ML20248J951
| ML20248J951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1998 |
| From: | STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSOCIATES, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248J876 | List: |
| References | |
| EPRI-116-310, EPRI-116-310-R, EPRI-116-310-R00, NUDOCS 9806090373 | |
| Download: ML20248J951 (34) | |
Text
STRUCTURAL CALCULATION pitt go.:
trgi.ii6-310 INTEGRITY Associates. Inc.
PACKAGE PROJECT No.: EPRI-116 PROJECT NAME: Pilot Study on Examination Category B-J Code Case N-560 CLIENT:
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
CALCULATION TITLE: Degradation Mechanisms Evaluation for ANO-1 PROBLEM STATEMENT OR OBJECTIVE OF THE CALCULATION:
ASME Code Case N-560 [1] provides alternative examination requirements for Class I, B-J piping welds in lieu of the requirements currently specified in Table IWB-2500-1 for such welds in ASME Code Section XL This risk-based approach consists of the following two essential elements:
- 1. A degradation mechanism evaluation is performed to assess the failure potential of the piping system under consideration.
- 2. A consequence evaluation is performed to assess the impact on plant safety in the event of a piping failure.
The results from these two independent evaluations are coupled to determme the risk significance of piping segments within the system and are used to prioritize the selection of welds for inspection.
Only the first element will be performed here.
The purpose of this calculation is to document an evaluation of degradation mechanisms for all Category B-J Welds at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, for application to a Code Case N-560 inspection. This evaluation will include the identification of Class 1 piping systems (lines) and inspection locations within those lines. The lines will then be evaluated for their susceptibility to the degradation mechanisms identified in Reference [1].
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Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION
.3 1.1 Background.
.3 1.2 Scope.
.3 1.3 Assumptions...
.4 2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF DAMAGE MECHANISMS..
.5 3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.
.9 3.1 Reactor Coolant System Description....
.9 3.2 Reactor Coolant System Class 1 Boundary.
.. 9 3.3 Reactor Coolant System Degradation Mechanisms Evaluation.
.10 3.3.1 ThermalFatigue (TF).
.10 3.3.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC).
.11 3.3.3 Locali:ed Corrosion (LC).
.12 3.3.4 Flow Sensitive (FS).
.12 3.3.5 WaterHammer.
.12 4.0 PRIMARY MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM..
. 19 4.1 Makeup And Purification System Description.
.19 4.2 Makeup And Purification System Class 1 Boundary....
... 19 4.3 Makeup And Purification System Degradation Mechanisms Evaluation..
..... 20
)
4.3.1 ThermalFatigue (TF)....
. 20 4.3.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC}.
.... 20 4.3.3 Localized Corrosion (LC).
.. 21 j
l 4.3.4 Flow Sensitive (FS).
.22 4.3.5 Water Hammer.
.22 5.0 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM.
.28
- 5.1 Decay Heat Removal System Description..
.28 5.2 Decay Heat Removal System Class 1 Boundary.
28 5.3 ' Decay Heat Removal System Degradation Mechanisms Evaluation.
.29 5.3.1 ThermalFatigue (TF).
.29 5.3.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)...
.30 5.3.3 Locali:ed Corrosion (LC)..
.30 5.3.4 Flow Sensitive (FS).
.31 5.3.5 Water Hammer.
.31
6.0 REFERENCES
...... 3 4
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
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1.1 Background
ASME Code Case N-560 [1] provides alternative examination requirements for Class 1, B-J piping welds in lieu of the requirements currently specified in Table IWB-2500-1 for such welds in ASME Code.Section XI. The Code Case permits a reduction in inspections from 25% to 10% of Class 1 piping welds if they are selected by risk-informed procedures. The risk-informed approach consists of two essential elements.- The first part consists of a degradation mechanism evaluation performed to assess the failure potential of the piping system under consideration. The second part consists of a consequence evaluation performed to assess the impact on plant safety in the event of a piping failure.
The results from these two independent evaluations are coupled to determine the risk significance of
_ piping segments within the system and are used to prioritize the selection of welds for inspection.
Only the first element will be performed here.
The purpose of this calculation is to perform the degradation mechanism evaluation for ap' lying Code p
i-
' Case N-560 to the Category B-J Welds at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1). This evaluation will include the identification of Class 1 piping systems (lines) and inspection locations within those I
lines, with an analysis of each location's susceptibility to the degradation mechanisms identified in Reference [1).
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1.2 Scope The following systems, which comprise the Class 1 piping at ANO-1, are included in this evaluation:
o ' Makeup and Purification System (includes HPI)
. o - Decay Heat Removal System (includes LPI & CF)
As part of the procedure, the system functions and the Class 1 boundaries of each system will be described and documented in the subsequent sections along with the degradation mechanism evaluations for_ each system. Selecting the Class 1 portion of the systems and identifying the inspection
' locations within that system are important, to focus the degradation mechanism evaluation on those sections where the Code Case [1] applies.
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1.3 Assumptions
- 1. System and system boundary identifications are defined by the ANO-1 ISI Program for Class 1, Category B-J Welds.
- 2. ANO-1 is in compliance with the requirements ofRegulatory Guide 1.36 for nonmetallic thermal insulation for austenitic stainless steel.
- 3. Degradation mechanisms are evaluated for systems within scope, based on conditions that occur during normal operation, excluding long lay-ups. Conditions which occur during " upset" transients are included, but those resulting from " faulted" or " emergency" transients are not considered in this assessment.
- 4. The potential for water hammer events in PWR systems is discussed extensively in Ref. [2]. It is assumed in this evaluation that any system identified in Ref. [2] for which a water hammer event has a moderate to high safety significance is considered susceptible. Preventative measures to avoid water hammer are provided in References [2] and [3].
- 5. Valves and other piping components do not allow air (oxygen) intrusion or other contaminants into the process fluid, even under long term stagnant conditions. If a system and/or section of piping is filled with primary grade water during startup or shutdown evolutions, the water quality is assumed to remain constant throughout the cycle. However, oxygen concentration in isolated piping sections can increase due to gas evolvement.
- 6. Vessel nozzle to safe-end welds are classified as category B-F welds, and thus are excluded from this evaluation. This is consistent with the existing ISI program and practice. These welds are listed in the weld tables for accountability purposes only, and are denoted by a superscript "B-F".
- 7. Socket welds are excluded from the scope of Code Case N-560 examinations; therefore all socket welds will be excluded from this evaluation. These welds are listed in the weld tables for accountability purposes only, and are denoted by a superscript "S"
- 8. Lacking any evidence to the contrary, all evaluation locations are subject to tensile stress, either from residual stresses or as a result of transients.
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2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF DAMAGE MECHANISMS For Code Case N-560 (1), all category B-J welds in the assessed systems must be classified by failure potential. This classification is accomplished by determining those degradation mechanisms that might
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apply to each assessed weld. By the terms of this Code Case, any welds susceptible to FAC can be classified as having a "large break" failure potential; welds susceptible to all other mechanisms can be classified as having a "small leak" failure potential. Welds in the "small leak" category must be upgraded to the "large break" category if the associated pipe segment is also susceptible to water hammer.
As given in Table 2-1, the attributes for determining degradation mechanisms are quite general. More specific guidance for determining potential degradation mechanisms has been provided in a companion risk-informed process, developed under the auspices of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
[4]. The degradation mechanisms and associated attributes provided in the EPRI program are shown in Table 2-2. By comparison to Table 2-1, we see that the listing of degradation mechanisms is similar between the Code Case and the EPRI approach. However, the EPRI program provides more specific guidance for identifying potential damage mechanisms.
' In the following sections of this calculation package, the criteria outlined in Table 2-2 (the EPRI reference) are used to assess the potentially active degradation mechanisms for all the Class 1 systems listed in Section 1.2 for the ANO-1 Power Plant.
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I Table 2-1 Degradation Mechanisms and Attributes in Code Case N-560 [1]
Mechanism Attnbutes Susceptible Regions 1
Thermal Fatigue Intermittent Cold Water injection (i, ii, iii)
Nozzles, branch pipe connections,
- i. Thermal Shock Low Flow, Little Fluid Mixing (ii. iii) safe ends, welds, HAZ, and base ii. Stratification Notch-Like Stress Risers (li, iii) metal regions of high stress iii. Striping Very Frequent Cycling (ii, iii) concentration Unstable Turbulence Penetration into Stagnant Lines (ii, iii)
Bypass leakage in valves with large ATs (ii, iii) 2 Flow Accelerated Turbulent Flow at Sharp Radius Elbows and Tees Corrosion Proximity to Pumps, Valves and Orifices Material Chromium Content Fluid pH Oxygen Temperature 3
Erosion-Cavitation Severe Discontinuities in Flow Path Fittings, welds, and HAZ Proximity to Pump, Throttle Valve, Reducing Valve or Flow Orifice 4
Corrosion Aggressive Environment (i, iii)
- i. GeneralCorrosion Oxidizing Environment (ii, iii) li. Crevice Corrosion Material (i, iv) iii. Pitting Temperature (i, iv) iv. MIC Contaminants (sulfur species, chlorides, etc.) (ii)
Crevice Condition (ii)
Stagnant Region (ii)
Low Flow (iii)
/
Lay up (iv) 5 Stress Corrosion Susceptible Material (i)
Austenstic stainless steel welds Cracking Oxidizing Environment (i, ii) and HAZ (i) i.IGSCC Stress (residual, applied)(i, ii)
Mill-annealed Alloy 600 nozzle ii. TGSCC Initiating Contaminants welds and HAZ wrthout stress lii. PWSCC (sulfur species, chlorides, etc.) (i) relief (iii)
(aqueout halides or concentrated caustic) (ii)
Temperature (i, ii)
Strain Rate (environmentally assisted cracking)
(i, ii)
Fabrication Practice (e.g., weld ID grinding, cold work (1)
Notch-like Stress Risers 6
Water Hammer [ Note Potential for Fluid Voiding and Relief Valve (1))
Discharge i
NOTE:
(1)
Water hammer is a rare, severe loading condition as opposed to a degradation mechanism, but its potential at a location, in conjunction with one or more of the listed degradation mechanisms, could be cause for a higher examination zone ranking, Revision:
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1 Table 2-2 Degradation Mechanism Criteria and Susceptible Regions in EPRI Risk-Informed Procedure [4]
Degradation Criteria Susceptible Region l
Mechanism TF TASCS
- nps > 1 inch, and nozzles, branch pipe connections,
- pipe segment has a slope < 45' from safe ends, welds, heat affected horizontal (includes elbow or tee into a zones (HAZ), base metal and vertical pipe), and regions of stress concentration
- potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, out-leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections connected to a source of hot fluid, or potential exists for two phase l
(steam / water) flow, or potential exists for l
turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and
- calculated or measured AT > 50'F and
- Richardson number > 4.0 l
l TT
- operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and
- potential for relatively rapid temperature
[
changes including cold fluid injection into hot pipe segment, or hot fluid injection into cold pipe segment, and AT l > 200'F for stainless steel, or l
AT
> 150'F for carbon steel, or i
AT
> AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
- evaluated in accordance with existing plant austenitic stainless steel welds and (BWR)
IGSCC program per NRC Generic Letter 88-HAZ
)
01 IGSCC
- operating temperature > 200*F, and (PWR)
- susceptible material (carbon content >
0.035%), and
- tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and
- oxygen or oxidizing species are present OR
- operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and
- initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, l
fluoride, chloride) are also required to be l
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Table 2-2 (cont'd)
Degradation Criteria Susceptible Region Mechanism TGSCC
- operating temperature > 150'F, and
- tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and
- halides (e.g., fluoride, chloride) are present, or caustic (NaOH) is present, and
- oxygen or oxidizing species are present (only required to be present in conjunction w/ halides. not required w/ caustic)
ECSCC
- operating temperature > 150'F, and austenttic stainless steel base metal,
- tensile stress is present, and welds, and HAZ
- an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a prcbable leak path (e.g.,
valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chloride bearing environments (e.g., seawater, brackish water, brine)
- piping material is inconel (Alloy 600), and nozzles, welds, and HAZ without
- exposed to primary water at T > 560*F, and stress relief
- the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or cold worked and welded without stress relief LC MIC
- operating temperature < 150'F, and fittings, welds, HAZ, base metal,
- low or intermittent flew, and dissimilar metal joints (e.g., welds,
- pH < 10, and flanges), and regions containing
- presence / intrusion of organic material (e.g.,
crevices raw water system), or water source is not treated w/ biocides (e.g., refueling water tank)
PIT
- potential exists for low flow, and
- oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and
-initiating contaminants (e.g. fluoride, chloride) are present CC
- crevice condition exists (e.g., thermal sleeves), and
- operating temperature > 150*F, and
- oxygen or oxidizing species are present FS E-C
- operating temperature < 250*F, and fittings, welds, HAZ, and base metal
- flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and
- velocity > 30 ft/s, and
- evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program Revision:
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3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.1 Reactor Coolant System Description The reactor coolant system (RCS) consists of the following components:
Reactor Vessel Two Once Through Steam Generators (SG's)
Four Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP's)
Pressurizer e
Interconnecting piping (including drains, vents, etc.)
e The RCS is a two-loop system with each loop consisting of two RCP's and one SG. The function of the RCS is to remove the heat from the nuclear fuel and transport that heat to the SG for use in steam production.
3.2 Reactor Coolant System Class 1 Boundary The Class 1 portion of the reactor coolant system piping consists of the RCS hot and cold legs, drain lines and pressurizer surge, spray and auxiliary spray lines. All lines are considered Class 1 out to the second valve beyond the RCS.
The RCS is connected to both the makeup and purification (MU&P) and decay heat removal (DHR) systems. These systems are evaluated separately in Sections 4.0 and 5.0, respectively.
' Table 3-1 lists the Class I lines within the RCS and defines their operating and design conditions.
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Table 3-1 RCS Class 1 Lines with Operating / Design Conditions Line Pipe Size Pipe Pipe Material Design Oper.
Design Oper.
Notes (ISI Zone)
(0)
Thickness Pressure Pressure Temp.
Temp.
Hot Leg 36" 2-5/8" SA 106 Gr.C' 2500 psig 2155 psig 650" 604' (5) 2 (14,15)
SA-516 Gr.70 SG to RCP 28" 2 1/16" SA-106 Gr.C' 1500 psig 2145 psig 650*
557 (5) 2 (6.8.10,12)
SA-516 Gr.70 RCP to RV 28" 2-1/16" SA-106 Gr.C' 2500 psig 2241 psig 650*
557' (5) 2 (7,9,11,13)
SA-516 Gr.70 Drain Lines 1%"
sch 160 SA-312 Tp.316' 2500 psig 2145 psig 650 503 2
(25)
SA-403 Wp.316 Pn Surge 10" sch 140 SA-376 Tp.316' 2500 psig 2166 psig 670 648 2
(16)
SA-403 Wp.316 Pu Spray 2%"
sch 160 SA-376 Tp.316' 2500 psig 2166 psig 670*'
555"'
(3) 2 (18)
SA-403 Wp.316 Aux Spray 1%"
sch 160 SA-312 Tp.316' 2500 psig 2166 psig 670 '
648"'
d 2
(18)
SA-403 Wp.316 SRV (4)
Notes:
(1) Meterial spec for straight pipe sections.
(2) Material spec for elbows, tees, reducers, etc.
(3) Last 20" of pipe before the spray nozzle is 4" sch 120; material is the same.
(4) There are no Class 1, category B-J welds in this system.
(5) All of the 36" and 28" RCS piping is clad with 18-8 Stainless Steel [5]
(6) Per reference [13]. Other references [5] [6] specify Design Temp. = 650 (7) Per reference [13]. However, author believes these should both be 550 3.3 Reactor Coolant System Degradation Mechanisms Evaluation The evaluation of degradation mechanisms for the RCS, per the criteria in Table 2-2, is documented in Appendix A. Highlights of this evaluation are provided below for all the mechanisms. A complete list ofClass I category B-J welds, along with the corresponding evaluation results, are provided in Tables 3-2 through 3-7.
3.3.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF) 3.3.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS)
TASCS is a potential damage mechanism in the cold leg drain lines (P-32B, P-32C and P-32D) upstream of the first isolation valve due to combined tubulent penetration / natural convection. It is also a potential mechanism in the horizontal sections of the surge line and upper horizontal section of Revision:
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the pressurizer spray line due to low flows and large driving temperatures. The hot and cold leg piping lines (exclusive of vent and drain lines) are unaffected because of high RCS flows during plant operation and no potential for mixing of hot / cold fluid flows.
3.3.1.2 Thermal Transients (TT)
TT is a potential damage mechanism in several locations, due to normal and upset plant events such as surge line insurge / outsurge, pressurizer spray initiation, HPI actuations and cycling of normal makeup flow. These events all involve injecting cold / hot water into hot / cold lines. Welds at or near the nozzles are generally susceptible; welds far from any branches are not affected by TT. The most severe TT effects will be near both surge nozzles, near the pressurizer main spray nozzle, and near the cold leg HPI and normal makeup nozzle branch connections.
3.3.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 3.3.2.1 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)
IGSCC is generally not a concern for this system, since plant chemisty controls maintain oxygen concentration inboard of the first isolation valve at insignificant levels. The fluid in the sections of the cold leg drain lines outboard of the first isolation valve may contain oxygen (due to gas evolvement),
but the temperature of the piping isjudged to be less than 200'. In addition, plant chemistry controls maintain other intitiating contaminants at insignificant levels.
3.3.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)
TGSCC is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain initiating contaminants (i.e., halides or caustics) at insignificant levels.
3.3.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)
ECSCC is not a concern for this system, since ANO-1 complies with Reg. Guide 1.36, and there are no nearby sources of chloride-bearing water.
3.3.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
PWSCC is a potential damage mechanism for the cold leg drain nozzles (inconel), pressurizer main spray nozzle safe end (inconel) and the hot leg surge line nozzle (inconel buttered). It is assumed that all of these locations would experience RCS temperatures of approximately 560 F or above.. PWSCC is not a concern elsewhere in this system, since the hot and cold legs are carbon steel (with stainless steel cladding) and the drain lines and pressurizer surge, spray and auxiliary spray lines are stainless steel.
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i 33.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) 3.3.3.1 Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)
MIC is not a concern for this system, since the only piping that operates below 150* (cold leg drain line piping outboard of the first isolation valve and the auxiliary spray line) contains water which has previously been exposed to elevated RCS operating temperatures.
3.3.3.2 Pitting (PIT)
PIT is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain initiating contaminants at insignificant levels.
3.3.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC)
CC is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration at insignificant levels for the locations where crevice conditions exist (i.e., the thermal sleeves in the hot leg and pressurizer surge nozzle connections).
3.3.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) 3.3.471 Erosion-Cavitation (E-C) 1 E-C is not a concern, since the only flow restriction in the system is the control valve in the Pressurizer spray line, which does not have a high enough flow velocity or AP to cause cavitation.
3.3.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
FAC is not a concern, since the system is composed of stainless steel (TP316 / WP316) components and carbon steel components clad in 18-8 stainless steel. Since the entire inner surface is coated in stainless steel,' it is resistant to FAC due to its high chromium content (<5%).
3.3.5 Water Hammer The RCS is not affected by the Water Hammer Degradation Mechanism. Industry experience suggest that Water Hammer is possible in pressurizer safety relief (SRV) lines, but for ANO-1 the SRV lines l
contain no category B-J welds.
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Tat,le 3-2 Inspection Locations, RCS Hot Legs, ISI Zones 14 and 15 Wild Weld TF SCC LC FS Nurnber Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC E-C FAC 14-001 Pipe () to S/G E-24A tr*iet Nozzle (70)14-002 Elbow () to Pipe ()14-006 Elbow () to Elbow ()14-009 Pipe (A7) to Elbow ()14-014 Pipe (14) to Pipe (A7)14-015 Pipe (A15) to Pipe (14)14-018 Pipe (22) to Pipe (A15) 14019 Pipe (24) to Pipe (22)14-020 Pipe (23) to Pipe (24)14-022 Pzr Surge Nozzle branch connection (25) y 14-023 Elbow (31) to Pipe (23)14-026 Decay Heat Nozzle branch connection (34)14-027 Pipe (32) to Elbow (31)14-028 Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzle (19) to Pipe (32)15-001 Pipe () to S/G E-24B Inlet Nozzle (70)15-002 Elbow () to Pipe ()15-006 Elbow () to Elbow ()15-009 Pipe (A7) to Elbow ()15-014 Pipe (14) to Pipe (A7)15-015 Pipe (A15) to Pipe (14)15-019 Pipe (22) to Pipe (A15)15-020 Pipe (24) te Pipe (22)15-021 Pipe (23) to Pipe (24)15-022 Elbow (31) to Pipe (23)15-025 Pipe (32) to Elbow (31)15-026 Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzle (19) to Pipe (32)
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Table 3-3 Inspection Locations, RCS Cold Legs, ISI Zones 6,8,10 and 12 i
Weld Weld TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC E-C FAC 06-001 Pipe (55) to RC Pump P-32C 06-002 Pipe (A56) to Pipe (55)06-004 Pipe (57) to Pipe (A56) 06405 Elbow (62) to Pips (G7) 1 06-008 Pipe (A63) to Elbow (62) 06 009 Drain Nozzle branch connection (64)06-010 Elbow (45) to Pipe (A63)06-013 Pipe (67) to Elbow (45)06-014 S/G E-24A Outlet Nozzle (65) to Pipe (67)08-001 Pipe (55) to RC Pump P-320 08-002 Pipe (A56) to Pipe (55)08-004 Pipe (57) to Pipe (A56)08-005 Elbow (62) to Pipe (57)08-008 Pipe (A63) to Elbow (62) 08409 Drain Nozzle branch connection (64)08-010 Elbow (45) to Pipe (A63)08-013 Pipe (67) to Elbow (45)06-014 S/G E-24A Outlet Nozzle (65) to Pipe (67) 1 10-001 Pipe (55) to RC Pump P-32A 10 002 Pipe (A56) to Pipe (55) j 10 004 Pipe (57) to Pipe (A56) l IMOS Elbow (62) to Pipe (57) 10 008 Pipe (63) to Elbow (62)
IM09 Letdovm Nozz2 branch connechon (87)10-010 Elbow (45) to Pipe (63)10-013 Pipe (67) to Elbow (45)10-014 S/G E-24B OutMt Nozzle (65) to Pipe (67)12-001 Pipe (55) to RC Pump P-328 12-002 Pipe (ASS) to Pipe (55) i2-004 Pipe (57) to Pipe (A56)13-005 Elbow (62) to Pipe (57) j 12-008 Pipe (A63) to Elbow (62) j 12-009 Drain Nozzle branch connection (64)
I 12-010 Elbow (45) to Pipe (A63) l 12-013 Pipe (67) to Elbow (45)12-014 S/G E-248 Outlet Nozzle (65) to Pipe (67) l Revision:
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f Table 3-4 Inspection Locations, RCS Cold Legs, ISI Zones 7,9,11 and 13 Wold Weld TF SCC LC FS I
Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 07 001 RC Pump P-32C to Pipe (A49)07-002 Pzr Spray Nozzle (51) branch connection 07 003 Pipe (A49) to Elbow (53)07-006 Elbow (53) to Pipe (A44)07-007 HPl Nozzle branch connection (46) y
[
07-006 Pipe (A44) to Elbow (43) l 07-011 Elbow (43) to Pipe (A40)07-013 Pipe (A40) to Elbow (39)07-016 Elbow (39) to Pipe (38) l 07-017 Pipe (38) to Reactor Vessel in!et Nozzle (18)09-001 RC Pump P-32D to Pipe (49)09-002 Pipe (49) to Elbow (53)09-005 Elbow (53) to Pipe (A44) 09-C36 Normal Makeup Nozzle aranch connection y
(46)09-007 Pipe (A44) to Elbow (43)09-010 Elbow (43) to Pipe (42)09-011 Pipe (42) to Elbow (39)09-014 Elbow (39) to Pipe (38)09-015
, Pipe (38) to Reactor Vessel inlet Nozzle (18) 11 001 RC Pump P-32A to Pipe (49)11-002 Pipe (49) to Elbow (53) 11 C35 Elbow (53) to Pipe (A44)11-006 HPl Nozzle branch connection (46) y 11 C37 Pipe (A44) to Elbow (43)11-010 Elbow (43) to Pipe (42) l 11-011 Pipe (42) to Elbow (39) 11 014 Elbow (39) to Pipe (38) j 11-015 Pipe (38) to Reactor Vessel inlet Nozzle (18)13-001 RC Pump P-32B to Pipe (49)
I 13-002 Pipe (49) to Elbow (53)
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13-C05 E! bow (53) to Pipe (A44)13-006 HPI Nozzle branch connection (46) y 13-007 Pipe (A44) to Elbow (43) l 13-010 Elbow (43) to Pipe (42)13-011 Pipe (42) to Elbow (39)13-014 Elbow (39) to Pipe (38)13-015 Pipe (38) to Reactor Vessel inlet Nozzle (18) l l
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Table 3-5 Inspection Locations, RCS Drain Lines, ISI Zone 25 Wold Wold TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT ' CC EC FAC 25001 P-32C Suction Cold Leg Drain Nozzle (64) to y
Pipe (34)25-002 Pipe (34) to Valve RBD-8C (35) y 35-003 Valve RBD-8C (35) to Pipe (36) 25-0DA Pipe (36) to Tee (40)25-005 Tse (40) to Pipe (41)25-006 Pipe (41) to Valve RBD-9C (37)25-007 Pipe (61) to Tee (40)25-008 Tee (42) to Pipe (61)25-009 Pipe (43) to Tee (42)25-010 Tee (44) to Pipe (43)25-011 P-320 Suction Cold Leg DrcWzzle (64) to y
Pipe (55)25-012 Pipe (55) to Valve RBD-8D (54) y 25-013 Valve RBD-8D (54) to Pipe (53)25-014 Pipe (53) to Tee (46) 25015 Tee (46) to npe (60)25-010 Pipe (60) to Reducer (49) 25 017 Reducer (49) to Valve RBD-9D (50) 25 018 Pipe (45)to Tee (46) 25 019 Tee (44) to Pipe (45)25-029 P-32B Suction Cold Leg Drain Nozzle (64) to y
Pipe (1)25-030 Pipe (1) to Pipe (39) y 25-031 Pipe (39) to Valve RBD-8B (40) y 25-032 Valve RBD-8B (40) to Pope (41)25-033 Pipe (41) to Tee (43)25-034 Tee (43) to Pipe (46)35-035 Pipe (40) to Reducer (47)35-036 Reducer (47) to Valve RBD-9B (48) 2 % 37 Pipe (51) to Tee (43)35-038 Tee (45) to Pipe (51)25-039 Tee (45) to Pipe (32)35-040
. Pipe (32) to Tee (34) 2M41 Tee (34) to Pipe (52) 25 042 Pipe (52) to Tee (29)25-043 Pipe (27) to Tee (29)25-044 Valve RBD-8A (26) to Pipe (27)25-045 Tee (29)to Pipe (30)25-046 Pipe (30)to Valve RBD-9A (31)
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Table 3-6 inspection Locations, PZR Spray Lines, ISI Zone 18 Wold Wood TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 18-001i'#8 Safe End (45) to Pzr Spray Nozzle (9) j
[ Category B-F1 l
16-001 A Pipe (1) to Safe End (45) y y
18-002 Elbow (12) to Pipe (1) y y
18 003 Reducer (19) to Elbow (12) y y
l 18-004 Pipe (2) to Reducer (19) y y
18-005 Tee (16) to Pipe (2) y y
18-006 Reducer (20) to Tee (16) y y
l 16-007 Pipe (33) to Reducer (20) y y
18-006 Elbow (13) to Tee (16) y y
18409 Pipe (3) to Elbow (13) y y
18-010 Valve CV-1009 (25) to Pipe (3) y y
18 011
- ipe (4) to Valve CV-1009 (25) y y
18-012 Reducer (2) to Tee (17) y y
18 013 Tee (17) to Pipe (4) y y
18-014 Pipe (5) to Tee (17) y y
16-015 Valve CV-1008 (24) to Pipe (5) y y
18#16 Pipe (6) to Valve CV-1006 (24) y y
IB-017 Elbow (14) to Pape (6) y y
18018 Tee (18) to Elbow (14) y y
18-018A Tee (18) to Reducer (1) y 18-019 Pipe (7) to Tee (18) y 18-020 Valve RC-3 (23) to Pipe (7) y 18-021 Pipe (8) to Valve RC-3 (23) y 18 022 Pipe (9) to Pipe (B) y i8-023 Elbow (15) to Pipe (9)16-024 Pipe (10) to Elbow (15) 18 025 Pipe (11) to Pipe (10)18-026 P-32C Discharge Cold Leg Spray Nozzle (51) to Pipe (11)18-068 Elbow (32) to Pipe (33)18-067 Pipe (1) to Elbow (32)18-029 Elbow (16) to Pipe (1)18-030 Pipe (2) to Elbow (16)18-031 '8' Valve DH-12 (30) to Pipe (2) socket weld 18-032 S' Pipe (27) to Valve DH-12 (30) socket weld 18-066 "'
Valve DH-16 (31) to Pipe (27) socket weld 05 040'*#8 Pzr PSV-1001 Rehef tJozzle (124)to Flange (125) fCategory B-F]
05-041**#8 Pzr PSV-1000 Relef Nozzle (31) to Flange (32)[ Category B-F]
05-042#8 Pzr PSV-1002 Rehef Nozzle (124) to Flange (125)ICategory B-F)
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Table 3-7 Inspection Locations, PZR Surge Line, ISI Zone 16 Wold Wold TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCE TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 16-001 E-24A Hot Leg Surge Nozzle (25) to Pipe y
y (85) 16 002 Pipe (85) to Elbow (80) y 16403 Elbow (80) to Pipe (84) y 16404 Pipe (84) to Elbow (80) y y
16 005 Elbow (80) to Pipe (83) y y
16-007 Pipe (83) to Pipe (82) y y
16-008 Pipe (82) to Elbow (80) y y
16-009 Elbow (80) to Pipe (81) y y
16010 Pipe (81) to Elbow (80) y y
16-011 Elbow (80) to Pipe ()
y y
16-012 Pipe () to Safe End (37) y 16 012A Safe End (37) to Pzr Surge NozzW (8)
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l 4.0 PRIMARY MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM 4.1 Makeup And Purification System Description The Makeup And Purification (MU&P) System performs various functions in direct support of the RCS. These functions include:
Supply RCS with fill and operational makeup water Provide ses injection and seal return for reactor coolant pumps e
Provide purification of the RCS to remove corrosion and fission products Control boric acid concentration in the RCS (in conjunction with the chemical addition system and e
waste dispesal system)
Accommodate changes in RCS valume due to small temperature changes e
Facilitate RCS chemistry control e
Supply borated water to the Core Flood Tanks Provide a source of pressurizer auxiliary spray for RCS pressure reduction when RCP's are turned e
4 ofrand RCS pressure is high
{
Inject borated water at high pressure upon ES actuation j
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4.2 Makeup And Purification System Class 1 Boundary The Class 1 ponion ofthe MU&P system piping consists of the letdown line and the HPI / normal makeup lines. All lines are considered Class 1 out to the second valve beyond the RCS.
The MU&P system is connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Legs via the letdown nozzle and the HP1/ normal makeup nozzles. The RCS is evaluated in Section 3.0.
Table 4-1 lists the Class I lines within the MU&P system and defines their operating and design conditions.
Table 4-1 MU&P System Class 1 Lines with Operating / Design Conditions Line Pipe Size Pipe Pipe Material Design Oper.
Design Oper.
Notes j
(ISI Zone)
(0)
Thickness Pressure Pressure Temp.
Temp.
l HPllines 2b" sch.160 SA-312 Tp.316' 2500 psig 2170 psig 650' 555"
2 (20 - 23)
SA-403 Wp.316 j
Letdown 2%"
sch.160 SA-312 Tp.316' 2500 psig 2170 psig 600*
5 55 * *'
2 (24)
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Notes:
(1) Material spec for straight pipe sections.
(2) Material spec for elbows, tees, reducers, etc.
(3) Temp reflects normal (stagnant) condition; HPI fluid temp. during injection = 100.
(4) Temp of piping upstream ofletdown coolers; downstream fluid temp. = 120.
4,3 Makeup And Purification System Degradation Mechanisms Evaluation The evaluation of degradation mechanisms for the MU&P system, per the criteria in Table 2-2, is documented in Appendix B. Highlights of this evaluation are provided below for all the mechanisms.
A complete list of Class 1 category B-J welds, along with the corresponding evaluation results, are provided in Tables 4-2 through 4-6.
4J.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF)
'4.3.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS)
TASCS is a potential damage mechanism for the HPI lines (P-32A, P-32B and P-32C), in the horizontal sections upstream of the first isolation chc.k valves due to conduction heating through the valves resulting in an isolated convection cell. It is not of concern in the horizontal sections downstream of these valves as the fluid in this region is assumed to be well mixed. TASCS is also not a concern in the P-32D normal makeup line (constant flow) or the letdown line (no mechanism for stratified flow).
.4.3.1.2 Thermal Transients (TT)
TT is a potential damage mechanism in the HPI lines (P-32A, P-32B and P-32C) downstream of the first isolation check valves off the RCS due to HPI actuations, and in the normal makeup line (P-32D) near the nozzle region due to loss of makeup events. TT is also a concern for the letdown piping, during recovery afler a loss ofletdown event (upstream of coolers), and to a lesser extent, when decay heat is initiated and the coolers are bypt ssed (downstream of coolers).
43.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 4.3.2.1 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)
IGSCC is a potential damage mechanism in the HPI lines (P-32A, P-32B and P-32C) immediately outboard of the first isolation check valves where the temperature of the piping is judged to be in the 200* range and oxygen may be present. IGSCC is not a concern elsewhere in this system, since plant Levision:
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chemistry controls maintain the oxygen concentration at insignificant levels for the HPI lines inboard of the first isolation check valves and for the normal makeup / letdown lines (makeup tank water supply).
4.3.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)
TGSCC is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain initiating contaminants (i.e., halides or caustics) at insignificant levels.
4.3.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)
ECSCC is not a concern for this system, since ANO-1 complies with Reg. Guide 1.36, and there are no nearby sources of chloride-bearing water.
4.3.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
PWSCC is a potential damage mechanism for the letdown nozzle, which is inconel buttered and encounters RCS temperatures of approximately 560 F. PWSCC is not a concern elsewhere in this system, since the HPI and normai makeup nozzles are carbon steel and the nozzle safe ends and piping are stainless steel.
4.3.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) 4.3.3.1 Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)
MIC is a potentially active damage mechanism in portions of the HPI lines (P-32A, P-32B and P-32C) upstream of the first isolation valves where the temperature of the piping isjudged to be less than 150*. However, due to the lack ofindustiy or plant degradation experience with this system, it is not considered to be a concern. Likewise, MIC is also not a concern elsewhere in this system, since the temperature of the piping is greater than 150* (downstream of the isolation valves) and/or the piping I
contains water which has been exposed to elevated RCS operating temperatures (letdown / normal makeup).
4.3.3.2 Pitting (PIT)
PIT is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain initiating contaminants at insignificant levels.
4.3.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC)
CC is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration at l
insignificant levels for the locations where crevice conditions exist (i.e., the thermal sleeves in the HPI j
nozzles).
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4.3.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) 4.3.4.1 Erosion-Cavitation (E-C)
E-C is not a concern for this system, since there are no flow restrictions in the HPI / normal makeup and letdown piping sections assessed.
l 4.3.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
FAC is not a concern, since the system is composed of stainless steel (TP316 / WP316) component.s, which is resistant to FAC due to a high chromium content (>12%).
4.3.5 Water Hammer l
The MU&P system is not affected by the Water Hammer Degradation Mechanism.
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Table 4-2 Inspection Locations, HPI Line (Loop C), ISI Zone 20 Weld Wold TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 20029A Valve MU-66C (58) to Pipe (8)20-030 Pipe (8) to Elbow (31)20-031 Elbow (31) to Pipe (7) 20 032 Pipe (7) to Elbow (30) y 20 033 Elbow (30) to Pape (6) y 2M35 Pipe (6) to Valve MU-34C (47) y y
20-036 Valve MU-34C (47) to Elbow (29) y 20437 Elbow (29)to Pipe (5)20-039 Pipe (5) to Elbow (28)20-040 Elbow (28) to Pipe (4)20-109 Pipe (4) to Pipe (3)20-041 Pipe (3) to Valve MU-45C (46) y 20 042 Valve MU-45C (46) to Pipe (2) y 30-110 Pipe (2) to Pipe (1) 20 043 Pspe (1) to Elbow (27)20-044 Elbow (27) to Safe End (47) y 20-045 Safe End (47) to P-32C Diacharge Cold Leg y
HPl Nozzle (46) 1
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Table 4-3 Inspection Loc tions, Makeup /HPl (Loop D), ISI Zone 21 l
l Wold Wold
{
Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC I
21 100 Valve MU-66D (105) to Pipe (22) 31 050 Pipe (22) to Pipe (23)31-051 Pipe (23) to Elbow (58)31-052 Elbow (58) to Pipe (24)31-053 Pipe (24) to Valve MU-340 (89)31-054 Valve MU-340 (89) to Elbow (59)31-055 Elbow (59) to Pipe (25) 21 4)S7 Pipe (25) to Elbow (60)21-058 Elbow (60) to Pipe (26)
I 31 059 Pipe (26) to Valve MU-45D (90) l 31-060 Valve MU-45D (90) to Pipe (104) 31 120 Pipe (104) to Pipe (27) 21 121 Pipe (27) to Pipe (103)21-062 Pipe (103) to Elbow (61)21-063 Elbow (61) to Safe End (47) y 31-064 Safe End (47) to P-32D Discharge Cold Leg y
Normal Makeup Nozzle (46) l i
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Table 4-4 Inspection Locations, HPI Line (Loop A), ISI Zone 22 Weld Wold TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC Mic PIT CC EC FAC 22-115 Valve MU-66A (102) to Pipe (18)23-034 Pipe (18) to Elbow (55) 22435 Elbow (55) to Pipe (17)22-037 Pipe (17) to Elbow (49)22-038 Elbow (49) to Pipe (16)22-039 Pipe (16) to Elbow (48)22-040 Elbow (48) to Pipe (15)23-041 Pipe (15) to Elbow (47)22-042 Elbow (47) to Pipe (14)22-043 Pipe (14) to Elbow (46)23-044 Elbow (46) to Pipe (13) 22 045 Pipe (13) to Elbow (45)22-046 Elbow (45) to Pipe (12)22-047 Pipe (12) to Elbow (44)22-048 Elbow (44) to Pipe (11)22-049 Pipe (11) to Pipe (10) j 22-050 Pipe (10) to Elbow (43)
I 22-051 Elbow (43) to Pipe (9)22-052 Pipe (9) to Elbow (42) l 22-053 Elbow (42) to Pipe (103)22-916 Pipe (103) to Pipe (8)
)22-054 Pipe (8) to Elbow (41) 23455 Elbow (41) to Pipe (7)22-056 Pipe (7) to Pipe (6)22-057 Pipe (6) to Elbow (40) y 22-058 Elbow (40) to Pipe (5) y 22-060 Pipe (5) to Valve MU-34A (30) y y
23-061 Valve MU-34A (30) to Elbow (29) y 22-062 Elbow (29) to Pipe (4)23-064 Pipe (4) to Elbow (27)22-065 Elbow (27) to Pipe (3)22-066 Pipe (3) to Valve MU-45A (26) y 22-067 Valve MU-45A (26) to Pipe (2) y i
23-068 Pipe (2) to Pipe (1) l 23-069 Pipe (1) to Elbow (25) 13470 Elbow (25) to Safe End (47) y 22-071 Safe End (47) to P-32A Discharge Cold Leg y
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Table 4-5 Inspection Locations, HPl Line (Loop B), ISI Zone 23 Weld Weld TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC Mic PIT CC E4 FAC 23-117 Valve MU-66B (121) to Pipe (16)23-029 Pipe (16) to Elbow (127)23-030 Elbow (127) to Pipe (15)23-031 Pipe (15) to Elbow (48)23-032 Elbow (48) to Pipe (14)23-033 Pipe (14) to Elbow (44) 23 034 Elbow (44) to Pipe (13)23-035 Pipe (13) to Elbow (43)23-036 Elbow (43) to Pipe (12)23-037 Pipe (12) to Elbow (42) 23 038 Elbow (42) to Pipe (11)23-039 Pipe (11) to Elbow (41)23-040 Elbow (41) to Pipe (10)23-041 Pipe (10) to Elbow (40)23-042 Elbow (40) to Pipe (52)23-043 Pipe (52) to Pipe (9)23-044 Pipe (9) to Elbow (39)33-045 Elbow (39) to Pipe (8)23-046 Pipe (8) to Elbow (38)23-047 Elbow (38) to Pipe (112)33-109 Pipe (112) to Pipe (7)23-048 Pipe (7) to Elbow (37)33-049 Elbow (37) to Pipe (6A)23-050 Pipe (6A) to Pipe (6) 33 051 Pipe (6) to Elbow (36) y 33-052 Elbow (36) to Pipe (5) y 23-053 Pipe (5) to Pipe (4) y 23-055 Pipe (4) to Valve MU-348 (50) y y
23 056 Valve MU-34B (50) to Elboe (35) y 23-057 Elbow (35) to Pipe (3)23-059 Pipe (3) to Elbow (34)23-060 E cow (34) to Pipe (2)23-106 Pipe (2) to Pipe (2A)23-061 Pipe (2A) to Valve MU-45B (49) y 23-062 Valve MU-458 (49) to Pipe (1 A) y 23-107 Pipe (1 A) to Pipe (1)33-063 Pipe (1) to Elbow (33)33-064 Elbow (33) to Safe End (47) y 23-065 Safe End (47) to P-32B Discharge Cold Leg y
HPl Nonle (46)
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Table 4-6 Inspection Locations, Letdown Line (Loop A), ISI Zone 24 Weld WeW TF SCC LC 7#
Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC E4 FAC 24-066A P-32A Suction Cold Leg Letdown Noz2le y
(87) to Pipe 0 2+002 Pipe () to Tee (32)34-001 Tee (32) to Reducer (54) 24 065 Reducer (54) to Pipe (25) 34057 Pipe (25) to Valve RBD-BA (26) l 24-003 Tee (32) to Pipe (62) l 34-004 Pipe (62) to Elbow (55) 34 005 Elbow (55) to Pipe (2)24-006 Pipe (2) to Elbow ()
3+007 Elbow () to Pipe (J) 34008 Pipe (3) to Elbow (28)24-009 Elbow (28) to Pipe (4)34-011 Pipe (4) to Elbow (27) 24012 Elbow (27) to Pipe (5) 34013 Pipe (5) to Elbuw (26)24-014 Elbow (26) to Pipe (6)24-015 Pipe (6) to Elbow 0 24016 Elbow () to Tee (31) y 34-017 Tee (31) to Pipe (8) y 2M18 Pipe (8) to Elbow (24) 24 019 Elbow (24) to Pipe (9)24-020 Tee (31) to Pipe (7) y 24-021 Pipe (7) to Elbow (23) 24 022 Elbow (23) to Pipe (10) 3^324 Pipe (10) to Valve CV 1213 (52) y 34-025 Valve CV-1213 (52) to Pipe (12) y 24026 Pipe (12) to Elbow (21)34-027 Elbow (21) to Pipe (13)34-029 Pipe (13) to Elbow (18)34-030 Elbow (18) to Pipe (16)34-031 Pipe (16) to Reducer (41)34-031 A Reducer (41) to Hx E-29A y
24-034A Reducer (40) to Hx E-29B y
24034 Pipe (17) to Reducer (40)34-035 Elbow (19) to Pipe (17)24-036 Pipe (15) to Elbow (19)24-038 Valve CV-1215 (53) to Pipe (15) y 34 039 Pipe (14) to Valve CV-1215 (53) y Revision:
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Table 4-6 (cont'd)
Wold Wold TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCO PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 24 040 Elbow (20) to Pspe (14)34-041 Poe (11) to Elbow (20)24-043 Elbow (22) to Pepe (11) 2 & O44 Pye (9) to Elbow (22) after letdown Hx's24-051 Pipe (20) to Velve CV-1214 (46) 34 052 Elbow (33) to Pipe (20)24-053 Pipe (22) to Elbow (33)24-055 Elbow (35) to Pipe (22) 24056 Pipe (25) to Elbow (35) j 34-057 Reducer (37) to Pipe (25) 34-057A Hx E-29A to Reducer (37) 34058A Hx E-29B to Reducer (36) 34058 Reducer (36) to Pipe (24)34-059 Pipe (24) to Elbow (34)34-060 Elbow (34) to Pipe (23)24-062 Pipe (23) to Elbow (32) 34 063 Elbow (32) to Pipe (21)34-064 Pipe (21) to Velve CV 1216 (45) l l
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5.0 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM 5.1 Decay Heat Removal System Description The Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System performs various normal and emergency functions. These functions include:
i Removal of decay heat from the core and sensible heat from the RCS during the latter stages of e
cooldown Provides a means to maintain RCS temperature within a desired band during refueling or e
maintenance outages Provides for purification and sampling of the RCS during shutdown conditions e
Provides a means of filling and partial draining of the fuel transfer canal e
Supplies auxiliary spray to the pressurizer for complete depressurization of the RCS and cool e
down of the pressurizer when RCP's are secured j
Provides a means of automatically injecting (via LPI) borated w ater into the reactor vessel for core e
cooling in the event of a loss of coolant accident (intermediate to large breaks)
Provides long term cooling by taking suction from the reactor building sump while operating in the j
e Emergency Safeguards mode Provides NPSH for the HPI pumps (piggy back) during small break LOCA's when the BWST is emptied and RCS pressure is to high for LPI i
Since the decay heat removal and low pressure injection functions do not occur simultaneously, some of the same piping and components are used for each function.
5.2 Decay Heat Removal System Class 1 Boundary l
The Class 1 portion of the DHR system piping consists of the suction line and the LPI / CF discharge lines. Alllines are considered Class 1 out to the second valve beyond the RCS.
The DHR system is connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg at the DHR system I
suction nozzle. The RCS is evaluated in Section 3.0.
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~ Table 5-1 lists the Class I lines within the DHR system and defines their operating and design conditions.
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l Table 5-1 DHR System Class 1 Lines with Operating / Design Conditions
\\
l Line Pipe Size Pipe Pipe Material Design Oper.
Design Oper.
Notes l
l (ISI Zone)
(0)
Thickness Pressure Pressure Temp.
Temp.*
m Suction 12" sch.140 SA-376 Tp.316' 2500 psig
< 250 psig 650'
< 280' 2
(17)
SA-403 Wp.316 l
LPI / CF 14" sch.140 SA 376 Tp.316' 2500 psig
< 250 psig 300*
< 280*
2 (19)
SA-403 Wp.316 LPI/ CF 12" sch.140 SA-376 Tp.316' 2500 psig
< 250 psig 300*
< 280*
2 (19)
SA-403 Wp.316 LPI/ CF 8"
sch.140 SA-376 Tp.316' 2500 psig
< 250 psig 300*
< 280*
2 (19)
SA-403 Wp.316 Notes:
(1) Material spec for straight pipe sections.
(2) Material spec for elbows, tees, reducers, etc.
(3) Per [5] and [12), the DHRS only operates when P<250 psig and T<280 F. However, [13]
defines operating conditions as P=2170, T=580 5,3 Decay Heat Removal System Degradation Mechanisms Evaluation The evaluation of degradation mechanisms for the DHR system, per the criteria in Table 2-2, is documented in Appendix C. Highlights of this evaluation are provided below for all the mechanisms.
A complete list of Class I category B-J welds, along with the corresponding evaluation results, are provided in Tables 5-2 and 5-3.
5.3.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF) 5.3.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS) l I
TASCS is a potential damage mechanism for piping sections near the core flood nozzles due to low I
flow (functional test of core flood check valves) and leakage flow past valves (backleakage test of the
)
DHR/LPI/CF check valves). TASCS is also a potential damage mechanism for a portion of the decay I
heat suction line due to combined turbulent penetration / natural convection.
5.3.1.2 Thermal Transients (TT)
TT is a potential damage mechanism for piping sections near the core flood nozzles during the functional test of the core flood check valves and the backleakage test of the DHR/LPI/CF check valves. TT is not a concern in the suction line, since decay heat is not initiated during plant cooldown l
until. the RCS fluid has cooled to below 280 F.
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5.3.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 5.3.2.1 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)
IGSCC is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration at insignificant levels for piping inboard of the first isolation valves. The oxygen concentration between the isolation valves is also considered insignificant since any oxygen present will have largely been scavenged when decay heat is operational during plant heatup.
1 5.3.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)
TGSCC is not a concern for this system,._.ce plant chemistry controls maintain initiating contaminants (i.e., halides or caustics) at insignificant levels.
l 5.3.2.3 Extemal Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)
ECSCC is not a concern for this system, since ANO-1 complies with Reg. Guide 1.36, and there are no nearby sources of chloride-bearing water.
5.3.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
PWSCC is a potential damage mechanism for the decay heat suction nozzle, which is inconel buttered and exposed to RCS temperatures above 560 F during normal operation. PWSCC is not a concern elsewhere in this system, since the core flood nozzles are carbon steel and the nozzle safe ends and piping are stainless steel.
5.3.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) 5.3.3.1 Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)
MIC is not a concern for this system, since the only piping that operates below 150* (outboard of the i
first isolation valves) contains water which was exposed to an elevated decay heat operation -
J temperature during plant heatup.
5.3.3.2 Pitting (PIT)
PIT is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain initiating contaminants at insignificant levels.
5.3.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC)
CC is not a concern for this system, since plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration at Revision:
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ini;dficant levels for the locations where crevice conditions exist (i.e., the thermal sleeves in the core flood nozzles).
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i 5.3.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) 5.3.4.1 Erosion-Cavitation (E-C)
E-C is not of concern, since the only flow restrictions in the system are the flow restrictors in the core flood nozzles.
5 3.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
FAC is not a concern, since the system is composed of stainless steel (TP316 / WP316) components, which is resistant to FAC due to a high chromium content (>l2%).
5.3.5 Water Hammer The DHR system is not affected by the Water Hammer Degradation Mechanism.
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Table 5-2 Inspection Locations, DHRS Suction Line, ISI Zone 17 l
Weld Weld TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 17-001 Pipe (11) to Valve CV-1410 (16)17-003 Valve CV-1050 (13) to Pipe (14) 17 004 Pipe (12)to Valve CV-1050 (13)17-006 Elbow (10) to Pipe (12) 17407 Pipe (9) to Elbow (10)17-008 Elbow (8) to Pipe (9)17-009 Pipe (7) to Elbow (B)17-010 Elbow (6) to Pipe (7)17-011 Pipe (5) to Elbow (6)17-012 Elbow (4) to Pipe (5) y 17-013 Elbow (3) to Elbow (4) y 17-014 Pipe (57)to Elbow (3) y 17 015 Pipe (2) to Pipe (57) y 17 016 Elbow (1) to Pipe (2)17-017 E-24A Hot Leg Nozzk (34) to Elbow (1) y i
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Table 5-3 Inspection Locations, LP! & Core Flood Lines, ISI Zone 19 Wold Weld TF SCC LC FS Number Location TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC MIC PIT CC EC FAC 19-051 Valve CF-1B (21) to Pipe (45)19-001 Pipe (45)to Elbow (20)
I 19-002 Elbow (20) to Pipe (33)19-003 Pipe (33) to Tee (34)19-004 Elbow (33) to Tee (34)19-005 Pipe (32) to Elbow (33)19-006 Valve DH-17 (31) to Pipe (32)19-007 Tee (34) to Pipe (32) i9-009 Pipe (32) to Tee (17)19-010 Reducer (18) to Tee (17)19-011 Valve DH-13B (19) to Reducer (18)19-012 Tee (17) to Valve DH-14B (11)19-013 Valve DH-14B (11) to Pipe (10)19-015 Pipe (10) to Elbow (12) y 19-016 Elbow (12) to Pipe (13) y 19-017 Pipe (13) to Elbow (14) y 19-018 Elbow (14) to Pipe (15) y 19-052 Pipe (15) to Pipe (16) y 19 019 Pipe (16) to Safe End (89) y y
01-026#8 Safe End (89) to T-2B Core Flood NozzHe (17) (Category B-F]
01-025'*#8 Safe End (89) to T-2A Core Flood Nozzle (17)[ Category B-F1 19-022 Pipe (1) to Safe End (89) y y
19-023 Elbow (2) to Pipe (1) y 19-024 Pipe (3) to Elbow (2) y 19-025 Elbow (4) to Pipe (3) y 19-026 Pipe (5) to Elbow (4) y 19-028 Valve DH-14A (6) to Pipe (5)19-029 Tee (7) to Valve DH-14A (6) 10 031 Reducer (8) to Tee (7)19-032 Tee (23) to Reducer (8)19-033 Vatve DH-13A (43) to Tee (23)10-034 Pipe (22) to Tee (23)19-035 Elbow (21) to Pipe ()19-050 Pipa () to Pipe (22)19-036
- Pipe (20) to Elbow (21)19-037 Elbow (19) to Pipe (20) 10 038 Valve DH-18 (18) to Elbow (19)19-039 Valve CF-1 A (9) to Tee (7) l I
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6.0 REFERENCES
- 1) ASME Coda Case N-560, " Alternative Examination Requirements for Class 1, Category B-J Piping Welds,Section XI, Division 1", Supp. 6 - NC, Approval Date: August 9,1996.
- 2) NUREG-0927, " Evaluation of Water Hammer occurrence in Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 1, SI File EPRI-l16-206.
- 3) ASME-87-PVP-19, " Prevention of Power Plant Water Hammer", S1 File EPRI-116-206.
- 4) EPRI TR-106706, " Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedures," June 1996.
]
- 5) Excerpts from ANO Unit 1 FSAR, Sections 4,6, and 9 (System Descriptions and Design Evaluations), SI File EPRI-l16-704.
- 6) ANO Unit 1, " System Training Manual: Reactor Coolant System", STM l-03, rev. 7,3/12/97. SI File EPRI-l16-705-1.
- 7) ANO Unit 1, " System Training Manual: Primary Makeup and Purification", STM l-04, rev. 4, 2/24/97. SI File EPRI-l16-705-2.
- 8) ANO Unit 1, " System Training Manual: Decay Heat Removal System", STM l-05, rev. 6, 6/17/97. SI File EPRI-l16-705-3.
- 9) ANO Unit 1, " System Training Manual: Core Flood System", STM 1-06, rev. 5,3/12/97. SI File EPRI-l16-705-4.
i
System", ULD-1-SYS-02, Revision 1,2/7/97. SI File EPRI-l16-706-1.
1
- 11) ANO Upper Level Document, ANO Unit 1, " Decay Heat Removal / Low Pressure Injection l
System", ULD-1-SYS-04, Revision 1,2/7/97. SI File EPRI-116-706-2..
l l
12)Framatome Technologies, " Functional Specification: Reactor Coolant System, ANO Unit 1",
j Document # 18-1173987-03.. SI File EPRI-l16-710.
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I t
I APPENDIX A Degradation Mechanism Evaluation Checklists for the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) l i
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Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Both Hot Legs from the Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzles to the Steam Generator E-24A / E-248 Inlet Nozzles No.
Attributes to be Considered Yes No Nic N/A Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and B
D D
D
[TASCS-2)- only the first 5% ft (spool 32) near I
the reactor vessel for each line l
TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45* from honzontal (includes elbow or B
O O
O l
toe into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potental exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a O E O
O in conesusion, TASCS is not a concern ainee component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or no potent /al arists for mixing of hot / cold Ruid Rows.
TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i e., in-leakage, out-O E O
O leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections O
2 O
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or
[TT-2-2]-the E-24A hot leg surge nozzle branch TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O
B D
D connection region is affected by pressunzer outsurges dunng plant heatups / cooldowns TASCS-3-5 potental exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected O 3 O
O to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and
[TT-3-2] during plant heetups / cooldowns e AT of 350* to 400* can occur at the E-24A hot leg TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, and O E O
O surge nozzle branch connection region TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4.0 0
0 2
O TT11 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or O
O O E da **ac'usion, Tr errects the e 24A hot fog surge nottle branch connection region due TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and 2
O O
O to potencias oursurges from the pressurizer.
potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-3-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or O 2 O
O TT-2-2 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and B
O O
O TT-3-1 laTl > 200*F for stainless steel, or O
O O
O TT-3-2 laT l > 150*F for carbon steel, or 2
O O
O TT-3-3 laTl > AT allowable (apphcable to both stainless and carbon)
B O
O O
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O @
[lGSCC-B-1] - only apphes to BWR's NRC Genenc Letter 88-01
[lGSCC-P-2)- the hot legs are carbon steeh.t-IGSCC-P 1 operating temperature > 200*F, and B
O O
O
$tainies: ste.1 ciaoding IGSCC-P-2 susceptible matenal (carbon content a 0 035%), and O 2 O
O
[lGSCC-P-4, IGSCC-P-6] - plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration and other IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and B
D D
D contaminants at insignificant i.veis IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidging species are present O 3 O
O OR in conclusion, IGSCC is not a concern for the
~
IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and O 3 O
O IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluonde, chlonde) are also O
O O
O
[TGSCC-31, TGSCC-3-2. TGSCC-4) - plant required to be present chemtstry controls maintain oxygen concentration TGSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
O O
O and other contaminants at it)significant levels l
TGSCC-2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and O
O O
O
',acj p g g M [ " ""*"
- TGSCC-3-1 halides (e g., fluoride, chloride) are present, or O 2 O
O TGSCC-3-2 caustic (NaOH)is present, and O E O O TGSCC-4 oxygen or oxid2 ng species are present (only required to be present O
O O
O in conjunction w/hahdes, not required w/ caustic)
A-1
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping A====ad.
Both Hot Legs from the Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzles to the Steam Generator E-24A I E-248 Inlet Narrian No.
Attributes to be Considwed N
8w
- c WA Remarks j
ECSCC-1 operahng temperature > 150*F, and E
O O
O IECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2]. ANO-1 compless with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potental eiaets for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and E
O O
O exposure to chioride beenna water sources ECSCC-3-1 en outside piping surface is within five demoters of a probable leek O E O
O h concausion, ECsCC Je not a concem nur path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metalhe insulation the reasons provided above.
that is not in compionnce with Reg. Guide 1.36, or ECSCC-3-2 en outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chloride O
E O
O beenng environments (e.g., seawater, braciush water, bnne)
[PWSCC-1] the hot legs are carbon eteel with stainless steel cladding (some 1 inch or less PWSCC-1 piping material is inconel (Alloy e00), and O
B O
O demoter tap knes are inconel)
PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > Se0*F, and B
O O
O h concAusion, PWSCC Js not a concem ahce n.ne.,.e - a,e -
PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O E
O PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O
O B
O MIC-1 oper' sting temperature < 150*F, and O E O
O IMiC-1]. the normat operating temperature or the hot seg is so5' mig-2 low or intermittent flow, and O E O
O
[MIC-2, PIT-1)- continuous high flow MIC-3 pH < 10, and E
O O
O l
,g, MIC-4-1 presencerintrusion of organic matenal (e.g., raw water system), or O E O
O maintain oxygen concentration and other contaminants at insignificant levels MIC-4 2 water source is not treated wAwid - (e g, refuehng water tank)
E O
O O
i
[CC-1]. the thermal sleeve in the hot leg surge PIT 1 potental exsts for low flow, and O
E O
O nozzie is
-d as a crevice incehon in the PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing speces are present, and O
E O
O h conclusion, h0C, PIT and CC are not a PIT-3 instating contaminants (e.g., fluoride, chlonde) are present O E O
O conown hr the-providedabove.
CC-1 crevice condition exsts (e g., thermal sleeves), and O E O
O CC-2 operating temperature > 150*F, and E
O O
O
)
CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O E D D E-C-1 exstence of cavitation source (i e., throtthng or pressure reducing O E O
O IE-C-1] no flow restrictions exet in the hot legs
[E-C-2]. the normal operating temperature of the E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and O
E O
O hat iog is e05-E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and B
D D
D IFAC-1]- not considered susceptible to FAC per plant FAC program (ciedded eteeniess steel
]
E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and E
O O
O intemel surface) i E-C-5 (Pc P ) / AP < 5 O
O E D
h conclusion, E-C and FAC are not a j
concem nur the reasons provided above.
\\
FAC 1 evaluated in accordance with exoting plant FAC program -
O B
D D
A-2
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i Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Mping Assessed: Four Cold Legs from the Steam Generator E-24A / E-248 Outlet Nozzles to Reactor Coolant Pumps P42A / P42B / P42C /
P42D No.
Attributes to be Considered ves No we wA Remarks l
TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 2
O O
O
[TASCS-2] only 1% ft (spool A63 / 63) between elbows TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45* from honzontal (includes elbow or S
O O
O tee into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-31 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a O 3 O
O in concJusion, TASCS is not a concem sJnce I
component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or no Potential exists for mixing of hot / cold Ruid Rows.
TASCS-3-2 potental exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, out-O 3
O O
leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3 3 potental exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections O
B D
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or
[TT-2-1, TT-2-2]- no potential exists for cold / hot l
TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O 9 O
O water injection into a hot i coid pipe segment i
TASCS 3-5 potental exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected O 2 O
O to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and in concJusion, TT is not a concern for the TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, and O 2 O
O
'***"* Provided above.
j TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4.0 O
O 3 O
i TT-1-1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or O
O O
E TT.1-2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and S
O O
O i
I potental for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or O
E O
O TT-2-2 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and O 3 O
O TT 3-1 laTl > 200*F for stainless steel, or O
O O
E TT-3-2 laT l > 150*F for carbon steel, or O 3 O
O TT-3-3 laT l > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
O O 2 O
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O
B IIGSCC-B-1] - only applies to BWR's NRC Genenc Letter B8-01
[lGSCC-P-2]- the cold legs are carbon steel with IGSCC-P 1 operating temperature > 200*F, and B
O O
O stainiess steel ciadding IGSCC-P-2 susceptible matenal (carbon content 2 0.035%), and O 2 O
O
[lGSCC-P-4, IGSCC-P-6). plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration and other IGSCC a-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and B
O O
O contaminants at insignificant ieveic IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing speces are present O
E O
O l
OR in conclusion, IGSCC is not a concern for the l
reasons provided above.
IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and O 3 O
O IGSCC-P-6 instating contaminants (e g., thiosulfate, fluonde, chloride) are also O
O O
O required to be present
[TGSCC-3-1, TGSCC-3-2 TGSCC-4) - plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration I
TGSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and S
O O
O and other contaminants at insignificant seveis l
TGSCC-2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and S
O O
O
)
TGSCC-3-1 halides (e g, fluonde, chlonde) are present, or 0 0 O
O in conciusim, TGSCC is not a concern for the reasons provided above.
TGSCC 3-2 caustic (NaOH)is present, and O 3 O
O TGSCC-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present (only required to be present O 2 O
O in conjunction w/hahdes, not required w/ caustic)
A-3 a
Degradation Mechanist-usessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Four Cold Legs from the Steam Generator E-24A / E-24B Outlet Nozzles to Reactor Coolant Pumps P-32A / P-328 / P 32C i P 32D No.
Attributes to be Considered M
No WC WA Remarks l
l ECSCC 1 operating temperature > 150*F, and S
O O
O
[ECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2]
ANO-1 complies I
with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potential exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and 2
O O
O exposure to chionde beenna water sources ECSCC-3-1 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O
E O
O 6 conclusion, ECSCC is not a concern for path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation tipe reasons provided above.
that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or
[PWSCC-1]- the cold legs are carbon steel with ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chloride O 2 O
O stainiese steel ciadding (3 coid iegs contain 1%
beanng environments (e g., seawater, brackish water, bnne) inch inconel drain nozzles which are all assessed in the cold leg drain evaluation; some less than 1 PWSCC-1 piping matenal is inconel (Alloy 600), and O 2 O
O inch diameter tap lines are also inconel)
PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > 560*F, and S
O O
O in conciusion, PW3CC is not a concern since PWSCC-3-1 the materialis mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O 3 O C,$$jif ## " #
PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O
O 2 O
MIC-9 operating temperature < 150*F, and O
E O
O IMiC-il-the normal opersong temperature of tne cold leg is 555' l
MIC-3 low or intermittent flow, and O 2 O
O l
[MIC-2. PIT-1] continmus high flow MIC-3 pH < 10 and S
O O
O l
[ PIT 2, PIT-3, CC-3] - plant chemistry controis MIC41 presence / intrusion of organic matenal (e.g., raw water system), or O 9 O
O maintain oxygen concerestion and otner MIC42 water source is not treated w/ biocides (e g., refueling water tank)
S O
O O
c[CC-1) no thermal sleeves are present in the PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and O
S O
O oid iegs PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and O
S O
O in conciusion, avic, P/T and CC are not a PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e g, fluonde, chloride) are present O
S O
O CC-1 crevice condition exists (e.g., thermal sleeves), and O
O O
O CC-2 operating temperature > 150*F, and S
O O
O CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O 9 O
O E-C-1 existence of cavitation source (i.e., throttling or pressure reducing O 3 O
O IE-C-1] no flow restrictions exist in the cold legs valves or onfices)
[E-C-2]- the normal operating temperature of the E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and O 3 O
O cold leg is 555' E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and 2
O O
O
[FAC-1] not considered susceptible to FAC per plant FAC program (cladded stainless steel E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and S
O O
O intemal surface)
E-C-5 (Pa - P,) l aP < 5 D
D 3
D in conciusion, E-C and FAC are not a 1
FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O 9 O
O l
A4
Degradation Mechanism Assesament Worksheet Piping Assessed: Four Cold Legs from Reactor Coolant Pumps P42A / P428 / P42C / P42D to the Reactor Vessel l' let Nozzles n
No, Attributes to be Considered Yo*
WC MA Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 ine'., and B
O O
O
[TASCS-2]- entire hne except for elbow (53)-to.
TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45* from honzontal (includes elbow or E
O O
O toe into a vertical pipe), and TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a O E O
O in conclusion, TASCS is not a concern since component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or no potenflat exists lbr mhring of hot / cold Ruid Rows.
TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, out-O S
O O
leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sectsons O E O
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or
[TT-2-1]- the P-32A, P 32B and P-32C cold leg TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O 3 O
O HPl nozzle branch connection regions are affected by HPI actuations (e.g., reactor inps, TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected O 2 O
O overcooling events) and the P-32D cold leg to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and normal makeup line nozzle branch connection (egion is affected dunng loss of makeup events r
TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, and O
E O
O e g., quarterty surveiiiances of isointion vaives TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4 0 0 0 0 0 CV-1233 and CV 1234)
TT-1 1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or O
O O
E [n bins' Non r ion ca TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and 2
O O
O expenence a AT of 515' during HPl actuations and a AT in excess of 400* can occur at the P-potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including 32D cold leg normal makeup hne nozzle branch TT-2-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or B
O O
O TT 2-2 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and O E O
O c ac
, rr aus the cold leg wi /
TT 3-1 l AT l > 200*F for stainless steel, or O
O O
E normal malteup nozzle branch connection TT-3-2 laTl > 150*F for carbon steel, or O
O O
O '*8'*"* ' ** '***on8 Provided above.
TT-3-3 l AT l > AT allowable (apphcable to both stainless and carbon) 0 O
O O
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O 2
[lGSCC-B-1]- only apphes to BWR's NRC Genenc Letter 88-01
[lGSCC-P 2]. the cold legs are carbon steel with IGSCC-P-1 operating temperature > 200*F, and O
O O
O stainiesa steel ciaoding IGSCC-P-2 susceptible matenal (carbon content 2 0.035%), and O
O O
O
[lGSCC-P-4, IGSCC-P-6] - plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration and other IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and B
O O
O contaminants at insignificant leveis IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O
E O
O OR in conclusion, IGSCC is not a concern for the reasons provided abnve.
IGSCC-P-S operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and O
B O
O IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride, chlonde) are also O 3 O
O required to be present
[TGSCC-3-1, TGSCC-3-2, TGSCC-4] - plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration TGSCC 1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
O O
O and other contaminants at irnignificant levels TGSCC-2 tenslie stress (including residual stress) rs present, and O
O O
[
- j j g" [ d f * **" "
- TGSCC-3-1 halides (e g., fluoride, chlonde) are present, or O
E O
O TGSCC-3-2 caustic (NaOH)is present, and O
O O
O TGSr C-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present (only required to be present O E
O O
in conjunction w/ halides, not required w/ caustic)
A-5
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Four Cold Legs from Reactor Coolant Pumps P42A / P-328 / P-32C / P-32D to the Reactor Vesselinlet Noules No.
Attributes to be Considered m
m we sd Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and S
O O
O IECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2] - ANO-1 complies with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potential exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and S
O O
O exposure to chioride bearing water sources ECSCC-31 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O
E O
O Jn conciusion, Ecsce is not a concern for path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation the reasons provided above, that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chloride O
S O
O beanng environments (e.g., seawater, brackish water, bnne)
[PWSCC-1)- the cold legs are carbon steel with stainless steel cladding (a single 1 inch demeter PWSCC-1 piping materuf is inconel (Alloy 600), and O
S O
O tap line is inconel)
PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > 560*F, and B
O O
O fa conesusion, PWSCC is not a concern sJnce none of the B.I weld locations are inconel.
PWSCC-3-1 the matenal is mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O E
D PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O
O E
O MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F, and O
S O
O IMiC-1) the normal operating temperature of the.
cold leg is 555' MIC-3 low or intermittent flow, and O
E O
O I
((MIC-2, PIT 1] continuous high flo MIC-3 pH < 10, and S
O O
O PIT-2, PIT-3, CC-3] - plant chemistry controis MIC-41 presence / intrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system), or O
E O
O maintain oxygen concentration and other MIC-4-2 water source is not treated w/ biocides (e.g., refueling water tank)
S O
O O
[CC-1] the thermal sleeves in the cold leg HPl /
PIT 1 potental exists for low flow, and O
E O
O normai makeup nonies are assessed as crevice PIT-3 oxygen or oxidizing species a o present, and O
E O
O [$ '" '"* ""' # " '**' **"*"P "' '
PIT-3 initating contaminants (e g., fluoride, chlonde) are present O
S O
O e, conciusson, mic, Pir and cc are not a CC-1 crevice condition exists (e g., thermal sleeves), and O
E O
O * "**'" " " *"* " " "
CC-2 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
O O
O CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O 3 O
O E-C-1 existence of cavitation source (i.e., throttling or pressure reducing O 3 O
O IE-C-1] no flow restnetions exist in the cold legs
[E-C-2] the normal operating temperature of the E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and O
B D
O coid leg is 555' E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and S
O O
O
[FAC-1] not considered susceptible to FAC per plant FAC program (cladded stainless steel E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and B
O O
O intemal surface)
E-C-5 (P e P,)l AP < 5 O
O 3 O
in conclusion, E-c and FAC are not a FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O E O
O
~
A-6
I
)
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Three Cold Leg Drain Lines branching off of the P-32B, P 32C and P-32D Suction Cold Legs to isolation Valves RBD4B I l
RBD4C / RBD4D and the Fourth Cold Leg Drain Line between isolation Valves RBD4A and RBD4A which is connected to l
the Letdown Line which branches off of the P-32A Suction Cold Leg No.
Attributes to be Considered M
No NtC N/A Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and B
O O
O ITASCS-2]- mostly horizontal TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45* from horizontal (includes elbow or O
O O
O ITASCS-3-3, TASCS-3-5]- hot water from the P.
tee into a vertical pipe), and 328, P-32C and P-32D sucten cold legs w6tl turbulently penetrate the vertical section below TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a O
E O
O the cold legs (cychng the elbow) and a natural component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or convection current will be established between
'al N,7a70 7o$ " "" * # " '
TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage' flow past a valve (i e., in-leakage, out-O E
O O
leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead ended pipe sections S
O O
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or in conclusion, TASCS is a concem for the TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O
O O
O TASCS-3 5 potential exists for turbulent penetraton in branch pipe connected B
O O
O to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, and O
O E
O
[TT-2-1, TT-2-2]- no potential exists for cold / hot TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4 0 O
O E O
TT-1 1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or 2
2 O
O in conclusion, TT is not a concern for the TT b2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and O
O O
E reasons provided above-potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including TT-2-9 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or O
E O
O TT-2-2 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and O
E O
O TT-31 l ATl > 200*F for stainless steel, or O 3 O
O TT-3-2 l4Tl > 150*F for carbon steel, or O
O O
B TT-3-3 laTl > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
O O 2 O
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC progsm per O
O O
B liGSCC-B-1] only applies to BWR's NRC Genenc Letter 88-01 p
p IGSCC-P-1 operating temperature > 200*F, and O
3 O
O temperature decreases as the distance from the cold leg increases due to heat loss; the piping IGSCC-P-2 susceptible matenal (carbon content 2 0.035%), and 2
O O
O (uninsuisted) between the. rirst and second IGSCC-P-3 iensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and S
O O
O
[lGSCC-P-4, TGSCC-4) plant chemistry IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present G
B O
O controis maintain oxygen concentration at insignificant levels for the piping upstream of the OR first isolation valve (hydrazine injected during IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attnbutes above apply, and B
B O
O piant startup for oxygen scavenging and l
hydrogen overpressure maintained dunng IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e g., thiosulfate, fluoride, chlonde) are also O
E O
O operation); oxygen may be present in the piping required to be present between the first and second isolation valves since this section is isolated pnor to plant heatup l
TGSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and E 3 O
O l
[lGSCC-P-6, TGSCC-3-1, TGSCC-3-2] plant TGSCC-2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and S
O O
O chemistry controls maintain other contaminants at TGSCC-3-1 halides (e.g., fluonde, chionde) are present, or O
B O
O TGSCC-3-2 caustic (NaOH)is present, and O 2 O
O t
in conclusion, IGSCC and TGSCC are not a k
TGSCC-4 oxygen or oxidtzing species are present (onty required to be present 2
2 O
O concern for the reasons provided above.
l in conjunction w/ halides, not required w/ caustic) l A-7 l
7 Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Three Cold Leg Drain Lines branching off of the P 328, P-32C and P-32D Suction Cold Legs to isolation Valves RBD4B /
RBD4C / RBD4D aad the Fourth Cold Leg Drain Line between isolation Valves RBD4A and RBD4A which is connected to the Letdown Line which branches off of the P-32A Suction Cold Leg No.
Attributes to be Considered yes No MC MA Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 1507, and 3
S O
O IECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2] - ANO-1 complies with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potential exists for l
ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and B
D O
O exposure to chinride beenng water sources ECSCC-3-1 an outside piping surface ls within five diameters of a probable leak O
2 O
O in conesusion, ECsCC is not a concern for path (e g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation the reasons provided above.
that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or
[PWSCC 1] - the P-328 P-32C and P-32D ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is expaed to wetting from chloride O
E O
O suction cold ieg drain nozzies are inconel beanng environments (e.g., seawater, brackiuh water, brine)
[PWSCC-2]- the drain nozzle regions are at cold PWSCC-1 piping matenal is Inconel (Alloy 600), and B
O O
O seg temperature of near 560' PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > 560V, and B
B-O D
in conciusion, PWSCC is a concern for the
~
PWSCC 3-1 the matenal is mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O 3 O
PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O
O B
O MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F, and 2
2 O
O luiC-1] the water in the isolated sectum that may be less than 150' will have previously been MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 2
O O
O exposed to elevated RCS operating temperatures MIC-3 pH < 10, and 2
O O
O " '#"#"8 ""Y *#"
[ PIT-2, CC-3]- plant chemistry controls maintain l
MIC-4-1 presence / intrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system), or O
S O
O oxygen concentration at insignificant ieveis for the l
pi mg upstream of the first isolation valve MIC-4-2 water source is not 'reated w/ biocides (e g., refueling water tank) 2 O
O O
P (hydrazine injected during plant startup for PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and S
O O
O oxygen scavenging and hydrogen overpressure maintained during operation); oxygen may be PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 2
E O
O present in the piping between the first and second isolation valves since this section is PIT 3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluonde, chionde) are present O
O O
O isolated prior to plant heatup j
CC-1 crevice condition exists (e g., thermal sleeves), and O
2 O
O
[ PIT-3] - plant chemistry controls maintain other t
CC-2 operating temperstare > 1507, and 2
S O O in conclusion, hflC, PIT and CC are not a CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 2
E O
O concern for rhe,.asons provided above.
E-C-1 existence of cavitation source (i e., throttling or pressure reducing O
O O
O IE-C-1]- no flow restrictions exist m the cald leg valves or orifices) drain lines E-C-2 operating temperature < 250V, and S
S O
O
[E-C-3 E-C-4] - the cold leg drain lines are essentially stagnant dunng normal operation E-C 3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and O E O
O
[ plani FAC program (stainless steel)
FAM) not considered susceptible to FAC per E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and O
2 O
O E-C-5 (Pe - P,) l AP < 5 D
D 3
D in conclusion, E-C and FAC are not a FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O
E O
O l
l i
l 1
l t
A-8 J
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Pressurizer Main Spray Line branching off of the P 32C Discharge Cold Leg to the Pressurizer Main Spray Nozzle and the Auxiliary Spray Line from isolation Check Valve DH-16 to the Main Spray Line Tee connection m l wc No.
Attributes to be Considered m
wA Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 2
O O
O
[TASCS-2]- mostly hormontal T/ SCS-2 pipe segment has s slope < 45* from honzontal (includes elbow or 2
O O
O
[TASCS-3-1, TASCS-3-4] - dunng penods of low tee into a vertcal pipe), and spray flow steam from the pressunzer can backfill into the main spray piping resulting in two phase TASCS-3-1 potental exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a S
O O
O (i.e., steam over water) stratircation in the upper component allowing mixing of hot and ccid fluids, or horizontal section
{
TASCS-3 2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i e., in-leakage, out-O E O
O in conclusion, TAsCS is a concem for the leakage, cross leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or reasons provided above.
TASCS-3-3 potental exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections O
E D
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potental exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or 2
O O
O w[TT-2-1, TT-2-2] - the potential exists for cold TASCS-3-5 potental exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected O 2 O
O ater injechon into hot piping extending from the to header piping containing hot fluio with Ngh turbulent flow, and au) 'lary / main spray too connection region to the main spray nozzle during normal plant cooldowns
(
TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, and O
O O O upon initiation of auxiliary spray flow; the potental TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4.0 0
0 2
O exists f r c W wsW W int hot #ng extending from the vertcal section corresponding j
TT 1 1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or 2
M O
O to pressurizer water level to the main spray nozzle dunng normal plant heatups dependent TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and O
O O 3 upon when P-32C is placed in servce; the reverse condihon (hot on cold) can also occur if potential for relctively rapid temperature changes including auxiiiary spray is initated to aid in cooldown C is taken out of servce when I
TT-2-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or S
O O
O [, rep
, TT-3-2 hw water injection into cold pipe segment, and B
O O
O or bypass fiow resumes TT-3-1 l AT l > 200*F for stainless steel, or G
O O
O in conciusion, rr is a concern ibe the TT-3-2 l AT l > 1507 for carbon steel, or O
O O
O TT 3-3 l ATl > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
O O
O O
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O 2
[lGSCC-B-1)- only apphes to BWR's NRC Genenc Letter 88-01
[lGSCC-P-1, IGSCC-P-5, TGSCC-1] the main IGSCC-P-1 operating temperature > 2007, and 3
0 0 D spray operates at coid i g temperature of 555' and auxiliary spray flow suppled by the makeup IGSCC-P-2 susceptible material (carbon content 2 0.035%), and B
O O
O tank operates in the 100*-110* tempo,ature range IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and B
O O O
[lGSCC-P-4, TGSCC-4] - plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration at 4
IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O E O
O insignircant levels for piping within tne RCS l
OR P " *"
Y U"*N *PY) * # ** *"P tank whch is the water source for auxiliary spray IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and 2
B O
O is als maintained essentally oxygen free
[$S C S
3-2] g
[
IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluonde, chlonde) are also O 2 O
O l
insignificant levels TGSCC-1 operating temperature w 1607, and S
S O O l
TGSCC 2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and B
O O
O fn concfusion, sosCc and rosCc are not a TGSCC-3-1 hahdes (e g., fluoride, chlonde) are present, or O 3 O
O " * * * * " " * * * *
- TGSCC-3-2 causte (NaOH)is present, and O 3 O
O l
TGSCC-4 oxygen or oxidizing speces are present (onty re pired to be present O B
D D
sa conjunction w/ halides, not required w/caustc)
A-9
i I
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Pressurizer Main Spray Lite branching off of the P-32C Discharge Cold Leg to the Pressurizer Main Spray Nozzle and the Auxiliary Spray Line from isolation Check Valve DH-16 to the Main Spray Line Tee connection No.
Attributes to be Considered Yes No Nic NIA Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
2 O
O IECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2] - ANO-1 comphes with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potental exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is preser,t, and E
O O
O exposure to chioride beanng water sources ECSCC-3-1 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O 2 O
O sn conciusion, rescc Js not a concern for path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation the reasons provided above.
that is not in comphance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or
[PWSCC-1] - the pressuruer main spray nozzle ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chionde O 2 O
O safe end is incones bearing enwonments (e.g., seawater, brackish water, bnne)
[PWSCC-2] - the pressunzer main spray nozzle PWSCC-1 piping m;,;enal is inconel (Alloy 600), and 2
O O
O regon operates ir:tne e50 temperature range PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > FSPF, and B
B O
O la coaciusion, ewscc es a concern for the reasons provided above.
k PWSCC-3-1 the matenal is mill-annealed ail cold worked, or O
O 3 O
PbbSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relef O
O E
O i
MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F, and 3
2 O
O
[MIC-1]- the makeup tank which is the source for auxiliary spray (temperature range of 105'-110*)
MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and S
O O
O contains water which has been exposed to mw ES opeeg tempures e nonnel MIC-3 pH < 10, and 2
O O
O makeup / letdown thereby eliminating any MIC-4-1 presence / intrusion of organic material (e.g., raw water system), or O 3 O
O m'C' b
l MIC-4-2 water source is not treated w/ biocides (e g., refueling water tank)
S O
O O
[ PIT-2, CC-3] plant chemistry controis maintain oxygen concentration at insign:ficant levels for PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and B
D D
D piping within the RCS pressure boundary (main spray and the makeup tank which is the water sourc)e for auxiiiary spray is also maints:ned PIT-3 oxygen or oxid; zing speces are present, and O
E O
O PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e g., fluonde, chloride) are present O
E O
O
[ PIT-3] - plant chemistry controls maintain other CC-1 crevice condition exists (e g., thermal sleeves), and O
O O
O contaminants at insignificant leveis CC-2 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
S O
O sn conesusion, Mic, Pir and cc are not a
{
CC-3 orygen or oxidizing species are present O
B O
O E-C-1 existence of cavitation source (i e., throttling or pressure reducing S
O O
O
[E-C-1, E-C-2 E-C-3, E-C-4] - the main spray valves or anfices) control valve CV 1006 (potential cavitation source) expenences a cold leg temperature of l
E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and 0
9 O
O 555' with main spray flow through it less than E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and 2
O O
O
[FAC 1]- not considered susceptible to FAC per E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s. and O 2 O
O plant FAC program (stainless steel)
E-C-5 (Pa P,)l sP c 5 O
O 3 O
in conclusion, E-C and FAC are not a FAC 1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O
O O
O l
4 1
1 A-10 l
J
\\
Degradation Mechanisrn Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Surge Line frorn E-24A Hot Leg Nozzle cormection to Pressurizer Nozzle connection No.
Attributes to be Considered Yes No N/C N/A Rernarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and O
O O
O
[TASCS-2] mostlyhormontal TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45* from honzontal(includes elbow or B
O O
O
[TASCS-3-1] - due to insurges / outsurges from tee into a vertical pipe), and the pressurrv during plant heatups / cooldowns the honzontal secten of the surge hne TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a O
O O
O experiences stratired fiow conditens component allowing mixing of hot end cold fluids, or TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i e., in-leakage, out-O 3 O
O leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or in conciusion. TASCs is a concern for the reasons provideJ above.
TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convecten heating in dead ended pipe sections O 2 O
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O a O
O TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected O 2 O
O
[TT-2-1 TT-2-2] - due to insurges the to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and pressureer surge nozzle region expenences cold water injection into a hot component dunng plant TASCS-4 calculated or treasured AT > 50*F, and O
O O
heatups / cooldowns; due to pressurrer outsurges the entire surge hne (excluding the TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4.0 0 0 0
O pressureer surge nozzie region) expenences hot
- d' NI* " '"' ' * 'd * *P "*"' d""8 P"'
TT 1-1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or B
O O
O s
TT-b3 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and O
O O E gyr.31] - dunng plant heatups / cooldowns the potential for relatively rapid ter perature changes includag surge hne can experience a AT of 350'to 400' TT 21 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or O
O O
O TT-2 3 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and 2
O O
O in emesusse, rr is a emeern for rh.
reasons provided abot e.
TT-3-1 l ATI > 200*F for stainless steel, or B
O O
O TT-3-2 l ATl > 150*F for carbon steel, or O
O O 2 TT-3-3 l ATl > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
O O
O O
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O
O IIGSCC-B-1]- only apphes to BWR's NRC Genenc Letter 88-01 IGSCC-P-1 operating temperature > 200*F, and O
O O
O controis maintain oxygen concentrated and other contaminants at insignificant levels lGSCC-P-2 susceptible matenal (carbon content 2 0.035%), and O
O O
O IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and B
O O
O in conchaion, iGsec is not a concern for the IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O O O
O reasons provided above.
OR IGSCC-P.5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and O
O O
O
[TGSCC-3-1, TGSCC-3-2, TGSCC-4) - piant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e g., thiosulfate, fluonde, chlonde) are also O
S O
O and otner contaminants at insignificant ievels required to be present TGSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 3
O O
O in conclusion, TGsCc is not a concern mr TGSCC-2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and S
O O
O ****"' Pmided abwe.
TGSCC-3-1 hahdes (e g., fluoride, chloride) are present, or O
O O
O TGSCC-3-2 caustic (NaOH)is present, and O
E O
O TGSCC 4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present (only required to be present O B
O O
l In conjunction w!hahdes, not required w/ caustic) r I
4 A-11
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Surge Line from E 24A Hot Leg Nozzle connwetion to Pressurizer Nozzle connection No.
Attributes to be Considered
- c MA Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
O O
O IECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2] - ANO-1 complies with Reg. i uide 1.36 and no potential exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and E
O O
O exposure ti. chioride beanng water sources ECSCC-3-1 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O 3 O
O in conen, don, ECsCC se not a concern sbr path (e g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation the reasons vovided above.
that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chlonde O
2 O
O beenng enwonments (e.g., seawater, brackish water, bnne)
[PWSCC 1] - the E-24A hot leg surge nozzle is inconel buttered PWSCC-1 piping matenal is inconel (Alloy 600), and O
O O
O in conclusion, PWSCC is a concern for tire PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > 560*F, and 2
O O
O reasoas Provided above.
PWSCC-3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O 2 O
PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O
O E
O MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F, and O
B O
O luiC-1] the normal operating temperature et the surge hne is in thw 605'-650* range I
MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 2
O O
O I
[ PIT-2, PIT-3, CC 3] - plant chemistry controls i
MIC-3 pH < 10, and B
O O
O maintain oxygen concentrated and other i
MIC41 presence / intrusion of organic matenal (e g., raw water system), or O E D
O dds",[ h1[,*g "d' MIC42 water sou.ce is not treated w/ biocides (e g., refueling water tank)
S O
O O
c nnecten both contain tnermai siems PIT-1 potent:al exists for low flow, and B
O O
O
" con *c*e"r*n'"for the reas'ons provided above PIT 2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and O 2 O
O PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e g., fluonde, chloride) are present O 2 O
O CC1 crevice condition exists (e g., thermal sleeves), and S
O O
O CC-2 operating temperature > 150*F, and S
O O
O CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O 3 O
O E C-1 existence of cavitation source (i e., throttling or pressure reducing O 3 O
O IE-C-1, E-C-2] - no flow restnetions exist in the valves or onfices) surge hne and the normal operating temperature is in the 605'-650* range E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and O
E O
O j
[E-C-3, E-C-4) - the surge hne is essentially E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and O 2 O
O stagnant during normai operation E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and O 9 O
O
[FAC-1] not considered susceptible to FAC per plant FAC program (stainless steel)
E-C 5 (P - P,)/ AP < 5 O
O O
O in conclusion, E C and FAC are not a i
FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O
O O
O concern for the reasons provided above.
l l
A-12 l
l 1
1 I
I I
APPENDIX B I
j Degradation Mechanism Evaluation Checklists for the Makeup and Purification (MU&P) System I
i j
I r
I I
i i
Revision:
0 Prepared by:
CEC 5/12/98 Checked by:
STC 5/12/98 File No. EPRI-116-310 Pages B1 - B4
l l
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: High Pressure injection / Normal Makeup Lines from isolation Check Valves MU46A / MU468 / MU46C / MU46D to the P.
32A / P 32B / P-32C / P-32D Discharge Cold Legs No.
Attributes to be Considered Yes No Nic N/A Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and 2
O O
O
[TASCS-3-3, TASCS-3-5]- hot water from the P.
32A P-328 and P-32C cold legs will turbulently TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45* from hormontal(includes elbow or 2
O O
O pene,trate the hormontal secton at the nozzie tee into a vertical pipe), and and natural convective heatmg will maintain the temPetum of h section back upstmam to TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low f'ow in a pipe section connected to a O 2 O
O cM Ws WM, W-MB and MC at a component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or fairly high temperature where due to conducten TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., irbleakage, out-O 3 O
O heat transfer across the vatves a natural leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or convection current will be estabkshed in the isolated upstream horuontal sections TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections B
O O
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or in conclusion, TASCS is a concern for the i
reasons provided above.
TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O
O O
O TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected B
O O
O to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and
[TT-2-1] - the sections downstream of check valves MU-34A, MU-348 and MU-34C to the P.
TASCS-4 calculated or rneasured AT > 50*F, and O
O O
O 32A, P-32B and P-32C cold leg HPI nozzles are affected by HPl actuatens (e.g., reactor trips, TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4.0 O
O O
O overcooling events) and the P-320 cold seg
" ""'('"* $ P [ $ '*g*g** $ Q 1
TT-1 1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or B
B O
O l
g l
TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and O
O O
O surveiiiances of valves Cv 1233 and Cv-1234) potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including
[TT41, TT43] - the ATs exponenced by the j
piping weld locatens as a result of the above TT-2-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or B
D D
O transients exceed the 200' AT initial screening hmit but meet the allowable AT critena; the valve TT-2-2 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and O
E O
O and nozzie weid iocations do not meet the enteria l
TY-3-1 l ATl > 200*F for stainless steel, or O
O O
O in conciusion, Tr is a concern for the TY 3-2 laT l > 150*F for carbon steel, or O
O O 2
'**** Prwided abwo-TT-3-3 l aT l > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
B B
O O
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O
S IIGSCC-B-1]- only applies to BWR's NRC Genenc Letter 88-01
[lGSCC P-1, IGSCC-P-5, TGSCC-1]- the piping i
IGSCC-P-1 operating temperature > 200*F, and 3
2 O
O temperature decreases as the distance from the cold leg increases due to heat loss, however, the IGSCC-P-2 susceptible matenal (carbon content 2 0 035%), and 2
O O
O piping immediately upstream of check valves Mu-34A, MU-34B and MU-34C is judged to be close ICSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress)is present, and 2
O O
O to the 200* temperature hmit l
lGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present G 3 O
O
[IGSCC-P-4 TGSCC-4] - plant chemistry l
U9'"
OR insignificant levels for the piping downstream of IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and B
B D
D the f rst isolaton valve (hydrazine injected dunng plant startup for oxygen scavenging and IGSCC-P-d initiating contaminants (e g, thiosulfate, fluoride, chtonde) are also O 3 O
O hydrogen overpressure maintained dunng required to be present operation); oxygen may be present in the piping upstream of the first isolation valve since this TGSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
2 O
O section is isolated from the RCS l
TGSCC-2 tensile stress (Ocluding residual stress) is present, and B
D D
O
[lGSCC-P-6, TGSCC41. TGSCC-3-2] - plant chemistry controls maintain other contaminants at TGSCC-3-1 halides (e g., fluoride, chloride) are present, or 0
0 O
O insignificant ieveis TGSCC-3-2 caustic (NaOH)is present, and O O O
O in conciusion, saSec is a concern and l
TGSCC-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present (only required to be present O 3
O O [$'"*[*""**'****
in conjunction w/ halides, not required w/ caustic)
B-1
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: High Pressure injection / Normal Makeup Lines from isolation Check Valves MU46A i MU488 / MU46C / MU48D to the P-32A i P-328 i P-32C / P-32D Discharge Cold Legs No.
Attributes to be Considered Y**
Sc MA Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and a
B O
O IECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3 2]
ANO-1 complies with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potential exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and 2
O O
O exposure to chionde bearing water sources ECSCC-31 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O 2 O
O in conclusion, ECsCC is not a concern por path (e g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metalhc insulation the reasons provided above.
that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chloride O
O O
O beanng environments (e g., seawater, brackish water, bnne)
[PWSCC-1]
the HPl and normal makeup nozzles are carbon steel and the nozzle safe PWSCC-1 piping matenal is inconel (Alloy 600), and O
B O
O ends and piping are stainless steel PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > 560*F, and 2
B O
O in conciusion, PWSCC is not a concern since none of the B J weld socations are incones.
PWSLL3-1 the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O E
O PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O
O G
O MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F and 2
S O
O IMIC-1] some of the piping a sufficient distance upstream of check valvet c.10-34A, MU-348 and MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and 2
S O
O MU-34C is judged to be less than 150' MIC-3 pH < 10, and 2
O O
O
[ PIT-2, CC-3]- plant chemistry controls maintain l
[ wye, [a"c'[pNS$Iry N MIC-4-1 presence / intrusion of organic matenal (e g., raw water system), or O
S O
O MIC-4-3 water source is not treated w/ biocides (e.g., refueling water tank)
B O
O O
xygen may be present in the outer piping section i
PIT-1 potential exists for low flow, and 2
S O
O NI * * * *** ** '"*"'I" "
contaminants at insignificant levels PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and S
S O
O
[CC-1] the HPi nozzies contain thermal sleeves PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride, chloride) are present O
E O
O in conciusion, although the system CC-1 crevice condition exists (e.g., thermal sleeves), and S
O O
O *'"d"O'
- bN d o th CC-3 operating temperature > 150*F, and E
B O
O
'v'd'ac' "'th th'8 8F8* 8' 381"d8'd "*"*
be a concern. PIT and CC are also not a CC 3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present 9
0 O
O concern for the reasons provided above.
E-C-1 existence of cavitation source (i e., throttling or pressure reducing O 2 O
O IE-C-1]. no flow restrictions exist in the HPl and valves or orifces) normal makeup piping sectons assessed E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and 2
S O
O IE-C-3 E-C-4] - the HPl hnes are essentially stagnant dunng normal operation and the normal E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and 9
0 O
O rnakeup kne has a fiow veiocity tes than 30 ft/s E C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and O 2 O
O
[FAC-il-not considered susceptible to FAC per E C-5 (P,- P.) / AP < 5 O
O O
O ks conciusion E-C and FAC are not a FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O 2 O
O concern for the reasons provided above.
i i
i l
l B-2 l
)
c i
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Letdown Line branching off of the P-32A Discharge Cold Leg to isolation Valves CV 1214 and CV-1216 and to Drain Line Valve RBD-8A No.
Attributes to be Considered M
we WA Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and O
O O
O ITASCS-2] mostlyhonzontal TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45* from hormontal (includes elbow or B
O O
O in conclusion, TASCS is not a concem since tee into a vertical pape), and no mechanism exists for creating stratined Row conditions.
TASCS-31 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a O
2 O
O component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-2 potential exists for leakage flow past a valve (i e., in-leakage, out-O 2
O O
ITT-2 the piping downstream of the cold ieg leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or letdown nozzle region (the region near the letdown nozzle will remain hot due to turbulent TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections O
O O
O penetration flow from the cold leg) to the inset of connected to a source of hot fluid, or letdown coolers E-29A and E-298 is affected by IMk"$$,$nI1$N TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O
O O
O TASCS-3 5 potential exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected O E O
O flo*
's subsequently restored; the piping to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and downstream of the coolers is affected when decay heat is initiated and the letdown coolers are TASCS4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, and 0
0 O
O bypassed 5SCS-5 Richardson number > 4.0 0
0 8
O
[TT-3-1. TT-3-3) - the piping upstream of the cooiers can expenence a AT of 435'if the event I
TT 1-1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or B @
O O
is of sufficient duration and the piping cools to containment ambient before letdown flow is TT-1-2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and O
O O 3 restored and the piping downstream of the potential for relatrvely rapid temperature changes including coolers will expenence a AT of less than 200*
since bypass flow does not begin until decay heat TT-2-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or O
E O
O is initiated at 280*; the piping weld locations that exceed the 200* AT initial screening limit meet TT-2-2 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and 2
O O
O the allowable AT cntena but the valve and toe weld locations do not TT-3-1 l ATl > 200*F for stainless steel, or E
O O
O TT-3-2 laT l > 150*F for carbon steel, or O
O O
S '"**"*#"*'*"-
reasons provided above.
TT-3-3 laT l > AT atiowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
B B
O O
IGSCC-B 1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O
O liGSCC B-1] only applies to BWR's NRC Generic Letter 88-01 p
p IGSCC-P-1 operating temperature > 200*F, and B B O
O 6etdown piping upstream of the cooiers operates at cold leg temperature of 555' and the piping IGSCC-P 2 susceptible matenal (carbon content 2 0.035%), and B
D O
O downstream of the coolers operates in the 105'-
IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including resdual stress) is present, and 2
O O
O
[lGSCC-P-4, TGSCC-4]
plant chemistry IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O
O O
O controls maintain oxygen concentration at insignificant levels for piping within the RCS OR pressure boundary 1GSCC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and 3
2 O
O
[lGSCC-P-6, TGSCC-3-1, TGSCC-3-2] - plant QQ}[* $
IGSCC P-6 initiating contaminants (e g, thiosulfate, fluonde, chlonde) are also O 3 O
O ret vired to be present TGSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and S
S O
O in conclusion TGSCC-2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 2
O O
O coneem a es, IGSCC and TGSCC are not a rea,on, prov,ded above.
TGSCC-31 halides (e g, fluonde, chlonde) are present, or O 2 O
O TGSCC-3-2 caustic (NaOH)is present, and O
O O
O I
TGSCC-4 oxygen or oxidizing' species are present (only required to be present O
O O
O l
in conjunction w/ halides, not required w/ caustic)
B-3
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Letdown Line branching off of the P 32A Discharge Cold Leg to isolation Valves CV-1214 and CV-1216 and to Drain Une Valve RBD-BA No, Attributes to be Considered M
No WC N/A Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 2
2 O
O IECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2]
ANO-1 complies with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potential exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and E
O O
O exposure to chlonde beanng water sources ECSCC-3-1 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O
O O
O sn conciusion, ECsCC is not a concern for path (e g., valve stems) and is covered wtth non-metallic insulation the reasons provided above.
that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or
[etoown nozzie is inconel butteredPWSCC-1] - thel ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chlonde O 2 O
O i
beanng environments (e g., seawater, brackish water, bnne)
[PWSCC-2) - the P-32A discharge cold leg PWSCC-1 piping matenal is inconel (Alloy 600), and B
O O
O letdown nozzle region operates in tne 560' tempemture range PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > 560*F, and B
2 O
O in conclusion, PWSCC is a concern for the PtfdSCC-3-1 the materialis mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O 2 O
reasons provsdodabove.
j PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relief O
O O
O l
MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F, and 2
S O
O IMiG-1] the piping downstream of the cooiers that operates in the 105'-110' temperature range MIC-2 low or intermittent flow, and O
O O
O contains water that has been exposed to elevated
,"ny c
wees we em MIC-3 pH < 10, and S
O O
O c
MIC-4-1 presence / intrusion of organic matenal (e.g, raw water system), or O
O O
O
[MIC-2, PIT 1]- continuous high flow MIC-4-2 water source is not treated w/ biocides (e g, refueling water tank)
S O
O O
[ pit-2, CC-3]- piant chemistry controis maintain PIT 1 potential exists for low flow, and O 9 O
O oxygen concentration at insignificant levels for pipmg within the RCS pressure boundary PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and 0
0 0 O
[ pit-3]- piant chemistry controis maintain otner PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e g, fluonde, chloride) are present O
O O
O
- "*'"*"t***'9#'****
CC-1 crevice condition exists (e.g., thermal sleeves), and O
G O
O ($~,U"*""*Z**d****
CC-2 operating temperature > 150*F and a
B D
D in conesusion, miC, PIT and CC are not a CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O
G O
O
- "**'n sbr the reasons provided above.
E-C-1 existence of cavitation source (i e., throttling or pressure reducing O 2 O
O
[E-C-1] - no flow restnctions exist in the letdown valves or onfices) piping sections assessed E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and 3
3 O
O
[E-C-4) the flow velocity is less than 30 ft/s E-C-S flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and B
O O
O
[FAC-1)- not considered susceptible to FAC per plant FAC program (stainless steel)
E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and O 2 O
O in concsusion, E-C and FAC are not a E-C-5 (Pe P,)I hP < 5 D
D 3
D concern for the reasons provided above.
FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O
O O
O D
B-4 t
[
i l
i I
i l
l APPENDIX C l
Degradation Mechanism Evaluation Checklists for the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System i
I I
1 l
l j
1 Revision:
0 t
Prepared by:
CEC 5/12/98 Checked by:
STC 5/12/98 File No. EPRI-116-310 Pages C1 - C4 l
_-__-_____--.J
1 i
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Decay Heat / Low Pressure injection Lines from Check Valves DH-13A / DH 13B and DH-17 / DH-18 and Core Flood Lines fnom Check Valves CF-1A / CF-1B to the Reactor Vessel No.
Attributes to be Considered ves he we wA Remarks J
TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and G
O O
O
[TASCS-3-1, TASCS-3-2]
dunng the performance of the functional test of core flood TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45' from horizontal (includes elbow or B
O O
O check valves CF-1 A and CF-1B cold water from tee into a vertcal pipe), and the core flood tanks can be injected at a low flow 1
TASCS-3-1 potential exists for low flow in a pipe section connected to a 2
O O
O $ $$in Co"n
- h"rz * *Y[n component allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or which stays warm due to convective heating from TASCS 3-2 potente exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e, in-leakage, out-3 O
O O
ine reactor vessel; dunng the performance of the leakage, cross-ieakage) aflowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or DHR/LPl/CF check valve backleakage test hot
)
water from the reactor vessel will mix with cold j
VASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections O
E O
O water creating a stratified flow condition at the
]
connected to a source of hr' ;,uid, or elbow (horizontal portion) located at the bottom of TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O
O O
O TASCS-3-5 potential exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected O
O O
O M*,,'Ndesjf*'*****
to header piping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and
[TT-2-1, TT-2-2]- during the performance of the TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, ana O
O 3 O
functionai te. of ene core fiood check v.,ve, tne
" d " "'" ""d '* * ""**'*8 h "'**'
TASCS-5 Rchardson nurrder > 4 0 0 0 2
O
- reg ion can expenence a transient; when the tan TT-1-1 operating temperature > 270*F for stainiess steel, or 0
0 O
O 8'"
rminated the nozzle region will exponence a reverse (hot on cold) transient; TT1 2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and O
O O @
dunng the performance of the check valve backieakage test the first vertcal run below the potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including reactor vessel and a portion of the upstream TT 2-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or O
O O
O
"#"*""**P'""'"*i'"'
TT-2 2 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and 2
O O
O
[TL3-1, TM3] - the ATs experieced can range from 250' 500'; the piping weld locations TT 3-1 l AT l > 200*F for stainless steel, or S
O O
O meet tne aliowabie aT entena but the nozzie safe TT-3-2 lot l > 150*F for carbon steel, or O
O O 3 In conclusion, TT is a concem for the TV-3-3 loTI > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
B B
O O
reasons provided above.
I IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O 9
[lGSCC-B-1]- only applies to BWR's j
NRC Genenc Letter 88-01
[IGSCC-P-1,IGSCC-P-5.TGSCC-1] the piping IGSCC-P 1 operating temperature > 200*F, and 2
S O
O temperature decreases as the distance from the reactor vessel increases due to heat loss; the IGSCC-P-2 susceptible matenal (carbon content 2 0.035%), and O
O O
O piping immediately upstream of check valves DH-14A and DH-14B is judged to be less than the IGSCC-P-3 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 2
O O
O 200' temperature hmit IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O
B O
O
[lGSCC-P-4, TGSCC-4]
plant chemistry N"
OR insignificant levels for the piping downstream of IG3CC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attnbutes above apply, and '
G B
C D
the first isolation valve (hydrazine injected during plant startup for oxygen scavenging and IGSCC-P-6 initiating contaminants (e g, *iosulfate, fluorice, chlonde) are also O
S O
O hydrogen overpressure maintained during required to be present operation); since all of the assessed piping expenences decay heat flow after hydrazine is TdSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and 3
9 O O
injected dunng plari startup the oxygen concentration between the first and second TGSCC-2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and B
O O
O isoiat,on valves is also considered insignificant TGSCC-31 hahdes (e g., fluoride, chlonde) are present, or O
S O
O
[iGSCC-P-6, TGSCC-3-1, TGSCC-3-2] - plant TGSCC-3 2 causte (NaOH)is present, and O
S O
O chemisttpontds maWain @er cMnants M insignificant levels TGSCC4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present (only required to be present O 3 O
O sn conciusion, iGsCC and TasCC are not,
in conjunction w/hahdes, not required w/ caustic) m,,m,,, m
_o,,,
o,m%wy, C-1
[
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Decay Heat / Low Pressure injection Unes from Check Valves DH-13A / DH-13B and DH-17 / DH-18 and Core Flood Lines l
Piping Assessed:
I from Check Valves CF 1A / CF-1B to the Reactor Vessel No.
Attributes to be Considered m
N MC MA Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and O
O IECSCC-3-1. ECSCC-3-2] - ANO-1 comphes with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potential exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and 2
O O
O exposure to chloride beanng water sources ECSCC-3-1 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O
E O
O in conciusion, ECsCC is not a concern for path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metalhc insulation the reasons provided above.
that is not in compliance with Reg Guide 1.36, or ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chlondo O
O O
O beanng environments (e g, seawater, brackish water, bnne)
[PWSCC-1]- the core flood nozzles are carbon steel and the nozzle safe ends and piping are PWSCC-1 piping matenal is inconel (Alloy 600), and O 3 O
O stainless steel PWSCC-2 exposed to primary water at T > 560*F, and 2
2 O
O in conclusion, PWSCC is not a concern since none of the B-J weldlocations are inconel.
PWSCC-3-1 the matenalis mill.. annealed and cold worked, or O
O E O
PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress rehef O
O S
O MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F and B
3 O
O
[ mig-1] - the piping upstream of check valves DH-14A and DH-14B judged to be less than the MIC 2 low or intermittent fkNv, and 2
O O
O 150 temperature limit was exposed to an MIC-3 pH < 10, and E
O O
O elevrted de ny heat operation temperature (up to 280') during bestup thereby ahminating any MIC41 presence / intrusion of organic matenal(e g., raw water system), or O
B O
O microbes MIC42 water source is not treated w/ biocides (e g., refueling water tank)
E O
O O
[ PIT-2, CC-3] plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration wt insignificant levels for the PIT 1 potential exists for low flow, and S
O O
O piping within the RCS pressure boundary and oxygen in the outer piping section should have PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and O 3 O
O been scavenged during plant heatup (decay heat)
PIT 3 initiating contaminants (e g., fluonde, chloride) are present O 2 O
O
[ PIT-3] - plaqt chemistry controls maintain other f
contaminants at insignificant levels i
CC-1 crevice condition exists (e g, thermal sleeves), and S
O O
O
[CC-1] the CF nozzles contain thermal sleeves CC-2 operating temperature > 150*F, and S
S O
O in conclusion ht!C, PIT and CC are not a CC-3 oxygen er oxidizing species are present O
O O
O concern for the reasons provided above.
E C-1 existence of cavitation source (i e., throtthng or pressure reducing B
O O
O
[E-C-1] the core flood nozzles contain a flow valves or onfices) restnction (flow limiting restnctor)
E-C-2 operating temperature < 250*F, and B
E O
O
[E-C 3, E-C-4]- flow is present in excess of 100 hrstyr due to decay heat operation dunng outages E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and 3
O O
O but the flow veiocity is less than 30 ft/s E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and O
O O
O IFAC-1]- not considered susceptible to FAC per E-C-5 (P. - P ) /.sP < 5 O
O M O
In conclusion, E-C and FAC are not a FAC-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program OB O
O concern for the reasons provided above.
I C-2
1 I
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Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Decay Heat Suction Line from the E-24A Hot Leg to isolation Valve CV 1410 No.
Attributes to be Considered yes m
we wA Remarks TASCS-1 nps > 1 inch, and B
O O
O
[TASCS-2]- mostly honzontal TASCS-2 pipe segment has a slope < 45' from honzontal(includes elbow or 2
O O
O ITASCS-3-3, TASCS-3-5]- hot water from the E-tee into a vertical pipe), and 24A hot leg will turbulently penetrate the vertical secton below the hot leg and a porton of the TASCS-3-1 potental exists for low flow in a ppe section connected to a O 2 O
O horizontal section and a natural convection component aliowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or current will be estabbshed along the remainder of hhNhpiping run t where the pping TASCS-3-2 potental exists for leakage flow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, out-O 2 O
O leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing of hot and cold fluids, or TASCS-3-3 potential exists for convection heating in dead-ended pipe sections B
C D
O connected to a source of hot fluid, or in conclusion, TASCS is a concern for the
** "' P"'#'d ***"*-
TASCS-3-4 potential exists for two phase (steam / water) flow, or O
2 O
O TASCS-3-5 potental exists for turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected B
O O
O to header pping containing hot fluid with high turbulent flow, and TASCS-4 calculated or measured AT > 50*F, and S
O O
O
[TT-2-2 TT-3-1] - dunns normal plant cooidowns the piping extending from the vertical drop section TASCS-5 Richardson number > 4.0 O
O O
O described above to isolation valve CV-1410 will experience a transient upon initaton of decay TT-1-9 operating temperature > 270*F for stainless steel, or Z
O O
O heat; with an assumed inttel temperature of 120-TT 1-2 operating temperature > 220*F for carbon steel, and O
O O g (building ambient) the AT experienced will be less than the 200* initial screening limit since decay potential for relatively rapid temperature changes including heat is not initated until the RCS temperature is TT 3-1 cold water injection into hot pipe segment, or O
E O
O TT-2-3 hot water injection into cold pipe segment, and B
O O
O
)
in conclusion, TT is not a concern for the
+
TT-3-9 laTl > 200*F for stainless steel, or O
O O
O reasons provided above.
TT-3-3 laT l > 150*F for carbon steel, or O O O 3 TT 3-3 l ATl > AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
O O
E D
IGSCC-B-1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant IGSCC program per O
O O O
[lGSCC-B-1] - only applies to BWR's
[lGSCC-P 1, IGSCC-P-5, TGSCC-1] the piping IGSCC-P-1 operating temperature > 200*F, and B
B O
O temperature decreases as the distance from the hot leg increases due to heat loss; the piping IGSCC-P-2 susceptible material (carbon content 2 0 035%), and B
O O
O immediately downstream of isoiaten valve Cv-1050 is judged to be less than the 200*
IGSCC-P-3 tenslie stress (including residual stress) is present, and 2
O O
O temperature limit IGSCC-P-4 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O
O O
O
[lGSCC-P-4, TGSCC-4] - plant chemistry controls maintain oxygen concentration at OR insignificant levels for the piping upstream of the IGSCC-P-5 operating temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and 9
3 O
O first isolaton valve (hydrazine injected dunng plant startup for oxygen scavenging and IGSCC-P-6 initating contaminants (e g., thiosulfate, fluonde, chlonde) are also O 2 O
O hydrogen overpressure maintained during l
required to be present operation); since all of the assessed pping expenences decay heat flow after hydrazine is TGSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and a
B O
O injected during piant startup the oxyger.-
j concentration between the first and second i
TGSCC-2 tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and 2
O O
O isoiation vaives is aiso considered insignificant 4
TGSCC-3-1 halides (e g., fluoride, chlonde) are present, or O
O O
O
[lGSCC-P-6, TGSCC-3-1, TGSCC-3-2] - plant TGSCC-3-2 caustic (NaOH)ir present, and O O O
O chemistry cond maintas other contammants W insignificant levels TGSCC-4 oxygen or oxidizing spe5es are present (only required to be present O
O O
O sn conciusion, IGsCC and TGsCC are not a in conjunction w!hhhdes, not required w/ caustic)
__gg__gu%
r l
C-3
Degradation Mechanism Assessment Worksheet Piping Assessed: Decay Heat Suction Line from the E-24A Hot Leg to isolation Valve CV-1410 No.
Attributes to be Considered yes No we wA Remarks ECSCC-1 operating temperature > 150*F, and B
E O
O
[ECSCC-3-1, ECSCC-3-2] - ANO-1 comples with Reg. Guide 1.36 and no potental exists for ECSCC-2 tensile stress is present, and B
O O
O exposure to chlonde beanng water sources ECSCC-3-1 an outside piping surface is within five diameters of a probable leak O
E O
O sn conesusion, ECsCC is not a concern w path (e g., valve slems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation the reasons provided above.
that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or
[PWSCC-1] - the E-24A hot leg decay heat ECSCC-3-2 an outside piping surface is exposed to wetting from chloride O 2 O
O nozzie is inconei buttered beanng environments (e.g., seawater, brselosh water, bnne)
[PWSCC-2] - the E-24A hot leg decay best PWSCC 1 piping material ls inconel (Alloy 600), and B
D O
O nozzie region operates in the 605* temperature range PWSCC-2 exposed to pnmary water at T > 560*F, and E
O O
O in conclusion, PWSCC is a concern w the PWSCC-3-1 the material is. mill-annealed and cold worked, or O
O 3O reasons provided above.
PWSCC-3-2 cold worked and welded without stress relef O
O O
O MIC-1 operating temperature < 150*F, and 2
2 O
O IMIC-il ine piping downstream of isoiaton valve CV 1050 judged to be less than the 150' MIC-2 low or intermittent fkm, and E
O O
O temperature hmit was exposed to an elevated MIC 3 pH < 10 and 2
O O
O decay heat operation temperature (up to 280')
during heatup thereby eliminating any microbes MIC-4-1 presence /intrusior: of organic matenal (e.g., raw water system), or O 2 O
O
[ pit.2, CC-3]- plant chemistry controls maintain MIC-4-2 water source is not treated w/ biocides (e.g., refueling water tank)
B O
O O
xygen e ncentration at insignificant ieveis for the piping within the RCS pressure boundary and PIT-1 potential exists for low flow and S
O O
O oxygen in the outer piping section should have been scavenged during plant heatup (decay heat)
PIT-2 oxygen or oxidizing species are present, and O 2 O
O
[ PIT-3] plant chemistry controls maintain other PIT-3 initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride, chloride) are present O
E O
O contaminants at insignificant leveis CC-1 crevice conditon exists (e.g., thermal sleeves), and O 3 O
O ICC-1]- the decay heat nozzle does not contain a thermal sioeve CC 2 operating temperature > 150*F, and 3
0 0
O in conclusion, MIC, PIT and CC are not a CC-3 oxygen or oxidizing species are present O 9 O
O concern w the reasons provided above.
E-C-1 existence of cavitaten source (i.e., throttling or pressure reducing O
E O
O
[E-C-1]- no row restrictions exist in the decay valves or onfices) heat sucton hne E-C-3 operating temperature < 250*F, and 2
S O
O (E-C-3, E-C-4] - fkw is present in excess of 100 hrs /yr due to decay heat operaton during outages E-C-3 flow present > 100 hrs /yr, and S
O O
O but the fiow velocity is iess tnan 30 ft/s l
E-C-4 velocity > 30 ft/s, and O
O O
O IFAC-1] not considered susceptible to FAC per plant FA pr gram (stainiess steet)
E-C-5 (P. - P ) / AP < 5 O
O O
O in conclusion, E-C and FAC are not a FAC 1 evaluated in accordance with existing plant FAC program O 2 O
O concern w the reasons provided above.
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