ML20217E921
| ML20217E921 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1997 |
| From: | Bauer A, Jaquith R, Weston R ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217E904 | List:
|
| References | |
| A-PENG-CALC-010, A-PENG-CALC-010-R00, A-PENG-CALC-10, A-PENG-CALC-10-R, NUDOCS 9710070306 | |
| Download: ML20217E921 (394) | |
Text
Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Pilot Plant Study l
l Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection 1
Evaluation for the H.igh Pressure Safety Injection System September 1997 sene
~'Entergy ju1888R3?83,8lge
A PENG CALC-010 Revision 00 AII Design Analysis Title Page Page1of89 b_
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure for the High Pressure Safety Injection System at ANO-2 Document Number: A-PENG-CALC-010 Revision Number: 00 Quality Class:
O QC 1(Sarety Related) O QC 2 (Not Safety Related) @ QC 3 (Not Safety-Related)
- 1. Apprwalof Completed Analysis This Design Analysis is complete and venfied. Management authorucs the use ofits results.
Printed Name j Signature , I) ate Cognizant Engineer (s) R. A. Weston Th h9h.)
A. V. Bauer g,' g g Mentor @ None
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Independent Resiewer(s) It E, Jaquith
[ /[/'f 8/' S[7p D M (V Management Apprwal B. T. Lubin
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Project Manager
- 2. Package Contents (this secnon may be completed aAer Mamgem-nt apprwal):
Total page count, includmg body, appendices, anachments, etc. 392 List -"'~4 CD-ROM disk Volume Numbers and path iunus: @ None Note: CD-ROM are stored as separate Quality Records CD-ROM Volume Path Names (to lowest dtrectory which uniquely applies to tius th'imen')
Numbers 1
Total number of sheets of microSche: @ None Number of sheets:
Other anehments (sM-):
- 3. Distribution:
,. B. Boya (2 copis) i i:Wata\lubin\rbifinal\apeng010. doc
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC CIO, Rev. 00 Page 2 of 89 RECORD OFREVISIONS Rev Date Pages Changed Prepared By Approved By 00 8fM] Original R. A. Weston A. V. Bauer R. E. Jaquith B. T. Lubin O
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Calculation No. A-PENG CALC 010. Rev. 00 Page 3 of 89 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE...............................................................................................................5 2.0 SCOPE..................................................................................................................5 3.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICA TION AND BOUNDARY DEflN! TION ............................................ 6
- 4. 0 C0NSEO UENCE EVA L UA TlON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 10 4.1 CONSEQ UENCE A SSUMP TIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2 CONSEQUENCE SEGMENT LINE BREAK DETECTION CAPABillTIES..................... 19 4.3 CONSEQ UENCE lOENTIFICA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 4.4 SHUTDOWN OrERA TION AND EXTERNAL EVENTS........................................... 2 7
- 5. 0 DEGRADA TION MECHANISMS EVAL UA TION ............. ....... ... ......... .. ................... ...... 54 5.1 DA MA G E GR O UPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5.2 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND IDENTIFICA TION ........................... 55
- 5. 3 BA SIC DA TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 6.0 SER VICES HIS TOR Y A ND SUSCEP TIBILITY REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G3 l 7. 0 RISK EVA L UA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 1
8.0 EL EMEN T SELEC TlON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 0 l ,, 9. 0 REFERENCES.......................................................................................................85 I
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LIST OF TABLES NUMBER PAGE 1
HPSI B O UNDA RIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 HPSI CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY
SUCCESSFUL ISOLA TION................ 30 3 HPSI CONSEQUENCE, FIGURES AND ISOMETRIC DRA Wik/GS .................................... 41 4 DA MA GE G R O UPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND SUSCEPTIBLE REGIONS......................... 56 6 SERVICE HISTORY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY REVIEW -
HIGH PRESSURE SA FETY INJEC T10.'! S YS TEM ....... ...... ..... ... ........ ..... .. ..... ........ .. ...... 65 7 RISK SEGMEN T IDEN TIFICA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7 8 RISK INSPEC TION SCOPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 9 ELEMENT SELECTION RISK CA TEGOR Y 4 . ..... . ............ .. ............... ...... .... . . . ........ . .... 81 10 ELEMENT SELECTION RISK CA TEGOR Y 2 .... .... . . . ... ........ ................. .. ... ... ... .. .... . ..... 82 11 ELEMEN T SELECTION - RISK CA TEGOR Y 5 ... ......... ......... . ...... ............. . . ..... . .......... ... 84
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ABB Cateulation No. A.PENG. CALC.010, Rev. 00 l
Page 4 of 63 0ST OF FIGURES NUMBER PAGE 1 A NO-2 HPSI S YS TEA 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 HPSI FLOW PA TH FROM HEADER VALVES TO RCS LOOP 2P-32B .............................. 43 3 HPSI FLOW PA TH FROM HEADe*R VALVES TO RCS LOOP 2P-32A.............................. 44 4 HPSI FLOW PA TH FROM HEADER VALVES TO RCS LOOP 2P 32D.............................. 45 5 HPSI FLOW PA TH FROM HEADER VALVES TO RCS LOOP 2P-32C.............................. 46 6 HPSI FLOW PA TH FROM EL. 360' O' TO HEADER VAL VES ....................................... 47 7 HPSI HEADER # 1 FLOW PA TH BETWEEN EL. 335'-O' & 360'-O'................................. 48 8 HPSI HEADER M2 FL OW PA TH BETWEEN EL. 33S'-O' & 360' O*................................. 49 9 HPSI PUMP 2P-89A SUCTION & DISCHARGE FLOW PA THS ....................................... SO 10 HPSI PUMP 2P-89B SUCTION & DISCHARGE FLOW PA THS....................................... 51 11 HPSI PUMP 2P-89C SUCTION & DISCHARGE FLOW PA THS........................................ S2 12 HOT LEG INJECTION FLOW PA THS (ABOVE EL. 3 60 ' 0 *). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 LIST OF APPENDICES A FMECA - CONSEOUENCE INFORMA TION REPORT B FMECA DEGRADATION MECHANISMS C FMECA SEGMENT RISK RANKING REPORT D OUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICA TION FOGMS O
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A k It 7"EFIF O Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 010, Rev. 00
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- 1. 0 PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation is to document .. Implementation of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure (RISI) of Reference 9.1 for the High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI) system at Arkcnsas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO 2), Entergy Operations, Inc. The RISI evaluation process provides an alternative L the requirements in ASME Section XI for selecting inspection locations. The purpose of RISIis to identify risk significant pipe segments, define the locations that are to be inspected within these segments, and identify appropriate inspection methods.
This evaluation is performed using the guidelines of the EPRI Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure of Reference 9.1 and in accontance with the requirements of the ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations Quality Procedures Manual (OPM 101).
2.0 SCOPE This evaluation procedure applies to the HPSI system at ANO-2, and utilizes the ISIS Software (Reference 9.2), which has been specifically developed to support and document this procedure.
p\ As part of (*se procedure, the system boundwies and functions are identified. A risk evaluation is performed by dividing the system into piping segments which are determined I t N to have the same failure consequences and degradation mechanisms. The failure consequences and degradation mechanisms are evaluated by assigning the segment to the copropriate risk category and identifying the risk.significant segme"ts. Finally, the in:pection locations are selected. The guidelines used in determining hir degradation mechanisms, the failure consequences and the risk-significant segments are those described in Reference 9.1.
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G Calculation No. A.PENG-CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 6 of 89
- 3. 0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICA TION AND BOUNDARY DEFINITION 3.1 System Description The High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI) system is part cf the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) designed to provide core cooling in the unlikely event of a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The cooling prevents significant fur % mage and removes energy generated in the reactor for extended periods of time folio aLOCA. The two (2) High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI) trains function by injectirry borated water, via four (4) independent injection paths, into the Reactor Coolant Sys.em (RCS) to prevent fuel damage and to incresse the shutdown margin of the core (Reference 9.3).
The HPSIprimary functions are:
- Upon a Safety injection Actustion Signal (SIAS), the HPSIpumps take suction from the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) and deliver borated water to the HPSI headers, then into the RCS via the salety injection nozzles in the RCS cold legs (also shared by the LPSI pumps and SITS);
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- Upon Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS), long term cooling is provided by using the HPSI pun os to recirculate borated water from the containment sump to the reactor core 1 for an extended period of time following a LOCA.
3.2 System Boundary
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O) The High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI) system is described consistent with the FSAR
' (Reference 9.3). The scope of this analysis includes all Class 1, and Class 2 piping in this system which is currently examined in the ANO-2, ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program (Reference 9.6). The code and non code lines which are part of or interface with the HPSI system were evaluated to determine their risk significance. The system boundaries are defined in Figure 1 and Table 1. Certain line segments contain welds that were not enteredin the database (Reference 9.2) as outlined below:
3.2.1 Lines Upstream of SITDischarge Check Valves (2FCB 3-12", ?FCB-8 12", 2FCB 13 12", 2FCB-18-12")
These line segments connect the Ssfety injection Tanks (SITS) to the appropriate safety injection path. A failure in any o' these segments would not cause an initiating event. During SITinventory makeup or standby operation, a failed segment would be detected immediately, thus minimizing the fault exposure time before a plant shutdown is initiated. During a response to e LOCA, the performance of HPSI and LPSI would not be affected. Ior a large LOCA, the line segment would not experience an increase in operating pressure. The failed segment would cause the performance of only one SIT to be degraded. This level of performance is caprble of mitigating a large LOCA (Reference 9.15). A LOW consequence category is therefore assigned. No degradacion mechanisms were identified for the welds in these line segments. Because of the LOW consequence and no damage mechanisms and based on the methodology being used, the risk significance of these line segments would be LOW (i.e., CAT 7). Since no element selections are needed for low risk significant segments, the welds for these lines were not entered in the
( j database.
v ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev, 00 Page 7 of 89 3.2.2 Lines Downstream oI SIT Fill Une isolation Valves (2DCD 5 2')
This line provides makeup to the SITS using the HPSIpumps. The line segment is inside the containment and is normally isolated from the HPSI hot leg injection paths.
This line 2egment would not cause an initiating event if a failure wora to occur. The ;
line is not used to accomplish or sul' port any of the safety functions following a l design basis event. A NONE consequence category would therefore be assigned.
No degradation mechanisms were identified for this line segment. Because of the consequence category and no degradation potential, the risk significance of a failure in this non code piping is LO\v li.e., CAT 7). Since no element selections are -
needed for low risk significant ssgments, the welds for this line are not entered in ,
the database.
3: 'l Lines ()ownstream of Pump Miniflow isolation Valves (2DCB 500 2', 2DCB 5012', 2DCB 502 2')
These lines recirculate HPSI pump mir., flow to the Refueling \ Vater Tasm (RWT). A
'~ilure during normalpower operation (i.e., standby, periodic testing or SITinventory makeup) would not cause an Initiating event. The failure would be detected shortly after its cccurrence based on level instruments in the ECCS pump rooms or walkdown conducted on a regular basis. The failed segment can be isolated by \
closing the appropriate miniflow isolation valve from the controlroom. An alternate i path is available for providing pump protection against dead headed operation.
During a demand for HPSI, the segment failure willnot impact RCS injection. During this mode of operat'on, the faioure can be detected b'* the ECCS pump room level n instruments or during local verification of ECCS pump room isolation. It should also be noted that the miniflow isolation valves are automatically closed by a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS). Because the line segments downstream of the j miniflow isolation valves are not needed to support HPSI function, a LOW consequence category is assigned to the segment feilure. No degr.pdation l mechanisms were identified for the welds in the above line segments. Based on this
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assigned consequence category and no degradation potential, the risk significance of <
the segment failure is LOW (i.e., ChT 7). Since no element selections are needed for low risk significan: segments, the welds for these lines were not entered in the i database.
3.2.4 '
ines Upstream of the HPSIPumps Suction Check Valves (2HCB IS-8', 2HCB 13 8')
These lines provide suction to the HPSIpumps from either the containment sump or the RWT. TI.cse line segments are included as part of the Containment Spray System (CSS) and are therefore not evaluated as part of the HPSI system.
3.2.5 Lines with Nominal Diameter of I' or less Piping with a nominal diameter of I' or less was not explicitly evaluated to determine its risk significance. Since volumetric examination of this piping is not practicable, the most eflective means to ensure its integrity is via conduction of a system leakage test. Consequently, since this piping is already subject to system leakage testing by the ASME Code, a risk assessment of this piping is not warranted.
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l ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 i
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ABB Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 010, Rev. Ob
' Page 9 of 89 TABLE I HPSI BOUNDARIES Line Line Ape Code Ape Nominal Ape Number Description Class Diameter (in.) Thickness (in.1 2CCA 21 12* Combined ECCS to B Cold leg 1 12 1.125 2CCA.213* HPSI to B Cold leg 1 3 2CCA 216* lPSI to B Cold leg 0.438_
1 6 0.562 2CCA 218* HPSI/LPSI to B Coltileg_ 1 8 0.719 2CCA 2212' Combined ECCS to A Coldleg 1 12 1.125 2CCA 22 3* HPSI to A Cold leg 1 3 0.430 2CCA 22 6* LPSI to A Cold leg 1 6 0.562 2CCA 22 8* HPSI/LPSI to A Cold leg 1 8 0.719 2CCA 23-12' Combined ECCS to D Cold leg 1 12 1.125 2CCA 23 3* HPSI to D Cold leg 1 3 0.438 2CCA 23 6* IPSI to D Cold leg 1 6 0.562 2CCA 23 8' HPSI/LPSI to D Cold leg 1 8 0.719 2CCA 2412' Combined ECCS to C Cold leg 1 12 1.125 2CCA 24-3' HPSI to C Cold ieg '
1 3 0.438 2CCA 24 6' LPSI to C Cold leg 1 6 0.562 2CCA 24 8' HPSI/LPSI to C Cold leg 1 8 0.719 2CCA 25-3' Hot leg injection to SDC Suction 1 3 0.438 2CCB 112' Charging to A HPSIheader 2 2 0.344 2CCB 12 2' A HPSI to MOh!'s 2 2 0.344 2CCB-12 3* A HPSI to manual throttle valves 2 3 0.438 2CCB- 12-4
- A HPSI Header 2 4 0.438 2CCB- 13-2 ' A HPSI to B Cold leg 2 2 0.344 2CCB 13 3* _ __HPSI to B Cold leg 2 3 0.438 2CCB 14 2' A HPSI to A Coldleg 2 2 0.344 2CCB.14-3
- HPSI to A Cold leg 2 3 0.438 2CCB 15 2' A HPSI to O Cold leg 2 2 0.344 2CCB 15 3* HPSI to D Cold leg 2 3 0.438 2CCB-23-1 %
- Pressure relief to holdup tank 2 1. 5 0188
}CCB-7 2* A HPSI to C Cold leg 2 2 0.344 leCCD 7 3* HPSI to C Cold leg 2 3 0.438 2CCB- 70 2
- A HL Injection line Bleedoff 2 2 0.344 2CCB- 70-3' A HPSI Hot leg injection 2 3 0.438 2CCB 712* B HL Injection I.ine Bleedoff 2 2 0.344 2CCB- 71-3
- B HPSI Hot leg injection 2 3 0.438 2DCB 14
- B HPSI to MI Cold ieos 2 2 0.218 2DCB 3 3* B HPSI to All Cold legs 2 3 0.3 2DCB 3 4' B HPSI Header 2 4 0.337 2DCB-500 2
- C HPSI Aimp Recirc to RbW 2 2 0.218 2DCB 5012* A HPSI R:? sp Recirc to RtW 2 2 0.218 2DCB 502 2* B HPSI Ptsmp Recirc to RtW 2 2 0.218 2DCB-511 2
- AllPumps Recirc to Suction. Line 2 2 0.218 2GCB-9 6* Suction Piping to Each Ptimp 2 6 0.28 2GCB 9-8' Suction Header from RLW/ Sumo 2 8 0.322 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Q Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 O Page 10 of 89
- 4. 0 CONSEQUENCE EVALUA TION The High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI) system is a subsystem el the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). The ECCS is designed to provide core cooling in the unlikely event of a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The cooling must prevent significant fuel damage or significant alteration of core geometry, limit the cladding metal water reaction, and remove the energy generated in the core for en extended period of time foHowing a LOCA. The ECCS also injects borated water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to increase the shutdown margin. The ECCS provides sufficient core cooling to accomplish the design requirements for aH breaks in the RCS up to and including a double ended break in the largest reactor coolant pipe.
The consequence evaluation for the HPSIportion of the ECCS was performed based on the guidance provided in the EPRI procedure (Reference 9.1). The evaluation focused on the impact of a pipe segment failure on tne capability of HPSI to perform its design function, and on thc overaH operation of the plant, impacts due to direct and indirect effects were considered. GeneraHy, the effects of a direct impact are confined to the HPSI system itself.
An indirect impact resulting from the failure of a pipe segment would affect neighboring equipment within the HPSI system or other systemis). Indirect impacts would generaHy be caused by flooding, spraying, orjet impingement of neighboring equipment. Determination of the consequences of a segment failure considers the potential of losing affected mitigating systems, or trains thereof, and the consequentialimpact on the safety functions.
To ensure that realistic assumptions were made concerning the impact of various line break Q locations on system performance, a hydraulic model of the HPSI system was developed by ANO 2 and employed during the evaluation process. The model results indicate that for an assumed double-ended guiMotine break, the performance of the HPSI system is significantly impacted for sman break LOCA mitigation unless the failure is isolated in a timely manner.
Per the level 1 PRA Success Criteria defined in the pending Revision I to the ANO 2 Individual Plant Examination flPE), HPSI flow must be established within 44 minutes of LOCA occurrence to preclude core uncovery. Conservative estimates of the operator response time to isolate the postulated line breaks during a iOCA demand is 30 to 35 minutes. Successful isolation wiH both ensure timely flow to the core and preclude potentially excessive flow divergence for breaks outside containment which could affect the ability to establish the recirculation mode of operation.
For line breaks upstream of the individualinjection line manual throttle valves, aH HPSI flow is diverted out the break for reactor coolant pressures greater than approximately 250 psig.
For line breaks downstream of the these manual valves aH HPSI flow is diverted for RCS pressures greater than approximately 1100 psig, while safety analysis HPSI flow assumptions are not met for RCS pressures greater than approximately 800 psig. These manual valves are maintained in a throttled condition to ensure adequate flow balance for various LOCA scenarios. Consequently, unsuccessfulisolation win render the HPSI system ineffective and result in increased core damage and potentiaHy chaHenge containment integrity.
The spatial effects of a segment failure are primarily associated with flooding, spraying, or jet impingement. The Internal Flood Screening Study (Reference 9.14) was used to identify
( the locations of major ECCS equipment that could be impacted by a segment failure. Based V
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Calculation No. A PENG. CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 11 of 89 on a revisw of the Intemal Flood Screening Study, the malnr equipment of the HPSI system is locatedin the f0Howing rooms of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB):
Room 2084 Upper South piping penetration room and equipment area Room 2055 Lower South piping penetration room and equipment ares Rooms 2009 & 2007 East HPSI, LPSI, & containment spray pump area and usHery Rooms 2013 & 2014 West HPSI, LPSI, & containment spray pump arer and psNery Room 2010 HPSIpump 'C' aren Since the HPSI system interfaces with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), censin piping segments for the HPSI system are also locatedinside the containment.
A walkdown of the HPSI system at ANO 2 was conducted on June 18 & 19,1996 to assess the spatial effects of HPSIpipe failures, and to supplement the assessment that was performed using the Plant Design Drawings. Individuals who participated in the walkdown are as follows:
l Tim Rush (ANO 2)
Susan Perkins (ANO 2)
The walkdown focused on the HPSI piping located in the above rooms and the potential interactions with other equipment resulting from the failure of a HPSI pipe segment. The foHowing summarizes the observations and judgments that were noted during the walkdown.
West HPSI, LPSI, & CS Pump Area (Rooms 2013 & 2014)
(a) This area is located at elevation 317' 0* in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB).
According to the Intemal Flood Screening Study (Reference 9.14), there are two rooms (2013 & 2014) within this area, and the entire area is regarded as a single flood zone. During the walkdown it was observed that HPSI pump 2P-89A is separated from LPSI pump 2P 60A and CS pump 2P 35A by a concrete barrier.
There are no demarking walls to physically separate the area into two rooms. The concrete barrier acts as part of the supporting system for the suction header piping for aH three pumps.
(b) The motor for HPSI pump 2P-89A is mounted in the same horizontal plane as the impeHer itself. A section of the suction piping for HPSI pump 2P-89A is mounted directly above the pump motor. Because of the location, a fa!!ure in this section of the piping could short out the pump motor before a high pump room water levelis annunciatedin the controlroom.
(c) A section of the miniflow line for HPSI pump 2P-89A is approximately two feet (i.e., running parallel to the concrete barrier) from the suction line for the pump.
There is also no pipe support / restraint in this section of the piping. Because of the closeness of the miniflow line to the suction line and the distance between the pipe supports / restraints, a failure in this section of the mini-flow could cause a pipe whip that damages the suction line for the pump. Note that during operation of HPSI ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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G Calculation No. A.PENG. CALC.010, Rev. 00 Page 12 of 89 pump 2P-89A the pressure in the mini flow line wiH be greater than the pressure in the suction line, id) Rigid supporturestra!,ts are in place for the suction and discharge lines for HPSI pump 2P-89A. Because of these supports / restraints, the suction line is judged to be not susceptible to pipe whip. Note also that the pressure in the s.tction line wiH be based on the head from the RWT during normalpower operation, le) Two of the pump room coolers (2VUC 1A & 2VUC.18) are mounted at one end of shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2E 35A. Room cooler 2VUC.18 is mounted approximately two feet above floor tsvel with room cooler 2VUC.1A directly above it.
(f) All manual valves within the flow paths are chain locked in their required safety related position.
- 10) Lucalized isolation using the manual valves within this area may not be feasible because of flooding putential, th) A curb of approximately I'xt' is installed close to HPSI pump 2P-89A (on the discharge side) where the room drain is located. This facilitates the easy detection and containment of certain spHis or leaks that could result from a pipe failure. The drain is equipped with leveldetectors which annunciate in the controlroom, f~'%
& (i) A break in the cross-connect piping to HPS) pump 2P-89C, just as the piping penetrLies the waH, could result in a significant amount of fluid being lost before it is detected by the levelindicators. The reason is, a break in this location would occur on the opposite side of the l'x1' curb which makes detection more difficult.
(j) Because there are several piping supports / restraints within the area, the general layout of equipment is relatively congested. The congestion limits easy access to certain components and makes the identification somewhat difficult.
(k) There are no motor control centers or switchgear within this area.
t (1) Access to this area is through a water proof door which is maintained closed.
i East HPSI, LPSI & CS Pumo Area (Rooms 2009 & 2007)
(a) This area is also located at elevation 317' 0* in the RAB. According to the Intemal Flood Screening Study (Reference 9.14), this area is also divided into two roorns (2007 & 2009), both of which are included in the same flood zone. However, during the walkdown it was observed that HPSI pump 2P-898 is separated from LPSI pump 2P 600 and CS pump 2P-358 by a concrete barrier. The layout in this room is similar to the layout in the West Pump Room Area.
(b) Although the layout in this area is similar to the West Pump Room Area, it is larger and much more spacious. Hence, the equipment within the area is more accessible p and easily identifiable compared with equipment in the West Pump Room area.
l V l
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB .
Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010 Rev. 00 Page 13 of 89 (c) Room coolers 2VUC 10 & 2VUC IF are mounted close to the floor approximately 15' sport, whereas room cooler 2VUC 1E is mounted directly above cooler 2VUC-If. All of the room coolers are located at one end of shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2E 359.
(d) Rigid supports / restraints are in place for the HPSI lines in this arts. Because of these supports / restraints, the HPSIlines are judged to be not susceptible to pipe whip.
(e) localized isolation using the manual valves within this area may not be feasible because of flooding potential.
(f) A drain is included in this area. The drain is equipped with level detectors which annunciate in the controlroom.
(g) All manual valves within the flow paths are chain locked in their required safety related position.
th) There are no motor control centers or switchgest within this area.
(i) Access to this area is through a water proof door which is also fire proof. The access door b also maintained closed.
HpSI Pumn 'C' Area (Room 2010)
(a) This area is also located at elevation 317* 0*In the RAB. Unlike the other two pump rooms, this area contsins the ' swing
(b) The room coolers for this area are mountedin the ceiling.
(c) Rigid supports / restraints are in place for HPSIpump 2P-89C piping.
(d) Access to this area is through a water proof door which is maintained closed.
q Lpwer Sgyth Egyhment Room (Room 2055)
(a)
This area is located at elevation 335' 0* in the RAB. There are no motor control centers or switchgear within this area.
Ib) Although both HPSI headers are located in this room, they are sufficiently for apart such that a pipe whip originating in one of the headers will not impact the other header.
(c) The HPSI orifice bypass valves (2CV 51031 & 2CV 5104 2) are located within this room, but for sport from each other (i.e., at opposite sides of the room) so that
' spraying or jet impincement resulting from a HPSI pipe failure is judged to be insignificant. It was also observed that there are pipe supports / restraints and other larger piping which provide some amount of protection'from spatialinteractions.
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
O ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 14 of 89 (d) Cable tray CB 5091 and electricalpanel 31LA are located in this room, and will not be impacted by flooding because they are mounted hi2h above the floor level.
(e) This room is equipped with a floor drain.
(f) Access to this room is through a fire proof non water tight door which annunciates when opened.
Vpner South Pioino and Penetration Room (Room 2084)
(a)
This area is located at elevation 354' 0* in the RAB. There are two drains within this area.
(b) There are no motor control centers or switchgear in this area.
(c) Because of the short pipe runs and rigid supports / restraints upstream of the HPSI header valves, pipe whip caused by a HPSIpipe segment failure is judged to be not a concern.
(d) The limitorque actuators for the HPSI header motor operated volves are sealed to minimize the effects caused by spraying orjet impingement. Cable conduits to the valves are connected to thejunction boxes /terminalblocks with lock nuts.
(~% (e) A failure in the line upstream of HPSI header valve 2CV 50151 or 2CV 5016 2 may
() cause spraying orlet impingeme.it to the following valves:
- 2CV 50381
- 2CV 56121
- 2CV 50171 The affected valves are very close to the HPSIline segment where the failure is postolated. Note that LPSI header valve 2CV 5057 2 is far enough away (i.e.,
approximately 10') from the failed segment so that spraying or jet impingement is judged to be not a concem.
(f) A failure in the line upstream of HPSIheader valve 2CV 50351 or 2CV 5036 2 may cause spraying orjet impingement to the following valves:
- 2CV 15191
- 2CV 5101 1
- 2CV 5613 2
- 2CV 4840 2
- 2CV-5077 2 The affected valves are very close to the HPSIline segment where the failure is postulated. The HPSI valve in the line segment that did not failis also close enough to be affected by spraying orjet impingement.
p (g)
A failure in the line upstream of HPSIheader valve 2CV 50551 or 2CV 5056-2 may Q cause spraying orjet impingsment to the following valves:
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ABB Calculation No. A PENG CAI.C 010. Rev. 00 Page 15 of 89
- 2CV 5101 1
- 2CV 1511 1
- 2CV 5057 2
- 2CV 50371
- 2CV 15191 The affected valves are very close to the HPSIline segment where the failure is postulated. The HPSI valve in the line segment that did not failis also close enough to be affected by spraying orjet impingement.
(h) A failure in the line upstream of HPSIheader valve 2CV 50751 or 2CV 5076 2 may cause spraying orjet impingement to the following valves:
- 2CV 10371
- 2CV 10251
- 2CV 1038 2 The affected valves are very close to the HPSI line segment where the failure is postulated. The HPSI valve in the line segment that did not failis also close enough to be affected by spraying orjet impingement.
(i) Cable tray C8208 is located above the valves in this room. The cables may be affected by spraying.
(j) There are several ESF valves (i.e., those identified in items (f), (g), th), & ll) above) located in this room. The large number of valves and the relative closeness of the volves to each other limit the accessibility within the area.
(k) Access to this room is through a fire proof non water tight door which annunciates when opened.
In performing this evaluation, several types of inputs were used and several assurnptions were made. These inputs and assumptions are discussed in Section 4.1. Forty six consequence segments were identified for HPSIlines entered in the database. Of the forty.
six, five were assigned as "HIGH', forty as 'MEOlUM' and one as 'NONE*. The consequence assessment summary for these segments is provided in Section 4.3. The bases and justifications for each category assignment are provided in Appendix A. This appendix contains reports obtained frotn the ISIS software (Reference 9.2) for the HPSI system. For HPSI lines not entered in the database, two were assigned as ' LOW" consequence and one as "NONE' (see Section 3.2).
4.1 CONSEQUENCE ASSUMPTIONS 4.1.1 It it assumed that all pipe degradation processes are relatively slow and that pipe failure tends to occur randomly in time. This assumption of randomness implies that the failure of a piping segment can occur during any of the various configurations (i.e., standby, testing and response to a demand) of the HPSI system. For the ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC Ot0, Rev. 00 G) t
. Page 16 of 89 purpose of this evaluation, aH configurations were considered to determine the limiting consequences of segment failures in the HPSIsystem.
At the time a segment failure is detected, the HPSI system wiH be in one of its various configurations (i.e., standby, periodic testing, inventory makeup to the SITS, or response to a demand). While in any of these configurations, the existence of a segment failure would be detected within a short time after its occurrence, if it is detectable. If a HPSI segment failure is detected during the standby, periodic testing, or inventory makeup configuration, the Technical Specification requires that the affected HPSI train be restored to operabHity within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or plant shutdown must be initiated. Because of the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Allowed Outage Time (ACT), the fault exposure time would be designated as a *Short A0T* (Reference 9.1) for the standby, periodic testing, or inventory makeup HPSI configuration.
The fault exposure time of a segment faHure which is detected during a HPSI demand would be much longer. The length of the exposure time would depend on whether the piping segment is exposed to the operating pressures on a quarterly basis or during a one year period. According to Reference 9.1, piping segments exposed at least once during the year or not at aH are treated as having on "AH Year" fault exposure time. Otherwise, piping segments exposed on a quarterly basis are treated as having a 'Between Test' fault exposure time. For both cases, the existence of a pipe degraded condition is assumed to be discovered (if it exists) during the last time the piping was exposed to HPSI operating pressures.
/"
(T) Table 3.2 of Reference 9.1 shows that the consequence of a segment failure depends on the frequency of chaHenge, the number of equivalent backup trains, and the fault exposure time which is linked to the system configuration. The HPSI system is designed to mitigate a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and the frequency of chauenge is classified as a Design Basis Category IV event (Table 1 of Appendix A). The consequence evaluation demonstrates that there is at least one equivalent backup train available whether or not the failed segment is isolated.
Since the fault exposure time associated with a segment failure in standby, periodic testing, or inventory makeup operation is 'Short A0T*, the resulting consequence of a failure with one equivalent backup train is ' LOW'. For a demand, the resulting consequence is ' MEDIUM". Therefore the limiting configuration of the HPSI system is associated with a response to a LOCA demand.
4.1.2 Vrrious pipe segment break scenarios, in conjunction with a LOCA, may degrade HPSI flow to the RCS until isolation of the HPSI line break is achieved. Per Reference 9.19, for a limiting case sman break LOCA with no HPSIinjection flow and no operator action, approximately 44 minutes elapse from LOCA initiation to initial core uncovery with initial fuel pin overheating (> 2200 *F) occurring approximately 17 minutes later. SpecificaHy, it is assumed tl.at:
(a) Failures in certain pipe segments outside containment that occur in con} unction with a HPSI demand are detectable and isolable. A 30 minute maximum time to detection is postulated based on Emergency Operating Procedures guidance to observe auxiliary building sump and waste tank p levels as part of determining whether the LOCA is occurring inside or outside i the containment. Discovery of the increasing or elevated levels of these ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations ;
I l
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC-010, Rev. 00 l Page 17 of 89 components wiu immediately be cause for investigation. The 30 minute value includes no credit for observation or alarm acknowledgment inside or l outside the control room, but is based solely on procedural guidance provided by the Emergency Operating procedures. The amount of RWT Inventory diverted to the auxiliary building in the 30 minutes prior to detection is not sufficient to affect operation of the ECCS pumps foHowing RASInitiation (Reference 9.20).
(b) for pipe segment failures in contalnment and upstream of the 2St 13A, 251 I3B, 2SI 13C and 2SI 13D check valves in conjunction with a HPSI demand in response to a sman enough LOCA, detection is based on observation of Individual HPSI Injection line flow in the control room or snelysis of RCS parameters resulting in a determination that the Indicated HPSI header flows are not reaching the RCS. Therefore, credit is taken for detection of a line break in these segments.
(c) for pipe segment failures in containment, downstream of the 25113A, 2SI-138, 2St 13C and 2SI 13D check valves in conjunction with a HPSI demand in response to a smsH enough LOCA, detection is based on unexpected discharge of the effected SIT injection and LPSI flow. Analysis of RCS parameters can be performed to determine that flow from the affected HPSI injection line is not reaching the RCS cold leg. Therefore, credit is taken for detection of a line break in these segments.
4.1.3 It is assumed that flooding of the valves located in Room 2084 due to the failure of a HPSI pipe segment is not a concem. The HPSIpipe segments in Room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB), Upper South piping penetration room and equipment area, are 2' or 3" nominal diameter. The HPSI, LPSI, and CS header valves are located in this room at least 30* above the floor. The worst case failure of a HPSIpipe segment within this room would be a complete rupture of a 3'line.
The ANO 2 hydraulic model for the HPSI system was used to determine the flow rates at various break locations.
4.1. 4 It is assumed that during normal power operation the configuration of the HPSI system is in the standby state, except when periodic testing or SIT inventory addition is being performed in this state, the HPSI header valves are closed and the HPSIpumps area aligned to take suction from the Refueling Water Tank (RWT). The HPSI *C' pump (2P-89C) is considered as a swing pump and can be aligned to either HPSI header.
4.1. 5 If on three HPSI pumps are operable, HPSI pump 2P-89C is interlocked (Reference 9.21) with the other two HPSI pumps to prevent it from starting automaticaHy in response to SIAS. This also prevents two HPSI pumps from being powered from the some bus and overloading the dieselgenerator. HPSIpump 2P-89Cis aligned to either train 'A' or 'B' when the dedicated pump for the train is taken out of service.
Therefore for the purpose of assessing the consequence of a failed segment associated w!'h HPSIpump 2P 89C, it is assumed that this pump is aligned to either HPSI train 'A ' or "B".
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010 Rev. 00
% Page 18 of 89 :
4.1.6 HPSI valves which are normally open, and fail-as is, are assumed to be unaffected by spraying orlet impingement caused by the faHure of a pipe segment.
4.1. 7 ft is assumed that a segment failure that is detected during normalpower operation wiH lead to a manual plant shutdown because the failed segment would not be repairable within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> aHowed outage time (Reference 9.13, Tech Spec 3.5.1) of the HPSI system.
4.1. 8 Based on the initiating event trees that were developed and used in the Individual Plant Examination for ANO 2 (Reference 9.15), there are no available backup trains to mitigate core damage foHowing a loss of the HPSI system.
4.1.9 Failures in pipe segments that occur during normalpower operation (i.e., during test or standby), either inside or cutside the containment, are tietectable and Isolable.
This is due to the various alarms and Indications available to the control room operatort, including but not limited to: RWT level Indication and clarm, auxiliary building sump levelIndication and alarm, ESF pump room level alarm, waste tanks levelindication and alarm, containment building sump levelIndication and alarm and HPSI flow indication. Many of these indications are monitored and tracked. By virtue of the RWTlow level clarm, the RWTinventory lost outside containment prior to discovery is not sufficient enough to affect ECCS pump operation in the event of a subsequent LOCA with RAS initiation. In addition, any significant water leakage outside containment would be promptly discovered during routine operator
() walkdowns performed each shift.
U 4.1.10 The HPSI pumps are periodicaHy tested on a quarterly basis to comply with the in.
service testing requirements (Reference 9.13, Tech Spec 4.5.2(fl) for these pumps.
4.1.11 The assumption is made that the SITS wiu continue to require inventory additions due to sampling, valve leakage, etc. as has historicaHy been the case.
4.1.12 According to Table 3.2 of Reference 9.1, the unreliability of unaffected backup trains is as foHows:
zero backup train ~1.0 one backup train ~1.0x10
two backup trains ~1.0x10' three or more backup trains ~1.0x10*
The probability of not performing corrective actions based on adequate information in the control room is typicaHy 1.0x10 (Reference 9.22). Therefore, failure of the operators to isolate a segment is treated as equivalent to one backup train.
4.1.13 For pipe segments normany isolated from the RCS (i.e., upstream of HPSI check valves 2SI 15A, 2SI ISB, 2SI 15C and 2SI-ISD), a potential LOCA initiating event was considered in the evaluation. A potential LOCA is defined as the failure of a check volve fouowed by the failure of the associated HPSI segment. The combined effect of a check valve failure and the Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCOP) for LOCA (Table 1 of Appendix A) results in a MEDIUM' consequence. The (y combined effect of two check volve faHures and the CCDP for LOCA results in a LOW consequence. For potential LOCAs outside containment, two check valve
, ABB Combustien Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010 Rev. 00 Page 19 of 89 faHures must occur. Because containment is being bypassed the impact on containment performance results in a MEDIUAf consequence. Note that this is conservative for the HPSI injection lines because of ability to detect excessive leakage or backflow through the first check valve. The above assignments were used to determine whether or not the consequences of HPSI segments susceptible to potentic! LOCAs were more limiting than the consequences resulting from HPSI demand. The results show that the consequences of potentialLOCAs are enveloped by the consequences during a HPSI demand.
The consequence segment line break detection capabilities are summarizedin Section 4.2.
4.2 CONSEQUENCE SEGMENT LINE BREAK DETECTION CAPABillTIES This section summarizes the unexpected alarms and indications available to the operators in the controlroom for detecting the failure of a HPSI segment. HP$r segments that exhibit similar detection capabilities are grouped and shown below. Additionalinformation for each l HPSI segment is providedin Appendix A.
LIPSU ConseovenceJenments HPSI C 33 / 34 / 35 / 36 A line break in these segments is a LOCA initiating event and the consequence is therefore I driven by that classification.
HPSI Conseavence Senments HPSI C 01/ 06 / 08 /10 For a HPSI segment line break downstream of any 2SI 13/14/16 valve and upstream of the correspornding 2S115 valve in conjunction with a sman break LOCA (i.e., a LOCA where RCS pressure initially remains above SIT tank pressure), several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. SpecificaHy; The SIT associated with the offected injection line would have low pressuro and levels atorms annunciated with RCS pressure above SITpressure.
The affected SITlevel and pressure instruments would reveal that the tank had dumped.
Inappropriately high HPSI and LPSI injection flows would be indicated by the main header flow HPSI (2FI 5101 1/5102 2) and LPSI(2FIC 5091) instruments with most or all of the HPSI flow indicated through one injection line flow instrument (2FI/FY 5014-1/5034 1/5054 2/5074-2).
- HPSI and LPSI pump discharge pressures (2PI 5108/5109/SO92) would be inappropriately low for the RCS pressure present.
A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity (i.e., capable of only relatively sman flows at higher RCS pressures) to pump against higher RCS pressures would become evident as a smaH tveak LOCA event progressed.
A disconnect betweJn safety system flows and RCS inventory response would become evident as a smallbreak LOCA event progressed.
The Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Post Trip Actions (EOP 2202.001) specificaHy requires the acknowledgment of ALL control room annunciators (step 13 on page 22). The SIT alarms in conjunction with the other associated indications available would almost certainly provide sufficient information to the operators to determine the ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 20 0f 89 existence of such a foHure. It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment.
HPSI Consegn.n ce segments HPSI-C 18 /19 / 20 / 21 For HPSI segment line breaks upstream of any 2SI 13 valve and inside containment in conjunction with a sman break LOCA li.e., a LOCA where RCS pressure initiaHy remains above SIT tank pressure), several unexpected indications would be encountered.
SpecificaHy;
- Inappropriately high HPSIinjection flows would be indicated by the main heeder HPSI flow instruments (2FI51011/5102 2) with most or sH of the HPSI flow indicated through one injection line flow instrument (2FI/FY 5014-1/5034-1/5054 2/5074-2).
This inconsistency would be further highlighted when SIAS pump flows are verified using Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve, per EOP 2202.003, loss of Coolant Accident, Snep 9.
- HPSI pump discharge pressures (2PI 5108/5109) would be inappropriately low for the l RCS pressure present.
A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity (i.e., capable of only relatively smaH flows at higher RCS pressures) when pumping against higher RCS pressures would become evident as a sman break LOCA event progressed.
- A c'isconnect between sefaty system flows and RCS inventory response would become evident as a sman break LOCA event progressed.
- The pressure alarm used to monitor for back4eakage of the 25115 valves would not be annunciated as expected.
l Although not specificaHy identified by a proceduralrequirement as in the case of segments 01, 06, 08 and 10, a break in one of these line segments would be quite visible based on the numerous indicators associated with safety related equipment which would identify the presence of a condition warranting investigation. It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment.
HPSI Consequence Segments HPSI C-02 / 07 / 09 /11 These segments include piping downstream of any injection MOV and upstream of tie associated containment penetration. For line breaks in conjunction with a LOCA the Emergency Operating Procedure, EOP 2202.003, Step 14, provides direction to determine if the LOCA is inside or outside containment. Operations personnel are required to observe auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank levels as weH es other indications.
Therefore in attempting to determine LOCA break location, the outflow from a HPSI segrotent failurs would be detected. For these HPSI segment line breaks several other unexpected alarms andindications would also be encountered. Specificany;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
- Inappropriately high HPSI injection flows for the RCS pressure present would be indicated by the mein HPSI header flow instruments (2FI-51011/5102 2) and, if the break location were downstream of the injection line flow. instrument, most cr aH of the
() HPSI flow indicated would be through one injection line flow instrument (2FI/FY 5014 Q ,) 1/5034-1/5054 2/5074 2). This enconsistency would be further highlighted when SIAS ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00
'Page 21 of 89 pump flows are verified using Exhibit 2, HPSI flow Curve, per EOP 2202.003, loss of Coolant Accident Step 9. For segment breaks upstream of the injection line flow elements, the high header flows would stiH be indicated, yet little or no injection line flows would be present at higher RCS pressures. In either case, indication of a significant flow inconsistency would be readily apparent by observation of the various flow instruments associated with the HPSI system.
- HPSI pump discharge pressures (2PI-5108/5109) would be inappropriately low for the RCS pressure present.
- A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity (i.e., capable of only relatively smaH flows at higher RCS pressures) when pumping against higher RCS pressures would become evident as a smaH break LOCA event progressed.
- A disconnect between safety system flows and RCS inventory response would become evident as a sman break LOCA event progressed.
The Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Post Trip Actions section (EOP 2202.001) specificaHy requires the acknowledgment of ALL control room annunciators (step 13 on page 22). The auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank level alarms would be acknowledged at this point if not already.
Because of the local verifications of ECCS pump room isolation required at on RWTlevel of 40% (EOP 2202.003, Step 21), it is nct credible to postulate that this line break would not be detected prior to recirculation initiation.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment.
HPSI Conseovence Seaments HPSI C 03A/022A/023A/024A/25A/026A/027A/028A These segments include piping downstream of any injection line manual throttle valve and upstream of the injection line MOV's. For line breaks in conjunction with a LOCA the Emergency Operating Procedure, EOP 2202.003, Step 14, provides c'irection to determine if the LOCA is inside or outside containment. Operations personnel are required to observe auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank levels as weH as other indications.
Therefore in attempting to determine LOCA break location, the outflow from a HPSI segment failure would be detected. in addition, several other unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. SpecificaHy;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
- Inappropriately high HPSI injection flows for the RCS pressure present would be indicated by the main HPSI header flow instruments (2FI51011/5102 2). This inconsistency would be further highlighted when SIAS pump flows are verified using Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve, per EOP 2202.003, loss of Coolant Accident, Step 9.
Little or no injection line flows (2FI/FY 5014-1/50341/5054-2/S074 2) would be present at higher RCS pressures. Indication of a significant flow inconsistency would be readily apparent by observation of the various flow instruments associated with the HPSI system.
HPSI pump discharge pressures (2PI 5108/5109) would be inappropriately low for the RCS pressure present.
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ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 22 of 89
- A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity (Ie., capcble of only re!stively small flows at higher RCS pressures) when pumping against higher RCS pressures would become evident as a sn'allbreak LOCA event progressed.
- A disconnect between safety system flows and RCS inventory response would become evident as a smallbreak LOCA event progressed.
The Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Post Trip Actions (EOP 2202.001) specifically requires the acknowledgment of ALL contral room annunciators (step 13 on page 22). The auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank level alarms would be acknowledged at this point if not already.
Because of the local verifications of ECCS pump room isolation required at an RWTlevel of 40% (EOP 2202.003, Step 21), it is not credible to postulate that this line break would not be detected prior to recirculation initiation, it is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failedline segment.
HPSI Consecuence Seaments HPSI C 03/022/023/024/25/026/027/028 These segments include piping downstream of the El. 360' 0* floor and upstream of the injection line inanval throttle volve . For line breaks in conjunction with a LOCA the Emergency Operating Procedure, EOP 2202.003, Step 14, provides direction to determine if the LOCA is inside or outside containment. Operations personnel are required to observe G auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank levels as well as other indications.
Therefore in attempting to determine LOCA break location, the outflow from a HPSI segment failure would be detected. In addition, seversi other unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
- Inappropriately high HPSI injection flows for the RCS pressure present would be indicated by the main HPSI header flow instruments (2FI 5101 1/5 t02 2) with a distinct imbalance between the two headers. This inconsistency would be further highlighted when SIAS pump flows are verified using Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve, per EOP 2202.003, loss of Coolant Accident, Step 9. Little or no injection line flows (2FI/FY.
5014 1/5034 1/5054 2/5074-2) would be present at any significant RCS pressure, ,
Indication of a significant flow inconsistency would be readily apparent by observation of the various flowinstruments associated with the HPSI system.
- HPSI pump discharge pressures (2PI 5108/5109) would be inappropriately low for the RCS pressure present.
- A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity (i.e., capable of only relatively small flows at higher RCS pressures) when pumping rgainst higher RCS pressures would become evident as a smallbreak LOCA event progressed.
- A disconnect between safety system flows and RCS inventory response would become evident as a smallbreak LOCA event progressed.
The Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Post Trip Actions (EOP 2202.001) f\ specifically requires the acknowledgment of ALL control room annunciators (step 13 on d .
ABB Cornbustion Engineering Nuclear Operations -
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Re5 Page 23 of 89 page 22). The auxHiery building sump level and waste drain tank level alarms would be acknowledged 51 this point if not already.
Because of the local verifications of ECCS pump room isolation required at an RWTlevel of 40% (EOP 2202.003, Step 21), it is not credible to postulate that this line break would not be detected prior to recirculation initiation, it is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment.
HPSI Conse3vence Seaments HPSI C 04/04A/12 These segments include piping downstream of floor elevatien 335' O'(LSPPR) and upstream of floor elevation 360' O". For line breaks in con} unction with a LOCA the Emergency Operating Procedure, EOP 2202.003 Step 14, provides direction to determine if the LOCA is inside or outside containment. Operations personnel are required to observe auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank levels as weH as other indications. Therefore in attempting to dLtermine LOCA break location, the outflow from a HPSI segment faHure would be detected. in addition, several other uroexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. Specificany;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
Inappropriately high HPSI injection flows for the RCS pressure present would be indicated by the main HPSI header flow instruments (2FI 5101 1/5102 2) with a distinct imbalance between the two header flows. This Inconsistency would be further highlighted when SIAS pump flows are verified using Exhibit 2, HPSI flow Curve, per E0P 2202.003, loss of Coolant Accident, Step 9. Little or no injection line flows (2FI/FY 50141/50341/5054 2/5074-2) would be present at any significant RCS pressure. Indication of a significant flow inconsistency would be readily apparent by observation of the various flowinstruments associated with the HPSIsystem.
HPSI pump discharge pressures (2Pl 5108/5109) would be inappropriately low for the RCS pressure present.
A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity (i.e., capsble of only relatively smaH flows at higher RCS pressures) when pumping against higher RCS pressures would become evident as a smaH break LOCA event progressed.
- A disconnect between safety system flows and RCSinventory response would become evident as a smaH break LOCA event progressed.
The Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Post Trip Actions (EOP 2202.001) specificaHy requires the acknowledgment of ALL control room annunciators (step 13 on page 22). The auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank level alarms would be acknowledged at this point if not already.
Because of the local verifications of ECCS pump room isolation required at an RWTlevel of 40% (EOP 2202.003, Step 21), it is not credible to postulate that this line break would not be detected prior to recirculation initiation.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment.
AB3 Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
1 ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 24 of 89 HPSI Consnyonce SMments HPSI C 05/J))LL4 For a HPSI segment line break in any of the three HPSI pump rooms, in con}vnction with a LOCA, severalunexpected alarms andindications would be encountered. SpecificaHy;
- An ECCS pump room level alarm would be annunciated very quickly ofte.' break initiation.
- Accumulation of water to any significant depth win cause faHure of a running HPSI pump motor which wiH in tum be annunciated in the control room when the breaker opens (Not applicable to segment piping In the standby pump room).
- For piping downstream of the HPSIpump discharge check valves (downstream of check valve 2SI 12 for the "A" header), inappropriately high HPSIInjectl n flow for the RCS pressure present would be indicated by one main HPSI header flow Instrument (2Fl.
5101 1/5102 2) with the other main header flow reading zero. This inconsistency would be further highlighted when SIAS pump flows are verified using Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve, per EOP 2202.003, loss of Coolant Accident, Step 9. Indication of a significant flow inconsistency would be readily apparent by observation of the various flow instruments associated with the HPSI system.
- HPSI pump discharge pressures (2PI 5108/5109) would be inappropriately low for the RCS pressure prescrit.
- A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity (i.e., capable of only relatively smaH flows at higher RCS pressures) when pumping against higher i s RCS pressures would become evident as a sman break LOCA event progressed.
U
- A disconnect between safety system flows and RCS Inventory response would become evident as a sman break LOCA event progressed.
The Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Post Trip Actions (EOP 2202.001) specificaHy requires the acknowledgment of ALL control room annunciators (step 13 on page 22), The pump room level alarm and pump failure alarms would be acknowledged at this point if not already.
Because of the local verifications of ECCS pump room isolation required at on RWT level of 40% (EOP 2202.003, Step 21), it is not credible to postulate that this line break would not be detected prior to recirculation initiation.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment.
I/ PSI CenJ1gue..gr n Segments HPJI,_QAff These segments include piping downstream of floor elevation 360'O' (USPPR) and upstream of the hot leg injection MOV's. For ,'ine breaks in conjunction with a LOCA the Emergency Operating Procedure, EOP 2202.003, Step 14, provides direction to determine if the LOCA is inside or outside containment. Operations personnel are required to observe auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank levels as weH as other indications. Therefore in attempting to determins LOCA break location, the outflow from a HPSI segment failurs would be detected, in addition, several other unexpected alarms and indications f3 would be encountered. Specificany; O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A16B Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 25 of 80
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annuncluted.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
Inappropriately high HPSI injection flows for the RCS pressure prestnt would be indicated by the main HPSI header flow instruments (2FI51011/5102 2). This inconsistency would be further highlighted when SIAS pump flows are verified using Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve, per EOP 2202.003, loss of Coolant Accident, Step 9. Utt s or no injection line flows (2FI/FY 50141/50341/S054 2/5074 2) would be present at any significant RCS pressure. Indication of a significant flow inconsistency would be readily apparent by observation of the various flow instruments associated with the HPSI system. HPSI pump discharge pressures (2PI 5108/5109) would be inappropriately low for the RCS pressure present. A disconnect between RWTinventory and the HPSIpumps known capacity fl.e., capable of only relatively small flows al higher RCS pressurest when pumping against higher RCS pressures would becume evident as a smallbreak LOCA event progressed. A disconnect between safety system flows and RCS inventory response would become evident as a smallbreak LOCA event progressed. The Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Post Trip Actions section specifically requires the acknowledgment of ALL controlroom annunciators istop 13 on page 22). The auxiliary building sump level and waste drain tank level alarms would be acknowledged at this point if not already. Because of the local verifications of EC:S pump room isolation required at en RWTlevel of 40% (EOP 2202.003, Step 21), it is not credible to postulate that this line break would not be detected prior to initiation of recirculation. It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment. HPS! Conseguence S.pgments HPSI C 16/16 for a HPSI segment line break downstream of the hot leg injection MOV's and upstream of the associated containment penetrations, in conjunction with a I.0CA, several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high 10 vel would be annunciated.
Waste drain tank I'lph level would be annunciatea. Because this piping segment remains isolated until hot leg injection is me"vally initiated Ino sooner than two hours after the initiating event LOCA) it is expected that the plant will be in the recirculation mode when the segment is placed in service. Unexpected auxiliary building radiation alarms would therefore be anticipated. EOP 2202.003, step 27 requires, per Attachment 12, that hot leg injection flows (2Fl. 5101 1/5102 2 minus 2F150141/50341/5054-2/5074 2) be verified in relat!Jn to cold leg flows (2FI 50141/50341/5054-2/5074-2). Although the resultant flows could potentially fall within the allowable band, a flow imbalance between the two trains would be evidence of an abnormality. Containment water level would decrease. S ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations ___ _--__ J
1
/O ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 26 of 89 Based on the alarrts and indications associated with a break in this segment, it is therefore considersd roescnabl+ to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by tholation of the failedlitie segment.
UESHpnsec>mco Senments HPS! C 30/32 For a HPcl segmMt line break downstream of the associated containment penetrations and enrem e ?$t r 2848, in conjunction with a LOCA, indication of the break could be encountrVVL SpecificaHy;
- EDP 2202.003, n;eo 27 requires, per Attachment 12, that hot leg injection flows (2FI-3101 1/5102 2 MINUS 2FI-5014-1/50341/5054 2/5074-2) be verified in relation to cold leg flows (2FI/FY 5014-1/50341/5054 2/5074-2). Although the resultant flows couldpotentistly faH within the aHowable band, a flow imbalance between the two trains could be evidence of an abnormality.
- For piping breaks which result in less flow than that required to exceed core boiloff rates, decreasing resctor vessellevel win provide additio, )Iindication of a diversion of flow wher hot leg injection is established. Detection probabHity is increased due the controueu :.ircumstances under which this configuration is established.
Detection in this case would be based on a possible smaH flow Imbalance between trains as weH as the introduction of a potential decreasing reactor vessellevel and is considered to be possible, h)/ w HPSI Ccnsecuence Senment HPSI C 37 A line break in this segment is a LOCA initiating event and the consequence is therefore driven by that classification. 4.3 CONSEQUENCE IDENTIFICA TION The consequence summary ascessment is provided in tabular form in this section. Simplified schematics are piovided in Figures 2 through 12 to iHustrate the boundaries for each of the HPSI consequences. Dotted lines are used to identify the boundaries for each consequence. Major HPSI equipment along with floor and wsH penetrations are shown on these i"yures for ease of identification. Table 2 summarizes the consequence evaluation for the HPSI system, given successfulisolation. This table contains the foHowing information for each of the consequences identified: Consequence ID A unique number assigned to the consequence Boundary The figure number that iHustrates the boundaries for the consequence Description A brief description of the effects of the consequence DB Event Category The category of design basis initiating event that the HPSI system is ce ssigned to mitigate, based on Table 1 of Appendix A Direct Effects The immediate or direct effects caused by a failure of the pipe segment p Spatial Effects The indirect effects caused by a faHure of the pipe segment V ,_ ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A1B Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010. Rev. 00 Page 27 of 89 Impact Group The impact of a pipe segment failure on the HPSI and other mitigating systemis) or treints) Availtble Trains The number of trains available fe; performing the intended design function of the HPSIsyste.L-Consequence Cat. The assigned consequence category based on the application of the methodology provided in the EPRI procedure (Reference 9.1) for a smaH enough LOCA where the failed segment remains unisolated, both trains of HPSI would be lost due to flow diversion. However, by crediting the capability at d reliabHity of the operators to isolate the failed segment, an equivalent backup train would provide a method of mitigating the faHed segment. - The bases and }vstifications for each of the assigned consequences are documented in Appendix A. The ISIS (Reference 9.2) software was used as a tool to prepare the docuanentation in this appendix. The documentation of the spatial effects are currently based on a review of the Internal Flood Screening Study (Reference 9.14) and Piant Design Drawings, and the walkdown that was conducted for the HPSI system. The walkdown captured subtle interactions which could not be readily identified using the screening study or the plant drawings. Observations from the walkdown are factoredinto the consequence evaluation. Table 3 presents the HPSI consequences, their corresponding figure numbers and Isometric Drawings. 4.4 SHUTDOWN OPERATION AND EXTERNAL EVENTS Shutdown Operation l The consequence evaluation is on assessment assuming the plant is at power. GeneraHy. the at power plant configuration is considered to present the greatest risk for piping failures since the plant requires immediate response to satisfy reactivity control, heat removal, and 1 inventory control. By satisfying these safety functions, the plant wiH be shut down and maintained in a stable state. At power, the plant is critical, and is at higher pressure and temperature in comparison to shutdown operation. The current version of the methodology (Reference 9.1) provides no guidance on consequence evaluation during shutdown l operation. This limitation is assessed herein to gain some level of confidence that the consequence ranking during shu'down would not be more limiting. Pipe segments that are already ranked as *HIGH' consequence from the evaluation at-power need not be evaluated for shutdown. Those that are already " MEDIUM' require some confidence that "HIGH' would not occur due to shutdown configurations. However, the
- LOW" consequences for power operation require more confidence that a "HIGH' would tot 1
occur and some confidence that a
- MEDIUM" consequence would not occur. Recognizing l
this, a review and comparison of system consequence results for power operation versus potential consequence during shutdown operation was conducted. The results of the comparison Indicate that during at-power operation, HPSI segments that cause an initiating event are ranked as "HIGH" consequence. The major segments beyond the first RCS isolation valve required to support high pressure injection and recirculation are ranked as
- MEDIUM
- consequence. During shutdown operation, the frequency of challenging the HPSI system is similar or less than at power operation. The system is assumed to require manualinitiation, and major equipment or portions of the system are ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010 Rev. 00 V Page 28 of 89 much more likely to be in maintenance. Stin, a combination of frequency of challenge and other factors such as available backup train, lower decay heat and longer response time are considered to provide a *AfEulUAf' consequence ranking during shutdown operation. The consequence ranking during shutdown operation would be no more significant than the ranking identified during at power operation. Extemal Event.g Although external events are not addressed in the current version of the methodology (Reference 9.1), the potential importance of piping failures during extemal event is also considered. The ANO 2 IPEEE was reviewed to determine whether extemal initiating events, with their potential common cause impacts on mitigating systems, could affect consequence ranking. This information, along with information from other extemal event PRAs, is considered to derive insights and confidence that consequence ranking is not more significant during an extemal event. The foHowing summarites the review for each of the major hazards (seismic, fire and others). Seismic ChsIIenges The potential effects of seismic initiating events on consequence ranking is assessed by considering the frequency of chaHenging plant mitigating systems and the potentialimpact on the existing consequence ranking. The foHowing summarizes this assessment: GeneraHy, the HPSI piping considered la this evaluation has a seismic fragility capacity much greater than the 0.3g screening value and is not considered likely to
;Q fait during a seismic event.
V
- With regard to the impact on mitigating systems, the most likely scenario is seismic induced loss of offsite power. Based on a typical fragility of 0.1g (Referes.ce 9.23) for loss of offsite power and the seismic hazards developed for the ANO site (References 9.24 and 9.25), the frequency of seismic induced loss of offsite power is less than 1.0E 4 per year.
Considering the scenario where an induced LOCA and non seismic failure of one dieselgenerator occur, there is only one train of HPSI available, in response to the event, the available HPSI train is assumed to fail when demanded, thus thers are no backup trains for mitigation. Assuming a probability of 0.1 for failure of the diesel generator and an "an year
- exposure time, the Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCOP) for this scenario is epproximately 1.0E 05. The resulting consequence is "AfEOlUAf'.
For the scenario where an induced LOCA occurs and both diesel generators are available, both HPSI trains are initiaHy available. However, in response to the event, one HPSI train is assumed to fail with the remaining HPSI train providing backup. Assuming a probability of 1.0E 2 for the backup train and an 'aH year
- exposure time, the CCOP is approximately 1.0E 6. The resulting consequence is
- LOW'.
Other seismic scenarios that include chaHenges to HPSI would result in lower CCDPs because additional failures (i.e., failure of PSV to reclose or failure of EFW) must occur. However, the consequence ranking would also be ' LOW'.
,~\ Based on the above, the consequence ranking for HPSI during a seismic event is enveloped i ) by the at power consequence ranking.
G ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations a
ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 29 of 89 Fire ChaHenges . The ANO 2 IPEEE indicates that the fire core damage frequency is dominated by fires initiated outside the containment. Similar to a seismic event, fires do not impact reactivity control or couw a LOCA unless it is due to a stuck open primary safety valve. Based on fire core damage frequency of 3.5E 05 per year in the ANO2 IPEEE, a fire induced loss of offsite power frequency is assumed to be less than 1.0E 02 per year. With regard to the impact on mitigating systerns, the most likely scenario fire induced loss of offsite power. Considering the scenario where fire induced loss of offsite power occurs and both emergency diesel generator trains are available, a transient induced LOCA (i.e., opening and failure of a PSV to reciose) or failure of ERV would challenge the HPSI system. Reclosure of the PSVs or ERV operation and the intact HPSI train (assuming one HPSI train fails on demand) would provide at least two backup trains for mitigation. Combining the frequency of loss of offsite power with two available backup trains results in a " LOW" consequence. Considering the same scenario with loss of one emergency diesel generator would result in one less backup train for mitigation. Hence, the resulting consequence is "AfEDIUM". Since the at power consequence ranking is already *HIGH' or 'A1EDIUA1', the resulting consequences during a fire would not be of greater significance. Other External Challenged Other hazards were screened in the ANO 2 IPEEE and are i assumed to have Fttle or no risk significant impact on HPSI. O 9 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
,o ,a (~3 v - 'w) 91WW CalctAation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 30 of 89 Table 2 HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Drect Effects SpatialEffects impact Group Avakble Conseovence ID Event Mitigathg Trabs Category Category HPSI-C-01 Rgure 2 Degradation of HPSI, IV Loss of ECCS flow None Degradation At least two MEDIUM
' LPSI, & SITflow to RCS to RCS toop 2P- ofmultiple ECCS injection loop 2P-32B occurs 328 systems Scops to RCS HPSI-C-02 Figure 2 Loss of HPSIflow to IV Loss of HPSIflow Spraying orjer Degradation At least two MEDIUM RCS toop 2P-32B occurs to RCStoop 2P- impingement of of HPS1 HPSIbrection 32B 2CV-5613-2, trains loops to RCS 2CV-5101-1, 2CV-1519-1, 2CV-4840-2 and 2CV-5077-2 HPSI-C-03 Route 6 Loss of HPS! train "A" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPST between floor containment in vanes 2CV-penetration and response to a 5036-2. 2CV-upstream of valve 2SI- LOCA demand 5613-2, 2CV-72 1519-1, 2CV-5101-1, 2CV-4840-2, & 2CV-5077-2 HPSI-C-03A Pgure 6 Loss of HPSI train "A" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train cf HPS1 trara of HPSI downstream of vake contahment in vakes 2CV-l 2SI-72 and upstream of response to a 5036-2. 2CV-vake 2CV-5035-1 LOCA demand 5613-2, 2CV-1519-1, 2CV-5101-1, 2CV-4840-2, & 2CV-5077-2 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
D*% W W Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 31 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd] HPSI Consequ nce Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects SpatialEffects Impact Group A vsRable Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trains Category Categorv HPSI-C-04 Rgure 7 Loss of HPSI train "A" IV Partialloss of None Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break RWTinventory in HPSI train HPSI train in Lower South Piping response to a l Room LOCA demand HPSI-C-04A Rgure 7 Loss of HPSI train "A" IV Partialloss of Spraying of one loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to a line RWTinventory in charging pump HPSI train HPSI train break in charging pump response to a discharge Ene to HPSI LOCA demand header 11 during normal power operation HPSI-C-05 Rgure 9 Loss of HPSI train "A", IV Rooding of HPSI Same as direct Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM CS train "A", and LPSI pump A, CSpump effects HPSI, LPSI, train for each of pump "A" occurs due to A, and LPSIpump & CS train the affected a line break in ECCS A systems pump room 'A". HPSI-C-06 Rgure 3 Degradation of HPSI, IV Loss of ECCS flow None Degradation At least two MEDIUM LPSI, & SITflow to RCS to RCSlonp 2P- of multiple ECCSinfection loop 2P-32A occurs 32A systems loops to RCS HPSI-C-07 Rgure 3 Loss of HPSI flow to IV Loss of HPSI flow Spraying orjet Degradation Atleast two MEDIUM RCS toop 2P-32A occurs to RCSloop 2P- impingement of of HPSI HPSIinjection 32A 2CV-5612-1 and trains loops to RCS 2CV-5017-1 ABB Combustion Engin ng Nuclear Operations
'N q) m)
A Rfl 9% WW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 32 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects SpatialEffects impact Group Avaaabie Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trains Category Category HPSI-C-08 Rgure 4 Degradation of HPSI, IV Loss of ECCS How None Degradation At least two MEDIUM LPSI, & SITHow to RCS to RCSIcop 2P- of multiple ECCSinjection loop 2P-32D occurs 32D syt. ems loops to RCS HPSI-C-09 Rgure 4 Loss of HPSI flow to IV Loss of HPSV flow Spraying orjet Degradation At least two MEDIUM RCSloop 2P-32D occurs to RCSloop 2P- impingement of ofHPSI HPSIinjectius 32D 2CV-1037-1, trains loops to RCS 2CV-1025-1 and 2CV-1038-2 HPSI-C-10 Rgure 5 Degradation of HPSI, IV Loss of ECCS flow None Degradation At least two MEDIUM LPSI, & SITflow to RCS to RCSloop 2P- ofmultplei ECCSinjection loop 2P-32C occurs 32C systems loops to RCS HPSI-C-11 Rgure 5 Degradation of HPSI to IV Loss of HPSI flow Spraying orjet Degradation At least two MEDIUM RCSloop 2P-32C occurs to RCSloop 2P- impingement of of multiple HPSIinjection 22C 2CV-5057-2, systems and loops to RCS 2CV-5037-1, loss of one 2CV-5101-1, train of CCS 2CV-t511-1 and 2CV-1519-1 HPSI-C-12 Rgure 8 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Partialloss of None Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break RWTinventoryin HPSI train HPSI train in Lower South Piping response to a Room LOCA demand ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
I D'1 B W Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 33 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Detect Effects SpatialEffects knpact Group AvaRable Conseavence ID Event Mitigating Trains Category Category HPSI-C-13 Rgure Loss of HPSI train "B", IV Rooding of HPSI Same as direct loss one One redundant MEDIUM 10 CS train "A", and LPSI pump ~B", CS effects HPSI, LPSI, train for each of pump ~B' occurs due to pump ~B", and & CS train the affected a line break in ECCS E *SIpump ~B* systems pump room "B". HPSI-C-14 Rgure Loss of HPSI train "A" cr IV Rooding of HPSI Same as direct Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM 11 ~B" occurs due to a line purne C effects HPSI train HPSI train break in pump room "C". HPSI-C-15 Rgure Loss of trah "A"hotleg IV Diversion of train Nane Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM 12 injection occurs due to a "A" hot leg HPSI train HPS! train line break in Urver injection flow Sovi~ *bing od Penetrauw ricom HPSI-C-16 Rgure Loss of train "B"hotleg IV Diversion of train None Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM 12 injection occurs due to a "B" hot leg HPSI train HPSI train line break in Upper injection flow South Piping and Penetration Room HPSI-C-17 Rgure loss of cross-tie IV None None None None NONE 12 capability between HPSI header 11 and train *B" hot leg injection
%) J O
& RIl F%WW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010 Rev. 00 Page 34 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd)
HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence l Boundary Description DB D; rect Effects SpatialEffects impsct Group AvaRable Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trains Category Category HPSI-C-18 R gure 3 Degradation of HPSI IV s.oss of HPSI flow None Degradation At least two MEDIUM flow to RCSloop 2P- to RCSloop 2P- of HPSI ECCSinjection 32A occurs 32A system loops to RCS HPSI-C-19 Rgure 2 Degradation of HPSI IV Loss of HPSIflow None Degradation At least two MEDIUM flow to RCSloop 2P-32B to RCSloop 2P- of HPSI ECCSinjection occurs 328 system loops to RCS HPSI-C-20 R gure 5 Degradation of HPSI IV Loss of HPSI flow None Degradation At least two MEDIUM flow to RCSloop 2P- to RCSloop 2P- of HPSI ECCSinjection 32C occurs 32C system loops to RCS HPSI-C-21 Rgure 4 Degradation of HPSI IV Loss of HPSI flow None Degradation At least two MEDIUM flow to RCSloop 2P- to RCSloop 2P- of HPSI ECCSinjection 32D occurs 32D system loops to RCS HPSI-C-22 Rgure 6 Loss of HPSI train "A* IV Diversion of RWT Spraybg orjet loss of one One reduriant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI between floor containment valves 2CV-penetration and valve during in response 50 t 6-2, 2CV-251-68 to a LOCA 5038-1, 2CV-demand 5612-1, & 2CV-5017-1 HPSI-C-22A Rgure 6 Loss of HPSI train 'A' IV Diversion of RWT Spraying oriet Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement cf train of HPSI train of HPSI downstream of valve containment valves 2CV-2SI-68 and upstream of during a response 5016-2, 2CV-valve 2CV-5015-1 to a LOCA 5038-1, 2CV-demand 5612-1, & 2CV-5017-1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
4 N F%BFIF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Prge 35 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects SpatialEffects impact Group AvaHable Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trains Categt.ry Category HPSI-C-23 figure 6 Lo3s of HPSI train "A" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet loss of one One redundant . MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI between floor containment valves 2CV-penetration and valve during response to 5056-2, 2CV-2SI-70 a LOCA demand 5057-2, 2CV-1511-1, 2CV-1519-12CV-5037-1 & 2CV- ' 5101-1 HPSI-C-23A Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train *A" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI downstream of valve containment valves 2CV-2SI-70 and upstream of during a response ' 5056-2, 2CV-valve 2CV-5055-1 to a LOCA 5057-2, 2CV-demand 1511-1, 2CV-1519-12CV-5037-1 & 2CV-5101-1 HPSI-C-24 Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "A" IV Divgrsion of RWT Spraying orjet Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI between floor containment valves 2CV-penetration and valve during response to 5076-2 2CV-2S1-74 a LOCA demand 1037- 1, 2CV-1025-1, & 2CV-1038-2 ABB Combustion Engin ng Nuclear Operations
r3
\ N.
A n Ik E'%IFIF Calculation Nc. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 36 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects SpatialEffects impact Group A.#able Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trains Category Category HPSI-C-24A Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "A" (V Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI downstream of valve containment valves 2CV-2SI-74 and upstream of during a response 5076-2 2CV-valve 2CV-5075-1 to a LOCA 1037-1, 2CV-demand 1025-1, & 2CV-1038-2 HPSI-C-25 Rgure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orlet loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occu's due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI betnen floor containment valves 2CV-renetration and valve during response to 5035-1. 2CV-2SI-73 a LOCA demand 5613-2, 2CV-1519-1, 2CV-5101- 1, 2CV-4840-2, & 2CV-5077-2 HPSI-C-25A Rgure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break irr a ntory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI downstream of valve containment valves 2CV-251-73 and upstream of during a response 5035-1. 2CV-valve 2CV-5036-2 to a LOCA 5613-2, 2CV-demand 1519-1, 2CV-5101-1, 2CV-4840-2, & 2CV-5077-2 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
F15pIF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 37 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consequcnce Assessment Summary - Succes?fulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects Spatial Effects impact Group Consequence Available ID Event Mitigating Trains Category Category HPSI-C-26 Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI between floor containment valves 2CV-penetration and valve during response to 5015-1, 2CV-2SI-69 a LOCA demand 5038-1, 2CV-5612-1, & 2CV-5017-1 HPSI-C-26A Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet Loss of cne One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI downstream of valve containment valves 2CV-2SI-69 and upstream of during response to 5015-1, 2CV-valve 2CV-5016-2 a LOCA demand 5038-1, 2CV-5612-1, & 2CV-5017-1 HPSI-C-27 Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet loss of one One re.*undant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI between floor containment valves 2C penetration and valve during response to 5055-1, 2l., 2SI-71 a LOCA demand 5057-2, 2CV-1511-1, 2CV-1519-12CV-5037-1 & 2CV- - 5101-1 ABB Combustion Engin ng Nuclear Operations
,, m /m J
ARR 9% WlF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 38 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consent >ence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects SpatialEffects impact Group Avar7able Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trains Category Category HPSI-C-27A Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI downstream of valve containment valves 2CV-2SI-71 and upstream of during response to 5055-1, 2CV-valve 2CV-5056-2 a LOCA demand 5057-2, 2CV-1511-1, 2CV-1519-12CV-5037-1 & 2CV-5101-1 HPSI-C-28 Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI between floor containment valves 2CV-penetration and valve during response to 5075-12CV-2SI-75 a LOCA demand 1037-1, 2CV-1025-1, & 2CV-1038-2 HPSI-C-28A Figure 6 Loss of HPSI train "B" IV Diversion of RWT Spraying orjet Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM occurs due to line break inventory outside impingement of train of HPSI train of HPSI downstream of valve containment valves 2CV-2SI-75 and upstream of during response to 5075-12CV-valve 2CV-5076-2 a LOCA demand 1037-1, 2CV-1025-1, & 2CV-1038-2 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
l 91WEF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 39 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - SuccessfulIsolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects SpatialEffects impact Group Available Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trairs Category Category HPSI-C-29 Figure Loss of HPSI train "A" IV Partialloss of None Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM 12 and hotleg injection RWTinventory HPSI train train of HPSI train "A" occurs during response to a LOCA demand HPSI-C-30 Figure Loss of hotleg injection IV Diversion of hot None loss of one One redundant MEDIUM 12 train A occurs leg injection flow hot leg train of hot leg inside containment injection injection occurs following a train - large LOCA HPSI-C-31 Figure loss of HPSI train "B" IV Partialloss of None Loss of one One redundant MEDIUM 12 and hot leg injection RWTinventory HPSI train train of HPSI train "B" occurs during response to a LOCA demand normalpower operation HPSI-C-32 Figure Loss of hot leg injection IV Diversion of hot None loss of one One redundant MEDIUM 12 train "B" occurs leg injection flow hot leg train of hot leg inside containment injection injection would occurs train following a large LOCA in the event of a LOCA ABB Combustion Engine ng Nuclear Operations
,, cy im k
A i. l n D'1 WlF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 40 of 89 Table 2 (Cont'd) HPSI Consequence Assessment Summary - Successfulisolation Consequence Boundary Description DB Direct Effects SpatialEffects impact Group Avas7sbie Consequence ID Event Mitigating Trakts Category Category HPSI-C-33 Figure 3 Loss of reactor coolant IV Large LOCA None initiati:rg Three ECCS HIGH via ECCS injection path initiating event event and iniection loops to RCS cold leg 2P-32A degradation occurs of multiple systems HPSI-C-34 Figure 2 Loss of reactor coolant IV Large LOCA None initiating Three ECCS HIGH via ECCSinjection path initiating event event and injection loops to RCS coldleg 2P-32B degradation occurs ofmultiple systems HPSI-C-35 Figure S Lost of reactor coolant IV Large LOCA None hoitiating Three ECCS HIGH via ECCSinjection path initiating event event and injection loops to RCS coldleg 2P-32C degradation occurs of multiple systems HPSI-C-36 Figure 4 Loss of reactor coolant IV Large LOCA None Initiating Three ECCS HIGH via ECCSinjection path initiating event event and injection loops to RCS coldleg 2P-32D degradation occurs of multiple systems HPSI-C-37 Rgure Loss of reactor coolant IV Medium LOCA None initiating Allfour ECCS HIGH 12 via HPSI hot leg injection initiating event event and injection loops line occurs loss of a single system ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It Ik
#"tIFIF Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 41 of B9 Table 3 HPSI Consequence, figures and Isometric Drawings ConsequenceID Figure No. Isometric Drawings HPSI-C-01 2 2CCA-21 1-1 CCA 21 2 1 HPSI-C-02 2 2CCB- 13 1 HPSI-C-03 6 2CCB 12-1 1 HPSI-C-03A 6 2CCB- 13-2 1 2CCB-12 1 1 HPSI-C 04 / 2CCB-12 1 1 2CCB 1212 2CCB-70-4-1 2CCB 11-1 1 2CCB 231 1 HPSI-C 04A 7 2CCB 11-1 1 HPSI-C-05 9 2GCB 912 2GCB 91 1 2GCB-9 21 2DCB-1 1 1 2DCB-1 12 2DCB-501 1 1 2DCB 511 1 1 2DCB 511 12 2DCB 511-2-1 2DCB 5113-1 HPSI-C-06 3 2CCA 221 1 2CCA 22 21 HPSI-C 07 3 2CCB 14 21 HPSI-C-OB 4 2CCA 23-1 1 2CCA 2312 2CCA 23-21 HPSI C-09 4 2CCB-15-2 1 HPSI-C-10 S 2CCA 24-1 1 2CCA 24-21 HPSI-C 11 S 2CCB-7 1- 1 HPSI C 12 B 2DCB-3 2 2 2DCB 3-21 2DCB 3-1 1 HPSI-C-13 to 2GCB-9 1 2GCB-9-3-2 2DCB 12 2 2DCB 5021 1 2DCB-511-6-1 2DCB-5115 1 2DCB-511 1 2DCB-3-2-2 HPSI C 14 11 2GCB-9 1 2GCB 9-31 2DCB 51131 2DCB-5114-1 2DCB 500-1-1 2DCB 12-1 2DCB- 1 2-2 2DCB-1 12 HPSI C 15 12 2CCB- 70 1 HPSI C 16 12 2CCB 7151 2CCB-71 1 HPSI-C 17 12 2CCB-71 61 HPSIC1B 3 2CCB 14-3-1 2CCA-22 21 HPSI-C 19 2 2CCB 13-3-1 2CCA-212 1 HPSI-C-20 5 2CCB 7 21 2CCA 24-2-1 HPSI C-21 4 2CCB- 15 1 2CCA 23-2-1 HPSI-C-22 6 2CCB 12-12 HPSi-C-22A 6 2CCB- 14-2 1 2CCB 12-1-2 HPSI-C-23 6 2CCB-12 1-1 HPSI-C-23A 6 2CCB 1 1 2CCB 1- 1 HPSI-C-24 6 2CCB-12 1- 1 2CCB-7161 HPSI-C-24A 6 2CCB- 15 1 2CCB 12-1 1 HPSI C-25 6 2CCB-13 2-1 HPSI-C 25A 6 2DCB 3-2-1 2CCB- 13-2 1 HPSI C-26 6 2DLU 1- 1 HPSI C-26A 6 2CCB- 14 1 2DCB 3-1 1 HPSI-C-27 6 2DCB 1- 1 HPSI-C-27A 6 2CCB 1- 1 2DCB-3 1-1 HPSI-C-2B 6 2DCB-3 2-1 HPSI-C-2BA 6 '2CCB- 15 1 2DCB-3-2 1 O
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations l
AR d'% IF
,Q Calculation No. A PENG cal.C-010, Rev. 00 O Page 42 of 89 Table 3 (Cont'd)
HPSI Consequence, Figures and Isometric Drawings . Consequence ID Figure No. Isometric Drawings HPSI C-29 12 2CCB-70 1 HPSI-C 30 12 2CCA-25-3 1 2CCB 1 1 2CCB 70 21 2CCB-70 3 1 HPSI C-31 12 2DCB-3 2 2 2CCB 715-1 HPSI C-32 12 2CCA 25-3-1 2CCB 71-4-1 2CCB 7131 2CCB-712 1 2CCB 71 1-1 HPSI-C-33 3 2CCA 221-1 HPSI C 34 2 2CCA 21-1-1 HPSI-C 35 5 2CCA 1 1 HPSI C-36 4 2CCA 2312 HPSI C-37 12 2CCA 25-3-1 G ~ V O u) ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
m E Fl O. sf Calculation No. A.PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 S Page 43 of 89 h 2r2s g 7.. ~ L j . . .
. .. /m,. . . . . .
7, ~ 2cves., ! 4 4
. u h . !2$$$e . i
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~
L___f__________________'*"i_________j_+ess__ [ _ *est j FIGURE 2 HPSI FLOWPATH FROM HEADER VALVES TO RCS LOOP 2P328
i 1) lll!liI ll llll 0 9 08 p f o o o tA 2 h 4 s p 0, 4e . m2
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._ .~ - .. - . . -. - _ . - . . . . - . . - .. .. S Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 SSlSU Page 45 of 89
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OUTSOE CONTAINMENT 4 > 98SOE CONTAr8 MENT FIGURE 4 HPSI FLOWPATH FROM HEADER VALVES TO RCS LOOP 2P32D ABB Combustion Engi ring Nuclear Operations
_ . _ . .. . - - . . . . . .. .. -- . -. . . . - . - - . . . . . - . ~ . . - . _ _ . . . . . , -_ . . , . . O , - k Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, 9ev.00 Page 46 of 89 P i
.~ gy '
272C O W SLTJ (Im:emses too eity) u ec - -
/ 2, c.........
2CV.50551 , 1= [
. . 1 r i 32SL13C ,
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, \
- iRCSLOOP
- 2Ps2c 2m N ,,,c2a
. n
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. r l
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.. . . . . . . I I I L .-+-__________________"l""____________""">.___ ! t_ _
__] otrsce conineen 4 > mscecor:rnanea FIGURE 5 HPSI FLOWPATH FROM HEADER VALVES TO RCS LOOP 2P32C ADB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
SOD Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 h Page 47 of 89 y _ 4a. te NLL gj - 470 ; u L2 rn .r m rn r,
,, Bi ;2cv sossi . P2 ,
;2cv soss, Hps e es ; Hesc22 ,wsc224 w9 e et : esc 2s , ;wsc25a
- 3
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p 2ps ju 293o , y y 2S*8 i 25 75 :' _ u. L2 _ u L2 rs .V m rs v,
,, , :v sois 2 m l2cv soss2 HPS HDR 82 l HPSC2s wse C 29A -96#2 $wSC27,A
[HPSC 27 2 9-30 o... . u - V3 V3' . ns, y . 4 72
- u. l" wa r
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,r ' A V, :
V N: Vm t 7, , ;2cv sa351 l2cv.sc751 tece -cma . . . ,
.. c.2 ~..s.c.2. .
= =
h . _.. h r- s, s ,, ' ;9 2" r- -. -
;= 225
== @ _
kW L2 == U _ w is is L2 r N. y3 r N. y3 l2cv-so3s 2 l2cv.so7s 2 y""Sc2' !"Sc2p y*Sc28 '"Sc.2p I i: I nom ramarms I nom enmans I ar a me ; ar a we ; I wmu 1 s. u________l u _ _ _ _=_ _ _ _l FIGURE 6 HPSI FLOWPATHS FROM EL 360'-0"TO HEADER VALVES e e ABB Combustion EngWring Nuclear Operations .
+- _ _ - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
+ %- Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-Oto, Rev. 00 Page 48 of 89
' ~ TOHOLDUPT4fM -
.g, , WALVE 2CV-51011 ,
w: . . l 2PsV stt2 ! W4L Y r
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g u d 70 . g V=vE u-1 h m i2 use, A
.@ TOMPSFOR VALVE 2CV 'IO55, FLOOR PENETRATION AT EL 335'e
$ _ 70 .
~ WMVE 2CV-60751
. . .. . .. . . . . . _ .. ... .... ..- .. .. ..) i l
FLOOR PENETRAT10NS AT EL 3817 FIGURE 7 HPSI HEADER #1 FLOWPATH BETWEEN ELV. 335'-0" & 360'-0* ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations : s
S Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 h lh & Page 49 of 89 i To m m ecnoN vAtvE2cv.s o22 To ese VALVE 2CV s0192 9 _ mea vAtvEacv-sassa 2cv sto*2 To w s a VALVE 2CV-905&2 FLOOR PENETRATION AT EL 33T4" To ws e
, vAtvE 2cv. sors 2 s
~
ms-c.52*esa 1 , l FLOOR PENETRADONS ! AT EL Sotr FIGURE 8 HPSI HEADER #2 FLOWPATH BETWEEN ELV. 335'-0" & 360'-(r* e ABB Combustion Eng6i ering Nuclear Operations e .
O S (3 e C Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, hev. 00 O SSUU Page 50 or89 vo e - ..
~ ~
i t m ,,. V 7 n rioon wros NM .T EL 33F# o . V
, =
N m =
=::," N,,,. =
R. --
/_ am o
M 2BSS3
. . . .~~..... . . . . .
e oorto n,.emro. FIGURE 9 HPSI PUMP 2P89A SUCTION & DISCHARGE FLOWPATHS i ABB Combust;on Engineering Nuclear Operations 1
A R F1 t - + Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 S Page 51 of 89 TO HP9 PUtdP FROM HPS PURAP 2P99C gppgg ii FOAMEO s200SaDe9 ma ,, .. -
-, l rsus "7 rtoonPrurrmanom 2 s 95 AT EL 337#
f I Y rnou nwr M NE p\...L ; ( i sj . j 2cv e z ]:. 2sre : 2s23e i r 2ssse .
. n2 r onourro l MdETunON t s20Dr&4 FIGURE 10 HPSI PUMP 2P898 SUCTION & DISCHARGE FLOWPATHS
i S f] I == l Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, R&. 00 Page 52 of 89
- m. ..
..b N. . . . . - . . . . $ b... M --
i f I
- = [Nj r
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/_ mne -
u
] L me==
l 7])3 e 7 m/) -m n y . n s. , , 29S$3 2BSSa 2CV-S,77-1 m= FIGURE 11 HPSI PUMP 2P89C SUCTION & DISCHARGE FLOWPATHS ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
k , Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 r S&h Page 53 of 89 l NPSC,5 e
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gl N i I I I iro soc I : = [ IUNE I
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') N N-NHX f/ 2,2m 26 * .
g _
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I i nom AT EL avons ,, j ( , i i l HPSC17 g i i g i upar I
-y- g____a l J k'" l i
i I unsw I l____________ FrGURE 12 HOT LEG INJECTION FLOWPATHS (ABOVE EL 360'-0")
A i i Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Aev. 00 Page 54L of 89
- 5. 0 DEGRADATION MECHANISMS EVALUA TION The purpose of this section is tea identify the degradation mechanisms that can be present in the piping within the selected syste:n boundaries for the ANO-2 HPSl, as described in Section 3.2 of this report. The ccnditions considered in this evaluation are: design characteristics, fabrication practices, operating conditions, and service experience. The degradation mechanisms to be identified (Reference 9.1) are:
- ThennalFatigue (TF)
Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS) Therma! Transients (TT)
- Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)
- Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)
External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)
- Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
- Localized Corrosion (LC)
Microbiologically influenced Corrosion (MIC) ^
- Pitting (PIT)
- Crevice Corrosion (CC)
- Flow Sensitive (FS)
Erosion-Cavitation (E-C) (Q - Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) V In performing this evaluation, some basic inputs were used. These inpats are discussed in Section S.3. The criteria andjustifications are providedin Section 5.2. In accordance with Reference 9.1, degradation mechanisms are organized into three categories: "Large Leak",
*Small Leak", and 'None".
The rssuits indicate that two degradation mechanisms are potentially present: thermal fatigue and intergranular stress corrosion cracking. Using ISIS (Reference 9.2), three damage groups (DM groups) were identified as HPSI-T,1, HPSI T, and HPSIN and are defined in Table 4 below. These DM groups results in two failure potential categories:
"Small Leak" and "None". The FMECA - Degradatkn Mechanisms for each segment and each element are presented in Appendix B.
Table 4 Damage Groups Damaee Damee Mechsnisme FeMure Group ThermalFatigue Strens Corrosion Cracking Lace &z5 Corrosion Row sennitke Potential ao TAscs TT ICsCC TGsCC ECsCC PWSCC MC P!T CC EC Cateeory l FAC HPSI-T,1 Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No Smell Leak HPSI-T Yes No No No No No No No No No No Sman Leek HPSIN Ne No No No No No No No No No No None O U ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
N lI !I MIFIF l Calculation No. A+ENG-CALC 010 Rev. 00 Page SS of 89 5.1 DAMAGE GROUPS 5.1.1 OM GROUP: HPSI T,1 < The HPSI-T,1 damarje group is considered subject to thermal fatigue due to the potential for thermal stratification (TASCS) and susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). It includes the welds in the horizontalsections of cold leg injection lines 2CCA 21 12' and 2CCA 23-12', upstream of the first check valve (2SI-158 and 2SI 150) to a c.isange in line orientction (vertical section up), and those welds in the portions of the horizontal sections of cold leg injection lines 2CCA 2212" and 2CCA 24-12", upstream of the first check valve (2SI15A and 2SI 1bC) to the second upstream elbow. Also included is one weld each, on lines 2CCA 23-8" and 2CCA 24-8', where these lines tee into lines 2CCA 23-12' and 2CCA 24-12", respectively (See Figures 2 through 5). 5.1.2 DM GROUP: HPStT The HPSI-T damage group is considered subject to thermal fatigue due to the potential for thermal stratificaticn (TASCS). It includes those welds in the portions of the horizontalsections of coldleg injection lines 2CCA 22-12"and 2CCA 24-12", upstream of the second elbow located upstream of the first check valve (2SI 15A and 2SI 15C) to a change in line orientation (vertical section up), and the welds in the sections downstream of the first check valve (2SI-15A, 2SI 158, 2SI-15C, and 2SI 15D) on each of the four cold leg injection flow paths up to the cold leg nozzle, and the welds in hot leg injection line 2CCA 25-3' from manual valves 2SI-29A and 2SI-29B to the shutdown cooling drop line (See Figures 2 through 5 and 12). 5.1.3 DM GROUP: HPSI-N The HPSI-N damage group is not considered susceptible to any damage niechbnism, and includes the er> tire High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI) system as defined in Section 3.2, with the exception of those welds in sections of the cold leg injection lines and the hot leg injection line which have been identified as being considered subject to thermal fatigue and susceptible to IGSCC as described above (See Figures 2 through 12). S.2 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND IDENTIFICA TION The degradation mechanisms and criteria assessed are presented in Table 5. O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ARR M IDIF (3 Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 010. Rev. 00 Page 56 of 89 Tabie 3 Degradation Mechanism Criteria andSusceptible Regions D ada on g g (,;,,,;, 3,,,,p,;;y, g,g;,m TF TASCS -nps > 1 inch, and nonles, branch pipe
-pipe segment has a slope < 43*from hori:ontal(includes elbow or connections, safe ends, see into a verticalpipe), and welds, heat afected
-potential existsfor lowpow in a pipe section connected to a :ones (IL47,), base compoMnt allowing mixing ofhot and coldpuids, or metal, and regions of potential existsfor leakagepowpast a valve (i.e., in-leakage, out. stress concentration leakage, cross-leakage) allowing mixing ofhot and coldpuids, or potential existsfor convection heating in dead-endedpipe ssctions connected to a source ofhotpuid, or l potential existsfor two phase (steam / water) pow, or potential existsfor turbulentpenetration in branch pipe connected to header piping containing htpuid with high turbulentpow, and
-calculated or measured AT > 30*F, and
-Richardson number > 4.0 TT -operating temperature > 270*Ffor stainless steel, or operating temperature > 220*Ffor carbon steel, and p -potentialfor relatively rapid temperature changes including coldpuid injection into hot pipe segment, or hotpuidinjection into coldpipe segment, and AT > 200*Ffor stainless steel, or AT > 130*Ffor carbon steel, or AT > ATallowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
SCC IGSCC -eval::ated in accordance with existing plant 1GSCCprogram per austenitic stainless steel (BliR) NRC Generic Letter 88-01 welds andIL4Z IGSCC -operating temperature > 200*F, and (PilR) -susceptible material (carbon content 2 0.033%), and
-tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and
-oxygen or oxidi: sng species are present OR
-operating temperature < 200*F the attributes above apply, and
-initiating contaminavs (e.g., thiosulfate,puoride, chloride) are also required to be present TGSCC -operating temperature > 130*F, and austenitic stainten steel
-tensile stress (includsng residual stress) is present, and base metal, welds, and
-halides (e.g., fluoride, chloride) are present, or IL4Z caustic (NaOll)is present, and
-oxygen or oxidi:ing species are present (only required to be present in conjunction w/ halides, not required w/ caustic) n V
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A ItIt M By F Calculation No. A PENG CALC-010, Rev. 00
'Page 57 of 89 Table 3 (cont'd)
Degradation Mechanism Criteria and Susceptible Regions g, CHteria Susceptible Regions SCC ECSCC -operating temperature > 130*F and austenitic stainless steel
-tensile stress ispresent, and base metal, welds, and
-an outside piping surface is withinfive diameters ofa probable flAZ leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or an outside piping surface is exposed to wettingfrom chloride bearing environments (e.g., seawater, brackish water, brine)
PHNCC -piping material is inconel (Alloy 600), and no::les, welds, and HAZ
-exposed to primary water at T > 620*F, and without stress relief
-the material is mill-annealed and cold worked, or cold worked and welded without stress relief LC MIC -operating temperature < 150*F, and fittings, welds, llAZ,
-low or intermittentpow, and base metal, dissimilar
-pH < 10. and metaljoints (e.g., welds,
-presence / intrusion oforganic material (e.g., raw water system), or fanges), and regions containing crevices water source is not treated w/ biocides (e g., refueling water tank)
PIT -potential existsfor lowpow, and
-omgen or oxidt:ing species are present, and
-initiating contaminants (e.g., fuoride, chloride) are present CC -crevice condition extsts (e.g., thermal sleeves), and
-operating temperature > 130*F, and
-omgen or oxidi:ing species are present FS E-C -operating temperature < 250*F, and fittings, welds. HAZ, and
-pow present > 100 hisyr, and base metal
-velocin' > 30p's, and
-(Ps - P,) / AP < $
FAC -evaluatedin accordance with existingplant FACprogram perplant FACprogram O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ARR A%IF El!P Calculation No. A PENG CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 58 of 89 5.2.1 Thermal fatigue (TF) Thermal fatigue is a mcchanism caused by attemating stresses due to thermal cycling of a component which results in accumulated fatigue usage and can lead to crack initiation and growth. 5.2.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS) The piping sections in the HPSI-Tal and HPSI-T damage groups, as defined in Section 5.1, are consioered subject to thermal stratification, in the two injection lines with longer horizontalsections upstream of the first check valves (2SI-ISA and 2SI-Ib'C), thermocouple data revealed ATs between 50*F and 60*F (Reference 9.7) due to natural convection which exceeds the allowable AT criteria of 50*F. Although thermocouple data revealed ATs less than the 50*F allowable for the two injection lines with shorter horizontal sections upstream of the first check voNes (2S1-158 and 2SI-ISD), these lines are + 'so considered subject to thermal stratification due to the potential for RCS backleakage. It should be noted, however, that the potential for thermal stratification induced degradation due to backleakage is considered remote. Leakage beyond the 2SI 15 check valves would be detected by a leakage indicator located in the injection legs bc1 ween the first and second isolation check valves. If leakage were to occur, the local pressure between these valves would increase. If the pressure indicated on the leakage indicator is greater than 750 psig, an annunciator in the control room alerts the operator ofleakage. The operator is
- p) then directed by procedure to open a drain line isolation valve but is limited to u opening the valve not more than twice for a 10-second duration each time. This is to prevent exceeding the drain line design temperature of 140*F but also provides a secondary benefit of reducing the potential for thermal stratification by limiting the amount of hot RCS fluid drawn through the header piping. Under normal pl ant operating conditions these four piping sections contain essentially stagnant water snd operate at a temperature of IS0*F (Reference 9.5) and are connected to piping containing hot water at close to RCS cold leg temperature (i.e., SS3*F). The four cont'ecting piping sections (i.e., downstream of the check valves to the cold leg injection nozzles) are not directly subjected to thermal stratification. Indirectly however, the effects of the thermalstratification upstream of the check valves could impact these piping sociions with respect to the magnitude of global bending stresses they are subjected to. Consequently, the potential for failure is considered to exist.
5.2.1.2 Thermal Transients (TT) The potential for thermal transients was identified for the four injection lines downstream of the check valves to the coldleg injection nozzles during normalplant cooldown, with an initial temperature of 350*F and a final temperature of 60*F (Reference 9.4, Figure 3). However, a review of the plant cooldown procedure (Reference 9.17) revealed that the RCS temperature is less than 245*F before shutdown cooling is placed in service. Consequently, no piping segments were identified where a potential exists for relatively rapid temperature changes that would exceed the AT allowable of 200*F. O) e v ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations l
__ ~ ARR 7%IFIF Calculation No. A PENG CAL.C-010, Rev. 00 Page 59 of 89 S.2.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) The electrochemical reaction caused by a corrosive or oxygenated media within a piping system can lesd to cracking when combined with other factors such as a susceptible material, temperature, and stress. Thi.s mechanism has several forms with varying attributes including intergranular stress corrorlon cracking, transgranular stress corrosion cracking, external chloride stress corrosion cracking, and primary water stress corroshin cracking. 5.2.2.1/ntergranular Stress Corrosion Cra: king (IGSCC) The piping sections in the HPSI-T,I damage group, as defined in Section S.1, are subjected to teinperatures in excesa of the IGSCC temperature threshold of 200*F (convection heating) and potentially exposed to oxygenated water from the RWT during SITinventory addition evolutions. Consequently, these piping sections are considered susceptible to IGSCC. A portion of the hot leg injection piping (Class 1 section) is also subjected to temperatures in excess of 200*F (300*F), however, this piping is not exposed to oxygen or oxidizing species (RCS backpressure maintains isolation valves closed preventing oxygenated RWT water supply intrusion) and is therefore not considered susceptible to IGSCC. The remainder of the system, which operates at less than 200*F (100*F or 150*F), is also not considered susceptible to IGSCC since plant chemistry controls ensure that initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride, chloride) levels are negligible. S.2.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC) Plant chemistry controls ensure that the levels of halides or caustics present in the system are maintained extremely low and this piping is therefore not considered susceptible to TGSCC. S.2.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC) ANO-2 complies with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.36 for non-metallic thermalinsulation and consequently the potential for ECSCC to occur does not exist. 5.2.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) PWSCC is not applicable as a potential damage mechanism for the HPSI system due to the fact that there is no inconel (Alloy 600) present in the system (Reference 9.4) and the range of operating temperatures is far below the PWSCC required tamperature threshold of 620*F (Reference 9.5). O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It It MIFIf - In\ Calculation No. A PENG CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 60 of 89 5,2.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) In addition to SCC, other phenomena can produce localized degradation in piping components. These phenomens typicaHy require oxygen or ox!dizing environments and are often associated with low flow or " hideout" regions, such as exists beneath corrosion products or in crevices. This mechanism includes microbiologicaHy influenced corrosion, pitting, and crevice corrosion. 5.2.3.1MicrobiologicaHy influenced Corrosion (MIC) The portions of this system that operate at a temperature of less than 150*F are considered potentiaHy susceptible to MIC. The RWT is a potential source of microbes since biological controls (i.e., biocides) are not utilized and the temperature range is appropriate for MIC to exist. MIC has not, however, ever been observed to exist in the HPSI system at ANO-2. On occasions when the system has been opened for maintenance (e.g., valve disassembly), no evidence of MIC has been discovered. Also, prior volumetric examinations of this system have not revealed the presence of any degradation attributable to MIC attack. Furthermore, from an overan industry standpoint, MIC has not historically been a source of degradation in HPSI systems. p Consequently, although the system conditions fail to preclude MIC attack, the potentialis considered low on the basis of the lack of ANO-2 or industry historical t}
% evidence, and this mechanism is therefore not considered cctive for the HPSI system.
5.2.3.2 Pitting (PIT) The essentiaHy stagnant flow conditions and the oxygenated water supply from the RWTprovide an environment for pitting to occur, however, the absence ofinitiating contar'inants (e.g., fluoride, chloride) in the system indicate the likelihood is extremely low. AdditionaHy, similar to the observations made in the MIC assessment above, pitting has t'ot historically been a source of degradation in the HPSI system for ANO.2 or in the industry. Consequently, the potential for pitting attack is considered low due to both the absence ofinitiating contaminants in the system and the lack of ANO-2 or industry historical evide,we had therefore this mechanism is not considered active for the HPSI system. V ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It R MIDIF Calculation No. A PENG CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 61 of 89 5.2.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC) Crevice corrosion is not applicable due to the fact that there are no crevice regions included within the boundaries of the HPSI system evaluation. 'The thermal r' eves in the cold leg injection nozzles are not considered as part of the HPSI bov.. sy. They are evaluated as part of the RCS system. 5.2.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) When a high fluid velocity is combined with various other requisite factors it can result in the erosion and/or corrosion of a piping materialleading to a reduction in wall thickness. Mechanisms that are flow sensitive, and can create this form of degradation include erosion-cavitation and flow accelerated corrosion. 5.2.4.1 Erosion-Cavitation (E C) There are no regions dowm:tream (within 5 diameters) of pressure reducing orifices or valves in the HPSI system that experience flow greater than 100 hrs /yr or fluid velocities greater than 30 ft/sec (References 9.4, 9.5, and 9.16). Consequently, this system is not considered susceptible to E-C. 5.2.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) The HPSI system is comprised entirely of austenitic stainless steelpiping (Reference
- 9. 4). Since FAC is a phenomenon that only affects carbon steel piping, the HPSI system is not susceptible to this degradation mechanism (Reference 9.12).
5.2. 5 Vibration Fatigue Vibration fatigue is not specifically made part of the EPRI risk-informed ISI process. Most documented vibrational fatigue failures in power plants piping indicate that they are restricted to socket welds in small bore pipirg. Most of the vibrational fatigue damage occurs in the initiation phase and crack propagation proceeds St a rapid rate once a crack forms. As such, this mechanism does not lend itself to typicalperiodic inservice examinations (i.e., volumetric, surface, etc.) as a means of managing this degradation mechanism. Management of vibretional fatigue should be performed under an entirely separate program taking guidance from the EPRI fatigue Management Handbook (Reference 9.10). If a vibration problem is discovered, the.t Lorrective actions must be taken to either remove the vibration source or reduce the vibration levels to ensure future component operability. Frequent system walkdowns, leakage monitoring systems, and current ASME Section XI system leak test requirements are some of the practical measures to address this issue. Because these measures are employed either singly or in combination for most plant systems it is not necessary to use a risk-info;medinspection selection process for vibration fatigue. 9 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It It MIFBy o q} Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 62 of 89 S.3 BASIC DA TA 5.3.1 Under normal plant operating conditions, the HPSI system, as defined by the boundaries in Section 3.2, operates at temperature of 100* F or 150*F with the exception of hot leg injection with an operating temperature of 300*F (Reference 9.5), and flow is present less than 100 hrs /yr (Iow flow or stagnant flow conditions exist). 5.3.2 Ove to the cyclic nature of thermal transients, only those transients which occur during the initiating events Categories I and ll as described in Reference 9.1, Table 3.1 are considered in the evaluation of degradation mechanisms due to thermal fatigue. Cetegory I consists of those events which occur during routine operation, e.g., startup, shutdown, standby, refueling. Category ll consists of those events which have anticipated operational occurrence, e.g., reactor trip, turbine trip, partial loss of feedwater. Therefore, the transients to be evaluated are those transients , which occur under normal operating and upset conditions. s ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB ('
'~
Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00
'Page 63 of 89 6.0 SERVICE HISTORY AND SUSCEPTlitillTY REVIEW An exhaustive review was conducted from mid '96 to Sprir.g '97 of databases (plant and industry) and station documents to characterite ANO-2's operating experience with respect to piping pressure boundary degradation. The results of this review are provided in a condensed form in Table 6 for the High Pressure Safety injection System.
Although several pre commercial references are included for completeness, the timeframe for identifying items applicable to this effort was focused on post commercial operation (Commercial Operation date of March 26,1980). This was done to avoid inclusion ofiter.,s primarily associated with construction oeficiencies as opposed to inservice degradation. The following databases and other sources were queried to accomplish this review: Station Informatlon Management System (SIMS) The SIMS database was queried for all ANO 2 job ordets on Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components which involved corrective maintenance (CM) or modifications (MOO). Additionally, a separate query was performed in order to capture certain non Code, 0 component failures. This query was for non Code 0 and SR (safety related) \ components. This database contains information from approximately 1985 to the present. t p) - Condition Report (CR) Ostabase G The CR database was queried for arv pipe leak / rupture events or other conditions associated with identified damage mechanisms at ANO 2. The keywords searched under were; pipe, piping, line, water hammer, Id, leaking and leakage. CR's are written on 0, F or S equipment failures or other conditions potentially adverse to safety. This database contains information from 1988 to the present. Ucensing Research System (LRS) The LRS database was queried using a keyword search specific to ANO 2. The keywords searched under were: thermal cycling, ther nal stratificatic.1, thermal fatigue, defect, flaw, indication, fatigue, ca.*itation and corrosion. This search captured all communication between ANO and th r NRC, both plant specific and generic industry, associated with these topics. Hvwever, for the purpose of this review, only communication from ANO to the NRC wat reviewed. Additionally, this search system was used to query Industry Events Analysis files (captures INPO documentri for ANO 2 events or conditions relevant to this review. The keywords searched under for this portion of the query were: pipe & stratification, thermal & fatigue, thermal & transient, pipe & leak, vibration & fatigue andpipe & rupture. ' Furry" search logic was employed to reduce the possibility of failing to identify a pertinent document. This database contains information from prior to commercial ope:ation to the present for ANO 2. t (3 : V ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG. CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 64 of 89
- Nuclear Plent ReliabHity Data System (NPRDS)
NPRDS was queried for ANO 2 entries for pipe failures. The keyword searched under was: pipe. This database contains information from 1991 to the present. ANO.2 ISI Program Records The ISI program findings were compiled and reviewed for all outage and non outage inservice inspections conducted at ANO 2 since commercial operation. 4 ControlRoom Station tog The station log was utilized as a source of information for recent operational events. The log exists in electronic format from early 1994 to the present and has search capabilities which allowed a review for events of interest. The keywords searched under were: water hommer, leak and leakage.
- System Upper levelDocument (ULD)
The ULO was reviewed as a source for historical perspective of issues related to the system andidentification of modifications made to the system or changes to operational procedures to address those issues (e.g., water hommer, corrosion or vibrational fatigue). Other Station Documents This source of information consists of such documents as the SAR, Technical Specifications, operationalprocedures and the damage mechanism analysis done as part of this effort. O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
O
\
n n (v}
.t V /d 7% WW CalCuiation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 65 of 89 Tabhr 6
, Smice History and Suscep6bMty Review - IKgh Pressswe Safety insecdotr Systerrr source Dms /Caabanee Renewed for C- . behememe P r :_ 2 , Cenodored EvWence of Nierericar Nine Prosesee ------ S. , Themser Feoyue Stieee Corroesee CrocAmy Lecefred Corressar, New Senerefwo neseAnvecef wooer orsser Depredeoen C_.-a et ANO-2 EMCS TT #CSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC ANC MT CC E-C FAC W Nemmer h enge Sterion hufoormten Menegem:mt CWme None None None %ne None %ne None None None Mne %cee None %ne %ne f Coinstkwt AsportDete6ese %ne Wne '
None None None None None None None None Wne Nene None (1) < Ucarrsmg Research Srstem PE(23, None %ne None %ne None None fWone None None %ne %ne Wne None Nucleer Mont ReSebiGry Date System %ne Wne None None None %ne None None %ne None None None None &ne ANO'2 ASTMogram Reesds None None None None %ne None None Wne %ne None %ne None %ne (1h ' ControlRoom Sterion Log None *4one None None %ne None None None %ne None Hone None None None , System (%per levelDocusents %ne %ne None None None Nene None None %ne None None None None None i Other Station Oc,cs , fPt38 %ne ~,. P(38 %ne None None None Neree None None None Nrme %ne %ne Lecend: P (Procuroort - TNe category includes edennfication of postuteted demoge enecheroeme end foodmge through Itnowwledge of operstmg parameters, water A. 4i,. etc. No physsemi evidence of pressure boundery degradetion currentfy emete. TNe category includes postuisted mecheroeme ident fied es a result of the review PE (Plant Event) - Tree category includes idenufication of postulated demoge ---M - and loedmgo es a result of an eboerved or potennel plant ewerat (e.g,, water hommert. % phyacel evidence of prescuee boundary degradetson currentty eeste. PD (Physical Demegel - TNe category includes identifiestion of observed pressure boundary degradetion es evidenced by creciting prtung, westege. tiennmg. physocei deformenon or other deterioretion. P9F- (Pressure Boundary Failueel - TNe category incAudes idenafiestion of through-wen flows resurtmg from the effects of en idenor.ed damage mecheroom. Notes:
- 1. Reference CR 2-924265 and ISI program records. Muttiple surface indications have been identified over time in the HPSI System. These k.1 A weee eether removed or evaluered and dere mmed to be Code ecceptable. None of these ind cations were ettnbuted to en ineenace degredation mecheroom and are believed to have been = w.h i aduced li.e febacetion or other origint.
- 2. Reference NRC BuRetm 8848 wNeh h.u..;ed the potentuel for thermal steetificenon in the HPSI System.
- 3. Reference Sectron 5 of tNo document wNeh identifies the poteness for TASC3 and IGSCC in opeofic portrone of the HPSI System.
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB ( Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 66 of 89
- 7. 0 MISK EVALUA TION The first step in the risk evaluation is the defining of the risk segments. Risk segments consist of continuous runs of piping that, if failed, have the same consequences (i.e.,
consequence segments), and are exposed to the same degradation mechanisms (i.e., damage groups). For the HPSI system, the risk segments were further subdivided into piping of the same nominal pipe diameter. This was done to facilitate the use of an algorithm to compute failure probability to enable an assessment to be performed of the effectiveness of the risk Informed developed program as compared to the existing Code program. The next step in the risk evaluation is the determination of the segment risk categories. This is accomplished by combining the consequence and damage mechanism categories to produce a risk category for each segment. Application of the above criteria results in the formstlon of 119 risk segments of which 5 are high risk trisk category 2),10 are medium risk (2 are risk category 4 and 8 are risk category 6) and 104 are low risk (103 are risk category 6 and 1 is risk category 7). The risk segments are Identifiedin Table 7. t V ( ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
\
MWW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 67 of 89 Table 7 Risk segment Mentification Msk Segment 10 Consequence 10 Demoge Group 10 Msk Repon Pipeg Line Nos. Msk Segment Start P6 int Msk t,.. ..: End Pbint Category fanTure P6tentist Msk Category isometric Drawiss HPS!RD1-12-1 HPSI CD1 HPS*N low 2CC&-21 12* 111 Dowrwarem of 251168 111 lbseeem eide of 12* Medkam None 6 obow - hem 17 1112CCA-21-1 Sh.1 HPSIR O1-12-2 HPSI CD1 HPSI T,1 Modum 2CCA-21-12" (1) lbseeem side of 12* (1) L&seeem of 2S*158 Med%m S meRtesh ebow - hem 17 5 (1) 2CC4 21 1 Sh.1 HPSIR 01-8 HPS!CO1 HPSIN low 2CCA-214~ ill 8*a 6* Reducer- kom 29 (11 12*s 8~ Tee - kom 21 Modum None 6 it! 2CCA-21-2 A 1 HPSI R Of-6-1 HPS!CD1 HPS!N Low 2CCA-216* (11 Dowrweeem of 2SF 148 til 8*s 6* Reducer - hem 29 Me6um None 6 (1) 2CC4-21-2 Sh.1 HPSI R Q1-6-2 HPSIC Of HPSIN low 2CCA-214* (116*a 3~ Reducer- kom 30 ill 8~s 6* Tee - hem 28 Medum None 6 fil 2CCA-21-2 Stt 1 HPSI R-O1-3 HPSIC-Of HPS!N low 2CC4-21-3~ fil Ce .- ;--.. of 251-138 til 6*a 3* Reducer- hem 30 Med%m None 6 ill 2CCA-21-2 Sh.1 HPSIRD2-3 HPSI CD2 HPSIN low 2CCB- 13-3~ (11 Downserem of 3*s 2~ (1) Pmetretion 2P-11 Medium None Redbcor - hem 36 6 ill 2CCB-13 2 Sh. I gg; g; _a ,_ _, ,g 3., g. Reducer- kom 37 HPSIRD2-2-1 HPSICD2 HPSIN low 2CCB- 13 2" ill C-. a--.. of 2CV-6035- its lkstroen.of 3*a 2* Mediwn None 6 ill 2CCB-132 Sh.1
~
HPSIRD2-2 2 HPSI-CD2 HPSIN Low 2CCB-13 2* a.. .. of 2CV-6036-ill C ill lbseenm of 3*a 2* Modum None 6 til 2CCB-12-2 Sh.1 HPSIR-O3-3 HPSIC-O3 HPSIN low 2CCB 12-3* Lil floor Govenon Q 360'O* ill lyseeem of 3"s 2*
~
Medium None 6 ill 2CCB 12-1 StL 1 HPSIR-O3-2 HPSIC-03 HPSI-N Low 2CCB-12-2* (11C,. a.-..of3*s2* (1) L&seeem of 2 SIT 2
~
Medum None 6 ill 2CCB-12-1 Sh.1 h ABB Combustion Engh:ing Nuclear Operations
n
\_) (O~l (aO E U D'1 W W
. Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010 Rev. 00 Page 68 Of 8,9 TsNe 7 Risk Segment iden66Cs6on (Cont'd] Msk SegmentID Consequence ID Damage Group 10 Msk Region P&nny Line Nos. Msk Segment Start IWnt Msk Segment ErentP> int Category FeMure Futentini MsA Category isometric Drawings HPSIR O3A-2 HPSI CD3A HPSIN low 2CCB-12 2* ill Dewswtroom of 2M72 (11 L>steem of 2* s %
- y 2CCS 13-2* Red lwcmg Conm o ing - kom
' 148 g, g3 g (21 Lystream o!2CVSO351 HPSIR D4 1 HPSI C 04 HPSIN Low 2DCB 1-4~ (1) Roor Devenon Q 335'O* til t.&stroom of 2912 Medium None 6 til 2CCB 12-1 Sht 2 HPSIRD442 HPSI C 04 HPSIN Low 2CCB 124' (21 Downstroom of 2912 til 4*x 3*Redkocer - kam 100 Medium None 6 (112CCB 12-1 S!L 1
~
(2) 2CCB 12-1 SPL 2 HPSIR -O4-3-1 HPSI C-04 HPSIN Low 2CCB- 12-3* (114~s 4's 3* Tee - kom 97 ill Roar Beverion Q 360~ O* Medium None 6 til 2CCB-12-1 S!L 2 HPSIR 04-3-2 HPSF CD4 HPSIN Low 2CCB- 12-3* ill 4~s 4*s 3* Tee - kom 98 (11 Mor Bevetion Q 360'C* Medium None 6 (112Ct.3-12-1 Sta.1 HPSIRD4-3-3 HPSICO4 HPSIN Low 2CCB- 12-3* Ill 4*s 3*Rodocer- kom 100 ill %er Bevetaan Q 360'O' Mediner &ne 6 ill 2CCS12-1 S!L 1 HPSIR-O4-34 HPSIC-O4 HPSIN Low 2CCB- 12-3* (114~s 3* Reducer- kom 101 (11 Roar Beveson Q 360'C* Medium None 6 til 2CCS12-1 S!L 1 HPSTRD4-3 6 HPSI CD4 HPSIN Low 2CCB-70'3* fil 4*z d*s 3* Tes - kom 42 til thw Beverion Q 360~ O* Medkmr None 6 ill 2CCS70L4 SPL 1 HPSIR O4-2 HPSF-C-04 HPSIN Low 2CCS 11-2* (11 Rber Reed Peneenaion fil 4*a 2*Secnolet - kom Medium None 6 til 2CCB 11-1 SIL 1 HPSI-RD4-1 % HPSFC-O4 HPSIN Low 2CCS23-1 %
- til 1%
- Han Conting - kom (11 '%stroom of 2PSV$112 Medam, None '*'
6 ill 2CCs 231 Sn 1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
MWW CalculatiOrr NO Ari'G-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 69 of 89 Table 7 Risk Segrnerrt identi6cs6 ort (Cont'd! Msk Segmerrt ID Consequence ID Demoge Group 10 Msk Regiors Mping Line Nos- Msk Segment Start Pulret Msk Segment End96 int Category TanTure P&tentini Msk Category ' isoneevic Drawings HPSIR 04A-2 HPT.JCD4A HPSIN Low 2CCB11-2* (11 Desernstreerre of 2Si24 (11 C>seems of 2*s %
- Redwcurg basert - ltem 43 MedGum None 6 (112CC& t1-1 StL 1 ggy y p;y,4 20554090 HPSIR-OS-S HPSICDS HPSIN Low 2GCB 9 3* ill Dewmst-~~~s of 25i 7A (19 Upsweem of 8*s 4~
Reducer - kom 37 Medium None 6 (112GCB S-1 Sit 1 g;9 ym g g., g. (212GCB 91 Sit 2 m . g,,,, 3g i 12GCB 9-2 A 1 g3, c,c,,,,4 p_ ,_ ;,, L,-, HPSIROS 6 HPSICOS HPSIN low 2GCB S 6* (11 Dommstream of 8*x 6* (112PRSA Suctner Reducer - kom 36 Madraw None 6 til 2GCB S 1 SfL 2 HPSIR 054 1 HPS!C05 HPSIN Law 2DCS
- 4* (19 Desctaarpe of 2PBSA (1) Gmured Peneverion Q floor Me6an None 6 til 2DCB-1 1 StL 1 (2) 2DCB 1-1 SPL 2 HPSIRD542 HPSFCOS HPSIN low 2GCB S-4* ill C,. -~ a.a,; of 8*x 4~ (114* Cap - kom 10~
~
Medrwrr None 6 ill2GCB9-1Stt1 HPSIRDS-2 HPSIC 05 HPS!N low 2D CB $O1-2* (11 Rockc trench i ..n%.- (19 D>stroom of 2*x %
- 2DCB- 511-2* L-. :.-- .; of 2P89A Redwemy kxsert - kom 25 (51 Grouted Penetreener til Upstreem ot2*s t' (112DCB 501-1 StL 1 g _ g, g4 III I" O' # #
ill C>seeem er 2CV-5126-1 (312DC8 511-1 StL 2 gg, y_ g g., y. 14I 2C CB $11-2 S!L 1 p y,,, . g, y, (512DCB511-3S!L1 m g g., y. Reducrig Ansert - kerrr 12 (31 U>seeem of 285-53 141 lbstroom of 2*s 1* Reducirag kasert- kom 12 (41 Ubsteem of 2*s 1* Redscmg basert - kom t 1 ABB Combustion Engi ring Nuclear Operations
f'm f n ( ) ( ( v % u k HWW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page 70Of 89 Tabk 7 Risk Segenerrt Iderr66Cs6ers (Cont'd! Msk Segment ID ConsequenceID Demone Group (D Msk Region Premy Lhse Nos. Msk Seynent Start Pbint Msk Segment EndPbint Category FeMure Futentini Msk Category isometnc Drawneys HPSI RD6- 12-1 HPSI C D6 HPS!N Lew 2CCA-22-12* til Downukeen of 2SF16A ill theweem skfe of 12* Mediurrr None 6 til 2CCA-22-1 Stt 1
~
HPSI R 06-12-2 HPSI CD6 HPSI T Medium 2CCS-22-12* (11 L&sewerrr skfe of 12* (11 (&skeem skse of 12* Medium ebow - kom 17 ebow - kom 15 SmeR Leet 5 (1) 2CCA 22-1 Stt 1 HPSI RM-12-3 HPSI CD6 HPSI T) Medium 2CCA-22-12* Lil L>sewom skfe of 12' til W of 2SF15A
"~
Mediser SmeWLeek 5 til 2CCA-22-1 Sh.1 HPSTR D6-8 HPSTCD6 HPSIN Low 2CCA-22 3* 1118~s 6* Reducer - kom 17 til 12*s 8* Tee - Stem 19 Medium None 6 til 2CCA 224' Str.1 HPSTR M 4-1 HPSI CD6 HPSI N Low 2CCA-224* (19 Dowensveem of 2531 AA (118*s 6* Peducer - kom 17 Medium None 6 til 2CCA-22 2 S!L 1 HPSIR-O64-2 HPSI CD6 HPSIN Low 2CCA-224* (116*s 3* Reducer- Mem 18 (1) 8*s 6* Tee - kom 16 Medium None 6 (112CCA 22 2 Sit 1 HPSTRD6-3 HPSICD6 HPSIN Low 2CCA 22-3* 111 C-- .- a --.. of 25313A (116*s 3* Redweer - Mem 18 Mecrner None 6 til 2CCA-22-2 Sit 1 HP51-RD7-3 HPSICD7 HPSIN low 2CCB143* (11 C-.~:. --. of 3*s 2* (1) L., ^. .:., .- 2P-5 Medinerr None Reducer - kom 25 6 ill 2CCB to2 Sh.1 gy, g,_; _ g y, g. Reducer - Rom 36 HPSTRD7-2-1 HPSTC-O7 HPSI N Low 2CC5142* (11 Dowrwweem of 2CV-6015- til theweem of 3*s 2* Medium None 6 1112CCB 142 StL 1
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HPSTRD7-2-2 HPSI CD7 HPSIN Low 2CCB- 142* (11 C-- e -.. of 2CV5016- fil (beveem of 3*s 2* Medium None " 6 til 2CC8-142 StL 1 HPSTRD8-121 HPSICDB HPSIN Low 2CCA-2312* til Downneenm of 2SF 160 til thseeem skfe of 12* Medium None 6 1112CCA-23-1 S!L 1
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ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
kI I MNW Calculation NO A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 71 Of 83 Table 7 Risk Segenent Identi6catiors (Cont'd) Msk Segment 10 Consequence 10 Damage GroupID Itisk Region P'pmy Line Nos. Msk Sew
- Start Pbint Msk Segment End1%t Category TsAre Pktentiet Msk Category Isometric Drawings HPSIRD8- 12-2 HPSI C-OS HPSI-T) Med%m 2CCA-23-12* 111 L&seeem side of 12* (21 L>seeomof 2SI15D
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Medum Smet Leek 5 (112CCA-23-1 Stt 1 (212CCA-231 $1L 2 HPSIR OS 81 HPSIC-OS HPSIN Low 2CCA-23 B* (11 8* s 6*Redocer - kom 25 (2) 12*s 8* Tee - kom 13 Med%an None 6 ill 2CCA-23 2 Sit 1 (2) 2CCA-23-1 Sit 1 HPSIRDS 8 2 HPSI C-C8 HPS$ TJ Modum 2CCA-23 8* (11 12*s 8* Tee - kom 13 (11 12"s 8* Tee - kom 13 Medium Smed Leek 5 (1) 2CCA 23-1 Sit 1 HPSIRDS 6-1 HPSIC-O8 HPSIN Low 2CCA-23 6* 111 Dowentroom of 2ST140 til 3*s 6*Ro&ocer - kom 25 Med%m None 6 til 2CCA-23 2 2,1 HPSIR OS 6-2 HPSF C-OS HPSIN Low 2CCA-23 6* (116* a 2*Rodocer - kom 26 (118*s 6* Tee - kom 24 Med%m tuone 6 til 2CCA-23 2 Stt 1 HPSIR48-3 HPSIC-08 HPSSN Low 2CCA-23-3* ill Dowrwtream of 2St130 til 6*a 3* Rodocer - kom 26 Medium None 6 ill 2CCA-23 2 S?L 1
^
HPSIRD9-3 HPSI-CD9 HPSIN Low 2CCB- 15-3* fil Dowrwtream of 3*x 2* ill Penevenian 2P-25 Medium None 6 til 2CCB-15-2 SPL 1 gg; ",g , g. Redocer- kom 39 HPSIR-09 2-1 HPSIC-09 HPSIN Low 2CCB 2* (11 Dewrweeee of 2CY5075- til (kstroom of 3*s 2*
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Medium None 6 (1) 2CCB-15-2 StL 1 HPSIRD9-2-2 HPSI C-09 HPSSN Low 2CCB- 15-2* (1) Dowrweeem ot2CY$O76- 111lkeveem ot2*n2*
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Me6um None 6 ill 2CCB-15-2 Stt 1 HPSIR-10L 12-1 HPSF C-10 HPSIN Low 2CCA-24-12* 111 Dowrwtreem of 2SI-16C 619 lketreem side of 12*
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Medium IU6ne 6 ill 2CCA-24-1 Sit I ABB Combustion Engi ring Nuclear Operations
O O O aoa D'% W W CalCadation No. A-PENG-CALC-0?O. Rev 00 Page 72 of 89 Table 7 Risk Segment identMce6an (Cont'd! Msk SegmentID ConsequenceID Demage GroupID Wesk Region Mpmg Line Nos. Msk Segment Start P6Ent Mst L, _ :GottP6 tnt Category faisee Pdlentief Kesk Category ,;.- ; ^, *e Drawings HPSIR-1612-2 HPSFC-10 HPSIT Medium 2CCA-2412* 111 l>rtreem side e
- 12* (11 l%nrtreem side of 12*
~ ~
Modrwn Smeqleek 5 til 2CCA-241 SPL 1 HPSIR-1012-3 HPS!CIO HPSITJ Medrwn 2CCA-2412* fil lyseeem side of 12* fit lkreeem ot2SF15C etow - kom 2 Medium Smet leek 5 11i 2CCA-24-1 StL 1 HPSIR-108- 1 HPSFC10 HPSIN low 2CCA-248' ill 3*s 3* Reducer - hem 22 (21 12*s 8* Tee - Hem 22 Medium None 6 (112CCA-242 Stt 1 (212CCA-24-1 Stt 1 HPSIR-108 2 HPSI C10 HPSF TJ Medium 2CCA-248' its 12* s 8* T** - hem 22 111 12*s 8* Tee - kom 22 Medium SmeR leek 5 (112CCA-241 SFL 1 HPSIR-106 HPSIC10 HPSI N low 2C.~.A-246* Lil Downsweem of 251-14C fil 3*a 6* Tee - hem 21 Med7um None 6 (112CCA-242 Stt 1 HPSFR-103 HPSIC10 HPSI N low 2CCA-243* Lil Downsweem o!2SF13C !!) 8*a 3* Reducer- kom 22 Medum None 6 (112CCA-242 SFL 1 HPSIR-11-3 HPSTC11 HPSPN low 2CCB 7-3* (11 Downeteem er 3*n 2* ill." a .2P30 Radbeer - som 25 Medum M 6 ill 2M7-1 A 1 ggy g, __ _,; _,, ,q 3., g. Reducer - hem 24 HPSI R- 11-2-1 HPSIC11 HPSIN Low 2CCB 7-2* (11 C -~a-.. of 2CY$055- til lbsweem of 3*a 2* 1 Reducer - hem 25 Medrun None 6 til 2CCB-7-1 SFL T HPSIR-11-2-2 HPSFC11 HPSIN low 2CCB-7-2* fil Downsweem of 2CV 5056- til L&sweem ot 3*s 2* 2 Rodner - hem 24 Medium None 6 1112CCB 7-1 SFL 1 HPSIR-12-4 HPSTC-12 HPSIN Low 2OCB-3-4* 121 floor Bevetman Q 335' 0* 111 4* a 3* Redecer - kom 32 Medium None 6 ill 2OCB-31 StL T 2OCB 3 2 Stt 1 (2120CB12StL 2 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
NbO MWW Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 73 Of 89 Table 7 Risk Segment iden66cadorr (Cont'd] Risk SegmentID Cortsequence ID Damage GroupID Msk Region Mpmy Une Nos. Msk Sogn= ent Start P6 int Msk Z:;...;:: EsedP% int Category Tsaure P&tentist Msk Category isornekic Drawings HPSIR- 12-3 1 HPSI-C-12 HPSIN low 2DCB 3 3* 1114* a 4*x 3* Tee - kom 83 (11 Roer Devenen 9 360'O* Mediurn None 6 ill 20QF 32 StL 2 HPSIR-12-32 HPSI C-12 HPSIN low 2DC8 3 3* (11 4* s d' u 3* Tee - kom 84 til Roar Gersoon Q 360'O* Mednan None 6 til 2DC8 3 2 SPL 1 HPSIR.12-3 3 HPSI C-12 HPSIN low 2DCB 33* LII 4's 4*x 3* Tee - kom 85 (11 Roer Devenon Q 360'C* Medkun None 6 fil 2DCB-2 2 $!L 1 HPSIR- 12-34 HPSI C12 HPSIN low am 33* fil 4*s 4*s 3* Tee - kom 35 ill Roar Bovenon Q 360' O* Mediurn None 6 til 2DCB31 SPL 1 HPSIR-12-3 5 HPSI C12 HPSI N low 2DCB 33' (11 4's 3* Reducer - Pern 32 (11 Rbe* Bovenon Q 360'C* Mediurn None 6 (1) 2DCB 31 S!L 1 HPSIR-13 8 HPSI-C-13 HPSIN Low 2GCB 9-B' ill Daewnstroomof 2978 ill 4mtreern of 8's 4* Medium None 6 til 2GCB 9 3 $1L 1 gg, (212GCB9-3 StL 2 g ,g gey ge , ( Reducer - kom 63 HPSS R-13 6 HPSI C-13 HPS1N Low 2GCB96* fil Doornstroom of 8** 6* fil 29298 Suenan Medium None 6 ill 2GCB 9-3.% 2
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HPSTR-134-1 HPSI C-13 HPSIN low 2DC81-4* ill Dachaje of 2P-398 W P. . :- w. Q bor Medum None 6 ' " " til 2DCB- 1-2 StL 2 (212DC8 3 2 S!L 2 HPSIR-1342 HPSI-C-13 HPSIN low 2GCB94* (11 L .. ^ - .ofB*x 4* (114* Cap - kom 65 Medhan None 6 til 2GC8 9 3 S!L 1
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i h ABB Combustion Engihng Nuclear Operations
p ') d v (V A fl E HWW CalCuistiers No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 74 of 69 Tabk 7 Risk Segmerrt kierttificadorr (Cont'J1 Msk Segummt ID ConsequenceID Demage GrospID Msk Regiors Pfpirar Line Nos. Msk Segment Start Point Msa Segment GottPaint Category feature P&tentist Msk Category isomenic Drawings HPSIR-13 2 HPSI C 13 HPSIN low 2DCS 502-2~ (11 Ree+c branch connecoco ill L&stroom of 2~s %~ 2DCB 511-2" L- ^r---. of 29898 Reducey burert - kom 30 Medium None 6 g2p GmenedMerecer (11 (kutroom cf 2*s 1* Ill 2DCB 502-1 Sk 1 pegwery 6,, ort - nem 21 (212DCB511-4SPL 1 til lkreeem of 2CY$128-1 (312DCB $11-5 S!L 1 431 %ewome!285-54 (412DCB 511-a StL 1 gyl wof 2*a t* Pockery 2: sert - hem 9 441 lkstroom of 2"a 1" Rechery husert - #em 6 HPSIR-14-8 HPSI Cid HPSIN Low 2GCB98" til ~. - - ^. . a . 121 l>stroom of 8~a 6"
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Medium None 6 fil 2GCB 9-2 S!L 1 (2) 2GCB 9-3 S!L 1 HPSIR-14 6 HPSI C-14 HPSIN Low 2GCB96* (11 Downeeeem of 8*s 6* til 2P89CSsoceem
^
Medrum None 6 ell 2GCB 9-3 S!L 1 HPSIR-T M HPSI C-14 HPSIN Low 2DCB1-4~ m Deefaarge of 2P89C (11 Groened Steree Penetrenon Medium None 6 1112DCB 1-1 S!L 2 m 2DCB 1-2 Stt 1 m 2DCB 1-2 StL 2 HPSTR-14-2 HPSTC-14 HPSI N Low 2DCB SOO2* (11 Recwe bronch i- s. (11 lbsweem of 2"s %~ 2DCB 511-2* L - a .-.. of 2f89C Reducmg kwert - kom 41 g,, , , fil lbseeem of 2*n 1"
~
(212DCB $11-3 SPL 1 ^ (312DCB $11-4 StL 1 -
<31 cm r.d -e.r.on (31 l@etreem of 2* a 1* (
Reduces hwert - trem 29 HPSFR-15-3 HPSI C-15 HPSIN low 2CCB 763* 111 C-. ;--. e! 3*x 2" 111 Penetretion 2P-12
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Medium None 6 til 2CCB 704 Stt 1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
Nk D't W W Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rs. 00 , Page 75 of 89 Table 7 Risk Segrnent !dentificatiori (Cont'd! _ Risk SegmsntID Consequence ID Damege Group ID flisk Region Fipng Line Nos. Ilish Segment Start Ptint Msk Segment EmiP6 int Category FsHure 1%terstiel Ilisk Category Escorsetric Drawirags HPSI R- 15-2 HPS$ C15 HPSIN low 2CCB-702" (11 Dowsastream of 2CV-5101- ill LVseeem of 3*a 2*
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Mediurrr N no 6 til 2CCB-704 S!L 1 HPSI R- 16-3 HPSI C 16 HPSIN tow 2CCB 71-3* fil C, . ; - of 3*s 2* (11 Peneeenort 2P-13 Reducer - kom 11 Med%m None 6 ill 2CCB 71-5 Stt 1 HPSIR- 16-2-1 HPSIC16 HPSIN low 2CCB-71-2* W C-- ;-- - ofICV 5107- fil lyseeem ot 3* s 2* Mediws, 2 Redweer - kom 11 Ncne 6 iti 2CCB-71-5 Str.1 HPSIR- 16-2-2 HPSI C16 HPSIN low 2CCB 71-2* W Downstroom of 2S731 (113*s 3~s 2* Tee - hem 12 Med%m None 6 ill 2CCB-71-5 Sh. I m 2CCB-714 S!L 1 HPSTR-17-2 HPSFC-l7 HPSIN low 2CCB-71-2* fil Ce ;-. of 23F30 til lbseeem of 23131 None None 7 til 2CCB-714 S!L 1 HPSIR- 18-3 HPSIC18 HPSIN low 2CCB 143* (11 Peneewoorr 29 5 m l>seeem of 2913A Medium None 6 (112CCB-143 Sh.1 m 2CCA-22-2 S!L 1 HPSIR-19-3 HPSF C19 HPSIN low 2CCB- 13-3* ill Peneketiers 2P 11 m lbstreerrr of 237138 Medium None 6 ill 2CC8-13-3 StL 1 (212CCA-21-2 Stt 1 HPSIR-203 HPSFC2O HPS!N low 2CCC-7-3* (11T-,; ;- 2P-30 m L&seremer2SF13C Mediurn None 6 til 2CCB-7-2 Sft t W 2CCA-242 S!L 1 HPSI R.21-3 HPSF C21 HPSIN low 2CCB 15-3* (19T-.; ov-2P25 (21 t.kseenm of 2SF130 Medium tame 6 (1) 2CCB-15-3 SPL 1 m 2CCA-232 S!L 1 HPSIR-22-3 HPSI C22 HPSIN low 2CCB 12-3* (11 Roor Breenorr Q 360'0* (11 lysteem of 2*s 2*
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Med%m None 6 (112CCB 12-1 S!L 2 ABB Combustion Eng ing Nuclear Operations
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Y A Ik R HWW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010 Rev. 00 Page 76of 89 Table 7 Risk Segrnerrt Idersti6catiort (Cont'd1 Msk SegmentID ConsequenceID Demoge GroupID Msk Region Pqping Line Nos. Msk Segummt Start Pbint Msk Se --..: Emf Pbint Category fsGure Potential Msk Category isornetric Drawings HPSIR22-2 HPSIC22 HPSIN Low 2CC812 2* (11 Domesastroen of 7m 2* 1114rstroom of 25168 Me6um None 6 til 2CCR 12-1 Stt 2 HPSIR 22A-2 HPSIC22A HPSIN Low 2CCB-12-2* Lil Dowrmstroen of 2S168 til Gust *eern er 2*m %~ y 2CCB142' Rockemy Canadng - Rent t11 I I *
, W Mnsewomsf 2CV5015-1 HPSTR-23-3 HPSIC23 HPSIN Low 2CC.B 12-3* Ill Roer Geweearr O 350'C* til L>eseem of 3*m **
Medwrr None 6 til 2CCB-12-1 StL 1 HPSIR-23 2 HPSIC 23 HPSIN Low 2CCB 12-2* 111 Dooernstroom of Fs 2* tts ltreewarer of 251-70 . Medium None 6 1112CCB-121 StL 1 HPSI R-23A-2 HPSIC23A HPSIN Low 2CCB 7-2* i3 Dowesweemof 259-70 (1) 4rsweem of 2CV5055-1 y , 2CCB 12-2* (214rseomm er2*x %*
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Ill 2CCB 7-1 SPL 1 (212CC812-1 Stt 1 HPSIR-2#3 HPSIC24 HPSTN Low 2CCB 12-3* til 1%or Bewooon Q 360'C* (11 Qweeem of Ys 2*
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Medurrs None 6 ill 2CCB-12-1 Sit 1 HPSIR-242- 1 HPSFC24 HPSTN Low 2CCB 12-2* I!! Downseeem cf Ys 2* M 4reveem of 2StL 74 2CCB- 15-2* Rockeer- kom 105 til 2CC8-12-1 SFL 1 (212CCB-15-2 StL 1 HPSIR-242-2 HPSIC24 HPSIN Low 2CC8 71-2* (?! 3*z 7s 2* Tee - nem SS 1214rsweem of 2S130 Medurrs None 6 (112CC&f2-1 StL 1 t212CCB- 71-6 SFL 1 HPSI R-24A-2 HPSIC24A HPSIN Low 2CC815-2* (11 C J - of 2St 74 til 4nseeem ot 2CV5075-1 ' Modum None 6 1112CC815 2 SPL 1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
Ann 91WW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 77 cf 89 Table 7 Risk Segment identi6 cation (Cont'dl Msk Segmerrt 'D Consequernce ID Demoge t .mpID Msk Regnors PTpung Urne Alas. Msk Segr=seret Stort 96irst Insk Segreneert EnestP> inst Category fanTure Pdtentie! Ilisk Category isometric Drawirngs HPSIR-25-3 HPS! C25 HPSIN Lcw 2DCB 33* (11 fibor Brewoorr O 360'O* iti W dYs 2* M mSurn None 6 (112DCB-32 Syn. t HPS!R-25-2 HPSIC25 HPSI N l.nr 2DG3 2* (11 C-.. ; _., of 3* u 2* (11 thetreern of 254 72 Mediurn None 6 (1) 2DCB3 2 Sh. t HPSIR 25A-2 HPSIC25A HPSI N Low 2DC&3 2* 121 L a_.; of 2SF73 (11 %w of 2CV-6036 2 M fun None " #"$ . 6 trl 2CCB 13 2 Sit t * #" i2l 2DCB 3 2 StL 1 tto HPSl#26-3 HPSIC26 HPSIN low 20C837 (11 floor gevanor, Q 360'0* (11 W d y s2*, Mediurn " ~ "" # None 6 iil 2DCB 31 SPL 1 HPSIR 26-2 HPSIC26 HPS/N low 2DCB32* (11 Downstrearrr af 3*s 2* (11 (4wtreern of 25163 Mediurn Rockeer - trern 33 None 6 (112DCB 31 Sh.1 HPSIR 26A-2 HFO C26A HPSIN Low 2CCB 3 2* (21 C - : - of 25169 (19 (J>streern of 2CY5016-2 Mediurn **"' # #
- Norse 6 (112CCB to 2 Stt t (212pcg3 y spt y R&M w. am 37 HPSIA 27-3 HPSTC27 HPSIN low 2DCB3 7 iti floor Beretions @ 360' C* (19 ()>streern of Ts 2*
MmSurn None 6 *#"'" ~ #" ## ill2DCB31Sh.t HPS *R-27-2 HPSIC27 HPSTN low 2DCB 32* 111C : ;.aaol3*s2* (11 Wstrearre of 2St-71 Medi'urn *" None 6 it! 2DCB-31 Str. t HPSS-R-27A-2 HPSt C27A HPSIN low 2DCB 32* (21 Do--a _,. of 251-71 (1) Warrearse of 2CY5056-2 Mediurn None 6 trl 2CC87-1 Stt t
'#I #"# *' #"" % "
(212DCB31Stt1 36 HPSt#28-3 HPSt C28 HPSI N low 2DCB3 7 (11 floor M Q 360'7 111 Wm d Ys 2* Mediurn None 6 (11 zocs 2 2 Spt y RM - km N ABB Combustion Eng ing Nuclear Operations .
t'*} ' Ll j J ARD D'1 B W Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 78 of 89 Table 7 Rhk Segrnent IdertbWcation (Cortt'd! Msk Segment 10 Consequence 1D Damage Group 10 Msk Region Piping Line Nos. Msk Segment Start Pbint Msk E., .....: EndP6Ent Category FaAus Putentiet Msk Category isornetic Drawings HPSIR-23 2 HPSIC28 HPSI-N :sw 2DW3 2' (11 Downstream of 3*a 2~ til L>etream et 2St 75 Medean Norm 6 (19 2DC8 3 2 Sh.1 HPSIR-28A-2 HPSI C28A HPSIN Low 2DCS32' (21 C- a-.. of 251-75 til L>eweem or 2CV 6076-2 gg y R - kom 116 HPSIR-29 3 HPSIC29 NPS1N Low 2CC& 703' iff floor Govenon Q 360'0" til W of 3~a 2* Modum Norm "~ 6 ill 2CCB-764 Sh.1 HPSIR 29 2 HPSFC29 4 HPSI-N lnw 2CCB 702* fil C - a - ..of3~s 2* 111 L>streem of 2CY$1011 Medum None 6 (112CC8- 764 Sh.1
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HPSIR-30 3 HPSIC30 HPSIN fsw 2CCB-763~ (11 Pmeenson 2P-12 621 W of 2SF28A MedVum None G (112CCB-7G1 S?L 1 2CC8 702 Stt 1 ' 2CCB-703 SPL 1 1212CCA-25-3 Stt 1 HPSt#302 HPSI C 33 HPSIN low 2CC&702" til 3"x 2*x 2~ Tee -Item 28
^
(19 thetreem ofltCV5106-1 Mediaan None 6 ill 2CCB-702 SPL 1 HPSIR-31-3 HPSIC31 HPSIN Low 2DCB-3-3* (11 floor Bevenon O 260'O~ til L>sweem of 3*m 2~ Medium None 6 1112DCB 3-2 SfL 2 HPS/ R-31-2 HPISC31 HPSIN Law 2DCS 3-2* (11 C-. a --. of 3*s 2* til b>stroem ot2CY6102 2 Mediaan None Reducer- trem 78 6 it! 2CCS71-5 Sit 1 HPSI 9-32-3 HPS$ C32 HPSt N low 2CC& 71-3" (11 P m ovecian 2fL13 (21 Chesream of 257288 Medron %ne 6 ill 2CCW71-1 Sh.1 2CC&71-2 Stt 1 - 2CCB-71-3 SFL 1 2CCB 71-4 S!L 1 (212CCA-25-3 Sh. I l ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
B"t E E Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 79 of 89 Table 7 Risk Segmerit Ider 66cadorf (Cont'd1 Risk SegmerrtID ConsequenceID Demoge GroepID lifst Region PTpmg Une Nos. Illsk Segment Start Pbint Esk Sognrent Emf 96 int Cateycry FenTure P&tentiel Illsk Category Isometri: Drawings HPSFR-32-2 HPSI C32 HPSIN Low 2CCB-112* til 2*s 3*s 2* Tee - Rom 12 til *,bserem of 2CV5106-2 i Medium None 6 (112CCB-71-2 A 1 HPSIR 33-12 HFSI C33 HPSFT High 2CCA-22-!2* til Downstroom of 2915A (11 Confleg krocean h%azie Wmh SmeaLeek 2 (112CCA-22-1 Sh 1 HPSl#34-12 HPSIC34 HPSI T High 2CCA-21-12" (11 DowrwVeem of 2SF158 til Centleg krocoon Nozzne Hg' h SmeR Leon 2 til 2CCA-21-1 Sh.1 HPS! R-35-12 HPSI C35 HPSIT High 2CC4 12" lll Dowrwerem of 2SF15C til Coafleg hipocoon Norzte Wmh Smed Leek 2 til 2CCS-24-1 A 1 HPSl#36-12 HPSI C-36 HPSFT Wmh 2CCA 12* til Dowrweeem of 2St 15D til Cokt leg knocoon horste High Sme6 Leek 2 til 2CCA 231 SPL 2 HPSS R-37-3-1 HPSFC37 HPSIN Medum 2CCA-25-3* 111 Dowrweeem et 2SF28A ill L&sewom ekte of 3* etow
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High None 4 til 2CCA-25-3 SFL 1 HPSIR-37-3 2 HPSFC37 HPSTN Medum 2CCA-25-3* (11 C- -.a-. of 231288 (11 tbsewom skie of 3*e6ow
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High None 4 (112CCA 25-3 Sh.1 HPSt#37-3-3 HPSFC37 HPSFT Wsh 2CCA 25-3* ill lbseeem skie of 3"ebow (11 Shundower CooGuy Drep
- kom 30 lirse Wmh SmeR Leek 2 i112CCA-25-3 S?L 1 gy; ,gg, ,g 3 m
- hem 31 h ABB Combustion Engh-ing Nuclear Operations h - - -
I
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A lB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 J Page 80 of 89 To facilitate application of the sampling 1,etcentages to determine the inspection scope, ISIS combints like segments (i.e., same consequence category and damage group) into segment groups. A total of 6 segment groups have been identified and are summarized in Table 8 belo w. Table 8 Risk inspection Scope Segment Consequence faHwe Risk Risk Total Selections Selections Groups Category 9%tentlet Repton Category Wolds Requked Mode HPSI-00 t High None Medium $ 8 1 2 HPSI-002 High Smalliesk High 2 34 9 9 HPS!D03 Medium None Low 6 t044 0 0 HPSI-004 . 004 a 8 and Medium SnallLeak Medium 5 005 e 19 HPSI-005 tots! s 27 3 4
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HPSI006 None None low 7 2 0 0 8.0 ELEMENT SELECTION
/ " 'N Qj '
The number of elements to be examined as part of she risk informed developed program depends upon the risk categories for the risk significant segment groups as indicated in Table 8 above. An element is defined as a portion of the segment where a potential degradation inechanism has been identified according to the criteria of Section 5.0. The selection of individualinspection locations within a risk category depends upon the relative severity of the degradation mechenism present, the physical access co sstraints, and radiation exposure. In the absence of any identified degradation mechar; isms (i.e., risk category 4), selections are focused on terminal ends and other locations (i.e., structural discontinuitits) of high stress and/or high fatigue usage. An inspection for cause process shall be implemented utilizing examination methods and volumes defined specifically for the degradation mechanism postulated to be active at the inspection location. Tables 9,10 and 11 depict the element selections and other pertinent information (e.g., examina: ion methods and volumes, basis for selection) for risk significant segment groups HPSI 001, HPSI 002 and HPSI 004 / HPSI 005. As indicated in the Risk Inspection Scope of Table 8, a total of 15 elemeats have been sclected for examination, including 2 elements from segment group H.oSI001, 9 elements from segment group HPSI 002 and 4 elements from segment groups HPSI-004 / HPSI 005. The examination methods and volumes specified in Tables 10 (risk category 2) and 11 (risk category 5) are defined in Reference 9.1 and are based upon the degradation mechanism (s) postulated to be active at each selected element. Currently, no specific guidance is provided in Reference 9.1 regarding appropriate examination methods and volumes for risk category 4 (i.e., no failure potentialidentified) element selections. Consequently, the examination methods and volumes soecified in Table 9 (risk category 4) are based upon the requirements defined in Reference 9.1 for therma! fatigue. V ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
~ . _. - -_ . - - . - _ . AnR MWW Calculatiots No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rec. 00 Page 87 cf 89 Tabk 9 Elemerst Sekctiots - Risk Category 4 Sesment Csesqp Cu _ . ,.- Fedure Pateneiet Miek Cerevery Aiet Kausise, Teenf f erenmasate term eredessnesme HpStoot Higs snne wentarnd e arasaw a t rates ed 2: Bemente Selected Line Me. Dem needed Riet Sepnent D Descriposer Joe Duny No. Dent t'eAwese Cn _ ,_ -- / Det Groep C's W ForSedecsen 25437 2CCA 25-3* Volurnetric HFSIR 374-1 kr she abeerme of any Monsehd demoge onecherosme, erw Wpheet Ebow-to-PTpe Wed 2CCA 25 3 Sh.1 Figure No. 7.1-1 HPSIC-37/HPS1N stress les 101 element knode voire 350. Calc No. 85-EDO55-211 ** gy, gwm 25-056 2CCA-25-3* Vokametric HPSIR27-J2 ts ehe obsence et any adenehd der =nege .- the leghest Wro-Pipe Wed 2CCA-25-3 S!L 1 Roure No. 7.1-1 HPSTC47/HPSTN stess les 109 element inede W 265. Cole No. 85 E-0055-211 in gyg, y , i h ABB Combustion Engi ing Nuclear Operations
O O O aaa
#% WW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 82.1f 89 Tab le 10 Element 5:!Ai - Risk Category 2 Senment Grome C.-- ._ - - Foalure Potened Met Catorerv l Mok Renneer Tere!9 erademeene 25% of elemerne HPSI002 High Smetleek 2 High 34 .9 l
Bemeests Selected line Me. Esem Mec%ed Mok Segment D Deecryeiser Joe Dwy No. Esem Vedwne C_____ ~-/DM Gros ,c'e Rennese for Sedoessor 21M1 2CC4-21 12" Vokenetric HPSIR 3412 This risk segment wat be swe rected se odober beredirsg seesses I shermer so se6cecove (potencer FCS becAiesAegel eccies aswereerm et Safe End to-Cohtiog 7CC4-21-1 Sh.1 Roure No. 7.1-2 HPSI C34 / H1'St- T ,s,eg ,,y, gSg g5g ;,, ,;,g ,,,,,,,,, ppSg g ng.gg g, ;y, q,,,,,,,e Safety Hectnon Nctrie end element hos beers selected smco it we>M be stdrected se the We& p % ,,,,,,,orst ire eSis risA W 22-001 2CC4 12" Vokmsetric HPSZR 3312 This rish segment k sahected to global bending seosses Aoe ne shermer spee6eenorr ' .. - . . ;Aa hoewgf -_ ; , aestroom of Safe End to-Cokileg 2CCA-22-1 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPSS C33 /HPS T ep,eck enfee 2M 15A k okk segrrnorrt HPSIR D6-12 3'L This t M Safety Hection Norsk ,,4,g,m,,,t %es been seketed sesce it k saheeted so the leg %est ' Y!**f bending enamorrt irr sfmis ris' engment. 224XM 2CCA 12* Voksnetric HPS$ R 12 This risk segment k e.4.esed se global bondrsg stresses shoo to sherrreef streoficeocer 1-...;~., bestingi occuerma avseeem of Check Veree-% P&re Wohi 2CCA-22-1 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPSIC-33 /HPM T m + g3g gyg ;,,,;,y ,,,,,,q yp3,g_og. gg_3 2. Ties element has beerr saketed sirvee it is su4ected se e Fog #ser be iderg seress dee se the long horarentalrear of streetiedp&usg. 23 001 2CCA 2412" Vokametric HPSIR 12 This risk segment is eutt octed so giobel bending rtresses doe se themist .e ;.& .: . (-. . .. ;~,, heetmpf ew;,, aesteem of Safe End to-Cohileg 2CCA-241 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPSS C35 /HPSIT check eeke 2M 15Cirr rist segrnent NPSIR-1612-12. TNssommnet Safety Hection Norsk and element has beerr selected since it is sakected so the h.phost We4f bending triomeert irr afis risk segrrieert. 23D06 2CCA-2612" VoAometnc HPS R-35-12 This sist segmerrt is sobrected sc giobe! bondng stresses doe se therrr.sf se e& ;,.. e5wecoorr hesenyt occurnny aesteem et Check VeNe-to-Pipe Wekt 2CCA-24 1 Sfn.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPSIC35 /HPSI T check eeke 2M15Cire rist segment HPSIR-1612-3'2. Timie o. ament hos been selected since it is saheeted se e ligher bending stress doe to the ksng hontorrtet raer of so"soGodp% reg. 24D01 2CCA-23-12" Voksnetnc HPSIR-36-12 This rise segment wel be sm4ected se global bendng svesses M thermal scroficeticer (poterraief RCS becAfeekegel occurs sesee-no et Safe Ersd-to-Cohileg 2rDS 1 Sh. 2 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPSTC36 /HPSF T check eeke 25t15D irr risk segment NPSIRD8-12-2. This comwmet 5^* aery W Norsk erre eterr.orst has beerr sedected since it woaM be se4ected :e the
#'Af foghest bendng enosveent irs etnis okA segr.none ABt:1 Combustion Engineenng Nuclear Operations
g . __ _ F1WW Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page 83 of 89 Tabb 10 Dement 5 election - Risk Category 2 (Cortt'.D se, ment omge c.. _ _ . a reaw, eat ww m a core ,orr ma m.m, Teter a er or.r,ene, 2s% ores we HPSI002 ngh Smas teek 2 whe 34 s e Bemems Se6ected Une No. Esem nierhed mk Sr.mnt D Deectpeon Zee W ** Eserrr Vonwne C-_ _ _ e /Det Groep D*s Reneen for Safeceen 25424 2CCA-25-3* Volumen HPSIR 37-3-3 This risk segmerrt in perenesty setreeted so th nnet stretfwenon E leenage ocews poet other hot Beg avecean peth ser er two senes PTve-to-WeMotet 2CC4-25-3 Sh.1 ."hrnee Mo. 7.1-1 HP9 C-37/HPSI T y g gygy, y gygga , gyyyy g gy;gg This termemet end element hos been sedected since it mnM be suerverect to the #ephest bendling triomentin sfeis risA segment. 25425 2CCA-25-3* Vokarrwtnc HPS!K37-3-3 TNs risk segrnent is potenoegy orMed to therruel stretfoceeiorr I onehege occurs post either hot leg irpecean poh set et em.n senes Bbow-to-PTre Wekt 2CCA 25-3 S.~ 1 Frgure No. 7.1-1 HPSTC37/HPS*- T y m g,, gygy, g gy y , gygyg y gyggg TNs element hos been sedected since it sweente be outrected no e higher bent 6r=g stress. 25426 2CCA 25-3* khmetric HPSIR 37 3-3 This risk segment is c: :, ~, sr&ed so t%ermet strati!w" eten M leakage occurs post orther het les ape-bon path set of two tones Pfpe to-Bbow Weld 2CCA-25-3 Sh.1 Rgure tee . 7.1-1 HPSI C-37/HPS$ T y m g, gygy, ,,,4 yyggy , gygyy 4 yy ggy This esement has boere selected since it weaM be sutpected se e higher benefs:;r seess. I h ABB Combustion Engh ing Nuclear Operations
= -
g
O p O O G E [l E FMFW Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-010 Rev. 00 Page 84 Of 89 Table 11 Elemettt L.'1.ra - Risk Category 5 Senment Gmer C-- -.= fegare Poteneier Riek Cetenerr Mea Raven Tetd 9 ete6annente 10% of elemente l HPSF004 & HPSI005 Medum Smed LeeA 5 Medium 27 3 foicked el Demente Selected Line No. Esem niethod Meh Segment D L_ ' - - Ice Cavy No. Dem Veheroe C-. ,_ ,. /Dht Cremer D's Reeeen for Selecaien i 1 21-007 2CCG-21 12" VoAometric HPSI A 01-12-2 TNs risA seyment is potenesty subrected te themmer swetfacermn a RCS becalesAege ocews poet checA vefre 2SF 158 and in 2 -v= Broow-to-ChecA Velve 2CCA 21-1 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.12 HPS* C41/ HPSF TJ y y,, ,m _ m4 ywww Wold Rgure No. 7.62 ,,g,,,,4 y y ;, ,, ,s , y y, ,y, ,;,g segment dwo se condocoon heet Vensfer across C,e enhre meamg it the most susceptMe h>cetion so SGSCC and since it eeoukt be eutt eet to the Nghet bendng seess kr this esisk segment due so TASCS. 22 M 2CCA 22-12* Vokanetric HPSIR 06-12-3 A poroon cf this risa segment is s&ed to thermet ses.;L.:n. doe no ia..u;u . hereng Ke AT > 50*R and the entire risa Pipe-to-Check Votre Wekt 2CCA-22-15% 1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPSS C-06 / HPSI T) , ;, y,g4 ,4 ,, w ,,,,,,y y ggg Rgwe M. 7.4 2 becAleakage acetn post check vehre 2SI-15A and is susceptoe no eterpronufer seess cormsoon crocal.ng. This e/ernent hos been sefected shsee it is sutyect as the foghest terryperetwo he true assa segmorrt due to coridwecorr heet aansfer across the ye/re meAing h the most suscognNe locenon so JGSCC es we6 es it bema sutvected so the toghest bendrnr suess er this risk segreent due no TASCS. 23-007 2CCA-2412" Voksnewic HPSIR-1012-3 A port'*ws of this risk seynont is sutvected se thermel everdicenan doe no ;-..a;iv , heeting Ke., AT > SC*R and the entire risk JTpe-to-Check Vahre Weld 2CCA-261 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPST C-10/HPSF TJ , , , , , , , , , , ;, ,,, ,,g,,,,,4 ,, ,,,,y y gc3 Rgwe M. 7A2 becAleeAege ocews post checa wehre 23115C and is suscept6e se hetergrarnder stess corromon crocairnr. TNe element her been selected since it is sutyeef so the fwghest t-.y r.e er this risA segment due se conduchon heet eensfer ocmss the volve meAhny it the most suscept6e Arcetion so JGSCC es owet es it being sutrected to the twghest benning svess he stuis risA cepment due to TASCS. 2#006 2CCA 12" VoAnnetric HPSI-R 06-12-2 TNs risk segment is poterraecy outrected to thermal averdicatsort M RCS becAleeAnge occws poet checA vehre 253150 and is earsceptbe lipe-to-ChecA Votre Weld 2CCA-23-1 Sh. 2 Rgure No. 7.1-2 HPSS C-OB /HPSF TJ w her sw m Mirsg. TNs M M & Rour* "o 7 *2 seuected >,ce it is enect no the r,ghest ten,,entwo h, sus sist segment due se condocoon heet uansfer ecross the volve sneaing it the most scept6e a,ceoo,s eGSCC end.+,ee st uat be ue rre, to the regr,est ben 6ng seems h, tus risk segm.nt due at rASCS. ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG. CALC 010, Rev. 00 (
'Page 85 of 89
9.0 REFERENCES
9.1 ' Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure,' EPRI Report No. TR. 106706, Interim Report, June 1996. 9.2 EPRIInservice Inspection Software llSIS*l,1996. 9.3 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2. " Safety Analysis Report,' akmendment No.12. 9.4 " Design Specification for ASAfE Section Ill Nuclear Piping for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, Arkansas Power and Ught Company,' Specification No. 6600-A12200, Revision 9. 9.5 'ANO 2 SIA15 Components Database,"(Plant Piping Une List (A12083), dated 3 31 96).
- 9. 6 'ANO 2 ISI Plant Piping Line Ust," from "evision 4 of ANJ 2 Inservice Inspection Plan.
- 9. 7 ' Temperature Distribution and Structural Analysis of Safety injection Piping Subject 13 Thermal Stratification,' CEOG Task 818, Report No. CE NPSD-963, Revision 01, September 1995.
,m) 9.8 " Technical Specification for Insulation for Arkansas Nuclear Ons Unit 2 of the (O Arkansas Power and Ught Company,' Specification No. 6600-M 2136, Revision 9.
9.9 ' Primary Chemistry Afonitoring Program," Procedure No. 1000.106, Revision 4. 9.10 *EPRI Fatigue Afanagement Handbook,' Report No. TR 104534 V1, V2, V3, V4, Project 332101, Final Report, December 1994. 9.11 ' Pipe Cracking in PWRs with low Pressure Borated Water Systems,' EPRI Report No. NP-3320. 9.12 ' Flow Accelerated Corrosion Prevention Program," HES-05, Revision 1. 9.13 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 " Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Ucense No. NPF 6, Arnendments Nos.173 and 174.* 9.14 Gaertner, J. P., et. al. ' Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Intemal Flood Screening Study," prepared for Entergy Operations, Inc. Calculation No. 89 E-0048 35, Rev. O. Afay 1992. 9.15 " Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Individual Plant Examination Submittal,' 94-R 2005-01, Rev. O, August 1992. g U ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A BB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 86 of 89 9.16 Entergy, Arkansas Nuclear One Lnit 2, Piping and Instrumentation and Isometric Drawings:
- 1. 0 Drawin; No. Af 2232, Sheet 1, Rev. 96; " Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Safety injection System.'
- 2. 0 Drawing No. Af.2236, Sheet 1, Rev. 73; " Piping !s Instrumentation Diagram Containment Spray System."
3.0 Drawing No. 2CCA 21 1, Sheet 12, Rev. 0; 'Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection to reactor Coolant Pump 2P 328. '
- 4. 0 Draw.'ng No. 2CCA 212, Sheet to Rev. 8; 'Lorge Pipe isometric Safety injection and Shutdown Cooling to RCP 2P-328 *
- 5. 0 Drawing No. 2CCA 221, Sheet 1, Rev.16, and Sheet 2 Rev. 3; 'Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection and Shutdown Cooling Piping to reactor Coolant Pump 2P-32A.'
- 6. 0 Drawing No. 2CCA 22 2, Sheet 1, Rev.16; "Large Pipe isometric Safety injection Supply from a 2SI 13A and 2St 14A.*
- 7. 0 Drawing No. 2CCA 231, Sheet I and 2 Rev. X; 'Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection Tank 2T 2D Discharge Piping.'
- 8. 0 Drawing No. 2CCA.23 2, Sheet 12, Rev. N; 'Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection and Shutdown Cooling to Reactor Pump 2P 320.*
- 9. 0 Drawing No. 2CCA 241, Sheet la Rev.12, Sheet 2, Rev.1; *Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection Tank 2T 2C to 2CCA 8 30' 10.0 Drawing No. 2CCA 24 2, Sheet 1, Rev.13; "Large Pipe (sometric Safety injection from Containment Penetrations 2P-29 and 2P-30.'
11.0 Drawing No. 2CCA 25 3, Sheet 1, Rev.12; 'Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection System.'
* :. 0 Drawing No. 2CCB 121, Sheet 1, Rev.16 Sheet 2. Rev. 2, Sheet 3, Rev.
3, "Large Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safety injection Header Loop 1." 13.0 Drewing No. 2CCB 13 2, Sheet 1, Rev.13, Sheet 2, Rev. 0; 'Lorge Pipe isometric from 2CV 50351 and 2CV 5036 2 to Containment Penetration 2P 11.* 14.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 13 3, Sheet 1, Rev. 4; *Large Pipe isometric Safety injection Piping from Flued Head 2P 11 to volve 2SI 138." 15.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 14 2, Sheet 1, Rev.16; Sheet 2, Rev. 4, 'Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection from Valves 2CV 50151 and 2CV-5016 2 to Containment Penetration 2P S.* 16.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 14 3, Sheet 1, Rev. 8, "Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection from Containment Penetration 2P-S.' 17.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 15 2, Sheet 1, Rev. 12, 'Large Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safety injection from Valves 2CV 50751 and 2CV 6076 2 to Containment Penetration 2P-25.' 18.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 15-3, Sheet 1, Rev. X, *Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection Header Cross Connection to Loop D." 19.0 Drcwing No. 2CCB 71, Sheet 1, Rev.11, Sheet 2, Rev. N;, "Large Pipe isomeiric Safety injection Supply from Vs/ves 2CV 50551 and 2CV 5056 2 to Cuntainment Penetration 2P-30.' 20.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 7 2, Shect 1, Rev.16; Sheet 2, Rev. 4, "Large Pipe Isometric Safety injection Piping from Flued Head 2P 30 to Valve 2SI 13C.' 21.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 70-1 Sheet 1, Rev. X; 'Large Pipe Isometric Shutdown Cooling Supply from HPSI Header #1.' ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations l
l g\ ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010 Rev. 00 Page 87 of 89 22.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 70 2, Sheet la Rev. X, "Large Pipe isometric Safety injection System from 2CCB 12 to Reactor Coolant System.' 23.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 70 3, Sheet 1, Rev. X, 'Large Mpe isometdc Safety injection System from Line 2CCB 12 to Reactor Coolant System.' 24.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 70-4, Sheet 1, Rev. X, Sheet 2, Rev. N: *Large Pipe isometric High Pressure Safety injection Header N.om.ker 1 to Containment Penetration 2P 12.* 25.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 71 1, Sheet 1, Rev. 5, *Large Pipe Isometric frorr. 'lCCB-12 to Shutdown Cooling.' 26.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 712, Sheet 1, Rev. 7, "Large Pipe isometric Safety injection System from 2CCB 12 to Rtactor Coolant System.' 27.0 Drawing No. 2CCB-713, Sheet la Rev. 4, 'Large Pipe Isometric Shutdown Cooling from HPSI Header #2.* 28.0 Drawing No. 2CCB-714, Sheet 1, Rev. X, "Large Pipe isometric Safety injection from 2CCB 12 to Reactor Coolant System.' 29.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 715, Sheet la Rev. 7, "Large Pipe Isometric from HPSI Header #2 to Reactor Coolant System.' 30.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 716, Sheet 1, Rev. 4, "Large Pipe Isometric High Pressure Srfety injection Header NT to Containment Penetration 2P 13.' 31.0 D. : wing No. 2DCB 1 1, Sheet 1, Rev.14, Sheet 2, Rev. N, *Large Pipe isometric HPSI Pump 2P 89A Discharge to High Pressure Sofety lnjection System Header #1.* m 32.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 12. Sheet 1, Rev.16, Sheet 2, Rev. N, "Large Pipe
)
{G Isometric High Pressure Safety injection Pump 2P 898 & C Discharge Piping. ' 33.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 31, Sheet 1, Rev. 9, 'Large Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safety injection Header Number 2 to 2CV 5016 2 and 2CV 5056-
- 2. '
34.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 3 2, Sheet la Rev.17, Sheet 2, Rev. N, Sheet 3, Rev. N,
*Large Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safety injection Header Loop 2.*
35.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 5001, Sheet 1 Rev.11, 'Small Pipe Isometric high
- Pressure Safety injection Pump 2P-89C Discharge to Refueling Water Tank 2 T 3. '
'f 6. 0 Drawing No. 2DCB 501 1, Sheet 1, Rev.10, 'Small Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safety injection Pump 2P 89o< Discharge to Refueling Water Tank 2 T 3. '
37.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 5024, Sheet 1, Rev.11, Sheet 2, Rev. 2, 'Small Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safety injection Pump 2P-898 Discharge to Valve 2CV 5128 1.
- 38.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 511 1, Sheet 1, Rev. X, Sheet 2, Rev. O, '3 mall Pipe Isometric HPSI Pump 2P-898 Afinimum Recirculation Piping from Valve 2S1 64 to Valve 2BS 53.*
39.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 5112, Sheet 1, Rev.1, "Small Pipe isometric HPSI Pump Afinimum Recirculation Piping.' 40.0 Drawing No. 2DCB-5113, Sheet 1, Rev. O, 'Small Pipe isometric HPSI Pump Minimum Recirculation System.' 41.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 5114. Sheet 1, Rev.1, *Small Pipe isometric Afinimurn flow Recirculation from HPSI Pump 2P-89A." Q Lj 42.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 5115, Sheet 1, Rev. X, 'Small Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safety injection Pump 2P-898 Afinimum Recirculation.' ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations I M
ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page 88 of 89 43.0 Drawing No. 20CB 5116, Sheet 1, Rev. X, "Small Pope isometric HPSI Pump 2P-899 Minimum Recirculation Piping." 44.0 Drawing No. 2GCB 91, Sheet I, Rev.17, Sheet 2, Rev. O, "Large Pipe Isometric High Pressure Safetyinjection Pump 2P 89A Inlet Piping.' 45.0 Drawing No. 2GCB 9 2, Sheet 1, Rev 9, *Large Pipe isometric High Pressure Safety injection Pumps 2P-89A, B & C Supply. ' 46.0 Drawing No. 2GCB 9 3, Sheet 1, Rev.16. Sheet 2 Rev. 0; "Large Pipe isometric High Pressure Safety lifection Pumps 2P 898 & C Inlet from Containment Sump.' 47.0 Drawing No. 2CCB 11 1, Sheet 1, Rev.10; "Small Pipe Isometric Charging Pump Discharge to High Pressure Safety injection Header #1.* 48.0 0. ewing No. 2CCB 231, Sheet 1, Rev. 3; *Small Pipe Isometric Safety injection Pressure Relief to 2PSV 5112.' 49.0 Drawing No, M 2044, ' Plant Design Drawing Area 24 Containment Au Building Plan El. 354' 0* to 372' O'." 50.0 Drawing No. M 2045, ' Plant Design Drawing Area 24 Containment Aux. Building Plan El. 33S' O' to 354' 0*.* S 1.0 Drawing No. M 2063, " Plant Design Drawing Area 26 Containment Aux. Building Plan above o.ede." S2.0 Drawing No. M 2064,
- Plant Design Drawing Area 26 Containment Aux.
Building Pian below crade. " 9.17 ' Plant Cooldown' Procedure No. 2102.' '
, Revision 28, Entergy Operations, Arkansas Nuclear One.
9.18
- Instruction Manual, Reactor Coolant Pipe and fittings," Arkansas Nuclear One Unit No. 2 C.E. Book No. 73470, June 1974.
9.19 'Depressurization and Decay Heat Removal Response to NRC Ouestions', CEN-239, June .1983. 9.20 *ANO 2 Containment Flood Maximum and Minimum levels', Calculation No. 90 E. 0100 04, February,1993. 9.21 ' Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 High Pressure Safety injection System Training Manual", 2 051, Rev.1, February 21,1992. 9.22 Swain, A. D. and Guttmann, H. E.; " Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Operations', NUREG-CR 1278, August 1983. l 9.23 North Atlantic Energy Services Corp. " Individual Plant Examination Extemal Events', i Report for Seabrook Station, Response to Generic letter 88 20, Supplement 4, September 1992. l 9.24 *Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Evaluation.t et Nuclear Plant Sites in Central and Eastern United States: Resolution of the Charleston Earthquake issue", EPRI NP. 639S 0, April 1989, Prepared by Risk Engineering, Inc., Yankee Atomic Electric l Company, and Woodward-Clyde Consultants. O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations 1 1
A15B Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 0:0, Rev. 00 Page 89 of 89 9.25
- Revised IJvermore Seismic Hatord Estimates for 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Afountains', NUREG 1488 (FinalReport), April 1994.
l O O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations 1
Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page At of A91 O l I APPENOlX A
'FMECA . CONSEQUENCE INFORMA TION REPORT *
(Attachment Pages Al A91) O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
FMECA - Consequence Inforrnation Report Cablarmn No. A,PENGGLC-010, Rev. 00 14-Ser91 Page A2 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 01 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of HPSI, LPSI, and SIT flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32B occurs due to an injection hne break assumed to occur during normal power operation (i.e., SIT imentory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i c., SIT imentory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time precedirig the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstrum of check vahrs 2SI 13B & 2SI 14B to upstream of check valve 1S1 15B is included in this segment. SIT 2T2B discharge piping downstream of check valve 2SI 16B is also included in this segment. This consequence includes all welds in lines 2CCA 213",2CCA 216", & 2CCA 218" and the applicable welds in line 2CCA 21-12" A failure in this segment would divert HPSI cold leg flow from trains "A" and "B" to the containment. LPSI ar.d SIT flow to RCS cold leg 2P32B would also be distrted to the containment. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump. For a small break LOCA (i c., RCS pressure initially remains aboyc SIT pressure), se tral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. These include low SIT 2T2B pressure and testi alarms with RCS pressure above SIT pressure, inappropriately high HPSI and LPSI injection flows indicated by the header flow instruments with most or all of the HPSI flow indicated by the affected injection line flow instrument, and inappropriately low HPSI and LPSI pump dischrg pressures for the indicated RCS pressure. The affected SIT alarms in conjunction with d c edict associated indications would alert the operators of the existence of a HPSI segment failure. It is therefore assumed that the failed HPSI segment would be detected and isolated following a LOCA. I c s B. ger LOCA which depressurizes the RCS, flow to the RCS is achieved via the intact QWn he,s, thus mitigating the failed segment without operator actions. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected Loevion: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The four safety injection paths are separately located in four different quadrants of the containment. A dynamic analysis which included the above lines has been performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (S AR Secuon 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all safety injection components and associated electrical equipment have been designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental conditions inside the containment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). Hence for the postulated break locations, it is assumed that spatial effects are negligible. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: SDM 3 System IPE ID: HPSI, LPSI, SIT System Recovery: In addition to HPSI, one LPSI and SIT injection flow path would be rendered ineffective. Although isolation is assamed for this segment failure following a LOCA, there are at least two RCS cold leg injection paths available. The avcilable injection paths will be capable of mitigating a LOCA.
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Co.khtion Na A PENG-C4LC-010, Rev. 00 O , l4-sep-91 Page A3 of A91 Loss of Train: N TraleIE: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, the injection of HPSI and LPSI flow to the RCS via cold leg 2P32B will not occur. The contents oiSIT 2T2B would discharge to the containment sump without being injected into the RCS. The remaining two or three RCS cold leg injection paths (depending on the LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from ECCS trains "A" and "B", For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences unuld be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one equivalent backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category, Periodic testing (i.e., presswizing to operating pressure) of this piping segment is not performed during normal power operation. However, this piping segment is routinely pressurized to accident pressures or above in the course of SIT imentory adjustments. f%
'p A between test " exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM C Consequence Rank O O
1 1 i FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cale"larion No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 14-ser-97 Page A4 of A91 Consequence ID: IFSI C 02 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32B occurs due to an injection line break during normal power operation (i.e., S!T imentory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i c., SIT inventory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the linuting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping downstream of HPSI line isolation vahes 2CW 5035-1 & 2CV 5036 2 and upstream of containment penetration 2P11 is included in this segment. This consequence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable portions ofline 2CCB-13 2" and all welds in line 2CCB 13 3" (outside containment). A failure in this segment would cause some of the RWT inventory to drain to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc 89 E-0048-35, pg. 28). Sestral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RC s pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications or alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation w hen R%T lesti decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS header valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24A are located in Room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios downstream of the HPSI line manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately ! 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor ' drain capacity in this room is 90 gpm ( Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). l The ANO-? Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E-0048-35, pg.13) assumes ' the failure cf all components in the flood initiation zone. This assumption is very j conservative for this flood scenario. Hand calculations indicate that for a leak of this size, the components identified would not be submerged during a 30 minute l allowance for discovery with no consideration of o dlow other than the floor drain. l A resiew of Plant Design Drawing M-2044 and the walkdown that was conducted l indicate that the line segmer.t of concern is adjacent to valves 2CV-5613-2, 2CV-5101 1,2CV-4840-2,2CV-5077-2, and 2C%1519-1. Because of the cicse ) proximity to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of these valves may occur. The valve motors are emironmentally qualified to withstand the sprrying or jet impingement of water. For this HPSI line break scenario, it is therefore assumed j that even though spraying orjet impingement of these vahes may occur they wil! I still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water ; from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'-0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. l
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ ..._..._ _ __ _ . _ _ _ _ m __ _
i FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cate.tauodo. A.PEM. CEC-010, Rev. 00 - 14-Sep 91 Page A3 of A91 1 x Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a
! concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A laitiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss o' System: SD System IPE ID: HPSI System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications, it is highly probable that the failed negment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection tahts 2CV 50351 and 2CV 5036-2 can be closed from the control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment, it i is assumed that the ability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is equivalent to j having one backup train. Loss'of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: Although the HPSI flow path to RCS cold leg 2P32B is assumed to be lost after being isolated, i the remaining injection paths will still be capable of performirq their intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA) after the failed segment is idated. . Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is raccessfully isolated, HPSI injection path via cold leg 2P32B will be unavailable after being isolated due to the break. The remaining two or three cold leg injection paths (depending on LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths 4 O available with each path being supplied from ECCS trains "A" and "B". } For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model 4 predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most sestre because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one equivalent backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases
- considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category.
Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not
- performed during normal power operation. However, due to routine activities i
primarily associated with maintaining SIT level, this piping segment ir. frequently j subjected to HPSI pump discharge pressures at or above those which wet ld be encountered following automatic initiation of the HPSI system. A between test
- exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) for responding to a LOCAand based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedurt (U?RI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculatum Na A PENG-C4LC-010. Rev. 00 14-sep-91 Page A6 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI-C-03 Consequence Descriptiont Loss of HPSI train A (i.e., flow from header #1) occurs due to an injection line break upstream of manual valve 25172 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Roorr during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from above elevation 360' 0" to upstream of reanual throttle valve 2SI 72 is included in this segment. This consequence includes all welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 12 2" & 2CCB-12 3". A failure in this segment would cause RWT imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a breat in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA w hich results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally vertfy ECCS pump room isolation when RWT level decreases to 40%. it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resuhing inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPS1 System), while Door drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E-0062 & 83 E 0G63, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E-0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT inventory equal to the delta between 100*4 and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that ti,e force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M. 2044 :nd the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV-5035-1 is adjacent to valves 2CV-5036 2,2CV-5613-2,2CV-5101-1,2CV-4840-2,2CV-5077-2, and 2CV 1519-1. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur. However, because the valve motors are emironmentally qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the
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i G FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculanm No. A.PENG. CALC 010, Rev. 00 Q 14 s 91 Page A7 of A91 adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" sia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001, Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. . Initiating Esent: N Initiating Event II): N/A initiating Event Recovery: N/A less of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner, HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5015-1,2CV-50351,2CV 5055-1 & 2CV 50751)in train "A" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "A" in order to terminate flow l through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed ! segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. Iess of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "A" Train Recovery: /Jthough HPSI train "A" is assumed to be ur.available after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). I Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "A" (i.e., header #1) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the ca.se where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model 3 predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its functicn. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having m equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup ' rain for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i e., pressurtzing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure ti.ne" inherefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least we equivalent backup train fo* -esponding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3,2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MED"JM O Consequence Rank O s v 4
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calcularmn Na A PENG CALC-Olo, Rev. 00 14-ser-91 Page A8 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI-C-03A Consequence
Description:
Loss ofIIPSI s) stem occurs due to an injection line break downstream of manual throttle valve 2S172 and upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV 5035 1 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing 3r in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of manual throttle valve 2SI-72 to upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV 5035 1 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 12 2"
& 2CCB-13 2".
A failure in this segment would cause RWT imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 84-E-0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These incl-de increasing or high water le.cl in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAb. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation w hen RWT leve! decreases to 40*/., it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E-24 A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E-0062 & 83-E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E-0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT imentory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve notors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M. 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV-5035-1 is adjacent to valves 2CV-5036-2,2CV-%13-2,2CV-5101-1,2CV-4840-2,2CV-5077-2, and 2CV 1519-1. Because of the d e proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the
4 l FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablata & A PENG. CALC-010. Rev 00 l4 ser 91 Page A9 of A9) adjacent valves may occur, However, because the valve motors are emironmentally , qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the I adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the I walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" sia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001 Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isoHed by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A i Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line ispection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable i that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection vahes (2CV 50151,2CV 50351,2CV 50554 & 2CV 5075-1)in train "A" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through MPSI pump "A" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. ! Loss of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "A" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "A" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant lp s . HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "A" (i c., header #1) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enougl. LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. HPSI flow would be diverted through the failed segment to the RAB sump with little or no RCS injection occurring. This would eventually lead to core uncovery. Since there are direct indications in :he control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category, Periodic testing (i.e., pressurtzing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore vemed Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O )
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculatwn No. A FENG-C4LC 010, Rev 00 l4-sep-91 Page A10 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C-04 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train "A" (i.e., header #1) occurs due to a line break in the Lower South Piping Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes 150 Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of th HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of the floor penetration at elevation 335' 0" to upstream of the floor penetrations at elevatiot. 360' 0" is included in this segment. Also included is a ponion of the piping for the charging pump discharge to HPSI header #1 and the piping for train "A" hot leg injection in the Lower South Piping Room. This consequence includes all welds in line 2CCB 23 1 1/2" and the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 112",2CCB 12 3",2CCB 12-4",2DCB 1-4" and 2CCB 70-3" (between elevations 335' 0" & 360'-0" ). A failure in this segment would cause RWT inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E-0048-35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instmments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated R CS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB, Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Iecation: Room 2055 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI and LPSI header valves are located in room 2055 of the kertor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 180 gpm. This capacity is based on two drains, esh with a capacity of 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83-E 0063, pg.13). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E-0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An R%T level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above components is not a concern. During normal power operation, the HPSI and LPSI/SDC vahes in this room are positioned (i.e., open) to perform their safety related functions. The valve positions are not changed during periodic testing of the HPSI pumps. Because the valves are normally open and fail as is or fail safe, it is assumed that jet impingement or
q FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cabla' ion Na A.PENG-CAK-010.Rev 00 14.ser 91 Page All of A91 I spraying will not prevent them from performing their safety related function. Hence, jet impingement or spraying of the vahts is also not a concern. As observed during the walkdown, the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" sia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area
- to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS, 1 Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A 1
3 Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump 4 discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner, Flow through the failed segment can be terminated by reclosing HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5015 1,2CV-5035 1, 2CV-5055 1 & 2CV 5075 1) in train "A" in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "A". It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to present the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. Loss of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "A" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "A" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant
, HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a N LOCA).
Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "A" (i.e., header #1) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "B" will still be availabic. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for
- mitigating a LOCA, For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model
- predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either cf the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category.
Periodic testing (i.e, pressurizing to operating pressure) of this piping segment is performed on a quanctly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence catege.y is assigned.
Consequence Category: h0:PIM O Consequence Rank O q J Q i
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablaten Na A PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 I4-sn~91 Page Al2 of A91
~
Consequence ID: HPSI C-04 A Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train "A" (i.e., header #1) occurs due to a line break in the charging pump discharge piping to HPSI header #1 during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPS1 pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of check valve 2SI 24 to upstream of Room 2055 wall penetation is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portion ofline 2CCB 12 2" A failure in this segment would cause RWT imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RC3 pressure, little or no fic,w through the injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected 1 mention: Room 2040 Spatial Effects Comments: This line segment is located in flood zone RAB-2040 JJ in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). The charging pumps, RWT discharge valves, motor control center 2B52, senice water to CCW heat exchangers isolation valves and the outflow valves to the Dardanelle Resenoir are located in this flood zone. The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components within the flood initiation zone. This assumption is too conservative for this evaluation. For a limiting line break, it was observed during the walkdown that one of the charging pumps may be affected because of the closeness of the pump to the location where the break is postulated. All other components within the flood zone are sufficiently far from the break location such that they will not be impacted. The accumulation of sufficient water to threaten the operability of MCC 2B52 is unlikely because of the large flood zone and several propagation paths to lower elevations. As observed during the walkdown, the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'- 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A
t j FMECA - Cor. sequence Information Report Catalatwn h A PENG<ALC Olo. Rn 00 7 \ l4 sey91 Page AIS of A91 I Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recover): Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line irQection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probabb
- that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. Flow through the 4
failed segment can be terminated by reclosing HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5015 1,2CV. 5035-1,2CV.5055 1 & 2CV.5075 1) in train "A" in addition
- securing flow through HPSI i pump "A". It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate * , failed segment, to preserve I
the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. Loss of Trala: T TralaID: HPSI train "A" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "A" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "A" (i.e., header #1) will be unavailable due tc isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e, presscizing to opetating pressure) of this piping segment is performed on a quarterly basis during nonnal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup trais. .Sr responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
r'MECA - Consequence Information Report Cahlamm No. A.PENG-C4LC-010. Rev. 00 te.ser 91 Page A14 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C-05 Consequence
Description:
Loss ofIFSI train "A" (i.e., header #1), CS train A and LPSI pump 2P60A occur due to a line break in ECCS pump room "A" during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolebility of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during nonnal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the 19S1 pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping downstream of HPSI pump 2P89A suction check valve 2SI 7A and upstream of the discharge line penetration at El. 335'- 0", and from HPSI pump 2P89A discharge to grouted sleeved penetration in the discharge cross-tic line is included in this segment. The segment also includcs the piping in the recirculation lines from HPSI pump 2P89A to mini-flow isolation valve 2CV-5126-1 and recirculation valve 2BS 53. This consequence includes the wc!ds in the applicable portions of lines 2GCB 9-8",2GCB-9 6",2DCB 1-4",2DCB 5012", & 2DCB 5112". A failure of this segment would cause R%T inventory to drain to ECCS pump room "A" in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be enwuntered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a LOCA. These include increasing level in ECCS pump room "A", inappropriately low HPSI pump "A" discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, and depending on the break location, inappropriately high or low HPSI flow indicated by train "A" header flow instrument for the indicated RCS pressure, and mismatch between the header flow and pump discharge pressure instruments. Because of the direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Propagation Affected Location: Room 2013 Spatial Effects Comments: This line segment is located in flood zone RAB-2014-LL of the RAD. The major equipment in this area includes HPSI pump 2P89A and its mini flow recirculation valve, LPSI pump 2P60A and its mini flowmive, CS pump 2P35 A and its mini-flow valve, and shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2E35A (Calc. 89-E-0048-35, Att. A, pg. 36). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. For this IFSI line break scenario, the ECCS pumps in the flood zone are assumed to be unavailable due to flooding, sprayiag orjet impingemerit caused by the segment failure. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A initiating Event Recovery: N/A less of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: The ECCS pump rooms are equipped with water level instrumentation to indicate if and when a flooding situation exists. Water level alarms are annunciated in the control room (SAR Section 3.6.4.3.3.1). It is assumed that there is not suflicient time to detect and isolate the break before HPSI pump 2P89A, CS pump 2P35 A, and LPSI pump 2P60A are impacted. However, closing RWT discharge valve 2CV-5630-1 and train "A" of the containment sump isolation valves from the control room will isolate the failed segment, thus presening the integrity of ECCS train "B". It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the leak is i i
4
- FMECA - Consequence Infor nation Report Calculation No A PENG-CALC 010, Rev. 00 I4-ser91 Page Al3 of A91 k equivalent to hasing one backup train.
1 i Loss of Trala: 1%3 Train ID: Train "A" of HPSI, CS and LPSI j Trala Recewery: Although one train of ECCS is lost aAer being isolated, the redundant train of ECCS will still be capable of performing the system's intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). ! Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, train "A" of HPSI, i LPSI, and CS becomes unavailable aAer the segment is isolated or is lost due to flooding, spraying orjet impingement of the ECCS pumps within the room. The i remaining tri.in of ECCS will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup l train available fist mitigating a LOCA. l l For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the hydraulic model j predicts that the HPSI system would still be able to perform its function. Outflow from HPSI train "B" through the failed segment would be prevented by check valve 2SI 12, thus allowing HPSI train "B" to prmide the necessary RCS injection and maintain the core covered. However, the failed segment must be isolated to prevent containment bypass during HPSI recirculation. (The suction of the HPSI pumps is j automatically realigned to the containment sump by RAS upon low level in the ' R%T.) Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having one equivalent backup train. Since a backup ) train is available for either case considered, it is used to determine the consequence g category, l Periodic testing (i c., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. - A between test " exposure time" i is therefore =nmM Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least i one equivalent backup train for mitigating a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is r.ssigned. i There are two active barriers (2C%5649-1 and 2CV 5647 1) to protect against containment bypass. Both valves must fail to close in order for the containment to be bypassed Thus, the cansequence of the failure on containment performance is also hEDIUM (Table 3.3 of EPRI procedure TR-106107). [ Consequenec Category: MEDIUM O Co.aq.e.ce Ra.k O i 4 1 d' f3-a 1-
FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14-o<y 91 Cablahoa
- A FEVGotLC-010 R 00 Page A16 of A91 g Consequence ID: HPSI-C-06 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of HPSI, LPSI, and SIT flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32A occurs due to an injection line break assumed to occur during power operation (i.e., SIT inventory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Con.ments: The break is postulated to occur during nonnal power operation (i.e., SIT inventory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of check valves 2SI 13 A & 2SI 14 A to upstream of check valve 2SI l! A is included in this segment. SIT 2T2A discharge piping downstream of check valve 2SI 16A is also included in this segment. This consequence includes all welds in lines 2CCA 22-3",2CCA 22 6", & 2CCA 22-8" and the applicable welds in line 2CCA 22-12", A failure in this segment would divert HPSI cold leg flow from trains "A" and "E" to the containment. LPSI and SIT flow to RCS cold leg 2P32A would also be diverted to the contianment. The divened flow would drain to the containment sump. For a small break LOCA (i.e., RCS pressure initially remains above SIT pressure), several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. These include low SIT 2T2A pressure and level alarms with RCS pressure above SIT pressure, inappropriately high HPSI and LPSI injection flows indicated by the header flow instruments with most or all of the HPS1 flow indicated by the i atTected inject or, line flow instrument, and inappropriately low HPSI and LPSI pump discharge pressures for the indicated RCS pressure. The affected SIT alarms in conjunction with the other associated indications would alert the operators ei the existence of a HPSi segment failure, it is therefore assumed that the failed HPSI segment would be detected and isolated following a LOCA. For a larger LOCA which depressuriz.es the RCS, flow to the RCS is achieved sia the intact injection lines, thus mitigating the faibd segment without operator actions. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The four safety injection paths are separately located in four different quadrants of the containment. A dpuunic analysis which included the above lines has been performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (S AR Section 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all injection components and associated electrical equipment have been designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental conditions inside the containment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). Hence for the postulated break locations, it is assumed that spatial effects are negligible. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: SDM 3 System IPE ID: HPSI, LPSI, SIT System Recosery: In addition to HPSI, one LPSI and SIT injection flow path would be rendered ineffective. Although isolation is not assumed for this segment failure following a LOCA, there are at kast two RCS cold leg injection paths available. The available injection paths will be capable of mitigating a LOCA.
p FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14-sep.91 Calculanon No A PENG-C4LC-010. Ret 00 Page Ali of A9) Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recosery: N/A Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, the injection of HPSI and LPSI flow to the RCS via cold leg 2P32A will not occur. The contents of SIT 2T2A would discharge to the containment sump without being iruccted into the RCS. The remaining two or three RCS cold leg injection paths (depending on the LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there at: at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from ECCS trains "A" and "B".
' For the case where the failed segment re nains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most sestre because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one equivalent backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category.
Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this piping segment is not performed dunng normal power operation. However, this piping segment is routinely pressurized to accident pressures or above in the court: of SIT imentory adjustments. A between test " exposure time" is therefore Mmmed Because of the between test O(/ exposure time and the availability of one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O 1 1 j r
FMECA - Consequence Inforrnat!on Report Cablation h A PENG CALC-010, M. 00 14-sep.91 Page A18 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI-C-07 Consequence Descriptiom lese drfPSI flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32 A occurs due to an irgjection line break during normal power operation (i.e., SIT inventory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., S!T inventory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping downstream of HPSI line isolation valves 2CV-5015-1 & 2CV 5016 2 and upstream of containment penetration 2P5 is included in this segment. This consequence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable portions ofline 2CCB-14 2" and all welds it line 2CCD 14 3" (outside contairment). A failure in this segment would cause a small amount # RWT inventory to drain to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)F m. 89-E-0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encounter @ %uing a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include incts.g or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPS! flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, sigmficantly less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications or alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected location: Room 208, Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS header valves and EFW distribution valves to steam ger.erator 2E 24 A are located in Room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSIline break scenarios downstream of the HPSIline manual throttle vahrs, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity in this room is 90 gpm ( Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83-E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E-0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in tne flood initiation zone. This assumption is very conservative for this flood scenario. Hand calculations indicate that for a leak of this size, the components identified would not be submerged during a 30 minute allowance for discovery with no consideration of outflow other than the floor drain. A review of Plant Design Drawing M 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern is adjacent to vahrs 2CV-5612-1,2CV-5017 I and 2CV-5038-1. Because of the close proximity to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of these valves may occur. The valve motors are emironmentally qualified to withstand the spraying orjet impirgement of water. For this HPSI line break scenario, it is therefore assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of these vahrs may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation - zone can propagate to the RAB su:np of the General Access Area at elevation 317'- 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General
4
/~~N FMECA - Consequence Information Report CalcularimNa A-PENG-CALC-010.Rev 00 i Q) l4 ser91 Page A19 of A91 Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS.
initiating Event: N laitiating Event ID: N/A i laitiatlog Event Recovery: N/A less of System: SD System IPE ID: HPSI System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control i room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line irucction flow and IFSI pump I discharge pressure indications, it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner, HPSI line injection valves 2CV 5015 1 and 2CV 5016-2 can be closed from the control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It i is assumed that the ability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is equivalent to l having one backup train. Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: Although the HPSI flow path to RCS cold leg 2P32 A is assumed to be lost after being isolated, the remaining injection paths will still be capable of performing their intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI injection path via
' cold leg 2P32 A will be unavailable after being isolated due to the break. The remaining two or three cold leg injection paths (depending on LOCA break location)
- p will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths t
V available with each path being supplied from ECCS trains 'A' and 'B". 4 For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the ' capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there it only one equivalent backup train, ' the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases
, considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category.
- Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not performed during normal power operation. However, due to routine actisities primarily associated with maintaining SIT level, this piping segment is frequently subjected to HPSI pump discharge pressures at or above those which would be encountered following automatic initiation cf the HPSI system. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore =W Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance prosided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O U
FMECA - Const:quence Information Report Cablarmn No A PENG CALC 010.Rev 00 14-ser 91 Page A20 of A9) Consequence ID: HPSI C-08 Consequence
Description:
Degradatioa of HPSI, LPSI, and SIT flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32D occurs due to an injection line break assumed to occur during power operpuon (i.e., SI-imentory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., SIT im entory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the lonpr fault exposure time preceding the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of check valves 2SI 13D & 2SI 14D to upstream of check valve 2SI 15D it, included in this segment. SIT 2T2D discharge piping downstram of check valve 2SI 16D is also included in this segment. This consequence includes all welds in lines 2CCA 23 3",2CCA 23-6", & 2CCA 23-8" and the applicable welds in line 2CCA 23-12" A failure in this segment would divert HPS1 cold leg flow from trains "A" r.nd "B" to the containment. LPSI und SIT flow to RCS cold leg 2P32D would also be diverted to the containment. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump. For a small break LOCA (i.e., RCS pressure initially remains above SIT pressure), sestral unexpect:d alarms and indications would be encotatered. These include low SIT 2T2D pressure and lesti alarms with RCS pressure above SIT
- essure, inappropriately high HPSI and LPSI injection flows indicated by the header flov mstruments with most or all of the HPSI flow indicated by the affected injection line flov > instrument, and inappropriately low HPSI and LPSI pump discharge pressures for tne indicated RCS pressure. The affected SIT alarms in conjunction with the other associated indications would alert the operators of the existence of a HPSI segment failure. It is therefore assumed that the failed HPSI segment would be detected and isolated following a LOCA.
For a larger LOCA which depressurizes the RCS, flow to the RCS is achieved sia the intact injectiodines, thus mitigating the failed segment without operator actions. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected Location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The four safety injection paths are separately located in four different quadrants of the containment A dynamic analysis which included the abost lines has been performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (SAR Section 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all safety injection components and associated electrical ! equipment have been designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental conditions I inside the containment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). Hence, for the postulated break locations, it is assumed that sprial effects are negligible. Initiating Event: N initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating F.sen; Recovery: N/A { Loss of System: SDM-3 System IPE ID: HPSI, LPSI, SIT . System Recovery: In addition to HPSI, one LPSI and SIT injection flow path would be rendered ineffective. l Although isolation is not assumed for this segment failure following a LOCA, there are at j 1:ast two RCS cold leg injection paths available. Th s diable injection paths will be capab'e of mitigating a LOCA. l
4 I O FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculanon No, A PENG Calf.010, Rev. 00
& l4.ser-9? Page A 1 of A91 Loss of Train: N Trala ID: N/A Trale Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, the injection of HPSI and LPSI flow to the RCS sia cold leg 2P32D will not occur. The contents of SIT 2T2D would discharge to the containment sump without being injected into the RCS, The remaining two or three RCS cold leg irdection paths (depending on the LOCA ; break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from ECCS trains 'A' and "B",
For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, tle HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fall to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only on e backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of ti.e two cases considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of thic piping segment is not performed during normal power operation. However, this piping segment is routinely pressurized to accident pressures or above in the course of SIT inventory adjustm:na. A between test ' exposure time" is therefore assumed Because of the between test exposure time and the mvailability of one equivalent backup train (l.c., failure to isolate case) and bas . on Table I and the guidance presided in Table 3,2 of the EPRI 4 procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O J 1 k
1 FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculation No. A PENG CALC-010, Rev. 00 1 t s.sep-97 Page A22 of A9) Consequence ID: HPSI C 09 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32D occurs due to an injection line break during normal power operation (i c., SIT inventory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large ) Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Commentu The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., SIT inventory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time p;cceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA denund. The piping downstream of HPSI line isolation ulves 2CV-5075-1 & 2CV 5076-2 and upstream of containment penetration 2P25 is included in this segment. This consequence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable portions ofline 2CCB-15-2" and all welds in line 2CCB-15 3" (outside containment). A failure in this segment would cause a small amount of RWT im entonj to drain to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E-0048-35, pg. 28). Sescral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water I vel in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT imentory would be drained to the RAB Because of direct indications at alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation whe.n RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatia! Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS header valves and EFW distribution vahes to steam generator 2E-24 A are located in Room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios downstream of the HPSI line manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity in this room is 90 gpm ( Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83-E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E-0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. This assumption is very conservative for this flood scenario. Hand calculations indicate that for a leak of this size, the components identified would not be submerged during a 30 minut' allowance for discovery v.ith no consideration of outflow other than the floor drain. A review of Plant Design Drawing M 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern is adjacent to valve 2CV-10371,2CV-1025-1 and 2CV-1038-2. Because of the close proximity to the failed segment, spraying erjet impingement of these valves may occur. The valve motors are emironmentally qualified to withstand the spraying orjet impingement of water. For this HPSI line break scenario, it is therefore assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of these valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'- 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General
r FMECA _- Consequence Information Report Calculahon No. A.PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 6 la.sm-97 Page A23 of A91 Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Reco cry: N/A Loss of System: SD System IPE ID: HPSI System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications, it is highly probable that the failed segm:nt would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves 2CV '0/5 1 and 2C%5076-2 can be closed froan the control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is t.ssuned 6at the ability of the operators to isolate the failed segir.cnt is equivslent to having one backup train. Loss of'I rain: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: Alihough the HPSI flow path to RCS cold kg 2P32D is assumed to be lost aAct being isolated, the remaining injection pa:hs will still be capable of performing their intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI injection path sia cold leg 2P32D will be unavailable aAer being isolated due to the break. The remaining two or three cold leg injection paths (depending on LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths j available with each path being supplied from ECCS trains "A" and "B", For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPS! hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one equivalent backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not performed during normal power operation. However, due to routine actisities primarily associated with maintaining SIT level, this piping segment is frequently subjected to HPSI pump discharge pressures at or above those which would be encountered following automatic initiation of the HPSI system. A between test
" exposure time" is therefere aunmed Because of the between 'est exposure time and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table 1 and the guidance prosided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned, Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O
1 1 l FMECA - Consequence Inforrnation Report Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 010. Rev. 00 j l4 sey91 Page A24 of A9) { Consequence ID: HPSI-C 10 Consemience
Description:
Degradation of HPSI, LPSI, and SIT flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32C occurs due to an injection line break assumed to occur during power operation (i.e., SIT inventory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break ts postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., SIT imentory addition) or during a respons to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the fei!ure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of check valves 2SI 13C & 2SI 14C to upstream of check valve 2SI 15C is included in this segment. SIT 2T2C discharge piping downstream of check valve 2SI 16C is also included in this segment. This consequence includes all welds in lines 2CCA 24 3",2CCA-24-6", & 2CCA 24-8" and the applicable wrlds in line 2CCA 24-12" A failure in this segment would divert HPSI cold leg flow from Tiais "A" or "B" to the containment. LPSI and SIT flow to RCS cold leg 2P32C would also be diverted to the containment. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump. For a small break LOCA (i.e., RCS pressure initially remains above SIT pressure), several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. These include low SIT 2T2C pressure and testi alarms with RCS pressure above SIT pressure, inappropriately high HPSI and LPSI injection flows indicated by the header flow instruments with most or all of the HPSI flow indicated by the affected injection line flow instrument, and inappropriately low HPSI and LPSI pump discharge pressures for the indicated RCS pressure. The affected SIT alarnu in conjuncdor. with the other associated indications would alert the operators of the existence of a HPSI segment failure. It is therefore assumed that the failed HPSI segment would be detected a ad isolated following a LOCA. For a larger LOCA which depressurizes the RCS, flow to the RCS is achieved sia the intact injection lines, thus mitigating the failed segment without operator actions. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected Location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The foar safety injection paths are separately located in four different gaadrants of the containment. A d;mmic analysis which included the above lines has been performed. The anlaysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (SAR Section 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all safety injection components and associated elect:ical equipment have been designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental conditions inside the containment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). Hence for the postulated break locations. it is assumed that spatial effects are negligible. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event kecovery: N/A Loss of System: SDM-3 System IPE ID: HPSI, LPSI, SIT System Recovery: In addition to HPSI, one LPSI and SIT injection flow path would be rendered ineffective. Although isolation is not assumed for this segment failure following a LOCA, there are at least two RCS cold leg injection paths available. The available injection paths will be capable of mitigating a LOCA. m
d ^; .p FMECA - Consequence Information Report 54-5g91 Calculadon %. A PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page A23 of A91 .
! Loss of Traln: N Train ID: N/A Train Reemery: N/A Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, the injection of HPSI and LPSI flow to the RCS via cold leg 2P32C will not occur. The contents of SIT 2T2C would discharge to the containment sump without being truccted into the RCS.
l The remaining two or three RCS cold leg injection paths (depending on the LOCA ' break location) will continue to be availabic. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from ECCS trains "A" and "B" For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct
- indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isc,
- ate the failed segment is treated as
' having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one equinient backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this piping segment is not performed during normal power operation. However, this piping segment is routinely pressurized to accident pressures or above in the course of SIT imentory adjustments. O' A between test " exposure time" is therefore ass',;med. Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) and based on Table I an.d the guidance prmided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM C Consequence Rank C i a $p U E 4
FMECA - Consequence Infonnation Report Cablata: No. A PENGCALC-010, Rev. 00 \ l4-ser 91 Page A26 of A91 Consequence iD: HPSI-C 11 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32C occurs due to an injection line break during normal power operati:n (i.e., S!T inventory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes t ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., SIT inventory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time peceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the liniting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping downstream of HPSI line isolation valves 2CV. 50551 & 2CV-5056 2 and upstream of containment penetration 2P30 is included in this segment. This conseqtence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable portions ofline 2CCB-7-2" and all welds in line 2CCB 7-3" (outside containment). A failure in this segment would cause a small amount of R%T inventory to drain to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89-E 0048-35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the ' indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injecticn paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT imentory and the known capacity of the HPSI purnps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications or alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation w hen R%T level decreases to 40% it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiatel. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS header valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24 A are located in Room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios downstream of the HPSI line manual throttic valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity in this room is 90 gpm ( Calc. 83-E 0062 & 83 E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E 0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. This assumption is very conservative for this flood scenario. Hand calculations indicate that for a leak of this size, the components identified would not be submerged during a 30 minute allowance for discovery with no consideration " outflow other than the floor drain. A review of Plant Design Drawing M 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern is adjacent to valves 2CV-5057-2,2CV. 5037-1,2CV-5101-1,2CV-1511-1, and 2CV 15191, Because of the close proximity to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of these vahrs may occur. The vahe motors are emironmentally qualified to withstand the spraying or jet impingement of water. For this HPSI line break scenario, it is therefore assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of these valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'-0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001.
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+
i l FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculanon Na A.PENG CALC 010. h. 00 f 14-59 91 Page Ali of A91 [ 3
~ Propagation frem the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a j concern because the pathways ate isolated by SIAS.
laitiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A ! laitiating Event Recovery: N/A 1 ! less of System: SD System IPE ID: HPSI i System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addidon to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow Fl HPSI pump [ discharge pressure indications, it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated its a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves 2CV 5055 1 and 2CV.5056-2 can be closed from the control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the ability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is equiv. lent to
- having one backup train, a
less of Trala: N Train ID: N/A 4 Train Recovery: Although the HPSI flow path to RCS cold leg 2P32C is assumed to be lost afier being isolated, l the remaining injection paths will still be capable of performing their intended design function (i.e- mitigation of a LOD.), t l Coasequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSIinjection path sia j cold leg 2P32C will be unavailable after being isolated due to the break. The remaining two or three cold leg injection paths (depending on LOCA break location) i - will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two irdection paths { available with each path being suppiiod from ECCS trains "A" and "B", 3 For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic mo&l
- predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe i because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct i
indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the ! capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as i
. having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one backup train, the i
resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. i This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category. j Periodic testing (i.e., pressunzing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not
- performed during normal power operation. Howcwr, due to routine actisities primarily associated with maintaining SIT level, this piping segment is frequently
{ subjected to HPSI pump discharge pressures at or above those which would be encountered following automatic initiation of the HPSI system. A between test 4'
" exposure time" is therefore assumed Because of the between test exposure time and the avaisability of at least one equiulent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) for i
responding to a LOCA, and based on Table 1 and the guidance prmided in Table 3.2 ! of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is j assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank C iO. i l-
.~ _ , . , _ . . _ . _ .- __ _ _ _ . . . _ _ , . _ . _ __. .- ___ _ _ _
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculahon No A.PENG.C4LC-010, Rev. 00 te.ser 91 Page A28 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI-C 12 Comcquence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) occurs due to a line break in the Lower South Piping Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comraents: The break is postulated to occur during no: mal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or durir.g a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time paeding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of the floor penetration at elevation 335'-0* to upstream of floor penetrations at elevation 360'-0" is included in this segment. Also included is the piping for train "B" hot leg injection in the Lower South Piping Room. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions of lines 2DCB&3" and 2CCB 3-4" (between elevations 335' 0" & 360' 0" ). A failuie in this segment would cause RWT inver. tory to be drained to the general access area s of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89-E 0048-35, pg. 28). Sestral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water lestl in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the injection paths, inap; ropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventony response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater " depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally strify ECCS pump room isolation w hen RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2055 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI and LPSI header valves are located in room 2055 of tae Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 180 gpm. This capacity is based on two drains, each with a capacity of 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg.13). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Scicening Study (Calc 89-E-0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT imentory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT lestl of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was obsvycJ during the walkdown Otat the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above componcrus is not a concern. During normal power operation, the HPSI and LPSI/SDC valves in this room are positioned (i.e., open) to perform their safety related functions. The vaht positions are not changed during periodic testing of the HPSI pumps. Because the valves are normally open and fail-as-is or fail safe, it is assumed that jet impingement or spraying will not prevent them from performing their safety related function. Hence, jet impingement or spraying of the valves is also not a concern. As
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4 FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cahlatim Na A PENGCE010, Rn 00 O l4.sey97 Page A29 of A91 ~ observed during the walkdown, the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" sia , the floor diains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathw7ys are isolated by SIAS, Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A less of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump j discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. Fow through the i failed segment can be tenninated by reclosing HPS! line irdection vahrs (2CV.5016 2,2CV-5036-2,2CV 5056 2 & 2CV 5076 2) in train "B" in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B", it is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to present the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. less of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of perfor:ning its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a j LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., ' header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. t For the case where the failed segme.it remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are ditect indications in the control room to determine the existence of tM failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category,
- Periodic testing (i.e, pressunzing to operating pressure) of this piping begment is i
! performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time"is therefore amn=A Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
- Consequence Category: MEDIUM C Consequence Rank O i
d ) 4 0 l
( FMFCA Consequence Information Report is te9i O'Md'"*NaAI N N 010
- 00 l'on A30 cf A91 g <
Consequence ID: ilPSl C 13 Consequence Descriptiont Loss ofIIPSI train 'B' (i c., header #2), CS train B, and LPSI pump 2P60B occur due to a line break in ECCS pomp room "B" during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. lireak Site: Large Isolmbility of Break Yes ISO Commrnts: De break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testingl or dunng a terpoase to a LOCA denumd. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding tir detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is , associated with a LOCA demand. The piping downstream ofIIPSI pump 2P89B suction check valve 2517B and immediately downstream of flow orifice 2FO 5102, and from IIPSI pump 2P89B discharge to penetration #2009 0049 in the discharge cross tic line is included in this segment. The segment also includes the piping in the accirevlation lines from IIPSI pump 2P89B to mini flow isolation valve 2CV 51281 and recirculation valve 2BS 54. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 20CD 9 8",2GCD 9-6". 2DCD 1-4",2DCB 3 4',2DCB 502 2", & 2DCB 5112" A failure of this segment would cause R%T inventory to drain to ECCS pump room "D' in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAD). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered folloning a break in this segment in cordunction with a small enough LOCA. These include increasing le cel in ECCS pump room 'B", inappropriately low 11 PSI pump 'B' discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, inadequate RCS inventory response, mismatch between R%T im entory and the known capacity of the !! PSI pumps, inadequate RLS im entory response, and dependirg on the break location inappropriately high or low llPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure. For a large LOCA which results in greater depressurization of t'- RCS, s;3nificantly less R%T inventory would be diverted to ECCS pump room 'B", Because of the direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation w hen R%T level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely mant'er before llPSI recirculation is initisted. Spatial Effects: Propagation Affected 14eation: Room 2009 Spatial Effects Comments: This line segment is located in flood zone RAB 2007 LL of the RAB. The major equipment in this area includes 1151 pump 2P89B and its mini flow recirculation valve, LPSI pump 2P60B and its mini ilow recirculation vah e, CS purnp 2P35B and its mini flow recirculation valve, and shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2E35B (Calc. 89 E 0048 35, Att. A, pg.14). The ANO 2 Flood Screening Study assumed the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. For this IIPSI line break scenario, the ECCS pumps in the flood zone are assumed to be unavailable due to tioodmg, spraying orjet impingement caused by the segment failure. Initlaring Egent: N Initiating Event ID: N/A initiating Egent Recovery: N/A Loss of S) stem: N S) stem IPE ID: N/A S) stem Reemery: The ECCS pump rooms are equipped with water level instrumentation to indicate if and w hen a flooding situation exists Water level alanns are annunciated in the control room (SAR Section 3.6.4.3.3.1). It is assumed that there is not sufficient time to detect and isolate the break before IIPSI pump 2P898, LPSI pump 2P60B, and CS pump 2P35B are impacted. llowever closing R%T discharge valve 2CV.56312 and train 'B' of the containment sump
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p FMECA ConsequenceInformation Report t 4-sty 91 Ca'al""*
- A l'ENG C4LC 810. R'" 00 l' age A30 Rf A91 isolation valves from the control room will isolate the failed segment, thus pleaning the integrity of ECCS train A. It is assumed that the operators abihty to isolate the leak is equivalent to having one backup train.
Ims of Train: Tht3 Train Ilh Train *B* ofIIPSI, CS and LPSI Train Heemery: Although one train of ECCS is lost, the redundtnt train of ECCS will still te capable of pe forming the system's intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, train 'B" ofIIPSI, LPSI, and CS becomes unavailable after being isolated or is lost due to flooding, spraying or jet impingement of the ECCS pumps within the room. The remaining train of ECCS will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case w here the failed segment remains unisolated, the llPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would te the most severe for majority of the piping tecause the iiPSI system would fail to perform its function. There are no check valves downstream of this flood rune to prevent diversion of flow from train "A" The llPSI line injection valves in train "B" must therefore te closed to prevent diversion. The failed ;gment must also be isolated to prevent containment bypass during III L , recirculation. (The suction of the IIPSI pumps is automatically realigned to the containment sump ty RAS upon low level in the RWT.) Since there g are direct indications in the control room to detennine the existence of the failed (V) segment, the capt.bility and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as basing an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i c., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on quarterly basis during nonnal power operation. A between test
' exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalert backup train for mitigating a LOCA, and based on ' Table 1 and the guidance provtled in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.
106706), a htEDIUM consequence category is assigned. There are two active barriers (2CW5648 2 and 2C%5650 2) to protect against containment bypass. Both valves mus; fail to close in order for the containment to be bypassed. *1 hus, the consequence of this failure on contamment performance is also MEDIUM (Table 3.3 of EPRI procedure TR 106107). Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA Consequence information Report Cahla'um L A TMG-C4LC 010. R" 00 I44na l Page A32 of A9) Consequence ID: IIPSI C.14 Consequence
Description:
Loss ofIIPSI train 'A' or 'B' occurs due to a line break in llPSI pump room 'C' during periodic testing or follouing a LOCA. Break Stie: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during nonnal power operation (i.e , pcmdic testing ofIIPSI pump 2P89C) or following a LOCA. IIPSI pump 2P89C can be aligned to either train 'A' or
'B' if the dedicated pump for the train is inoperable or is taken out of service. llence, the consequence of a segment in llPSI pump room 'C' is comparable to the consequence of a segment failure in ECCS purnp room 'A' or 'B', Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is cssumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping in the suction and discharge Unes fot 1(PSI pump 2P89C is included in this segment . from grouted penetration and penetration
#2009-0044 (suction side) to grouted sleeved penetration and penetration #2009 0049 (discharge side). The segment also includes the piping in the recirculation lines from ilPSI pump 2P89C to mini flow isolation valve 2CV $1271 and the grouted penetrations in the I
recirulation line. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2DCD 14",2DCD $00 2",2DCD 5112',2GCD 9 8', & 2GCD 9 6" A failure of this segment would cause R%T inventory to drain to IIPSI pump room 'C" in the l Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAD). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be ! encountered follouing a LOCA. These include increasing level in llPSI pump room 'C", l inappropriately low IIPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS l pressure, inappropriate low ilPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the llPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For e lar%OCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T inventory would be divened to llPSI pump room 'C". Because of the direct indications and alanns in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation w hen RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed t* at the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner tefore IIPSI recirculation is imtiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected twentinn: Room 2010 Spatial Effects Comments: This segment is located in flood zone RAB 2010 LL in the RAB. The major components in this area include HPSI pump 2P89C and its minbilow recirculation valve. The ANO 2 Flood Screening Study assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. This would result in a loss ofIIPSI pump 2P89C. Initiating Esent: N Initiating Event ID: N/A laitiating Event Recoscry: N/A less of Sptem: N System IPE ID: N/A S stem Recovery: !! PSI pump room 'C' is equipped with level instrumentation to annunciate if and w hen a flooding situation exists in the room. Because of the orientation of the pump motor, it is c.ssumed that there will not be sufficient time to isolate the failed segment before HPSI pump 2P89C is 11ooded. Ilowever by closing the appropriate R%T discharge valve (2CV 5630 lor 2CV 5631 1) and the containment sump isolation valves in the appropriate train, the failed segment can be isolated. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the leak is equivalent to having one backup train.
FMECA Consequence Infonnation Report Cablatum No A PENG CAK.010, /(n. 00 l4 ser s1 Page A33 of A91 1ms of Train T Train ID: liPSI train 'A' or 'B' Trale Recovery: Although one train of ECCS train is lost after being isolated, the redundant train of ECCS will still be capable of performing the system's intended design function (i c., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comsment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, IIPSI train 'A' or 'B' becomes unavailable due to isolation or due to flooding, spraying orjet impingement. IfilPS1 pump 'C' is aligned to train "A" then train "A" will be lost otherwise train
'B" will be lost. The remaining train of ECCS will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA.
1 or the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the llPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe for majority of the piping because the liPSI system would fail to perform its function. If IIPSI pump 'C" is aligned to train *A*, flow diversion from train "B" will be prevented by check valve 251 12. Otherwise,11 PSI line injection valves in train 'B' must be reclosed to prevent flow diversion when IIPSI pump 'C' is aligned to train "B", The failed segment must also be isolated to prevent contairunent bypass during ilPSI recirculation. (The suction of the HPSI pumps is automatically realigned to the containment sump by RAS upon low level in the R%T.) Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segnent is treated as hasirig an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category, Periodic testing (l.c., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
' exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of one backup tram for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
There are two active barriers (depending on the alignment of HPSI pump 'C",2CV. 56471 and 2CV.56491 or 2CV.5648 2 and 2CV.5650 2) to protect against containment b> pass. Both valves must fail in order for the containment to be bypassed. Thus, the consequence of the failure on containment pe formance is also MEDIUM (Table 3.3 of EPRI procedure TR 106107). Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Co. seq.e.e. na.k O O
FMECA - Consequence Infortnation Report Calculanoah A M:NG C4M-010 Rev 00 144e97 Tage A H of A 91 Consequence ID: !! PSI C 15 Consequence
Description:
Loss of train "A" hot leg injection occurs due to a line break in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room in response to a large LOCA demand. Break Sire: Large isolability of Ilreak: Yes 150 Comments: The break is postulated to occur following a large LOCA, and in the piping from downstream ofIIPSI train *A* hot leg injection line isoladon vah c 2C%5101 1 to upstream of containtnent penetradon 2P12. This consequence evaluadon includes the welds in the applicable portions of lines 2CCD 70 2" and 2CCD 70 3"(outside containment), A failure in this segment would divert IIPSI hot leg injection flow from train *A* to outside the containment. The diverted hot leg injection flow would drain to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAD)(Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg. 28). Indications available to the control room operators include rising RAB sump level indication and alarm, falling l containment sump water le d and RAB area radiadon monitor alarms. Because of the unexpected alarms and indications in the control room, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner. Spatial Effects: Local Affected 14 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The IIPSI, LPSI and CS injection line isoladon valves and EFW distribution vahes l to Steam Generator 2E 24 A are located in tuom 2084 of the Reactos Auxiliary i Duilding (RAB). For this llPSI line break scenario the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 450 gpm (based on the ANO 2 hydraulic model for the !! PSI System), while fioor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E-0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation rot.c. For this scenario, the time required to fill the room to the lowest level component identified above would be approximately one and one half hours. By this time all valves in the room would have already been placed in their safety related positions. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the roum and flood the valve motors. Flooding of these valves is therefore assumed to be of no concern. A resiew of Plant Design Drawing M 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment w hich contains valve 2C%5101 1 is not within the immedicte vicinity c adjacent to other safety related valves within the room. Hence, it is also assumed that valves in this room would not be impacted by I spraying orjet in'pingement due to the failure of this line segment. It was obsened i during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can l propagate to the RAD sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagadon from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the patinvays are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Esent: N Initiating Esent ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N S3 stem IPE ID: N/A Pstem Recovery: Following a large LOCA and the manual initiadon of hot leg injection, l{ PSI flow would te diverted though the failed segment to the General Access Area of RAB. Because of the
FMECA - Consequence Information Report cablarun n A.rrm-cAtc.010. Rev 00 \ 144er91 Page A33 of A91 dire:t indicadans and alanns in the control room, it is highly probable diat the failed ugment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner, Since the hot leg irdection line isoladon valves are emironmentally qualified, valve 2CW5101 1 can be reclosed from dw control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators sollity to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant train HPSI train, is equivalent to luwing one backup train. Loss of Trale: T Train IDt Train 'A' of hot leg irdecdon Trals Recoverp Although train "A" of hot leg injection is lost after being isolated, the redundant train of hot leg injection car k ee9ually aligned for responding to a large LOCA from the control room. Consequence Commentt for the im.9fM f he failed segment is successfully isolated, train 'A' of hot leg irdecuou n & pac unavailable aAer the failed segment is isolated. The remaining train of hot leg irdecdon will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for prcviding hot leg ledection following a large LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the hydraulle model predicts that the llPSI system would still be able to perfonn its function because the RCS is depressurized. llowever, isolation of the failed segment would sull be needed to prevent significant loss of containment sump inventory. Since there are direct indicadons in the control room to determine the cdstence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having one equivalent backup train. Since a backup train is available for either case considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not performed during normal power operadon. A yearly " exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the yearly exposure time and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a large LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance prmided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category MEDIUM O Co..eque.e, Rank O O
FMECA - Consequence Infortnation Report i4-Sep97 cakulatum n .l rno c4Lc olo. /<rv oo fagt A36 of A91 g Consequence ID: IIPSI C 16 Consequence
Description:
Loss of train "B" hot leg irdection occurs due to a line break in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room in response to a large LOCA demand. lireak Sin: Large Isolability of Breakt Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur following a large LOCA, and in the piping downstream of train 'B' hot leg line injecdon valve 2CV 5102 2 and upstream of containment penetradon 2P13. This consequence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 712* and 2CCB 713"(outside containment). A failure in this seg nent would divert HPSI hot leg irGection flow from train 'B' to outside the containment. The L.verted hot leg injection flow would drain to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAD)(Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg. 28). Indications available to the control room operators include rising RAB sump level indication and alarm, falling containment sump water level and RAB area radiation monitor alarms. Because of the unexpected alarms and indications in the control room, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner. Spatial Effects: Local Affected leestion: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI and CS injecdon line isolation valves and EFW distribudon valves to Steam Generator 2E 24A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For this HPSI line break scenario the resulung inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 450 gpm (based on the ANO 2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), w hile floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Cale. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E-0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood inidation zone. For this scenario, the time required to fill the room to the lowest level component identified above would be approximately one and one-half hours. Dy this time all valves in the room would have already been placed in their safety related positions. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Flooding of these valves is therefore assumed to be of no concern. 1 i A review of Plant Design Drawing M 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment which contains valve 2CV 5102 2 is not within the immediate vicinity or adjacent to other safety related valves within the room. i Hence, it is also assumed that valves in this room would not be impacted by spraying orjet impingement due to the failure of this line segment, it was observed [ during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0* sia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A Sy stem Recovery: Following a large LOCA and the manual initiation of hot leg injection, HPSI flow would be diverted through the failed segment to the General Access Area of RAB. Because of the l
FMECA Consequence Information Report Cal <*lan(*
- d FMG CM 010 h 00 Is.sep o?
Page Ali ef A91 direct indications and alarms in the control room, it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. Since the hot leg iQection line isolation valves are ennronmentally qualified, valve 2CV.5102 2 can be reclosed from the control room in ordet to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant train HPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. 14ss of Tralet T TraleIDt Train 'B' of hot leg injection Trale Recoveryt Although train *B" of hot leg irtjection is lost after being isolated, the redundant train of hot leg irg)cetion can be manually aligned for responding to a large LOCA from the control room. Consequener Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, train "B" of hot leg irtjection will become unavailable after the failed segment is isolated. The remaining train of hot leg injection will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for providing hot leg irgjection following a large LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the hydraulic model predicts that the HPSI system would still be able to perform its function because the RCS is depressurized. However, isolation of the failed segment would still be needed to prevent significant loss of containment sump inventory Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having one equivalent backup train. Since a backup train is available for either case considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. , Periodic testing (i.e., pressurir.ing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not performed dunng normal power operation. A yearly *erposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the yearly exposure time and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for recoonding to a large LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Categoryt MEDIUM C Consequence Rank O O
FMECA - Consequence Inforination Report Cak"'d'*a Na d PENGC4LC-010 I 00 l 4.sg91 Page A38 qf A91 Consequence ID: ilPSI C 17 Consequence Description less of cross tic capability between llPSI header #1 and train 'D' hot leg injection path occurs due to a line break. Ilreak Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur in the piping beturen manual vah es 25130 & 25131. Tids consequence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable portion ofline 2CCD 712". A failure in tids segment would be noticed immediately because local manual action is required to open valve 25130 or 2SI 311n establishing a cross tic flowpath. It is therefore highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated immediately. Spatial Effects: Local Affected lAcation: Room 2084 i Spatial Effects Comments: This line segment is located in Room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) Room. Because of the immediate isolation of the failed segment and the limited volume of water within the segment. it is assumed that viss within the room will not be affected by flooding, spraying, orjet impingement. Initiating Event: N Initiating Egent ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of S) stem: N S) stem IPE ID: N/A System Recover): N/A less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: Immediate operator actions are assumed in order to isolate the failed line segment. Consequence Comment: The establishment of the cross-tic path is not required for mitigating a LOCA. llence, a NONE consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: NONE D Consequence nank O O
P FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cahlaaaa Na A lENG-C46010.h 00
. ns-sm.91 Page M9 nl A9)
Consequence ID: IIPSI C.18
, Consequence
Description:
Degradation ofIIPSI flow occurs due to diversion of cold leg injection from RCS loop 2P32A to contairunent. The break is assumed to occur during power operadon (i.e., SIT inventory addidon) or in resportse to a LOCA demand. Break Slic: Large Innlability of Break: Yes 150 Comments: The break is postulated to occur during power operation (i.e., SIT im entory addidon) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the failure, it is assumed that the limiting cansequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping between containment penetration 2P5 and itPSI check valve 2SI.13 A is included in this segment. Tids consequence evaluadon includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCA 22 3"(upstream of check valve 2SI 13A) and 2CCD 14 3"(inside containment). A failure in this segment would divert IIPSI cold leg flow from trains "A" and "B" to die containment. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump. For a small enough LOCA (i c., RCS pressure initially remains above SIT pressure), several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. These include inappropriately high IIPSI tidection flow indicated by the header flow instruments with most or all of the IIPSI flow indicated by the aflected injection line flow instrument, inappropriately low IIPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the 7 llPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. These indications would alert die (N operators of the existence of a IIPSI segment failure. It is therefore assumed that the failed ! llPSI segment would be detected and isolated following a LOCA. For a larger LOCA w hich results in greater depressurizadon of the RCS, flow to the RCS would be achieved via the intact injection lines, thus midgating the failed segment without operator actions. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected Location: Containment Buiki.ag Spatial Effects Comments: The lines in this segment are included as part of the }{ PSI injection path to RCS toop 2P32 A. A dynarnic analysis w hich included the above lines has been performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dptamic effects of the line break (SAR Section 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all safety injection components and associated electrical equipment inside the containment have been designed to withstand LOCA emironmental conditions (S AR Section 6.3.2.12.1). It is therefore assumed that spadal effects would be negligible, and IIPS! flow to RCS loop 2P32 A would be ineffective. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: SD System IPE ID: IIPSI System Recoveryt IIPSI flow path via RCS cold leg 2P32A would be rendered ineffective. Although isolation is assumed for this segment failure following a LOCA, there are at least two RCS cold leg
,h injection paths availabic. The availabic injection paths will be capable of mitigating n (d LOCA. IIPSI line injection valves 2CV 50151 and 2CV 5016 2 can be cic.ied from the control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment.
FMECA Consequence Inforniation Report le-sv91 Catala'a h A l'NGC Ol0A N l' age A40 of A9) g less of Traln: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, the injection of } IPSI flow sia RCS cold leg 2P32 A will not occur due to isolation. The remaining two or three RCS cold leg injection paths (depending on the LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Tims for this case there are at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from IIPSI trains "A" and "B". For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the !! PSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the llPSI system would fall to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to detennine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this piping segment is not performed during nonnal power operation. Ilowever, this piping segment is routinely pressurized to accident pressures or above in the course of SIT inventory adjustments. A between test " exposure time"is therefore assumed. Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Conwquence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O m.
i l p FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14.$rp 91 Cohlatuw No A TENG C4LC 0/0, Rev 00 Page A4i of A91 Consequence ID: !! PSI C 19 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of11 PSI flow occurs due to diversion of cold leg injection from RCS loop 2P32D to containment. The break is assumed to occur during power operation (l c., SIT inventory addition; or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Stre: Large Isolability ofIlttak Yes 150 Comments: The break is postulated to occur during power operadon (i c., SIT inventory addition) cc during a response to a LOCA dernand Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping between containment penetration 2Pil and IIPSI check valve 251 13H is included in this segment. This consoquence evaluadon includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCA 213"(upstream of check valve 2SI 13D) and 2CCD 13 3"(inside containment). A failure in this segment would divert IIPSI cold leg flow from trains "A" and 'D' to the contaimnent. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump. For a small enough LOC A (i.e., RCS pressure initially remains above SIT pressure), several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered These include inappropriately high liPSI irdection flow indicated by the header flow instruments with most or all of the IIPS! flow indicated by the affected injecdon line flow instrument, inappropriately low IIPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the llPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. These indications would alert the \ operators of the existence of a IIPSI segment failure. It is therefore assumed that the failed llPSI segment would be detected and isolated following a LOCA. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, flow to the RCS would be echieved via the intact irdection lines, thus mitigating the failed segment without operator actions. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The lines in this segment are included as part of the liPSI injection path to RCS loop 2P328. A dynamic analysis u hich included the above lines has been performed The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (S AR Section 364.2.8.2). In addition, all safety injection components and associated electrical equipment inside the containment have been designed to withstand LOCA emironmental conditions (S AR Section 6.3.2.12.1). It is therefore assumed that spatial effects would be negligible, and IIPSI flow to RCS loop 2P32B would be ineffective. Initiating Event: N lattiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Esent hecmcry: N/A Loss of System: SD System IPE ID: IIPSI System Recovery: IIPSI flow patinia RCS cold leg 1P32B would be rendered ineffective. Although isolation is assumed for this segment failure following a LOCA, there are at least two RCS cold leg injection paths available. The available injection paths will be capable e' mitigating a LOCA. HPSIline injection valves 2CV 50351 and 2CV 5036 2 can be closed from the O(7 control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment.
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablanm h A PEEC4K-010,1(n. 00 14-ser91 Page A42 of A91 ks: of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recoiery: N/A Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, the injection of IIPSI flow via RCS cold leg 2P32B will not occur due to isolation. The remaining two or three RCS cold leg irjection paths (depending on the LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from IIPSI trains "A" and "B" For the case where the falicd segment remains unisolated, the !! PSI hydrauli; model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the llPSI system would fall to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train Because there is only one backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. This case is therefore used to detennine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operatmg pressure) of this piping segment is not performed during normal power operation. Ilowtver, this piping segment is routinely pressurized to accident pressures or above in the course of SIT inventory adjustments. A between test " exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA ConsequenceInforsnation Report Cahtaa<a n A-rnu.c4w.010./rm oo O I** W rage Alt qf A9) Consequence ID: HPSI.C.20 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of HPSI flow occurs due to diversion of cold leg injection from RCS loop 2P32C to containment. The break is assumed to occur during power operation (i.e., SIT imentory addition) or in response to a LOCA demand. Break $1se: Large teolability of Devak: Yes
!$0 Cosaments: The break is postulated to occur during power operation (i.e.. SIT inventory addition) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the i failure, it is assumed that the limidng consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping between containment penetration 2P30 and HPSI check valve 251 13C is included in this segment. This consequence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable l - portions oflines 2CCA 24 3'(upstream of check valve 2St.13C) and 2CCB 7 3* (inside con:aintnent).
A failure in this segment would divert HPSI cold leg flom from trains "A* ani *B' to the containment. 'Ihe diverted flow would drain to the contahment sump. For a small enough LOCA (i.e., RCS pressure initially remains above SIT pressure), several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. '!hese include inappropriately high HPSI injecdon flow indicated by the her der flow instruments with most or all of the HPSI flow indicated by the aNected injection line flow instrument, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity nfibe HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. These indicadons would alert the O operators of the existence of a HPSI segment failure,11 is therefore assumed that the failed HPS1 segment would be detected and isolated following a LOCA. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, flow to the RCS would be achieved via the intact is9ection lines, thus midgating the failed segment without operator actions. Spatial ENects: Containment ANected 1Acattom: Containment Building Spatial E#ects Comments: The lines in this segment are included as part of the HPSI insection path to RCS loop 2P32C. A dynamic analysis which included the abms lines has been performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic e#ects of the line break (SAR Seedon 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all safety i Qoction components and associated electrical er ipment inside the containment have been designed to withstand LOCA emironmental condi6ons (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). It is therefore assumed that spatial e#ects would be negligible, and HPSI flow to RCS loop 2P32C would be ineNoctive, lattisting Event: N lattiaties Esent ID: N/A laitiatlag Event Recovery: N/A
. lass of System: SD System IPE ID: HPSI System Recovery: HPSI flow path via .CL cold leg 2P32C would be rendered ineNective. Although isoladon is assumed for this segnu nt failure following a LOC /., there are at least two RCS cold leg insection paths available. The available injection paths will be capable of midgating a O LOCA. HPS1 line injection valves 2CV.50551 and 2C%5056 2 can be closed from the control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment.
I FMECA Conserguence Information Report Cawlahm Ah A l'EAmm0/0.Rn 00 14 sep 97 l'ageA44ofAPI ims of Traint N Train ID: N/A Train Reemer): N/A Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, the irQection ofIIPSI flow via RCS cold leg 2P32C will not occur due to isolation. The rernaining two or three RCS cold leg injection paths (dependiag on the LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from IIPSI trains "A" and "R". For the case w here the failed segment remains unisolated, the }{ PSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the llPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct
) indica %s in the control room to detennine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered.
This case is therefore used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i c., pressurir.ing to operating pressure) of this piping segment is not performed during normal power operation. s4 wever, this piping segment is routinel) pressuriwi to accident pressures or above f . ie course of SIT inventory adjustments. A between test " exposure time" is therefore sumed. Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of one equivalent backup train (i.e., failure to isolate case) and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a hiEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
O FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calcula'"a Na d PENG-C4LC 8/8 E'" 00
\
Q ss-sm91 Page An of A91 Consequence ID: IIPSI C 21 Consequence Desedption: Degradation ofIIPSI flow occurs due to diversion of cold leg irdection from RCS loop 2P32D to containment. The break is assumed to occur during power operation (i.e., SIT imentory addition) or l't response to a LOCA demand. Break Site Large Isolability of Breakt No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during power operation (i e., SIT inventory addition) or during a respons6 to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping between containment penetration 2P25and IIPSI check valve 2SI 13D is included in this segment. This consequence evaluation includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCA 23 3"(upstream of check valve 2SI 13D) and 2CCB 15 3'(inside containment). A failure in this segment would divert IIPSI cold leg flow from trains "A" and 'B" to the containment. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump. For a small enough LOCA (i e., RCS pressure initially remains above SIT pressure), several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. These include inappropriately high IIPSI trucction flow indicated by the header flow instruments with most or all of the HPSI flow indicated by the affected injection line flow instrument, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T trwentory and the known capacity of the gi t IIPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. These indications would alert the operators of the existence of a HPSI segment failur:. It is therefore assumed that the failed llPSI segment would be detected and isolated follouing a LOCA. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, flow to the RCS would be achieved via the intact injection lines, thus mitigating the failed segment without operator actions. I Spatial Effects: Containment Affected 14 cation: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The lines in this segment are included as %rt of the HPSI injection path to RCS loop 2P32D. A dynamic analysis which icluded the above lines has been performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (SAR Section 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all safety injection components and associated electrical equipment inside the containment have been designed to withstand LOCA emironmental conditions (SAR Section 6.3.2.12,1), it is therefore atsumed that spatial effects would be negligible, and HPSI flow to RCS loop 2P32D would be inctiective. Initiating Esent: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A less of System: SD S) stem IPE ID: HPSI System Recovery: HPSI flow path via RCS cold leg 2P32D would be rendered ineffective. Although isolation is assumed for this segment failure following a LOCA, there are at least two RCS cold leg injection paths available. The available injection paths will be capable of mitigating a [,} LOCA. HPSIline injection rakes 2CV 50751 and 2CV 5076 2 can be closed fmm the V control room in order to terminate flow through the failed segment.
FMECA - Consequence Information Report i4.sep.97 Ca'a'aa= ^h d l'E^M6010 R" 00 l' art A46 of sf 91 g laas of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recoser): N/A Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, the injection of }{ PSI flow via RCS cold leg 2P32D will not occur due to isolation. The remaining two or three RCS cold leg injection paths (depending on the LOCA break location) will continue to be available. Thus for this case there are at least two injection paths available with each path being supplied from IIPSI trains " A" and 'D*. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the llPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the llPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to detennine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Because there is only one backup train, the resulting consequence for this case is the more limiting of the two cases considered. This caw is therefore used to determine the consequence category. l Periodic testing (i c., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this piping segment is not performed danng normal pour operation. Ilowever, this piping segment is routinely pressurized to accident pressures or above in the course of SIT inventory adjustments. A between test " exposure time"is therefore assumed. Because of the between test exposure time and the availability of one equivalent backup train (i c., failure to isolate case) and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TL106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. , Consequence C6tegoryt MEDIUM O Consequence nank D O
ra FMECA - Consequence Information Report 144er97 cohl nm xo Anno cu.c.olo./<n 00 Tage A47 g/ API Consequence ID: IIpSI C 22 Consequence
Description:
Loss of!! PSI train A (i.e., flow from header #1) occurs due to an injection line break upstream of manual throtde valve 2SI 68 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Slie: Large Isolability of Break Yes ISO Comments: The break is pos ulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the llPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure,it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from above elevadon 360' 0* to upstream of manual throtde valve 25168 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 12 2* & 2CCD 12 3', A failure in this segment would cause R%T inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg. 28). Se tral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water lesti in the RAB sump, inappropriately high IIPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaficcted irpection paths, inappropriately low IIPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressu.:. mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the IIPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA w hich results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significandy less R%T imentory would be drained to the RAD. Because of direct indications and alarms in the V control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation w hen R%T level decreases to 40%. it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before llPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected location: Room 2084 , Spatial Effects Comments: The llPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution vahts to steam generator 2E 24A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliuy Building (RAB). For IIPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle vahrs, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO 2 hydraulic model for the IIPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone.11owever, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% RWT level weie to be emptied into the room. An R%T les el of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the vahr motors. Therefore for this llPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying or jet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M-2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CW50151 is adjacent to valves 2CW5016 2,2CV 5612 1,2C%$0171 and 2CW5038 l Because of the close proximity of these valves to (G) the faikd segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur, liowever, because the valve motors are emironmentally qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will i
FMECA . Consequence Information Report Cala I *
- d PEG Cdif 010. h 00 14 sep97 Part A# c3f APl still be operable. It was observed during the walldown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation ro te can propagate to the RAD sump of the General Access Area at elevadon 317' 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001.
Psopagadon from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by Sl AS. Initiating Esent: N Inlilating Event ID: N/A Initiating Esent Recoscry: N/A tess of System: N S3 stem IPE ID: N/A Sy stem Recos er): Since increasing water level in the RAB ' ump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addidon to unexpected deviation of IIPSI line irdoction flow and itPSI pump discharge pressure indicauons and higher pump flow rate in train 'A', it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a Omely manner, llPSI line irdection valves (2CW50151,2CW50351,2C%$0$51 & 2CW5075 l)in train "A" must te reclosed in addition to securing flow through IIPSI pump 'A' in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant liPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. less of Traln: T Train ID: IIPSI train 'A' Train Recovery: Although IIPSI train 'A' is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant ilPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i e., midgadon of a LOCA). g Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, llPSI train 'A' (i e., W header #1) will be unavailable due to isoladon of the break. The redundant itPSI train
'B' will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA.
For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the llPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the llPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to detennine the existence of the failed seFment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as hasing an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quanerly basis dunng normal power operation. A betwren test
' exposure time' is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 10o706), c. MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA Consequence Information Report Celnslanws No A.PDG-CAM-01W 00 3*8 W P, Mp 4 Apt Conseguence ID: HPSI.C.22A Consequence Deerription: less of HPSI system occurs due to an idection line break downstream of manual throttle valve 2S148 and upstream of HPSI line i$ection valw 2CV.50l$.1 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break $1se Large laelability of Break No ISO Cessments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e.. periodic testing of the ' HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time precedmg the detection of the failure, it is assure that the limiting consequence l described herein is associated with a LOCA demand The piping from downstream of manual throttle valve 25148 to upstream of HPSI line i$ection valve 2CV. Col $. is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB.12 't* A 2CCB.14 2". l A failure in this segment would cause RWT imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Cale,89.E.0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in coWunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water lost in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow thraugh the unaffected i$ection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory O. and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely mannes before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected LAestioG1. Room 20a4 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, A CS line teolation valves and EFW distribution vaives to steam generator 2E.24 A are located in room 20g4 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstroom of tin enual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum td approximately 850 spm (based on the ANO.2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 spn. (Calc. 83.E.0062 A 83.E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89.E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T inventory
- equal to the delta between 100% and 95% RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An R%T level of 95% is the annunciated low inst for this tank, it was observed during the walkdoun that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant anmnt of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern.
Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur, Plant Design Drawig M. O 2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV.$0151 is a4acent to valves 2CV.5016 2,2CV 5612 1,2CV.50171 and 2CV 50381. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the a$acent )*1ves may occur. I l
r------ 1 FMECA - Consequent, inforrnation Report Cablana h A FLWG CUC-810 R'" 00 l4 sm91 Page A30 of A9) llowever, because the valve motors are emironmentally qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves ma) occur they will still te operable. It was observed dunng the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation tone can propagate to the RAD sump of the O meral Access Area at elevation 317 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. ' 001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not ,* concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Esent Recoscry: N/A less of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAD sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addidon to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line in)xtion valves (2CV.50151,2CV.50351,2CV.50$$.1 & 2CV.507$.1)in train "A* must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "A' in order to terminate flow thraugh the failed segment, it is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segmem, to preserve the redundant itPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. less of Traln: T Train ID: HPSI train "A" Tralu Recovery: Although IIPSI train "A" is vtumed to ha unavailable after being isolatt the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). ' Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "A* (i c., header #1) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train
'B' will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA.
For the case w here the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. HPSI flow would be diverted through the failed segment to the RAB sump with little or no PCS i: Vection occurring. This would eventually lead to core uncovery. Since there tre direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of tids pipe segment is performed on a quanerly basis during normal power operation. A between test
' exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one .quivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA Consequence Information Report O ts-W91 Calatatum h A.PENG C4LC 010, M 00 Page A3) of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI.C.23 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train A (i.e., flow from header #1) occurs due to an irdection line breek upstream of manual throttle vaht 25170 in the Upper South Piping and Peratration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Sleet Large Isolability of Break Yes ISO Cominents: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from above elevation 360'.0" to upstream of manual throttle valve 25170 is included in this segment. This comequence includes Ow welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 12 2" & 2CCB.12 3", A failure in this segment would cause R%T inventory to be drained to Ow general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89.E 0048 35, pg. 28). Sneral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water Intl in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected irpection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significandy less R%T O inventory would be drained to the RAB Because of direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identifled and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected L9eation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves ral EFW distnbution vahts to steam generator 2E.24 A are located in roor: 2m of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarius upstream of the inanual throttle valves, he resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO 2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83.E.0062 & 83.E 0063, pg. 38). The AMO 2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89.E.0048 35, pg.13) asmtm se hilure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand caVulatiou indicJe the the components identified above would not be submerged if @ r invente equal to the delta between 100% and 93% RWT level were to be emptied into the. room. An RWT les el of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. P was observed during the walkdown that the form excried en the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the vahc motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Sptaying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M. 2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV 50551 is adjacent to valves 2CV 5056 2,2CV 5057 2,2CV.50371,2CV.$t '.1,2CV.15191 and 2CV 1511 1, Because of the close ( }koximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur. However, because the vaht motors are em ironmentally qualified, it is asstuned that nta though spraying orjet impingement of the
l f FMECA - Consequence Information Report CakWa'imh A FMG CMC-010dfrv 00 14-5cV91 Page A.12 of A91 adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It uas observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAD sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'.0" via the floor drains and stairw y No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the Iwthways are isolated by Sl AS. Initiating Esent: N Initiating Event IDt N/A Initiating Esent Recoveryt N/A IAss of System: N System IPE IDt '"A S) stern Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RA3 sump is indicated and annunciated in the control roc,.n, in addition to unexpected deviation of IIPSI line injection flow and IIPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be dettcted and isolated in a timely manner. IIPSI line injection valves (2CV 50151,2CV 50351,2CV 50551 & 2CV.50751)in train "A" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through }{ PSI pump 'A' in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant lips! train, is equivalent to having one backup train. less of Train: T Train ID: IIPSI train "A" Train Recosery: Although IIPSI train *A* is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant ilPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA) Conwquence Comment: For the case w here the failed segnant is successfully isolated, llPSI train " A" (i.e., header #1) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the l{ PSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the IIPSI system would fail to perform its function Since there are direct indications in the controf room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered. it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i c., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
*expor.tre time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O O
FMECA ConsequenceInforruation Report c t e n a A m e m olo,R n 00 O 144er 97 Pere AAt qrArt Ceasequence ID: HPSI C 23A Casseguence
Description:
Loss of HPSI system occurs due to an injection line break downstream of manual throttle valve 2S170 and upstrerm of HPSI line irdection valve 2CV 50$$ 1 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response i to a LOCA demand. Break Sise Large Isonability of Break: No 150 Comments: The breat is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., penodic testing of the HPSI pump) or riuring a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time proceding the detection of the failur; it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein it associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of manual
- throttic valve 2SI 70 to upstream of HPSI line Iq)oction valve 2CV 5055 1 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 12 2"
& 2CCB 7 2".
- A failure in this segment would cause RWT inventory to be drained to the general access ares l of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E4048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and mdications would be encountersd following a break in this segment in coqiunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flw indicated by the header flow iratruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow thrush the unasected iqjection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory O and the known capacity of the HPS: pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response For a larger LOCA which remdts in greater depressurization of the RCS, signincantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAB. Becauts of the direct indications in the control room
. and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated.
Spatial Effects: Local Anieted 14catient Room 2084 Spatial Effects Commentai The HPSI, LPSI, A CS linc isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24A are located in Room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upsusam of the manual throttle valas, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of appmximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO 2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 laternal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. Homer, hand calculations indicate that the components identined above would not be submerged if an R%T lawntory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An R%T level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed dunns the walkdown that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M. O 2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV 50$$ 1 is a4acent to valves 2CV 5056 2,2CV 5057-2,2CV 50371,2CV 5101 1,2CV 15191 and 2CV 1511 1. Because of the close. < proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the
FMECA - Consequence Information Report l4 sep97 Cah'a'a Na A PE^Yi CdK 010. R'r 60 Page Ah of A9/ g adjacent vahes may occur, llowever, because the valve motoss are emironmentally qualified, n is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed dunng the walidown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump roonc is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Esent: N Initiating Egent ID: N/A Initleting Event Reemery: N/A imst of System: N S3 stem IPE ID: N/A System Recovery Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addidon to unexpected deviadon of HPSI line injection flow and llPSI pump discharge pressure indications and Idgher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner, llPSI line injection valves (2C%50151,2CV 50351,2C%50551 & 2CV 50751)in train "A" must be reclosed in addidon to securing flow through HPS! pump "A" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ab;lity to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPS! trai t, is equivalent to having one backup train. I less of Traln: T Train ID: ! ilPSI train "A" Train Reemery: Although IIPSI train 'A' is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant ilPSI train will s:ill be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). I Consequence Comment: Loss of HPSI system occurs due to non-isoladon of the break. There are no available backup trains for liPSI. Periodic testing (i e., pressurizing to operaung For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train 'A" (i.e., header #1) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train 'B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for midgating a LOCA. For the case w here the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. HPSI flow would be diverted through the falied segment to the RAB sump with little or no RCS injection or. curring. This would eventually lead to core uncovery. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periadic testing (i c., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
' exposure time' is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O
FMECA - Consequence Inforruation Report Ca'c"Ia'"* No d FMGC4K-010 ^" 00 C 14-ses*97 fogt A33 of A91 Consequence ID: IIPSI C 24 Consequence
Description:
Loss of IIPSI train A (i e., flow from hcader #1) occurs due to an injection line break upstream of snanual throtdc valve 25174 in the Upper South Piping and Penetradon Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA denumd. Break Stic: Large Isolability of Brtakt Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the llPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from abost eination 360' 0" to upstream of manual throttle valve 25174 is included in this segment. The piping from downstream of manual valve 25130 is also included in this segment. This conscquence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCD 712",2CCB 15 2" & 2CCB 12 3". A failure in this segment would cause R%T imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg. 28). Sntral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in tids segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAD sump, inappropnately high IIPSI flow indicated by the header flow insuuments for the indicated RCS pressure, little nr e flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low IIPSI pump discharge inw.re for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T imentory and the known capuity of the IIPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a (Ug) larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAB Because of direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation w hen R%T Inti decresses to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before llPSI recirculadon is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The IIPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distnbution valves to steam generator 2E 24 A are located in room 2084 cf the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For IIPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle vahrs, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the IIPSI System), wldle floor drain capacity is 90Fpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screerdng Study (Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood irutiaden zone. Ilowner, hand calculadons indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T imentory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An R%T Inti of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walidown that the force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can hecumulate inside the room and finod the valve motors 'therefore for this IIPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain vahts may occur, Plant Design Drawing M-2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of
/7 concern which contains 2CV 50751 is adjacent to vahts 2CV 5076 2,2CV 5077 h 2,2CV 10371,2CV 10251 and 2CV 1038 2. Because of the close proximity of I
l these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur,110 wever, because the vaht motors are emironmentally
FMECA - Consequence Infortnation Report le ser 91 Cahlaa
- A PNG CALC 10 h 00 Page A% of A91 g qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflou of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001, Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SI AS.
Initiating Esent: N Initiating Event ID: N/A initiating Esent Recover): N/A Loss of 53 stemt r4 S3 stem IPE ID: N/A System Recovery Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation ofIIPSI line injection flow and IIPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. IIPSI line injection valves (2C%$0151,2CW5035 1,2CW50$$ 1 & 2CW50751) in train 'A" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through }{ PSI pump 'A' in order to tenninate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant itPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. Loss of Train: T Train ID: IIPSI train "A* Train Reemery: Although IIPSI train 'A' is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the reduadant i llPSI train will still be capabic of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train 'A" (i.e., header #1) will be unavailable due to Solation of the break. The redundant itPSI train "B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the lips! hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe
- because the llPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since these are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category.
Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A betwten test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
p FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cahb'* Na A FMG-CALC Ol0
- 00 t i4-Ser97 Page AJ1 of A9/
L Consequence ID: IIPSI C 24A Consequence
Description:
Loss ofIIPSI system occurs due to an injection line break downstream of manual throtde valve 25174 and upstream ofIIPSI line injection valve 2CV 50751 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room r5 ring periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Stie: Large Isolability of Break No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i c., periodic testing of the IIPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of manual throttle valve 25174 to upstream ofIIPS1 line it.jection valve 2CV 5075 1 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portion ofline 2CCD 15 2'. A failure in this segment would cause R%T inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high IIPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, litdc or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low liPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the !! PSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imtntory response. For a 3 (b larger LOCA w hich results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significandy less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level decreases to 40% it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before IIPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Imestion: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The llPSI, LPSI, & CS Mne isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24 A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For }{ PSI ime break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO 2 hydraulic model for the IIPSI System), w hile floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiadon zone, llowever, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An R%T level of 93% is the annunciated low inel for this tank, it was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve anotors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M. 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV 50751 is adjacent to valves 2CV 5076 2,2CV 5077-y S) 2,2CV 10371,2CV 10251 and 2CV 1038 2. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impi:wement of the adjacent valves may c.. cur. However, because the vahc motors'are emironmentally
FMECA - Consequence Infornantion Report Cablanm % A TENG-CALC-010. Rev 00 14-ser 91 Tage A38 of A91 qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'-0" sia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by Sl AS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A loitiating Event Recovery: N/A IAss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A Syrtem Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner, HPSI line injection valves (2CV 50151,2CV 50351,2CV 50551 & 2CV 50751)in train "A" must be reclosed in addition to secunng flow through HPSI pump "A" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed tiet the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI trea, is equivalent to having one backup train. less of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "A" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "A" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "A" (i.e., header #1) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe bemuse the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. HPSI flow would be diverted through the failed segment to the RAB sump with little or no RCS injection occurring. This would eventually icad to core uncovery. Since there are direct indications in the control room to detern,ine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performW on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
' exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA - Consequence Infonaation Report Calcularon Na A PMG CALC 010. Rrw 00 14-sw91 Pop A39 of A91 wt Consequence ID: HPSI C-25 Conseguemee
Description:
Loss of HPSI train B (i.e., flow from header #2), occurs due to an injection line break upstream of manual throttle vaht 2S173 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes 150 Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time proceding the detection of tne failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from abmt elevation 360'.0" to upstream of manual throttle valvt 25173 is included in this segment. This consequence includes thel welds in the applicable portions oflines 2DCB-3 2" & 2DCB 3 3", A failure in this segment would cause RWT inventcry to be drained to the general access area of th- Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, - inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS L ' pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump am isolation when RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be islentified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected 14eation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Conaments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Bui ding - (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83-E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E 0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the wa!k&wn that the force exerted on the non w3ter tight door would cause it to open tefore a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve mot. ors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, floodi ig of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying or jet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M. 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concein which contains 2CV 5036-2 is adjacent to valves 2CV 5035-1,2CV 5613-2,2CV 5101 1,2CV-4840-2,2CV-5077 2, and 2CV 15191. Because of the close i-( proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent w .tes may occur. However, because the valve motors are erwironmentally qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of ue
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculanon No A PENG-CALC-0/0.Rev 00 l4-sey91 Page A60 of A91 ' adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'-0" sia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A lattiating Event Recosery: N/A Loss of System: N System IP I ID: N/A Systern Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is ind :ated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI li, e injection flow and IIPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5016 2,2CV-5036 2,2CV 5056-2 & 2CV 5076-2)in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backmp train. Loss of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable cue to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category, Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the
- availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM C Consequence Rank O O
FMECA - Consequence Inf'ormation Report C,*ularkw & A PEE-CALC 010. h. 00 t s-ser 91 Page A61 of A9) Consequenec ID: HPSI C 25A Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI system occurs due to an irsection line break downstream of manual throttle valve 2SI 73 and upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV-5036 2 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the
!! PSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure
- time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of manual throttle valve 2SI 73 to upstream of HPSI line injectior. valve 2CV 5036 2 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portion ofline 2DCB-3 2".
A failure in this segment would cause RWT inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small breal LOCA. These include increasing or high water lewl in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a
\
larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T imentory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when RWT lent decreases to 40%. it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected 14 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E-24 A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building
-(RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of tie manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model fonhe HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83-E 0062 & 83-E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 laternal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes th: failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. Howewr, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An R%T level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSIline break scenario, flooding of the above valws is not a concern.
Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M-2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the fine segment of - O concern which contains 2CV 5036-2 is adjacent to valves 2CV 5035-1,2CV-5613-2,2CV-5101 1,2CV-4840-2,2CV-5077 2, and 2CV-1519-1. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur. However, because the valve motors are emironmentally
)
FMECA - Consequence Information Report CalculaamNa A PENG-CALC-010 h 80 14-Sep-91 Page A62 of A91 qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was obsen ed dunng the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0*aia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probabic that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5016 2,2CV-5036-2,2CV 5056-2 & 2CV 5076-2)in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. lass of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. HPSI flow would be diverted through the failed segment to the RAB sump with little or no RCS injection occurring. This would eventually lead to core uncovery. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressunzing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is l performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test i
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quanerly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and i
based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
1 FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablanon No. A.PMG-CALC-0/0, Rn 00 14-Sw91 Pay A63 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 26 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train B (i.e., flow from header #2) occurs due to an injection line break upstream of manual throttle valve 2SI 69 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room 6. ing periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes , ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. .Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from above elevation 360' 0" to upstream of manual throttle valve 2S1-69 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicabic portions oflines 2DCB 3 2" & 2DCB 3 3". A failure in this segment would cause RWT inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Buildog (RAB)(Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg. 28). Several =W alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch betwoca R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected 14 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E-24A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 spin (based on the ANO 2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain - capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83-E 0062 & 83-E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 laternal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E-0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non-wster tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M-2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV 5016-2 1 is a4acent to valves 2CV 5015-1,2CV-50381,2CV-5612-1 and 2CV 5017-1. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the a4acent valves may occur. However, because the valve motors are emironmentally qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may l
FMECA - Consequence Inforunat10n Report Calculation No. A PENG.C4LC 010. Rev. 00 14-Sep-91 Page A64 of A91 occur they will still be operable, it was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'-0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathway are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N laitiating Event ID: N/A initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves (2CV-5016 2,2CV 5036 2,2CV-5056 2 & 2CV 5076-2)in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. Imss of J da: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train =ill still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPS! train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI syste 9. would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because af the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
p_ . FMECA - Consequence Information Report Is-Sw-91 Catala'a No. A-PENG CALC-010. h,00 Page A63 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 26A Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI system occurs dae to an injection line break downstream of manual throttle valve 25169 and upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV 5016-2 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Bnakt No ISO Commets: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic twing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. 'the piping from downstream of manual throttle valve 2SI-69 to upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV 5016-2 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portion ofline 2DCB 3 2. A failure in this segment would cause RWT inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89-E41048-35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction . with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a
.\ larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T imentory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level dxw to 40%, it is assumed that the segment failure would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated.
Spatial Effects: Local Affected 14 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam
- generator 2E 24A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83-E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). 'Ihe ANO 2 laternal
- Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T lent were to be emptied into the room. An RWT level of 95% is the annunciated low lewi for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valw motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern.
Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M-2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of O concern which contains 2CV 5016-2-1 is adjacent to valves 2CV 5015-1,2CV-5038-1,2CV-5612-1 and 2CV 50171. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur. However, because the valve motors are emironmentally qualified, it is
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cahlomm Na A PENG CALC-010. Rev 00 l4-sep-97 Page A66 of A91 assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5016 2,2CV 5036-2,2CV 5056 2 & 2CV 5076-2)in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. Loss of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI trak aill still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. HPSI flow would be diverted through the failed segment to the RAB sump with little or no RCS injection occurring. This would eventually lead to core uncovery. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), n MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA - Consequence information Report Calculanonh A PENG-C4LC-010,Rn 00 H-Sep-97 Page A67 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 27 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train B (i.e., flow from header #2) occurs due to an injection line break upstream of manual throttle valve 2SI 71 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPS1 pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from abost elevation 360'-0" to upstream of manual throttle valve 2S171 is included in this segment. This consequence includes all welds in the applicable portions oflines 2DCB-3 2" & 2DCB 3 3", A failure in this segment would cauw R%T inventory to be drained to the general access area i of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89-E-0048 35, pg. 28). Sestral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. *lhese include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T imentory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT A inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications and alarms in the V control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected IAcation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation walves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E-24 A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc,83 E-0062 & 83-E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E 0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT imentory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT lesti of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the am water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSIline break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain vahts may occur. Plant Design Drawing M-2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV-5056-2 is adjacent to valves 2CV 5025-1,2CV-5057-O g 2,2CV-5101-1,2CV-50371,2CV-1519-1 and 2CV-1511 1. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur. However, because the valve motors are environmentally qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the l i
l l FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablahon Na A PENG-CALC 010. Rn 00 l4-Sm.91 Page A68 of A91 adjacent vab es may occur they will still be operable. It was obsened during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" sia the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiathg Event: N laitiating Event ID: N/A laitiating Event Recosery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to uraxpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5016 2,2CV-5036-2,2CV 5056-2 & 2CV 5076 2)in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. Loss of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the IIPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPS! system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and I based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI !
TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. l Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O1 l
\
l
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cal *'a' ion No. A. PEAU. CALC-010, Rev. 00 14-ser-91 Page A69 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 27A Consequence Desesiption: Loss of HPSI system occurs due to an injection line break downstream of manual throttle valve 2SI 71 and upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV 5056 2 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room dering periodic testing or in rerponse to a LOCA demand. Break SI:e: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer faalt exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of manual
- throttle valve 2SI 71 to upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV 5056 2 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portion ofline 2DCB-3 2",
A failure in this segment would cause RWT imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc 89-E 0048-35, pg. 28). Several ~~ed alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. - These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump,
- j. inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS l
l pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less R%T J inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when R%T level decreases to 40% it is assumed that the segment failure v,ould be uia,tified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. . Spatial Effects: Local Affected I4 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comanats: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24 A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building
- (RAB).. For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Cale. 83 E-0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO 2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T im entonj equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exened on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern.
Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M-2063 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV-5056-2 is adjacent to valves 2CV-5055-1,2CV 5057-2,2CV-5101-1,2CV 5037-1,2CV-15191 and 2CV-1511-1. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur. However, because the valve motors are emironmentally
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablation No. A.PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 l 14.Sep-97 Page A70 of A91 qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will still be operable. It was obsened during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'-0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A Sy stem Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves (2CV 5016-2,2CW5036-2,2C%5056 2 & 2C%5076-2) in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPS! pump "B" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment, it is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve tb: redundant W train, is equivalent to having one backup train. Loss of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Tims for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. HPSI flow would be diverted through the failed segment to the RAB sump with little or no RCS injection occurring. This would eventually lead to core uncovery. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressunzing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quanctly basis during normal power operation. A betwren test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and '
based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O l l
n FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculatum Na A PENG CALC-0/0.Rrv. 00 14 Sct 97 Page A71 of A9) Consequence ID: HPSI C-28 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train B (i c., flow from header #2) occurs due to an irGection line break upstream of manual throttle valve 2S175 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Commtets: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the . HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from abost elevation 360' 0" to upstream of manual throttle vahr 2S174 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2DCB 3-2" & 2DCB 3 3". A failure in this segment would cause RWT inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89-E 0048-35, pg. 28). Sestral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water lestl in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, significantly less RWT (] inventory would be drained to the RAB Because of direct indications and alarms in the (/ control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when RWT 1 level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in l a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. i Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to steam generator 2E 24A.are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle vahts, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E-0062 & 83-E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E-0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate the the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT inventory equal to the delta betweer.100% and 95% RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT lestl o'95% is the annunciated low lesel for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before r. significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the VMye motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. I Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur. Plant Design Drawing M-2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV 5076-2 is adjacent to valves 2CV-5075-1,2CV 1037-p) (" 1,2CV-1025-1 and 2CV-1038-2 Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur. Howestr, because the valve motors are emironmentally qualified, it is assumed that even though spraying orjet impingement of the adjacent valves may occur they will
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculanon h A PENG-CtLC-010. h. 00 14.scr 97 po p A 7) of A p) still be operable. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317'-0" via the floor drains and stainvay No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N S3 stem IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valves (2CV-5016-2,2CV 5036-2,2CV 5056-2 & 2CV 5076-2)in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B" in order to terminate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to hasing one backup train. Less of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable aller being isolated, the redundant HPSI train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA t!'e consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the cperators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is - perfonned on a quanerly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quanerly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculohon No A PENG-CALC-010.Rev 00 14-sep-91 V Page A73 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 28A Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI system occurs due to an injection line break downstream of manual throttle valve 2S175 and upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV 5076-2 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during n~ mal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOL \ demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it i t assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping from downstream of manual throttle valve 2S1-75 to upstream of HPSI line injection valve 2CV-5076-2 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portion ofline 2DCB 3-2", A failure in this segment would cause RWT imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor A uxiliary Building (RAB) (Calc. 89-E-0048-35, pg. 28). Sestral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water lesel in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected irdection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between R%T imtatory p and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA w hich results in greater depressurization of the RC3, significantly less RWT l d imtntory would be drained to the RAB. Because of the direct indications in the control room i and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room isolation when RWT level decresse t to 40%, it is assumed that the segmeht failure would be identified and isolated in a timely tr.anner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI, & CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution vahrs to steam generator 2E-24 A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle vahts, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 850 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83-E 0062 & 83-E 0063, pg. 38) The ANO 2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E 0048 35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an R%T inventory equal to the delta between 100% and 92 RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An R%T level of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above valves is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may occur Plant Design Drawing M-2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV 5076-2 is adjacent to Valves 2CV 5075 1,2CV-1037-1,2CV-10251 and 2CV-1038-2. Because of the close proximity of these valves to the failed segment, spray.ng orjet impingement of the adjacent vahrs may occur. However, because the valve motors ale emironmentally qualified, it is assumed that
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Ca'c"Iaten & A PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 I4-str-91 Page A74 of A91 even though spraying or jet impingement of the adjacent valves may occce they will still be operable, it was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of weet from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001, Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunci ted in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. HPSI line injection valve s (2CV-5016 2,2CV 5036-2,2CV 5056-2 & 2CV 5076-2)in train "B" must be reclosed in addition to securing flow through HPSI pump "B" in order to tertninate flow through the failed segment. It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segaent, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. Loss of Train: T Train ID: HPSI train "B" Train Recovery: Altho Jgh HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant HPS', train will still be capable of performing its intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a LOCA). Consequence Cornmcut: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, HPSI train "B" (i.e., header #2) will be unavailable due to isolation of the break. The redundant HPSI train ! "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function, Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treateo as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report O 'W Cahlanm No A.PENG CMC-010. h. 00 Page A73 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 29 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train "A" (i.e., flow from header #1) and loss of hot leg injection train "A" occur due to a line break upstream of valve 2CW5101 1 in the Upper South Piping and Penetration Room during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., periodic testing of the HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping above elevation 360'-0" and upstream of hot leg injection valve 2CW5101 1 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB 70 2" & 2CCB 70-3", A failure in this segment would cause a portion of RWT imentory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E-0048 35, pg. 28). Sestral unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water lesti in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT l inventory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS inventory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of the RCS, v significantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally verify ECCS pump room l isolation when RWT level decreases to 40%. it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 i Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI and CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution nhts to Steam Generator 2E 24A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle valves, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while the floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E 0062 & 83 E 0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89 E-0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zcae. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT imentory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% R%T lesti were to be emptied into the room. An RWT lesti of 95% is the annunciated low lesti for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above components is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement of certain valves may be a concern. Plant Design Drawing M-2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line - A segment of concern which contains 2CV-5101-1 is not within the immediate ( vicinity or adjacent to other safety related valves within the room it is therefore also assumed that the valves in this room will not be impacted by spraying or jet impingement for this HPSI line break scenario. It was observed during the
FMECA - Consequence Information Reporg Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010. Rev 00 14-scr-91 Page A76 of A91 walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" via the floor drains and stairway No. 2001. Propagation from the General Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the patinvays are isolated by SIAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexnected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "A", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. Flow through the failed segment can be terminated by securing HPSI train "A". It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. 14ss of Traln: TM 2 Train ID: HPSItrain A HLtrain A Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "A" is assumed to be unavailable after being isolated, the redundant train of HPSI is still capable of pimiding hot and cold leg injection for mitigating a LOCA. Consequence Comment: For the case w here the failed segment is successfully isolated, hot and cold leg injection in train "A" will be unavailable due to isolation of the failed segment. The redundant HPSI train "B" will still be available. Thus for this case there is one backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most severe because the HPS1 system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the control room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i e,, pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Catego y: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O l l l l
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculation No A PENG CALC 010. Rev. 00 ( t4-Sep 91 Page A77 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C 30 Consequence
Description:
Diversion of train "A" hot leg injection flow inside containment occurs due to a line break following a large LOCA. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur following a large LOCA, and in the piping betwecn containment penetration 2P12 and upstream of check valve 25128 A. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB-70-2",2CCB 70 3" and 2CCA 25-3"(inside containment). A failure in this segment would cause hot leg injection flow in train "A" to be diverted through the failed segment inside containment. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump as expected and would then be recirculated by the HPSI pumps. Verification of hot leg injection flow is based on the diNerence between the HPSI header and HPSI line injection flows. Because of the location of the failed segment and the depressurized RCS, a significant flow imbalance is considered to be unlikely. Hence the failed segment would not be detected. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected Location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: All safety injection related components and associated electrical equipment inside the containment have been designed to withstand the harsh LOCA emironment (S AR Section 6.3.2.12.1). It is therefore assumed that there will be no spatial effects due to the failure of the line segment of concern. Initiating Event: N laitiating Event ID: N/A laitiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: N/A Loss of Train: T Train ID: HL train "A" Train Recovery: Following a large LOCA, hot leg injection from train "A" would be ineffective in the unlikely event that it would be necessary to prevent boron precipitation. Hot leg injection from train "B" would still be available without the need for operator actions to isolate the failed segment. Consequence Comment: Even though the failed segment is assumed to remain unisolated, hot leg injection from the redundant train (i.e., train "B") would not be affected. Thus for this segment failure there is one backup train for mitigating a large LOCA. Periodic testirg (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not performed during normal power operation. A yearly " exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the yearly exposure time and the availability of one backup train, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O V s
l FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cohtanm No. A.PENG CALC-010. Rev. 00 l4-ser91 Page A78 of A9) Consequence ID: HPSI C 31 Consequence
Description:
Loss of HPSI train "B" (i.e., flow from header #2) and loss of hot leg injection train "B" occur due to a line break upstream of valve 2CV 5102 2 during periodic testing or in response to a LOCA demand. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation (i.e., during periodic testing of HPSI pumps) or during a response to a LOCA demand. Because of the longer fault exposure time preceding the detection of the failure, it is assumed that the limiting consequence described herein is associated with a LOCA demand. The piping above elevation 360' 0" and upstream of hot leg injection valve 2CV 5102 2 is included in this segment. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2DCB 3 2" & 2DCD 3 3", A failure in this segment would cause a portion of the RWT inventory to be drained to the general access area of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)(Calc. 89 E-0048-35, pg. 28). Several unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered following a break in this segment in conjunction with a small break LOCA. These include increasing or high water level in the RAB sump, inappropriately high HPSI flow indicated by the header flow instruments for the indicated RCS pressure, little or no flow through the unaffected injection paths, inappropriately low HPSI pump discharge pressure for the indicated RCS pressure, mismatch between RWT imentory and the known capacity of the HPSI pumps, and inadequate RCS imentory response. For a larger LOCA which results in greater depressurization of 3e RCS, significantly less R%T inventory would be drained to the RAB. Because of direct indications and alarms in the control room and the requirement to locally strify ECCS pump room isolation w hen RWT level decreases to 40%, it is assumed that the failed segment would be identified and isolated in a timely manner before HPSI recirculation is initiated. Spatial Effects: Local Affected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: The HPSI, LPSI and CS line isolation valves and EFW distribution valves to Steam Generator 2E 24 A are located in room 2084 of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). For HPSI line break scenarios upstream of the manual throttle vahrs, the resulting inflow of water into the room is a maximum of approximately 1700 gpm (based on the ANO-2 hydraulic model for the HPSI System), while the floor drain capacity is 90 gpm (Calc. 83 E-0062 & 83 E-0063, pg. 38). The ANO-2 Internal Flood Screening Study (Calc. 89-E 0048-35, pg.13) assumes the failure of all components in the flood initiation zone. However, hand calculations indicate that the components identified above would not be submerged if an RWT imentory equal to the delta between 100% and 95% RWT level were to be emptied into the room. An RWT lesel of 95% is the annunciated low level for this tank. It was observed during the walkdown that the force exerted on the non-water tight door would cause it to open before a significant amount of water can accumulate inside the room and flood the valve motors. Therefore for this HPSI line break scenario, flooding of the above components is not a concern. Spraying orjet impingement may be a concern for certain valves. Plant Design Drawing M 2044 and the walkdown that was conducted indicate that the line segment of concern which contains 2CV-5102 2 is not within the immediate vicinity or adjacent to other safety related valves within the room. It is therefore also assumed that the vahts in this room will not be impacted by spraying orjet impingement for this HPSI line break scenario. It was observed during the walkdown that the outflow of water from the flood initiation zone can propagate to
FMECA - Consequence Information Report O I4 ser 97 Cablatm"Na A-FENG-C4LC 010.h 00 Page A79 of A91 the RAB sump of the General Access Area at elevation 317' 0" via the floor drains and stairny No. 2001. Propagation from the Geaeral Access Area to the ECCS pump rooms is not a concern because the pathways are isolated by SlAS. Initiating Event: N Initiating Egent ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: N/A Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Since increasing water level in the RAB sump is indicated and annunciated in the control room, in addition to unexpected deviation of HPSI line injection flow and HPSI pump discharge pressure indications and higher pump flow rate in train "B", it is highly probable that the failed segment would be detected and isolated in a timely manner. Flow through the failed segment can be terminated by securing HPSI train "B". It is assumed that the operators ability to isolate the failed segment, to preserve the redundant HPSI train, is equivalent to having one backup train. Loss of Train: TM 2 Train ID: HPSI train B, HL train B Train Recovery: Although HPSI train "B" is assumed to be unavaliable after be.ng isolated, the redundant train of HPSI is still capable of providing hot and cold leg irgjection for mitigating a LOCA. Consequence Comment: For the case where the failed segment is successfully isolated, hot and cold leg injection in train "B" will be unavailable due to isolation of the failed segment. The redundant HPSI train "A" will still be available. Thus for this case there is onc backup train available for mitigating a LOCA. For the case where the failed segment remains unisolated, the HPSI hydraulic model predicts that for a small enough LOCA the consequences would be the most sevt.re because the HPSI system would fail to perform its function. Since there are direct indications in the centrol room to determine the existence of the failed segment, the capability and reliability of the operators to isolate the failed segment is treated as having an equivalent backup train. Since there is only one backup train for either of the two cases considered, it is used to determine the consequence category. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurizing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is performed on a quarterly basis during normal power operation. A between test
" exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the quarterly testing and the availability of at least one equivalent backup train for responding to a LOCA, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a MEDIUM consequence category is assigned.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calndatwn No. A PENG CALC-010. Rev 00 14-scr 97 Page A80 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI-C 32 Consequence
Description:
Diversion of train "B" hot leg injection flow inside containment omirs due to a line break following a large LOCA. Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur following a large LOCA, and in the piping between cantainment penetration 2P13 and upstream of check valve 2SI 28B. This consequence includes the welds in the applicable portions oflines 2CCB-712",2CCB 713" and 2CCA 25-3" (inside containment). A failure in this segment would cause hot leg flow in train B to be diverted through the failed g segment inside contaimnent. The diverted flow would drain to the containment sump as expected and would then be recirculated by the HPSI pumps. Verification of hot leg injection flow is based on the difference between the HPSI header and HPSI line injection flows Because of the location of the failed segment and the depressurized RCS, a significant flow imbalance is considered to be unlikely. Hence the failed segment would not be detected. Spat!al Effects: Containment Affected Location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Com:nents: All safety irgjection related components and associated electrical equip.nent inside the containment have been designed to withstand the harsh LOCA emironment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). It is therefore assumed that there will be no spatial effects due to the failure of the line segment of concern. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A laitiating Event Recovery: N/A less of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: N/A Loss of Train: T Train ID: HL train "B" Train Recovery: Following a large LOCA, hot leg injecuon from train "D" would be ineffective in the unlikely event that it would be necessary to prevent boron precipitation. Hot leg injecuon from train
"/." would still be available without the need for operator actions to isolate the failed segment.
Consequence Com.nent. Even though the failed segment is assumed to remain unisolated, hot leg injection from the redundant train (i.e., train "A") would not be affected. Thus for this segment failure there is one backup train for mitigating a large LOCA. Periodic testing (i.e., pressurtzing to operating pressure) of this pipe segment is not performed during normal power operation. A yearly " exposure time" is therefore assumed. Because of the yearly exposure time and the availability of one backup train, and based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.2 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR-106706), a hEDIUM consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O I
I FMECA - Consequence Infortnation Report - Cakulation Na A.PENG CALC 010. Rev. 00 { 14-$ep 91 ! Pase A81 of A9) Consequence ID: HPSI C-33 I Consegaeace
Description:
- Loss of reactor coolant via ECCS injection path to RCS cold leg 2P32 A occurs due to a line break.
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation, and in the piping fiom ' dounstream of check valve 2SI 15A to the ECCS injection nozzle in RCS loop 2P32A, This consequence includes the applioble welds in line 2CCA 22 12".
~
A failure in this segmem would result in a large Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This is characterized by a rapid decrease in RCS pressure, followed by automatic plant shutdown in ! order to bring the plant to a stable state. RCS inventory would drain to the containment sump as expected and would then be recirculated by the HPSI pumps. The failed segment cannot be ! isolated during a LOCA because there are no isolation valves in the RCS. RCS makeup from j the ECCS to RCS loop 2P32A will be ineNective. l Spatial ENects: Containment ANected 14 cation: Containment Building Spatial ENects Comments: The four ECCS injection paths are separately located in four diferent quadrants of the containment. A dvnamic analysis which included the above line has been performed. *he analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related
- components caused by the dynamic eNects of the line break (SAR Section 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all ECCS components and associated electrical equipment have been designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental conditions inside the containment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). Hence, for the postulated break locations, it i
is assumed that spatial c#~ !! are negligible. f laitiating Event: I Initiating Event ID: A i laitiating Event Recovery: Based on the ANO-2 IPE (Report 94-R-2005-01, Rcy. 0), two of four SITS. one of
~
three HPS) pumps, and one of two LPSI pumps are required for successful mitigation of a large LOCA during RCS inventory control (i.e., injection mode). 1 For long term RCS inventory control and heat removal (i.e., recirculation mode), j one of three HPSI pumps and one of two CS pumps with an associated SDC heat 1' exchanger or one of two CS pumps and two containment cooling units are required for mitigating a large LOCA. Automatic actuation of the reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuation system occurs in response to the
- initiating event.
14w of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: HPSI, LPSI, SIT [ System Recovery: During a large LOCA, the HPS!, LPSI, and SIT systems will operate in a degraded but eNective manner. These systems will not fail to perform their intended design function (i.e., L mitigation o. a large LOCA) as a result of the segment failure. No operator actions or { - automatic isolation are needed in order to recover from the segment failure. Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A ] Train Recovery: N/A } Consequence Comment: Following a large LOCA, flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32A from the ECCS is j1- assumed to be ineNective due to failure of the line segment. ECCS flow to the i i remaining reactor coolant loops will not be aNected, and this level of performance is capable of mitigating a large LOCA. In Table 1, a LOCA is classified as a limiting { fault event. Because the segment failure causes an initiating event and degradation of l
FMECA - Consequence Infonnation Report Calculation No A PENG-CALC-0/0, Rev. 00 14-Sq91 Page A82 of A91 ECCS injection, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.1 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a HIGH consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: HIGH O consequence nank O O. O
FMECA - Consequence Infor nation Report Cakulation No. A.PENGotLC-010, Rev. 00 le-sep 91 Parr A83 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI C-34 Consequence
Description:
less of reactor coolant via ECCS injection path to RCS cold leg 2P32B occurs due to a line break. Break Slae:- Large isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation, and in the piping from downstream of check valve 2SI 15B to the ECCS injection nozzle in RCS loop 2P32B. This consequence includes the applicable welds in line 2CCA 21 12". A failure in this segment would result in a large Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This is characterized by a rapid decrease in RCS prestrre, followed by automatic plant shutdown in order to bring the plant to a stable state. RCS inventory would drain to the containment sump as expected and would then be recirculated by the HPSI pumps. The failed segment cannot be isolated during a LOCA because there are no isolation valves in the RCS. RCS makeup from the ECCS to RCS loop 2P32B will be incKective. Spatial Edects: Containment Affected I4 cation: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The four ECCS injection paths are separately located in four different quadrants of the containment. A dynamic analysis which included the abmc line has been 4 performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (SAR Section 3.6.4.2.8.2). In addition, all ECCS components and associated electrical equipment have been designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental conditions inside the ( containment (SAR Suion 6.3.2.12.1). Hence, for the postulated break locations, it is assumed that spatial cNects are negligible. laitiating Event: I lattiating Event ID: A Initiating Event Recovery: Based on the ANO-2 IPE (Report 94-R 2005-01, Rev,0), two of four SITS, one of three HPSI pumps, and one to two LPSI pumps are required for successful mitigation of a large LOCA during RCS imentory control (i.e., iqjection mode). For long term RCS inventory control and heat removal (i.e., recirculation mode), one of three HPSI pumps and trae of two CS pumps with an associated SDC heat exchanger or one of two CS pumps and two containment cooling units are required for mitigating a large LOCA. Automatic actuation of the reactor protection system and the ngineered safety features actuation system occurs in response to this initiating event. IAss of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: HPSI, LPSI, SIT System Recovery: During a large LOCA, the HPSI, LPSI, and SIT systems will operate in a degraded but effective manner. These systems will not fail to perform their intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a large LOCA) as a result of the segment failure. No operator actions or automatic a:tuations are needed in order to recover from the segment failure. less of Trala: N Train ID: N/A Trala Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Following a large LOCA, flow to reactor coolant loop 2P12B from the ECCS is assumed to be ineffective due to failure of the line segment. ECCS flow to the remaining reactor coolant loops will not be affected, and this level of performance is capable of mitigating a large LOCA. In Table 1, a LOCA is classified as a limiting fault event. Because the segment failure causes an initiating event and degradation of
s FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculassm Na A PENG<ALC-010, Rev. 00 ILSep-91 Page A84 of A91 ECCS injection, and based on Table 1 and the guidance provided in Table 3.1 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR 106706), a HIGH consequence category is assigned. Consequence Category: IUGH C Consequence Rank O
- 3. -
O O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Caleslation No. A.PENG-CEC 010. Rev. 00 I ***Y" Page A85 of A91 Consequence ID: HPSI-C 35 Consequence
Description:
Loss of reactor coolant sia ECCS injection path to RCS cold leg 2P32C occurs due to a line break. Break Slae: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation, and in the piping from downstream of chmk valve 2SI 15C to the ECCS injection nozzle in RCS loop 2P32C. This consequence includes the applicab!c welds in line 2CCA 24 12". A failure in this segment would result in a large Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This is characterized by a rapid decrease in RCS pressure, followed by automatic plant shutdown in order to bring the plant to a stable state. RCS inventory would drain to the containment sump as expected and would then be recirculated by the HPSI pumps. The failed segment cannot be isolated during a LOCA because there are no isolation valves in the RCS. RCS makeup from the ECCS to RCS loop 2P32C will be ineNective. Spatial ENects: Containment ANected location: Containmem Building Spatial ENects Comments: The four ECCS injection paths are separately located in four different quadrants of ! the containment. A dynamic analysis which included the above line has been l performed. The analysis concluded that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic eNects of the line break (SAR Section 3.6A.2.8.2). In addition, all ECCS components and associated electrical equipment (] v have been designed to withstand the LOCA environmental conditions inside the contamment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). Hence, for the postulated break locations, it is assumed that spatial eNects are negligible.
-laitiating Event: I laitiating Event ID: A Initiating Event Recovery: Based on the ANO 2 IPE (Report 94-R 2005-01, Rev. 0), two of four SITS, one of three HPSI pumps, and one of two LPSI pumps are required for successful mitigation of a large LOCA during RCS imentory control (i.e., injection mode).
For long term RCS imentory control and heat removal (i.e., recirculation mode), one of three HPSI pumps and one of two CS pumps with an associated SDC heat exchanger or one of two CS pumps and two containment cooling units are required for mitigating a large LOCA. Automatic actuation of the reactor protection system and the enginected safety features actuation system occurs in response to the c initiating event. Ims of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: HPSI, LPSI, SIT System Recovery: During a large LOCA, the HPSL LPSI, and SIT systems will operate in a degraded but eNective manner. These systems will not fail to perform their intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a large LOCA) as a result of the segment failure.' No operator actions or automatic isolation are needed in order to recover from the segment failure. Imss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Following a large LOCA, flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32C from the ECCS is assumed to be ineNective due to failure of the line segment. ECCS flow to the remaining reactor coolant loops will not be aNected, and this level of performance is capable of mitigating a large LOCA. In Table 1, a LOCA is classified as a limiting fault event. Because the segment failure causes an initiating event and degradation of
.. )
FMECA Cor. sequence Inforniation Report Ca h la'u= h A 1 " G C E C 010 Arv 00 16sn>91 l' age A86 of A91 ECCS injection, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Tsble 3.1 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI TR.106706), a IIIGil consequence category is assigned. Conwquence Category: !!! Ort O Conxquence Rank O O O
p FMECA Consequence Information Report Cabla'"a n Arma.csolo. h. oo
\ te scrV1 l' age Asi of A9)
Consequence ID: IIPSI C 36 Consequence
Description:
Loss of reactor coolant via ECCS injec' ion path to RCS cold leg 2P32D occurs due to a line break. Bresh Slie: Large Isolability of Break No ISO Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operadon, and in the piping from downstream of check valve 2S.. 5D to the ECCS injectior; nor.rje a RCS toop 2P32D. This consequence includes the applicable weld. in line .CCA.23 12". A failure in tids segment would result in a large ' oss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This is characterized by a rapid decrease in RCS pn..sure, followed by automatic plant shutdown in order to bnng the plant to a stable state. RCS inventory would drain to the containment sump as expected and would then be recirculated by the IIPSI ranps. The failed segment cannot be isolated during a ? OCA because there are no isolation valves in the RCS. RCS makeup from l the ECCS to RCS loop 2P32D will be ineffective. Spatial Effects: Containment Affected location Containment Building Spatial Effects Com.nents: The four ECCS irdection paths are separately located in four different quadrants of the containment. A dyr3mic analysis uhich included the above line has been perfonned The analysis concludod that there would be no failure of safety related components caused by the dynamic effects of the line break (S AR Section 3.6.4.2.8 2), in addithn, all ECCS components and associated electrical equipment t ) have been designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental conditions inside the V containment (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). llence, for the postulated breat locations, it is assumed that spatial effects are negligible, initiating Esent: 1 initiating Evtst ID: A initiating Event Reemer): Based on the ANO 2 IPE (Report 94 R 2005 01, Rev. 0), two of four SITS, one of three IIPSI pumps, and one of two LPSI pumps are required to nutigate a large LOCA during RCS inventory control (l.c., injection mode). For long term RCS inventory control and heat removal (i.e., recirculation mode), one of three IIPSI pumps and one of two CS pumps with an associated SDC heat exchanger or one of Iwo CS pumps and two contaimrent cooling uruts are required for mitigating a large LOCA. Automatic artuation of the reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuation system occurs in response to the initiating es ent. less of S) stem: SM 3 Sptem IPE IDI HPSI, LPSI, SIT S) stem Reem ery: During a large LOCA, the HPSI, LPSI, and SIT systems will operate in a degraded but c!Tective manner. These systems will not fail to perform their intended design function (i.e., mitigation of a large LOCA) as a result of the segment failui t No operator actions or automatic isolation are needed in order to recover from the sament failure. less of Trah.: N Train 10: N/A Train Reemery: N/A Consequence Comment: Following a large LOCA, flow to reactor coolant loop 2P32D from the ECCS is
,m assumed to be ineffective due to failure of the line segment. ECCS flow to the V) remahting reactor coolant loops will not be affected, and this level of performance is capable of mitigating a large LOCA. In Table 1, a LOCA is classified as a limiting fault event. Because the segment failure causes an initiating event and degradedon of
FMECA Censequence Information Report c kut =n A.rrAc.cAtc.olo.nn oo 1449*97
/' age A68 of AP/
ECCS injection, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in Table 3.1 of the EPRI procedure (EPRI 'IR 106706), a filGil consequence category is assigned. Consequence Categor): lilGli O Con.cquence Rank O l t I \ O O
FMECA - Cotuentience information Report Cahlaam h A Il G CALC 010. h'. 00 l4 591 Page A89 of A9) 461nM%e i Consequence ID: IIPSI C47 Consequemee
Description:
Loss of reactor coolant via IIPSI hot leg injection line occurs due to a line break. 1 Brtak Sine Large Isolability of Break No 150 Comments: The break is postulated to occur during normal power operation, and in the piping from downstream of check valves 2SI 28A & 2St 28B to the shutdown cooling line. Tlis consequence includes all welds in line 2CCA 2$ 3'. A failure in Ods segment would result in a medium Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This would be characterir.ed by a rapid decrease in RCS pressure, followed by automatic plant shutdown in order to bring the plant to a stable state. The lost RCS inventerv would drain to the containment sump as expected and would then be ree rcv ted by the IIPil pumps. The failed segment cannot be isolated during a LOCA because A.re are no .u'adon valves in the RCS. Spatial ENects: Containment ANected 14callona Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: The llPSI hot leg irdection lines are connected to the shutdown cooling line. A dynamic analysis of the shutdown cooling line which bounds the effects of the hot leg irQection lines was performed. The analysis concluded that uncontrolled pipe whip would not impair the ability to mitigate consequences of the event and reach cold shutdown (S AR Section 3.6.4.2.7.2). O in addition, all ECCS components and associated electrical equipment have been V designed to withstand the LOCA emironmental condidons inside the containment ! (SAR Section 6.3.2.12.1). Hence for the postulated break locations, it is assumed that spatial effects are negligible. Initiatlag Events i Initiaties Event ID: M laitiating Event Recovery: Based on the ANO4 IPE (Report 94 R 2005 01, Rev. 0), one of three llPSI pumps is required for successful midgs.uon of a medium LOCA during RCS inventory control (i c., irdection mode). For lors term RCS inventory control and heat removal (i.e., recirculation mode), one of three !! PSI pumps and one of two CS trains (i.e. one CS pump and one SDC heat exchanger or one CS pump and two containment cooling units) are needed for success, Automatic actuation of the reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuadon system is required in order to recover from this initiating event. Ims of System: S System IPE ID: SDC Sy stem Recovery: During a medium LOCA, the shutdown cooling sy stem would be lost. However, the midgaung systems used to satisfy long term RCS inventory control and heat removal (i.e., HPSI, CS pumps & SDC lix) would not be affected. No operator actions or automatic isoladon are needed in order to recover from the segment failure. Ims of Trala: N Trale ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A
,c Consequence Comment: A medium LOCA occurs due to a failure in the pipe segment, HPSI flow to the four
( RCS cold legs will not be affected. In Table 1, a LOCA is cla ,ified as a ligniting fault (Design Basis Category IV) event. Because the segment failure causes an initiating event, and based on Table I and the guidance provided in 'I able 3.1 of the EPRI
FM ECA - Consequence Infortnation Report Cahlatu 'n A inG CAM Olo. A* 00 I *%AT l' age A90 etf AV1 procedures (EPRI TR 106706), a lilGil consequence catergory is assigned. Consequence Category: IIIGli O Consequence nank D 1 l i O O
l l FMECA Consequence kibii-i;an Report I4.Sapsn N% Ah AMMMAlcola Aw.00 Agn A91 of A91 Telde 1 ASSIGNED CONSEQUENCE CABX;ORIES FDR ANO.2INmABNG D'INIS Imeuoung Ewat
- _ __-; Iwat inh 6eung twas Deentpuen IE CDF CCDP Commespueswe (18pe)
(C,DF
,1 /IE 1 Routme Swtig NA NA N'A NA CNetmr*
8**y Refelms II Antweened keertar Trip.(T6) 2 03 1951A6 293E45 MEDIUM taas of Poww Cannesian Syenom . (T2) 0 25 099047 3 59EA6 MEDAM Twbue Tnp . (T!) 0 76 2 24Je 2DsE45 14DIUM til inho,ent teen of Onane Poww. (T3) $ 64F42 172Ede 2 95E45 Ewnts MEDIUM taas W 8W Nmp 2NA -(TI) ? 30E42 214E47 1,G:DIUM as 2901w6 Less ef 8W Nmp 2ND . (79) ? )tB42 104E47 2 m.46 MEDIUM *'
!Y Ltrnnwg huha 1.neensive iudweier . (74) 910d
" MEDIUM'" 4 10 < CCDP < 10d
" LOW" CCDP < 10 4
The nhese table was devoloped for the ANO-2 spectile latelsetng ese 18 la bened en the inferination provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.4 of the EPRI RIst procedure (EPRI TR4%706). The Inteiseing esent descr6pe6 ems (for eveel ensegeets II. III. A IV) and menocesse 200$41. Rev. 9) event frequencies and Core Demenge imuencies (CDFs) were estracted freen Tablee 3.34 and 3.E4-7A of the A G
Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Mov, 00 l Pope 81 of 8187 iO l APPENDIX 3
'FMECA DEGMADATION MECHANISMS
- IAttachment Pages 810187)
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Catalar, n E. AMN 010. Ra 00 Page B2 of B187 Weld Sycks ID Segment Line Number Une Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI40I 2CCA-25-3* HPSi hot leg injection 25-035 Upstremm ofmanual va!x No No No No No No No No loop (from check rain 2SI-29A 2SI-27A to SDC suction ime and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI-001 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injection 25-037 Downstream ofelbow 814 No No No No No No No No loop (from check nhr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI401 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leg injection 25-037A Upstream ofelbow #I4 No No No No No No No N-loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suctum line and from check nhe 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI-001 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injection 25-038 Downstream orcheck No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr vahr 2SI-28A 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). Deeradmuon Medieneviv . T-umnal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress Cme =sen Crecbng (PWSCC) M - Miaml=elegscan, Inomenced Carmum (MIC) F-No AccelmsedCmessee c-Cems son C,= dung I- Iraersranular Stress Carmeen Cracias (IGSCC) E- Emsen-Cavesense 0-oher e G G
O O O '# FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N#*"r Na MMQlO, Rm 00 Page B3 of B187 W eld System ID Segment IJoe Number Liec Descriptsom Member Weld IAcatsee T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-001 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injection 25455 Upstream of man.nal vaht No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 251-29B 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC sectxm line). IPSI HPSI-001 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injection 25-0 % Downstream ofelbow #32 No No No No No No No No loop (from check sahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 251-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI-001 2CCA-25-3* HPSl hot leginjection 25 056A Upstream orcibow #32 No No No No No No No No loop (from check s2e 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vaht 2SI-27B to SDC section line). HPSI HPSI-001 2CCA-25-3* HPSi hot leg injection 25457 D-hs ofcheck . No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr vaht 2SI-28B 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC section line). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-21-12" Safety injection line 21-001 Weld at RCS cold leg Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge 2P32B check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32.B). L' - Meclassisms T-Thenal Fatigue P - Pnmary Weier seress Cerressen Crecisng (FW3CC) M - Micrt4=alogpcmHy Innuenced Cerronen (MIC) F-fle= AccelerseedCommen C-Cervessen Cracking I. 6, -- Stress Cervenste Crociang(1GSCC) E- Eremen -Cardshen O.Oqher
14-sepo7 FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms C"Ic=lano'r% MEVCr-CfLC-olo.Rer 00 Page B4 of B157 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-21-12* Safety injection line 21-001 A Downstream ofelbow #20 Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-168 to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-21-12" Safety injection line 21-004 Upstream ofcibow #20 Yes No Ne No No No
; .s No from SIT discharge check wht 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P328).
HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-21-12" Safety injection line 21-005 Downstream ofcibow #19 Yes No No No No No No No from STT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-21-12" Safety Injection line 21 @ 6 Du. .&.-. cfcheci Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge vahr 2SI-15B check vahr 251-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-22-12" Safety Injection line 22-001 Weld at RCS :old leg Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge 2P32A (ISO 2CCA-22-1) check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A)_ w _ . m :_. _ T-Hermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Waser 51ren Cerreamn Cracting(P%W C-Carramen Cracking M - MacrohoolepenDv bdleenced Cerronum (MIC) F-flew AcalerusedCarrenne I-Ireerparmier Stres Cerresum Crackmq OGSCC) E - Ereema -Cmmatum O-Other e 9 9
O O O '# C"'""*" A'a NMWIO Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms ; l' age B5 of BIST Weld l System ID & ,,..a.4 Line Number Une Description Number Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 ! IIPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-22-12* Safety injection iine 22-001 A Dumou-w orelbow 8tl Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32A). HPSI IIPSI-002 2CCA-22-12* Safety injection line 22-003 Upstream orelbow #Il Yes No No No No No No No from STT discharge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI IIPSI-002 2CCA-22-12* Safety injecuon line 22-004 Downstream ofcheck Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge vahr 2SI-15A check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI IIPSI-002 2CCA-23-12" Safety injecuon line 24-001 Weld at RCS cold leg Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge 2P32D check vaht 2SI-16D to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32D). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-23-12* Safety injecuonline 24-002 Don 1 stream ofpiping Ye: No No No No No No No from SIT hg segment #9 check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold Icg (RCP 2P32D). Desredman Matanen. T-Tlemet resigue r - Prenery waner sims cerranne crachns (twscc) M - Microteolopenny Innuenced cerroman (Mic) r- tw Acceserseed c_. c-correman oscung I - 1=arrgranussr sims corremen crachns (IGSCC) E- % -cavemann U-oder
3*" N'"'"" " #" # FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms
$"$7[ '
W eld System ID Segment Une Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection lir 24-003 Downstream ofcIbow fl0 Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge i check vahr 2SI-16D to l RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-004 Upstream ofelbow #10 Yes No No No No No No No frem SITdischarge check whr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 244105 Du- a miiofcheck Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge vahr 2SI-15D check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-001 Weld at RCS cold leg Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge 2P32C check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-24-12" Safety Injection line 23-00I A Dv.adm ofcibow #16 Yes No No No No No No No I from SITdischarge check :,hr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). Ded== M#h===is T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnrnary Waser Svens Cerresson Cradang (PW5CC) M-M C-
- My failuesent Corresrau(%GC) F-The AnekennedCermese C-Commen Crecimig I-Iaw renmiersweeCommonCradang00 a SCC) E- Ersamus -Cavitetsous 0 - Other e G #
m m m '# FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"""" #" A * " C # C R " 88 Page B7 of BIST W eld System ID Segment une Number use Descripties Nember Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 l HPSI HPS1402 2CCA-24-12* Safety injection line 23-003 Upstream ofelbow #16 Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32O. HPSI liPSI-002 2CCA-24-12" Safetyinjecuon line 23-004 Downstream ofelbow #I Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32Q. HPSI HPSI402 2CCA-24-12* Safety injection line 23405 Upstream ofcibow 8I Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check valm 2SI-16C to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32Q. HPSI IIPSI-002 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-006 Weld at RCS cold leg 2SI- Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge 15C check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32Q. HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leginjecuan 25424 Connecting weld to 14* Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check ulve shutdown cooling line 2SI-27A to SDC sucuan line and from check valw 2SI-27B to SDC suchon line). Des =dmien Med=mann T-Thmnal Fatisme P - Prunary Water Strew Cerromen Cradung (F%W M - Microlweleycnify Innuenced Cervemon (MIC) F-Flew AccekwedCarremenn C-Cerremon Cracking I-Interg anular Stress Corramen Craclung(1GSCC) E- Eremma -Cavnesien 0-Oiher
ic.s,97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Cala'larnwr Na A-PEW-C4LC-010. Rev. 00 Page B8 cf B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Une Dewription Number Weld Emestion T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injection 25-025 Dumo,Lmu ofcibow #45 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check vakt 2SI-27A to SDC sa:iton line and from check vahr 2SI-27E w SDC suction hne). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-25-3" HPS1 hot leg injection 25-026 Upstream ofelbow #45 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check uht 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check nht 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-25-3" IIPSI hot leg injection 25-027 Downstream ofelbow #44 Yes No No' No No No loop (from check nhe No No 2SI-27A to SDC section line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI402 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leg injection 25-028 Upstream ofcibow 844 Yes No No No loop (from check vahr No No No No 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). tuw W T-Thermal Fatigue P - Phmary Waser Stress Carrussen Cracking (7%W C-Common Cracting M - ML . 2r':y hu"hseced Cerremen (MIC) F-m= hi a Comme I-Irmergranuier Stress Cerrasme Cractung(IGSCC) E - Eremen-Cowstatma 0 -Other e O O
O O O FMECA - Degradation Mechar.isnes N""" A*a AMMWIR Rn. 00 Page 29 of B187 W eld System ID Segment IJae Member Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C F I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI40' 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injecho'n 25-029 Downstream ofcibow #43 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2ST-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSi HPSI402 2CCA-25-3* HPSi hot leg injection 25-030 Upstream ofelbow #43 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check rahr 2SI-27A to SDC suchon line and from check nhe 2SI-27B to SDC sucuon line). HPSI HPSI402 2CCA-25-3* HPSi hot leg injection 25-03I Downstream ortee #46 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC sucuon line and from check =2he 2SI-27B to SDC sucuon line). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injection 25-032 Upstream of tec #46 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check vsnr 2SI-27A to SDC sucuan line and frora check vahr 2SI-27d to SDC suction firy.). Desr dmianMah wms T-Herrnal Fatigue F - Prunary Waser Stress Corresum Crecies (FEM M-Ma* * ,l IremencedCerrmean(%GC) i F-Nw AccelerenedCerrasson C-Cerres.nn Crackmg I-Innergranular Stress Cerronen Craimg (!GSCC) E- Eressen -Cavemenew 0-06er
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C'""** * " C##8R" " i l' age B10 of BIST l W eld I System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nemeber V'*14 Imestion T C P M E F 0 I
)
1 HPSI HPSI402 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leg injecten 25433 Dumohw.i of elbow #30 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check wht 2SI-27A to SDC sucten line and from check nht 251-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI402 2CCA-25-3* HPSI hot leg injection 25-034 Domitstream of manual Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check nhe uht 251-29A 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC sucten line). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leg injection 25451 Upstream of tec #46 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from checx nht 2ST-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI-002 2CCA-25-3* HPS1 hot leg injection 25-052 Downstream ofelbow #31 Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check nht 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). Dearnderion Mecherusms T-Therrmal Fatigue P - Prenary Water stress Cceressen Cracking (PRM M - Micrabsoleg cany Innuenced Carmnon (MIC) F-flow AccelerusedCmoness C-Cerromem Cracbng I- IrAergranular Stress Cermnen Creding (IGSCC) E- Erossen - Cavitshoe 0-Other O O O
o '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C'*"lan n Na AMMWIR Rm M I Pa:ce Bil cf BIS 7 W eld System ID Segment IJee Number Line Description Number Weld Iscatese T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI402 2CCA-25-3* IIPSI hot leg injection 25-053 Downstream ofmanual Yes No No No No No No No loop (from check valve vahr 2SI-29B 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI403 2CCA-21-12* Safety injection line 21-011 Upstream ortee #21 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety injectron tine 21-012 Downstream orelbow sI6 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety injection line 21-013 Upstream oferoow #16 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P328). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12" Safety Injection line 21-014 Downstream orelbow #IS No No No No No No No No from STT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32B). Desredssean wannems T-Dennel Fatigue P - Pnenary Weser Stress Cemason Cradung (P%W M-E f
- J "y isemenced Commoon(MIC) F-Fk= AccelerawdCerreseen C-Cewessen Cracung I-Innerparadar Steus Cerrames Cradung OGSCC) E- Ereman-Cavasteen 0 - 0*er I
l
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C'd
#** N'"*WI8 ^" 88 I Page B12 of BJU w eld l Systess ID Segment Line Number une Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 l HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12" Safety Injection line 21-015 Upstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 251-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B).
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety injection line 21-016 Downstream of cibow #13 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2ST-16B to RCS cold leg (RCc 2P32B). ) HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12" Safety injection line 21-017 Doni: stream ofelbow #I2 No No No No No No No 14 from SITdischarge l check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12" Safety injection line 21-018 Upstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No from STT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety Injection line 21-019 Upst: tam ofcIbow #Il No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). Desradshon Mechannms T-nermal Fatigue F - Pnmary Water Stress Comwman Crack.eg (PW5CC) M - Microsoleycan, Indhsenced Cer aman (M.C) F. flow Accelmeed Cerme== C-Comme Cruchns 1 - traerpinatar Stres Cerramon Cruchng OGSCC) E- Erasum -Cavennen 0 -other e 9 9
O O O
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanismes * ##""** *
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Page B13 of B187 Weld Syseenn ID Segement Line Moseber Line Descripties Meerber Weld I.mcaties T C P. I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12" Safety Injecuon line 21-020 Upstream orefbow 811 No No No W No No No No from STT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety Injecuen tine 21-021 Downstream ore! bow fl0 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 251-16B to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12" Safety injecuan line 21-022 D- m.-. of motor- No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge operated waht 2CV-5023-1 check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety Injecuan line 21-023 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge operated wahr 2CV-5023-1 check vaht 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12" Safetyinjectionline 21-024 Don 1: stream ofcheck No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge vaht 251-16B check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). Dear.de.e= Mea ==== T-Themet F@ P- Pnary Water has Commen CW(FW5CC) " M"C * . , bdimenzdCarresser(nGC) F-Ikw AccelerusedCerressee C-Carresson Crecitag I "a, Sierens Cermuen Crochng(1GSCC) E-Erween-Cavesame O.Other
'N FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"'"'*** * " "#8#"88 l' age Bit of Bl87 W eld System ID Segment une Number Line Description Number WeldIecation T C I P M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety !njection line 21-054 Donnstream ofelbow 814 & No No No No No Fo &
from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-12* Safety injection iine 21-055 Donnstream ofe! bow 89 No No No No No No No No o from SIT discharge check uhr 251-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P328). HPSI HPSI403 2CCA-21-3* HPSI discharge line 21-049 Upstream of reducer 830 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from check vahr 2Sil3B to reducer'2CCA-21-8* HPSI HPSI403 2CCA-21-3* HPSI discharge line 21-050 Downstream ofc! bow 825. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, from check nhe 2STI3B to reducer /2CCA-21-8* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-3* HPSi discharge line 21-051 Upstrean ofcIbow 825 No No No No No No No No toward RCS Ioop B. from check set 2SII3B to reducer /2CCA-21-8* Mmn Mecheneses T-Dmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser Stress Cerroism Cracking (FHM M - Ecre4ealcycelfv inflamced Cerrasseur A F-fleur AcreiermoedCarroern C-Cervoemn Orackirg I-:.a., _._ Stress Cerroeien Crecimg(1GSCC) E - Eressam-Cantabam 0 - Other t e - 9. 9
'# N fe'm A~oMMC-010. Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mccitanismas Page BIS of B187 wew System ID Segneemt IJee Nee 6er Use Descripties Messer WeMImatsee T C F I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-3* HPSi discharge line 21-052 Dowitstream orcibow f26 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, from check vahr 2Sil3B to reducer /2CCA-21-8* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-3* HPSidischarge line 21-053 Domwstream orcheck No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. vahr 2SI-13B from check vahr 2Sil3B to reducer /2CCA-21-8* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-3* HPSi discharge line 21-053A Upstream cfcheck taht No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. 2SI-138 from check vahr 2Sil3B to reducer /2CCA-21-8* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* LPSI disd-p line to 21-043 Upstream of 8* x 6* No No No No No No No No RCS loop B (6* piping) concentne reducer #29 (ISO 2CCA-21-2) HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214" IESI discharge line to 21-044 Downstream ofcibow F23 No No No No No No No No RCS loop B (6* piping) (ISO 2CCA-21-2) HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214" LPSi discharge line to 21-045 Upstream ofelbow f23 No No No No No No No No RCS loop B (6* piping) (ISO 2CCA-21-2) HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* LPSidischargelinc to 21-046 Dumou- ofelbow #24 No No No No No No No No RCS loop B (6* piping) (ISO 2CCA-21-2) HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214" IISI "iap linc to 21-047 Downsacam orcheck No No No No No No No No RCS loop B (6* piping) vahr 2SI-14B Dearedman Mecien=== T-umnal Fatigue F- Pnenary Waeer Serens Cerrowan Cracking (FWSCC) M - Mes5=elqpcsay indeemd Cerramen (M!C) F-Flour Am:;ermed Commmar c-Cerroman Crectes t :.a. Sem Comm cn Crac6he OGSCC) E-Erewe-Censhee 0-oder
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'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N*'"
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Page 616 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Desenption Number WeldIscation T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214" LPSi discharge line tt 21-048 Dommteam orreducer #30. No No No No No No No No RCS loop B (6* pipings HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-025 Dommtream side ofpipe No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. #I. (at interface mth Tee from reducer / 2CCA- in 2CCA-21-12") 21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34". to 2CCA-21-12*- HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-026 Dmaham ofelbow #16 No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop B, from reducer / 2CCA-2I-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI403 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-027 Upstream ore 2' bow #16. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* SIdishargeline 21-028 Don 1: stream of elbow #17. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34~. to 2CCA-21-12*. Dearsdarme Mecharmsms T "thmnalFs6gue P- Thmery Water Stress Cmomn Crackmig(F%W M-Mi22 AIndleencedCerrween(MIC) F-flow Accelerseed Cere==== l C-Common Crackire !-Irmergrarunter Stress Cervonan Cracing(KISCC) E- Eressese - Centseven 0-other
m % v J } FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms C"'""* &MMWIR Rn. 00 Page BIT of B187 WeW System ID Segment Line Number Ilme Description Huamber WeM Locaties T C P I M E F 0 l HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-029 Upstream ofelbow #17. No No No No No No No & toward RCS loop B, 3 from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34* to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-030 Dovmstream orelbow #18_ No No No No No No No No toward RCS W B. from reducer / 2CCA-2I-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*. to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-031 Upstream orelbow #18. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34~, to 2CCA-21 ~2*. HPSI HPSI.003 2CCA-214* Si discharirline 21-032 Ibubmn ofelbow #19. No No No No No No No No toward RC; ng B. from reductr/ 2CCA-21-3" and reducer /2CC3-34* to 2CCA-21-12*. Desradmaan Med===ms T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Weser Stress Cervosenn Csming (PMW M-ML
- My Isomenced Corremman (1 LUC) F-Fl== Accese seedCamimme c-Cerre anCruimg I *.a. , __ _ _ 5 tress Cerroman Cradung (IGSCC)
E- Esamen -Cavenesen 0- Oswr
issepo7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Cak=Icra= h A-PEvo-c4tc-oio. Rev. oo Page B18 of RIS7 W eld System ID Segment Line Number IJee Description Number Weld Iscation T C P M E F I 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* S1 dischargeline 21-033 Upstream orcibow fl9 No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop B, from reducer /2CCA-21-3* and redrcer/2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-034 Downstream of cibow #20 No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, No from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Sidischargeline 21-035 Upstream orcibow #20 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, from reducer /2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Si discharge line 21-036 Downstream ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, No from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*. c_ ' -. MA. = T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Freiery Water Stress Cmeiseen Saddag (FWSCC) C-Cer=== Cr=img M - M'urebelogicany Innue iced Cerremon (MK') F-flew AccelmeedCerrosum I -Ireergnnotar strew Cerroman Cruimg CGSCC) E - Eremian -Cevitnesan 0-Oewr e -- O O
D (G J v '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnas C'**" " #" d" Tfp#" #7,[ Weld Systems ID Segment Line Number IJee Description Nearber Weld Location T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI403 2CCA-21-8" Si discharge line 21-037 Upstream ofelbow f21- No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop B. from reducer /2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-8* Si discharge line 21-037A Betwee,t pipelengths.#39 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. and #7. from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*. HPSI HPSI-00; 2CCA-21-8* Si discharge line 21-038 Downstream ofelbow f27 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34* to 2CCA-21-12*- HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-21-8* SI discharge line 21-039 Upstream of Elbow #27. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from reducxr/ 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34*, to 2CCA-21-12*- Daarwww Mechenurns T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Water Sims Cormace Cradung (PWSCC) M-Micreb okycepwidlemcedCerrassan(MiC) F-Fle= AcceleresedCerens== C-Carmeen Creasig I .2.,
- sameCorr enCracbng(IGSCC) E- Erence -Cavene.en 0-oder
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'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms """"#"A* " "#"#"~"
Page B20 of B157 WeM System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imcation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* Sidischargeline 21-040 Ems-n of Reducing - No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop B. Tec #28. from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34* to l 2CCA-21-12". i ! HPSI HPSI4303 2CCA-21-8" Si discharge line 21-041 Upstream of Reducing Tee No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. #28 from reducer!2CCA-21-3" and reducer /2CCB-3-6*, to 2CCA-21-12". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-214* SI discharge line 21-042 Downstream of LPSI No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. reducer #29. from reducer / 2CCA-21-3* and reducer /2CCB-34* to 2CCA-21-12". 19S1 HPSI-003 2CCA-22-12" Safety Injectron line 22-014 Ams-n of reducing No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge tee #19 check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-12* Safety Injection line 22-015 Upstream of reducing tee No No No No No No No No from SIT drscharge #19 check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32A). Desradecon Mechanrsms T-1hrmal Fatigue P - I% mary Weser Stress Cerro. ann Crachh (P%W M-E. . , Jy tralmencedCarremen(MIC) F-Fle= AcceleratedCammm C-Carrosen Chisq I -Insergrensis Stress Comsman Crackmg (KISCC) E - Eromen -Can shen 0 -Other e G G
O O O I4-SeP87 C'"##""' ^'" ""##" #"~ ## FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Fage B21 of B187 W eld Syseene ID Segment Liec Number Line Description Number WeM IAestion T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection line 22-0I5 Dv-. srea... ofelbow fl6 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection line 22-017 Upstream orcibow d16 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vaht 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-12" Safety injectan tine 22-018 Domnsticam ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check nht 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-003 ' 2CCA-22-12" Safety Injection line 22-019 Du.. w-.. of SIT 2T-2A No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge discharge motor operated check vahr 2SI-16A to valve 2CV-5003-1 RCS coldleg(RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection line 22-020 Upstream of SIT 2T-2A No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge discharge motor operated check vahr 2SI-16A to vahr 2CV-5003-1 RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). T-Tiermal resigue r- rnmary weier sevus Carremum crachns (twstc) M - wacratwalepently teAsenced Carresien (M!C) F-11o= AccelerseedComneau C-Common Crackis a I- Ireerysrsalar Stress Cerroman Oechng (IGSCC) E-Erammm tavestien 0 -Other
i%w FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calc =' arm't h. A-FDU-CALC-Olo, Rev. 00 Page B22 of BIS 7 Weld System ID Seguent Line Number Line Description Number Weld tacation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI403 2CCA-22-12* Safety Injection line 22-02I Downstream orelbow CI2 No No No No No No No No from S1T discharge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-12" Safety Irgection line 22-022 Upstream orcibow #12 No No No No No No No No from sit discharge cP.ck vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection iine 22-023 Downstream of SIT 2T-2A No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge discharge check vahr 2SI-check vahr 2SI-16A to 16A RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-3" HPSIdischarge line 22-040A Upstreamofreducer#18. No No No No No No No No i toward RCS loop A. from check vahr 2Sil3A te reducer /2CCA-22-8* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-3* HPSi discharge line 22-041 Downstream ofelbow fl4 No No No No No No No No toward RCSloop A, from check vahr 2Sil3A to reducer /2CCA-22-8" n ./ w. Mea _--_ T-The insi Fatigue P - Pnrnary Water stress Corrum.m Cracting (P%W M - Mscrd=elagically Innuemmi Carramen (MIC) F-fle= AccelermedCerre enn C-Correacn Cracting I-6, -' SwCarronenCradung(IGSCC) E - Eremen-Cavaaham O-other e 9 9
o b- U dp
'# # FMEC[-- Degradation Mech::nisms C*'"'"'#" #* A-B N C-8'8 R " 88 Page B23 of BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Neber Weld Leestice T C P 1 M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI 003 2CCA-22-3" IIPSi dischargeline 22-042 Upstream ofcIbow #14. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, fram check vahr 2Sil3A to reducer /2CCA-22-8" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-3" IIPSI discharge line 22-043 Downstream ofelbow #15. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, fnm check valve 2Sil3A to reducer /2CCA-2i-8*
IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-3" IIPSi dischargeline 22-044 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No - toward RC6 loop A. vahr #2SI-13 A. from check vahr 2Sil3A to reducer /2CCA-22-8" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-3" IIPSI dischargeline 22-044A Vendor eld at inlet to No No No No No No No Ne , toward RCS loop A, check vahr 2SI-13A . from check vahe 2Sil3A to reducer /2CCA-22-8" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-224" SI dischargeline to 22-037 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No RCS loop A (6" piping) vahr #2SI-14A i IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-6" Si dischargeline to 22-040 Downstream of reducer #18 No No No No No No No No RCS loop A (6" piping) Desradatica F T IhermalFatigue P - Primary Water Stress Cerroseen Cr clung (PWSCC) M - E ,:,' M.!!y Innuenced Cerroman SUC) F- Flow Aculerated Cerromwee C-Cer caonCracung I - Leergrunnier Stress Cerm.an Cracung 00 SCC) E - Erosion -CsAtation 0 - Other i
'# """" " A'a AMMQ10. Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B24 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" SI discharge line 22-024 Dontistream of pipe #1 No No No No No
- No No No toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA '
3" and reducer /2CCB4-6", to 2CCA-22-12*. , IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" SI discharge line 22-025 Downstream of elbow #8 No No No No No No No No tonard RCS loop A. from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB4-6", to 2CCA-22-12". IIPSI IIPSI.003 2CCA-22-8" Sidischarge line 22-026 Upstream ofelbow #8. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB4- l 6". to 2CCA-22-12". j IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" Si discharge line 22-027 Dmmstream ofcIbow #9. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB4-6" to 2CCA-22-12". HPSI HPS14)03 2CCA-22-8" SI dischargeline 22-028 Upstream of cibow #9. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB4-6", to 2CCA-22-12". Dearada6cn Medassms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Wster Stress Corrosion Crackmg (PWSCC) M - MM_:#y Influenced Cenesian (MIC) " F-flow Accelerssed Cerroman C- Cerresson Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Carrosum Crackmg (IGSCC) E - Eressan- Cavitsuan 0 - Other O O O
p . s m N N
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"'"" " Na A-FNW10. Rn. 00 4 Page B25 of B187 j Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 li?SI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" SI discharge line 22-029 Downstream of elbow #10 No No No ?!o No No No No i toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA !
3" and reducer /2CCB l 6", to 2CCA-22-12". ' IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" Si discharge tine 22-030 Upstream ofelbow #10. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A. from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB 6", to 2CCA-22-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" SI discharge line 22-031 Downstream of cibow #12. No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop A, from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB 6", to 2CCA-22-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" SIdischargeline 22-032 Downstream of elbow #13 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, (uysw6 ofcibow #12) from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB 6", to 2CCA-22-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-22-8* Si discharge line 22-033 Upstream ofelbow #13. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCS 6", to 2CCA-22-12"- Dearaderime W T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Carrosion Crachng (PWSCC) M - Microbiologscally InAmereced Cervemon (MIC) F- flow Accelermed Correnen C-Corremian Oncking I - Intergranular Stress Carrossen Craciung (IGSCC) E- Eroman-Cavitation O-Other L . . _ . . .. _. .. . . . .. .. . . . . _ _ . _ . . . ..
"" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms "'#""#" #" *""# 8 #" " Page B:6 of BI87 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" SI dischargeline 22434 Downstream ofelbow #11. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB 6", to 2CCA-22-12". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" Si dischargeline 22-035 Upstream orelbow #II. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB l 6", to 2CCA-22-12". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-22-8" Si discharge line 22-036 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop A, #17. from reducer /2CCA 3" and reducer /2CCB 6", to 2CCA-22-12*. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-010 Upstream ofelbow #16 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check valve 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-011 Downstream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). Dearadation Mechanres T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Caromon Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micretnologicaffy Innuenced Carreexm (MIC) F-flow Acceleraert Common C- Common Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Corroman Craciung (IGSCC) E- Erosion -Cantaten 0- Other e ' 9 - 9
n r b 'd ' #*" N'"" " Na MMNIO. Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B27 of B187 . W eld ; System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-012 Upstream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No , from SIT discharge l check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-013 Downstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No from SIT discSrge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safetyinjection line 24-014 Downstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-015 Upstream orelbow #20 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-016 Downstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). Deeradation Mechanisms T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cmonon Cracting (PWSCC) M - ML' .4.::y Inbenced Common (MIC) F-Flow AccelerstedCermoen C-Common Cracking I - freergranular Stress Cerronen Cracbng (IGSCC) E-Erouca-Cavitation 0-other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""" " ## A-NNC-8'8 R" 88 l' age B:8 cf B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPS1403 2CCA-23-12" Safety injectionline 24-017 Dosmstream of cIbow #22 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). I I: PSI IIPSI403 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-018 Upstream orelbow #22 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-019 Downstream ofelbow f23 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injectioa line 24-020 Upstream orelbow #23 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP , 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-020A Between piping segments No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge #3 and #28 (ISO 2CCA check val e 2SI-16D to I) RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). Dezradation Mechanisms T-Therrial Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M-MM4_"y Innuenced Corremen(MIC) F-Flow AccelerstedCorresum C-Cerrosion Chiing I - Irmergranular Stress Comsnan Cracking (IGSCC) E - Erosion - Cavitation O - Other O O O
O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"ulanon A'o. AMWQIO, Rm 00 Page B29 of B187 '
Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-021 Dowstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS coldleg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI 003 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-022 Downstream ormotor No No No No No No No No j from SIT discharge operated wahr 2CV-5063- ; check vahr 2SI-16D to 2 and upstream ofelbow l RCS cold leg (RCP #26 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-023 Upstream of elbow #26 No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge i check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-024 Downstream orcibow #29 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-025 Upstream orelbow #29 No No No No No No No No from SITdiscluirge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). Deeradmuon Mechanisms T-Thennel Fatigue P - Pnnwy Water Stress Carrosum Cracting (PWSCC) M - Muretmologically Inpsenced Corronen (MIC) F-flow AccelernsedCorrcew= C-Carramen Cruclung I - Irmergranular Stress Cornmes Cracking (IGSCC) E -Esomen -Cavitation O-Oswr 1 . . . . . .
MUMWB
'*" Catalan n A'a AMM-010, Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B30 of Bl87 i Weld Systeen ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-026 Downstream halfcoupling No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge #30 check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D).
i IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2CCA-23-12" Safety Injection line 24-027 Downstream orcheck No No i No No No No No No l from S!T discharge vahr 2SI-16D check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). liPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-3" IIPSI dischargeline 24-050 Upstream of reducer #26. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from IIPSI check vahr 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-3" IIPSi dischargeline 24-051 Dovmstream orcibow #23. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from IIPSIcheck vahr 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-3" IIPSi discharge line 24-052 Upstream ofelbow #23. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from IIPSIcheck vahr 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8" Deeradation Mechemsms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbeolopcally Innuenced Cerrosum (MIC) C-Cerrosion Crack 5 g F-Fkm AcceleratedCemmon 1 -linergranular Stress Cerrosen Crmting (IGSCE) E- Erossen - Cavitaten 0 - other j
n U C v FMECA - Degradatien Mechanisms Gamlad n No. A-PEVG-C4LC-0/0. Rev. 00 i Page B31 of B187 i Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 llPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-3" IIPSI dischargeline 24-053 Downstream of elbow #16. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from HPSI check vahr 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8"
)
IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-3" IIPSI dischargeline 24-054 Upstrea;n of elbow #16 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from HPSI check vahr 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-3" IIPSIdischargeline 24-055 Downstream ofelbow #17. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from HPSI check vahr 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8" IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-23-3* HPSIdischargeline 24-056 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, vahr 2SI-13D. from ifPSI check valve 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-3* HPSIdischargeline 24-056A Upstream of check vaht No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, 2SI-13D from HPSI check vahr 2SI-13D to reducer /2CCA-23-8" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-6" LPSI line discharge to 24-046 Upstream orreducer #25. No No No No No No No No RCS loop D (6" piping) Dearadation Mectaanssus T-Dermal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress conosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbiologically InAmenced Cerremon (MIC) F- flew Accelerated Cono= son C- Corrosion Oracking I - Intergranular Stress Carrossen Craciung (IOSCC) E - Erosion -Caviestion 0 - Other
'd # ' FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I"""" Aa AmmM' 010. Rei>. 00 Page 132 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-234" LPSIline discharge to 24-047 Dawstream ofcIbow #15 No No No No No No No No RCS loop D (6" piping) (ISO 2CCA-23-2) IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-234" LPSiline discharge to 24-047A Upstream ofelbow #15 No No No No No No No No RCS loop D (6" piping) (ISO 2CCA-23-2) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-234" LPSiline discharge to 24-048 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No RCS loop D (6" piping) valve 2SI-14D IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-234" LPSiline discharge to 24-049 Downstream orreducer No No No No No No No No RCS loop D (6" piping) #26. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si discharge line 24-029 Downstream ofelbow #15 No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop D, (ISO 2CCA-23-1) from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" SIdischargeline 24-030 Upstream of elbow #15 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, (ISO 2CCA-23-1) from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si dischargeline 24-031 Downstream orcibow #12. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3". and reducer /2CCB-5-6", to 2CCA-23-12". IkiirM i Mw:_-- T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmery Water Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) C-Commen Crackmg M - Microbeetopcally Innuenced Commen (MIC) F-How Accelersted Cerreman I- freergranular Stress Commen Cracting (IGSCC) E - Eremen -Cavitatsen 0 -Other e O O
O O O "*" FMECA - Degradstion Mechanisms " '"#""*"^'""' " [# ',#[j,[ Weld System ID Segment Line Number . Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8* SIdischarge line 24-032 Upstream ofcIbow #12. No No No No No No .No No toward RCS loop D, ; from reducer /2CCA l 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-234" Si discharge line 24-033 Don 1istream ofelbow #13. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si discharge line 24-034 Upstream ofelbow No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, #13.(donitstream ofelbow from reducer /2CCA #18) 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" SI discharge line 244)35 Upstream of cibow #18. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54*, to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" SIdischargeline 24-036 Downstream of elbow #19. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12*. i Destatssion Mechannes T-Thermal Fatigue P- Primary Water Str-es Cerranon Cracking (PWSCC) M-Mi,A:,L !!yIrdluencedCommon(MIC) F- flow Accelerated Corresson C- Corresson Crnaing I - Iniergranular Stress Cerroman Cracksng (IOSCC) E - Erosion - Cavitatsen 0 - Oiha
'# C"Ic"'"'##" No_ A-PENG-CfLC-010. Rev. 09 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B34 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Loca.\ ion T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si dischargeline 24-037 Upstream ofchw #19. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCD-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" SI dischargeline 24-038 Downstream of cibow #20 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si discharge line 24-039 Upstream ofelbow #20. No No No No No No No No l toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCD-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si dischargeline 24-040 Downstream of cibow #21 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" SI dischargeline 24-041 Upstream orelbew #21. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". ) Dearadation Mecharmms T-Thermal Fatigue P Primary Water Stress Corrorien Craciung(PWSCC) M - Micretmologpca!!y influenced Common (MIC) F- flow Accelersted Cemmon C-Commen Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Crachng (IOSCC) E- Erosion -Caustion 0 - Other e 9 . 9
'## Ca/culad n Na AMMC410. Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B33 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 l IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" SI dischargeline 24 042 Downstream ofc! bow #22 No No No No No No No No ,
toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-l 54", to 2CCA-23-12" l l IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si dischargeline 24-043 Upstream ofelbow #22. No No No No No No No No l toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si discharge line 24-044 Downstream ofelbow #14. No No No No No No No No i toward RCS loop D, f.i. n reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12*. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si dischargeline 24-045 Upstream ofelbow #19. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. (Downstream of reducer from reducer /2CCA #25) 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" Si discharge line 24-058 Downstream ofpipe #36. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-54", to 2CCA-23-12". pen =hnion Mechar na T-Thermal racisne P - Pnmary water stress Common creciung (ruscc) M - Microb.osopceny Innuenced Common (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCerro on C- Common Cracking I-Ireerpanular Stress Cerroman Craclung(105CC) E - Eressen - Cavitation 0- Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'#"'"" " #" A *"C-8'" #" 88 Page B36 of BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 117 S1 IIPSI-003 2CCA-23-8" SI discharge line 24-059 Upstream ofpipe #36 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from reducer /2CCA 3", and reducer /2CCB-5-6", to 2CCA-23-12". IIPSI IIPSI403 2CCA-24-12" Safety injectioc line 23-015 Dontistream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check nhr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-016 Upstream ofcibow #19 No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge c!cck valve 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-017 Downstream of motor No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge operated uhr 2CV-5043-2 check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA 4-12" SafetyInjectionline 23418 Upstream ormotor No No No No No No No No from SIT discharge operated vahr 2CV-5043-2 check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). h .a.t-,, Mech _ _..- T-Thermal Fatigue P- Ihmery Water Stress Corrosion Cracbng(PWSCC) C- Cerrosion Crackmg 1 - Intergranular Sress Cerrosion Cracking (10 SCC) M - ML ALM infhameed Cerrossen (LUC) F-flow AccelentedCerrosian E- Eronen-Cavitation 0 - Other e G #
,m p q *" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I"" " A'o. MMC-CIO. Rev. 00 :
Page B37 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld tacation T C P I M E F 0 j l IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-12" Safety Injection line 23-019 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No from SITdischarge valve 2SI-16C i check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSI dischargeline 23-040 Upstream side of Reducer No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop C, #22. from IIPSI check vahe 2Sil3C to reducer /2CCA-24-8". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSi dischargeline 23-041 Downstream ofelbow #25. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from IIPSI check vahr 2Sil3Clo reducer /2CCA-24-8". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSi discharge line 23-042 Upstream ofelbow #25. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from liPSI check vahr 2SI13C to reducer /2CCA-24-8". IIPSI IIPSI.003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSi dischargeline 23-043 Domistream ofelbow #26. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, fromIIPSI check vahr 2SI13C to reducer /2CCA-24-8". Dearadmuon Mechanisms T-nermal Fatigue P - Phmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbsologicany Innuenced Corm (MIC) F-Thsw AcceleratedCormoon C-Corrosion Cracking I-Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E - Emion - Cavitahan 0- Other u- -
14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation & A-PCiG-CfLC-0/0, Rei. 00 Page B38 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld I.scation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSi discharge line 23-044 Upstream orelbow #26. No No No ho No No No No toward RCS loop C, from HPSI check vahr 2Sil3C to reducer /2CCA-24-8". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSi discharge line 23-045 Downstream ofelbow #27. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from IIPSI check vahr 2Sil3C to reducer /2CCA-24-8'- IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSI dischargeline 23-046 Downstream side of Vaht No No No No No No No No l toward RCS loop C, 2SI-13C from IIPSI check vahr 2SIl3C to reducer /2CCA-24-8". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" IIPSI dischargeline 23-046A Vendor weld at inlet to No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, check wht 2SI-13C. from IIPSI check vahr 2Sil3Clo reducer /2CCA-24-8". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-6" LPSi discharge line to 23-047 Upstream of 8" x 6" No No No No No No No No RCS loop C (6" piping) reduci:rg tee #2I (6" side) ISO 2CCA-24-2 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-6" LPSi dischargeline to 23-048 Downstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No RCS loop C (6" piping) (ISO 2CCA-24-2) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-244" LPSi dischargeline to 23-049 Upstream oreIbow #23 No No No No No No No No RCS loop C (6" piping) (ISO 2CCA-24-2) j DegLadation Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P Pnmary Water Stress conosinn Cracking (PWSCC) M - ML Mk*ly influemed Cerrosion (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Cerrosnan C- Cerronen Cracking I - Irmergranular Stress Cerrosmn Cracking (IOSCC) E - Erosien - Cavir2 tim O- Other e _ O O
(N c) Q G ('s]
'## C""'""** ^'" A-"W'" R" 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisras '
l' age B30 of BIE7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descriptiou Number Weld leemtion T C P I M E F' O IIPSI IIPSI 003 2CCA-24-6" LPSi discharge line to 23-050 Downstream ofelbow #24 No No No No No No No No RCS loop C (6" piping) (ISO 2CCA-24-2) HPSI IIPS14)03 2CCA-244" LPSIdischargeline to 23-051 Upstream ofelbow #24 No No No No No No No No RCS loop C (6" piping) (ISO 2CCA-24-2) HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-244" LPSi discharge line to 23-052 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No RCS loop C (6" piping) valve 2SI-14D HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-3" SI dischargeline 23-021 Downstream of elbow #20 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, (ISO 2CCA-24-1) from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahe 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8* SI discharge line 23-022 Downstream of elbow #21 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, (ISO 2CCA-24-1) from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" Sl o.scharge line 23-023 Upstream ofcIbow #21 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, (ISO 2CCA-24-1) from reducer /2CCA . 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" SI discharge line 23-024 Downstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C. from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" Deeradstum Mechanums T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnenary Water Svens Carrosien Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micreinologicm3y Innuenced Cerrosum (MIC) F-Flew Accelerated Cerrassen C-Cerrosien Cracking I- Indergranular Stress Cornmen Cracksng (IGSCC) E- Ereason - Cavitatum O -Other i L______ .
' #*" " #" ""#I8 R" 88 Fh1ECA - Degradation afechanisms C""'""
Page B40 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" Si discharge line 23-025 Upstream orelbow #I4. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI HPSi-003 2CCA-24-8" Si dischargeline 23-026 Downstream ofelbow #15 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahe 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" SI discharge line 23-027 Upstream of cibow #G. N No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check valve 2SI-14C lo 2CCA-24-12" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" Si dischargeline 23-028 Downstream ofcIbow #16. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" SI discharge line 23-029 Upstream of elbow #16. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check valve 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" Deeradation Mechanisms T 'Ihmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Ccemnan Cracbng (PWSCC) M- ML,1_L 6'84 Innuenced 7 Carossen (MIC) F. Flow Accelerated Cerronxws C-Cormnon CracUng I - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Crachng (IGSCC) E- Erosion-Cavitetson 0 -Other 1 e 9 9 _ - .
-s-(N h
u-ser97 C""'""*'^''" # FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C[/f j"g,$ Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F, 0 ! IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" SI dischargeline 23-030 Donstream of cibow #17- No No No No No No No No l' toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24s *
~
Si dischargeline 23-031 Upstream ofelbow #17. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check sahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" PPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" Si discharge line 23-032 Downstream ofelbow #18. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, I from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" 3?SI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" Si dischargeline 23-033 Upstream ofelbow #18. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" SI discharge line 2? 034 Downstream ofelbow #19. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" Desradatirm Mecherunes T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prw.ary Water Strees Cenoemn Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microheolopcmily bdimenced Cerremon (MIC) F-flow Accelernsed Cermenm C-Common Cracking I-Intergrarnstar Stress Carrosson Crackmg (IGSCC) E - Eresson -Canatson 0-other
' = = - - " - - ' - - - ' - ' ' ' " " ' ' ' ' = ' - -
.- - ' " " ' ' - ' - - - - ' = - " . ';*- ' ' - ' - - .
? - -- - --*., r . FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I'"'" don A'o. A-PEW-C4LC-CIO. Rev. 00 Page B42 of BIS 7 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O , IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" Si discharge line 23-035 Upstream ofelbow #19. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check valve 2SI-14C lo 2CCA-24-12" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" Si discharge line 23-036 Downstream ofcIbow #20. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check valve 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" SI discharge line 23-037 Upstream of cibow #20. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from reducer /2CCA 3" and check valve 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8* SI dischargeline 23-038 Downstream of Reducing No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C. Tee #21. from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" j HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-24-8" SI discharge line 23-039 Upstream of Reducing Tee No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, on HPSI side. from reducer /2CCA 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" Dearadarwn Mechanisms T ThermalFatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cermsion Cracting (PWSCC) M - Micrainolopenny Innuenced Cerroman (MIC) F- Thnr Accderated Carmosen C- Cerrenon Cracking I- Intergrara far Stress Cerrosion Craclung (IOSCC) E - Erosion -Cavitation 0 - Other O O O
O O O I4 M ' FMECA - Degradation Mechai:ssms C"##"'" " No. A-IE'G-CALC-Olo. Rev. 00 Page B43 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 I IIPSI IIPSI403 2CCA-25-3" IIPSI hot leg injection 25-036 Upstream ofcheck vaht No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-28A 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check valve 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). IIPSI IIPS1403 2CCA-25-3" IIPSI hot leginjection 25-039 Domistream ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leginjection 25-040 Upstream of cibow #13 No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leginjection 25-041 Downstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). Desradstum Meclamars T-Hermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Weser Stress Cenosum Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micretmolcycally Innuenced Carranon (MIC) F-flow AccelerasedCession C-Corrosion Cracking I - Insergranular Strees Cerromon Creding (IGSCC) E - Eronen -Carnation 0 -Oiher
l '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"'"'""' ^'" A *"C##" #" 08 l Page B44 of B187 Weld j System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI liPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" IIPSI hot leg injection 25-042 Downstream ofcheck No No Na No No No No No l loop (from check valve uhr 2SI-27A { 2SI-27A to SDC ' suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). liPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" liPSI hot leg injection 25458 Upstream orcheck vaht No No No No No No No No loop (from check valve 2SI-28B 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" IIPSI hot leginjection 25-059 Downstream ofelbow #33 No No No No No No No No loop (from check nht 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check nIve 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" IIPSI hot leg injection 25-060 Upstream ofelbow #33 No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). Dearadsuon Mechanssms T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Ihmary Water stress Corroman Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microteologically Innuenced Cerraman (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCerronen C-Common Cracking I - Intergranular Strees Corramen Onclung (IGSCC) E- Eroman -Caustion 0 - Other e - G S
n l O O- U i
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'c"'""" ^'" A*"W'8 R" 88 Page B45 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number WeldImcation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leg injection 25-061 Downstream ofelbow #34 No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line).
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCA-25-3" HPSI hot leg injection 25-062 Downstream orcheck No No No No No No No No loop (from check vahr vahr 2SI-27B 2SI-27A to SDC suction line and from check vahr 2SI-27B to SDC suction line). HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-181 Upstream of 4"x2" No No No No No No No No dischstge to High sockolet #106 (shooli on Pressure Safety ISO 2CCB-12-1) in 2" Injection header #1 line - ISO 2CCB-II-I HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-182 Downstream orelbow #9 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-Il-1) Pressure Safety injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-l l-2" Charging pump 81-183 Upstream orcibow #9 No No No No No No No No - discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety injecten header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-11-2" Charging pump 81-184 Dowlistream ofelbow #8 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 Deeradmaion w T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prwnery Waser Stress Cerrassen CW (PWSCC) M - Micrd:id, Impmenced Corresson (MIC) F-Fkm AccelerseedCerressen C-Cerroman Cracking I - Leergramler Stress Carrasson Cracksng (IOSCC) E- Eresson-Cavissaion 0-Other L___________ ~ . . _ . . .. - . ~ . = , . . . . . . . - - - - - . - . . . . - . . - - . . . . - - . - . .
- - - . - . .. - - - = -
' 4*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"'lan n Na A-PEVG-CILC-010 Rev. 00 Page B46 ef B187 Weld ' System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-l l-2' Charging pump 81-185 Upstream ofelbow #8 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-l 1-2" Charging pump 81-186 Downstream ofelbow #7 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-l) Pressure Safety , injection huder #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-187 Upstream ofelbow #7 No No No No No No No No discharge to liigh (ISO 2CCB-11-l) Pressure Safety injection header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2 CCD-l !-2" Charging pump 81-188 Downstream of 2"x2"x2" No No No No No No No No discharge to High tee #45 (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCD-11-2" Charging pump 81-189 Downstream of 2"x2*x2" No No No No No No No No discharge to High tee #45 at reducer # 40 Pressure Safety (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-190 Upstream of 2*x2"x2" tee No No No No No No No tto discharge to High #45 (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 . HPS! HPSI-003 2CCB-l l-2" Charging pump 81-191 Downstream ofcoupling No No No No No No No discharge to High No
#47 (ISO 2CCB-11-1)
Pressure Safety Injection header #1 6 daion Mai-nisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cmonion Crecting (PWSCC) C- Cerrosion Cracking M - Mianbiokqpenny innuenced Corrasma (KHC) F flow AcceleratedCerrosi_a I- Ireergranular Stress Cerrosaan Cracting (10 SCC) E - Erosion -Caviestion 0 - other e G #
O O O "W7 C"##"'"" " #" d# FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C1#"',$ 3 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imention T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump S1-192 Upstream ofcoupling #47 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-11-2" Charging pump 81-193 Downstream ofcibow #6 No No No No No No No No discharge to fligh (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safe;y Injection header #1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-194 Upstream orelbow #6 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-195 Downstream of elbow #5 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-11-2" Charging pump 81-I % Upstream of elbow #5 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-II-1) Pressure Safety injection header #1 HPSI HPSI.003 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-197 Downstream of elbow #4 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-II-1) Pre =sure Safety injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-198 Upstream ofelbow #4 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 pgradation MecSarusqr T-Thermal Fatigi.e P Pnrnary Water Stress Comneen Cracking (PWSCC) M-MLL:-4 nyIrdleencedCanamon(MIC) F. Flow Accelerated Ceweswin C-Cenesson Cracking I-Intergranular Stress Carrosion Crackmg OGSCC) E-Eremen Cavitation 0 -Other
- v. _
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"#"#"" "^'" A " N #8 # " 88 Page B48 of B187 \
W eld l System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-l l-2" Charging pump 81-199 Donnstream of elbow #3 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) i Pressure Safety I Injection header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-200 Upstream ofelbow #3 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressurc Safety injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCD-I I-2* Charging pump 81-201 Downstream ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Presstte Safety injection header #1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-202 Upstream ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety injection header #1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-203 Downstream of elbow fl2 No No No No No No No No discharge to IIigh (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 HPSI HPSI4X)3 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-204 Upstream of cIbow #12 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety injection header #1 HPSI HPSI4)03 2CCB-11-2" Charging pump 81-205 Downstream ofelbow #11 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) l Pressure Safety injection header #1 Dearadata Mechamsms T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerroman Craciung (PWSCC) M - Miarobsologiculty Inonenced Cermace (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Cerem C- Common Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Cormion Crackmg (IOsCC) E - Erosion -Cavstation 0 -Other e 9 9
(v) v O v
'# Catalan n No. A-PEKG-CfLC-010. Rev 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B49 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C F I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-11-2" Charging pump 81-206 Upstream ofcibow #11 No No No No No No No No discharge to Ifigh (ISO 2CCB-11-1)
Pressure Safety Injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-207 Downstream ofelbow fl0 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-208 Upstream ofelbow #10 No No No No No No No No discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-II-2" Charging pump 81-209 Downstream ofcoupling No No No No No No No No discharge to High #46 (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety Injection header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-210 Upstream ofcoupling #46 No No No No No No No No { discharge to High (ISO 2CCB-11-1) Pressure Safety injection header #1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I I-2" Charging pump 81-211 Downstream orcheck No No No No No No No No discharge to High valve 2SI-24 (ISO 2CCB-Pressure Safety 11-1) Injection header #1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-027 In 2"line downstream of No No No No No No No No (IAop C) from reducer Tee #85
#103 to tee #85 Desradation Mechamsms T-Hermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M-Mk.L'6 :7Wluenml Cerreman(MIC) F-Flow AccelerseedCerrassen C- Corremon Creding I-IrsergranularStree CorressonCraclung(IOSCC) E- Enman -Ca.itation 0-Other L .---_______ _ .
'W' FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C Iculation No. A-PEVG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page B50 of BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-027A At interface of 2"line with No No No No No No No No (Loop C) from r-ducer reducing coupling #11I
#103 to tee #85 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-027B In 2"line downstream of No No No No No No No No (Loop C) from reducer Tee #85
#103 to tee #85 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-027C In 2"line upstream ortee No No No No No No No No (Loop C) from reducer #85
#103 to tec #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-027D Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No (Loop C) from reducer valve 2S148,in 2"line
#103 to tee #85 IIPSI HPSI 003 2CCB-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 8!-027E Upstream of manual vaht No No No No No Nc No No (Imp C) from reducer 2S148, in 2* line
#103 to tee #85 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-028 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No (Loop C) from reducer ~#102 o: 2" side
#103 to tee #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-071 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No (Imp C) from reducer #103. On 2" side.
#103 to tee #85 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-071 A Upstream of manual va.ve No No No No No No No No (loop C) from reducer 251-70, in 2" line.
#103 to tee #85 Demdaticei Mectngrn_s T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnrnary Water Stress Carrosien Cracking (PWTCC) M - Mk. cl@etty Influenced Common (MIC)
C- Corrosion Cracking F. Flew Accelerated Cerronmn I - Intergrarustar Stress Common Cracking (IGSCC) E - Erasen -Cavitation 0-Other e G S
v) () v h) s l
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnas C"* *"' *"##" #" "
Pace BSI of BIS 7 WeW Syseene ID Sctinent Line Nessber Line Description Nes=6er WeM I.mestion T C P I M E F 0 e LTSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* IEST Ainjechonline 81-071B Dom 1 stream of manual No No No No No No No No (Loop Q from reducer vahr 251-70,in 2* line.
#103 to tec #85 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI A injection line 81471C In 2* line upstream orTee No No No No No No No No (1. mop Q from reducer #85.
#103 to tec #85 HfSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI A injection line 81471D in 2* line downstream of No No No No No No No No (Loop Q from reducer Tee #85.
#.03 to tee #85 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainjectionline 81471E At interface of 2* Iine with No No No No No No No No (Loop Q from reducer Reduchon Couplini;;5II1.
#103 to tec #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-072 In 2* line dentistream of No No No No No No No No (i. mop Q from reducer Tee #85.
#103 to tee #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainyecuonline 81-081 Downstream orrhi No No No No No No No No (Loop Q from reducer #104, on 2* side
#103 to tee #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainjechonline 81-081A Upstreamofmanualvahe No Ar No No No No No No (Imop G from reducer 251-72,in 2* line
#IG3 to tee #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainjecuanline FI-081B Dominstreamofmanual No No No No No No No No (Loop Q from reducer uthe 251-72,in 2* line
#I03 to tee #85 h* Mahanuma
--The inal Fanisme P- Pnrnary Wen w Stress Carreensa Crecis g (F%W M - MarcheotopcmEy InSmenced Carremen (MIC) F-Nur AcreiermoedCarremen C-Correusen Cincking I - Inneryanaler Stress Carreman Cruciang (IGsCC) E- Eressen -Cavitanne 0-Olher
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' "'"'"" ##"""'# #" " Page B52 of B1$7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI A injectron line 81-081C in 2* Iine sw. ofTee No No No No No No No No (Loop Q fro . 7::ducer #149
#103 to tec #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* IIPSI Ainjectionline SI-081D In 2* line downstream or No No No No No No No No (Loop Q from redxer Tee #149
#103 to tee #85 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-08tE Atinterfaceof2*Iinewith No No No No No No No No
- 1. loop Q from reducer Reducing Coupling i148
#103 to tee #35 HPSI HPSI-001 2CCB-12-2* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-082 In 2* line downstream of No No No No No No No No (Imop Q from reducer Tee #149
#103 to tee #85 HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-12-3" HPSI A injection '.rne 81-029 Upstream orreducer #102 No No No No No No No No from header A,*.o HPSI on 3* side MOV2CV-50~.S. to reducer /2CCB-12-2*.
to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81430 Downstream ofeibow #84 No No No No No No No No from header A. to HPSI MOV 2CV-5035. to reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* Desradstum Mechent*w T-Thmal Fatigue P - Pnmary Weser Strns Carmsum Cracking (PRW M-Mb" :w'ly Innuenced Carmsum(MIC) F-flew AcxxiermeedCorresum C-Carmann Crachs I- beergrinstar stem Cemma Cradung (1GSCC) E - Eresum -Cantstww 0-Other e -
' ' ' ' ~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' ' ' '
O O
n y p) p l ( \ I J %J %d
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechamisms C""'"'##"* A-rsr,circoiR Rev. 00 Page B33 of B187 W eld System ID Segneemt une Nor ber Use Desenyt'en Noenber Weld Locaties T C P M E F I 0 l HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-031 Upstream ofelbow #84. No No N9 No No No No No l from header A. to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to i reducer /2CCB-12-2*, '
to HPSI MOV 2CV- ! 5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectenline 81-032 Domistream ofTee #97. No No No No No No No No . from header A, to HPSI ' MOV2CV-5035, to l reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* ! HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-065 h mb-. of Reducing No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI Tee #98. MOV2CV-5035, to l reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV- I 5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline SI-066 LW of cibow #56. No No No No No No No No , from header A, to HPSI l MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* i pesadmasas; Mediassens T-Thmnet Fatigue F-Pnmary Weser Stress Cer eason Cradung(FEW M-ML 'M IndluencedCarressen(MK) F-Flour AcreleasedC-C-Cerrasson Cracking I "a ,, _ _ StressCerrassanCractW(TGSCC) E - Erossen -Caviestion O-Odier l l
swv FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation % A-PEE;-CALCola, Rev. 00 Page B34 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Nember Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI4)03 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-067 Domrstream ofcibow #86. No No No No No No No No fiem header A, to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPS1 Ainjectionline 81-068 Upstream ofelbow #87 No No No No No No No No from header A. to HPSI MOV2CV-50s, to reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPS1 Ainjectionline 81-069 Domistream ofcibow #87 No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI - No MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-070 Upstream of Redomr #103. No No No No No from header A, to HPSI No No No MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2*
% -en - gr e T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnenary Want stress Ceneman Crading (P%W c-corremon cracking hi - K. J 4.ny inD=essed Cerrasson < 7 F-Flow Accelerened cam ===
- Innerrenmaar same correann creams closcc) E-tro on-cavanna o-co-r e O O
O O O 'N" C"#'*"*"^'* * " ~##"#" " FMECA - Degradation Mechanisons Page BS$ of BIS 7 WeM Systems ID Segecat Line Nemeber Line Descripties Number WeM Locaties T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI-003 iCCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-078 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI #100. MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-078A Upstream ofcibow #89. No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-079 Dv uh- ofelbow o #89. & No No No No No No No from header A,to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to reducer!2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-080 Upstream orreducer #104 No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* Desadesco Mediarmens T-Therr elFatigue P - Prunary Waner Stress Cerresum Crackmg (FWSCC) M'L" . , bdbermd Carremman(MIC) F-Flew AccelerusedCarreesen c-Corre senCredung I-Imerg enmier seeis C.,re.sen ondung 005CC) E - Eressen -Cmentsen 0-oder
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C'*"nuwr Ah A&MQ10 Rm 00 l Page B56 of BEST l W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-084 LWm ofelbow f91. No No No No No No No No I from header A, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-I2-2*,
to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSi403 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-085 Donnstream ofelbow #91. No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5C35, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI A injection line 81-086 Upstream of cIhow #92- No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I2-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-087 Downstream ofelbow #92- No No No No % No No No from header A, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, 'o 2CCB-71-2* Ikaradmuon Mecherusms T-T1*rmal rarigue r - Pr. nary weser strew cervenen crect.g (rum M - unabadeocarry Inneenced c- (1Lcc) F-11o= Accelersied cows-. c-corressen Ctecking 1 - beersrarmster Swen Cerresson Cracking (LW E- Ermen- Cavitation 0 -06er O O O o
i O O O
'* FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C#"#'" " ^'" """# # ^" "
1 Fage B57 of B187 Weld Systen ID Segnient Line Number Une Description Number Weld Laenties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-12-3* HPSI A injection line 81-088 Upstream of Reducing Tee No No No No No No No No , from header A, to HPSI #99. ! m MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* HPSI HPSI-003 ?CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-089 Downstream of Reducing No No No No N No No No from header A, so HPSI Tee 199,in cold leg MOV2CV-5035, to injecuon line. reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-090 Between pipes #55 and No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI #56. MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3" HPSI Ainjectionline 81-091 Upstream ofelbow s93. No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to y reducer /2CCB-12-2*. to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* c-_ - wammen. T-nerrnal ratigue P. Prenary Waner streme cerremon Cracksng (FW3CC) M-Macretmolopcmily trdimenced C- (MDC) F-Tk= AccelersiedCarreurse C-Carwm Crackmg I- beeryerusler Beress Ceres =en Crecitang CGsCC) E- Eremesa - Cenemhen 0 -Other
'* FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms N'"## #" AN""#E "" " Page B58 cf B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81493 Upstream of reducer #105. No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2*, to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-7I-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-3* HPSI Ainjectionline 81-095 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No from header A, to HPSI a101. MOV2CV-5035, to reducer /2CCB-12-2", to HPSI MOV 2CV-5075, to 2CCB-71-2* HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4* HPSi beader A from 81-033 Dumoum ofTee W97. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SI12 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducer /vahr 2SI-68. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4" HPSI header A from 31-034 Doumstream ofTee #95 No No No No No No No No check vahr 25112 to (Upstream ofTee #77). reducci/2CCB-12-3", (two places) to reducer /vahr 251-68. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4* HPSI header A from 81-035 Downstream of Orifice No No No No No No No No check vahr 2S112 to Flange #122. reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducer /vahr 251-68. Mkm Mechannes T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Sirew Corressee Cradung (PRW M - krm:reteologically Inomewed Carressen (MIC) F- ther Acceemand Cermesm C-Carm on Cracking 1-Intergranmier sire = Corre on Cracbng(10500) E- Laman - Carnshan O - Otfwr O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"Ic""*'t A~a NMW10. Rm 00 Page B39 of Bl87 WeM Systens ID Segneemt line Noseber Line Descripties Neber WeM tacaties T C P I M E F 0 HPS! HPSI-003 2CCB-124* HPSI header A from 81-036 Inlet to Orifice Flange No No No No No No No No check valve 2SI12 to #121. reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducer /vahr 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124* HPSI header A from 81-037 Between pipes #32 and No No No No No No No N check vahr 2SII2 to #33. reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducer /vahr 2S148. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124" HPSI header A from 81-038 Downstream ofTee #94. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2Sil2 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducerkahr 25148. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124* HPSI header A from 81-039 Upstream ofTee #94. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SI!2 to reducer /2CCB-12-3", (two places) to reducer /vahr 2SI48. IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124" HPSI header A from 81-040 Upstream ofTec #95. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2Sil2 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducer /vahr 2SI48. Dearadmoon Mec*enen. T-Tiunnel Fatigue F - Prunary Waser Stress Commsen Crackmg (PWSCC) M - Kicrohselegn:mily Indeenced Cerronen (1mC) F-Flow AccelerseedCominen C-Corrosion Cracking I- beeryanaler stress Cerramen Crudung (IGSCC) E- Eronen -Canension 0-Other r
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"'"""" * "*"# 8 ^" #8 l l' age B60 of B187 W eld System ID Segment IJne Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSi-003 2CCB-12-4" HPSi header A from 81-041 DouTistream of elbow #83. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2Sil2 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*.
(tnu places) to reducer / valve 251-68. HPSI HPSI-003 ?CCB-12-4* HPSI header A from 81-042 Upstream of elbow #83. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SII2 to reducer /2CCB-12-3". (two places) to l redocer/vahr 251-68. HPSI IIPSI.003 2CCB-12-4* HPSI header A fror 81-043 Between pipes #42 and No No No No No No No No check vahr 2Sil2 to #43 on 2CCB-12-1 sheet 2. < reducer /2CCB-12-3*. (two places) to reducer /vahr 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4* HPSI header A from 81-044 Downstream ofelbow #82. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2S112 to reducer /2CCB-12-3". (two places) to reducer /vahr 2SI48. HPSI H/SI-003 .2CCB-12-4" HPSI header A from 81-045 Upstream of cIbow #82. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SI12 to reducer /2CCB-12-3". (two places) to reducer /vaht 25148. Desredstwn Mecharasms T-Thermal Farigue P - Prunary Water Swess Camisson Cracturig (PWSCC) M - MiamboologicmDy Inrasenced Commen (MIC) F-Ibw Accelerseed Commen C-Caressen Cruimg I-Ireergranular Stress Comisson Crackmg(IOSCC) E - Emesan -Cawstatsen 0-Otfwr O O O
'# N '" "^'"A * " I "'"R" " FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B61 of B187 Weld System ID Segment time Namiber Line Description Member Weld IAcaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4* HPSI header A from 81-046 Downstream ofcibow #81. No No No No No No No No j check vahr 2S112 to I reducer /2CCB-12-3", (two places) to reducerA2ht 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4* IIPSI header A from 81-047 Upstream ofcibow #81. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SII2 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*. (two places) to reducerA2hr 2SI48. HPSI HPS -003 2CCB-12-4* HPSI header A from 81-048 Downstream of MOV No No No No No No No No check vahr 2Sil2 to 2CV-5103-1. reducer /2CCB-12-3". (tuo places) to reducerA2he 2SI48. HPSI HPSI4)o3 2CCB-12-4" HPSI header A from 81-049 Upstream of hK)V 2CV- No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SII2 to 5103-1 reducer /2CCB-12-3". (two places) to reducerA2ht 25148. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-8* HPS1 header A from 81-051 Domistream orelbow #80. No No No No No No No No check vahr 25I12 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*. (twJ places) to reducerA2ht 2SI48. Demmimbon Mecharmes T "IliermalFatigue F - Pnmary Water Stres Carronian Crschng (FW3CC) M-Md
- My InpuencelCarremme(MIC) F-Flow AccelerseedCommen c-commien Crmting I-iw swe= cerreman crming(IGsCC) E-Damon -Cavnsman 0-oder
'*" "#"A *
- C#'"R" "
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'* Page B62 of B157 W eld System ID Segment Une Number Une Description Number Weld tacation T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4* HPSI header A from 81-052 Upstream ofelbow #80. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2Sil2 to reducer /2CCB-12-3", (two places) to reducer /<ahr 25148. HPSI IFSI-003 2CCB-12-4" HPSI hcader A from 81-053 Dontstream of Tee #94 No No No No No No No No check vahr 25I12 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducerAiht 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4" HPSI header A from 81-054 Downstream ofelbow #77. No No No No No No No No check vahr 25112 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducerhahr 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-12-4" HPSI header A from 81-055 Upstream ofcIbow #77. No No No No No No No No check nht 2SI12 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*. (two places) to reducerhahr 25148. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-J-4" HPSI header A from SI-055A Downstream of pipe #30 No No No No No No No No check vahr 2S112 to on 2CCB-12-1 sheet 2. reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (u@-. of Tee) (two places) to reducerhahr 25148. Desraderim Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Fru,mry Weser Stress Cerresen Crackmg (P%W M - M~mreinolopcnDv Inpuenced Cerroman (MIC) F-Thrw AccelarmwdComynan C CommenCrecbng 1-linery=nuter stre= Cerroman Cr=cEng (IGSCC) E- Eroom -Cavemen 0- 06er O O O
O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnes C""##'*" #" ##"##" #" "
Page B63 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descripties Number Weld IAcaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI 10 51-003 2CCB-124* HPSI header A from 81-057 At interfaz with Sockolet No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SII2 to #106. reducer /2CCB-12-3*. (two places) to reducerhiht 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124" HPSI heaJer A from ** 060 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SI12 to vahr 251-12 reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducerA2ht 25148. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124* HPSI hcader A from 81-062 Upstream ofelbow f78. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2S112 to reduar/2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to ihloht 2S148. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124* HPSI header A from 81-063 Upstream of pipe #36 No No No No Nc No No No check uhr 2SI12 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*. (two places) to reducerA21ve 25148. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124" HPSI header A from 81-064 Upstream of Reducing Tee No No No No No No No No check wht 2SIa2 to #98. reducer /2CCB-12-3". (two places) to reducerA2ht 25148. Desadmisen N T-Thenal Fatigue P- Prenery Wahr Stress Commen Crechng (FHW M - 3.L . *
- Jy lidisegced Cerromme(MIC)
F-No AccelerusedCampwun c-Com=.cn crackes I-Inserymaster stress Cc.vasion Cruchng (IGSCC) E -Eressen-Cowemasen 0-other
FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms C"#" " ^'" A*"C#18 #" 80 Pay BM of B187 Weld System ID Segment Une Number Line Description Number Weld Locat-es T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124* HPSI l'eader A from 81-073 Doultstream of Reducing No No No No No No No No check sahr 2Sil2 to Tee #98. reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducerA2hr 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124" IIPSI header A from 81-074 LW of elbow #79. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2SII2 to reducerCCB-12-3", (two places) to reducerA2hr 2SI48. IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124" HPSi header A from 51-076 D:raitstream of elbow i79. No No No No No No No No check vahr 2S112 to reducer /2CCB-12-3", (two p6ces) to reducerA2ht 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124" HPSi header A from 81-077 LW orreducer #I00. No No No No No No No No check vahr 25112 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducerA2ht 2SI48. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-124* HPSI header A from 81-083 Upstream of reducer s'01- No No No No No No No No check sahr 25I12 to reducer /2CCB-12-3*, (two places) to reducerA2ht 2SI48. Derradatson Mechenems T-Thenal Febsue F - Prunary Weser stress Common Cracbng (7%W M - Micralm4cgsen8e Influenced Cerremme (MIC) F-flew Accelerased Commen C-Commer Cractris I - hvergnemier siress Common Crainig OGsCC) E - Ennen -Cavasten 0 -Other e O O
b)
- s. .
V FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' d"'"" w m m n ia. m oo Page B65 of B187 W eld Systems ID Segneemt Line Neriter Une Descripties Moseber Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-11-2* HPSiinjecten line to 80415 Up arcam orreducer #37. No No No No No No No No RCS loop B. Con 1estream MOV 2CV-5036-2 HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-13-2* HPSIinjection line to 80-016 Dontistream of MOV No No No No & No & No RCS loop B. 2CV-5036-2. downstream MOV 2CV-5036-2 l j HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-13-2* HPSIinjection line to 30-023 Upstream of reducer #36. No No No No No No No No RCS loop B. downstream MOV 2CV-5036-2 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-2* HPSIinjection line to 80424 Dominstream of MOV No No No No No No No No RCS loop B. 2CV-5035-1. downstream MOV 2CV-5036-2 HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-13-2* HPSiinjecten linc to 80-025 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No RCS loop B, 5035-1 downstream MOV 2CV-5036-2 HPSI HPSI003 2CCB-13-3* HPSI discharge line 80401 Upstream c(check vaht No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. 2SI-13B. from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 2SI-138.
Desredene Med=nnes T-Thmnal Fasigue P- Pnmary Weser Svens Cerresson Credang (PW3CC) M-Mu _ " gyInamencedCemn.on(MIC) F-fleur Am4erseedCommons C-Carre anoechng I .._ ,_ _ suas Cem on Cradung 00 SCC) E - Eremen -Cevens.ca 0-Oher
'*" FMECA-Degradation Mechanisms Garladon A'a AmMQIR Rm a7 I rage B66 of BIS 7 W eld System ID Segment Une Nomber Line Description Number Weld Emention T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI@ 3 2CCB-13-3" HPSI discharge line 80 002 Adjxent to penetration No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, 2P1Iinside containment i from HPSI MOVs j (2CV-5035-1 and 5036- 1
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 2SI-13B.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3* HPSI discharge line 80-003 Adjacent to penetration No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, 2PII outsxle contamment from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-I and 5036-
- 2) to HPSI check vahr .
2SI-138. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3" HPSi discharge line 80-005 Downstream ofelbow f25. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 5036-2)to HPSI check vahr 2SI-138. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3* HPSI discharge line 80-OrM Upstream ofelbow F25. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 251-13B.
Deeredstm Matenmns T-Thenal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water $1ress Cerrasean Cracbng (PWSCC) M - ML M-A Inneerred Carouca(MIC) T-flow AcreierssedC-C-Cerroman Crucing I- Irmagranular Stree Carveman CracLng (IGSCC) E - Ereman -Cavastian 0 -Other e 9 _ 9
m o m U U U '# "" " ^'* '8"""18 8" 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' Pat:e Bt7 of B187 wew System ID Segneemt Liec Nonsber IJae Desenption Number Weld I.4 cation T C F M I E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3* HPSi discharge line 804)o7 Downstream ofelbow #26. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 50% 2)to HPS! check nht 251-138.
]
HPSI HPSI4)03 2CCB-13-3* HPSi discharge line 80-008 Upstream ofetow #26. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 50W
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 2SI-13B.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3* HPSI discharge line 80 009 Domistream ofOrifice No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, Flange #33. from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 50W 2)to HPSIcheck uhr 2SI-13B. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3* HPSI dixA.ise line 80-010 Upstream ofOrifke No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop B, Flange #34. from HPSI hK)Vs (2CV-5035-1 and 50W
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 251-138.
Dewedsax= N T-Thenal Fatigue P- Frunary Weser Stress Carremen Cradung (FWSCC) M-L J J y bdhsencedCerremen(MIC) F-Flow AcedersnedCarros a C-Ceermien CracUng I "a. , Stream Cervesson Crachng(IGsCC) E- Eremen-Cavesesen 0 -Oiher m - .
.m. , ., ..s,.u, --- --s -. .. - 1 - - - -
s
14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calah No. A-PEVCMLC-CIO. Rev. 00 Page B68 of B187 Weld System ID Segment IJne Number Line Descri stion N=mhcr Weid Location T C P M E F I 0 IFSI IFSI-003 2CCB-13-3* IIPSi dischargeline 80-011 Dounstream ofelbew #27 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to IPSI check nht 251-138.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3* 11PSidischarge line 80-012 Upstream ofelbow #27. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B. from IFSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to 1951 check vahr 251-138.
IPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-11-3' IG Si discharge line 80-014 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop B. #37 from HPSIMOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 251-13B.
HPSI 1 9 51-003 2CCB-13-3* HPSI discharge line 80-019 Upstream ofTee #31. Ne No No No
.No No No No toward RCS loop B.
frem HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to IPSI check vahr 2SI-13B.
h A,; Mi e-- - T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Weser Stress Cermuan Cracking (P%W C-Carmnon Cracking M-M - 2 ,,, :ty bdhsenced Cervesen (MTC) F-flew Acce:ernsedCawvver a I- Ernergranular Str-se Carreman Crackang (1GSCC) E-Eres eu-Cavestwa 0-Other e G #
p m d pd
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisins N""r Na AMN4/R Rm (U Page B69 of B187 Weld System ID Segment une Member Use Description Number Weld Istation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-13-3* HPSi dischargeline 80420 ba n ofelbow 828. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B.
from HPSI MOVs (2CV-5035-1 and M36-
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 2SI-13B.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-13-3* HPSIdischargeline 80-021 Upstream ofelbow #28. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, from HPSIMOVs GCV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to HPSI check vahr 251-138.
HPSI HPSi403 2CCB-13-3" HPSI discharge line 80422 Dmmstream of reducer No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop B, #36. from HPSI MOVs GCV-5035-1 and 5036-
- 2) to HPSI check tahr 2SI-138.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-2* Both sides ef HPSI 81-014 Upstream ofReducer #35. No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5015-1. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-2* Both sides of HPSI 81-0 5 L&-e of HPSI No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5015-1. MOV 2CV-5015-I. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-2* Both sides ofHPSI 81-016 Upstream of HPSI MOV No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5015-1. 2CV-5015-1. HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-14-2" Both sides ofHPSI 81023 Upstream of Reducer N No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5015-1. Desadshan Medunums T-Dennel Fatigue P - Frunary Wsier Sirew Cerrousen Crackmq (FEM M - MureteclaycmRy bilmenced Cemeenn (MIC) F-Nw AccrierusedCarreeman C-Corre anCracking I - beerparler Stress Cemesen Crachng (IGSCC) E- Eressen-Caviemhan 0-Deer
~
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N'"'* **d " " # #8R" " l' axe B:0 of BIST W eld System ID Segment Line Number Une Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI 003 2CCB-14-2* Both sides of HPSI 81-024 Dounst: cam of HPSI No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5015-1. MOV 2CV-5016-2 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3* HPSlinjection line 81-001 Upstream orcheck nhe No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV- 2SI-13 A. 5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check nhe 2SI-13 A. - HPSI HPSI4)03 2CCB-14-3* HPSIinjectionline a:-002 Adjacent to penetration No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV- 2P5 inside contamment 5015-I and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 2SI-13 A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3" HPSIinjection line 81-003 Upstream ofFlued head No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV- for 3* pipe. 5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 2SI-13 A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-I4-3* HPSlinjection line 81-005 Downstream crelbow #4. No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 2SI-13 A. HPSI HPSI4)03 2CCB-14-3* HPSIinjection line 81-006 Upstream ofelbow #4 No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 251-13 A. Desradstion Med=rnens T-lherma' Fatigue P - Prwnery Waser Stress Cerromen Credung (PWSCC) M - Micret=alopcally Indhsenced Cerroman (M4 F-fic= AccelersmedCarvoman C-Cerroman Cradung 1 - Intersrun=Isr siress Cm==an Crachng OGSCC) E- Eroacn -Caviewsm o -other e O O
FMECA - Dqradation Mechanisms C"'c"'""*" N""NC-8'8 R" 88 l' age B71 of B187 l Wek8 System ID S, a : Line Number Line Description huser Weld IAcation T C F I M E F 0 HPSI HPsi-003 2CCB-14-3* HPSlinjection line 81-007 Dominstrean. of elbow f3. No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to checiniht 2SI-13A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3" HPSIinjection line 81-008 Upstream of cibow #3 No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 2SI-13 A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3" HPS! injection line 81-009 Domiistream ofOnfice No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV- Flange #33. 5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check valve 7SI-13A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3* HPSlinjection line 81-010 Upstream of Orifice No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2(.V- Flange #34. 5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 251-13 A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3* HPSiinjecnon line 81-011 Domiistream ofelbow #2. No No No No Ns No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 2SI-13A. I m Medsamms r-Thermal resisme r-rr aryweserstreescem ono cons (rum u-wurosnoensicanyins cedcarro a.tur) F-r1 Acceser dcar c-cem-on c% I .2,. s==== common CW (1GSCC) E- Eres.am-caviassam o-O&er
ia-sen FMECA - Degradation Mehanism? N """' #* """#8 #" 88
- Page B72 of B187 System ID Weld Segment Line Number Line Description Numher Weld Isetion T C P M E F I
O HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3* IIPSlinjection line 81-012 DouTrstream ofTee #37 No No No tb No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-I and 2CV-5016-2, to check vaht 2SI-13 A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3* HPSlinjectionline 81-013 Douttstream of 3* x 2* No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV- No reducer #35 (153 2CCB-5015-1 and 2CV-5016- 14-2) 2, to check vahr 2SI-13 A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3* HPSl injection line 31418 Upstream ofTee 837 No No ?4 No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 2SI-13 A. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3* IIPSliniection line 81-019 Douttstream of elbow #I. No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 251-13A. , HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-14-3* HPSlinjectionline 81-020 Upstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV- < 5015-1 and 2CV-5016-2, to check vahr 251-13 A.
% = W:---
T-Thermat Fatigue
? - Prwnery Water Stres Cerromee Crackamg (PW3CC)
C-Commen Crackmg M - Marebseinycalf, Indaenced Carremen (M1C) I-Intergranusar Strew Cermnon Cracking (IGSCC) F-flow Accele-ased Com=.an E- Eranon-Cavanhan 0-Oewr e 9 9
p a m Y '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N'*#""** * *"" " ## l' age B73 of B157 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descripties Messer Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-14-3" HPSIinjection line 31-022 Dommtream of Reducer No No No No No No No No from HPSI MOVs 2CV- #36. 5015-1 and 2CV-5016-
- 2. to check vahr 251-13 A.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-2* Both sides of19S1 83-020 Upstream of redracer #39. No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075-1. HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-15-2" Both sides of HPSI 83-021 Dowlistream of HPSI No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075-1. MOV 2CV-5076-2. IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-2" Both sides of HPSI 83-030 Upstream of reducer #38. No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075-I. HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-15-2* Both sides of HPSI 83-031 Dow1: stream of HPSI No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075 MOV 2CV-5075-1. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-2* Both sides of HPSI 83-032 Upstream of HPSI MOV No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075-1. 2CV-5075-1 HPSI HPSi403 2CCB-15-2" Both sides of HPSI 83-032A Downstreamofmanuel No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075-1. vahr 251-74 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-2* Both sides of HPSI 83-032B Upstream ofmanual vaht No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075-1. 2SI-74 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-2* Both sides of HPSI 83-033 Dow1: stream of reducer No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-5075-1. (#105 from 2CCB-12-1-1) Desradman Med=nane T-11iennas ratigue r-Ivanaryw=eersirensCarre encradars(twscc) M - Micreh.ese,cmey 1,di.e w.d Cerroman (usC) F-rio. AccetereiedC re C-Carresian Cracking I-Insergranular Siress Cerrassen Cradung (IGsCC) E-Erosum Caventsan 0-Oeer
isser.97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Caic*lanoa No. A#DGUIC-Olo. Rev. oo Pay B74 of B187 Weld System ID Segment une Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3" HPSi discharge line 83-001 Don 1tstream orelbow #6. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-- 13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3" HDSI discharge line 834102 Upstream ofelbowe6. No No No No No No No No l toward RCS loop D. I from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. HPSI dPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSI discharge line 83-003 Dumhu orcIbow #4 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check nhr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSi discharge line 83-004 Upstream ofofelbow s4 No No No No No .Vo No No toward RCS loop D, from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check valve 2SI-13D. Desradam Mectanums - T-Themal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stres Carmeen Craimg (F%W M-M ' ,, ayinfleecedCorressan(LUC) F- Nur Li_a Commen C-Common Craimg I- :,a., _-
*- Stress Commaan CW (IGSCC) E - Erwson -Cavnahen 0 -Odwr
O O O I'3eP97 N'""*"""" FMECA- Degradation Mechanisnes # # 7,",ff[7 weed System ID Segment Line Number Line Descriptsee Messer WeldImcaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSI discharge line 83-005 Downstream ofcibow #2. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-I ami 2CV-5076-2 to check tahr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSI discharge line 83-006 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. frem HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check suht 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-IS-3" HPSI discharge line 83 @ 7 Adjacent to penetration 2P- No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. 25 inside containment from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-I and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3" HPSidischargeline 834108 Inlet to Flued head for 3* No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, pipe #55. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vaht 2S1-13D. Dunradme un Mechamans T-Thennel Fatigue P - Frunary Weser Stress Cerroman Crociting (FW9CC) M-M~f '.4, bdluenced Carremen(MIC) F-flew " c'~ aJ Cerrame= C-Cerronen Craclung I - beerymouler Stress Cerroman Credung (IOSCC) E- Eremos -Caveeme 0-Other
1 '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'a#"" ^'* A *""'" R" " Page B76 of B187 W eld System ID Segment une Number Une Description Number Weld Iscation T C P M E F I 0 HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-15-3* IIPSI discharge line 83-010 Dumahc.im of flow No No No No No No No foward RCS loop D, element 2FE-5074-2 No l from ID'SI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCD-15-3* HPSi discharge line 83411 Upstream ofOrifice No No No No No No No No < toward RCS loop D, Flange 832-from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vphr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-15-3* HPSi discharge line 83-013 DvmoLwo ofelbow c25. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI- - 13D. IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSi discharge line 83-014 Upstream ofcIbow s25. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. Desredshan Mecher=== T-nermal ratigue P - Prunary water wens cerramen creding (Pwscc) M-Micr b.aseye fryInnuencedcem an(MIC) F-flow Accelers!!edCarre san c-cenesson creding 1. beersraradar sims cerroman crackms (losCC) E - Erensen -cessahen 0-Odier e O G
O O O FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnes C"'"#" " 'V" A*"W'8 R" 88 Page B77 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Numkr Line Descripties Number Weld Location T C F I M E' F 0 HPSI UPSI-003 2CCB-IS-3* HPSi discharge line 83-015 Dun.ob-. of elbow #26 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. (ISO 2CCB-15-2) from HPSI MOVr 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSi discharge line 83-016 Upstream orcibow f26. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSI discharge line 83-017 Downstream ofTee #37 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-I and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI403 2CCB-15-3* HPSI discharge li*ie 33-018 Upstream ofTee #37 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. (2CV-5076-2) from HPS1 MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vaht 2SI-13D. Dunderm Mah===us T-umn :raisee r-Pr yweserseemcom>=encr=ains(rwscc) u-u.crob s s, car;ndh.c.c.4c m (wnc) F-ri Acmer.ncacom, c-com== creams I-:.e. '- sv.= Camm.an Oncisis OGSCC) E - Erosum - ce=amaso. 0-Oeier L_ _ - - --- =- -
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C*"#""*^'"A *
- K-8#8R" "
l' age B'8 ef B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number f.Line Dewription Number Weld I. mention T C P I M E 2' O HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSi discharge line 83-019 Downstream orreducer No No No No No No No No Ioward RCS loop D. #39. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5075-2 to check valvi. 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* IIPSi discharge line 8?-023 Upstream ofTee #37 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. (2CV-5075-1) from IIPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check valve 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSidischargeline 83-024 Dumha efelbow f27 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check ulve 2SI-13D. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-15-3* HPSI discharge line 83-025 Upstream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 251-13D. L 2. Ma .. . T-Thmnal Fatigue F - Pnrnary Waser Stres Cerroman Cractang (PWSCC) M - MicreteohicmDy Inffuenced Cerroesen (MIC) F-flow Acce4ermees . eneseen C-Cerrossen Crading 1- beergranular Stress Cerrossen Creding(IGSCC) E - Ereeme- Cavambee 0 -Other e - O O
O O O c FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'#"'"" " ^'" ANN"#8 R" 88 Page B79 of B187 Weld System 19 Segment Line Number Line Description haber Weld Location T C P I M F E 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-15-3" IIPSi discharge line 83-026 Downstream ofelbow #28. No No No No No No No No l toward RCS loop D, from IIPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahr 2SI-13D. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-15-3" IIPSi discharge line 83-027 Upstream orelbow f2ft. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D, from IIPSI MOVs 2CV. 5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check valve 251-13D. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-s 5-3" IIPSi discharge line 83-029 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop D. #38. from IIPSI MOVs 2CV-5075-1 and 2CV-5076-2 to check vahe 2SI-13D. IIPSI IIPSI-003 ' 2CCB-23-1 1/2" Safety injection 81-056 At interface with 1 1/2" No No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- coupling #107 (shown on
$112 ISO 2CCB-12-1)
IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCB-23-1 1/2" Safetyinjection 81056A Downstream of I 1/2" half No No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- coupling #107 (shown ou 5112 ISO 2CCB-12-1) } IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-23-I I/2" Safety injection SI-056B Upstream orelbow #9 Ne No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-1) 5112 Desredation Mechar=== T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnenary Water Stress Corressen Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micret=dogicany Innuenced Carressan (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCerensson C- Corrosion Cracking I- Irmergranular Stress Cerresson Onclung (10 SCC) E- Ercemn-Cavitation 0 -Other _,,,u - n-- - ,--n , . , . , ~ - - . . - - - . . . - - - - - . . . . .
'N97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms
- Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 p,y, 33, ,f 3,37 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 liPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-23-I I/2" Safety injection 81-056C Downstream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-1) 5112 i IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-23-i l/2" Jafety injection 81056D Upstream ofelbow #8 No No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-l) 5112 IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2CCB-23-1 1/2" Safetyinjection 81-056E Downstream ofelbow #8 No No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-1) 5112 IIDSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-23-1 1/2" Safety injection 81-056F Upstream of cibow #7 No No No No No No No No I
pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-1) 5112 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-23-I I/2" Safetyinjection 81056G Downstream of elbow #7 No No No No No No No No ) pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-1) 5112 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-23-I I/2" Safety injection 81-05611 Upstream orcibow #6 No No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-1) 5112 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-23-I I/2" Safety injection 81-0561 Downstream ofelbow #6 No No No No No No No No pressure relief to 2PSV- (ISO 2CCB-23-1) 5112 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-23-1 1/2" Safety injection 81-056J Upstream of pressure relief No No No No No No No No pressur: relief to 2PSV- valve 2PSV-5112 (ISO 5112 2CCB-23-1) Desradstion Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Conosion Craciang (PWSCC) M - Microbiologicany Innuenced Corrence (MIC) F- Nw Accelerated Comseson C - Corrosion Cracking I- Interg anular Stress Cernman Osching (IGSCC) E - Erosion -Cavitation 0 - Other O O O
O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I""" " A'a NMLC-0IO. Rev. 00 ,
Page B81 of B187 ' Weld System ID Segment Line Number - Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-2" Downstream ofIIPSI 42 009 Upstream of reducer #24. No No No No No No No No: ; MOV 2CV-5056-2 and ;
, also upstream of HPSI I MOV 2CV-5055-1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-2" Downstrer.m ofiiPSI 82-010 Downstream of MOV No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-50%2 and 2CV-50%2 also upstream of HPSI MOV 2CV-5055-1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-7-2" Downstream of HPSI 82-017 Upstream orreducer #25. No No No No No No No No
- MOV 2CV-50%2 and also upstream of HPSI MOV 2CV-5055-1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-2" Downstream of HPSI 82-018 Downstream ofiiPSI No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-50%2 and header valve 2CV-5055-1 also upstream of HPSI MOV 2CV-5055-1 HPSI IIPSI4)03 2CCB-7-I' Downstream of HPSI 82-019 Upstream of HPSI header No No No No No No No No MOV 2CV-50%2 and valw 2CV-5055-1 also upstream of HPSI MOV 2CV-5055-1 HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-3" HPSI dischargeline 82-001 Downstream ofpipe #1 No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, (on sheet 2CCD-7-2) from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-50% 2, to check valve 2SI-13C. IhaL% Medus=nns T-Thennel Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser Stress Conosion Cracking (PWSCC) M-MM _' AllyinfluencedCaraman(MIC) - F-I'lew Accelerated Conoseon C-Canonon Cracking I - Innergranular stress conomon Cracking (IOSCC) E- Eronen- Cavnshan 0- Other E
- " FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"' tan n A'a Aamu -Olo. Rm 00 Page BS2 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld l_acation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI 003 2CCB-7-3" HPSi discharge line 824)01 Adjacent to penetration No No No No No No No No toward RCS toop C, 2P30 inside containment from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-5056-2, to check valve 2SI- l 13C.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-3* HPSI discharge line 82-003 Adjacent to perietration No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, 2P30 outside containment from HPSI MOVs 2CV- l 5055-1 and 2CV-5056- ) 2, to check vahr 2SI- i 13C. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-3" HPSi discharge line 82-004 Dumuumii of orifice No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop t', flange #21. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-5056-2, to check vahr 2SI-13C. HPSI 1 9 S1-003 2CCB-7-3" HPSI discharge line 82-005 Upstream oforifice flange No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, #22. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-5056-2, to check vahr 2SI-13C. Desradetson Methannms T-Therrnal Fangue P - Pnmary Water Stress Carrosson Crariing (P%E) M - Micrainologpcally influenced Corrasson (MIC) F-mw AcceleratedCommon C- Corrcaion Cracking I- Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracksng (IGSCC) E - Erosson-Caviwien 0 - Other e G . G
'*" . FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N"I'*"" NommC-Ola Rn. W Page B83 of B187 '
Weld System ID Segneent Line Neueber Line Description Number Weldimcation T C P I M E- F 0 ( ) HPSI _ HPSI-003 2CCB-7-3" HPSI discharge line 82-006 Downstream ofTee #23. No No No No No No No No 9 toward RCS loop C, . from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-50% 2, to check valve 2SI-13C. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCE-7-3" HPSI discharge line 82-008 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, #24. from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-I and 2CV-50% 2, to check valve 2SI-13C. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-3" HPSI dischargeline 82-013 Downstream ofelbow #26. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-50% 2, to check valve 2SI-13C. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7-3" HPSI dischargeline 82-014 Upstream ofelbow #26. No No No No No No No No toward RCS loop C, from HPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-50% 2, to check valve 2SI-I3C. Desrede.ca Mechensens T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Weser serens Carrossen Cradung (PWSCC) M-MLf ' J r,bdlerncedCarresson(MIC) F-Flow AccelerasedCarramen C CarremenCrocidng I - keerpaneler Strees Carromen Cradung (IGSCC) E- Eressen-Cavensson 0 -Odier
FMECA - Degradafion Mechanisms C"'"""" ^'* "^""# 8 R'" 88 Page BS4 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-7-3" IIPSi dischargeline 82-016 Downstream orreducer No No No No No No No No towsrd RCS loop C, #25. from IIPSI MOVs 2CV-5055-1 and 2CV-5056-2, to check vahr 2SI- l 13C. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-2" IIPSl return iine to 81-116 In 2"line downstream of No No No No No No No No i RWT. reducer #33. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-2" IIPSI return line to 81-117 In 2"line upstream of No No No No No No No No RWT. MOV 2CV-5101-1. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-2" IIPSI return line to SI-I18 In 2"line downstream of No No No No No No No No R W T. MOV 2CV-5101-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-2" IIPSi return line to 81-119 In 2"line upstream or No No No No No No No No R W T. reducer #34 IIPSI I! PSI-003 2CCB-70-2" IIPSI retura line to 81-140 Downstream orreducing No No No No No No No No RWT. tee #28 (2" side)(ISO 2CCB-70-2) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-2" IIPSi return line to 81-141 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No RWT. operated vahr 2CV-5105-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-061 Downstream of Reducing No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC Tee #42. suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-061 A Betuten pipes #14 and No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC #41. suction". Dearadetion Mechaniwns T-Thermal Fatigue P Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracbng (PWSCC) M - Microbeol.pcany influenced Correemm (MIC) C -Cerrosion Cracbng F- Flow /sa a4 Carroman 1 - Intersranular stress Common Cradung (tosCC) E - Erosum - Cantation 0-Other O O O L ____ ____
~N p p (V V V
"*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculan n A#a AmmW/0, Rn. 00 Page B85 of B187 ;
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Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number WeldImation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-0 % Upstream orelbow #10. No No No No No No No' No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-097 Downstream of elbow #10. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-098 Upstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-099 Downstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-100 Upstream ofcibow #2. No No No No No No No No , valve 2SI-26A to "SDC 1 suctson". ! IIPSI HFSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-101 Downstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-102 Upstream orelbow #11. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-103 Downstream ofelbow #11. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". Dearadassan M% T-Hermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stresa Correswwi Cradung (PHW M - Micre6eologsca!!y hdluenced Common (MIC) F- Flow Accelerused Cerrosion C-Cerrosion Craclung I - beerpanular Stress Cemman Craclung 00 SCC) E- Erosion-Cavientsen 0- Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Catala# n A'oM%LC-010 Rev. 00 Page BS6 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld location T C P I M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-104 Upstream of elbow #3. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC se: tion". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downs *. ream of check 81-105 Downstream of elbow #3. No No No No No No No No ! vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IlrSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-106 Upstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to *SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-107 Downstream orcibow #4. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to *SDC suClion". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-70-3" Downstream of check 81-108 Upstream ofcibow #5. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-109 Downstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-110 Upstream ofelbow #12. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI HFSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-11I Downstream ofcibow #12 No No No No No No No No 1 vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". Desradation Mechanisms T-Hermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Conesian Cracking (P%W M-MLALs OyInnuencedCanesen(MIC) F-flow Accelerated Commen C-Common Cracting I- Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracbng (IGSCC) E- Erosion - Cavitation 0 - Other O O O
G O O G (3
~J "# FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""""" * ^^*WI8 R" 88 Page B87 of B187 l Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 l l
IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-112 Upstream ofelbow #6 No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-113 Downstream of elbow #6. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 8l-113A Between pipes #23 and No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC #40. suction". HPSI 11 PSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-114 Upstream of elbow #7 No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-115 Upstream orreducer #33. No No No No No No No No , vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI HPSI003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-120 Downstream orreducer No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC ,#34. suction". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-121 Downstream of cibow #8. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-122 Upstream ofelbow #9. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". Desradatim M- + _ T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosma Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microhologically influmced Common (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Common C-Corrosion Cracking I - Irmergranular Stress Commion Crackmg (IOSCC) E- Erosion -Cavitation 0 - Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " #" A"-Cd### ^" 88 Page BSS of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number ) ine Description Number Weld tecation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-123 Downstream ofelbow A9 No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". j IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-125 Upstream ofelbow #13. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-126 Downstream of elbow #13. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to *SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-127 Upstream of Flued header No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC for 3" pipe #36 suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-128 Downstream of Flued No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC header for 3" pipe (#36 on suction". 2CCB-70-4) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-128A Upstream ofelbow #2 No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-129 Upstream orcheck rahr No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC #2SI-26A. suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-130 Downstream of check No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC vahr 2SI-26A suction". Dearadation Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prirnary Water Stress Cerrosson Cracking (PC3CC) M - Micratwologscally Inouermed Corresson (MIC) F- flow Accelerated Cerroman C- Certosion Cracking I - Intergranular stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E- Erosion - Carstation 0 - Othee l e 9 9
p ,r) r N.)
'"* C""lan n A'a AMG-C4WIR Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B89 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-131 Upstream orelbow #5 No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC (ISO 2CCB-70-1) suction".
IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-132 Dounstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-133 Upstream ofelbow #7. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Down-tream ofcheck 81-134 Downstream of cibow #7. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC i suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-135 Upstream orelbow #9. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI4)03 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-136 Downstream orelbow #9 No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to *SDC (from 2CCB-70-1) suction". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-139 Upstream of Reducing Tee No No No No No No No No vaht 2SI-26A to *SDC #28. suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-142 Downstream of Reducing No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC Tee #28. suction". Dearadetson Mechenserns T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prirnary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Miaobsolgpcally Innumced Cerrossan (MIC) F-11cw AcceleratedCommoss C CommonCracking I-Interpanular sims Cerrosion Cractung (10 SCC) E- Eressen-Cavitation 0 -Other
'# # ' C"'"'"" " #" -l'8""#8 #" 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B90 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-142A Between pipes #2 and #3. No No No No No No No No '
valve 2SI-26A to "SDC sDClion". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-143 Upstream of elbow #19. No No No No No No No No ; vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC ' soction". l IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstres .ofcheck 81-144 Downstream of elbow #19. No No No No No No No No ! vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC l suction". i IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-144A Between pipes #4 and #5. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to *SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of c'ieck 81-145 Upstream of elbow #23. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suCliors~, IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofchect 81-146 Domsicam of elbow #23. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-146A Beturen pipes #6 and #7. No No No No Na No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-147 Between pipes #7 and #8. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". Derradatiori Mechanesms T-nemial Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbior.ycally Influenced Cerrosaan (MIC) F- flow Accelerated Common C-Common Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracking (10 SCC) E - Eresian - Cavitation 0 -Other l e 9 m 9
- ' s emamimu su miu O O O
' " C"' ' lad n A'a A-PEVG-C4LC-0IO. Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B91 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Mation T C P I M E F O IIPSI 11 PSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-148 Upstream ofelbow #24. No No No No No No No No' 4 vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction".
IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-149 Downstream ofelbow #24. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI HPSI4K)3 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-150 Upstream of cibow #25. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC SuClion". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 31-151 Downstream of elbmv #25. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-152 Upstream ofelbow #26. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-153 Downstream ofcibow 26. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-154 Upstream of elbow #27. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-155 Downstream of elbow #27. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". Desradaten Mechamems T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser Stress Carrosenn Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microtnolopeally Innuenced Common (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCarrosen C-Carrosen Cracking I - Intery anular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IOSCC) E - Eromaan-Cavitation 0 - Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"''"""" ^'" A-8"C-8#8 #" 88 Page B92 of B!S7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Iecation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-155A Between pipes tfl2 and No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC #13. suction". l HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-155B Between pipes #13 and No No No No No No No No , vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC #14. suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-70-3" Downstream orcheck 8.-156 Between pipes #14 and No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A 10 "SDC #15. suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-157 Upstream of elbow #20. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-158 Downstream orelbow #20. No No Nr No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downs' ream of check 81-159 Upstream ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC (ISO 2CCB-70-2) suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-160 Downstream of elbow #21. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". IIPSI HPSI 003 2CCD-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-161 Upstream of elbow #22. No No No No No No No No vaht 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". i Dearadation Mecharmru T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnenary Water Stress Cerrosion Crackmg (PWSCC) M - MhM.!!y Innuenced Cerroemi(MIC) F-Flow AccelerstedCerrosion C-Cerrosion Crackmg I - Intergranular stress Corrosion Cradung (IGSCC) E Eronen-Cavitation 0- Otter e 9 ._ _ _. 8
O O O i4.ser97 C"#'"#"" * *"# FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C-##"[#,[7 3,, , Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI@3 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check '81-162 Deuttstream of cibow #22. No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to *SDC suction". I HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-163 tJpstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No s valve 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-164 Upstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to *SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-166 Downstream ofelbow fl. No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC No_ No ] suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-167 Upstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No= vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-168 Downstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No P'o No valve 231-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-169 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC sucten". HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-170 Downstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". Dearadaten Mechanisms T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary water stress cerroman Cracking (PwsCC) M - Microhnolopca!!y Innuenced Carvesson (MIC) F- flow Accelerseed Cerrosen C-Cerrosion Cracting I Intersranular stress cc resson Craciang(losCC) E- Erosson- Cavitetson 0-other 1 I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ W
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Caladadon No. A-PENGCf LC-010. Rev. 00 i Page B94 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 llPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-171 Upstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC l suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-172 Downs 4 ream of elbow #3. No No No No No No No No 1 vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction", llPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Doumstream ofcheck 81-172A Upstream of piping No No No No No No No No valve 2SI-26A to "SDC segment #21 (ISO 2CCA-suction". 25-3) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-70-3" Downstream orcheck 81-173 Upstream of elbow #22 No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC (ISO 2CCA-25-3) suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-70-3" Dowmtream ofcheck 81-174 Downstream orelbow #22 No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC (ISO 2CCA-25-3) suction". IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-176 Upstream ofelbow #15 No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream of check 81-177 Downstream of elbow #15 No No No No No No No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC (ISO 2CCA-25-3) suction". HPSI HPSI-003 2CCD-70 3" Downstream of check 81-178 Upstream of elbow #11 No No No No No No No No [ vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC (ISO 2CCA-25-3) suction". Deeradation Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Primary Water Stress Cerrosion Cradung (PWSCC) M - Mi.2.26J,- Innuenced Cerrosnan (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Carramen C- Corrosica Cracking I - Ir.terErarmlar Stress Cerro= ion Cradting (10 SCC) E - Ernseen -Cavitation 0 - Other e _ _ O O
)
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N'wlad n A'a AMMC-010 Rm 00 Page B95 of B187 Weld Syrtem ID Segment Line h mber Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Downstream ofcheck 81-179 Donitstream of elbow #11 No No No No No th No No vahr 2SI-26A to "SDC (ISO 2CCA-25-3) suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-70-3" Doutistream of check 81-180 Upstream ofcheck vahr No No No No No No No No vahe 2SI-26A to "SDC 2SI-27A suction". IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-7l-2" Cross mer fromIIPSI 80-233 In 2"line downstream of No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" MOV 2CV-5102-2 hot leg injectionline IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from IIPSI 80-234 In 2"line Upstream of No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" reducer #11. hot leg injectionline IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from iiPSI 80-243 Downstream ofpipe #14. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leginjectionline IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from iiPSI 80-244 Downstream ofelbow f5. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injectionline IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from ilPSI 80-245 Upstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injection line IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from IIPSI 80-246 Downstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train *B" hot leginjectionline Dearadation Mechammu T. Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser Stress Cerrasson Crackms (PWSCC) M - Microbiologicany Indaenced Corremon (MIC) F. Flow AccelerenedCerween C-Cerrosien Cracking I- Intergranular Stress Carremon Crading (IOSCC) E- Frosien-Cavitation o-Oder
~
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " #" A *"##" #" 88 Page B96 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Iecation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-71-2" Cross mer from HPSI 80-247 Upstream of elbow #4. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injection line HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from HPSI 80-250 De mstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leginjectionline HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from IIPSI 80-251 Upstream of cIbow #3. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hat leginjection line HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from HPSI 80-252 Downstream ofvalve 2SI- No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" 31. hot leg injection line HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from HPSI 80-255 Upstream ofvalve 2SI-30 No No No No Nc No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injection line HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from IIPSI 80-256 Downstream of ccupling No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" #15. hot leg injection line HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from HPSI 80-257 Upstream ofcoupling #15. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injectionline HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from HPSI 80-258 Downstream of elbow #2 No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leginjection line gar m M ;.;sms T-Therrial Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Carrasion Cracting (PWSCC) M - Micrutmologically Influenced Cerroman (MIC) F- Flow Accelermed Common C- Common Cracking 1 - Irmergranular Stress Corrosion Craclung (IGSCC) E - Erosion - Cavitation 0 -Other e 9 9
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'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Catalan n A' . MMC-M, Rn. 00 Page B97 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld lecation T C P I M E F 0 !
IIPSI IIPSI-003 = 2CCB-71-2* Cross mer from flPSI 80-259 Upstream of elbow #2. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injection line IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from ilPSI 80-260 Downstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leginjection line IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from l! PSI 80-261 Upstr.:am orelbow #1. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injection line IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from IIPSI 80-262 Upstream of pipe #6 at No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" Reducing Tee. A.K.A. #- hot leg injection line 81-094 oa Sheet 2CCB I sheet I IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-2" Cross mer from il?SI 80 276 Downstream orreducing No No No feo No No No No header #1 to train "B" tee #12 (2" side)(ISO hot leg injection line 2CCB-71-2) HPSI IIPSI/X)3 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from HPSI 80-277 Upstream oi motor- No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" operated vahr 2CV-5106-2 hot leg injection line IIPSI HPSI4)03 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-235 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" #11. IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-236 Downstream ofelbow #1. No ? 'o No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-237 Upstream of Red-Mng' fee No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" #12. Desradation Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M-Mk J4 JhInfluencedCerroman(MIC) F-Flow AccelerstedCommon C-Common Cracking 1 -Intergranular Stress Cor osan Cracturg OGSCC) E- Eroman-Censexe 0-other i
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " #" d-IBMC-0/0, Ra. 00 Page B98 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld lmcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI 003 2CCB-7!-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-238 Downstream of Reducing No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" Tee #12. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-239 Downstream of c! bow #2. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-241 Upstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suG'on" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-242 Upstream of Flued header No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" for 3" pipe #14. HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-263 Downstream of Flued No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" header for 3" pipe (#14 on 2CCB-71-5) HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-264 Upstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No line to *SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSI train B injection 80-265 Upstream of check vaht No No No No No Na No No line to "SDC suction" 2SI-26B IIPSI IFSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSI train B injection 80-266 Downstream of check No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" vahr 2SI-26B. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-267 Downstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-268 Upstream of cIbow #5. No No No No No No No No line to *SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSI train B injection F3-269 Downstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" Deeradatwn Mechemsms T-Thennal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Water Stress Cerrosion( %g(PWsCC) M - Microbiologica!!y Innuenced Cerrosion (MIC) C-Cerrosion Cracking F-flow AcceleratedCorressen I-IrfergranularStressCerrosienLW g(IGsCC) E Erosien-Cavitation 0- Other O O O
O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"Ic"'"" " ^'" AN^""l8 R" 88 Page B99 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Numirr Weld Imation T C P I M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSitrain B injection 80-270 Upstream ofelbow #7 No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-7 l-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-271 Downstream of cibow #7. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IPSI train B injection 80-274 Upstream of Reducing Tee No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" #12.
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-275 Downstream of Reducing No No No No No No No 'No line to "SDC suction" Tee #12. HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSI train B injection 80-278 Upstream of elbow #8. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-279 Downstream ofelbow #8. No No No No No No No No
!ine to "SDC suctior."
HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-280 Downstream ofc1 bow #10. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI IFSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-281 Upstrears ofelbow .fil. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI IFSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-282 Downstream of elbow #11. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-283 Upstream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No
~ ae to "SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSitrain B injection 80-284 Downstream ofelbow #9. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSitrain B injection 80-285 Upstream ofelbow #9. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" Dearadstion Mectianisns T- Thermal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress Corresien Craclung (FWsCC) M - Microbiolopcally Innuenced Corressen (MIC) F-flew AcceleratedCerrasson C- Corrosion Crociting '
I - Irmergranular Stress Corrosion Craciung (IOSCC) -Ns - Cavitation 0 - Other b -._ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . -
i4.sep-97 FMECA - Degradah.on Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010 Rev. GO page s100 of sis 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P M E F I 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-286 Downstream of cIbow #9. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-287 Upstream of elbow #7. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction
- IIPSI HPSI4)03 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection W-288 Downstream orcibow #7. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-289 Upstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-290 Downstream of elbow #5 No No No No No No No No line to *SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-291 Upstream orcibow #3. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-292 Downstream of elbow #3. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSI train B injection 80-293 Between pipes #1 and #2. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-294 Upstream of cibow #3 (on No No No No No No No No line to *SDC suction" 2CCB-71-4)
IIPSI IIPSI 003 2CCB-71-3" HDSi train B injection 80-295 Downstream of elbow #3. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction
- HPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSI train B injection 80-2 % Upstream of c! bow #4. No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" HPSI HPSI-003 2CCD-71-3" HPSI train B injection 80-297 Downstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No line to *SDC suction" Drat = Mien _ Mat =nnms T-Thamal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrosum Cracking (PWSCC) M - Meeretnologica!!y Innuenced Corrosion (MIC) F- flow Accelerated Corromen C- Corrosnan Cracking 1 - Intergrarantar Stress Cerresian Cracking (IGsCC) E - Eronan - Cavitation 0 - 0:her O O O
p r ( Q V
' N'7 .
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 p,y,y,,, ,f 3,37 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi train B injection 80-298 Upstream orpiping No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" segment #54 (ISO 2CCA-25-3) i IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSi trair 4 injection 80-299 Upstream of elbow #58 No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" (ISO 2CCA-25-3) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCD-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-300 Downstwam of elbow #58 No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" (ISO 2CCA-25-3) IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-301 Between cibow #58 and No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" cIbow #36 IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-302 Upstream ofelbow #36 No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" (ISO 2CCA-25-3) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSi train B injection 80-303 Downstrean ofelbow #36 No No No No No Nc No No line to "SDC suction" (ISO 2CCA-25-3) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B ir.jection 80-304 Upstream of cibow #35 No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" (ISO 2CCA-25-3) IIPSI HPSI 003 2CCB-71-3" IIPSI train B injection 80-305 Downstream of cibow #35 No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" (ISO 2CCA-25-3) IIPSI HPSI-003 2CCB-71-3" HPSI train B injection 80-306 Upstream of check vahe No No No No No No No No line to "SDC suction" 2SI-27B HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-138 Downstream ofpipe #35. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (25I12) at HPSI header #1 Deeradation Mechanisms T-lhermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Common Cradung (PWSCC) M - Merotwolopearly Innuenced Common (MIC) F- flow Accelerated Cerromon C- Carmsion Cracking I- Interpanular Stress Common Cracbng (10 SCC) E - Eronan - Cavitation 0- Other
'# C"I"'la# n A*o. ef MMLC-0/0, Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B102 of B187 ' Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" II*SI pump disciurge 80-139 D mnstream ofcibow #60. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2Sil2) at i IIPSI header #1 l HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-I-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-140 Upstream orelbow #60. No No No No No No No No ' line from pump to check vaht (2SI12) at IIPSI header #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-141 Downstream of elbow #59. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2SIl2) at IIPSI header #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCD-I-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-142 Upstream ore! bow #59 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2SI12) at IIPSI header #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" HPSI pump discharge 80-144 Downstream of elbow #58. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2SI12) at IIPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-145 Upstream ofelbow #58. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2SI12)at IIPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-146 Downstream ofelbow #68. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2SIl2) at IIPSI header #1 Desradation Mechehn T-Thermal Fatigue P - Primary Water Stress Comsion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micrainologra!!y Infloenced Corresson (MIC) F-flow Accelerated Carvessen C-Carrosion Crackmg I- Irmergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IOSCC) E - Eroman - Cavitation 0 - Other e . 9 9
n ( p i b d
'# # FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calc" Icd n A'a AMMC-Olo.Rcw A7 Page B103 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld location T C P I M E F 0 j l
lIPSI HPSI4X)3 2DCB-1-4" IIPSI pump discharge 80-147 Upstream ofcIbow #68. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2Sil2)at IIPSI header #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-147A Downstream orelbow #67. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-I-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-148 Upstream orcibow #67 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2Sil2) at - IIPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSI pump discharge 80-149 Downstream ofelbow #57. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-150 Upstream ofelbow #57. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2SIl2)at IIPSI header #1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-151 Downstream ofelbow #56. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2SI12) at 11 PSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-151 A Upstream ofelbow #56. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2SI12) at IIPSI header #1 Dearadatum Mah=== T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Wmer Stres Cerromon Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micrainologically influenced Cerrosion (MIC) F-flow Acrelermed Cerreme C-Cerrosion Oracking I-Irmergranular Stress Corre Craclung (IOSCC) E- Eroman-Cavitation 0 -Other
l "M7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"#"'#"""" ^'""'" C ## # 3[y,',f,g$ ! Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCD-14" IIPSI pump dixharge 80-152 Downstream of elbow #55. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCD-I-4" IIPSI pt.mp discharge 50-153 Upstream ofelbow #55. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2SI12) at MPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCD-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-155 Downstream of valve 2SI- No No No No No No No No line from pump to II A. check vaht (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-156 Upstream ofvaht 2SI-ll A No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-156A Domistream orcibow #54. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr(2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-I-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-157 Downstream ofTee #69. No No No No No No No No line fmm pump to check valve (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-158 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No line from pump to vahr 2SI-10A check vahe (2Sil2)at HPSI header #1 Dearadatier Mechanings T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Comnion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbiologica!!y influenced Carrosmi (MIC) F- flow Accelerated Cemmon C-Cerrosion Ctscking I-Intergranutar Stress Common Cracking (10 SCC) E - Erosion - Cavitation 0-Other O O O o
O O O i4-sep.97 FMECA - Degradate.n Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 p,y, 3,g, ,f gfg7 Weld System ID Segment Line Newiber une Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E .F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-159 Upstream of check vaht No No No No No No No No line from pump to 2SI-10A check valv t (2SI12) at IIPS! header #1 IIPSI flPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSI pump discharge 80-160 At interface with Elbolet No No No No No No No No line from pump to #71. check valve (25112) at HPSI hemier #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-161 Upstream of elbow #53. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-163 Downstream of Tee #69. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2Sil2)at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" IIPSI pump discharge 80-164 Upstream of elbow #61. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (2Sil2) at ifPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-165 Downstream ofelbow #61. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr(25112)at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-168 Upstream ofelbow #62. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (25112)at HPSI header #I Degadation Mechanisms T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microteologically inDuenced Common (MIC) F-flow Accelerated Cermoon C- Cerrosion Cracking I-Irmergranular Stress Carrosion Craciung (10 SCC) E - Eresson - Cavitation O -Other
Calculanon A'a AMMWlo. Rm 00
# 7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B106 of B187 Weld System ID Segment IJne Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-169 Downstream of elbow #62. No No No No No No No No line from pump to ,
check vahr (2Sil2)at IIPSI header #1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSI pump discharge 80-170 Upstream of Orifice No No No No No No No No line from pump to Flange #22. check vahr (2S112) at HPSI header #1 I IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-171 Downstream of Orifice No No No No No No No No line from pump to Flange #23. check vahr (2S112) at liPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-I-4" IIPSi pump discharge 80-172 Upstream ofelbow #63. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2Sil2)at HPSI header #1 HPRI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSI pump discharge 80-172A Downstream ofelbow #63 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr(2S112)at IIPSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-I-4" HPSI pump discharge 80-173 Upstream oreibow #64. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr(25112)at IIPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-174 Downstream of elbow #64 No No No No No No No No lie from pump to cink vahr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 Derradm6an Mechanims T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerronen Crackmg (PWSCC) M MicrohoolopcanyInocencedCarrossen(MIC) F- Fkm Accelerated Carros on C-Cerrosion Crackmg I-Irdergranular Stress Corrosion Cat Aing OGSCC) E - Erasem - Cavitation 0 - Other O O O
ra n m O
'" FMECA- Degrasation Mechanisms N'"##"" A~a AMMWla Rm 00
." oge B101 of B187 Weld Systese ID Segneemt IJae Neuser IJee Desenptica Moseber Weld Imcaties T C P I M E F G HPSI HPSI4)03 2DCB-14" HPSipomp discharge 80-175 Upstream ofeRmw #65 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (25112) at ItoS1 header #1 HPSI HPSi@ 3 2DCB-1-4" IIPSI pump discharge 80-176 Downstream ofcibow #65. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2S112) at HPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-176A Between pipes #73 and No No No No No No No No line from pump to 842.
check nhe (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI4)03 2DCB-14" HPSi pump descharge 80-177 Upstream orelbow #66. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-178 Downstream ofelbow #66. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check saht (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSI pump discharge 80-179 Downstream ofpipe #43 No No No No No No No No line from pump to (at inlet to check vahr) check vaht (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSi pump discharge 30-179A Upstream ofelbow #55. No No No No No No No No line from purnp to chedt uht (2Sil2) at HPSI heade;#1 Degradshee Mechensmus T-11mervemi Fusigue P- Frunary Weser Stras cervessan Oradting (Fw3cC) M -?.0 J ___ y influenced Carrassen(MIC) F-Flow AccelerusedCamsmeno c-Carre anCracUng 1 *.-., Stress Common Cradtmig(IGSCC) E - Erwesen-Cenemmes 0-Odier
'*" " ^'" A *"-## # #"#
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" Page BIOS of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P M F I E 0 HPSI HPST-003 2DCB-I-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-180 Dovmstream orelbow #55. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (25112) at HPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-I-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-181 11pstream ofelbow #56 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump disch_:rge 80-182 Downstream ofelbow s56. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check nhe (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4* HPSi pump discharge 80-183 Upstream ofelbow f57. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-I-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-184 Downstream orcibow #57 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check valve (25112) at l HPSI header #I HFSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-185 Upstream ofcIbow #58. No No Nc No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2S112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-18o Downstream orelbow #58. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2SII2) at HP.,I header #1 Deeradsam Mahresns T-Thenal Fatigue P - Pnmary Weser Stress Cerresine Cracing (P%W M - Mare 4=elegesIfy trasenced Cerramen (MIC) F-Fiew Acce.eratedComioon C-Corresson Cradung I-:.e,_ : Stress Carrnoen Cracimg(IGSCC) E - Esence - Cantance 0-other O O O
O O O ; 1
' N C " * ^'*~ d * " ~##" # " "
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B109 of B!S7 lJ WeM System ID Segneemt Line Number Line Descripties Nassber Weld Iecaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI 003 2DCB-I-4* HPSI pump discharge 80-187 Upstream ofelbow #34 No No No No No No No No 1 line from pump to check vahr (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI003 2DCB-I-4" HPSipump discharge 80-187A Domitstream ofelbow f34. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI4103 2DCB-I-4* HPSI pump discharge 80-187B Upstream of elbow #59 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahe (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-I-4* HPSI pump discharge 80-188 D--Amo ofcibow #59. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (25I12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-t-4* HPSIpun9 discharge 30-189 Between pipes #28 and No No No No No No No No line from pump to #43. check vahr (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI003 2DCt3-1-4" HPSI pump discharge 80-190 Upurtam ofc! bow #74. No No No No No No No No line from pmnp to check vahr (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-093 2DCB-I-4* HPSi pump dischage 80-191 Upstream ofTee 874 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check nhe (25112) at HPSI header #1
.n Dear =&am hedesman.
T-Therinal Fatigue F- Primary Waner Siress Cerroman Cracking (FRW M-M 2 - A.::7 In8eenc-d Carraman(MIC) F- Flow Accelermed Coreconne c-Carraman Creong I - 6., * - sure a Carrcom Credung OGscC) E-Erossen-Canamesen 0 -Oiher
1 l l l
*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I'"Idmn L. AMMWIR Rn. 00 Page B110 of B157 weid 1 System ID Segment IJne Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C F I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSI pump discharge 80-192 Dowirstream of elbow #60. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check nhr (25112) at HPSI header #1
- HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSi pump discharge 80-193 Upstream ofelbow e60 No No No No No No No No l line from pump to (ISO 2DCB-1-2) check nhr(2S112)at l HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-194 Dowirstream of check No No No No No No No ?4 line from pump to nhe 2SI-10C. l i
check vahr (2S112) at HPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSI pun p discharge 80-195 Upstrr.am ofcheck vahr No No No No No No No No line from pump to 2SI-10C. check vahr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSi pump discharge 80-l % Upstream ofelbow #61. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check nhr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI.003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-197 At interface with sockolet No No No No No No No No line from pump to #92. check vahr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSi pump discharge 80-198 Ups: ream orpipe #45. (at No No No No No Pb No No line from pump to pump disc?:arge 2P-89C) check vahr (2SII2) at HPSI header #1 Desredatami fesarms T-T$errnal Fatigue P - Prmary Water Stress Cermsson Cratbng (PWSCC) M - JardweicycaDy Irdleereced Commwm (MIC) F-Fhm AccelerusedCarewane c-Cermuio cs - Irmerysneler Stress Carveace Oechng 00 SCC) E - Eronen-Cavantsen 0-other e O O
o o U J U
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisans N'"" " ^'* "B'"##" R" 88 Page Bill of BIST Weld SyseeseID Segneemt IJee Member Line Description Naumber Weld Imesties T C P I M E F G HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSi pump discharge 80-199 Dumm.-. of elbow s74 No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI.003 2DCB-14" IIPSi pump discharge 80-199A Upstream orelbow #35. No No No No No No No ho line fro:n pump to check vaht (2S112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-199B Du . uream ofcibow #35. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2SI12) at HPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-200 Dmiinstream of pipe #32. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (2S112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-I4" HPSipump M rp 80-201 Dowlistream ofelbow s62. No No No No No No No No line frem pump to check .4hr (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-t-4* HPSi pump N p 30-202 Upstream ofelbow #63. No No No No No No No No ,
line from pump to j check vahr(2Sil2)at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSipumr discharge 80-203 Dominstream ofelbow s63. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check saht (25112) at HPSI neader #1 Desredeen Mech == inns i T "DerinalFatigue P - Phmary Waser Stress Cerresson Cracksng (PWSCC) M'A * "
. , namencelCorreseen(MIC) F-Ew Accelerseed Cerrousan ,
C-Carmacn trackies I-:.a., __ ' _ Stress Cerreseen CW OGSCC) E- Esemen-Cavanesen 0 - O*er
'*" C"'"zhon Na AEMWIO Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms l' age Bill of B187 1 Weld System ID Segment Line Nember Line Description Number WeldImation T C P I M E F O IPSI IFSI-003 2DCB-I4" IIPSI pump discharge 80-204 Upstream ofelbow #72. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (25112) at IPSI header #I HPSI HPSI4)o3 2DCB-14" HPSi pump discharge 80-205 Upstream ofcIbow #M. No No No No No No No No line fmm pump to circk vahe (25112) at liPSI header #I IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSI pump discharge 80-206 At interface with Sockolet No No No No No No No No line from pump to #79. check vaht (2SII2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI4)03 2DCB-14* HPSi pump discharge 80-207 Upstream orelbow #65. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2SII2) at HPSI header #I IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" ID%I pump discharge 80-208 Douwtream orelbow #65. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14* IIPSIpump discharge 80-209 Upstream ofelbow #73. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vaht (25112) at HPSI12ader #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSIpump discharge 80-210 Dominstream ofelbow #73. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #I DeEmdation Mechenrsms T-%errnal Fatigue P - Primary Water Stress Carrassan Cradung (PEW M - Microl=alogiadly Iremenced Carrosson (MIC) F-Fky= Accelerseed Cerro=, i C-Commmon Cracking 1 -IrmerErarmalar Stress Cerrosion Oradkig (IGSCC) E - Eronien - Cavitarson 0 -Other
'O O G
O O O '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""#"" " ** d*"C-##" #" 88 Page Bil3 of B187 Weld System ID Segneemt Liec Ncmber IJee Description Number Weld Imation T C F I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI@3 2DCB-14" IIPSi pump discharge 80-211 Upstream ofelbow #66. No No No No No ho No No line from pump to check vahr (2S112) at IIPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI.003 2DCB-14" HPSi pump discharge 80-212 Downstream orelbow s66. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check uhr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-213 Upstream ofelbow #67. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2SII2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSi pump sap 80-214 Downstream ofelbow s67. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check ulve (2SI12)at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-215 Upstream ofcibow #68. No No No No No No Na No line from pump to , check vahr (2Sil2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-0G3 2DCB-14" HPSI pump discharge 80-216 Downstream ofcibow #68. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2SI12) at HPSI header #1 HPSI rIPSI-003 2DCB-14* HPSi pump discharge 80-217 Upstream ofelbow #69. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (25112) at HPSI header #I Demeentsee Medenur3 T.Thernial Fatigue F - Prunary Weser Serens Commsen Credung (FW50C) M - MicretendessenBy hemenced Carrummen (MIC) F-flew AccelerseedCemeen C-Carreseen Crackag I - L., Sereus Cerramen Oncksmg OGsCC) E- Eremen -Covemaman 0-Other
imm-- FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms " ^ " Na MMWIR Rm 00 Page Bilt of BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI@3 2DCB-1-4" IPSI pump discharge 80-218 Du-mhcart orcibow #6?. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (25112) at IFSI header #1 IIPSI I" IPSI-003 2DCB-I-4' i1 psi pump discharge 80-219 Upstream ornht 2SI- No No No No No No No No lin: from pump to I IB. check nhe (25112) at liPSI header #1 IfPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-t-4" IPSI pump discharge 80-220 Donnstream of vahr 2SI- No No No No No No No No line from pump to 1 IB. check vaht (2SII2) at IIPSI header #1 HPSt liPSI-003 2DCB-I-4* HPSi pump discharge 80-221 Du-mb oam of cItew #70. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (2SI12) at IIPSI header CI HPSI IIPS14)03 2DCB-I-4" HPSIpump discharge 80-222 At interface eith sockolet No No No No No No No No line from pump to #80. check vahr (2S112) at HPSI header #1 ITSI HPSI-003 2DCB-t-4* ~ HPSI pump discharge 80-223 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No line from pump to vahr 2SI-10B. check vaht (2SII2) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSIpump discharge 80-224 Upstream ofcheck vaht No No No No No No No No line from pump to 251-10B. check vahr (25112) at HPSI header #1 Dearadation Maharagrre T-Thermat ratigue r- Pnmary water stress common cincting (rwscc) u-u crobioics.carryinn enmacommon(urcy r-rio. Acceter.ied corro.c. c-cernman crachns I . Irwergrennter seress commen crachng OGSCC) E - Erc.cn -caes.stian 0-other
f3 V O V (O_/ '*" FMECA - Degtadation Mechanisms C""'*"**^'* A
- N #'" ^" "'
Page Bl!$ olBl87 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Use Descripties Number Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4* IIPSI pump discharge 80-225 At interface with elbolet No No No No No No No No line from pump to #93. check valve (2SII2) at HPSI header #I HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSi pump discharge 80-226 Upstream ofelbow f71. No No No No No No No No line from pump to i check valve (2SI12) at
. 'PSI header #1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-1-4" HPSIpump discharge 80-227 Dominstream ofcibow #64. No No No No No No No No line from pump to check vahr (25112) at HPSI header #1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80417 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV5056- 5036-2 2, and 2CV5016-2.
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2" HPSI header #2 to 80-027 Domitstream of tec #115 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV5056-2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2" HPSI header #2 to 80-027A Inboard of reducer #114 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV5056-2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2" HPSI header #2 to 30-027B Upstream ofTee #115 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV5056-2, and 2CV5016-2.
' IPSI HPSI-UO3 2DCB-3-2" HPSI header #2 to 80-027C Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV5056- vahr 2SI-73 2, and 2CV5016-2.
Desredshan Mahamenms T-Therrnet Fangue F -Inmary Waeer Strees Carreman Cradung (F%W M-Micrainokycep IndeencedCar=eman(hCC) y F-flow Asselerseed Carree.== C-Cerrasson Craddng I
- a. Strees Cerrassen Crecing(1GSCC) E - Eressesi-Cenemmes 0 -other
.. ~. ._ . .
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'#""' ## N""'8 R" 88 Fw Bil6 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P M E I F O l HPSI 1951403 2DCB-3-2* IFSI header #2 to 80427D Upstream of mammal rahr No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2SI-73 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2" HPSI header #2 to 80-028 Downstream of reducer #79 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80451 Downstream of reducer #30 No No No No No No No No IPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2" IIPSI header #2 to 80-051 A Upstream of manual vahr No No No No No No No No IFSI MOVs 2CV50% 2SI-75 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI hcader #2 to 80-051B Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No IFSI MOVs 2CV5056- vahr 2SI-75 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI403 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80451C Upstream of tee #117 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI hcader #2 to 80-051D Inboardofreducer#66 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI hcader #2 to 80452 D u- u s m ortee #il7 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016 thstantien Mahamma T-Thmnal Fangue F- Prunnry Wakr Stress cerromer CracW (PWSCC) M-ML i A Indimanced Car-ammus(MIC) F-F1cw AccelerusedCommen C-Common Cracking 1
- a. y sires.Commen Cracksig(IGSCC) E - Erasum-Cas1:stian 0 -Other e O O
(*) m Qv (J3
^"' G**'"" *
- d""##" #" '8 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bil7 of B187 W eld S.tseene ID Segment Une Noesber une Description Number Wdd Imaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI hcader #2 to 80-120 Dund iof reducer No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% #34.
2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPST-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-120A Upstream of vahr 251-71. No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-120B Dv-u==T.ofvahr 2SI- No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 71. 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-120C Upstream ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI4X)3 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-120D Outboard ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No > HPSI MOVs 2CV50% - 2, and 2CV5016-2. l HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-120E Inboard of Reducing No No No No No No No No HPSIMOVs 2CV50% Coupling #36. 2, and 2CV5016-2. l HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI hcader #2 to 80-121 Domistream ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No ! HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. in j HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-135 Downstream of reducer No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% #33. 2, and 2CV5016-2. Des =dmaion N T-Therinal Fstigue F- Prunary Wasar strew Ccwesson Cradung(FW3Ct.) M-M C '. Si nfheaucedCerrooms(MIC) i F-Flow Accelerused Cerm C-Carronen Creding I-ic , seress Carre=en Cr=& sng OGSCC) E-Eremen-Cowiessun 0-Odier i 1
=
'# ""#"'" #" A"""'8 #" 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bil8 of B187 Weld l System ID Segment une Number Line Description Number Weld F r, cation T C P I M E F 0 1
IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* IFSileader #2 to 80-135A Upstream of tahc 2SI49 No No No No No No No No IFSI MOVs 2CV50% .
- 2. and 2CV5016-2. l I
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-135B Downstream ofvalve 2SI- No No No No No No No No l ifPSI MOVs 2CV50% 69. I
- 2. and 2CV50I6-2.
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI hcader #2 to 80-135C Upstream ofTee #1. No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 30-135D Outboard ofTee #1. No No No No No No No No HPS! MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. I3"JI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-135E Inboard of Reducing No No No No No No No No HPSIMOVs 2CV50% Coupling #37.
- 2. and 2CV5016-2.
IL*SI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSi header #2 o 80-136 Downstream ofTee #1 No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* IIPSI header #2 to : A231 Downstream of Reducer No No No No No No No No IFSI MOVs 2CV50% #78 (on 2DCB-3-2) 2, and 2CV50I6-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 80-232 In 2* line, upstream of No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% MOV 2CV-5102-2 2, and 2CV5016-2. Desraasuon Mechernsms T-Tlemnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosum Cracking (FWSCC) M - Microbiolopcalfv ta3mmced Car-essen (EUC) F-Fhm AccelerusedComman C-Corressen Cracting I-Icaergranular Stress Commen Crackeg (IGSCC) E. Eressan - Cavetshen 0 -Other O O O
O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms " '"## "" ^'* * " #-### # " "
Foge B119 ef BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Neanber Weld Locaties T C F I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 81-025 Upsti::am of HPSI MOV No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2CV-5016-2. 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2* HPSI header #2 to 82-011 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 50 % 2. 2, and 2CV5016-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-2" IIPSI header #2 to 83-022 Upstream of HPSI MOV No No No No No No No No HPSI MOVs 2CV50% 2CV-5076-2. 2, and 2CV5015-2. HPSI FPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injection line 80-029 Upstream ofreducer #79 No No No No No No No No , from header B to HPSI J ,\ MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-030 Dom 1: stream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injection line 80 0i1 Upstream of elbow #27. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injectionline 80-032 Downstream ofeRnw #26. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. Desredsman1&tannus T-Dmmal Fatigue F - Pnmary Weser Stress Cerreeman Crecims (FWSCC) M - Macreheolopcally bomenced Carrossen (MA F-Nur Accelerseed Corressee c-commen oscung - heeryensier serves cerreneen Cradung (IOSCC) E- Eremen- Cavessenen 0-Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I"'lah e A'o. MMQ10. Rn. 00 Page B120 of B157 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F O ITSI IFSI-003 2DCB-3-3" ITSI B injection line 30-033 Upstream ofcIbow #26. No No No No Nc No No No from header B to IFSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. IFSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* IFSI B injection line 80-034 Domistream of reducing No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI Tee #85. MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI IFSI-003 2DCB-3-3* IFSI B injection line 80-037 Dom stream of Reducing No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI No Tee #84 MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI IFSI-0G3 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injection line 80-038 Upstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No from header B toIIPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-039 Domistream ofelbow #19. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-040 Upstream ofelbow #20. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. IFSI IFSI-003 2DCB-3-3" IPSI B injection line 80-041 Domistream orcibow t20. No No No No No No No No ' from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. E % Me ?-- --- T-Dermet Tarigue P - Pnmary Water stress cervinson Cradting (PWscC) M - L' . 4.::y bdhenced Corremmen(%DC) C-Corroman c%cting 1-inierar===i.r see.s Corm cn Onckmg(MISCC) F-rice hL 4C-. E - Eremen -Cavention 0- Her e 9 -- - - _ - - 9
O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Cd ""* * "ETG'C4LC-8'8 R'" 88 !
Page Bill of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Neneber LJoe Description Namiber Weld I4 cation T C F I M E F 0 i HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80442 Upstream orelbow #21. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI Binjectionline 80-043 Don 1 stream orelbow f21. No No No No N No No No j from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and i i 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80444 Upstream ofelbow f22. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI - MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injecten line 80-045 Da enstream ofcibow #22. No No No No No No No & ) from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI D injecten line 80-046 Upstream ofcibow #23. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injectenline 80-047 Don 1: stream ofcibow #23. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. , HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-048 Upstream ofcibow #24. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. , De== amen Mechan === T-Timmel Famigue P - Pnmary Weser Stress Cerrasson Credtvig (F%W M - Micrdeeleasemay Iremenced Carros- (ABC) F-T1ow AcedermoedCarremen 4 C- Cerrossar.Cracksg 1 *.% Swens Coreoman Chdtag OGSCC) E- Eremen -Cavenhen 0-Oewr i
"# N"" " Na AMEfWIR Rm M FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bill of B157 Weld System ID Segment Line Number une Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injection line 80-049 Dcunstream ofcibow #24. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2.
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* IPSI B injection line 80-050 Upstream of reducer #80 No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI.003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-067 Downstream of Reducing No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI Tee #83. MOVr 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-068 Upstream ofc! bow #13. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injectionline 804)69 Downstream ofcIbow iil3. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injection line 80-070 Upstream ofelbow #14. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injection line 80-071 Dommstream ofelbow #I4 No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. Desredsten hiccturusms T-Thermal Fatigue F - Pnmary Water Stress Carremen Crudung (PWSCC) M- CU- A Innuenced Cerreaui(MT) F - fle= Accelerseed Cerros== C-Corresen Crackmsg I-leW Stress Cervessan Cradung(IGSCC) C- Eronen-Cantshen 0 -Other l e O O
q p pd k/ b FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms """"" ^'* A"*"#8 E" 88
. Page B123 of B187 Weld System ID Segment une Number Une Descripties Number Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injxtion line *:0472 Upstream ofelbow #I5. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2.
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-073 Downstream ofelbow #15. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and i 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-074 Upstream ofcIbow fl6. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSIBinjectionline 80-075 Cv Tistream ofelbow #16. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injecima line 80-076 Upstream ofelbow #17. No No No No No No No No from header B to IIPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injechonline 80-077 Domistream ofelbow #17. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* IFSI B injecuan line 80-078 Upstream ofelbew #18. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2.
- m.
- _W T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Weser Stress Commeon Cradung (PW3CC) M-C2 . r IndsencedCerressonMC) y C-Cerroman Cracbng I - L e, -Stress CervomiOndting(105C0) F-now AccelerasedCorresson E - Ereemen- Cavastien 0-Oder l
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"" " "^'* A * " # 18 #"
- Page B124 of B187 Weld i System ID Segment Line Nember Line D S iption Number Weld IAcation T C P M E F I 0 I i
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B injection line 80-079 Downstream ofelbow #18. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV50%2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-080 Upstream of 3" x 2* No No No No No Ne No No from header B to HPSI concentric reducer #78 MOVs 2CV5076-2 and (ISO 2DCB-3-2) 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI.003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-1II Dowstream of reducing No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI tec #35. l MOVs 2CV5042 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-112 Upstream ofelbow #7 No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-1-3* HPSI B injectio.s line 80-113 Dunisws crelbow #7. No No No No , No No No No from header P to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B in ection line 80-114 Upstream ofcibow #8. No No No No No No No No fmm heater B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV503f -2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3" HPSI B i tjection line 80-115 Downstream ofdbow #8. No No No No No No No No from hesIer B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. Desradet.m Meanams T-Thrmal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Carose a Chaing (PWSCC) M - MicreheetcycmDy Infimewed Cerrooms (VIC) F-rie= AccelerseedCarrenome C-Cermnon Crackmg I- beergranular Stress Cervoere Crackeg (1GSCC) E - Eresum-Centance 0 -Other e S #
s n\s O J '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' '#""" A~a AMMWla Rn. M Page B125 of B187 W eld Systens ID Segneemt Liec Number IJee Descriptsee Number Weld 1 mention T C P M E F I 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injechon line 80-116 Domiistream orelbow #11. No No No No No No & No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI 003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI Binjection line 30-117 Upstream of elbow #10. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI@3 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injecnon line 80-118 Dom 1 stream orcibow #10. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSim3 2DCB-3-3* HPSIB injecuanline 30-119 Upstream of reducer #34. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-124 Downstream ofcibow #32. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injecuan line 80-125 Downstream ofcibow #6. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPST-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-126 LW ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. Dewsdesen h T-nennel Fatigue F- Prunary Waeer Stress Carressen Craciung(FHM M - MscrobsekycnNy Lasered Cerressen (1WDC) F-flew Acreiermeed Carrassen C-Cerremen Cradung I- tmeerpesuQr Swess Carramen Credme (IGSCC) E - Lessen-Cavesisen O-Odser
l 1
'*" " ^""C-8'8 ^" 88 l FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C'*"'"
Page B126 of BIS 7 W eld System ID Segment une Number une Description Number WeldIecation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-127 Dv .ubam orcibow s5. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV50%2 and 2CV50%2. HPSI HPSI@3 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-128 Upstream ofe8 bow #4 No No No No No No No No
~
from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV50%2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI@3 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-129 Downstream ofcIbow #4 No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV50%2. HFSI HPSI-003 2DCD-3-3* HPSI B injectionline 80-130 Upstream ofcIbow #3. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-131 Downstream of cIbow #3. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPS! B injection line 80-132 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV5036-2. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injectionline 80-133 Upstream ofcah #2. No No No No No No No No from header B to HPSI , MOVs 2CV5076-2 and 2CV50%2. Desraderson Medenums T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnrnary Weser Stress Cerrmsen Cracbng (FWSCC) M-MicratnaicssempyImamencedCamsmosSCC) F-1%w AccelerssedCavemen C-Cerrosion Crociang 1 - Irinergrarsalar Stress Commsen Cracturig (IGSCC) E - Eressen - Cantahen 0 -0%er e O O mMMMM l
O O O
*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisans N'"**" NoMMQIO. Rm M Page B127 of B187 WeM , Systesa ID Segneemt Line Monster Line Description Naseber Weld I.mestion T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-3* HPSI B injection line 80-134 Upstream orreducer #33. No No No No No No No No f.om header B to HPSI MOVs 2CV50-'6-2 and 2CV5036-2.
HPSI HPSI403 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 80435 Upstream of Reducing Tec No No No No No No No No HPSIpump discharge #85. piping.2DCB-I-4* to 2DCB-3-3" (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 30-036 D-sum of Reducing No No No No No No No No HPSIpump discharge Tee #84 piping. 2DCB-14". to 2DCB-3-3*,(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPSI header B from 80454 Upstream of ReducingTee No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge #84 piping. 2DCB-1-4*, to 2DCB-3-3*,(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) HPSI HPSI403 2DCB-3-4* HPSI header B from 80-055 Domiistream ofTee #82. No No No No No Na No No HPSIpump discharge piping. 2DCB-1-4*, to 2DCB-3-3*,(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) Desradessee Mechamnus T ThermalFatigue P - Prunary Weser Swee Cerroman Crackans (FEM M-lL ? J97Innuenced Commen(MIC) F-me AccderenedCorrence c-Common oncking I .c . seems Common Docksng(IGSCC) E- Eremme- Cavemason O-Odser
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N'"'""#* ^'" A *N##" "'" #8 Page BI:8 of B187 i W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld tecation T C P I M E F O IIPSI IFSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI header B from 80-056 Upstream a. .ee #82. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping 2DCB-14", to 2DCB-3-3*, (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) HPSI HPSI403 2DCB-34* IIPSi header B from 80457 Downstream orcibow #12. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-14*, to 2DCB-3-3*, (2 places) and 2DCD-3-2* (2 places) IFSI IPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI header B from 80458 Up : ream ofcIbow #12. No No No No No No No No llPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-14", to 2DCB-3-3*, (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 80-059 Donastream of MOV No No No No No No No HPSIpump discharge No i 2CV-5104-2. piping. 2DCB-14*, to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) h & M4.- -. T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prunary Waer swess Correman Crucimg(FEW C-Cerrassen Cr= clung M - Micrabselogically 3rdhsenced Cerressau (MIC) F-flow AccelerasedCerrawan 1 - Intersranula s=== Cerronen Cr= clung (IGSCC) E- Eremen-Cavambea 0-Other
O O O
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"*'""
" ^'" *"##" #"# I Page B129 of B187 WeM Systene ID Segnsent Line Number Line Descripties Noenber Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 IFSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI header B from 8040 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No IFSIpump discharge $104-2.
piping. 2DCB-14*, to 2DCB-3-3*,(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 8042 Du..isium ofcIbew *11. No No No No No No No No IDSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-14", to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSi header B from 8043 Upstream ofelbow #tl. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3*.(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 p > :s) HPSI HPSI@3 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 30-064 Upstream of Onfice No No No No No No No No t HPSI pump discharge Flange #76. piping. 2DCB-14*, to 2DCB-3-3*, (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) Desredataan Mechensens T-Berinal Fans P- Prunary Waner Stress Common Crachng(Psq M-Mu ' . , hdluencedCmomeo(MIC) F- Flow Accekrmed Commen C-Cerves.an Cracung 1-bee sr n.serserensCorremanCredtang(1GSCC) E- Erowen -Cantaisen 0-Odier
'*" C"' 'lanon No. AJ'DMC-010. Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bl30 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Ijne Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C F I M E F O HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* IIPSI header B from 80-065 Upstream ofTee #81. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-I4*, to 2DCB-3-2*, (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI header B from 80-066 Dou1tstream of Reducing No No No No Ne No No No IIPSI pump discharge Tee #83. piping. 2DCB-14", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2"(2 places) IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSi header B from 80-081 Upstream oforifice llange No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge #77 piping 2DCB-14*,to 2DCB-3-3*,(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 80-082 Dontistream of Orifice No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge Flange #77. piping. 2DCB-14", to 2DCB-3-3*, (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) Desradshon Mechamwrs T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Weaer Stress Cerroesen Creclung (PW3CC) M - Micre4=c4cgically Inomenced Corresson (MIC) F-How AccekretedCamrwan C -Corres.en Cruciang I - beergranuter Stress Correesen Cradbrig (IGSCC) E- Eremesi-Cavastien 0-Odser O O O
. - _. _ ._~ - . .
O O O FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"=iano.3a ,immnio, an. oo foge B131 of B187 - WeM System ID Segment IJee Neuntt. IJee Description Neesber WeW Locaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 80-083 Upstnam ofTee #82. No No No Fo No No No No HPSI pump discharge f piping 2DCB-i-4".to 2DCB-3-3" (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 80-084 Downstream ofelbow #10 No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge o piping. 2DCB-14*, to 2DCB-3-3*,(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 Pl aces) l HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSi beader B from 80-085 Upstream ofelbow #IO No No No No No No No No HPSIpump discharge i piping.2DCD-14" to i 2DCB-3-3*,(2 places) I s and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4* HPSI header B from 80-086 Downstream ofcibow #9. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump d.scharge ! piping. 2DCB-t-4*, to l 2DCB-3-3*. (2 places) ; and 2DCB-3-2"(2 places) ' a f wm W T-Thermal Fatigue P . Pnmary Water Swens Cerremen Omding (FEM M - Miaduelopcmity InSeemed Cerramen (MIC) F- Fkm Accelwaard Cerro=een C-Cerremen Cradung I ".e ,, Stress Cerresian Cradung(10 SCC) E- Eremen-Cavesanne 0-odier
FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms C"'"""#* ^'*"""#" #" 88 Page B132 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld tecation T C F I M E F 0 IFSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" 1951 header B from 80487 Upstre:im ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-14", to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2"(2 l Paces) IPSI 12 PSI-003 2DCB-34* IIPSI header B from 80-088 Dounstream ofcIbow #8. No No No No No No No No IFSI pump discharge
. piping. 2DCB-l4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2"(2 l
Paces) IPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSi header B from 80489 Upstream orcibow #8. No No No No No No No No HPS1 pump discharge piping. 2DCB 'n4*, to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2"(2 places) HPSI 19 51-003 2DCB-34" IPSIheader B from 80492 Dummidm of cibow #7. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-14", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) 12 mad =non Mect:arn=ns T-Therm : retigue r rnmary weier stress corrc=en crocung (rum M-M; 2 :. AIntinencedcarro.on(utc) r-rio. Aaelerusedcerr an c-cerro ancreciung 1 - bergrennter stress correman crachng (IGSCC) E- Erman -caiwaben 0-Other O O O
O O O FMECA - Degradation Mechamisms C"''*" No. A-PEVCeCALC-Olp. Rev. 00 Page Bl33 of B187 W eld Systene ID Segiment Line Member Line Description Neueber Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 ,
; HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34* HPSI header B from 80493 Upstream ofelbow f7. No No No No No No No i
HPS1 pump discharge No ( 4 piping. 2DCB-14*, to ' 2DCB-3-3*, (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2
- l Paces) r HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI header B from 80-094 Dominstream of Orifice No No No No No No No No '
HPSI pump discharge Flange #75. piping 2DCB-14*, to 2DCB-3-3" (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI header B from 80495 Upstream ofOrifice No No No No No No No No ' HPS1 pump discharge Flange #74 piping. 2DCB-14*, to ( 2DCB-3-?",(2 places) , and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) l HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI1+ B from 30-095A Betuten welds 8-80-95 No No No No No No No No HPS1 pump discharge and 96. ' piping 2DCB-t-4*,to 2DCB-3-3*, (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 l Paces) f! i f l
,.^ a ' ' t C.-
Y T.The mal Fahgue P - Pnmary Water Stress Carreeson Creclung (FWSCC) M" J ' . ",ImAmencedCerrance(MIC) F-How AccelerenedCarreene C-Cerrama. Cracking I- :..: . , ' - Swens Corressen Crecing(IGSCC) E - Eressen -Cavienham O-Oder { i L
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculan n NoMMC-010. Rn. 00 . Page B134 of B187 , Weld Ojstem ID Segruent Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 i HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4* HPSI header B from 80-096 Donnstream ofcIbow #6 No No No No No No No No llPSI pump discharge (sheet 2n piping 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) ! HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-1* HPSI header B from 80-097 Upstream ofcibow #6. No No No No No No No No - HPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-1-4*, to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) 1 and 2DCB-3-2* (2 ! places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-34" HPSI header B from 80J)98 Downstream ofcibow #5 No No No No No No No' No HPSI pump discharge piping. 2DCB-1-4*, to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCD-3-2* (2 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPE' header B from 804r19 Upstream of elbow s5- No No No No No No No No HPSIpump discharge piping, 2DCB-1-4*, to 2DCB-3-3" (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2* (2 places) h hi Mecherunns T-Thmnna Fatigue P- Prunary W W Stress Common Cratik(P%W M-Micredwaleccapy InnuencedCommen(MIC) t - fleur Accelerseed Comisson C-Cerrasson Crackmg 1-Ireergranels tress Commenn Cracbng(IGSCC) E -Eressan -Cavitmasco 0 -06er e O O
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'## C"I'" lad n A'a APamC-010, Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradstion Mechanisms '
Pagc- B135 of BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number - Line Description Number Weld Leestion T C P I M E F O l l a EPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPSI header B from 80-100 Between pipes #32 and No No No No No No No No l HPSI pump discharge #33. piping, 2DCB-I-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3 2"(1 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPSi header B from 80-101 IMastream ofelbow #4 No 1%'9 No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping,2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPSi header B from 80-102 Upstreara ofelbow #4 No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping, 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2"(2 l Paces) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPSI header B from 80-103 Downstream ofcIbow #3. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping, 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 Pl aces) T-Thmnal Fangue P - Pnenary Water Stress Cerressen Cracking (PWSCC) M - MicrobiologneeDy1 '
*(MIC) F-Flow AccelerseedCorremen C-Cerrosion Cracking I - Innergranular Stress Corroman Cradung (IOSCC) E- Erosion -Cavitation O -Other
*# " A'a A-IMGNIO, Reir. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"""
Page B136 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" IIPSI header B from 80-104 Upstream of elbow #3. No No No No No No No No i IIPSI pump discharge piping, 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) IIFSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" IIPSI header B from 80-105 Downstream of e! bow #2. No No No No No No No No IIPSI pump discharge piping, 2DCB-I-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) l and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-34" IIPSI header B frorr, 80-106 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No IIPSI pump discharge piping, 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCD-3-2" (2 places) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" IIPSI header B from 80-107 Downstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No IIPSI pump discharge piping, 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3",(2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) Deeradation Mechanisms T -Hermal Fatigue P- Frimary Water Stress Cerrosum Cracting (PWSCC) M- Miaotnologicany Infiner t'arrosum (MIC) F-T1ow AcceleratedCerromon C - Corrosion Cracting I -Irsergrarm!ar Stress Common Crudung (IGsCC) E - Eremon - Cavitation 0- Other
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(A O] HN97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms ## C""'"#"" #" #7 ## 7 ,f
#"ff, W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P a M E F 0 l IIPSI HPSI 003 2DCB-3-4" IIFSI header B from 80-108 Upstream of elbow #1. No No No No No No No No j ilPSI pump ditr.harge l piping, 2DCB-1-4", to '
l 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" IIPSi header B from 80-109 Upstream ofpipe #14. No No No No Nr= No No No HPsl pump dascharge piping. 2DCB-I-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2"(2 places) flPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPSI header B from 80-110 Upstream of Reducing Tee No No No No No No No No IIPSI pu:np discharge #35. piping. 2DCD-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-3-4" HPSI header B from 80-123 Upstream of reducer #32. No No No No No No No No HPSI pump discharge piping, 2DCB-1-4", to 2DCB-3-3", (2 places) and 2DCB-3-2" (2 places) HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSI unp 2P-89C 80-392 Downstream ofvalve 2SI- No No No No No No No No discharge to R%T 62. (Item #49) HPSI HPSI403 2DCB-500-2" HPSI pump 2P-89C E0-490 Upstrearr of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No discharge to R%T .5127-1. Dearedmuan Mechanms T -De mal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Onckmg (PWSCC) M - Microbiologscally Innuenced Cerresson (MIC) F-11aw Accelerased Common C-Cenosum Oncting 1 - Intersranular Stress Cenesian Qackmg 00 SCC) E- Eremen - Cavitation 0 -Oder C_ .. _ . . . . . . . . .. . _ .. .. ..._. .... _.. ..
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"#"d#" ^'" ""C818 #'* 88 Page B138 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld imestion T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89C 80-491 Downstream of Tee *37. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P-89C 80-492 Outted ofTee #37. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT IIP.sl llPSI.003 2DCD-500-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89C 80-493 Upstream of Tee #37. No No No No No No No No , discharge to RWT l IIPSI IIPSI-003 ZDCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P.89C 80-494 At ilange #43. No No No No No No No No j discharge to RWT IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSI pump 2P-89C 80-495 At flange #44. No No No No No No No No discharge to RFT HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89C 80-4 % Downstream ofTec #38. No No No No No No No No 1 discharge to RWT IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89C 80-496A Outboard of Tee #38. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT I IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCD-500-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89C 80-497 Upstream ofTee #38 No No No No No No No No I discharge to RWT l IIPSI liPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89C 80-498 Downstream ofTee fl9. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P-89C 80-499 Upstream of valve 2SI-62 No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT 1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89C 80-500 Downstream ufTec #39 No No No No No No No No discharge to R%T llPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89C 80-501 Upstrean. of Tee #39. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT Deeradation Mecharusms T- Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Cerros on Crariing (PWSCC) C - Certosion Cracking M - ML: !-M influenced Cerroms(MIC) F- flew Accelerated Carronon I- Intergraantar Stress Carrosion Crsckmg (IGSCC) E- Eromon -Cavitation 0 - Other e O O
m
- U fd' v 14 4 97 .
Calculation No. A-IENG-C4LC-010, Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms p,,, 3,3, ,f afg7 Weld System ID Segn:nt Line Number L!ne Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E; F 0
'{ psi IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" 11 psi pump 2P-89C 80-502 Downstream ofcheck Ne No No No No No No No s discharge to RW1 valve 2SI-23C.
IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P49C 80-503 Upstream of check valve No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT 2SI-23C. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89C 80-504 Downstream of elbow #31. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT HPSI , IPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P-89C 80-505 voenstream orpipe #I6. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPS! pump 2P-89C 80-506 Downstream of elhow #32. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P-E9C 80-507 Upstream orcibow #32. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P-89C 80-508 Downstream of Flow No No No No No No No No discharg: to RWT Orifice #47. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSI pump 2P49C 80-509 Upstream of Flow Orifice No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT #47. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSi pump 2P49C 80-510 Downstream orelbow #33. No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-500-2" HPSI pump 2P49C 80-511 Upstream orelbow #33 No No No No No No No No discharge to RWT HPSI HPSI4)03 2DCB-500-2* HPSi pump 2P49C 80-512 Upstream orpipe #19 at No No No No No No No No ' discharge to RWT sockolet. L ' Itechanums ' T-Thermal Fatigue P Prunary Water Stress Corrosion Cracting (PWSCC) M - Micrainologically Infhsenced Corroman (MIC) F-flow AccelerstedCarroman C-Corrosion Creding I- Intergranular Stress Corrosion Ctaciung (IOSCC) E- Eroman-Cavitation 0- Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C fcul tion N . A-PENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 Page B140 of B187 Weld S3stem ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSi pump A mini- 80-523 Upstn:am of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB $ 126-1. 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed o!T I l IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSI pump A mini 80-524 Downstream ofTee #27. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4* to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed oft. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" liPSi pump A mini- 80-525 Outboard ofTee #27. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCD-I-4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed ofI. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSi pump A mini- 80-526 Upstream ofTee #27. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated unt and drain lines teed off. HPSI IIPSI-003 ) 2DCB-501-2" IIPSIpump A mini- 80-527 Downstream ofTee #26. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB-:- 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with doubleisolated vent and drain lines teed off. Dearadstm Mecherusms T-Ziermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water stress Corrosa cracking (PWSCC) M - Micrainologically Influenced Cerresion (MIC) C -Corrosion Cracking F- flow Aaelerated Cormnon 1 - Irmergranular Siress Corrosion Crackir.r (IGSCC) E- Eresien-Cavitatmn 0 - Other e O O
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O FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-C4LC-010. Rev. 00 1 Page Biti of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number . Line Description Number Weld IAestion T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSI pump A mini- 80-578 Outboard ofTee #26. No No No No No No No No i flow line from 2DCB ! 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. ItPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSi pump A mini- 80-529 Upstream ofTec #26. No No No No No No No No flow line frem 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSI pump A n.Ki- 80-330 Downstream ofTee #28. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSI pump A mini- 80-531 Upstream ofTee #28. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSI pump A mini- 80-532 Downstream ofTee #28. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. Desradacon Mechan =ns T-Thenal Fatigue P - Pnenary Waw Stress Carrosion Cracking (P%W M - Micretmologscally Innuenced Cerroman (MIC) F-Flow Accelerated Correami C- Corre Cracbg 1 - traergranular Stress Cerroman Cracking (IGSCC) E - Erosson-Cavitation 0 -Oiher
' " C"I"'I""#" N ANGN18 R'" 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bl42 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Iecation T C P I M E F O IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSi pump A mini- 80-533 Upstream of valve 2SI-64 No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB (Item #32). 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed oft. IIPSI IIPSl@3 2DCB-5s t-2" IIPSi pump A mini- 80-534 Dowinstream orcheck No No No No No No No No I flow line from 2DCB vahr 2SI-23A. 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated sent and drain lines teed off. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" HPSi pump A mini- 80-535 Upstream orcheck vahr No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCD 2SI-23A. 4" to 2DCD-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines feed off. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" HPSI pump A mini- 80-536 Downstream of Orifice No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB-I- #37. 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with doubleisolated sent and drain lines teed off. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" HPSi pump A mini- 80-537 Upstream of Orifice #37. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated sent and drain lines teed off. Deeradscon Mechanrms T - Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmery Water Stress Common Cracking (PwSCC) M - Microtnolopcany influenced Cerrasson (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Common C -Cerrrman Crackmg I - Intergranular Stress Common Craciung (IGSCC) E - Erosion - Cavitation 0- Other e - G
Id*97 . FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 y,y,gf,,of3fg7 Weld System ID Segment Linei Waber Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M f F 0 l IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSI pump A mini- 80-538 Downstream of elbow #2. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4* with double isolated unt and drain lines teed off. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSi pump A mini- 80-539 Upstream ofelbow #2 No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCD-I-4" to 2DCB-7-4" with double isolated v:nt and drain lines teed off. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" IIPSi pump A mini- 80-540 Downstream ofelbow #I. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" HPSI pump A mini- 80-541 Upstream of elbow #1. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-501-2" HPSI pump A mini- 80-542 Upstream of pipe #6. No No No No No No No No flow line from 2DCB 4" to 2DCB-2-4" with double isolated vent and drain lines teed off. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" HPSi pump 2P-89B 80-307 Upstream of pipe #1. No No No No No No No No discharge to valve 2CV-5128-1 Dearadation Mecharnams T-umnal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Water Stress Carronen Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microklopcally Innuenced Corresum (MIC) F-Flow AcceleratedCerroinen C -Cerrossen Cracking I - Irmergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracking (IGsCC) E - Frosion-Cavitation 0 - Other L . _ _ _ _ _ . _ .
FMECA - Degradation Mecisanisms C"I"' lad n A*aMAUNIR Rn 00 Page Bitt of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 l a 2DCD-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-398 80-308 Upstream ofelbow #25. No No No No No No No No discharge to valve 2CV-5128-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89B 80-309 Downstream of elbow #25. No No No No No No No No discharge to valve 2CV-5128-1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89B 80-310 Upstream orelbow #24. No No No No No No No No discharge to valve 2CV-5128-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-898 80-31i Downstream of elbow #24. N" No No No No No No No discharge to vahc 2CV-5128-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89B 80-312 Upstream of Onfice #54 No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV-5128-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSI,mmp 2P-89B 80-313 Downstream of Orifice No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV- #54. 5128-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89B 80-314 Upstream ofcheck valve No No No No No No No No discharge to valve 2CV- 2SI-23B. 5128-1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89B 80-315 Downstream orcheck No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV- vahr 2SI-238. 5128-1 Dearndation Mechanistra T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbiologica!!y Innuenced Cerroman (MIC) F- Flow Accelwed Corremen C - Cerrouan Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking 00 SCC) E- Eros on -Cavitation 0 - Other e G G
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"# FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms C"'"' lad n %. AMMQld Rn. 00 Page B145 of B187 i W eld i System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nun':,cr Weld 14 cation T C F I M E F 0 l IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P49B 80-316 Upstream ofelbow f23. No No No No No No No No disclarge to valve 2CV-5128-1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" ID'Si pump 2P-89B 80-317 Downstream ofelbow #23. No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV-5128-1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" HPSI pump 2P49B 80-318 Upstream ofTee #55. No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV-
$128-1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" HPSi pump 2P49B 80-319 Downstream ofTee #55. No No No No No No No No discharge to vahe 2CV-5128-1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2* IIPSI pump 2P-89B 80-320 Upstream ofTee #26. No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV-5128-1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P49B 80-321 Outboard ofTee #26. No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV-5128-1 HPSI HPSI003 2DCB-502-2" HPSi pump 2P49B 80-322 Downstream ofTee #26. No No No No No No No No discharge to vahe 2CV-5128-1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSI pump 2P49B 80-323 Upstream ofTee #27. No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV-
$128-1
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T-Thermal ratigue P - rnmary weer si-s cormam cracking (rwsec) ;. -Microhaegicany horaencedcorroman(urC) F- How Accelerused Cerresum c- carroman cracking I-heernr nui.,stresscorre.iancreciong00 SCC) E- Ereman-Caviinhen 0- O$ier
"* FMECA - Degradafior: Mechanisms C"'""" " #" N"*818 R"# Page B146 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Nun ber Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F O IC'SI linSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-84B 80-324 Outboard ofTee #27. No No No No No No No No discharge to valve 2CV-5128-1 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P 89B 80-325 Downstream ofTee #27. No No No No No No No No discharge to valve 2CV-
$128-1 i
HPSI IIPSI-J03 2DCB-502-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89B 80-326 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No i discharge to valve 2CV- 5128-l. 5128-1 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" HPSi pump 2P-89B 80-345 Downstream ofTee #55. No Na No No No No No No discharge to ulve 2CV-5128-1 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-502-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89B 80-346 Upstream of vaht 2SI-65 No No No No No No No No discharge to vahr 2CV- (Item #57) 5128-1 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-347 Downstream of vaht 2SI- No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from 65 (Item #65 on 2DCB-vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. 502-1) HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-348 Downstream of elbow #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SM4 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-Sil-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-349 Outboard ofTec #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2B5-53. Dewsdation Mahanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) at - Micretnolopcally Infhsenced Canesson (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Cerronson C-Corrosion Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Gwresion Cracking (IGSCC) E- Eronen-Cavitation 0 -other e _ 9 _ 9
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'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N""^ " #" A*""#" R'" 88 Page B147 of B187 W eld ) System ID Segment Line Number 1.ir-e Description Number Weld 1mation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-350 Upstream ofTee #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-351 Downstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" 1 IPSI pump 2P-89A 80-352 Upstream of elbow #3. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI.003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-353 Downstream ofelbow #4. No No No Ne No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-354 Upstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vaht 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-355 Downstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-356 Upstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-39A 80-357 Downstream of elbow #2. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire, from vaht 2SI44 to 2BS-53. Dearadation Mecharvens T-Dermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PwSCC) M - Micretmologically Innuenced Carmuon (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedOceresson C-Cerrosum Cracks I- Irmergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E- Erosion -Cavitation O -Other
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""" " ^'" A-1"N-8'8 R" 88 '
Page B148 of B187 ' We!d System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 , l HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-358 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No' No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-359 Dowtistream of Coupling No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from #8. valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-360 Upstream of Coupling #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahc 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-Si l-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-361 Upstream o! -2xm #4. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2S1-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-362 Downstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-363 Upstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-364 Downs: ream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2S1-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-365 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 251-64 to 28S-53. Deeradation Mechanrsms T-Hern.cl Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cormnon Craclung (PWSCC) M - Microb.ologicaffy Infbenced Cerramon (MIC) F- Fkm Accelerated Common C-Corrosion Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Carromon Crackmg (IOSCC) E - Eronae- Cavitation O -Other e G
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' #*" Calado# n A'a AGMQ10 Rei. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B149 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Numine Line DescriPtion Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-366 Donstream of ellbow #2. No No No No No is No No Mini-Recire. from vahe 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-Si l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-357 Upstream of elbow #6. No No No No No No No. No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-368 Downstream of elbow #6. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-369 Upstream ofTee #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-370 Downstream ofTee #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-372 Upstream ofTee #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire, from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-373 Downstream ofTec #7. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI.003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-374 Outboard ofTee #7. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53.
Dearada:
son Mechensama T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cracking (FWSCC) M - Watuologically Innuenced Cerroman (MIC) F-Fkne Accelerased Comssion C- Common Cracking I - beergranular Sirens Cerrassen Oscking 00 SCC) E-Erossen -Cavitation 0 - Other
'* FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"d#" # " A * " C 8'8 # " 88
- Page B150 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-375 Upstream orTee #7. No No No No No No No No ,
Mini-Recire. frem valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-376 Downstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCD-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-F9A 80-377 Upstream of elbow #5. No No No No No No No No - Mia-Recire. fiom I vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-378 Downstream ofellmw #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-Si l-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-379 Upstream orelbow #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-380 Downstream orcibow #1 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from (DCB-511-4) vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-381 Upstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-382 Downstream o. dbcw #2. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. Deeradstem Meci-anisms T-Tlermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosen Cracking (PWSCC) M - Miaobiologsca!!y Innuenced Corremon (MIC) F- flow Accetersted Cerroswn C -Corresson Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Cerrosen Cracking (IOSCC) E - Erosion - Cavitat.on 0 - Other
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g 3 u-s,97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I""" " ^'" NN-818 R" 88 ' Page B131 of B187 Weld System ID Segment ] Line Number Line Description Number 5.e2d IAcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-383 Upstream of elbow #3 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. l HPSI liPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-384 Downstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. l IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-385 Upstresm orelbow f3. No No No No No do No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSVA)3 2DCB-511-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-386 Dowitstream of valve 2SI- No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from 67 (item 32). valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-5 I l-2" HPSI purrip 2P-89A 80-387 Upstream ofvahr 2SI47 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from (item 32) vahe 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-5 I I-2" HPSII wm2P-89A 80-388 Dowinstream ofc! Low #4 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recir;:. froin + vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-389 Upstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahe 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI.003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-390 Downstream ofelbow #30. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. Dgradettaen Md T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Cor onen Cracking (PWSCC) M-M' ' ,.W';fInnuenced Comnion(MIC) F- Flow Accelernsed Commaan C-Cermswn Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Cerrossen Crackmg (IGSCC) E- Eressen- Cavitation 0 -Other
1
-l t 4-4'T Calculation No. A-PENG-GtLC-010, Rev. Ou FMECA - Degradatmn Mechanisms 1 l
f ,y, 3,,, ,j 3,37 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M F E 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-5 I I-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-391 Downstream ofTee #30. No No No No No No No No i Mini-Recire. from valve 2S144 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-393 Upstream of Tee #30. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-394 Doutistream orell #5. No No No No No No No N:, Mini-Recire. fmm vahr 2Sl44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-395 Upstrean. of e! bow #5. No No No No No No Nc. No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-3 % Downtream of vahr 2SI- No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from 66 (item 33) vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-397 Upstream of vahr 2SI-66 No No "a No No No No No l Mini-Recire. from (item 33). l vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. l l HPSI HPSI-003 2DCD-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-398 Downstream ofelbow #6. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recirc. from vahr 2SI 64 to 2BS-53. - IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-399 Upstream ofcIbow #6. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. Dearadatice Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cernmon Cracking (PWSCC) M - Mk s?.As. fly influenced Cet remm (MIC) F-Flow AculeratedCommon C- Common Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E - Erosion -Cavitation 0 - Other e G G
3 g 3 O G' ) 34 * '7 C"#'"'"" " #* ""##" #"' 8' FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bl53 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M' E' F 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-400 Downstream ofTee #31. No No No No No No No No i Mini-Recire. from vahr 25144 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-401 Outboard ofTee #31. No No No No No No No No h'a i-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-402 Domitstream ofTee #31. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI4)03 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P49A 80-403 Upstream ofelbow f7. No No No No' No ' No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI.003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-404 Downstream ofefbow #7. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 1P-89A 80-405 Upstream ofelbow #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2S144 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-406 Downstream ofelbow #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-407 Upstream ofelbow #9. No No No No No No No No Mini sl drc. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. Dearadstion Mecleanesms T-Hermal Fetigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosien Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbiologually Infhsenced Cer asson (MIC) F- flow Accelernsed Cerresum C-Cerrosace Cracking I-Ireergranular Strens Cerrosion Cracting GGSCC) E- Ercuien-Cavitsaion 0 -Other L____.._ --
*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"'ladon A'a A-PSMC-0/0 Rcw 00 l Page B154 of 2187 Wcld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld tecation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-408 Dowitstream orelbow #9. No No No No No No No No ,
Mini-Pecire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-408A Upstream of Coupling #14. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2* HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-401B Downstream of Coupling No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from #14. vahr 2S144 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-409 Upstream of elbow #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-410 Downstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCD-511-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-4II Upstream of cibow #2. No No No No No No No No Mmi-Recire. from vahr 2S144 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-412 Downstream ofelbow #2. No ha No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. I' PSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-413 Upstream ofelbow #3 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. Deeredsuon Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracting (PWSCC) M - Microbiologpcally Influenced Cerrasson (MIC) F- Flow hb.24 Cerromas. C - Corrosion Cracting I - Intergrarmlar Stress Cemmion Crackmg (IOSCC) E- Erosson-Cavitauen 0 Other e O O
n. v n v o 1
'*" , - FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms maton.AaA m m nio.Rn.oo l Page B153 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descriptiou Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 1 l' PSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P49A 80-414 Downstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No ;
Mini-Recire. from I valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P 89A 80-415 Upstream orelbow #4. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-Ot)3 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pemp 2P49A 80-416 Downstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 251-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-Si l-2* HPSi pump 2P49A 80-417 Upstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-Si l-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-418 Downstream ofelbow f5. No No No No No No No No , Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI4)03 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P49A 80-419 Upstream ofelbow #6. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSipump 2P49A 80-420 Downstream ofelbow #6. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P49A 80-421 Upstream ofelbonfl. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahc 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. Dearadition Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prwnery Water Stress Carrasion Qacking (PWsCC) M - Micrat*dogsemity Influenced Carrossen (MIC) F-Flow AcceleratedCerresen C -Corresmo Cracking I - Irisergranular Stress Corrossen Cracking (IOSCC) E- Eremen-Cavitation O - Other [ . ._ . . -
'* * ' C Iculati n N . A-PENG-GtLC-0IO, Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechan sms Page B156 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-422 Downstream ofelbow #1 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53.
llPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-423 Upstream of elbow #2. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" liPSi pump 2P-89A 80-424 Downstream of elbow #2. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from I valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-425 Upstream ofcoupling #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" ' llPSi pump 2P-89A 80-426 Downstream of Coupling No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from #8. valve 2S!-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-427 Upstream of elbow #9. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-428 Outboard ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-429 Downstream ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. Deeradation Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cradung (PWSCC) M - Micrcheologica!!y Innuenced Cerrassnn (MIC) F-Flow AcceleratedCorresson C- Cerrosion Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Corresson Cracking (IOSCC) E - Erosion - Cavitation 0 -Other
14
- 97 FMECA - Degradatm.n Mechanisms Calculation No. A-FENG-CALC-010, Rev. 00 1 p,,, 3,37 ,f 3fg7 -
weid System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 ; HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-430 Upstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recirc. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-431 Downstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No- No No Mini-Recire, from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-432 Upstrer.m of elbow A4. No No No No No No. No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-433 Dowinstream ofelbow #4 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-434 Upstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCli-Si l-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-435 Dow1 stream ofelbow #5 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 .,2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI 003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-436 Upstream ofelbow #6. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53.' HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-437 Downstream ofelbow #6. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire from vahr 2S1-64 to 2BS-53. Dearadst=n Mechannny T-Thermal Fatigue P - Frunary Waser Stress Carrossan Craciung (PWSCC) M - Mscrabsologscally Infimenced Carronan (MIC) F-Flow AccelerwedConcesan C-carrosen Cracting I-beergrunniersir Cerra onCracbag00 SCC) E- Erweian-Cavitation 0 - Other u---__ _ y
i l i
'* FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C fcstlati n No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page Bl38 of B187
( Weld Systera ID Segment Line Nnmher Line Description Number Weld Is) cation T C P I M E O F. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-Sil-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-438 Upstream of elbow #7. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIP 3I pi:;np 2P-89A 80-439 Downstream ofelbow #7. No No No No No No No No Mir i-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-440 Upstream of elbow #7. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-441 Outboard ofTee #10. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-442 Downstream ofTee #10. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire, from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" !! psi pump 2P-89A 80-443 Downstream of pipe #28. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" ? IPSI pump 2P-89A 80-444 Downstream of elbow #1. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-445 Upstream ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. Barsdatuw klacharusms T-The mal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Strees Carrosson Cracking (PWSCC) Af - hfhM.: y Innuenced Corrosion (AflC) F-flow AcceleratedCorresson C-Corrosion Cracking I-Intergranular Stress Carronen Cracking (IOSCC) E - Erosion - Cavitation 0 - Ot!wr e . _ G .
O - O O 14ScP-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " #" ""##" #"~ ** Page B159 of B187 Weld System ID is a.; Line Numeber Line Descripties Number Weld IAtaties T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i t -2" HPSi pump 2P49A 80-446 Upstream ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recirc. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P49A 80-447 Domistream ofTee #9. No No No No No No No No > Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P49A 80-448 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI 11 PSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P49A 80-449 Downstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" HPSi pump 2P49A 80-450 Upstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No Na No No Mini-Recirc. from valve 2SI-64 to 2B5-53. ' HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSI pump 2P49A 80-451 Downstream of e' bow #3. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from ! valve 251-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 .'9CB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P49A 80-452 Downstream orpipe #24. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from ' vahr 251-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI 003 2DCB-Si l-2" HPSi pump 2P49A , 80-453 Upstream ofTec #4. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vaht 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. Dearadation M ' T-Thennel Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Craclung (PWSCC) M - MicrobeolopenHy influenced Cerrasson (MIC) C-Corrosion Cracking F-Flow AcceleratedCarrosson I-:.L / StressCerrosionCradmg(IOSCC) E - Eraman - Cantauan 0-other i
' d" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms """"*" '"" **"# " #" #8 Page B160 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Numbe'r Weld lacation T C 5 I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-454 Downstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recirc. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53.
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A . 80-455 Upstream ofelbow #5. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2S1-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-l' IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-456 Dmmstream ofTee #to. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recirc. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-S i l-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-457 Outboard of Tee #10. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-458 Upstream of elbow #10 No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-5 I I-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-459 Downstream ofelbow #7. No No No No No No No No I Mini-Recire, from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-460 Downstream of elbow #7. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI-64 to 2BS-53 HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-461 Donstream of elbow #6. No No No No No No No No ; Mini-Recire. from valve 2SI-64 to 2BS-53. Deeradstion Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Primary Water Strens Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Miactnologically Induenced Cermsson (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCermwm C-Cermion Cracking I-Irmergranular Stress Cormsion Cracking (IOSCC) E - Erosion -Cavitation 0 - Other O O O
V'O (vD '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' ""#" ^'#""#'8 #" 88 Page B161 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI IIPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-462 Upstream ofelbow #6. No No No No No No No W Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI IIPSI403 2DCB-511-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-463 Downstream of elbow #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2S144 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-Si l-2" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 80-164 Upstream of elbow #8. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. i HPSI HPSI403 2DCB-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-465 Downstream of Tee #11. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from
- vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53.
HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 80-466 Out'ooard of Tee #11. No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from vahr 2S144 to 28S-53. IIPSI HPSI-003 2DCD-511-2" HPSi pump 2P-89A 80-467 Upstream ofTee #11. No No No No No No No No l Mini-Recire. from vahr 2SI44 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2DCB-511-2" HPSI pump 2P-89A 80-468 Downstream of vahr 251- No No No No No No No No Mini-Recire. from 64.(2DCB-501-1) vahr 2S144 to 2BS-53. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-94" HPSI pump 2P-89A 91-012 Upstream ofvaht 2SI- No No No No No No No No injection piping. 8A.(item 45) HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-94" HPSi pump 2P-89A 91-013 Dum6Gws of vaht 2SI- No No No No No W No No injection piping. 8A (item 45). Desradatenn Mechcaisms T-Thennal Fatigue P - Pnmary Wster Stress Cerronen Craclung (PWSCC) M - MLC4.ny influenced Cerroman (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Cerrtman C-Cerrosion Cracking I IntergranularStressCerrosionCrackmg(IOSCC) E - Erosson-Cavitatson 0- Other
14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calada#m L. A-PENG-CfLC-0/0, Rev. 00 Page Bl62 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-94" IIPSI pump 2P-89A 91-014 Upstream of Strainer No No No No No N> No .No injection piping. Flange #34. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-94" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 91-015 Downstream ofStrainer No No No No No No No No injection piping. Flange #35. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-94" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 91-016 Upstream orpump flange No No No No No No No No injection piping. #33. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCD-9-6" MPSi pump 2P-89A 91-060 Upstream ofvalve 2SI-8B No No No No No No No No injection piping. (item 81) HPSI IIPSI 003 2GCB-94" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 91-061 In 6"line Downstream or No No No No No No No No injection piping. valve 2SI-8B (item 81) IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-94" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 91-062 In 6"line upstream of No No No No No No No injection piping. No Strainer Flange #61 IIPSI IIPSI-003 . 2GCD-94* IIPSi pump 2P-89A 91-063 In 6"line Downstream of No No No No No No No No injection piping. Strainer Flange #61. IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-94" HPSI pump 2P-89A 91-064 In 6"line upstream or No No No No No No No injection piping. No pump 2P-89B in!ct flange. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-94" IIPSi pump 2P-89A 91-085 Downstream ofTee #68. No No No No No No No No injection piping. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-94" HPSi pump 2P-89A 91-086 Downstreim ofStrainer No No No No No No No No injection piping. Flange #58. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-94* IIPSi pump 2P-89A 91-087 Upstream of Pump Flange No No No No No No No No injection piping. #59.
% ^ -L--n Md 7-Thermal Fatipve P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
C -Corrasson Cracting M - Micretwolopcany Innuenced Cerrosen tMIC) F Fkm Accelerated Cerresen I - Iraergramlar Stress Carrosen Crackmg (IGSto*) E - &nuon -Cavitation 0 -Other e - -- - O O
I *" t FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"Ic"'"""" ^'" ANN"18 R" 88 Page B163 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Iecation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header ' 91-001 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from vahr 2SI-7A (item 46) check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-002 Downstream of Tee #39 No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-003 Upstream ofelbow #4. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), f om check valve. (2SI-7A and 251-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-004 Downstream of cibow #4. No No No No No No No No ' (all three pumps), from ' check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps, i Dearadetson Mecleanesms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser Stress common Crociang (PWSCC) M - Micrainolopently Innuenced Correman (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCorresson C-Corrosion Cracking I- Intergranular Stress Cerrasson Qacking (10 SCC) E - Erossen-Cavitation 0-Other Il
s
'*' FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calmaimn A'a A-SMW10 Rn. 00 Page 3164 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P 1 M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-005 Upstream ofcibow #5. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vakes (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps.
IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-006 Downstream of elbow #5. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-007 Upstream of elbow #6. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-008 Downstream of cibow #6. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. Denradation Mecfwusms T-Thermat Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micretmolopcany influenced Common (MIC) F- Flow ha AJ Commen C-Corrassen Cracking I - In:ergranular Stress Cerrosion Crackang 00 SCC) E - Famien -Cavitation . O- Othen
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O O O
"*'7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"#'"'""*" #" " " " #" # " "
Page B165 of B187 WeW System ID Segment IJee Number IJee Description Number Weld incation T C P I- M E F' O IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8* HPSI suction header 91-009 Ugstream ofelbow #7. No No No No ti No No No l (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-010 Dcunstream ofcibow #7. No No No No No' No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-011 Upstream of reducer #36 No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from (2GCB-9-1-2) check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-017 Downstream ofTee #39. No No n No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. Desradshen Mectanans T-Thermal Fanigue P- Pnmary Waeer Siress Commwm Cracking (PWScT) M - Microbiolagscany bauenced Carrousen (MIC) F- Fkm Accelmeed Cerrassen c-Cerranca Cracking I-InnersrunuiersireescarranonCr dbng(IGSCC) E- Erosum-cavkshan 0 -Other a
14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Colcarlanon No. A-PENG-CALC-010 Rev. 00 Page B166 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Emestion T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-018 Outboard ofTee #38. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), frem check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction header 91-019 Downstream of Tee #38. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. l IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-020 Upstream ofvahr 2SI-9A No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from (item 47) check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. liPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-021 Downstream ofvahr 2SI- No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from 9A (item 47) check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. Desradation Mechanism T-Hermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stree Commion Cracting (PWsCC) M - MicrotwolograHy influenced Common (Mit?) F- Flow Accelerated Conomion C-Common Cracking I - linergranular Stree Corrosion Crackirig (IGSCC) E - Eroma- Cr.vnshon 0-other e O O
O O O
"*93 .
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-010. Rev. 00 p,,, 3f,7 of 3,37 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C I M P E. F O HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-022 Downstream ofelbow #3. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side ofall three pumps. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-023 Downstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-024 Upstream ofcibow #2. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSi suction header 91-025 Upstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of allthree pumps Dearadmoon Mechannms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waeer stress Corresum Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbiologicany Innaenced Correman (MIC) C-Cerrosion Cracking F-Flow Accelerseed Cerresum I-Interpanular Stress Corronen Cradting (IOSCC) E-Erosion-Cavitanen 0-Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"'lan n A'a A-l'aMQ10. Rn. 00 Page B168 of BIS 7 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld lacation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-026 Downstream ofelbow #1. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-027 Upstream orelbow #9. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-028 Downstream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No (all three pwnps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-028A Betuten pipes #27 and #1. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), frein check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. l l Dearadation Mechannms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micretnologpenny Inhencal Common (MIC) F- How Accelerated Cemmen C -Carrasien Cracking 1-1,e , - Stress Comsson Crackmg(105CC) E - Erosion - Cavnetson 0 - Otfur O O O
-. . .. -. ~. ~~ . . . ..- . _ - .-.. _ - - -
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% o O FMECA - Degradstion Mechanisms "'"'"""#""
[g##'[],f7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld 14estien T. C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction header 91 r . xtrezm ofelbow #17. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. l IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-030 Upstream ore! bow #18. No No No No No No No No i (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction herder 91-031 Downstream ofelbow #18. No No No No No No No No (all thw pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-032 Upstream crelbow #10. No No No No No No No No , (all three pumps), frmn i check vahts (2SI-7A i and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. c__:.= . Mechnen. T-Tkmal Fatigue P - Prunary Waser Sims Corremon Cracking (FWSCC} M - Micnheloescany bdhsenced Carrwesen (MIC) F. Flow AaeksucedCemnsen C- Cerremen Cracbng I- Irmergranuler Sims Cerroman Crociang (IGsCC) E- Erossen-Cavesteen 0- Other
- FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""' **" ^* A*N-8#8 #" 88 Page B170 of B187 i
b cid System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI 003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction heeder 91-033 Downstream ofelbow #10. No No No No No No No No l (all three pumps), from l check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI HPSI403 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-034 Upstream orelbow #il. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSi suction header 91-035 Downstream of elbow #11. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8* HPSi suction header 91-036 Upstrean. of elbow #12. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction siis of all three pumps. Deeradation Mechenems T-Hermal Fatigue P- Phrnary Water Stress Carmnon Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micrainologwally influenced common (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Cerramon C -Carrosen Cracking I-Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracbng(10 SCC) E - Eronen- Cavitation 0 - Other O O O
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(J M-SP97 '##' # FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms O'"'#"""" #* " 7 f7f ,f f$ Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imstion T C P -I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction header 91-037 Downstream ofcIbow #12. No No No Na No No No ' No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2S1-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction header 91-038 Upstream orelbow #19. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 251-78) to the suction side of all three Pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-039 Downstream
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ofelbow #19. No No No No No No No No (all Jute pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction header 91-040 Upstream ofelbow #13. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. Dearadat.on M- - T-Thomal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) M - MW : " J -", bilmenced Carramen(kHC) F-Flow AcceleratedCarouwm C -Carre. ion Cracking I-Interyanslar Stress Cerrasson Cracking (IOSCC) E-Emmon-Caviestion 0-Other
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PEVG-CALC-Olc, Rev. 00 Pm;e Bl72 of DIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 f IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCD-9-8" HPSi sation header 91-041 Downstream ofelbow #13. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 251-78) to the suction side of all three Pumps.
IIPSI HPSI403 2GCD-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-042 Upstream ofelbow #I4. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from l check vahts (2SI-7A and 251-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSi suction header 91-043 Downstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahes (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three Pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction header 91-044 Downstream ofcIbow #15. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahes (2SI-7A l and 2SI-7B) to the ! suctioni side of all three pumps. ! Erwadation Mechananms T "DermalFatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbiologically Indumced Cerrassen (MIC) F- Fkm Accelerated Cerroman C- Cerrosxri Cracking I - Irwergranular Stress Cerr inven Omdung (IOSCC) E- Eremen-Cavitation 0- Other i e e - e l
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FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"#'"'"##" #" ""##8 #"~ 88 Page B173 cf B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F- O IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-045 Upstream orelbow #16. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8* HPSI suction header 91-046 Upstream orpipe #20. No No No No No No No No (all three pu::ips), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" 11 PSI suction header 91-047 Upstream ofTee #68. No No No No ' No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-048 Downstream of check No No No No No No No No i (all three pumps), from valve 2S1-7B (item 80) check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the ! l suction side of all three - Pumps. i Desadesian W T-Hermal Fatigue P Prunary Weser stress Cmonon Crechg(PWSCC) M - MicrobsceogscaRy Induenced Commen (MIC) j C-Cerroman Cracking I- h*rsrinmier strew Common Credung (105CC) F- Fkm * - " ^ "Careeman ! E-Ereason-Cawamason 0 - Other i h
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Colalanim A'oMMQ10 Ra. 00 Page B174 of BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Nur hr Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-A" IIPSi suction header 91-049 Demstream ofTee #67. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-050 Upstream ofcIlxm #8. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 251-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI HPSI403 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-051 Downstream of elbow #8. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2S1-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-052 Upstream ofcIbow #9. No No No No No No No No * (all three pumps), from check vahes (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. Derradation Mechmisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Wat T Stress Comsson Crackmg (PWSCC) C -Cerrosion Crackmg M- MLa
- r. :y Innuenced Commion(MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCerrosann 1 - Intergrarutar Stress Corresson Crackmg (IOSCC) E- Erosion - Cavitation O-Other e G G
.,s
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"#"" " A'a AMMWIO Rn. 00 Page B175 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Noenber Weld Location T C P I M E F 'O IFSI liPSI 003 2GCB-9-8* IFSI suction header 91-053 Downstream af elbow #9 No No No No No No N Mo (all three pumps), from
. check vahes (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" }{ PSI suction header 91-054 Upstream od cibow #10. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-70; to the suction side oisit three Pum HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8* 11 PSI suction header 91-055 Downstream ofelbow #10. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps.
HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-056 Downstream ofelbow #1I. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A
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and 2SI-7B) to the suctson side of all three pumps peeradm.an Meche==ns T-nermal Fseisme P Primary Water Stress Cerroman Osckmg(PWsCC) M - ML. ' LA.;;7bdluenced Cerroman(MIC) F-Ilow Accekreted Corresums C-Corre mnCrackins I - 1, . , stress Cereman Crackmg(10 SCC) E- Eramen-Cavinshan 9-Other
. , . . _ . . . . l
l '~" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calcul tion N . al-PENG-CtLC-010. Rev. 00 b Page Bl76 of Bib 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld I4 cation T C P I M E F- O HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8* IIPSi suction header 91-057 Upstream orelbow #12. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. ilPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-058 Downstream o'clbow #12. No No No No No - No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-059 Upstream of reducer #63. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8* IIPSI suction header 91-065 Downstr:am ofTee #67. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of al! three pumps.
& Mahannms T "IhermalFatigue P - Pnmary waar Stress Carronen Cradung (PWSCC) M-ML-L:v :lyInneencalCerronen(MIC) F-Fkm AcceleratedCommen C- Cmesian Crackmg I-Interpanular Stress Cerroman Cracking 00 SCC) E- Esonen - Cavitation 0-Ot.wr O O O
m p U .br V
'" # FMhCA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " ^'*""W'8 R" 88 Page Bl?7 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E. F 0 IIPSI IIPSI4)03 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-066 Outboard ofTee #66. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahes (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all t*iree pumps.
HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-067 Upstream ofvahr 2SI-9B No No No No No No No No iall three pumps), from (item 79) check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header .9!-068 Downstream ofvahr 2SI- No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from 98 (item 79) check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" ' HPSI sucten header 91-069 Upstream ofcibow #7. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. I Desudshen Mechenusu T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Waaer See Common Crockeg (PWSCC) M - Microbiologicany InEsenced Common (MIC) F-Flow AcceleratedCommon c-Common Cracking I- tmerynneler swess Cerroman Crackms 00 SCC) E- Eremien-Cavanhan 0 -Oiher l
.. .. . . _ _ . .. . -. . .. . -.. .. -----_= - . .
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- FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C'#"""#" ^'" A**C-### #" 88 Page BIT 8 of Bb97 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-070 Downstream ofcIbow #7. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vakes (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps.
IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCD-9-8" hPSI suction header 91-071 Upstream ofcibow #6. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pteops. HPSI IIPSI4303 2GCB-9-8" HPSi suction header 91-072 Downstream ore;$ow #6. No No No No No No No No l (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A l and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI " IPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-073 Downstream ofelbow #S- No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valva (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B to the suction side of all threc pumps. Depredation Mechanisms T-T1.mnal Fatigue P - F.imary Water stress Common Cracbng (PWSCC) M-MM. :#Mme red Carrwon(MIC) F- Flow Accelersted Comme C-Common Cracking I - Intergranuler stress Common Cracking (IGsCC) E - Er: mon -Cantatson 0 - Other O O O
' d*" FMECA - Degradction Mechanisms C"##"#""*" "#
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Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nember Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSi suction header 91-074 Upstream ofelbow #13. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vakes (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-075 Downstream ofelbow #13. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. HPSI HPSI.003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction heada 91-076 Upstream of elbow #4. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 ' 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suctica header 91-077 Downstream ofcibow #4. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check valves (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. Dearadshan Mechanums T-Thermal Fatigue P- Prunary water Seess Carremen Cracking (F%W M - Micrdmologscally Innuenced Corresson (MIC) T 51ew AccelerssedCerronen C-Cerresson Cracking 1 - Irmergranular Stress Corremen Cracking (105CC) E- Erossen-Cavitshan 0-Oiher
14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calc"lanon Na A-PEW-CALC-010. Rev. 00 Page B180 of B187 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-078 Upstream ofelbow f3. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCD-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-079 Doumstream ofcibow #3. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three Pump . IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-080 Upstream ofelbow #2. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three pumps. IIPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" IIPSI suction header 91-081 Downstream of elbow #2. No No No No No No No No t (all three pumps), from check vahrs (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. Derradation Mechernsms T-Thermal Fatigue P- Primary Water firess Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micratwdogicaffy InDeerred Carrosen (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCavemon C - Cerrosen Cracting I- Iraergranular Stress Cortonon Cracking OGsCC) E- Eroman - Cavstatson 0 -Odier e O O
J G U 14 4 97 * #"'""*"*'""#~ " FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms [g#"[g,$ f W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description . Number Weld 14 cation T C F I M E F 0 HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction header 91-082 Upstream of elbow #1. No No No No . No , W No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three pumps. HPSI IIPSI-003 2GCB-9-8* HPSI suction header 91-083 Domistream ofelbow #1- No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), frors-check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-7B) to the suction side of all three Pumps. HPSI HPSI-003 2GCB-9-8" HPSI suction h& 91-084 Upstream ofTee #68. No No No No No No No No (all three pumps), from check vahts (2SI-7A and 2SI-78) to the suction side of all three Pumps. HPSI HPSI-004 2CCA-22-12" Safety injectionline 22-010 Domistream ofelbow #14 Yes No No No No- No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). HPSI HPSI-004 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection line 22-011 Upstream ofelbow #14 Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check valve 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). T-Herrnal Tatigue P - Pnmary Wneer Stres Carroman Craclung (PWsCC) M - Micrainolopcacy Inneem_11 Carremen (MIC) F- Flow Accelerseed Carroman C-Cerraron Cracking I - Iraersranular Strem Common Crackms CGSCC) E- Ercaen-Cavisasion 0-Other _ _ = -
'" C"'"'ladon Na AMMC4/0. Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B182 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 IIPSI IIPSI-004 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection line 22-012 Downstream ofeltnw #17 Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A).
IIPSI IIPSI-004 2CCA-22-12" Safety lnjectien line 22-013 Upstream ofelbow #17 Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). IIPSI IIPSI-004 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-011 Downstream ofelbow #2 Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-004 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-012 Downstream of cibow #2 Yes No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-004 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23413 Downstream of elbow #18 '.'es No No No No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). Deeradation Mecharusrrs T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Water Stresa Correnan Crackir.g (PWSCC) M-Mi.l_6k flyInfluencedCerrosson(MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCerroman C-Cerrosion Cracking I - Irmergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracking (10 SCC) E - Eroman - Cavitation 0-Caer l e e e
O O O t 4-s*P*7 - FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-C4LC-010. Rev. 00 7,,,3,,, ,f 3,g7 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-004 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-014 Upstream ofelbow #18 Yes No No No No No No No from SIT discharge check vahc 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-21-12" Safety injection line 21 007 Upstream ofcheck vaht Yes No No Yes No No No No from SITdischarge 2SI-15B check vahr 2SI-16G to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-21-12" Safetyinjection line 21-008 Upstream of elbow #18 Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). IIPSI IIPSI4)05 2CCA-2I-12" Safety injection line 21-009 Downstream ofelbow #17 Yes No No Yes No No No No from SITdischarge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). ; IIPSI }{ PSI-005 2CCA-21-12" Safety injectionline 21-010 Donstream of tee #21 Yes No No Yes No No No Fo from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16B to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32B). t Dearadstum Mechenuens T-nerm I ratigue r - Pnmary water same correman crachas (rwscc) M Micrainokwcallyinnuencedcommen(Mic) c commoncracking F-rio. Acceler iedcom 1 -lineryanular stms common crachng OOscc) E- Eromen-Cavitation O- Other i l
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""" " ^'" "'" W'" #" 88 Page B184 of B187 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weldlocation T C I M F P E 0 IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection line 22-005 Upstream ofcheck vahe Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge 2SI-15A check vahr 2SI-16A to I RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-22-12" Safety injection line 22-006 Downstream orelbow #18 Yes No No Yes No No No lio from SIT discharge check vahe 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-22-12" Safety Injection line 22-007 Upstreara ofcibow #18 Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 1 i 2P32A). 1 IIPSI HPSI-005 2CCA-22-12" Safety injectionline 22-008 Downstream ofelbow #15 Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). IIPSI IIPSI-O')5 2CCA-22-12" Safetyinjection line 22-009 Upstream of elbow #15 Yes No No Yes No No No No from SITdischarge check vahe 2SI-16A to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32A). Deeradation Mectranisms T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnenary Water Stress Cerrosion Onckmg (FWSCC) M-M W :Wy LAuenced Cerronen(MIC) F-&w ActvlerstedCernmen C- Corronen Crackmg I- Intergranular Stress Cerroseon Crackmg (10 SCC) E- Erosion -Cavitsrian 0 -Other
O O O
' #*" N'"lan,e A'a ARAMM-010. Rn. 00 Fre1ECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B185 of BIS 7 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nember Weld Imation T C F I M E F O IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-23-12" Safetyinjecten line 24-006 Upstream ofcheck nhe Yes No No Yes No No No No-from SIT discharge 2SI-15D check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D).
HPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-23-12" Safety injecten line 24-007 Domtstream of reducing Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge tee #13 check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI HPSI-005 2CCA-23-12" Safety injection line 24-008 Upstream of reducing tee Yes No No Yes No No No No fiom SIT discharge #13 check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). IIPSI HPSI-005 2CCA-23-12" Safetyinjection line 24-009 Domistream ofelbow #16 Yes No No Y. No No No No from SIT discharge check vahr 2SI-16D to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32D). HPSI HPSI-005 2CCA-23-8* SI discharge line 24-028 Upstream of 12" x 8" Yes No No Yes No No No No toward RCS loop D, reducing tee f13 (ISO from reducer /2CCA 2CCA-23-1) 3*, and reducer /2CCB-5-6", to 2CCA-23-12". Dearmistian Medaann. T-nermalFs6 ue P - Pnmary Water Strena Corramen Cracking (PWSCC) M - Microbiologrally Innuemmd Co-(MIC) F-Flow Accelerased Comnion c-Caro onCr ains I-IniersranutersiressCorre anCraciung(IOSCC) E-Eremen-Caviension 0 -Other
,- a
'N' FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculan n A'a AMG-CAW 10.Rm 00 Page BIS 6 of B187' W eld System ID Segment Line Numir:r Line Description Number Weld laation T C P I M E F 0 l .
l lIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection line 23-007 Upstream of check vrht Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge 2SI-15C check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP - 2P32C). IIPSI HPSI-005 2CCA-24-l?" Safety injection line 23-008 Downstream of reducing Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge tee #22 check vahr 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-24-12" Safety Injection line 23-009 Dmuistream of elbow #17 Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge check valve 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). IIPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-24-12" Safety injection Lne 23-010 Upstream ofcibow #17 Yes No No Yes No No No No from SIT discharge check valve 2SI-16C to RCS cold leg (RCP 2P32C). HPSI IIPSI-005 2CCA-24-8" SI dischargeline 23-020 Upstream of 12" x 8' Yes No No Yes No No No No toward RCS loop C, reducing tee #22 (ISO from rMucer/2CCA 2CCA-24-1) 3" and check vahr 2SI-14C to 2CCA-24-12" IIPSI IIPSI4X)6 2CCB-71-2" Cross over from ilPSI 80-253 Upstream ofvalve 2SI-31. No No No No No No No No header #1 to train "B" hot leg injection line b h, Mechannem T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Co resson Cracting (PWSCC) M - Microtmologicarry influenced Corrosion (MIC) F- rlow Accelerated Cerrowen C- Carranon Cracking I - Iraergranular Stress Carrasion Cracbng (IGSCC) E- Emnon- Ctvitation 0- Other e O O ,
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Calculation No. A PENG CALC 010, Rev. 00 Page Cl of C17 O APPENDIX C
'FMECA SEGMENT RISK RANKING REPORT *
(Attachment Pages C1.C17) O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
'*" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report CN
- dmocec-** * "
re c2 4cn Degradation Nember Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanisen Con w Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Gr g ID Category Category Category Rank HPSI-00I 8 2CCA-25-3" 25-035,25-037,25- HPST-N NONE HIGH CAT 4 hEDIUM 037A,25-038,25-055, 25-056, 25-056A 25-057 HPSI-002 34 2CCA-21-12*. 21-001,2iGI A. 21- T HPSI-T SMALL HIGI CAT 2 HIGH 2CCA-22-12", 004,21-005,21-006 LEAK 2CCA-23-12". // 22-001,22-001 A. 2CCA-24-12*. 22-003, 22-004 // 24-2CCA-25-3" 001,24-002,24-003. 24-004,24-005// 23-001,23-001 A,23-003,23-004,23-005, 23-006 //25-024.25-025.25-026,25-027, 25-028,25-029, 25-030,25-031,25-032, 25-033, 25 034, 25-05I, 25-052, 25-053 9 9 8
C n p v p V
'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report ch wmGC"ce'* r-
- 1 rees4cn Degradaties Number Lines le Welds im Degrt:lation Degradation Mechseine Ceasem Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segiment Mechanisms Group ID Catege y Category Category Rank HPSI-003 1044 2CCA-21-12*, 21-011,21-012,21- HPSI-N NONE MEDIUM CAT 6 LOW 2CCA-21-3*, 013.21-014,21-015, 2CCA-21-6*, 21-016.21-017,21-2CCA-21-8*, OI8,21-019,21-020, 2CCA-22-12", 21-021,21-022,21-2CCA-22-3*, 023,21-024,21 054, 2CCA-22-6*, 21-J55 // 21-049,21-2CCA-22-8*, 050,21-05I,21-052, 2CCA-23-12", 21-053,21-053A //
2CCA-23-3", 21-043,21 444,21-
'2CCA-23-6*, 045,21-046,21-047, 2CCA-23-8*, 21-048 //21-025,21-2CCA-24-12*, 026,21-027,21-028, 2CCA-24-3*, 21-029,21-030,21-2CCA-24-6*, 031,21-032,21-033, 2CCA-24-8", 21 034,21-035,21-2CCA-25-3", 036,21-037,21-2CCB-11-2*, 037A,21-038,21-2CCB-12-2", 039,21-040,21 441, 2CCB-12-3", 21-042 //22-014, 22-2CCB-12-4*, 015,22-016,22-017, 2CCB-13-2", 22-018, 22 019, 22-2CCB-13-3", 020,22 021.22-022, 2CCB-14-2*, 22-023 // 22440A, j 2CCB-14-3", 22-041, 22-042, 22-2CCB-15-2*, 043, 22-044,22-2CCB-15-3", 044A // 22-037,22-2CCB-23-1 1/2*, 040 // 22-024,22-2CCB-7-2",2CCB- 025,22-026,22-027, 7-3*, 2CCB-70-2", 22-028,22-029,22-2CCB-70-3*, 030,22-031,22-032,
'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report ch
- d'ecC"c-*m 8" "
rage co of CI7 Degradation Number Uses la Welds is Degradation Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Weids Segment -Wt Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank 2CCB-71-2*, 22-033,22-034,22-2CCB-71-3*, 035,22-036 //24-l 2DCB-1-4*, 010.24-011.24-012, 2DCB-3-2", 24-013,24-0I4,24-2DCB-3-3*, 015,24-016,24-017, 2DCB-3-4*, 24-0I8,24-019,24-2DCB-500-2", 020, 24-020A, 24-2DCB-501-2*, 021,24-022,24 4 23, 2DCB-502-2", 24-024,24-025,24-2DCB-5I I-2*, 026,24-027//24-2GCB-9-6", 050,24-051,24 4 52, 2GCB-9-8* 24-053,24-054,24-055,24-056, 24-056A // 24-046,24-047,24-047A 24-048,24-049//24-029,24-030,24-031, 24 432,24-033,24-034,24-015,244 36, 24-037,24-038,24 - 039,24-040,24 441, 24-042,24-043,24-044,24-045,24-053, 24-059//23-015,23-016,23 017, 23-018 H 23-019 // 23-040, 23-
- 041, 23-042, 23-043, 23 4 44,23-045,23-046,23-046A // 23-047,23-048,23 449, 23-050,23-05I, 23-052 //23-021,23-G G S ,
m
- w. , .
?
O O O ; i '*" FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report cha emccaceu- = ! rv a 4cn Degradaties Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Riek Segment ID ofWelds Segment Segment Mechanisats Groep ID Category Category Category Rank 022, 23 4 23,23-024, 23-025,23-026,23-027,23 4 28,23-029, 23-030, 23-031, 23-032, 23-033, 23-034, 23-035,23-036,23-037,23 4 38,23-039
//25-036,25-039,25-040,25 4 41,25-042, 25-058,25-059,25-060, 25-06I,25-062
// 81-181,81-182, 81-183,81-184,81-185, 81-1 ",81-187,SI-188,81-189,31-190
- 81-191, 81-192, 81-193, 81-194,81-195, 31-196,81-197,81-198, 8l-199, 81-200, 81-201,81-202, El-203,81-204,81-205, 8I-206,81-207,81 208,81-209,81-210, 81-21I//81 427,81 027A. 81027B,81-027C,81-027D,8I-027E 81-028,81-071,81-071 A,81-071B, 81-071C,81-071D,81071E,81-072,81-081, El-081 A,81-081B,81-
FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report ch * "ncccc-m * ** rvca 4 cr~ Degradaties Nember Lines in Weids in Degradation Segment ID Degradation Mechanime Ceasequence Risk Risk of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Creep ID Category Category C.as y - Rank 081C,814)SID 81-081E,81-082 // 31-029,81-030,81-031, 8l 032,81-065,81-066,81-067,81-068, 81-069.81 070,81-078, 81-078 A,81-079,81-080,81-084, 81-085. El-086, 31-087,8!4)38,81-089, 81-090,81-091,81-093,81-095 //81-033, 81-034, 81-035, 81-036,81 4 37,81-038,81-039,81-040, 81-041,81-042,81-043, 8I-044, 81-045, 31-046,81-047,81-048,81-049,81-051, 81-052,81-053,81-054,81-055,81-055A,81-057,81-060,81-062,87-063, 81-064,81-073,81-074,81-076,81-077, 81-083 // 80-015, 80-016,80 023, 80-024, 80-025//80-00I,80-002,80-003,80 005, 80-006, 80-0G7, 80-008,80-009,80-010, 80-011. CD-012,80-i e 9 9
O O O 8*" FMECA - Segmert Risk Ranking Report N* emm a"- a rose C7 erC17 L - Noneber Lines in Welds is A ,..-i ~ Degradaties Mechanisen Ceasegsence Risk Risk Segnecat ID ofWeids Segmeest Segneemt Mechanismes GroepID Category Cseegory Category Rank 014,80-019,80-020, 80-021,80-022 //81-014,81 015,81-016, 8I-023,81-024 // SI-001,81-002,81-003, 81-005,81-006,SI-007,81-008,81-009, 81-010,81-011, El-012,81 013,81-018, 81-019,81 020,81-022 //83-020,83-021,83-030,83-031, 83-032,83-032A,83-032B,83-033 // 83-00I,83-002,83-003, 83-004, 83-005, 83-006,83-007,83-008, 83-010,83-011,83-013,83-014,83-015, 83-016,83 017,83-015,83-019,83-023, 83-024, 83 025, 83-026,83-027, 83-029
// 81-056,81-0%A, 81-056B El-056C.
81-0%D 81-0%E, 81456F 81-056G, 81-056H 81-0%I. 81-0%J // 82-009,82-010,82-017,82 018, 82-019 //82-001, 82-002,82-003,82-004,
'*" FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report c h C N #'*8" "
recsoren Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Methamises Con w Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segneent Segment Methanisnes Groep ID Category Category Category Rank 32-005, 82 4 06,82-008,82-013,82 4 14, 82 4 16//81-116,81-117,81-118,81-119, 81-140,81-141//81-061,81-061 A, 81-096,81-097,81 4 98, 81 4 99,81 100,81-101, 81-102, 81-103, 81-104,81-105,81-106,8l-107,8l-108, 81-109,81-110,81-I I I, 81-112, 81-113, 81-il3 A, 81-114,81-115,81-120, 81-121, 81-122, 81-123, 81-125,81-126,81-127, 81-128,81-128A,81-129,81-130,81-131, 81-132, 81-133, 81-134,81-135,81-136, 8I-139,31-142,81-142A,81-143,81-144,81-144A 81-145,81-146,81-146A,81-147, 81-148,81-149,81-150, 81-151, 81-152, 81-153, 81-154, 81-155, 81-155A,81-155B, 81-156,81-157,81-158,8I-159,81-160, G . 9 O
O O O
'*" FMECA -Segenent Risk Ranking Report C+'- m - **a=*
r ,cv 4 ct? Degradsenen Neusber Liecs in Welds in L., " M~ . L ,_" -- Mechanises Ceasequence Risk Risk Segument ID of Welds Segnsent Segument Mechseisers Group ID Casersey Category Caterwy Rank 81-161, 81-162,81-163, 81-164,81-166, 81-167, 81-168,81-169,81-170,81-171, 81-172. 81-172A, 81-173, 81-174,81-176, 81-177,81-178,81-179,81-180 //80-233,80-234,80-243, 80-244, 80-?15, 80-246,30-247, 80-250, 80-251, 80-252,80-255,30-256,30-257, 30-258,30-259, 80-260,80-26I,80-262, 30-276,80-277//30-235, 30-236,80-237, 80-238,30-239, 80-24I,80-242,30-263, 80-264,80-265, 80-266,80-267,80-268, 80-269,80-270,80-27I, 80-274,30-275, 80-278,30-279, 80-280,80-281,80-282, 30-283, 80-284,80-l 285,80-286,80-287, 30-288,80-289,30-290,80-291,80-292, 80-293,80-294,80-295,80-296,80-297, 30-298, 80-299, 80-
~
~
'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report CN 5dm6C"c#m '" " rage clo of CI: Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradaties Mechasesas Cee p Risk Risk Segment ID ofWelds Segment Segment Mechanisms Groep ID Category Caterery Category Rank 300,80-301,80-302, sn-303, 80-304,80-305,80-306 # 80-138,80-139, 80-140, 80-141,80-142,80-144,80-145, 80-146, 80-147,80-147A, 80-148,80-149, 80-150, 80-151,80-151 A,80-152, 80-153, 80-155, 80-156, 80-156A, 80-157,80-158,80-159, 80-160, 30-161, 80-163,80-164,80-165, 80-168,80-169, 80-170,80-17I,80-172, 80-172A, 80-173,80-174, 80-175,80-176, 80-176A,80-177, 80-178, 80-179, 80-179A, 80-180, 80-1E1, 80-!82,80-183, 80-184, 80-185, 80-t86,30-187,80-187A, 80-187B,80-188,80-189,80-190, 80-191, 80-192, 80-193, 80-194,80-195, 80-196,30-197,80-198,80-199,80-199A,80-199B,80-200,80-20I,80-202, e O O
O O O
'*" FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report CN F- "DGcuc-*'* *
- race css 4cs7 L,,. _ : ^ ._
, Number Linesin Welds in L., _ f :- L,,._**_ Mechanism Cee p Risk Risk Sessment ID of Welds Segment Segument Mechanisms Group ID Casesory Casersey Category Rank 80-203, 80-204,80-205,80-206,80-207, 80-208, 80-209, 80-210 PO-211,80-212, 80-213, 80-214, 80-215,80-216, 80-217, 80-2I8,80-219,80-220,80-221,30-222, 80-223,50-224, 80-225.80-226,80-227 ] //30-017,80 4 27,30-027A,80-027B,80-027C,80427D, 80-028,30 451,80-051 A,80451B,30-051C, 80-051D,80-052,80-120,80-120 A, 30-120B,30-120C,80-120D,80-120E,80-121,80-135,80-135A,80-135B 80-135C,80-135D,30-135E 80-136,80-231,30-232, 8I-025,82-011, 83-1 022 //30-029,80-030,80-031,30 4 32, 80-033,80-034,80-037,80-038,30-039, 80-040,80-04I,80-042,80-043,80-044, 30-045,80-046,30- ' I i
, - + .
'*" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report c ~ * " acce cem F" " rage ct2 <ct? Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradatien Degrzdation Mechasesse Consegnence Risk Risk Segment ID ofWeids Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Caterery Category Category Rank 947, 80-048,80-049, 80 050,80-067, 80-068,80-069,80-070, 80-07I,80-072, 80-073, 80-074,80-075, 80-076,80 077,80-078, 80-079, 80-080, 80-1I1, 80-112, 80-1I3, 80-114, 80-115, 80-116,80-117,80-118,80-119,80-124, 80-125, 80-126,80-127, 80-128, 80-129, 80-130,80-131,80-132, 80-133, 80-134 l
# 80-035,80-036,80-054,30-055,80-056, 80-057,80-058,80-059,80-060,80-062, 80-063,80-064,80-065,80-066,80 481, 80-082, 80-083, 80-084,80-085,80-086, 80 487.80-088,80-089,80-092,80-093, 80-094,80-095,80-095 A,80-096,80-097,80-098,80 499, 80-100, 80-101, 80-102, 80-103,80-104, 80-105,80-106,80-107,80-108,80-109, 9 O O
O O O '*" FMECA-Segnient Risk Ranking Report Nwmmcat*
- r.e,en.1cn Detradassen Neusber Lines in Welds is is ' ^*_ _
L_'^~__ Mechanisme Commequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Seyneet Segumesd Mechanismes Group ID Caergery Cseenery Caeegory Rank l 80-110,80-123 //80- ' 392, 80-490, 30-491, 80-492,80-493,30-494,80-495,80-4 %, 80-4%A,80497,80-498,80-499,80-500, 80-501,80-502,30- l 503,80-504,80-505, 80 506,80-507,80-508,80-509,80-510, 80-51I,80-512 //80-523,80-524, 80-525, 80-526,80-527,80-528, 30-529, 80-530, 30-531,80-532,80-533,80-534,80-535, 80-536,80-537,30-538, 30-539, 30-540, 80-541,30-542//80-307,30-308,30-309, 30-310,80-3II,30-312,80-313,80-314, 80-315,30-316,80-317,80-318,30 319, 80-320,80-321,30-322,30-323, 30-324, 80-325,80-326,80-345,30-346//80-347,80-348,80-349, 80-350,80-351,80-352,80-353,30-354, 80-355,30-356,80- _ _ - _ _ i
'N" FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report CN * "DGccc"' 8- "
Page Cl4 of Cl* Degradaties Number Linesin Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segment Mechanismes Group ID Category Category Caterwy Raek 357,80-358,80-359, 80-360,80-361,80-362, 80-363,30-364, 80-365,80-366,80-367,80-368,80-369, 80-370,80-372,80-373, 80-374,80-375, 80-376,80-377,80-378. FO-379, 80-380, 80-381,80-382,80-383,80-384,80-385, 80-386, 80-387, 80-388,80-389,80-390, 80-391, 80-393,80-394,80-395,80-3 %, 80-397,80-398,80-399,30-400,80-401, 80-402, 80-403,80-404,80-805,80-406, 80-407,80-808,80-408 A, 80-408B, 80-409,80-410,80-411, 80-412, 80-4I3, 80-414,80415, if>416, 80-417,80-4I8,80-419, 80-420,80-421, 80-422, 80-423, 80-424, 80-425,80-826, 80-427, 80-428,80-429,80-830,80-83I, 80-432, 80-433, 80-434,80-435,80-436 O O O --4 r _.
O O O
$*" FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report N"a dN#'* *
- rw cn 4 cir Degradaties Number LJacs in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Ceasequence Risk Risk Segment ID ofWelds Segmeent Segament Mechanismes Group ID Category Category Category Rank 80-437,80-438,80-439,80-440,80-44I, 80-$42,80-443,80-444,80-445,80-446, 80-447,80-448,80-449, 80-450,30-451, 30-452,80-453,80-454, 80-455,80-456, 80-457, 80-458,80-459, 80-460,80-461, 80-462,80-463,80-464,80-465,80-466 I 80-467,30-468//91-012,91-013,91-014, 91-015.91 416,91-060,91-061,91-062, 91-063,91-064,91-085,9l-086,91-087
//91-001.91-002,91-003,91-004,91-005, 91-006,9I-007,9I-008,91-009,91-010, 914 11,91 017,91-018, 91-019,91-020, 91-021.91-022,91-023,91-024,91-025, 91-026,91-027,91-028,91-028A,91-029,91-030,91-031, 91-032,91-033,91-034,9I-035,91-036, 91-037,91-038,91-
FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report N *e mc-**** r.a. cu eren Degradation Number Lines la Welds in Degradation Segment ID Degradation Mechar. ism Coesequence Risk Risk of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Catimy Category Category Rank 039,91-040,91-04I, 91-042,91-043, 91-044,9I-045, 9!-046, 91-047,91 448,91-049,91-050,91 051, 91-052,91-053,91-054,91-055,91-056, 91-057,9I-058,91-059,91-065, 9I-066, 91-067,91-068,91-069.91-070,91-071, 9I-072,91-073,9l-074, 9I-075, 9I-076, 9I477,9I-078,9I-079,9I-080,91-08I, 91-082, 91-083, 91-084 HPSI-004 8 2CCA-22-12*, 22-010. 22-011.22- T HPSI-T SMALL MEDIUM CATS MEDIUM 2CCA-24-12* O12, 22-013 // 23-LEAK 011, 23-012, 23-013, 23-014 HPSI-005 19 2CCA-21-12", 21-007,21-008.21- T. I HPSI-T.I SMALL MEDIUM CATS MEDIUM 2CCA-22-12*, 009,21-010//22- LEAK 2CCA-23-12*, 005,22406,2't-007, 2CCA-23-8*, 22-008,22-009//24-2CCA-24-12*, 006,24-007,244 08, 2CCA-24-8* 24-009//24-028// 23-007,23 4 08,23-009,23-010 //23-020 e - G G
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i Calculation No. A.NNG CALC 010, Mov. 00 Pope D1 of D5 O APPENulXD QUAllTY ASSURANCE VEMIFICA TION FORMS O O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
C:Icularl:n No. A.PCNG CALC 010. R:v. 00 Pcge 02 of DS 1 l Verification Plan h
Title:
Implementation of tlic EPRI Risk Informed Inservice luspection Evaluation Procedure fonhe I; PSI system at ANO.2 j Document Numks: C.PENG-CAI,C 010 Revision Number: 00 httyslipg pedhdil[ method (s) of verification so be employed. ie., Design Review Alternate Analy QdvN& T6ing a combination of these or an titrinative. The Design Analysis Verincation Checklist is to be used l07 s?J 1h Ag:t AnrJyses Other elements to consider in formulating the plan are: methods for checking calculations; sentr.arison of results with similar analyses, etc DACIipjlen of Verification Method: Ar; independent review will be conducted as appropriate with the ;ork activities described in Project Plan PP 2000839, Revisicn 00. The verification willinclude:
- 1. Verification of a Design Analysis by Deslon Review (per OP 3.4 of the Quality Procedures Manual).
- 2. Verification that the appropriate methodology is selected and correctly implemented
- 3. Verify all design input (as applicable) is appropriately and correctly obtained from traceable sources.
- 4. Review that the assumptions, results, conclusions, report format, ... etc. are made in accordance with Desl0n Analysis Verification checklist.
Ven0cutio)wmv
- f. 6 i-o . ...
/(b, Plan prepared by: /
/k/ Approved by:
47.W6,,~. N
,....a ,_ . p -... . 3 m,. ,- ,.sw ..-.-
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
C:Icutti:n No. A.PENG CALC 010. R:v, 00 Page 03 of D5 i i O Other Design Document Checklist V (Pare 1 of 3) Instrvetione The Independent Reviewer is to complete this checklist for each Other Design Document. This Checklist is to be made part of the Quality Record package, although it need not be made a part of or distributed with the document itself. The second section of this checklist lists potential topics uhich could be relevant for a pmicular 'Other Design Document". If they are applicable, then the relevant section of the Design Analysis Verification ChecMist shall be completed and attached to this checklist (Sections of the Design Analysis Verification Checklist uhlch are not used may be left blank )
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk infonned Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure for the IIPSI system at ANO 2 Document Number: Revision Number: A PENG-CALC-010 00
- i Section 1: To be completed for all Other I)esign Documents Yes N/A Overall Assessment 1 Are the results/ conclusions correct and appropriate for their intended use? @
2 Are millimitations on the results/ conclusions documented? @ Documentation Requirements l. _ Is the documentation legible, reproducible and in a form suitable for filing and retrieving as a Quality Record?
- 11. Is the document identified by title, document number and date @
111. Arc all pages identified with the document number including revision number? @ IV. Do all pages have a unique page number? @ V. Does the content clearly identify, as applicable: A. objective
@ O B. design inputs (in accordance w4th QP 3.2) @ O C, conclusions @ O VI. Is the venfication status of the document mdicued? @
Vll. G If an Independeat Reviewer is the supersisor or Project Manager, has the appropriate approval been O documented? Assumptions I. Arc all assumption identified, justified and documented? @ O
!!. Arc all assumptions that must be cleared listed? O @
A. Is a process in place which assures that those which are CENO responsibility will be cleared? O @ G B. Is a process in place w hich assures that those w hich are the customer's responsibility to clear will be indicated on transmittals to the customer? O @ ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
C:Icul: tion No. A.PENG CALC 010, Rev,00 Page D4 of DS Otlier Design Document Cliecklist (Pare 2 of 3) Assessment of Significant Design Changes Yes N/A 1. Have significant design retired changes that might impact this document been considered? 11. If any such changes have been identified, have they been adequately addressed? ! O @ Selection of Design loputs
- 1. Are the design inputs documemed?
II. Are the design inputs correctly selected and traceable to their source? 111. Are refcrences as direct as possible to the original source or documents containing collectiorvtabulations ofinputs? @ IV. Is the reference notation appropriately specific to the information utilized? V. Are the bases for selection of all design inputs documented? VI. Is the verification status of design inputs transmitted from customers appropnat and documented? S O Vll. Is the serification status of design inputs transmitted from ABB CENS appropriate and documented?
@ O Vill.
Is the use of customer controlled sources such as Tech Specs, UFSARs, etc. authorized, and does the authorization specify amendment level, revision number, etc.1 @ O References
- 1. Are all referer:es listed?
11. Do the reference citations include sufficient information to assure retrievability and unambiguous @ location of the referenced material? Section 2: Other Potentially Applicable Topic Areas . use appropriate sections of the Design Analysis Venfication Checklist (QP 3.4, Exhibit 3.4 $) and attach. Yes N/A
- 1. Use of Computer Software O @
- 2. Applicable Codes and Standards O @
- 3. Literature Searches and Background Data O @
- 4. Methods O @
$. Hand Calculations O @
- 6. List of Computer Software 7.
O @ List of Microfiche O @
- 8. List of optical disks (CD-ROM)
O @
- 9. List of computer disks O @ h BB Combu ons
- n~r e J~r,stion Engineering w ~Nu . .lear O ep ~ < 4
C:Icu.': tion No. A PENG CALC.010. M:v. 00 Page D5 of DS Other Design Document Checklist (Page 3 of 3) IndependentReviewer'sCom.ments Comenest Reviewer's Commn.t Response Author's Response Response Number Required 7 Accepted? 1 See recommendedchange to Yes Recommendedchanges Yes Table of Contents, Tables, have beenincorporated Appendices 2 Sec changes to page 7 Yes Changeshave been Yes incorporated 3 Typo,page 12 Yes Typo has been corrected Yes 4 Words missing,page 20 Yes The missing word has Yes been add-d 5 Typo,page 34 Yes Typo has been corrected Yes 6 Format,page 36/37 Yes Table 4 has been Yes teformattedto fit on one page 7 Table 6 r.ceds more Yes Table 6 has been Yes explanation (see comment) replaced p 8 Table 8. Is it OK to sefer to Yes Table 8 has been Yes V " moment" vs " stress" replaced 9 Figures 9 & 10 Arrow Yes Figures 9 & 10 have Yes direction been correctedto show proper flowdirection 10 Appendix A, page 1 - how Yes The pipingsegmentis Yes do we know that pipeis routinelypressurizedto stressed by SITinventory accident pressureor addition abovein the course of SITinventory adjustment
- 11 A- 1, 2, 4,1 1,12, 22, 32, 33, Yes Editorialcomments have Yes 35,37,39,55, editorial been incorporateo
- comments 4
Checklistcompleted by: IndependentReviewer [g, M yf7g Prmied Name [ MggdwE S/g/97 Date ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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