

Considering that the proposed completion time extensions will be implemented in accordance with the NRC-endorsed guidance in NEI 06-09-A and Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, including the implementation of RMAs, and considering the redundancy of both offsite and onsite power systems, the NRC staff finds that adequate DID is maintained. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed TS LCOs associated with the electrical power systems, as requested by the licensee in the LAR, as supplemented, are acceptable for inclusion in the RICT program.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes are consistent with the NRC-endorsed guidance in NEI 06-09-A and satisfy the second key principle of RGs 1.177 and 1.174. The NRC staff further concludes that the proposed changes are consistent with the DID philosophy described in RG 1.174.

3.2.3 Key Principle 3: Evaluation of Safety Margins Paragraph 10 CFR 50.55a(h) requires in part, that [p]rotection systems of nuclear power reactors of all types must meet the requirements specified in this paragraph. Section 2.2.2, Technical Specification Change Maintains Sufficient Safety Margin (Principle 3), of RG 1.177 states, in part, that sufficient safety margins are maintained when:

a. Codes and standard or alternatives approved for use by the NRC are met

b. Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the final safety analysis report are met, or proposed revisions provide sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainties...

The licensee is not proposing to change any quality standard, material, or operating specification in this application. In the LAR, the licensee proposed to add a new program, Risk Informed Completion Time Program, in Section 5.5, Programs and Manuals, of the Salem TSs, which requires adherence to NEI 06-09-A.

The NRC staff evaluated the effect on safety margins associated with application of the RICT Program to extend CTs up to a backstop value of 30 days in a TS condition, provided that sufficient trains remain operable to fulfill the applicable TS safety function. Although the proposed change would allow design-basis equipment to be out of service for a longer duration than currently permitted by the TSs, any increase in equipment unavailability is expected to be insignificant and is addressed through consideration of the single-failure criterion in the design-basis analyses. The acceptance criteria for operability of equipment are not changed and, when sufficient trains remain operable to perform the TS safety function, the operability of the remaining train(s) ensures that the existing safety margins are maintained.

Therefore, the NRC staff finds that, provided the specified TS safety function remains operable, sufficient safety margins would be maintained during the extended CT established under the RICT Program.

Safety margins are also maintained if PRA functionality is determined for the inoperable train, which would result in an increased CT. Credit for PRA functionality, as described in NEI 06-09-A, is limited to the inoperable train, loss-of-offsite power (LOOP), or component. Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the design-basis analyses for Salem remain applicable and unchanged, that sufficient safety margins would be maintained during the extended CTs, and that the proposed TS changes do not alter the applicable standards or safety analysis acceptance criteria. Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(h) and meet the third key principle of RGs 1.177 and 1.174.

3.2.4 Key Principle 4: Change in Risk Consistent with the Safety Goal Policy Statement Proposed TS Section 6.19, states, in part, that the RICT Program must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09-A, Revision 0.

NEI 06-09-A provides a methodology for evaluating and managing the risk impact of extensions to TS CTs. Permanent changes to the fixed TS CTs are typically evaluated by using the three-tiered approach described in Section 16.1 of the SRP, RG 1.177, Revision 2; and RG 1.174, Revision 3. This approach addresses the calculated change in risk as measured by the change in core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), as well as the incremental conditional core damage probability and incremental conditional large early release probability: the use of compensatory measures to reduce risk; and the implementation of a configuration risk management program (CRMP) to identify risk-significant plant configurations.

The NRC staff evaluated the licensees processes and methodologies used to determine that the change in risk associated with implementation of RICTs would be small and consistent with the intent of the Commissions Safety Goal Policy Statement1. The NRC staff also reviewed the licensees proposed changes against the three-tiered approach in RG 1.177, Revision 2, for evaluating the risk associated with proposed TS CT changes. The results of the NRC staffs evaluation are discussed below.

3.2.4.1 Tier 1: PRA Capability and Insights Tier 1 evaluates the impact of the proposed changes on plant operational risk. The Tier 1 review involves two aspects: (1) an evaluation of the scope and acceptability of the PRA models and their application to the proposed changes, and (2) a review of the PRA results and insights described in the licensees application.

In Enclosure 2, Information Supporting Consistency with Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 3, and Enclosure 4, Information Supporting Justification of Excluding Sources of Risk Not Addressed by the PRA Models, to the LAR, the licensee identified the following modeled hazards and alternate methodologies proposed for use in the Salem RICT Program to assess 1 Commissions Safety Goal Policy Statement, Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants; Policy Statement, published in the Federal Register on August 4, 1986 (51 FR 28044), as corrected, and republished, on August 21, 1986 (51 FR 30028).

the risk contribution associated with extending TS LCO CTs:

Internal Events PRA (IEPRA) model (includes internal floods);

Internal Fire Events PRA (FPRA) model; Seismic Hazard: a CDF penalty of 2.3 x 10-6 per year, and a LERF penalty of 3.3 x 10-7 per year; Extreme Winds and Tornado Missile Hazards: Tornado missile CDF penalty of 5x10-6 per year and a tornado missile LERF penalty of 5x10-7 per year for all plant configurations associated with LCOs to be included in the RICT Program except for LCO 3.6.1.3.c where a tornado missile LERF penalty of 1x10-6 per year applies Other External Hazards: screened out from RICT Program based on appendix 6A of the ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S 2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications (ASME/ANS RA-SA-2009 PRA Standard).

PRA Scope The guidance in RG 1.174, Revision 3, states that [t]he scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy of the PRA are to be commensurate with the application for which it is intended and the role the PRA results play in the integrated decision process. In addition, the NRCs SE for NEI 06-09-A states that PRA models used to support RICT applications should conform to RG 1.200, Revision 1. The current version, RG 1.200, Revision 3, endorses ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 as the applicable PRA standard and does not introduce technical changes that would affect the acceptability of PRA models previously found consistent with NEI 06-09-A.

Therefore, both RG 1.200, Revisions 2 and 3, are acceptable for use in implementing a RICT Program. For external hazards for which a PRA is not available, the guidance in NEI 06-09-A allows for the use of bounding analysis of the risk contribution of the hazard for incorporation into the RICT calculation or justification for why the hazard is not significant to the RICT calculation.

The NRC staff evaluated the PRA acceptability information provided by the licensee in to the LAR, including industry peer review results and the licensees self-assessment of the PRA models for internal events, including internal flooding, and fire, against the guidance in RG 1.200, Revision 2. The licensee screened out all external hazard events, except for seismic and extreme winds and tornado missiles, as described later in this section, as insignificant contributors to the RICT calculations. The Salem PRA model with modifications is used as the CRMP model, as described later in this section. In addition, the licensee provided a bounding estimate of the seismic and tornado missile CDFs and LERFs and will include those CDF and LERF values, per Sections 3.5 and 4.3 of Enclosure 4 to the LAR, in the change-in-risk used to calculate RICTs consistent with the guidance in NEI 06 A.

The NRC staff finds that the Salem scope of modeled PRA hazards, and those hazards for which a modeled PRA is not available where the licensee has proposed use of alternative methods, are commensurate with the RICT application for use in the integrated decision-making process, consistent with RG 1.174, Revision 3.

Evaluation of PRA Acceptability for Internal Events and Internal Fires Internal Events PRA (Includes Internal Flooding)

In Section 3 of Enclosure 2 to the LAR, the licensee stated that the internal events PRA model was subjected to a full-scope peer review in November 2008 against RG 1.200, Revision 2. In November 2018, the licensee conducted independent assessments to close all finding-level facts and observations (F&Os) using the NRC-accepted Appendix X process documented in the NEI letter dated February 21, 2017 (ML17086A431). The LAR identifies no remaining open finding-level F&Os.

The NRC staff finds that the Salem IEPRA (that includes internal flooding) was appropriately peer reviewed consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 2, and that all finding-level F&Os have been closed consistent with the Appendix X process guidance, as accepted, with conditions by the NRC staff. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the IEPRA (that includes internal flooding) is acceptable for use in the RICT Program.

Internal Fire Events PRA In Enclosure 9 to the LAR, the licensee stated that the Salem Internal Fire Events PRA (FPRA) development was guided by and used consensus models described in NUREG/CR-6850, Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, Volumes 1 & 2 (ML15167A401 and ML15167A411). The licensee also stated that guidelines in NUREG/CR-6850 and NUREG-1855, "Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making, (ML17062A466) were used to address uncertainties associated with FPRA for the RICT Program application. The licensee concluded that the uncertainties do not present a significant impact on the Salem RICT calculations.

In Section 4 of Enclosure 2 to the LAR, the licensee confirmed that the Salem, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, FPRA model received a full-scope peer review in January 2023 using the ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 PRA Standard, and RG 1.200, Revision 3. A focused-scope peer review was subsequently completed in December 2023 to address the cable selection task which was incomplete at the time of the full-scope peer review for both units, as well as the development of the PRA logic model and quantification for Unit 2. During this same effort, all F&Os were closed, and all supporting requirements (SRs) were found to meet at least Capability Category II. The independent Assessment Team also concluded that there were no PRA upgrades associated with the resolution of F&Os, or there were any open F&Os associated with newly developed methods.

The NRC staff identified that the Salem FPRA, applies a minimum joint human error probability (JHEP) floor value of 1x10-6 floor value. This is a departure from NUREG-1792, Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) (ML051160213) which recommends the JHEP should not be below 1x10-5 unless the sequences have very low level of dependence. In the LAR supplement dated October 10, 2025, the licensee justified use of the lower 1x10-6 floor value by providing a sensitivity evaluation, which demonstrates raising all JHEPs below 1x10-5 to 1x10-5 produces negligible changes (<0.5 percent) in plant CDF and LERF, and that individual combinations also have negligible F-V importance (0.1%) in both base and RICT cases. Based on the above, the NRC staff determined that the use of 1x10-6 JHEP floor value in the Salem Fire PRA is acceptable because the sensitivity evaluation demonstrates the treatment of minimum JHEP does not mask the safety significance of systems, structures and components (SSCs) or affect the RICT calculations.

The NRC staff also identified that Salem, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, have shared systems between units. These shared systems require analyses addressing: (1) the risk contribution of fires originating in one unit and affecting the other unit; (2) the risk contribution of fires that impact common components in both units; and (3) how the Salem Fire PRA addresses the possibility that a shared system is demanded in both units in response to a single fire initiating event. In the LAR supplement dated October 10, 2025, the licensee stated that the Fire PRA includes all unscreened Physical Analysis Units (PAUs) and each postulated scenario in the PAU is included in both units quantified scenario list in the quantification process. As such, all Fire PRA targets within each scenario, regardless of unit designation, are included in the risk evaluation. Based on the above, the NRC staff determined that the licensee has adequately addressed risks associated with shared system at Salem, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff finds that the Salem, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, FPRA was appropriately developed and peer reviewed consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 3, and that all finding-level F&Os have been closed consistent with the NRC-endorsed NEI 17-07 process guidance. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the FPRA is acceptable for use in support of the RICT Program.

Evaluation of PRA External Hazards Modeled Evaluation of Seismic Hazard The licensees approach for including the seismic risk contribution in the RICT calculation is to add a seismic CDF and a seismic LERF penalty to each RICT calculation. The proposed seismic CDF penalty estimate was based on using the plant-specific mean seismic hazard curve developed in response to the Near-Term Task Force recommendation 2.1 (ML14090A043), and a plant-level mean high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) capacity of 0.19g referenced to peak ground acceleration (PGA). The HCLPF value is not explicitly listed in the LAR but is calculated to be 0.19g based on the licensees use of the median seismic capacity (Am) of 1.31g PGA and a seismic capacity uncertainty parameter represented by a composite beta factor (c) of 0.84 using the provided equation of Am=HCLPF/(exp-2.33 c). The calculated seismic CDF penalty is 2.3x10-6 per year based on PGA, which is conservative as compared with an average of four frequencies, namely, PGA (100), 10, 5, and 1 Hertz. The staffs review finds the method to determine the baseline seismic CDF acceptable for this application because it is consistent with the approach used in NRC Generic Issue 199 (GI-199), Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing Plants (ML100270582). For this application, the NRC staff convolved the input parameters identified by the licensee to confirm the proposed seismic CDF penalty estimate.

Concerning the proposed seismic LERF penalty estimate, the licensee explained in the LAR that an estimate of the seismic LERF was obtained by convolving the estimated seismic CDF (as described above) with a PGA-based seismic fragility for the containment function that is conservatively assumed to be the same as the plant level seismic fragility. The calculated seismic LERF is 3.3x10-7 per year. The NRC staff finds the licensees approach to determining a seismic LERF penalty estimate to be acceptable for this application because use of the same plant level seismic fragility as that used for the seismic CDF penalty is conservative.

The licensee stated in the LAR that the Salem seismic penalty calculation addresses the risk of seismically-induced LOOP by conservatively including very low magnitude seismic events (as low as 0.0005g PGA), which is a very small fraction of the Salem Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), in the seismic CDF and seismic large early release frequency (SLERF) convolution calculations. The 24-hr non-recovered seismic-induced LOOP frequency is a very small percentage (approximately 1.5 percent for seismic events up to the SSE) of the frequency of such challenges already captured in the FPIE PRA such that it will not significantly impact the RICT Program calculations and therefore, has been omitted from explicit analysis in the RICT calculations. The NRC staff finds that this evaluation adequately addresses the impact of seismically induced LOOP for very low magnitude seismic events and has an insignificant impact on the RICT program calculations.

In summary, the NRC staffs review finds the licensees proposal to use the seismic CDF penalty of 2.3x10-6 per year, and a seismic LERF penalty of 3.3x10-7 per year to be acceptable for the licensees RICT Program for Salem, because (1) the licensee used the most current site-specific seismic hazard information for Salem, (2) the licensee used an acceptably low plant HCLPF value of 0.19g and a combined beta factor of 0.84 consistent with the information for Salem in the GI-199 evaluation to develop the conservative seismic CDF penalty, (3) the licensee used an acceptably low primary containment HCLPF value of 0.19g and a combined beta factor of 0.84 for the containment integrity fragility in the convolution to develop the bounding seismic LERF, and (4) adding baseline seismic annual risk to RICT calculations, which assumes fully correlated failures, is conservative for this application.

Evaluation of Extreme Winds and Tornado Hazards Section 4.1 of Enclosure 4 to the LAR discusses the licensees evaluation of extreme wind on this application. Tornado wind speed hazard curve information for Salem is provided in Table 6-1 of NUREG/CR-4461, Tornado Climatology of the Contiguous United States, Revision 2 (ML070810400). Based on the Enhanced Fujita (EF) scale, the wind speed for the 10-6 annual exceedance probability is 166 miles per hour (mph). Comparable 1,000,000 year Mean Recurrence Interval (MRI) tornado wind speed from the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) ASCE 7 Hazard Tool 2 is 195 mph. The licensee concluded that the extreme winds pressure can generally be screened from consideration for the TSTF-505 application because the frequency of tornadoes having wind speeds that exceed the design basis of 300 mph is much less than 10-6 per year and the 10-6 per year hurricane wind speed is approximately 150 mph, per Figure 3-1d of NUREG/CR-7005.

Section 4.2 of Enclosure 4 to the LAR discusses the licensees evaluation of tornado missile impact on this application. The licensee determined that for certain maintenance LCO configurations, tornado missiles could not be screened for the TSTF-505 application, necessitating a tornado missile penalty factor to be established for RICT calculations. Tornado missile failure probabilities for potentially vulnerable SSCs are based on the methodology provided in NEI 17-02, Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator (TMRE) Industry Guidance Document, Revision 1, September 2017 (ML17268A036). To develop the penalty factors, the tornado missile risk model was quantified for all LCO configurations proposed to be included within the RICT Program and for several risk significant combinations of LCO configurations.

Based on its evaluations, to encompass all the plant configurations associated with LCOs to be included in the RICT Program, the licensee proposed a bounding tornado missile CDF penalty of 5x10-6 per year. Similarly, for all plant configurations associated with LCOs to be 2 The ASCE 7 Hazard Tool can be accessed at https://asce7hazardtool.online/.

included in the RICT Program, the licensee proposed a tornado missile LERF penalty of 5x10-7 per year, which was determined by the licensee to be bounding for all LCOs and plant configurations except for LCO 3.6.1.3.c where the tornado missile LERF penalty is 1x10-6.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensees evaluation provided in Section 4 of Enclosure 4, and finds the licensees determination of CDF and LERF tornado missile risk penalties acceptable for this application because (1) the tornado missile risk is calculated using a conservative approach for tornado strike frequencies, (2) recovery or mitigation is conservatively not credited for these scenarios, although there are potential mitigation paths available using either installed equipment and/or FLEX, (3) the penalties bound the results of a tornado missile risk assessment for all LCOs encompassed by the RICT Program, and (4) the estimated LCO-specific tornado missile penalty factors would be added in their entirety to the delta-risk calculations for RICT determinations.

Evaluation of External Flooding Hazard The licensee justified screening out the external flooding hazard for their TSTF-505 LAR by stating that the NRC issued a Staff Assessment of the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) on October 7, 2016, 3 which concluded that the FHRR appropriately evaluated the flood causing mechanisms and agreed with the results that local intense precipitation (LIP) was the only mechanism required to be included in the Focused Evaluation (FE) 4. The FE affirmed that Salem has effective flood protection from the LIP mechanism and will not require additional safety enhancements since watertight doors, listed in Attachment 1 of PSEG Procedure SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001, are provided around the power block and for buildings that house SSCs important to safety reducing Salems external flooding risk below the screening criteria as discussed below.

The post-Fukushima external flooding analysis required licensees to update their external flooding hazard curves and to evaluate for all applicable external flooding mechanisms that are beyond design basis, such as LIP. The Salem FHRR5 determined that LIP was not bounded by the current design basis. The NRC issued its staff assessment of the FHRR on October 7, 2016. The staff concluded that the results in the FHRR were appropriately evaluated and should serve as input to the Integrated Assessment (IA).

The Salem FE was submitted to the NRC on June 30, 2017. This assessment affirmed that Salem has effective flood protection from the LIP mechanism and will not require additional safety enhancements since watertight doors are provided around the power block and for buildings that house SSCs important to safety. The updated analysis also demonstrated flood protection at Salem is designed to manage the storm surge probable maximum water surface 3 Goven, T., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Sena, P. P., President of PSEG Nuclear, "Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, - Staff Assessment of Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Information Request - Flood-Causing Mechanism Reevaluation," October 7, 2016 (ML16265A085).

4 Charles V. M., Site Vice President Salem Generating Station, PSEG, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Focused Evaluation of External Flooding for Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2,"

June 30, 2017 ( ML17181A221).

5 John, F. P., Site Vice President Salem Generating Station, PSEG, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "PSEG Nuclear LLC's Response to Request for Information Regarding Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident - Salem Generating Station Flood Hazard Reevaluation," March 11, 2014 (ML14071A401).

elevations (WSEs) and therefore the site has at least 10 feet of margin between the maximum WSE from LIP and the exceedance of flood protection at the site when all doors in Attachment 1 of SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001 are in their normally closed position. The staff concluded in its staff assessment (ML17257A279) of the Salem FE that the licensee has demonstrated effective flood protection exists from the reevaluated flood hazard, that Salem screens out of performing an integrated assessment, and additional regulatory actions associated with the reevaluated flood hazard are not warranted.

In a supplemental letter dated October 10, 2025, the licensee clarified that Salem has no temporary passive components credited as flood protection features and that all the doors, penetration seals, and hatches below the design basis flood height are watertight and permanently installed. These features are also assumed to be normally closed, but upon receipt of a flood warning, an operator is dispatched to ensure all the watertight doors and hatches in Attachment 1 of the procedure are in fact closed if not already closed and signs posted to maintain closure during the event. Reasonable simulations were performed during the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 walkdowns and the estimated time to complete the verification by a single on-site operator was one hour and seven minutes with a 2-hour closure action and 24-hour flood warning. Also, in the supplemental letter dated October 10, 2025, the licensee clarified that for the Storm Surge Hazard in Table E4-11, that Criterion C1 (Event damage potential is less than events for which plant is designed) alone is sufficient to screen the hazard for the RICT.

The NRC staffs review of the external flood hazard risk finds that the licensee has appropriately considered the risk from external flooding in the proposed RICTs and can support the screening of this external hazard because the site has at least 10 feet of margin between the maximum WSE from LIP and the exceedance of flood protection at the site when all doors in Attachment 1 of SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001 are in their normally closed position where a single on-site operator can verify their closure in about 1-hour and 7 minutes and the event damage potential is less than events for which the plant is designed. Therefore, the external flooding hazard is not a significant contribution to configuration risk and can be excluded from the calculation of the proposed RICTs.

Evaluation of Other External Hazards In addition to the seismic, extreme winds and tornado missiles, and external flooding hazards discussed above, the licensee stated that other external hazards for Salem have an insignificant contribution to configuration risk and proposed that these hazards be screened out from the RICT program. The licensee provided the technical basis for screening these hazards in Table E4-11 of Enclosure 4 to the LAR. The licensee further stated that the screening evaluation considered configuration-specific plant conditions.

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in the LAR and its supplements, and finds that the contributions from the remaining external hazards are insignificant and can be excluded from the calculation of the proposed RICTs because these hazards either do not challenge the plant or are bounded by the external hazards explicitly analyzed for this plant application.

Specifically, the NRC staff finds that the aircraft impact hazard has an insignificant contribution to the configuration risk because nearby airports and helipads have a low number of annual operations. Although air traffic along nearby airways (V123-312, V29, and J42-150) may be relatively frequent, the licensee estimated that the resulting core damage frequency contribution from an aircraft impact is below the threshold value of 1 x 107 per year. Based on this information, the staff finds that aircraft impact hazard is negligible and may be excluded from the proposed RICT calculations.

The NRC staff also reviewed the hazards associated with the transportation and release of hazardous chemicals. The NRC staff finds that the Salem site is located in a rural area with no nearby industrial or military facilities within 5 miles of the site and no major transportation routes (e.g., roads, rail lines, or pipelines) in close proximity. The Delaware River is the only transportation route with the potential to pose a chemical hazard. However, the NRC staff finds that the frequency of shipments of hazardous chemicals on the Delaware River is sufficiently low, consistent with the guidance in RG 1.78, such that a credible hazard to the plant does not exist. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that hazards associated with toxic chemical releases during transportation or at nearby facilities can be excluded from the proposed RICT calculations. In addition, the NRC staff reviewed the licensees evaluation of meteorite and satellite strike hazards and agrees with the licensee that the likelihood of a strike by a meteorite or a portion of satellite large enough to cause significant damage to plant SSCs is very low. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that meteorite and satellite strike hazards may also be excluded from the proposed RICT calculations.

The NRC staffs review also notes that the preliminary and progressive screening criteria applied by the licensee, as presented in Table E4-12 of Enclosure 4 to the LAR, are consistent with the screening criteria in Supporting Requirements EXT-B1, EXT-B2, and EXT-C1 of the ASME/ANS PRA Standard.

In summary, the NRC staff finds that the contributions from other external hazards have an insignificant contribution to configuration risk and can be excluded from the calculation of the proposed RICTs because they either do not pose a credible challenge to the plant or are bounded by the external hazards analyzed for the plant.

PRA Results and Insights The proposed change implements a process to determine TS RICTs rather than specific changes to individual TS CTs. NEI 06-09-A delineates that periodic assessment be performed of the risk incurred due to operation beyond the front stop CTs resulting from implementation of the RICT Program and comparison to the guidance of RG 1.174, Revision 3, for small increases in risk. In Enclosure 5, Baseline Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), to the LAR, the licensee provided the estimated total CDF and LERF to demonstrate that they meet the 1x10-4/year CDF and 1x10-5/year LERF criteria of RG 1.174 consistent with the guidance in NEI 06-09-A, and that these guidelines will be satisfied for implementation of a RICT.

The licensee has incorporated NEI 06-09-A into the new proposed TS 6.19. The estimated current total CDF and LERF for Salem PRAs meet the RG 1.174, Revision 3, guidelines; therefore, the NRC staff finds that the PRA results and insights to be used by the licensee in the RICT Program will continue to be consistent with NEI 06-09-A.

Key Assumptions and Uncertainty Analyses The licensee considered PRA modeling uncertainties and their potential impact on the RICT program and identified, as necessary, the applicable RMAs to limit the impact of these uncertainties. In Enclosure 9 to the LAR, the licensee discussed the identification of key assumptions and sources of uncertainty along with providing the dispositions for impact on the risk-informed application of applicable sensitivities. The licensee evaluated the Salem PRA model to identify the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty for this application consistent with the RG 1.200, Revision 2, definitions, using sensitivity and importance analyses to place bounds on uncertain processes, to identify alternate modeling strategies, and to provide information to users of the PRA.

In response to Audit question AQ-16 in the October 10, 2025, LAR supplement, the licensee discussed the impact of State of Knowledge Correlation (SOKC) on the Salem PRA model. In the supplement, the licensee stated that parametric uncertainty calculations resulted in less than 2 percent increase in each CDF and LERF for the full-power internal events model, and less than 0.5 percent increase in both CDF and LERF for the base fire PRA model for both Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The NRC staff determined that propagated uncertainties from the SOKC correlation do not significantly impact this application.

Therefore, the NRC staff find the licensee has satisfied the guidance in RG 1.77, Revision 2, and RG 1.174, Revision 3, and that the identification and treatment of assumptions and treatment of model uncertainties for the risk evaluation of extended CTs is appropriate for this application and is consistent with the guidance in NEI 06-09-A and is therefore acceptable.

PRA Scope and Acceptability Conclusions As stated in Enclosure 2 to the LAR, the licensee has subjected the PRA models to the peer review processes and submitted the results of the peer review. The NRC staff reviewed the peer-review history, which included the results and findings, the licensees resolutions of peer review findings, and the identification and disposition of key assumptions and sources of uncertainty. The NRC staff concludes that (1) the licensees PRA models are acceptable to support the RICT Program, and (2) the key assumptions for the PRAs have been identified consistent with the guidance in RG 1.200, Revision 2 and NUREG-1855, Revision 1.

Additionally, the staff finds that the licensees approach for considering the impact of seismic events, non-seismic external hazards and other hazards using alternative methods is acceptable.

Application of PRA Models in the RICT Program The Salem base PRA models (that are determined to be acceptable previously in this SE) will be modified as an application-specific PRA model (i.e., CRMP tool), that will be used to analyze the risk for an extended CT. The CRMP model is described in Enclosure 8 to the LAR and produces results (i.e., risk metrics) that are consistent with the NEI 06-09-A guidance.

Throughout the entirety of the LAR and associated supplements as discussed below, and specifically Table E1-1, the licensee provided all information to support the requested LCO actions proposed for the Salem RICT Program consistent with all the Limitations and Conditions prescribed in Section 4.0 of NEI 06-09-A.

In LAR Enclosure 1, Table E1-1 identifies each TS LCO proposed for the RICT program, describes whether the systems and components involved in the TS LCO are implicitly or explicitly modeled in the PRA, and compares the design basis and PRA success criteria. For certain TS LCO conditions, the table explains that the associated SSCs are not modelled in the PRAs, but will be represented using a surrogate event that fails the function performed by the SSC.

In response to Audit Question AQ-17 in the October 10, 2025, supplement to the LAR, the licensee discussed whether alternate system alignments and system asymmetries are accounted for in the real-time CRMP tool, and whether alignments underestimate CDF and LERF in calculating a RICT. The licensee stated that the CRMP utilizes a built-in alignment editor to capture alternate alignments and asymmetries and uses splits fractions for equipment on standby. These treatments for system alignments are consistent with NEI 06-

09. The licensee also stated that changes in CDF and LERF will not be underestimated because the calculation would be made assuming the least conservative baseline configuration.

In response to Audit Question AQ-18 in the October 10, 2025, supplement to the LAR, the licensee described how the PRA models the success criteria for Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) and Block Valves, especially in the context of bleed-and-feed and leaky PORVs. For bleed and feed, the licensee described the cutsets for operator actions and pump and valve actions. The licensee also stated that leaky PORVs and their associated block valves are explicitly accounted for in the model. Additionally, the licensee stated that the position of PORV block valves can be toggled to TRUE if a block valve is known to the closed.

Based on the information provided, the NRC staff determined that PORV and block valve actions associated with bleed-and-feed and leaky PORVs are adequately addressed in the model.

In Section 2 of Enclosure 8 to the LAR, the licensee states: For emergent conditions where the extent of condition is not completed prior to entering into the RMAT [Risk Management Action Time] or the extent of condition cannot rule out the potential for common cause failure, common cause Risk Management Actions (RMAs) are expected to be implemented to mitigate common cause failure potential and impact, () However, if a numeric adjustment is performed the RICT calculation shall be adjusted to numerically account for the increased possibility of CCF in accordance with RG 1.77, as specified in Section A-1.3.2.1 of Appendix A of the RG.

The NRC staff finds that numerically accounting for an increased probability of failure, in accordance with RG 1.177, Revision 2, will shorten the estimated RICT based on the particular SSCs involved, thereby limiting the time when a CCF could affect risk. Alternatively, implementing actions that can increase the availability of other mitigating SSCs or decrease the frequency of demand on the affected SSCs will decrease the likelihood that a CCF could affect risk. The staff finds that both methods minimize the impact of CCF because they either limit the exposure time, help ensure the availability of alternate SSCs, or decrease the probability of plant conditions requiring the safety function to be performed.

For planned inoperability, the licensee states in LAR Enclosure 8, Section 2, that for planned inoperability, the appropriate component is taken Out-of-Service and no other changes are made when calculating a RICT.

Section 3.3.6, Common Cause Failure Consideration, of NEI 06-09-A states, in part, that for all RICT assessments of planned configurations, the treatment of CCFs in the quantitative configuration risk management tools may be performed by considering only the removal of the planned equipment and not adjusting CCF terms. Therefore, the Salem method of removing the planned equipment is acceptable. However, RG 1.177 states that when a component is rendered inoperable in order to perform preventative maintenance, the CCF contributions in the remaining operable components should be modified to remove the inoperable component and to only include CCF of the remaining components. The NRC staff finds that the CCF contribution from the out-of-service component is conservatively retained in the following ways: (1) the independent failure rate used in the PRA models includes both independent and dependent failure events (i.e., the dependent failures should be subtracted from the total population of failures to calculate the independent failure rate) and (2) the CCF event probabilities that include the out-of-service component are retained. However, the NRC staff also finds that this simplification produces both conservative and non-conservative effects.

The CCF probability estimates are uncertain and retaining precision in the calculation of these estimates using a more refined approach will not necessarily improve the accuracy of the results. Therefore, the staff finds that the licensees method is acceptable because, consistent with NEI 06-09-A, the calculations reasonably include CCFs after removing one train for maintenance consistent with the accuracy of the estimates.

The NRC staff did not identify any insufficiencies in the information or the CRMP tool (RTR model) as described in the LAR, as supplemented. Furthermore, as indicated in Attachment 1 to the LAR, regarding the Salem design criteria, the licensee stated that actual RICT values will be calculated using the actual plant configuration and the current revision of the PRA model representing the as-built, as-operated condition of the plant... The NRC staff finds that the Salem PRA models and CRMP tool used will continue to reflect the as-built, as-operated plant consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 2, for ensuring PRA acceptability is maintained.

Therefore, the staff finds that the proposed application of the Salem RICT Program is appropriate for use in the adoption of TSTF-505 for performing RICT calculations.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied the intent of tier 1 in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174, for determining the PRA acceptable, and that the scope of the PRA models (i.e., IEPRA, FPRA) evaluated PRA hazards, high winds hazards, other external hazards, and seismic methodology is appropriate for this application.

3.2.4.2 Tier 2: Avoidance of Risk-Significant Plant Configurations As described in RG 1.177, Revision 2, the second tier evaluates the capability of the licensee to recognize and avoid risk-significant plant configurations that could result if equipment, in addition to that associated with the proposed change, is taken out of service simultaneously or if other risk-significant operational factors, such as concurrent system or equipment testing, are also involved.

In Section 2 of Enclosure 10 to the LAR, the licensee confirmed that the risk thresholds associated with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) will be coordinated with the RICT limits. Enclosure 12 to the LAR identifies three kinds of RMAs (i.e., actions to provide increased risk awareness and control, actions to reduce the duration of maintenance activities, and actions to minimize the magnitude of the risk increase). Enclosure 12 to the LAR also explains that RMAs will be implemented, in accordance with current plant procedures, no later than the time at which the 1x10-6 incremental core damage probability (ICDP) or 1x10-7 incremental large early release probability (ILERP) threshold is reached and under emergent conditions when the instantaneous CDF and LERF thresholds are exceeded.

Based on the licensees incorporation of NEI 06-09-A in the TSs, as discussed in LAR, the use of RMAs as described in LAR Enclosure 12, and because the proposed changes are consistent with the Tier 2 guidance of RG 1.177, Revision 2, the NRC staff finds that the licensees RICT Program requirements and criteria are consistent with the principle of Tier 2 to avoid risk-significant configurations. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensees Tier 2 program is acceptable and supports the proposed implementation of the RICT Program.

3.2.4.3 Tier 3: Risk Informed Configuration Risk Management Tier 3 of RG 1.177, Revision 2, provides that a licensee should develop a program that ensures that the risk impact of out-of-service equipment is appropriately evaluated prior to performing any maintenance activity.

The proposed RICT Program establishes a CRMP, or RTR model, based on the underlying PRA models. In Enclosure 8 to the LAR, the licensee explains the adjustments to PRA models (e.g., adjustments to maintenance unavailability) to ensure the proper use of models in the RTR model calculations. The RTR model is then used to evaluate configuration-specific risk for planned activities associated with the RMTS extended CT and emergent conditions that may arise during an extended CT. This required assessment of configuration risk, along with the implementation of compensatory measures and RMAs, is consistent with the principle of Tier 3 for assessing and managing the risk impact of out-of-service equipment.

In Enclosure 8 to the LAR, the licensee confirmed that future changes made to the baseline PRA models and changes made to the online model (i.e., RTR) are controlled and documented by plant procedures. In Enclosure 10, Program Implementation, to the LAR, the licensee identified the attributes to be addressed by the RICT Program procedures, which are consistent with the guidance in NEI 06-09-A. The NRC staff finds that the licensee has identified appropriate administrative controls consistent with NEI 06-09-A and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5).

Based on the licensees incorporation of NEI 06-09-A in the TSs, as discussed in LAR ; the use of RMAs, as discussed in LAR Enclosure 12; and because the proposed changes are consistent with the Tier 3 guidance of RG 1.177, Revision 2, the NRC staff concludes that the licensees Tier 3 program is acceptable and supports the proposed implementation of the RICT Program.

3.2.4.4 Key Principle 4 Conclusions The licensee has demonstrated the technical acceptability and scope of its PRA models and alternative methods, this includes considering the impact of seismic events, non-seismic external hazards, and other hazards, and that the models can support implementation of the RICT Program for determining extensions to CTs. The licensee has made proper consideration of key assumptions and sources of uncertainty. The risk metrics are consistent with the approved methodology of NEI 06-09-A and the acceptance guidance in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174. The RICT Program will be controlled administratively through plant procedures and training and follows the NRC approved methodology in NEI 06-09-A. The NRC staff concludes that the RICT Program satisfies the fourth key principle of RG 1.177 and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.3 Key Principle 5: Performance Measurement Strategies - Implementation and Monitoring RG 1.177, Revision 2 and RG 1.174, Revision 3, establish the need for an implementation and monitoring program to ensure that extensions to TS CTs do not degrade operational safety over time and that no adverse degradation occurs due to unanticipated degradation or common cause mechanisms. Enclosure 11 to the LAR states that SSCs within the scope of the RICT Program are also within the scope of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65.

The Maintenance Rule monitoring programs will provide for evaluation and disposition of unavailability impacts which may be incurred from implementation of the RICT program.

NEI 06-09-A specifies that the cumulative risk associated with the use of RMTS beyond the front-stop for equipment out of service is to be monitored. In Enclosure 11 to the LAR, the licensee states that the cumulative risk is calculated at least every refueling cycle, not to exceed 24 months. The NRC staff finds that this periodicity is consistent with NEI 06-09-A.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the RICT Program satisfies the fifth key principle of RG 1.177 and RG 1.174. Specifically, the NRC staff finds that (1) the RICT Program as described in Enclosure 11 to the LAR, includes provisions to monitor the average annual cumulative risk increase as described in NEI 06-09-A and to ensure that the program, as implemented, meets RG 1.174 guidance for small increases in risk, and (2) all SSCs affected by the RICT Program are within the scope of the Maintenance Rule monitoring program, which provides a mechanism to monitor changes in SSC reliability and availability over time.

3.3 Adoption of TSTF-591, Revision 0 The NRC staff compared the licensees proposed TS changes in Section 2.3 of this SE against the changes approved in TSTF-591. The NRC staff finds that the licensees proposed changes to the Salem TSs described in Section 2.3 of this SE are consistent with those found acceptable in TSTF-591.

In the SE approving traveler TSTF-591, the NRC staff concluded that the TSTF-591 proposed changes to STS 5.5.15, Risk Informed Completion Time Program, and the proposed addition of STS 5.6.7, Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program Upgrade Report, were acceptable. These modifications were acceptable because, as discussed in that SE, they continued to ensure the PRA models used to calculate a RICT are maintained and upgraded by the licensees appropriate use of endorsed guidance (i.e., the ASME/ANS PRA Standard requirements, and specific industry guidance that the NRC staff has determined are sufficient for determining the acceptability of PRA models and newly developed methods for use in the RICT program). Furthermore, as discussed in the traveler SE, the addition of reporting requirements does not preclude any NRC staff oversight of PRA changes performed to ensure the PRA model(s) continues to be maintained and upgraded consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 3. Therefore, the NRC staff found that the proposed changes to the RICT Program and addition of the RICT Program Upgrade Report requirements were acceptable because they continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5) by providing administrative controls necessary to assure operation of the facility in a safe manner. For these same reasons, the NRC staff concludes that the corresponding proposed changes to the Salem TSs in Section 2.3 of this SE continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5).

3.4 Technical Conclusion The NRC staff has evaluated the proposed changes against each of the five key principles in RG 1.177, Revision 2 and RG 1.174, Revision 3, and evaluated the optional variations from the approved TSTF-505 discussed in Section 3.2.1 of this SE. The staff concludes that the changes proposed by the licensee satisfy the key principles of risk-informed decision-making identified in RG 1.174, and RG 1.177 and; therefore, the requested adoption of the proposed changes to the TSs and associated guidance are acceptable to assure the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 identified in Section 2.1 of this SE will continue to be met.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on January 22, 2026. On February 3, 2026, the State official confirmed that the State of New Jersey had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration published in the Federal Register on May 14, 2025 (90 FR 20513), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: April Pulvirenti, NRR Jeff Circle, NRR Ching Ng, NRR Thinh Dinh, NRR Keith Tetter, NRR Michael Swim, NRR Khoi Nguyen Edmund Kleeh, NRR Ming Li, NRR Jason White, NRR Hosung Ahn, NRR Rosalynn Wang, NRR Amit Ghosh, NRR Jason English, NRR Brian Lee, NRR Andrea Russell, NRR Jo Ambrosini, NRR Date: February 20, 2026

ML26023A048 NRR-058 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL3/LA NRR/DRA/APLA/BC(A)

NAME RGuzman SLent MGonzalez DATE 1/23/2026 1/27/2026 12/16/2025 OFFICE NRR/DRA/APLB/BC NRR/DEX/EMIB/BC NRR/DEX/EEEB/BC(A)

NAME EDavidson SBailey Adakou Foli (for WMorton)

DATE 11/24/2025 1/28/2026 2/5/2026 OFFICE NRR/DEX/EICB/BC(A)

NRR/DEX/EXHB/BC(A)

NRR/DEX/ESEB/BC NAME CCheung (for SDarbali)

BHayes ITseng DATE 1/8/2026 9/30/2025 2/2/2026 OFFICE NRR/DSS/SNSB/BC NRR/DSS/SCPB/BC NRR/DSS/STSB/BC NAME NDifrancesco MValentin SMehta DATE 1/30/2026 1/28/2026 2/5/2026 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL1/BC(A)

NRR/DORL/LPL1/PM NAME UShoop RGuzman DATE 2/18/2026 2/20/2026

v t e Letter Sequence Approval
EPID:L-2025-LLA-0021, TSTF-591 (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request, Request Acceptance Supplement Administration Questions Answers Results Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval Other: ML25096A002
MONTHYEAR2025-03-10 [Table View]

Person / Time
ML26023A048
Site:	Salem (DPR-070, DPR-075)
Issue date:	02/20/2026
From:	Richard Guzman NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL1
To:	Mcfeaters C Public Service Enterprise Group
References
EPID L-2025-LLA-0021
Download: ML26023A048 (0)
v • d • e

ML26023A048

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Mr. McFeaters:

Enclosures:

Attachment:

Attachment:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

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