ML20217E950
| ML20217E950 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1997 |
| From: | Bauer A, Jaquith R, Weston R ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217E904 | List:
|
| References | |
| A-PENG-CALC-015, A-PENG-CALC-015-R00, A-PENG-CALC-15, A-PENG-CALC-15-R, NUDOCS 9710070321 | |
| Download: ML20217E950 (143) | |
Text
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l Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2
! Pilot Plant Study i
Risk-Informed Inservice Inspec1: ion
! Evaluation for 1:he
! Containment Spray System 4
i 9
l September 1997 i
=En 8?A 188!A 8?88886e G PDR
l $ A PENG-CALC-015 Revision 00 gg Design Analysis Title Page Page1of51 f3 x_)
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure for the Containment Spray System at ANO-2 Document Number: A-PENG-CALC-015 Revision 00 Number:
Quality Class:
O QC 1(Safety-Related) O QC-2 (Not Safety-Related) @ QC 3 (Not Safety Related)
- 1. Approvalof Completed Analysis This Design Analysis is complete and verified. Management authorizes the use ofits results.
Printed Name j Signature Date Cognizant Engineer (s) R. A. Weston [ (gylqr)
A. V. Bauer
[ '
[ gq l Mentor D None /, , f Independent Reviewer (s) R. E. Jaquith [ /[j [ g/jkpj qC , V Management Approval B. T. Lubin ,
4'% %
)
Project Manager
- 2. Package Contents (this section may be completed after Management approval):
Total page count, including body, appendices, attachments, etc. 140 List associated CD-ROM disk Volume Numbers and path names: g None Note: CD-ROM are stored as separate Quality Records CD-ROM Volume Path Names (to lowest directory which uniquely apphes to this document)
Numbers Total number of sheets of microfiche: g None Number of sheets:
Other attachments (specify):
- 3. Distribution:
7 B. Boya (2 copies) i
\._
i:\ data \lubin\rbifinal\apeng015. doc
kkI g gy g AoPENG CALC-015 Revision 00 Page 2 of 51 i
RECORD OF REVISIONS Rev Date Pages Changed Prepared By Approved By 00 Original R. A. Weston R. E. Jaquith B)l5l%9 A. V. Bauer i
O i:\ data \lubin\rbifinal\apeng015. doc
A kR M INIP r
6 Calculation No. A PENG CALC-015, Rev. 00
'w Page 3 of 51 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE
- 1. 0 PURPOSE..............................................................................................................5
- 2. 0 SCOPE..................................................................................................................5
- 3. 0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICA TION AND BOUNDARY DEFINITION ................................... ........ 6 3.1 S YS TEM DESCRIP TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3,2 S YS TEM B O UNDA R Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.0 CONSEO UENCE EVA L UA TlON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1 4.1 CONSEQ UENCE A SSUMP TIONS/INPU T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2 CONSEQUENCE SEGMENT LINE BREAK DETECTION CAPABILITIES..................... 15 4.3 CONSEQ UENCE IDENTIFICA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.4 SHUTDOWN OPERA TION AND EXTERNAL EVENTS........................................... 20
- 5. 0 DEGRA DA TION MECHANISMS EVAL UA TION . ....... . . .. ......... ......... ... .. ......... ...... ..... . . . 30 5.1 OA MA GE GRO UPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 5.2 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND IDENTIFICA TION ........................... 31 5.3 BASICDATA.................................................................................................37
- 6. 0 SER VICE HIS TOR Y A ND SUSCEP TIBILITY REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
- 7. 0 RISK EVA L UA TlON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 8.0 EL EMEN T SEL EC TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7
9.0 REFERENCES
........................................................................................................49 O
f
\ LIST OF TABLES NUMBER PAGE 1 CSS B O UNDA RIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 CSS CONSEQ UENCE A SSESSMENT SUMMA R Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3A CSS CONSEQUENCLS, FIGURES AND ISOMETRIC DRA WINGS................................... 26 3B CONTAINMENT SPRA Y SYSTEM (CSS) PIPING BY CONSEQUENCE & LOCA TION.......... 27 4 DA MA G E GR O UPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND SUSCEPTIBLE REGIONS......................... 32 6 SERVICE HISTORY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY REVIEW - CONTAINMENT SPRA Y SYSTEM ... 40 7 RISK SEGMEN T IDENTIFICA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 42 8 RISK INSPEC TlON SC0PE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 9 ELEMENT SELECTION - RISK CA TEGOR Y 4 ....... . .............. ..... ..... ... ....................... ... 48 O
V ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It R F1IFIF Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 Page 4 of 51 LIST OF FIGURES NUMBER PAGE 1 CONTAINMENT SPRA Y SYSTEM SIMPLiflED SCHEMA TIC ....................................... 10 2 SCHEMA TIC OF CS PUMP SUCTION FLOW PA THS................................................... 28 3 SCHEMA TIC OF CS PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW PA THS ............................................... 29 LIST OF APPENDICES A FMECA - CONSEQUENCE INFORMA TION REPORT B FMECA - DEGRADA TION MECHANISMS C FMECA - SEGMENY RISK RANKING REPORT D QUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICA TION FORMS O
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ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A ItIt MIfIF f^\ Calculation No. A PENG CALC-015, Rev. 00 O ' Page 5 of 51
- 1. 0 PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation is to document the implementation of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure (RISI) of Reference 9.1 for the Containment Spray System (CSS) at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO 2), Entergy Operations, Inc. The RISI evaluation l'rocess provides an alternative to the requirements in ASME Section XI for selecting inspection locations. The purpose of RISI is to identify risk significant pipe segments, define the locations that are to be inspected within these segments, and identify appropriate inspection methods.
This evaluation is performed using the guidelines of the EPRI Risk-Informed inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure of Reference 9.1 and in accordance with tls requirements of the ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations Quality Procedures Manual (OPM-101).
2.0 SCOPE This evaluation applies to the CSS at ANO-2, and utilizes the ISIS Software (Reference 9.2),
which has been specifically developed to support and document the implementation of the EPRI RISIprocedure.
As part or the RISI procedure, the system boundaries and functions are identified. A risk evaluation is performed by dividing the system into piping segments which are determined G to have the same failure consequences and degradation mechanisms. The failure consequences and degradation mechanisms are evaluated by assigning each segment to the appropriate risk category and identifying the risk significant segments. Finally, the inspection locations are selected. The guidelines used in deterrnining the degradation mechanisms, the failure consequences and the risk-significant segments are those described in Reference 9.1.
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ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A Ik Ik 7"EIFIF Calculation No. A-PENG CALC-015, Rev, 00
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Page 6 of 51 3.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICA TION AND BOUNDARY DEFINITION
3.1 System Description
The Containment Spray System (CSb) is designed to spray borated water into the containment in the event of a LOCA in order to suppress any resultant increase in containment pressure and temperature. The system is also designed to introduce sodium hydroxide solution with the spray to rapidly reduce fission product iodine concentration in the containment atmosphere. This solution win retain the fission products in the containment sump water and thereby considerably reduce the potential of fission product leakage to the environs.
The CSS consists of two separate loops of equal capacity and is independently capable of meeting containment heat removal system (CHRS) requirements. Each loop consists of a containment spray pump, NaOH additive pump, shutdown cooling heat exchanger, spray header, isolation valves, and the necessary piping, instrumentation and controls. Tho loops are supplied with sodium hydroxide additive from a common sodium hydroxide tank via the respective NaOH additive pumps, and are initiaHy supplied with barated water from the common Refueling Water Tank (RWT).
During normal operation CSS piping is maintained fun of water and the pumps are aligned to the RWT. When low levelis reached in the RWT, during the injection mode of operation (emergency operation), the Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) automaticcHy transfers the (Q containment spray pump suction to the containment bump by opening the recirculation line G valves and closing the RWT outlet and pump minimum flow recirculation valves.
3.2 System Boundary The CSS is defined consistent with the FSAR (Reference 9.3). The scope of this analysis includes au Class 2 piping in this system which is currently examined in the ANO-2, ASME Section XIInservice inspection (ISI) Program (Reference 9.6). In addition, aH Class 2 piping which is in the CSS flow path is also included in this evaluation. The code and non-code lines which are part of or interface with the CSS were evaluated to determine their risk significance. The system boundaries are defined in Table 1 and Figure 1. Certain line segments contain welds that were not entered in the database (Reference 9.2) as outlined below:
3.2.1 Containment spray headers from downstream of check valve 2BS-5A in train "A" and check valve 2BS SB in train "B" (2HCB-3-10", 2HCB410", 2HCB-3-6", 2HCB-4-6", 2HCB-3-4', 2HCB-4-4*, 2HCB-3-3", 2HCB43*, 2HCB-3-2%" and 2HCB-4 2%")
These line segments are rosed for spraying the containment atmosphere with cooled water in cider to remove heat from the containment and maintain the containment pressure within acceptable limits. The water used for containment spraying is obtained from the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) during the injection phase or from the containment sump after being cooled by the shutdown cooling heat exchangers during recirculation. Because of the locations of the above pipe segments, the
()
,x majority of the welds are inaccessible. A hmiting failure in the above line segments would eliminate one of the two trains of containment spray. However, the ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A Ik k A%IFIF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00
' Page 7 of S1 Containment Cooling System (i.e., consisting of two redundant trains) which also provides containment heat removal would not be affected. It should be noted that the segment failure occurs inside the containment and flow diversion that may challenge the NPSH requirements for the ECCS pumps is not a concern. Because there are three remaining trains available for removing heat from the containment atmosphere, the safety significance of a failed segment would be negligible. A LOW consequence category would therefore be assigned. The assessment of the degradation mechanisms for these segments indicates that no leaks would occur.
Based on the LOW consequence category and the no leak potential, the risk significance of the segment failure would be LOW (i.e., CAT 7). Since no element selections are needed for low risk-significant segments, the welds for these lines were not included in the dstebase.
3 3.2.2 Unes in the lodine Removal System from upstream of check valves 2BS-12A and 2BS 128 (2HCB-69 2", 2HCB 70 2', 2HCB-38 4' 2HCB-39-4", 2HCB-37-8', 2HCB-42 3')
These line segments are used for adding Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) to the containment spray in order to remove elemental iodine from the containment atmosphere following a LOCA event. Failure of a line segment during normalpower operation willnot cause an initiating event. Given that core damage has occurred, the majority of iodine released into the containment atmosphere is in particulate form instead of elemental form. Consequently provided the containment remains intact, the lodine Removal System is not risk significant. As discussed above, there are three backup trains available for containment heat removal to ensure that containment integrity is maintained. As a result, a LOW consequence category would therefore be assigned due to a failure in any of the abcve piping segments.
The assessment of the degradation mechanisms for these segments indicates that no leaks would occur. Based on this assigned consequence category and the no leak potential, the risk significance of the segment failure would be LOW (i.e., CAT 7). Sint e no element selections are needed for low risk-significant segmere the welds for these lines were not included in the database.
3.2.3 Lines Downstream of Pump Mini-flow Isolation Valves 2CV 56721 and 2CV.5673-1 (2DCB-112", 2DCB-13 2")
These lines recirculate containment spray pump miniflow to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT). A failure in a line segment downstream of the associated mini-flow isolation valve would be detected, and there is a nigh probability that the failed segment would be isolated by closing the appropriate mini-flow valve from the control room. This segment of piping is not needed to support containment spray function. During a demand for containment spray (i.e., injection mode), the segment failure willnot impact the delivery of containment spray flow. During this mode of operation, the failure can be detected by the ECCS pump room levelinstruments or during local verification of ECCS pump room isolation. It should also be noted that the mini-flow isolation valves are automatically closed by a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS). Because the line segments downstream of the mini-flow isolation valves are not needed to support containment spray function, a LOW consequence category would be assigned as a result of a segment failure. No degradation mechanisms were identified for the welds in the above line segments. Based on this assigned consequence category and no leak potential, the risk significance of the
)
i ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations l
Nk M IF F
(} Calculation No. A PENG CALC-015, Rev. 00 L Page 8 of 51 segment failure would be I.OW (i.e., CAT 7). Since no element selections are needed forlow risk-significant sygments, the welds for these lines were not entered in the database.
3.2.4 Unes with Nominal Diameter of 1' or f.ess Piping with a nominal diameter of 1* or less was not explicitly evaluated to determine its risk significance. Since volumetric examination of this piping is not practicable, the most effective means to ensure its integrity is via conduction of a system leakage test. Consequently, since this piping is already subject to system leakage testing by the ASME Code, a risk assessment of this piping is not warranted.
TABLE 1 CSS BOUNDARIES Line Line Description ISi Pipe NominalPipe Number Drawing Class Diameter (in)
Number 2DCB-112" Ahnimumflow linefrom 2GCB-35 to 2DCB-2 2DCB-l1 1 2 2 2DCB-13-2" CS Pump 2P-35B minimumflow kne 2DCB-13-1 2 2 _
2GCB-10-10* From CS Pump 2P-35A to SDC HX 2E-354 2GCB-101 2 10 _
2GCE>-1012" From CSPump 2P-354 toSDCHX 2E 354 2GCB-10-1 2 12 2GCB-10-3" Interface 3"line wnth CS Pump discharge 2P-354 2GCB-10-1 2 3 2GCB-10-6" From CS Pump 2P-35A 2GCB-10-1 2 6 (m
2GCB-11 I0" 2GCB-11 12" From CS Pump 2P-353 !? SDC HX 2E-35B From CS Pump 2P-35B to SDCILY 2E-35B 2GCB-11 1 2 10 2GCB-11 1 2 12 2GCB-11-6" From CS Pump 2P 35B Discharge 2GCB-11 1 2 6 2GCB-16-10* Dischargefrom SDC HX 2E 354 (10" portion) 2GCB-16-1 2 10 2GCB-16-12" Dischargefrom SDC HX 2E 354 (12" portion) 2GCB-161 2 12 2GCB-16-3" From CS duscharge line to valve 2BS-19A 2GCB-16-1 2 3 2GCB-16-4" H eldolet 4"line interfacing wita SDC HX 2E-354 2GCB-16-1 2 4 discharge line 2GCB-17-10" Discharge headerfrom SDC ILY 2E-35B. 2GCB-171 2 10 2GCB 17-12" Discharge headerfrom SDC ILY 2Ed$B 2GCB-17-1 2 12 2GCB-l7 3" From CS ducharye hne to valve 2BS-l9B 2GCB-17-1 2 3 2GCB-34-2" CS Pump 2P-35B minsmumpow kne to check valve 2GCB-34-1 2 2 2BS-17B 2GCB-35 2" CS Pump 2P-354 msnimumpow kne to check valve 2GCB-311 2 2 2BS-17A 2GCB-35-3" CS Pump 2P-354 minimumpow kne check valve 2GCB-35-1 2 2 2BS-17A 2GCB-69-2" From downstream ofcheck wlve 2BS-12A to the 2GCB-69-1 2 2 containment spmv line 2GCB-70-2" From dowrutream ofcheck valve 2BS-12B to the 2GCB-70-1 2 2 containment symv hne 2HCB-13-14" Suetion linefor LPSIPump 2P-60B 2HCB-13-1 2 14 2HCB-13-2" HPSIPump 2P-89A mini-pow recurculanon return 2HCB-13-1 2 2 line .o pump suction 2HCB-13 20" Suction linefrom RHT to CS Pump 2P-35B suction 2HCB-13-1 2 20 2HCB-13-24" From Cont. Sump to Spmv Pump 2P-35B 2HCB-13-2 2 24 ~
2HCB-!3 R" Suctson linefor HPSI Pump 2P-89B 2HCB-13-1 2 8 L.)
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
I A It R I
- '%IFIN Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 Page 9 of 51 TABLE 1 (cont'd)
CSS BOUNDARIES Line Line Description ISE Pope Nominal Pipe Number Drawing Class Diameter (in)
Number 2HCB 13-14* Suction line .orll'S! Pump 2P-60A (14"partion) 2HCB-131 2 14 2HCB-13 2* HPSIPump 2P-89B mini-flow rreirculation return 2HCB 131 2 2 line to pump suction 2HCB-13-20* Fmm CS Sump to CS Pump 2P-35A 2HCB-13-1 2 20 2HCB-13-24" From Containment Sump to CS Pumps 2HCB-13-1 2 24 2HCB-13 8* Suction imefor HPSIPump 2P-894 2HCB-13-1 2 8 2HCB-20-10* CSfrom l'alve 2CV 36121 to Flued head 2P l7 at 2HCB-201 2 10 containment penetmtion 2HCB-20-2* CS train A interfacing 2"Ime connection to service 2HCB 20-2 2 2 air line 2HCB-20-3" 2F1-5690 return to ime 2HCB-20 (Tmin Al 2HCB-20 2 2 3 2HCB-21 10* CSfrtun MOV 2CV 3613-2 to contatnment 2HCB-21 1 2 10 penetmtion #2P-23 2HCB-212" CS tmm B interfacmg 2"Ime connectson to servuce 2HCB-212 2 2 air line 2HCB-21 3
- 2F1-5693 retum to hne 2HCB-21 (Tmin B) 2HCB-212 2 3 2HCB-24-20* large Pipefrom Refuelmg Water Tank 2T 3 to 2HCB-24 2 2 20 Containment Spmv Pumps 2HCB-24 24" large pspefrom Refuelmg Water Tank 2T-3 to 2HCB-24-l. 2 2 24 Containment Symv Pumps (and other ECCS pumps) 2HCB-26-10" CS Pump 2P-35A suction hne (10"pspung) 2HCB-26-1 2 10 2HCB-26-14" Suction knefor CS Pump 2P-314 2HCB-261 2 I4 2HCB 26-20" Suetion hnefor CS Pump 2P-314 2HCB-26-1 2 20 2HCB 27-10~ CS Pump 2P-33B suction hne (10'pering) 2HCB-27-1 2 10 2HCB-2714* Suetson knefor CS Pump 2P-35B 2HCB-27-l 2 14 2HCB 27-20" Suction hnefor CS Pump 2P-33B 2HCB-271 2 20 2HCB-3-10" CS headerfrom penetmtson G2P-l7 2HCB-3-1 2 10 2HCB-4-10" CS header from Containment Penetmtion 2P-23 2HCB-4-1 2 10 2HCB-7-3
- Chargmg pump suctionfrom RilT 2HCB-71, 2 3 2HCB-7 2 2HCB-93 2" Service air hne to 2HCB-20 (Train Ab 2HCB-931 2 2 2HCB-94-2" Service air hne to 2HCB-21 (Tmin B) 2HCB-941 2 2 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It Ik 7"E IF IF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-016. Rev, 00
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FIGURE 1: ANO 2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM (Reference 9.151 O
%j ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
NNk MIFIF (Q Calculation No. A.PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 (I page y y of 5y
- 4. 0 CONSEQUENCE EVALUA TION The Containment Spray System (CSS) consists of two redundant trains of equipment. The neat removal capacity of each is adequate to keep the containment pressure and temperature below design conditions for any size break in the RCS piping. Adequate quantities of sodium hydroxide are included in the spray to reduce the airborne concentrations of radioactive forms ofiodine, and retain the iodine in the containment sump water. During normal power operation, the CSS is in the standby mode. The CSS is automaticaHy actuated when coincident Safety injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and high containment pressure signal occurs. These coincident signals generate a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) which starts the CS pumps and opens the containment spray header isolation valves. The containment spray pumps initiaHy take suction from tf.s RWT and deliver the flow, in smaH droplets, to the containment atmosphere to assist in the containment heat removal process. Once the RWT inventory is depleted, a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) is generated for automaticaHy transferring the suction of the containment spray pumps and the suction of the other Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps to the containment sump. The switchover automaticaHy opens the containment sump discharge valves and isolates the ECCS pump miniflow recirculation valves. The RAS also closes the RWT discharge valves and opens the service water valves to the shutdown cooling hest exchangers. During the recirculation move of operation, containment sump weter is circulated through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers in order to reject the heat to the service water.
& The consequence evaluation for the CSS was performed based on the guidance provided in the EPRI procedure (Reference 9.1). The evaluation focused on the impact of a pipe segment failure on the capability of CSS to perform its design functions, and on the overaH operation of the plant. Impacts due to direct and indirect effects were considered.
Generauy, the effects of a direct impact are confined to the CSS itself. An indirect impact resulting from the failure of a pipe segment would affect neighboring equipment within the CSS or other system (s). Indirect impacts would generaHy be caused by spraying, flooding, or jet impingement of neighboring equipment. Determination of the consequences of a segment failure considers the potential of losing affected mitigating systems, or trains thereof, and the consequentialimpact on the safety functions.
The CSS consequence evaluation was performed separately and was documented as a quality assured report, listed as Reference 9.8. Plant locations as defined in the Internal Flood Screening Study (Reference 9.15) were used in that evaluation. The plant locations are summarized in Section 4.2.1 of Reference 9.8. The report contained herein is one of a series of reports which documents the implementation of the EPRI Risk Informed ISI methodology at ANO-2. As such, appropriate sections of Reference 9.8 were extracted and are proVided herein in order to maintain the level of detail, the format structure and consistency with the other reports in the series. The remainder of this section (Section 4.0) along with Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in their entirety provide the information obtained from Reference 9.8.
On November 19 and 20,1996, a walkdown was performed at ANO-2 to assess potential spatialinteractions associated with splashing, spraying, and flooding, including propagation paths. The fonowing individuals participatedin the walkdown and meetings at ANO-2:
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ARR D%WW Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 015, Rev. 00 Page 12 of 51 Tim Rush (ANO PRA Group)
Jim Moody (YAEC Consultant)
Pat O'Regan (YAEC)
The plant was in an unexpected outage and radiological controls would not allow access to the south piping penetration rooms (Rooms 2084 and 2055) and elevation 317'-O' (Rooms 2006, 2011, 2014, 2007, and 2010). However, this is not judged to have an impact on the analysis since spatial questions were answered for these areas during the visit. The focus of the walkdown was in those areas where analysis scope piping exists and their propagation paths andimpacts. The following summarizes the walkdown observations:
(a) Elevation 335' 0" (Room 2040) is a very large area containing general access, corridors, and several large non safety related rooms. Several floor drains were noted. EFW and containment spray piping is located here, including RWT suction MOVs. The MOVs are located high off the floor in the tank room, protected from floods. Also, the EFW steam admission valve 2CV-0340-2 and 2SV 0205 is located behind a wall and sufficiently off the floor to be protected. Several rooms connect to this room from elevation 354' O' (Room 2073) anc* pe piping penetration rooms (Rooms 2055 and 2084) at elevation 335'0". The most critical component identified in this area is MCC 2852 which powers several train A components.
Although the MCC is not near analysis scope piping, it is at the east stairway entrance (the propagation path to elevation 317'-O'). If six inches of water could be accumulated at elevation 335'-0* or if a very large pipe break occurred, it is considered likely that the MCC could fail.
(b) Elevation 354'-O' (Room 2073) is a large area containing general access, corridors, and other non safety related rooms. Several floor drains were noted. There is no analysis scope piping located here, but the upper south piping penetration area (Room 2084) willpropagate to this room. The most critical component identified in this area is MCC 2B62 which powers several train B components. The MCC is not near analysis scope piping and there is easy propagation through grating at the west end of the floor away from the MCC. It appears unlikely that six inches of water could accumulate at elevation 354'-O'.
The type of inputs used and the assumptions made in performing this evaluation are documented in Reference 9.8. Key input and assumptions, which were extracted from Reference 9.8, are provided in Section 4.1. Thirty consequence segments were identified for the CSS lines entered in the database. Of the thirty, five were assigned as "HIGH',
twenty as ' MEDIUM'and five as " LOW". The consequence assessment summary for these segments is provided in Section 4.2. The bases and justifications for each category assignment are provided in Appendix A. This appendix contains reports obtained from the ISIS software (Reference 9.2) for the CSS. For the CSS lines not enteredin the database, the consequence segments were assigned as " LOW"(see Section 3.2).
4.1 CONSEQUENCE ASSUMPTIONS / INPUT The following assumptions and input were extracted from Reference 9.8. The type of initiating events and mitigating capabilities consideredin this evaluation are described in detailin Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of Reference 9.8.
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() Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 U Page 13 of 51 4.1.1 Pipe failure can occur at anytime; three configurations have been defined as shown in Table 4-1 of Reference 9.8. These are normal (operating or standby), test, and accident demand. This table also summarizes judgments and assumptions regarding which configurations are most important, if pipe failure does not cause a cirect initiating event, it is assumed that pipe failure occurs during the accident demand configuration, if applicable. This assumes pipe failure occurs during the most conservative exposure time and accounts for the higher stress placed on the operators with resultant delay in operator response.
4.1.2 Pipe failures in moderate energy lines (<200'F and <275 psig) are assumed to be large. This analysis goes beyond the design basis by evolvating the consequences of unisolated large breaks (i.e., flooding) eveou though they'are considered less likely in moderate energy lines. SmaHer breaks would allow more time for the flooding -
impacts to occur. Most studies would consider such events almost incredible.
4.1.3 The valve arrangement in Room 2084 and the failure of fire doors into Room 2073 are assumed to preclude flooding of the ECCS valves in Room 2084. Some of the HPSI valves appear to be close to the floor (i.e.,1 to 2 feet above elevation 360'-
O'), but their motor operators are a few feet higher. Spray from EFWlines abcve could impact some valves, but there are a number of HPSI supply valves and the containment spray valves are separated such that there should always be a discharge path for these systems. Also, flooding to a level of 3 to 5 feet in a room is assumed to fail the door and drain the room even though the door opens into the
() toom.
U 4.1.4 MCCs at elevation 354'-0" (Room 2073) and elevation 335'-0* (Room 2040) are assumed to fail if water accumulates to a height of 6 inches at the MCCs. At elevation 354'-0", there is a large grated opening to elevation 335'-0* on the west end of the building. Thus, it is assumed that breaks in this analysis scope can not accumulate 6 inches at this location. It takes a significant amount of time to flood to a level of 6 inches at elevation 335'-0" but it is assumed that failure to isolate results in MCC failure.
4.1.5 The IPE internal flooding study identifies impacts in rooms from cable terminal points. Since most junction boxes, terminal boxes, etc. noted during the walkdown were at least a few feet off the floor, these impacts were ignored in the analysis.
Also, junction boxes appeared to be tight and sealed, therefore, even if water reached them, an electrical fault appeared unlikely.
4.1. 6 Draining the RWTinto the east or west ECCS Room (2007 or 2014) win flood the room where the flood initiated and propagate to the general access area (2006/2011) through ventilation penetrations, but will not flood the other ECCS room. If the flood is initiated in the access area (2006/2011), flood levels could reach the ECCS room ventilation penetrations; it is assumed aH ECCS could be flooded and all equipment failed. Even if a more detailed evaluation of room areas showed this to be untrue, loss of RWT would still fail recirculation function.
Therefore, this conservatism was not evaluated further.
4.1.7 No credit is aHowed for isolation of ECCS Room ventilation penetrations. Isolation (m)
' could prevent flood propagation into or out of the ECCS rooms. These ventilation openings auto close on a safety injection signal and annunciator response ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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Page 14 of 51 procedures for room flooding direct operators to close these penetrations. Since an ECCS room or the generalaccess area can hold approximateN 50% of the RWT, the importance of this assumption is notjudged to be important (see next assumption).
4.1. 8 Draining approximately 50% of the RWT outside the containment is assumed to fail the containment sump recirculation function (i.e., insufficient NPSH).
4.1. 9 Suction piping from the RWTis assumed to fait during on accident demand. This is conservative because the demand stress may not be significantly different than the standby condition.
4.1.10 Unisolated flow diversion due to CSS pipe failure is assumed to lead to insufficient containment sump level and failure of containment .tump recirculation.
4.1.11 MCCs 2B52 impacts are assumed to occur whether isolation occurs or not for RWT suction (20 inch pipe); this is conservative.
4.1.12 Except for the containment sump piping upstream of 2CV-5647 and 5648, piping is assumed to fait during the RWTinjection phase (i.e., if the pipe did not fait during injection it is assumed unlikely to fait during recirculation). Also, transfer to recirculation after the RWT is emptied and subsequent failure to isolate the containment sump on the train with the pipe failure is considered unlikely and neglected. The EOPs require local verification of ECCS room drain valves and water tight doors closure upon receipt of RAS pre-trip (alarm at 40% RWTlevel).
4.1.13 CSS welds inside the containment sump and the piping sleeve are conservatively combined with the consequence of piping outside containment in the same line.
4.1.14 The IPEEE (external hazards analysis) essessment neglects (1) the potentialimpacts of relay chatter from relays with unknown capacity (possible optimism, although this is scheduled to be resolved), (2) en improvement if the seismic capacity of EDG tanks is increased, and (3) a detailed review of fire scenarios (not provided in the IPEEE). These are not judged to significantly impact the analysis results.
4.1.15 Each containment spray pump is designed to provide 2200 gpm at a discharge head of approximately 525 feet. Break flow for the discharge side of the CSS pumps
- ahead of flow restricting orifices (2FO-5625/5626) at pump runout flow is 3,200 gpm. Break flow from the RWT through a 20 inch diameter suction pipe is greater than 15,000 gpm assuming a double ended break.
i 4.1. t6 There is containment spray discharge pressure and flow indication in the control room for each train.
l 4.1.17 Containment spray is initiated by a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS -
containment High-High pressure of 23.3 psia). Containment spray suction transfers to the containment sump on a recirculation action signal (RAS low RWTlevel, 6%
level).
4.1.18 According to Table 3.2 of Reference 9.1, the unreliability of unaffected backup trains is as follows:
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!^\ Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 0 ,Page 15 of 51 zero backup train ~ 1.0 one backup train ~ 1.0E 2 two backup trains ~ 1.CE 4 three or more backup trains ~ 1.0E-06 The probability of not performing corrective actions based on adequate information in the control room is typicaHy 1.0E 2 (Reference 9.18). Therefore, failure of the operators to isolate a segment is treated as equivalent to one backup train.
The consequence segment line break detection capabilities are summarized in Section 4.2.
4.2 CONSEQUENCE SEGMENT UNE BREAK DETECTION CAPABILITIES This section summarizes the unexpected alarms and indications available to the operator in the control room for detecting the failure of a CSS segment. Segments t^st exhibit similar detection capabilities are grouped and shown below. Additional information for each segment is providedin Appendix A.
CSS Consecuence Seament CSS-C-01 For a CSS line break downstream of the RWT outlet, located outside the auxiliary building, and upstream of the pipe penetration to the auxiliary building, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered.
SpecificaHy; (V~\
CSS trains low flow alarms (2FT-5610/5616) would be annunciated.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Consecuence Seament CSS-C-02 For a CSS line break downstream of the pipe penetration to the auxiliary building and upstream of isolation valves 2CV-5630-1 and 2CV-5631-2, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the foHowing unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered.
SpecificaHy; CSS trains low flow alarms (2FT-5610/5616) would be annunciated.
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
Inappropriately low or zero injection flows indicated from CSS, LPSI and HPSIpurr:ps.
Inappropriately low discharge pressures indicated from CSS, LPSI and HPSIpumps.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
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. CSS Consecuence Senments CSS C 03A / OLD For a CSS line break downstream of the pipe penetration to the auxiliary building and upstream of iso /Mion valves 2CV 56301 and 2CV 5631.?, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the foHowing unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered.
SpecificaHyl
- CSS trains low flow storms (2FT 5610r5616) would be annunciated.
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be anne n.;ated.
Inappropriately low or zero injection flows indicated from CSS, LPSI and HPSIpumps.
Inappropriately lo w discharge pressures indicated from CSS, LPSI and HPSIpumps, it is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the faHed segment.
CSS Consecuence Senments CSS C 04A / 048 for a CSS segment break downstream of the ECCS room pipe penetration to the respective spray pump and downstream of containment sump isolation valves isolation valves 2CV.
56491 and 2CV 5650 2, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the foHowing unexpecte.1 alarms andindications wouldbe encot,ntered. SpecificaHyl
- ECCS pump room high level alarm would be annunciated.
CSS trains low flow alarms (2FT 5610/5616) would be annunciated.
Inappropriately lo w discharge pressures indicated from CSS, LPSI and HPSIpumps.
Flooding and subsequent breaker opening of HPSI, LPSI and /or CSS pumps would be annunciatedin the controlroom.
It is tf.erefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
QSS Consecuence Senment CSS-C-05 For a CSS line break in the general area of elevation 317' O'in the 'B' tral,o suction header, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the foHowing unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. SpecificaHy;
- B' CSS train low flow olarm (2FT 5616) would be annunciated.
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
Inappropriately low or erratic discharge pressures indicated from "B" Train CSS. LPSI and HPSIpumps.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
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\v' Calculation No. A PENG. CALC 015 Rev. 00 Page 17 of St CSS Connguence Senments C1S C 06A / 068 For a CSS line break downstream of the containment pipe penetration to the respective spray pump and downstream of containment sump isolation valves 2CV 56491 and 2CV.
1 5650-2, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms and l indications would be encounterea. Specifically;
- ECCS pump room high level alarm would be annunciated.
- CSS trains low flow storms (2FT 5610/5616) would be annunciated.
- Flooding and subsequent breaker opening of HPSI, LPSI and/or CSS pumps would be annunciatedin the controlroom.
It is therefore cons!dered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Consecuence Senments CSS C-07A / 078 For a CSS line break downstream of the respective spray pump and upstream of the shutdown cooling hest exchangers, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. Specifically; i
- ECCS pump room high level alarm would be annunciated.
CSS trains low flow alarms (2FT 561W5616) would be annunciated.
- Flooding and subsequent breaker opening of HPSI, LPSI and/or CSS pumps 'vould be annunciatedin the controlroom.
It is therefore considered rossonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Conseguence Senments CSS C-08A / 088 s
For a CSS line break in the respective spray pump recirculation line up to the recircu!stion line isniation valve, 2CV 56721/2CV 56731, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms andindications would be encountered. Specifically;
- ECCS pump room high level alarm would be annunciated.
CSS trains low flow alarm (2FT 561W5616) would be potentially be annunciated.,
e inappropriately low injection flow indicated from CSS pump.
- Inappropriately low discharge pressures indicated from CSS pump.
c
- Flooding and subsequent breaker opening of HPSI, LPSI and/or CSS pumps would be annunciatedin the controlroom, it is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
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ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00 Page 18 o!51 CSS ConsequRELS19!!Lentt_GSS.C 0@A / 028 For a CSS line break in the respective spray pump discharge line down stream of the shutdown cooling heat exchangers to the discharge line penetration leaving the ECCS pump rooms, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected nianns and indications wnvid be encountered. Specifically;
- ECCS pump room high level alarm would be annunciated.
- Dependent on break location, CSS trains low flow slerm (2FT531W5616) would be annunciated.
- Dependent on break location, inappropriately low or zero injection flow indicated from CSS train.
- Inappropriately low discharge pressure indicated from CSS pump.
- Flooding and subsequent breaker opening of HPSI, LPSI and/or CSS pumps would be annunciated in the controlroom.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Consecuence}eoments CSS C 10A /10E For a CSS line break upstream of 2SI-5A / 2SI 5C in the respective spray pump return line to the LPSI header and outside the ECCS pump rooms, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms andindications would be encountered. Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste otain tank high level would be annunciated.
Insppropriately low discharge pressure indicated from CSS pump.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Consnuence S 1 gments CSS C 11A /118 For a CSS line break in a spray pump discharge line in Room 2055, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered.
Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
- Inappropriately low discharge pressures indicated from CSS pump.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Consquence Senments CSS C 12A /128 For a CSS line break in a spray pump discharge line in Room 2084 and upstream of the containment building isolation valve, 2CV 56121/2CV-5613 2, in conjunction with a LOCA ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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ABB Calculation Vo. A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00 0 Page 19 of 51 demsnd, the following unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered.
Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Weste drain tank high level would be an"unciated.
- Dependent on break location, inappropriately low or zero injection flows indicated from CSS train.
- Inappropriately low discharge pressures indicated from CSS pump.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Consecueng.e Seaments CSS C 13A /138 For a CSS line break in a spray pump discharge line in Room 2084 and oownstream of the containment building isolation valve, 2CV 56121/2CV 5613 2, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered.
Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Weste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
- Inappropriately low discharge pressures indicated from CSS pump.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and (G mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
GSS Consecuence Seaments CSS C 14A /148 For a CSS line break in a spray pump discharge line between the containment penetration and check valve 2BS 5A/2BS 58, in conjunction with a I.OCA demand, the following unexpected indications would be encountered. Specifically;
- Inappropriately low discharge pressures indicated from CSS pump indicated.
Based on the limited indications available to ths operators, it is considered reasonable to conclude that detection is unlikely for a break in this segment.
GSS Consecuence Seaments CSS C 15A /158 For a CSS line break in the sodium hydroxide injection line downstream of 2BS 12A/128 and up to the point of connection to the respective spray pump discharge header, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms and indications would be encountered. Specifically;
- ECCS pump room high level alarm would be annunciated.
Because of the small diameter (2' nominalt of the subject piping, detection and mitigation would occur before significant flooding would cause other indications to become available to
(~'y provide detection. It is therefore, based on response to the single identified alarm, L)
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Page 20 of 51 considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detectud and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
QSS Conseove_rstLEeyment CSS C 16 for a CSS line break in It'e 3'line to spent fuel cooling and CVCS, in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following ynexpected alarms and indications would be encountered.
Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Weste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude thrt this line break wovId be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed segment.
CSS Consecuence Sooment CSS-C 17A /178 for a CSS segment break in the 2'line connection to service air , in conjunction with a LOCA demand, the following unexpected alarms and indications wouH be encountered.
Specifically;
- Auxiliary building sump high level would be annunciated.
- Waste drain tank high level would be annunciated.
It is therefore considered reasonable to conclude that this line break would be detected and mitigated by isolation of the failed line segment.
4.3 CONSEQUENCEIDENTIFICA TION The consequence summary assessment is provided in tabular form in this section. Simplified schematics are provided in Figures 2 and 3 to illustrate the boundaries for each of the CSS consequences. Dotted lines are used to identify the boundaries for eaci; consequence.
Major CSS equipment are shown on these figures 'or ease of identification. Table 2 summarizes the consequence evaluation of the CSS. (Refer to Section 5.2 of Reference
- 9. 8.)
The bases and justifications for each of the assigned consequences are documented in Appendix A. The ISI (Reference 9.21 software was usui as a tool to prepare the documentation in this appendix. The documentation of the spatial sffects are currently based on a review of the IntemalFlood Screening Study (Reference 9.14) and the walkdown that was conducted for the CSS. The walkdown captured subtle interactions which could not be readily identified using only the Intemal Flood Screening Study. Observations from the walkdown are factored into the consequence evaluation. Table 3A presents the CSS consequences, their corresponding figure numbers and Isometric Drawings. In addition, Table 3B identifies the pipe line numbers and their corresponding locations.
4.4 SHUTDOWN OPERA TION AND EXTERNAL EVENTS Shutdown Operation The consequence evaluation is an assessment assuming the plant is at power. Generally, the at power,3lant configuration is considered to present the greatest risk for piping failures ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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0 Page 21 of 51 since the plant requires immediate response to satisfy reactivity control, heat removal, and inventory control. By satisfying these safety functions, the plant wiH be shut down and maintained in a stable state. At power, the plant is critical, and is at higher pressure and temperature in comparison to shutdown operation. The current version of the methodolugy (Reference 9.1) provides no guidance on consequence evaluation during shutdown operation. This limitation is assessed herein to gain some level of confidence that the consequence ranking during shutdown would not be more limiting.
l Pipc segments that are already ranked as *HIGH' consequence from the evaluation at power need not be evaluated for shutdown. Those that are already " MEDIUM" require some confidence that "HIGH" would not occur due to shutdown configurations. However, the
- LOW" consequences for power operation require more confidence that a "HIGH' would not occur and some confidence that a
- MEDIUM' consequence would not occur. Recognizing this, a review and comparison of system consequence results for power operation versus potential consequence during shutdown operation was conducted.
The results of the comparison indicate that during at power operation, CSS segments are ranked as 'HIGH',
- MEDIUM" and
- LOW', depending on the pipe site Jnd resulting impoCt.
During shutdown operation, the frequency of challenging the CSS is reduced significantly.
Typicany, the containment spray function is not modeled in shutdown risk assessments.
The consequence ranking of CSS segments during shutdown operation would be no more risk significant than the ranking identified during at power operation. The at power ranking is therefore assumed to be bounding.
O Q External Events Although external events are not addressed in the current version of the methodology (Reference 9.1), the potential importance of piping failures during extemal event is also considered. The ANO 2 IPEEE was reviewed to determine whether external initiating events, with their porcntial common cause impacts on mitigating systems, could affect consequence ranking. This information, along wit % information from other external event PRAs. is considered to derive insights and confiden:a that consequence ranking is not more significant during an extemal event. The following summarizes the review for each of the major hazards (seismic, fire and others).
Seismic Challenges The potential effects of seismic initiating events on consequence ranking is assessed by considering the frequency of challenging plant mitigating systems and the potentialimpact on the existing consequence ranking. The foHosing summarizes this assessment:
GeneraHy, the CSS piping considered in this evaluation has a seismic fragility capacity much greater than the 0.3g screening value and is not considered likely to fait during a seismic event.
- With regard to the impact on mitigating systems, the most likely scenario is seismic induced loss of offsite power. Based on a typical fragility of 0.1g (Reference 9.19) for loss of offsite power and the seismic hazards developed for the ANO site (References 9.20 and 9.21), the frequency of seismic induced loss of offsite power is less than 1.0E 4 per year.
Considering the scenario where an induced LOCA and non-seismic failure of one U diesel generator occur, there is one train of CSS and on, train of the Containment ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC-015, Rev. 00 l Page 22 of 51 Cooling System (CCS) available. In response to the event, the availab!c CSS train is assumed to fail when demanded with the CCS train providing backup. Assuming probabilities of 0.1 and 1.0E 2 for failure of the diesel generator and the backup train, respectively, and an "all year' exposure time, the Conditional Core Damage Probabihty (CCDP) for this scenario is less than 1.0E 06. Thus, the resulting consequence is " LOW".
For the scenario where an induced LOCA occurs and both diesel generators are available, both CSS trains are initially available. However, in response to the event, one CSS train is assumed to fail with the remaining CSS train and both CCS trains providing backup. Assuming a probability of 1.0E 2 for a backup train and an "all year' exposure time, the CCDP is less than 1.0E 6. Thus, the resulting consequence is " LOW'. Other seismic scenarios that include challenges to CSS would result in lower CCDPs because additional failures (i.e., failure of PSV to reclose or failure of EFW) must occur. However, the consequence ranking would also be ' LOW'.
Based on the above, the consequence ranking for CSSI during a seismic event is enveloped by the at power consequence ranking.
Fire Challenges - The ANO 2 IPEEE indicates that the fire core damage frequency is dominated by fires initiated outside the containment. Similar to a seismic event, fires do not impact reactivity control or cause a LOCA unless it is due to a stuck open primary safety valve. Based on fire core damage frequency of 3.5E-05 per year in the ANO2 IPEEE, a fire induced loss of offsite power frequency is assumed to be less than 1.0E-02 per year.
With regard to the impact on mitigating systems, the most likely scenario fire induced loss of offsite power. Considering the scenario where fire induced loss of offsite power occurs and both emergency diesel generator trains are available, a transient induced LOCA li.e.,
opening and failure of a PSV to reclose) or failure of EFW would challenge the CSS.
Reclosure of the PSVs or EFW operation and the intact CSS and CCS trains (assuming one CSS train fails on demand) would provide threa or more backup trains for mitigation.
Combining the frequency of loss of offsite power with three available backup trains results in o
- LOW" consequence. Considering the some scenario with loss of one emergency diesel generatur would result in two backup trains for mitigation. Hence, the resulting consequence would also be ' LOW'. Since the at-power consequence ranking is already
'HIGH", ' MEDIUM
- or ' LOW", the resulting consequences during a fire would not be of greater risk significance.
Other Extemal Challenges Other hazards were screened in the ANO 2 IPEEE and are assumed to have little or no risk significant impact on CSS.
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aoa F1WW Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-015. Rev. 00 Page 23 of 51 Table 2 CSS Consequence Assessment Summa!y D Descrptoon Spetief Configuration kaitiator Isoterion Systerrr Bachp Contaanment Esposure Table Used Rant locetion knpoets Troirer Time (Ref. > tl CSSC-01 Common RWT Ototskie Domend Assumed No CSS. HrSt. O lkseffected betweers 2-2 MM7H suction outside M LPSI test CSS C 02 Cornmon RWT 2040 Demand Assumed No CSS HPSL 0 (kseffected between 2-2 MfGH suction inskfe M LPS! rest CSSCO3A RWT suction A 2040 Demand Assumed 2CV- ECCS A y eR 1(ECCSB q U% effected between 2-2 MEDtVM ire 2040 M 5630 ECCS isolationi rest CSS-CO3B RWTsuction B 2040 Demand Assumed 2CV- eR ECCS & 0 lkseffected betweerr 22 HIGH in 2040 M 5631 CSS test CSSC04A RWTsuctmer A 2014 Dem=nd Assumed 2CV- ECCS A y eR 1(ECCSB g Unoffectsd between 2-2 MEDevM in 2014 M $630 ECCS isolationi rest CSS-C048 RWTsucten B 2007 Demend Assumed 2CV- ECCSB geq 1 (ECCS A (kseffected between 2-2 MEDIUM irr 2007 M 5631 ECCS or isolationi rest CS& C05 RWT suctiorr B 2006 Demand Assumed 2CV- ECCS B q eq 1 (ECCS A (kseffected between 22 MEDIUM in 2006 M 5631 ECCS cr isolutioni test CSS C-D6A Surrp suction A 2014 Demand Assumed 2CV- ECCS A y e6 1(ECCSB q Bypass MIsoi e3 peer 2-2 HIGH in 2014 M 5647 ECCS isoletioni fek CSS-C068 Surry suction B 2007 Demand Assumed 2CV- ECCS B g eq 1 (ECCS A Byress if Isol eqyear 2-2 HIGH in 2007 M 5648 ECCS or isolationi feRs CSS-C-07A 2P-35A 2014 Demand Assumed trv purrv ECCS A g e6 I(ECCSB g Uheffacted between 2-2 MEDIUM discharge to M & 2CV- ECCS isoletioni test 2E35A 5630 CSSC-078 2P358 2007 Demand Assumed tnp purno ECCSB geq 1 (ECCS A lkseffected between 2-2 MEDIUM discharge to M & 2CV- ECCS y isolation) test 2E358 5631 CSS-C-OSA 2P-35A mini 2314 Demand Assumed trv purry CSS A 1 (CSS B f Uneffected between 2-2 MEDtVM flow M & 2CV- test
$630 CSSC-OBB 2P358 mini flow 2007 Demend Assumed trp pump CSSB 1 (CSS A l (kseffected betweerr 2-2 MEDIUM M & 2CV- test
$631 CSSCOSA Downstream of 2014 Demand Assumed trppung ECCS A y eR 1 (ECCS B g (kseffected betweers 22 MEDIUM 2E35A in 2014 M & 2CV- ECCS isolationi test 5630 CSSC-098 Downstraem of 2007 Demand Assumed & purry ECCSB g og 1 (ECCS A (kseffected between 22 MEDIUM 2E358in 2007 M & 2CV- ECCS g isolationi test 5631 l
l ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations m
9%W W Ca!Culation NO. A-PENG-4;ALC-01S. Rev. 00 Page 24 of S1 Table 2 (Cont'd)
CSS Consequence Assessment Summary K1 Descrption Spatief Configweriorr kutsetor isoletsort System B4 Corrteewnent Exposure Tebte Used Reed locerion krpects Treens Te~ne (Ref. 9 31 CSSC-10A 2P-35A test 2011 Demerni Assumed try purry ECCS A q mE 1(ECCSB q lkseffected betweert 22 MEDA!M returrr k 2011 M & 2CV- ECCS isoletioni test 5630 CSSC-108 2F358 test 2011 Demand Assaned tr& purry ECCSByeE 1 (ECCS A (kseffected between 22 MEDK/M returrr iro 2L'11 M & 2CV- ECCS q isotea^orri test 5631 CSSC-11A Downstream of 2055 M md Assumed tre purne ECCS A y eE 1 (ECCS B g thseffected betweerr 2-2 MEDIUM 2E35A in 2055 M & 2CV- ECCS isoletical test 5630 CSSC-11B Downstream of 2055 Demand Assumed up purry ECCSB qe6 1 (ECCS A lkseffected between 2-2 MEDIUM 2E258its 2055 M & 2CV- ECCS yisoleaioni test 5631 CSSC-12A L& stream of 2084 Domend Assumed try purry ECCSA yet 1(ECCSB y Unoffected between 22 MEDKiM 2CY$312 irr M & 2CV- ECCS seoletioni test 2C84 5630 CSSC-128 Upstroom of 2084 Domend Assumed tre pung ECCSBget 1 IECCS A (kseffected between 22 MEDIUM 2CV5613in M & 2CV- ECCS y isoletioni test 2064 5631 CSSC-13A Dowrsstream of 2084 Domend Assumed tr& pwrp CSS A g eE 1 (CSS B er 2BS-5A etpeer 2-2 MEDKJM 2CY5612 irr M 3 2CV- ECCS iscieriors irnide l 2064 5612 CSSC-138 Dowwtream of 2084 Domend Assumed try purrv CSSB q et 1 (CSS A y 285-5B etpeer 22 MEDIUM 2CY5613its M & 2CV- ECCS isolenord iruside 2OS4 5613 CSSC-14A Downstreem ot Containm Demerut Assumed trp purrp none 2 2CY5612 sepeer 2-2 LOW 2CV5612in ent M & 2CV- and closed Conteernerer 5612 system ,
outside CSSC-14B Downstreem ot Contenww Domend Assumed trp pump none 2 2CY5613 etpeer 2-2 LOW 2CV$613irr ont M & 2CY end closed Conte 6ernorrt 5613 system ,
^
- '.:SS-C-15A NACH to Train 2014 Demand Assumed try purry ECCS A 1ECCSB thseffected betweers 2-2 MEDIUM A M & 2CV- test ,
5630 ABB Combustion Engin ng Nuclear Operations
/3 r Oz b}/ U nWW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-015. Rev. 00 Page 25 of 51 Table 2 (Cont'd)
CSS Consequence Assessment Summary D Descretion Spatief Configureten hvoetor holetion System Bectsp Cmtemment Esposure Table Used Rent location Weets Troms Te* ne (Ref. 9.8$
CSS-C-158 NADH to Train 2007 Demand Assumed trv pemp ECCSB 1 ECCS A Uhe9ected between 2-2 l MEDtC)ht 8 M & 2CV- test 5631 CSS-C-16 RWT to SFPP & Outside Demeruf Assumed No None AB thwffected e6 year 2-2 LOW ctarging 2040 M CSS-C-17A Sernce air 2084 Demand Assumed tre paarp CSSA 2 ECCS, 2BS-SA eq year 2-2 LOW
... .. . ;;-, to M & 2CV- CSSB& heside Trein A 5612 Cent Coonna CSS-C-17B Service air 2064 Demand Assumed tr#r pump CSSB 2 ECCS, 2BS-6B etyear 2-2 LOW
.- e;;-, to M & 2CV- CSS A & huside Train B $613 Cont Coosng ,
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
1 ABB Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 015, Rev. 00 Page 26 of 51 Table 3A CSS Consequences, figures and Isometric Drawings ConsequenceID figure Number Isometric Drawings CSS C-01 2 2HCB 241 2HCB 24 2 l CSS C-02 2 2HCB 24 2 l CSS.C-03A 2 2HCB 261 CSS C-03B 2 2HCB 271 CSS C-04A 2 2HCB 261 2HCB-15 1 CSS C-04B 2 2HCB 271 2HCB 131 CSS C-05 2 2HCB 271 CSS C-06A 2 2HCB.15 1 2HCB.15 2 CSS C-068 2 2HCB 131 2HCB.13 2 CSS C-07A 3 2GCB.10-1 CSS C-078 3 2GCB 11 1 CSS-C-0BA 3 2GCB 351 2DCB.11 1 CSS C 88 3 2GCB 341 2DCB-13 1 CSS-C.9A 3 2GCB 161 CSS C-98 3 2GCB 171 CSS-C 10A 3 2GCB161 CSS C-10B 3 2GCB 171 CSS-C 11A 3 2GCB.16 1 CSS-C 118 3 2GCB 171 CSS-C.12A 3 2GCB.16 1 CSS C 126 3 2GCB.17 1 CSS.C.13A 3 2HCB 20-1 2HCB 20-2 CSS C 138 3 2HCB.21 1 2HCB-212 CSS-C.14A 3 2HCB 31 CSS-C 148 3 2HCB-4 1 CSS-C.15 A 3 2GCB 70-1 CSS-C 158 3 2GCO 691 CSS C 16 2 2HCB 7-1 2HCB 7 2 CSS-C.17A 3 2HCB 931 2HCB 201 CSS C.17B 3 2HCB.94 1 2HCB 21 1 O
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB
() Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 O Page 27 of 51 Table 3B Containment Spra' lystem (CSS) Piping By Consequence & Location Pope Description Consequence location 2HCB 24 Common RWT suction to 2CV 5630-1 and 56312 01 Outside 2CV 5630-1 ar.d 56312 are at El 348 in tank room 2054 02 2040 2HCB 7 Common RWT suction to SFPP and charging punips 16 Outside 2040 2HCB 26 RWT suction A from 2CV 56301 to check valve 2BS 1A and from 03A 2040 2BS 2A to pump 2P 35A 04A 2014 2HCB 27 RWT suction B from 2CV 56312 to check valve 2BS 18 and from 03B 2040 2BS 28 to pump 2P358 05 2006 048 2007 2HCB 15 Containment sump suction A to 2BS 1A and 2BS 2A 06A Sump Includes suction to 2P-60A and 2P 89A 2014 ,
2HCB 13 Containment sump suction 8 to 2851B and 28S 2B 06B Sump Includes suction to 2P-608 and 2P-898 2007 2GCB 10 Pump 2P 35A discharge to heat exchanger 2E35A 07A 2014 2GCB 35 Pump 2P-35A min flow to 2BS 17A 08A 2014 2DCB 11 Pump 2P-35A min flow from 2BS 17A to 2CV 56731 08A 2014 2GCB 16 Pump 2P-35A discharge from heat exchanger 2E35A to 2CV 56121 OSA 2014 and test return manual valve 2SI 5A (flow element is in 2014) 10A 2011 2SI 5A is in Room 2011/2012 11A 2055 2CV 56121 is at El362 in Room 2084 12A 2084 ,
2GCB 11 Pump 2P358 discharge to heat exchanger 2E358
()
\ 2GCB 34 2GCB 69 Pump 2P358 min flow to 28S 178 NADH supply to pump 2P358 07B 08B 158 2007 2007 2007 2GCB 70 NADH supply to pump 2P 35A 15A 2014 2DCB.13 Pump 2P358 min flow from 2BS 17B to 2CV 56721 08B 2007 2GCB 17 Pump 2P358 discharge from heat exchanger 2E35B to 2Ci'E13 2 093 2007 and test retum manual valve 2SI 58 tilow element is in 2007) 10B 2011 2SI 5B is in Room 2011/2012 118 2055 2CV 5613 2 is at El362 in Room 2084 128 2084 2HCB 20 2P 35A discharge downstream of 2CV 56121 to containment 13A 2084 penetration 2HCB 21 2P358 discharge downstream of 2CV 5613 2 to containment 13B 2084 oenetration 2HCB-3 2P 35A discharge downstream of 2CV 56121 inside containment 14A Containment 2HCB 4 2P358 discharge downstream of 2CV 5613 2 inside containment 148 Containment 2HCC-93 Service air connection to train A 17A 2084 2HCB-94 Service air connection to train B 17B 2084
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ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A R F 't 9% WW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-015 Rev. 00 Page 28 of 51 ,
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f3 AIB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00 Y Page 30 of $1 G. 0 DEGRADA TION A1ECHANISA1S EVALUA TION The purpose of this section is to identify the degradation Inechanisms that can be present in the piping within the selected system boundar:es of the ANO 2 CSS, as described in Section 3.2 of this report. The conditions considered in this evaluation are: design characteristics, fabrication practices, operating conditions, and service experience. The degradation mechanisms to be identified (Referenca 9.1) are:
- ThermalFatigue (TF)
- Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS) 1 Thermal Transients (TT) l
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)
Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)
Extemal Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
- Localized Corrosion (LC)
Alicrobiologically influenced Corrosion (A1/C)
- Pitting (PIT) l Crevice Corrosion (CC) l e Flow Sensitive (FS)
Erosion Cavitation (E C)
,9 - Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) !
!"J In performing this evaluation, some basic inputs were used. These inputs are discussed in Section 5.3. The criteria andJustifications are provided in Section 5.2. In accordance with Reference 9.1, degradation mechanisms are organized into three categories: "Large Leak",
- Small Leak", and *None'.
The results indicate that no degradation mechanisms are potentially present. Using ISIS (Reference 9.2), one damage group (DA1 group) was identified as CSS N and is defined in Table 4 below. This DA1 group results in the failure potential category: "None'. The FAfECA Degradation Afechanisms for each segment and each element are presented in Appendix B.
Table 4 Damage Groups Damare Demoee Mecherwarna Fehwe Group Thermal Fatieue strees Correalen Crackine Locaused Corrosion Row Sonettive Potendal to TAscs TT ICsCC TQsCC ECsCC PWsCC Mtc P(T CC E-C FAC Carneory css N No Na No No No No No No No No No None
(%
c)
ABB Cornbustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 015, Rev 00 Page 31 of 51 6.1 OAMAGE GROUPS 6.1.1 DM GROUP: CSS-N The CSS N damage group is not considered susceptible to any damage mechanism.
It includes all the lines in the system as defined in Section 3.2 (See Figures 2 and 3).
- 6. 2 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA ANO IDENTIFICA TION The degradation mechanisms and criteria assessed are presented in Table 6.
O I
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB f) Calculation No, A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00 N,) Page 32 of 51 1
Table 3 l I)egradation Mechanism Criteria and Susceptible Regions I
f,'s , Criteria Susceptible Reglons TF TASCS -nps > 1 inch, and noszles, branch pipe
-pipe segment has a slope < 43*from hort:ontal(includes elbow or connections, sqfe ends, ter into a verticalpipe), and welds, heat qfected ,
-potential existsfor lowflow in a pipe section connected to a zones (1L4Z), base component allowing mixing ofhot and coldpuids, or metal, andregions of potential existsfor leakageflow past a valve (Lt., in-Irakage, out- stress concentration leakage, cross leakage) allowing mixing ofhot and coldfluids, or potential existsfor convection heating in dead-endedpipe sections connected to a source ofhotfluid, or potential existsfor two phase (Steam / water) flow, or potential extstsfor turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected to headerpiping containing hotfluid with high turbulentflow, and
-calculated or measured AT > 30*F, and
-Richardson number > 4.0 TT -operating temperature > 270*Ffor stainless steel, or operatmg temperature > 220*Ffor carbon steel, and
,. -potentialfor relatively rapid temperature changes includmg
( coldfluidinjection into hotpipe segment, or U) hotfluidinjection into coldpipe segment, and
- l AT > 200*Ffor stamless steel, or lAT > 150*Ffor carbon steel, or l AT > ATallowable (apphcable to both stainless and carbon)
SCC JGSCC -evaluated in accordance with existmg plant IGSCCprogram per austenitic stainless steel (Ilif'R) NRC Generic Letter 88-01 welds andIL4Z IGSCC -operatmg temperature > 200*F, and (PilR) -susceptable material (carbon content h 0.035%), and
-tensile stress (includmg residual stress) is present, and
-oxygen or oxids:ing species are present OR
-operatmg temperature < 200*F, the attributes above apply, and
-initialmg contamunants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluortde, chloride) are also required to be present TGSCC -operatmg temperature > 130*F, and austenitic stainless steel
-tensile stress (includmg residual stress) is present, and base metal, welds, and
-halides (e.g., fluorude, chloride) are prese nt, or IL4Z caustic (NaOH)ispresent, and
-oxygen or oxidt:ing species are present (only required to be present in conjunction w: halides, not required w/ caustic) b)
V ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
_ _ __ _ - _ = _ .. . .
A BB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 0!$, Rev, 00 g Page 33 of $1 W Table 3 (cont'd)
Degradation Mechanism Criteria and Susceptible Regions
'E " ,," ","
g,,'g Criteria Susceptible Regions SCC ECSCC -operating temperature > 130*F, and austentric stainless steel
-tensile stress ispresent, and base metal, urids, and
-an outside piping surface is withinfive diameters ofa probable HAZ leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1,36, or an outside piping surface is exposed to wettingfrom chloride bearing environments (e.g., seawater, brc.ckish water, brine)
PHSCC -piping materialis inconel (Alloy 600), and nonles, welds, andHAZ
-exposed to primary water at T > 6:0*F, and without stress relief
-the materialis mill-annealed and cold uvrked, or cold worked and welded without stress relief LC MIC -operating temperature < 130*F, and Attings, welds, il4Z,
-low or intermtttentpow, and base metal, dissimilar
-pH < 10, and metaljoints (e.g., welds,
-presence / Intrusion oforgante material (e.g., raw water nstem), or fanges), and regions u ater source is not treated w'blocides (e.g., refueling water tank) containing crevices PIT -potential existsfor lowpow, and
-omgen or oxid sing species are present, and
-anitiating contaminants (e.g.,fuoride, chloride) are present l
CC -crevice condition exists (e g., thermal sleeves), and
-operating temperature > 130*F, and
-ongen or oxid sing species are present E5 E-C -operatmg temperature < 230*F, and pttings, welds. HAZ, and
-pow present > 100 hrs yr, and base ;.etal
-velocoty > 30p's, and
-(Ps - PP AP < 3 FAC -evaluated in accordance with existmg plant FA Cprogram perplant FACpmgram S. 2.1 Thermal Fatigue (TF)
Thermal fatigue is a mechanism caused by alternating stressas due to thermal cycling of a component which results in accumulated fatigue usage and can lead to crack initiation and growth.
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CAI.C-015, Rev. 00 r^\
O Page 34 of 51 5.2.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS) '
During normal plant operating conditions, the temperature of this standby system ranges from a containment building ambient of 120T to en auxiliary building ambient between 80*F and 1007. In a standby mode, none of this pipin0 is connected or dead ended to a source (i.e., componwnt or piping) containing hot fluid.
not is there a potential for the backleakage of hot fluid by a valve Jr.to this I.iping.
As such, no potential exists for the mixing of hot and cold fluids or convection heating. Consequently, this system is not sub}ect to thermalstratification.
5.2.1.21hermal Transients (TT)
During normal plant operating conditions, the temperature of this standby system ranges from a contaio, ment building ambient of 120T to an auxiliary tuilding ambient between 807 and 1007. No piping segments were identified where a potential exists for relatively rapid temperature chenges tltSt would e2.ceed the AT allowable of 200*F. Consequently, this system is not subject to thermal transients.
5.2.2 Stress Corrosion Crackiro (SCC)
The electrochemical reaction caused by a corrosive or oxygena;ed media within a
^ piping system can lead to cracking when combhed with other l' actors such as a f) susceptible material, temperature, and stress. This mechanism has several forms LJ with varying att'ibutes including intergranular stress corrosion cracking, trentgranular stress corrosion cracking, extemal chlor:de stress corrosion cracking, and primary water stress corrosion cracking.
5.2.2.1/ntergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking flGSCC)
During normal plant operating conditions, the tempera.'ure ol this standby system ranges from a containment building ambient of 120T to en auxiliary building ambient between 807 and 100T. Consequently, since the temperature of this system during norm:I plant operating conditions is less than 200*F, and plant chemistry controls ensure that initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride, chloride) levels are negligible, this system is not considered susceptible to IGSCC.
5.2.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)
During normal plant operating conditions, the temperature of this standby system ranges from a containment building ambient of 120T to an auxiliary building ambient between 807 and 1007. The piping upstream of check valves 2BS 12A and 2BS-128 (i.e., l'ortions of lines 2HCB-69 2", 2HCB-10 2', and lines 2HCB 38 4" 2HCB 39-4', 2HCB 37 8', 2HCB 42 3'), which is used for adding Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) to the containment spray, was excluded from this evaluation.
The basis for exclusion are indicated in Section 3.2.2. Normally closed isolation valves 2CV 56571 and 2CV 5667 2, whicn are located upstream of check valves 2BS 12A and 2BS 128, respectively, prohibit caustic intrusion during normal plant f operating conditions. Consequently, since the temperature of this system during
&) normal plant operating conditions is less t/~en 1507, and plant chemistry controls ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A.PENG. CALC 015, Rev 00 Page 35 of 51 ensure that the levels of halides or caustics present are maintained extremely low, this system is not considered susceptible to TGSCC.
5.2.2.3Extemal Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC)
ANO 2 complies with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.36 for non metallic thermalinsulation and con sequently the potential for ECSCC to occur does not exist.
5.2.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) !
I PWSCC is not applicable es a potential damage mechanism for the CSS due to the l fact that there is no inconel (Alloy 600) present in the system, and the range of operating temperatures is far below the PWSCC required temperature threshold of 620*F.
l 5.2.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) i In addition to SCC, other phenomens can produce localized degretation t in piping components. These phenomena sypically require oxygen or oxidizing environments and are often associated with low flow or
- hideout' regions, such as exists beneath corrosion products or in crevices. This mechanism includes microbiologically influenced corrosion, pitting, and crevice corrosion.
5.2.3.1Microbiologically influenced Corrosion (MIC)
The temperature of the CSS is **ss than 150*F during normal plant operating conditions and as a result is considered potentially susceptible to MIC. The RWTis a potential source of microbes since biologicsl controls (i.e., blocides) are not utilized and the temperature range is appropriate for MIC to exist.
MIC has not, however, ever been observed to exist in the CSS at ANO 2. On occasions when the system has been opened for maintenance (e.g., valve disassembly), no evidence of MIC has been discovered. Also, prict volumetric examinations of this system have not revealed the presence of any degradation attributable to MIC attack. Furthermore, from the overallindustry standpoint, MIC has not historically been a source of degradation in containment spray systems.
Consequently, although the system conditions fail to preclude MIC attack, the potentialis considered low on the basis of the lack of ANO 2 or industry historical evidence, and this mechanism is therefore not considered active for the CSS.
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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()
LJ Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 015. Rev. 00 Page 36 of 51 5.2.3.2 Pitting (PIT)
The essentially stagnant flow conditions and the oxygenated water supply from the RWTprovide an environment for pitting to occur, however, the absence of initiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride, thloride) in the system indicate the likelihood is extremely low.
Additionally, similar to the observations made in the MIC assessment above, pitting has not historically been a source of degradation in the CSS for ANO 2 or in the industry.
Consequently, the potential for pitting attack is considered low due to both the absence of inoliating contaminants in the system and the lack of ANO 2 or industry historical evidence, and therefore this mechanism is not considered active for the CSS.
5.2.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC)
Crevice corrosion is not applicable due to the fact that there are no crevice regions included within the boundaries of the CSS evaluation.
6.2.4 Flow Sensitive (FS)
When a high fluid velocity is combined with various other requisite factors it can (Q,/ result in the erosion and/or corrosion of piping materialleading to a reduction in wall thickness. Mechanisms that are flow sensitive, and can create this form of degradation include erosion cavitation and flow accelerated corrosion.
5.2.4.1 Erosion Cavitation (E C)
Although the temperature of the CSS is less than the erosion cavitation threshold
- emperature of 250'F during normal operating conditions, this mechanism is not expected to be an active in the CSS. The flow velocity is less than 30 ft/sec, and the system experiences flow less than 100 hrs /yr (system is in standby during normalpower operations). Furthermore, there a.e no potential sources of cavitation (e.g., pressure reducing orifices or valves)in the entire system. Consequently, this system is not considered susceptible to E C.
5.2.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
The CSS is comprised entirely of austenitic stainless steel piping (Reference 9.4).
Since FAC is a phenomenon that only affects carbon steel piping, the CSS is not susceptible to this degradation mechanism.
Ov
, ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations 1
m
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00 Page 37 of 51
- 5. 2. 5 Vibration fatigue Vibration fatigue is not specificsily made part of the EPRI risk informed ISI process.
Most documented vibrational fatigue failures in power plants piping indicate that
-they are restricted to socket welds in small bore piping. Most of the vibrational l i
fatigue damage occurs in the initiation phase and crack propagation proceeds at a l rapid rate once a crack forms. As such, this mechanism does not lend itself to \
typicalperiodic inservice examinations (i.e., volumetric, surface, etc.) as a means of l
managing this degradation mechanism.
Management of vibrational fatigue should be performed under an entirely separate program taking guidance from the EPRI Fatigue Management Handbook (Reference 9.11). If a vibration problem is discovered, then corrective actions mus: be taken to either remove the vibration source or reduce the vibration levels to ensure future component operability. Therefore, frequent system walkdowns, leakage monitoring systems, and current ASME Section XI system leak test requirements are practical measures to address this issue. Because these measures are employed either singly or in combination for most plant systems it is not necessary to use a risk informed inspection selection process for vibration fatigue.
5.3 BASIC DA TA 5.3.1 All piping in the CSS is austenitic stainless steel. Under normal plant operating conditions, the CSS, as defined by the boundaries in Section 3.2, is in a standby mode and stagnant. Plant Piping Line Lists, References 8.5 and 8.6, indicate post-accident temperatures. Per Reference 9.7, during normalplant operating conditions, the temperature of this standby system ranges from a containment building ambient of 120'F to an oaxiliary building ambient of 80'F(winter) to 100'F(summer).
5.3.2 Due to the cyclic nature of thermal transients, only those transients which occur during the initiating events Categories I and ll as described in Reference 9.1, Table 3.1 are considered in the evaluation of degradation mechanisms due to thermal fatigue. Category I consists of those events which occur during routine operation, e.g., startup, shutdown, standby, refueling. Category ll consists of anticipated operational occurrence, e.g., reactor trip, turbine trip, loss of feedwater. Therefore, the transients to be evaluated are those transients which occur under normal operating and upset conditions.
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00
(*
. Page 38 of 51 6.0 SERVICE HISTORY AND SUSCEPTIBlUTY REVIEW An exhaustive review was conducted from mid '96 to Spring '97 of databases (plant and industry) and station documents to characterire ANO-2's operating experience with respect to piping pressure boundary degradation. The results of this review are provided in a condensed form in Table 6 for the Containment Spray System.
Although several pre-commercial references are included for completeness, the timeframe for identifying items applicable to this effort was focused on post commercial operation (Commercial Operation date of March 26,1980). This was done to avoidinclusion ofitems j palmarily associated with construction deficiencies as opposed to inservice degradation.
The following databases and other sources were queried to accomplish this review:
Station Information Management System (SIMS)
The SIMS database was queried o'or all ANO-2 Job orders on Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components which involved corrective maintenance (CM) or modifications (MOD).
Additionally, a separate query was performed in order to capture certain non Code, O component failures. This query was for non Code 0 and SR (safety related) components. This database contains information from approximately 1985 to the present.
Q LJ
- Condition Report (CR) Database The CR database wac queried for any pipe leak / rupture events or other conditions associated with identified damage mechanisms at ANO 2. The keywords searched under were; pipe, piping, line, water hammer, leak, leaking and leakage. CR's are written on 0, F or S equipment failures or other conditions potentially adverse to safety.
This database contains information from 1*88 to the present.
- Ucensing Research System (LRS)
The LRS database was queried using a keyword search specific to ANO 2. The keywords searched under were: thermal cycling, thermal stratification, thermal fatigue,
, defect, flaw, indication, fatigue, cavitation and corrosion. This search captured all communication between ANO and the NRC, both plant specific and generic industry, associated with these topics. However, for the purpose of this review, only communication from ANO to the NRC was reviewed. Additionally, this search system
- was used to query Industry Events Analysis files (captures INPO documents) for ANO 2 events or conditions relevant to this review. The keywords searched under for this l pvtion of the query were: pipe & stratification, thermal & fatigue, thermal & transient, l pipe & leak, vibration & fatigue and pipe & rupture. " Fuzzy" search logic was employed to reduce the possibility of failing to identi'y a pertinent document. This database contains information from prior to commercial operation to the pressnt for ANO 2.
O
\v)
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG. CALC 015, Rev. 00 Page 39 of 51 Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPROS)
NPROS was queried for ANO 2 entries for pipe failures. The keywords searched under were: pipe. This database contains information from 1991 to the present.
- ANO-2 ISIProgram Records The ISI program findings were compiled and reviewed for all outage and non-outage (
inservice inspections conducted at ANO-2 since commercial operation. 1 ControlRoom Station Log The station log was utilized as a source of information for recent operational events.
The log exists in electronic format from early 1994 to the present and has search capabilities which allowed a review for events of interest. The keywords searched under were: water hammer, leak and leakage.
l System Upper LevelDocument (ULD) 1 i
The ULO was reviewed as a source for historical perspective of issues related to the '
system andidentification of modifications made to the system or changes to operational procedures to address those issues (e.g., water hammer, corrosion or vibrational fatigue).
Other Station Documents This source of information consists of such documents as the SAR, Tech sical Specifications, operationalprocedures and the damage mechanism analysis done as part i
of this effort.
l l
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
,a )
ay s sq a a
- !! (
Calculation No. A-PENG-CALCD15. Rev. 00 Page 40 of 51 Table 6 Service History and SuscepttMty Review - Containtnent Spray System Searco Docsanente / Detsbeoeo Reviewed for Dennere Mechenoeme AM=lenecy Canadered Evidence of16stentcelPiping beenure ! : . '-, Thermalfetique Somos Cerroeien CrocAmy Lece6 edCorreeneer Row Sene% ACechereenf Weter Other Degredetfeer Occurrencee et ANO-2 TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PWSCC AOC PIT CC E-C FAC VF 14enwner Mm6nge Station ksformation Menegement System None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Condition Report Detsbese None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Licenseg Research Systn None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Nucteer Rent Refe65ty Detebese System None None None None None None None None None None None None None None AN32151Rogram Records None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Controt Room Storion log None None None None None None None None None None None None None None System Lkper leve/ Documents None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Other Sterion Documents None None None None None None None None None None None None None _.PRM. k-Legend: !
P (Precursor) - TNe category includes identifrestion of postufeted demoge mechanisme end toerfmge through knowledge of operstmg parameters, water chervestry, etc. No physecal evidence of pressure boundary degradetron currently exists. TNs category includes postulated wata..w identified es e reeutt of ttie review PE (Plent Event) - Ttes category includes identification of postulated demoge war i. . end Icedege se a result of en obserwd or potencel plant event (e.g water her enerl. No physical evidence of pressure boundary degradation current 1y existe.
PD (Physical Demegel - TNe category includee identification of observed pressure boundary degredation es evidenced by cracking, pettmg, westege, thmnmg. physicef deformetron or other detenoration.
PSF (Pressure Boundary Falueel - TNe category includes identification of through-wen flaws teoutting from the effects of en identified demoge eW-..-
Notes:
- 1. Reference Procedure 2104.040. Dunng 2R10 e change in the t. PSI procedure ellowed exclusion of poet outage fluehmg reeuttmg in era remereng entremed in the system. When the LPS3 surveillence wee subsequently p+denc J, the irstial flow surge in the suction pipmg compressed the est pocket in the contomment sprey system wNeh subsequently = ; c.Jed.
elemming the containment sprey purre deocherge checit valve end rettimg system pepmg. ..- ah of system piping revealed no demoge. The procedure wee rew*eed end no eubeequent events have occurred.
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations '
ABB Q Calculation No. A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00 N' Page 41 of 51 7.0 RISK EVALUATION The first step in the risk evaluation is the defining of the risk segments. Risk segments consist of continuous runs of piping that, if failed, have the same consequences (i.e.,
consequence segments), and are exposed to the same degradation mechanisms (i.e.,
damage groups). The next step in the risk evaluation is the determination of the segment risk categories. This is accomplished by combining the consequence and damage mechanism categories to produce a risk category for each segment. Application of the above criteria results in the fonnation of 30 risk segments of which 5 are medium risk (risk category 4) and 25 are low risk (20 are risk category 6 and 5 are risk category 7). The risk segments are identifiedin Table 7 below.
,c\
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ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
D'1B E Ca'culat.%n NO. A-PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 Page 42 of 51 Table 7 Risk Segmerit identi6ca6 ort Msk Segment 10 Consequence ID Den.ege Group 10 Msk Region Ispesy thee Nos. Msk Segment Start Pbint Msk Segamnt Emf 96Ent Category faIure Futentiet Msk Categwy lsemeeric Drawings CSS R-or CSS C of CSS N Mescum 2HC8ze24* til ouster of Rwr tzi cpen Pmewooon - Conare 1
High None 4 (112HC 2#1 Stn.1 (212HC8 242 Stn.1 CSS R O2 CSS-CD2 CSS N Medium 2HC82424* irl Cpen Peneverion - CoAnwr $11 (4mesem of 2CV56301 2HC8 2420* 1 (11 (4'sweem o! 2CV5631-2 (112HC8 242 S!n.1 CSS R-03A CSS C-03A CSS-N low 2HC8 26-20* 111 Dowrusweem of 2CV 5630 ill Rocr Bovenian Q 3?$~ O' 1
Medurn None 6 (112HC8 26-1 S!n.1 CSS-R-038 CSS-C-038 CSS-N Medium 2HC8 27-20* ill Dowresweem of 2CV5631- til Roor Bovenian Q 335'O*
Migfr None 4 ill 2HCB 27-1 Stn.1 CSS-R O4A CSS C-D4A CSS-N Low 2HC815-24* 11t Downsveem of 2CY5643- tri l%rsarem of 2SF 7A 2HCs 15-20* 1 til L4weeem ot 2St.12A Mednan None 6 gycy_ y$_ y4 ggy g,,_,,_,;,_,, ,yggg 53 gy; 4 c,p 9,,, y y 2HCB- 154* L31 Roar Berenon Q 335'0* (31 Suenon of 2P 35A 2HCB-15-2*
2HC8 26-20*
2HCB 26-14*
2HCB 1O*
(112HCB-15-1 Stn.1 (212HCB-15-1 Sin. 2 (312HCB-26-1 S!n.1
_ ABB Combustion Ens ing Nuclear Operations
[, .
J u k! h MWW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-015. Rev. 00 Page 43 Of 51 Table 7 Risk Segment Ider56f;Cadorf (Cont'd]
Msk SegmentID Consequence 10 Demoge Group 10 Risk Region Pl>ng Line Nos. a egment Stut IWnt Msk Segment Enef P6 int Category faisse P&tential Msk Category isometrk Drawings CSS R 048 CSS-C 048 CSS N Low 2HCB-13 24* til Downsweem of 2CV$650 til lystroom of 251-78 2HCB 13 20* 2 (2) L&stroomof 251-128 2HCB- 13-14* L21 C-. a.-.. of 2BS-54 14I 4* Cap - kom 24 2HC813 8* (31 foamed Penegeeions 2007- 141 Succion of 2P-358 2HC813 2* 0001 2HCB 27-20*
2HCB 27-14*
2HCB 27-10*
2HCB 274*
- 11) 2HCB 13-1 StL 1 (2) 2HCB-13-1 SfL 2 (312HCB 27-1 SPL 1 (412HC8 27-1 SfL 2 CSS-R OS CSS-C-OS CSS-N Low 2HC8 27-20" (11 Roer Besetion 0 235'O* 111 foemed Persesrenon 2007-Medium None 6 (1) 2HC827-1 StL 1 CSSRD6A CSS-C-06A CSS N Medlium 2HCB- 15-24' (21 Cn..: ;-.. of 2CV$647- $1! lystroom of 2CY5649-1 High None 4 (1) 2HC8-15-1 Stu 1 ,
(2) 2HCB-15-2 StL 1 '
CSS-R 06B CSS-C-068 CSS-N MedVum 2HCB- 12-24' (21 Dowrwarem or2CV-5648- (1) L&stroem er2CY&6502 High Nove 4 1112HCB 13-1 S?L 1 (2) 2HCB-13 2 StL 1 CSS-RD7A CSS-C-O7A CSS-N Low 2GCB to12* (1) Descharge of 2P 35A til Downstroom of 2514A i 2GC8- 1010" (11 Net of 2E-35A M *"" "*"*
(1) 2CCB-101 S?L 1 CSS-RD78 CSS-C-078 WN Low 2GCB 12" til Discherge of 2P-358 (11 Dowwwweem ot 231-48 2GCB- 11-10~ (1s Hetof 2E-35B 2GCB- 11-6 ,
1 ill 2GCB 11-1 StL 1 '
l ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations ;
E'% BhPIF Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-015. Reir. 00 Page 44 of 51 Table 7 Risk Segrnentidentification (Cont'd!
Rish SegruentID ConsequenceID Damage Gr0srpID Risk Region liping Line Nos. Itisk Segment Start IWnt Msk Segment Enef Psint Category faRure Potential Ri6k Cstegor; Isometric Drawings CSS-R OSA CSS-C 08A CSS-N Low 2DCB-11-2* i2) WeMotet Comection -Item (112* u 1* Reducer - Item 10 2LiCB-25-3* 55 (1) Wstream of 2CY5673-1 Medium None 6 2GCB-35-2
- III 2L."** 11 1 Sh.1 (2) 2GCB 35-1 Sh.1 CSS R-OS t* CSS-C OSB CSS-N Low 2DCB- 13 2 * (21 Weldolet Comection -Item 111 Wstream of 2aN-5672-1 2GCB-34-2
- 36 Medium None 6 til 2DCB-131 Sh.1 (2) 2GCB-34-1 Sh.1 CSJ-R-09A CSS-C-09A CSS-N Low 2GCB 12 * (1) Outlet of 2E-35A 4114* Cap - Item 68 2GCB 10' 421 *A*HPSIf%rnp Room 1/eR Medium None 6 2GCB- 16-4
- 121 Roor Bevetion @ 335'O*
(1) 2GCB-16-! Sh.1 (2) 2GCB-16-1 Sh. 2 CSS-R-098 CSS-C-098 CSS-N Low 2GCB-17-12* (2) Outlet of 2E-358 (1) Roor Beverion @ 335' O*
2GCB- 17-10* (21 4* Cap - Item 25 Meditan None 6 gggy,y74- (21 *B*HPSIPump Room Wsq fil 2GCB-17-1 Sh.1 (2) 2GCB-11-1 Sh. 2 +
CSS R-10A CSS-C-10A CSS-N Low 2GCB- 16-12" (1) *A*HPSI1%rry Room Wed (1) Ws*reem of 2SI5A Mediurn None 6 (19 2GCB-16-1 Sh. 2 CSS R-10B CSS C-109 CSS-N Low 2GCB- 17-12" (1) *B*HPS11%rrp Room Weg (19 Upstream er 251-52 Medium None 6 (1) 2GCR-11-1 Sh. 2 CSS-R-11A CSS C-11A CSS-N Low 2GCB- 16-10* (11 Roor Beverion O 355'O' $11 Roor Deverion O 360'O' Medium None 6 ill 2GCB-16-1 Sh. 2 CSS-R-11B CSS-C- 118 CSS N Low 2GCB- 17-10' til floor Beverion @ 335'O' (11 Roor Bevotoon @ 360'0*
l Medium None 6 (1) 2GCB-11-1 Sh.1 ABB Combustion Eng. t i ng Nuclear Operatioi
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A"R. FIF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 Page 45 of 51 Table 7 Risk Segment identife* atlOn (Cont'd)
Risk Segment ID ConsequenceID Damage Group 10 Msk Region Piping Une Nos. Msk Segment Start Pdst Msn Segment EndPbint Category for7are P6tentist Risk Category isometric Drawings CSS R 12A CSS C 12A CSS-N lew 2GCB-16-10* (11 Roor Devotion @ 360'O* (1) Wst earn of 2GS-1/m 2GCB-16-3 * (1} Wstream ot2CV5212-1 (1) ?GCB-16-1 Sh 2
)
CSS-R- 128 CSS C-128 CSS N Low 2GCB 10* (11 Roor Devotion @ 360' O* (1) Wstream of 2BS-198 2GCB 17-3* 111 Wsweem of 2CV5613-2 (1) 2GCB-17-1 Sh I CSS R-13A CSS-C 13A CSS N Low 2HCB 2010* (1) Downstroom of 2CV$512- (1) Penetration 2P-17 2HCB-20 3
- 1 Medium None 6 (2) Downsweem of 28S-204
(?) 2HCB 202 Sh 1 CSS R 138 CSS C-13B CSS N low 2HCB 21-10* (1) Downsweem of 2CV$613- til Penewerion 2P 23 2HCB 21 ** 2 Me None 6 (2) Downsweem of 2BS-208 (212HCB-21-2 Sh 1 CSS-R- 14A CSS-C- 14A CSS-N Low 2HCB-3-10' (2) Peneverion 2P-17 (1) Wstream of 2BS-5A low None 7 (112HCB 3-1 Sh 2 (2) 2HCB-3-1 Sit 3 CSS-R- 14B CSS-C- 149 CSS-N Low 2HCB410" (1) Penewetion 2P-23 (1) Wsween of 2BS-5B low None ? (1) 2HCB41 Sh.1 CSS R-15A CSS C-15A CSS-N Low 2GCB-702* fil Downsweem of 2BS-12A (11 Hoff CoupEng - Item 69 (11 Wsweem of 2*x 1*
Medium None 6 (1) 2GCB-701 Sh 1 Reducing ksort -Item 72 CSS-R- 15B CSS-C-ISB CSS-N Low 2GCB 6? 2* (1) Downsweem of 2BS 128 (1) Hoff CoupRng - trem 39 (1) Wstroem or2*x 1*
Medium None 6 (1) 2GCB 691 Sh.1 Reducing heert - trem 63 CSS-R- 16 CSS-C-16 CSS-fi Low 2HCB- 7-3* (18 WMiet Connection - trem (2) Wstream of 2BS-7 low None 7 (19 2HCB-7-1 Sh 1 (2) 2HCB-7-2 Str.1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
~ - - - -
a ~ '
k 2"K W W Calcu?ation No. A+MG-CALC-015, Rev. t)0 j Page 46 of 51 Table 7 Risk Segenent identification (Cont'd)
Msk Segment ID Consequence ID Demsge GroupID Risk Resfon Mping Une Nos. Msk Segment Start Pbint Msk Segment EndAnint Category Fature Pblential Ksk Category isometric Drawings CSS R-17A CSS-C-17A CSS-N Low 2HC6932* '11 Nwnstream of 2SA 85A ill Sockolet C--e,-%;- trem 15 low None i til 2NCB-93-1 CSS-ti Low 2HCB 94-d ' (1) Downstream of 2SA-858 f t) Sockotet C--a;% - Stem CSSS178 CSS-C-178 9
low None 7 (1) 2HC894-1 ABB Combustion Eng._ ing Nuclear Operations _
ARR M INIP Calculation No, A PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 G Page 47 of 51 To facilitate appiication of the sampling percentages to determine the inspection scope, ISIS combines like segments (i.e., same consequence category and damage group) into segment groups. A total of 3 segment groups have been identified and are summarized in Table 8 below.
Table 8 Risk inspection Srope Segment Consequence Degredntion Risk Risk Total Selections Selections Groups Categor;* Mechanism Region Category Welds Required Made l CSSDot High None Medium 4 33 4 4 CSS-002 Low None Low 7 53 . 0 0 CSSD03 Medium None Low 6 287 0 0 8.0 ELEMENT SELECTION The number of elements to be examined as part of the risk-informed developed program depends upon the risk categories for the risk significant segment groups as indicated in Table 8 above. An element is Jefined as a portion of the segment where a potential degradation mechanism has been identified according to the criteria of Section 5.0. The selection ofindividualinspection locations within a risk category depends upon the relative severity of the degradation mechanism present, the physical access constraints, and radiation exposure. In the absence of any identified degradatio, mechanisms (i.e., risk O category 4), selections are focused on terminal ends and other locations (i.e., structural discontinuities) of high stress and/or high fatigue usage. An inspection for cause process shall be implemented utilizing examination methods and volumes defined specifically for the degradation mechanism postulated to be active at the inspection location.
Table 9 depicts the element selsctions and other pertinent information (e.g., examination methods and volumes, basis for selection) for risk-significant segment group CSS-001. As indicated in the Risk Inspection Scope of Table 8, a total of 4 elements have been selected for examination trom segment group CSS-001. Currently, no specific guidance is provided in Reference 9.1 regarding appropriate examination methods and volumes for risk category 4 (r.e., no failure potential identified) element selections. Consequently, the examination methods and volumes specified in Table 9 (risk category 4) are based upon the requirements defined in Reference 9.1 for thermal fatigue.
Ov ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
Aon MEPIF Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-015, Rev. 00 Page 48 Of 51 Table 9 Eternent Selection - Risk Category 4 Seement Group Coneentuence feAwe Potentief Risk Categoy Risk Renion Totel I of elemente 10% of elemente CSS 001 High None identified 4 Medium 33 4 Bamente Selected the No. Exam Method Risk Segment D '
Descr4nion leo Dwg No. Exam Volume Consequence / DM Group D'e Reneen for Select'.sn 77-006 2HCB 24 20' Voksmetric F "'S-R-02 h the obsence of any Mentified damage mechanisme, the Nghest Redacing Elbow-to- Tee 2HCB 24-2 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 CSS-C-02 / CSS-N g,g y ,, ,g_
Wald 78 056 2HCB 15-24' Voksmetric CSS-R-06A k the obsence of any kientified demoge mechanisms, the Nghest Ww-to-Plipe Weki stress (eg.10) element (node poht 25E, Cole No. 91-E-0016-1611 k 2HCB-15-1 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 CSS-C-06A / CSS-N gy, ,;,g , ,,, y,, ,g,,,,4,79-002 2HCB-27-20* Vokametric CSS-R 038 h the absence of any Hentified damage n ochenisms, the Nghest Pipe-to-Ww Weld 2HCB 27-1 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 stress (eg.10) eiement (node point 408. Cec No. 66002-1062) k CSS-C 039 / CSS-N shis risk engment has been selected.
79 063 2HCB-13 24* Voksnetric CSS-R-069 h the obsence of any kfentified damage mx:4,,s, the highest stress (eg.10) element (node poht 406 Calc No. 66002-10631 h Pipe-to-Ww Weld 2HCB-13-1 Sh.1 Rgure No. 7.12 CSS-C-068 / CSS-N this risk eagment has been selected.
_ ABB Combustion Eng ring Nuclear Operations -
MIfIF l p Calculation No. A PENG CALC-015, Rev. 00 Q ~ Page 49 of 51
- 9. 0 REFERENCES 9.1 ' Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection hvaluation Procedure, EPRI Report No. TR-106706, Interim Report June 1996.
9.2 EPRIInservice Inspection Software (ISIS ~),1996.
9.3 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, " Safety Analysis Report,' Amendment No.13.
9.4 " Design Specificatior, for ASME Section Ill Nuclear Piping for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, Arkansas Power and Ught Company,' Specification No. 6600-M-2200, Revision 9.
9.5 'ANO-2 SIMS Components Database,"(Plant Piping Une Ust (M-2083), dated 3 96).
- 9. 7 "Apprcpriate Temperatures to be used in DM Assessment for CSS,' Lotus Notes message from R. Fougerousse (ANO-2) to A. Bauer, dated 1 14-96.
9.8 " Consequence Evaluation of ANO-2 EFW, Containment Spray, and Main Steam and (Q Feedwater System Piping," Arkansas Nuclear 1 Unit 2. Yankee Nuclear Services Q) Division Calculation No. NSD-018, Rev. O, August 1997.
9.9 " Technical Specification for Insulation for Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 of the Arkansas oower and Light Company," Specification No. S600-M-2136, Revision 9.
9.10 ' Primary Chemistry Monitoring Program,' Procedure No. 1000.106, Revision 4.
9.11 *EPRI Fatigue Management Handbook,' Report No. TR-104534-V1, V2, V3, V4, Project 332101, FinalReport, December 1994.
9.12 ' Pipe Cracking in PWRs with Low Pressure Borated-Water Systems," EPRI Report No. NP-3320.
9.13 ' Flow Accelerated Corrosion Prevention Program,' HES-05, Revision 1.
9.14 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, " Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Ucense No.
NPF-6, Amendments Nos.173 and 174."
9.15 Gaertner, J. P., et. al., " Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Intemal Flood Screening Study," prepared for Entergy Operations, Inc., Calculation No. 89 E-0048 35, Rev.
O, May 1992.
9.16 " Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Individual Plant Examination Submittal,'94-R-2005-01, Rev. O, August 1992.
v ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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MIFIN Calculation No. A.PENG CALC-015, Rev. 00 Page 50 of 51 9.17 Entergy, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, Drawings:
1.0 Drawing No. M 2236, Sheet 1, Rev. 75, Sheet 2, Rev. 14; " Piping &
Instrumentation Diagram Containment Spray System.'
- 2. 0 Drawing No. 2DCB 11-1, Sheet 1, Rev. B; "Sn'all Pipe Isometric Minimum Flow Une From 2GCB-35 to :DCB-2."
3.0 Drawing No. 2DCB 131, Sheet 1, Rev. B; "Small Pipe isometric Containment Spray Pump 2P-35B Minimum Flow Une to Refueling Water Tank 2 T 3. "
- 4. 0 Drawing No. 2GCB-10-1, Sheet 1, Rev.13, Sheet 2, Rev. 0; "Large Pipe Isometric From Containment Spray Pump 2P-35A to Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger 2E-35A."
5.0 Drawing No. 2GCB 11 1, Sheet 1, Rev. 15; "Large Pipe isometric Containment Spray From Pump 2P-35B to Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger 2E 25B. "
- 6. 0 Drawing No. 2GCB-161, Sheet 1, Pev.10, Sheet 2, Rev. N; "Large Pipe Isometric Containment Spray Discharge From Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger 2E-35A."
- 7. 0 Drawing No. 2GCB.17-1, Sheet 1, Rev. X, Sheet 2, Rev. 0; "Large Pipe isometric Discharge Header From Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger 2E-358.'
B. O Drawing No. 2GCB 1, Sheet 1, Rev. 2; "Small Pipe Isometric Containment Spray Pump 2P-35B Minimum Flow Une to 2FO 5627.'
- 9. 0 Drawing No. 2GCB-35-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 4: "Small Pipe isometric Containment Sp.ay Pump 2P-35A Minimum Flow Une to 2FO-5624.'
10.0 Drawing No. 2GCP-69-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 9, Sheet 2, Rev. 2; "Small Pipe isometric 2PSV-56dB Discharge From NaOH Addition Pump 2P-1368 to NaOH Addition Tank 2T-10."
11.0 Drawing No. 2GCB-70-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 9; "Small Pte Isometric NaOH Addition Pump 2P 136A Discharge to 2PSV 5678 and 2GCB-10-12".
12.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-131, Sheet 1, Rev.15, Sheet 2, Rev. N; "Large Pipe isometric From Containment Sump tt, Containment Spray Pump 2P-358 Inlet."
13.0 Drawing No. 2HCE- 13-2, Sheet 1, Rev. 4; "Large Pipe Isometric Containment Sump to Containment Spray Pump 2P-358."
14.0 Drawing No. 2HCB 15-1, Sheet 1, Rev. X, Sheet 2 Rev. N; "Large Pipe isometric From Containment Sump to Containment Spray Pump 2P-35A."
15.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-15-2, Sheet 1, Rev. 6; "Large Pipe isometric From Containment Sump to Containment Spray Pumps."
16.0 Drawing No. 2HB-20-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 6; "Large Pipe Isometric Supply From Valve 2CV 56121 to Flued Head 2P-17."
17.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-20-2, Sheet 1, Rev. 4; 'Large Pipe Isometric Building Spray Return From 2FI 5690."
18.0 Drawing No. 2HCB 1, Sheet 1, Rev. 6; "Large Pipe Isometric Containment Spray From 2CV 5613-2 to Containment Penetration 2P 23."
19.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-212, Sheet 1, Rev. 5; 'Large Pipe Isometric 2FI-5693 Return to Une 2HCB-21."
20.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-231, Sheet 1, Rev. 4; "Large Pipe isometric Building Spray Recirculation to Refueling Water Tank 2T 3."
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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- %IFIP p Calculation No. A PENG CALC-015, Rev. 00
() Page 51 of 51 21.0 Orawing No. 2HCB 23 2, Sheet 1, Rev. 8; "Large Pipe Isometric From Valve 2BS 25 to Refueling Water Tank 2T3."
22.0 Drawing No. 2HCB 241, Sheet 1, Rev. 5; "large Pipe isometric Refueling
- Water Tank 2T 3 to Containment Spray Pumps."
23.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-24-2, Sheet 1, Rev. 6; 'Large Pipe isometric Refueling -
Water Tank 2T 3 to Containment Spray Pumps."
24.0 Drawing No. 2HCB 26-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 15; "Large Pipe isometric Containment Spray Pump 2P-35A Supply."
25.0 Drawing No. 2HCB 271, Sheet 1, Rev.12, Sheet 2, Rev. 0; "Large Pipe Isometric Containment Spray Pump 2P-35B Supply From Control Valve 2CV-5631 2."
26.0 Drawing No. 2HCB 3-1, Sheet 1, Rev.16, Sheet 2, Rev. 3, Sheet 3, Rev. 2; "Large Pipe isometric Containment Spray Header From Containment Penetration 2P-17."
27.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-71, Sheet 1, Rev. 4; "Large Pipe isometric From Refueling Water Tank 2T3 to 2CV 4950-2."
28.0 Drawing No. 2HCB 7-2, Sheet 1, Rev. X; "Large Pipe f.tometric From 2HCB-24 to Sodium Hydroxide Tank Fill Valve 2BS-6."
29.0 Drawing No. 2HCB-93-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 3; "Small Pipe Isometric Auxiliary Building. "
30.0 Drawing No. 2hCB-94-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 2; *Small Pipe isometric Auxiliary Building. '
f 9.18 Swain, A. D. and Guttmann, H. E.; " Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Q Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Operations', NUREG-CR 1278, August 1983.
9.19 North Atlantic Energy Services Corp. *lr :fividual Plant Examination Extemal Events',
Report for Seabrook Station, Raponse to Generic Letter 88 20, Supplement 4, September 1992.
9.20 'Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Evaluations at Nuclear Plant Sites in Central and Eastern United States: Resolution of the Charleston Earthquake issue" EPRI NP.
' 6395-D, April 1989, Prepared by Risk Engineering, Inc., Yankee Atomic Electric Company, and Woodward Clyde Consultants.
9.21
' Revised Uvermore Seismic Hazard Estimates for 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains", NUREG-1488 (Final Report), April 1994.
9.22 Interoffice Correspondence from A. V. Bauer to Quality Records Letter No. PENG-97140, " Submittal of SIA Calculations,' dated July 21,1997.
p) i U
ABE Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
Calculation tjo. A PENG. CALC-015, Rev. 00 Page A t of A31 l0 .
9 APPENOlXA
'FMECA - CONSEQUENCE INFORMA TION REPORT *
(Attachment Pages A1 A31)
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
, o
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cahlation No. A PEMC4LC 0U. Rev 00 14-Sep.9 Page A2 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C-01 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of common RWT suction outside auxiliary building during an independent demand (line 2HCB-24 outside)
Break Sia: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: Unisolable.
Spatial Effects: Local Effected IAcation: Outside Spatial Effects Comments: The common RWT suction piping outside se auxiliary building (near the RWT) can not propagate to the auxiliary building and impact safety equipment.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This is conservative since pipe break during normal standby m-- L iust as likely (i.e.,
demand stress of RWT head is not significantly different durmg demand).
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Loss of RWT (flow diversion) results in common cause failure of all ECCS.
Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is 'High" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and no backup trains). No impact on contaimnent isolation.
Consequence Category: HIGH O Consequence Rank O O
I l
l
O (ECA - Consequence Information Report cainlaum Na A-mo-catc.on an. oo
\ 14.Sep.9 Page A3 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 02 Consequence Descdption: Degradation of common R%T suction upstream of 2CV 5630 & 5631 in auxiliary building during an independent demand (line 2HCB 24 in auxiliary building)
Break Size: Large 14alability of Break: No ISO Comments: Unisolable.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected location: Room 2040 Spatial Effects Comments: The common RWT suction piping will likely fail MCC 2B52 in the corridor at El 335 (Room 2040) and propagate to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and the cast stairway. Also, El 317 will fill up and propagate into the ECCS rooms (2007,2010, & 2014). Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high level alarm and the ECCS toom flood alarms in the control room, but this is irrelevant since the break is unisolable. .
Initiating Event: N laitiating Event ID: N/A initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This is conservati,: since pipe break during normal standby may be,just as likely (i.e.,
demand stress of R%T head is not significantly different during demand)
Loss of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Loss of R%T (flow diversion) results in common cause failure of all ECCS.
( Lose of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is "High" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and no backup trains). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: HIGH O Consequence Rank O O
l l
FMECA - Consequence Information Report catc=tarwn No. A./ ENG-C4LC-015 Rev. 00 14 Sep-9 Page A4 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS C43A Conxquence
Description:
Degradation of R%T suction A downstream of 2C%5630 in Room 2040 during an independent demand (line 2HCB 26 in Room 2040)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2C%5630-1 can be closed from the control room. Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm and CSS low flow alarm if the break is large enougL A low R%T level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2040 Spatial Ef fects Comments: RWT suction piping will likely fail MCC 2B52 in the corridor at El 335 (Room 2040) and propagate to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and the cast stairway. MCC 2B52 contains breakers for normally clorM CSS valves 2CW 5612 1 and 56491 (containment sump recirculation A). If unisolated, El 317 will fill up and propagate into the ECCS rooms (2007, 2010, & 2014) failing all ECCS.
Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high level and ECCS room flood alarms in the control room.
Initiating bent: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This is conservative since pipe break during normal standby may be just as likely (i.e.,
demand stress of RWT head is not significantly different during demand).
Loss of S3 stem: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS cither due to flow diversion or insufficient RWT inventory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS A, HPSI A, LPSI A Train Recosen: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train A.
Consequence Comment: Consequen:e is " Medium" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train B). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" based on 1 backup train (isolation). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O 9
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablanon & A PENG C4LC 013. Rev. 00 14 Sep.9 Pay A3 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 03B Consequence
Description:
Degradstion o'RWT suction B downstream of 2CV 5631 in Room 2040 during an independent deinsod (line 2HCB 27 in Room 2040)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CV 56312 can be closed from the control room. Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm and CSS low flow alarm if the break is large enough. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected IAcation: Room 2040 Spatial Effects Comments: R%T suction piping will likely fail MCC 2B52 in the corridor at El 335 (Room 2040) and propagate to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and the east stairway. MCC 2B52 contains breakers for normally closed CSS vahrs 2CV.
, 5612 1 and 5649 1 (containment sump recirculation A). If unisolated, El 317 will fill up and propagate irao the ECCS rooms (2007,2010, & 2014) failing all ECCS.
Detection is provided t;; auxiliary building sump high level and ECCS toom flood alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This is conservative since pipe break during normal standby may be just as likely (l.c.,
demand stress of RWT head is not significantly different during demand).
less of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS either due to flow diversion or insufficient RWT inventory in the containment sump to suot) ort recirculation. Isolation success also leads to loss of both CSS trains due to assumed imp w on MCC 2B52 before isolation. Normally closed 2CV 3612-1 can not fully open for train A success due to flood impact on its breaker in MCC2B52.
Loss of Train: TM-2 Train ID: HPSIB LPSIB Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B and both trains of CSS as shown above.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is "High" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and no backup train). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: HIGH O Consequence Rank O b
v
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablation No. A PENG44LC-0M, Rev 00
~14.sep.9 Page A6 of AU C Consequence ID: CSS-C-04A Consequence
Description:
Deg adation c Suction A downstream of 2CV 5630 & 2CV 5649 in Room 2014 during an independent demand (lines 2HCB 26 and 2HCB-15 downstream of 2CV-5649 in Room 2014)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CV 5630-1 can be closed from the control tvm (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection phase). Detection is bcsed on Room 2014 flood alarm, auxiliary building sump high level alarm, and CSS low flow alarm if the break is large enough. A low dWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2014 Spatial Effects Comments: R%T suction piping will likely flood ECCS train A in Room 2014 before isolation.
Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings, but the R%T can not flood Room 2007 (ECCS train B).
However, failure to isolate can be assumed to result in loss of sufficient RWT inventory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is prosided by ECCS room flood and 'uxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiatin[ Event Recovery: A medmm LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This is conservative since pipe break during normal standby may be just as likely (i.e.,
demand stress of RWT head is not signficantly different during demand).
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: 1 solation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS either due to flow diversion or insufficient RWT inventory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS A, HPSI A, LPSI A Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train A.
Corsequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, bemeen test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train B). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" based on 1 backup train (isolation). No impact on i
containment isolation.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA - Consequence Infonnation Report Calculanon No. A PENG-C4LC-Olun. 00 O 14 Sep.9 Pop A7 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS C 04B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Suction B downstream of 2CV 5631 & 2CV 5650 in Room 2007 during an independent demand (lines 2HCB-27 and 2hCB 13 downstream of 2CW
$650 in Room 2007)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments 2CW56312 can be closed from the control room (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection phase). Detection is based on Room 2007 flood alarm, auxiliary building sump high level alarm, and CSS low flow alarm if the break is large enough. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Imcation: Room 2007 Spatial Effects Comments: R%T suction piping will likely flood ECCS train B in Room 2007 before isolation.
Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings, but the R%T can not flood Room 2014 (ECCS train A).
However, failure to isolate can be assurred to result in loss of sufficient R%T inventory to fail cuntainment sump recirculation. Detection is provided by ECCS room flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N laitiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challente this piping. This is conse vative since pipe break ring normal standby inay be just as likely (i.e.,
demand stress of RWT head is not signiicantly different during demand).
Loss of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS cither due to flow diversion or insufficient RWT inventory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is "Mediurn" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9,18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train A). The failure to isolate case is a "Medime" based on I backup train (isolation). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O .
i
.f~
NJ
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculohon Na A+ENGGC-011 Rev 00 14 Sep-9 Page A8 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C-05 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of RWT suction B downstream of 2CV-5631 in Room 2006 during an independent demand (line 2HCB-27 in Room 2006)
Preak Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CV 56312 can be closed from the control room. Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm and CSS low flow alarm if the bres.k is large enough. A low R%T Icvel alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2006 Spat!al Effects Comments: Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into ECCS Rooms 2007,2010, & 2014 through ventilation openings even if they do isolate automaticall; on an SI signal.
Also, failure to isolate can tie assumed to result in loss of sufHeient R%T inventory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is prmided by auxiliary building sump high leul alarm in the control room.
Initiating Event: N initiating Event ID: N/A initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge ,is piping. This is conservative since pipe break during normal standby may be just as likely (i.e.,
demand stress of RWT head is not significantly different during demand).
less of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS cither due to flow diversion, flooding, or insufIicient R%T inventory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B. ,
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train A). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" based on i backup train (isolation). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence nank O i
FMECA - Cousequence Informat10n Report Calculatwn No. A(ENG CALC-015. Rev. 00 14 Sep.9 Page A9 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C-06A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of containment sump suction A upstream of 2CV 5649 during an independent demand (line 2HCB-15 from containment sump to 2CV 5649)
Break Size: large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CV 5647 1 can be closed from the control room. Detection is based on Room 2014 flood alarm and auxiliary building sump level.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected I4 cation: Room 2014 Spatial Effects Comments: Containment sump suction piping will likely flood ECCS train A in Room 2014 before isolation. Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings and draining the sump into the auxiliary building.
Detection is provided by Room 2014 flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the cor, trol room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A laitiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
IAss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure case is assumed to lead to loss of containment sump (common cause failure of ECCS recirculation).
uss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS A,HPSI A,LPSI A
>O Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train A recirculation.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2-2 of Ref,9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train B). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" based on 1 backup train (isolation). The consequence is upgraded to "High" because piping failure together with failure to isolate (MOV 2CV-5647-1 failure to close) can result in containment bypass (Table 2-4 of Ref. 9.18)
Consequence Category: HIGH O Consequence Rank O k
Cablanon No. A PENG4414-Off, Rrv 00 FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14 Sep-9 Page AIO of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 06B l Consequence
Description:
Degradation of containment sump suction B upstream of 2CV 5650 during an independent demand (line 2HCB-13 from containment sump to 2CV 5650)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CV-5648 2 can be closed from the control room. Detection is based on Room 2007 flood alarm and auxiliary building sump level.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2007 Spatial Effects Comments: Containment sump suction piping will likely flood ECCS train B in Room 2007 before isolation. Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Roote.s 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings and draining the sump into the auxiliary building.
Detection is provided by Room 2007 flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Es ent Recovery: A medium LOCA (hi) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: Shi-3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure case .s assumed to lead to loss of containment sump (common cause failure of ECCS recirculation).
Loss of Train: Thi-3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B recirculation.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is "hiedium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref, 9,18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train A). The failure to isolate case is a "hiedium" based on 1 backup train (isolation). The consequence is upgraded to "High" because piping failure together with failure to isolate (hiOV 2CV-5648-2 failure to close) can result in containment bypass (Table 2 4 of Ref. 9.18).
Consequence Category: HIGH C Consequence Rank O O
l
p y
FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14.Sep.9 Cablatica Na A.?ENG CALC-015. Rev. N Page Al1 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C-07A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35 A discharge to heat exchanger 2E35A during an independent demand (line 2GCB 10)
Break Stre: Large isolability of Break: Yes -
ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5630 may be required to proent grasity drainir.g through pump 2P35 A from the R%T (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection plutsc). Detection is based on Room 2014 flood alarm, auxiliary building sump high level alarm, and CSS low Eow alarm if the break is large enough. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propay,ation Effected Location: Room 2014 Spatial Effects Comments: Flooding is assumed to affect train A ECCS in Room 2014 before isolation can occur. Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings, but the RWT can not flood 2007 (ECCS train B). Howntr, failure to isolate can be assumed to result in loss of suffici:nt RWT inventory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is prosided by ECCS roore flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Eveat ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge tids piping.
p Loss of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Reco cry: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insufficient RWT inventory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Imss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS A, HPfl A, LPSI A Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train A due to flooding in the room before isolation.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of cha!!enge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train B). The failure to isolate case is a "Medmm" consercence based on I backup train (isolation).
Consequence Category: MEDRJM O Consequence Rank O O .
4 FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculation No A PENG-CALC-013. Rev. 00 14.Sep.9 Pogr A12 of A3]
l Consequence ID: CSS-C 07B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35B discharge to heat exchanger 1.E35B during an independent demand (line 2GCB-11)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Commer ts: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5631 may be requirtd to prestat grasity draining through pump 2P35B from the R%T (break is assumed to occur during R%T injection phase). Detection is based on Room 2007 flood alarm, auxiliary building sump high level alarm, and CSS low flow alarm if the break is large enough. A low R%T level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2007 Spatial Effects Comments: Flooding is assumed to affect train A ECCS in Room 2007 before isolation can occur. Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings, but the R%T can not flood 2014 (ECCS train A). However, failure to isolate can be assumed to result in loss of sufficient R%T im entory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is prosided by ECCS room flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Evert: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed tc fail all ECCS due to insufficient RWT imtntory in containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS B. HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B due to flooding in the room before isolation.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train A). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" consequence based on 1 backun train (isolation).
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank U e
1 l
. _ . . - -- ~. . .- - . -- - - - . . . - - - -
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculanon No. A PENG CALC-013 Rev. 00 O 14-Sep-9 Page A13 of A31 '
Consequence ID: CSS-C-08A Consequence Descdption: Degradation of Pump 2P35A mini flow in Room 2014 during an independent
- demand (linc 2GCB-35 and line 2DCB 11 upstream of 2CV 5673 in Room 2014)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suaion MOV 2CV 5630 is not assumed necessary to allow successful injection of the R%T into the containment (this is only a 2 inch pipe). If needed, it is assumed this train would be operated and not isolated during the R%T iqjection phase. Also, CSS could be isolated locally by closing 2BS 2A in Room 2014 which nuld allow operation of HPSI A and LPSI A without further leakage into the room. Detection is based on Room 2014 flood alarm and auxiliary building s imp high level alarm.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2014 Spatial Effects Lomments: Flooding is assumed to affect train A ECCS in Room 2014 if not isolated. Another opportunity to recognize the need for isolation is assumed to occur during recirculation actuation. Failure to isolate during the second opportunity by closing 2CV-5647 or 2CV 5649 (may be flooded) is assumed to fail the rectreulation phase of inventory control and heat removal. Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate 2
into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings. Detection is prosided by ECCS room flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A
^
p Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure case (2 failures) is assumed to lead to loss of containment sump (common cause failure of ECCS recirculation).
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS A, HPSI A, LPSI A Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of only CSS train A. Failure to isolate before recirculation (1
, failure)is assumed to lead to failure of ECCS train A due to flooding in the room.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup trains - CSS B in recirculation). The f failure to isolate cases are " Low" consequence based oa 2 backup trains (isolation and l ECCS B or 2 isolations).
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rana 0 v
FMECA . Consequence Information Report Calculanon No. A.PENG-C4LC-Olj, Rev. 00 14 Sep.9 Page Aid of A3)
Consequence ID: CSS-C 08B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35B mini flew in Room 2007 during an independent demand (line 2GCB 34 and line 2DCB-13 upstream of 2CV 5672 in Room 2007)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5631 is not assumed necessary to allow successful injection of the RWT into the containment (this is only a 2 inch pipe). If needed, it is assumed this train would be operated and not isolated during the RWT injection phase. Also, CSS could be isolated locally by closing 2BS 2B in Room 2007 which would allow operation of HPSI B and LPS! B uithout further leakage into the room. Detection is based on Room 2007 flood alarm and auxiliary building sump high level alarm.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2007 Spatial Effects Comments: Flooding is assumed to affect train B ECCS in Room 2007 if not isolated. Another opportunity to recognize the need for isolation is assumed to occur during recirculation actuation. Failure to isolate during the second opportunity by closing 2CV 5648 or 2CV-5650 (may be flooded) is assumed to fail the recirculation phase ofimentory contml and heat removal. Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 201I through ventilation openings. Detection is presided by ECCS room !!ood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A
, Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recott.ry: Isolation failure case (2 failures) is assumed to lead to loss of containment sump (common cause failure of ECCS recirculation).
Loss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of only CSS train B. Failure to isolate before recirculation (1 failure) is assumed to lead to failure of ECCS train B due to flooding in the room.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup trains - CSS A in recirculation). The failure to isolate cases are
- Low" consequence based on 2 backup trains (isolation and ECCS A or 2 isolations).
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
i p FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculanon No. A PENG-C4LC Ol3, Rev 00 Q 14 Sep.9 Page A13 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 09A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35A discharge donstream of heat exchanger 2E35A in Room 2014 during an independent demand (line 2GCB-16 in Room 2014)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV-5630 may be required to prevent gravity i
draining through pump 2P35 A from the RWT (treak is assumed to occur during RWT injection phase). Detection is based on Room 2014 flood alarm, auxiliary buili ag sump high level alarm, and CSS low flow alarm if the break is large enough and upstream of flow element. A low R%T level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2014 Spatial Effects Comments: Flooding is assumed to affect train A ECCS in Room 2014 before isolation can occur, Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings, but the RWT can not flood 2007 (ECCS train B). Howestr, failure to isolate can be assumed to result in loss of sufficient R%T imentory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is provided by ECCS room flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
less of System: SM-3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insuflicient RWT imentory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS A. HPSI A, LPSI A Train Recovery: Isolation success leis to loss of ECCS train A due to flooding in the room before isolation.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on ThSle 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I t ickup train - ECCS train B). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" consequence based on I backip train (isolation).
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O b
v
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cakulatwn No. A.PENG-CALC 015. Rev. 00 )
14 Sep-9 Page A16 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C-09B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35B discharge downstream of heat exchanger 2E35B in Room 2007 during an independent demand (line 2GCB 17 in Room 2007)
Break Size: Large Isodability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5631 may be required to prevent gravity draining through pump 2P35B from the R%T (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection phase). Detection is hised on Room 2007 flood alarm, auxiliary building sump high lesti alarm, and CSS low flow alarm if the break is large enough and upstream of flow element. A low RWT lesti alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2007 Spatial Effects Comments: Flooding is assumed to affect train B ECCS in Room 2007 before isolation can occur. Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 through ventilation openings, but the RWT can not flood 2014 (ECCS train A). However, failure to isolate can be assumed to result in loss of su0icient R%T inventory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is provided by ECCS room flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isoir. ion failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insufficient RWT inventory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B due to flooding in the room before isolation.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train A). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" consequence based on 1 backup train (isolation).
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O t
9
p FMECA - Consequence Inforrnation Report 14.Sep.9 Cataladon Na A-PENG CALC-OlJ, Rn. 00 Pay Al7 of ASI Consequence ID: CSS-C 10A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35A discharge test return upstream of 2SI 5 A in Room 2011 during an independent demand (line 2GCB 16 in Room 201I) l Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pmnp and closing suction MOV 2CV 5630 may be required to prnent grasity draining through pump 2P35A from the R%T (break is assumed to occur during R%T injection phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low R%T level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Tacation: Room 2011 Spatial afects Comments: Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2007,2010, & 2014 through ,
ventilation openings even if they do isolate automatically on a SI signal. Alst l failure to isolate can be assumed to result in loss of sufficient R%T imentory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high level alarm in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medwm LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challent his piping.
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: C"S, HPSI, LPSI Sy tem Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insufficient RWT imentory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS A, HPSI A, LPS! A Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train A.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9,18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train B). The failure to isolate case is a " Medium" consequence based on I backup train (isolation).
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O n
i 1 O
FMECA - Consequence Information Reporg Calmiaam Na A PNCAW/W M 14 Sep.9 Page A18 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 10B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35B discharge test return upstream of 2St 5B in Room 2011 during an independent demand (line 2GCB 17 in Room 2011)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suctic n MOV ?.CV 5631 may be required to prevent gra5ity draining through pump 2P35B from de RWT (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Ef)ects: Propagation Effected Location: Roort Sll Spatial Effects Comments: Failure to isolate is assumed to propagate into Rooms 2007,2010, & 2014 through ventilation openings even if they do isolate automatically on a SI signal, Also, failure to isolate can be assumed to result in loss of sufficient RWT imentory to fail containment sump recirculation. Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high I-vel alarm in the control room.
Initiatlog Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insuflicient RWT imentory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train A). The failure to
- isolate case is a " Medium" consequence based on 1 backup train (isolation).
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank D O
r FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablandn L A-PENG-CALC.Off,1tn. 00 r'
- 14 Sep.9 Pop Al9 0.f A3)
Consequence ID: CSS-C-11 A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35A discharge downstream of heat exchanger 2E35 A in Room 2055 during an independent demand (line 2GCB-16 in Room 20$5)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes
- ISO Comments
- Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2C%5630 may be required to prestnt grasity draining through pump 2P35A from ti.e RWT (break is assumed to occur during R%T injection phase) Detection is based on auxillary building sump high level alarm. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with tlw assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected I4 cation: Room 2055 Spatial Effects Comments: There are no impacts in Room 20$5, but propagation is into Room 2040 where 4 MCC 2B52 is located. Isolation failure is assumed to affect this MCC, Roort. 2040 propagates to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and the cast stair well, MCC 2B52 contains breakers for normally closed CSS valves 2C%5612 1 and 5649 1 (containment sump recirculation A). If unisolated, El 317 will fill up and i propagate into the ECCS roems (2007,2010, & 2014) failing all ECCS. Detection is prmid'.d by auxiliary building sump high level and ECCS room flood alarms in the
, co': trol room.
- Initiating Event
- N Initiating Eves.t ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovesy: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: . SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insufficient RWT im entory in the containment sump to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS A, HPSI A, LPSI A Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train A.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" bas:d on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS train B). Tiw: failure to isolate case is a " Medium" based on 1 backup train (isolation). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: hEDIUM O Consequence Rank O 1
4 O
9
FMECA - Consequence Infonnation Report Cala%tum Na A PENGMC 0D. Rn 00 14.Sep.9 Page A20 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 1IB Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35B discharge downstream of heat exchanger 2E35B in Room 2055 during an independent demand (line 2GCB 17 in Room 2055)
Break Slic: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5631 may be required to prevent gravity draining through pump 2P35B from the RWT (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2055 Spatial Effects Comments: There are no impacts in Room 2055, but propagation is into Room 2040 where MCC 2B52 is located. Isolation failure is assumed to be affected by this MCC.
Room 2040 propagates to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and the cast stair well. MCC 2B52 contains breakers for normally closed CSS vahts 2CV.
5612 1 and 56491 (containment sump recirculation A). If unisolated, El 317 will fill up and propagate into the ECCS rooms (2007,2010, & 2014) failing all ECCS.
Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high level and ECCS room flooo alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Less of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insufficient RWT inventory in the contaicment sump to support recirculation. Isolation success also leads to loss of both CSS trains due to the assumed impact on MCC 2852 before isolation, but containment cooling i provides backup train.
Loss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Reco cry: Isolation succc ; cads to loss of ECCS train B and both trains of CSS as described above.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and one backup train). The failure to isolate case is a
" Medium" based on one backup train (isolation). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O O
l
)
1
,f FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calc"Idoa No. A-Pac.cac-on. Rn. oo 14 Sep.9 Pop A21 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 12A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35A discharge upstream of 2CV 5612 in Room 2084 during an independent demand (line 2GCB 16 in Room 2084)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break Yes
- - ISO Commenin Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5630 may be required to prevent grasity draining through pump 2P35A from the RWT (break is assumed to occur during R%T tection l phase), Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low RWT levet alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
SpatialEffects; Propagation Effected 14 cation: Room 2084 I Spat!al Effects Comments: In Room 2084, the potential exists for spray impacts on HPSI and LPSI discharge i
valves. It is assumed there is sufficient separation betueen trains as with the CSS valves in this room. Propagation is into Room 2073 (EL 354) where MCC 2B62 is located, but floodmg of the MCC is unlikely, From Room 2073 propagation continues easily to El 335 (Room 2040) through floor grating and the east stairway.
Propagation into Room 2040 where MCC 2B52 is located in the corridor. Isolation failure is assumed to affect this MCC. Room 2040 propagates to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and east stairway MCC 2B52 contains breakers for normally closed CSS valves 2CV 5612 1 and $649 1 (containment sump ncirculation A). MCC 2B62 contains b.cakers for normally closed CSS valves 2CV-5613 2 and 56501 (containment sump recirculation B). If unisolated, El 317 will fnl up and propagate into the ECCS rooms (2007,2010, & 2014) failing all ECCS.
Os Detecdon is provided by auxiliary building sump high level and ECCS room flood alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A laitiatir g Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPS!
System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insuqicient P'VT inventory in the containment sump to support recirculation Loss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS A HPSI A,LPSI A Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to !oss of ECCS train A.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train). The failure to isolate case is a
" Medium" based on 1 backup train (isolation). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O L/9 x;
FMECA Consequence Information Report Calculanon No A PENG CALC-Ol5, Rev 00 14 Sep.9 Page A22 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 12B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35B discharge upstream of 2CV 5613 in Room 2084 during an independent demand (line 2GCB-17 in Room 2084)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5631 may be required to prevent gravity draining through pump 2P358 from the RWT (break is assumed to occur during RWT injstion phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected I.4 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: In Room 2084, the potential exists for spray impacts on HPSI and LPSI discharge valves. It is assumed there is sufficient separation between trains as with the CSS vahts in this room. Propagation is into Room 2073 (EL 354) where MCC 2B62 is located, but flooding of the MCC isjudged unlikely. From Room 2073 propagation continues casily to El 335 (Room 2040) through floor grating and the cast stairway.
Propagation is into Room 2040 where MCC 2B52 is located in the corridor.
Isolation failure is assumed to affect this MCC, Room 2040 propagates to El 317 .
(Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and east stairway. MCC 2B52 contains i breakers for normally closed CSS valves 2CV 5612 1 and 5649 1 (containment sump recirculation A). MCC 2B62 contains breakers for normally closed CSS vahts 2CV 5613-2 and 5650-1 (containment sump recirculation B). If unisolated, El 317 will fill up and propagate into the ECCS rooms (2007, 2010, & 2014) failing all ECCS. Detection is provided by auxilary building sump high level ar.d ECCS room flood alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fait all ECCS due to insufficient RWT inventory in the containment suinp to support recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM-3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of ECCS train B.
Consequence Corament: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train). The failure to isolate case is
' Medium" based on 1 backup train (isolation). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA - Consequence Infonnation Report cast uo Na A.Pswo calf-015,Rev. 00 f
\ l4 Sep.9 Page A23 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 13A Consequence Cescription: Degradation of Pump 2P35A discharge downstream of 2CV 5612 in Room 2084
- . during an independent demand (line 2HCB 20)
Break Size: Large Isolability en Break: Yes -
, ISO Coasments: Trip pump 2P35A or close MOV 2CV 5612 (break is assumed to occur during R%T injection phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low R%T level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition. -
1 Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected IAsh Room 2084 l Spatial Effects Comments: In Room 2084, the potential exists for spray impacts on HPSI and LPSI discharge valves. It is assumed there is sufficient separation between trains as with the CSS i valves in this room. Propagation is into Room 2073 (EL 354) where MCC 2B62 is
- . located, but flooding of the MCC isjudged unlikely. From Room 2073 propagation j continues easily to El 335 (Room 2040) through floor grating and the east stairway, Propagation is into Room 2040 where MCC 2B52 is located in the corridor.
isolation failure is assumed to affect this MCC. Room 2040 propagates to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and east stairway MCC 2B52 contains breakers for normally closed CSS valves 2CV 5612 1 and 5649 1 (containment 1 sump recirculation A). MCC 2B62 contains breakers for normally closed CSS valves
, 2CV 5613 2 and 56501 (containment sump recirculation B). If unisolated, El 317 will fill up and propagate into the ECCS rooms (2007,2010, & 2014) failing all
/ ECCS, Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high level and ECCS room
\ flood alarms in the control room.
4 Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A 1
Initiating Event Recovery: A medmm LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Less of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI
- System Recovery
- Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insufficient R%T inventory in the
- trains in recirculation due to assumed impact on MCC 2B62 before isolation (discharge MOV 2CV 5613 is assumed to open prior to impact on MCC)J less of Train
- TM 1 Train ID: CSS A i
Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of CSS train A, but containment cooling prosides backup.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure, and one backup train (isolation)) for failure to isolate case. The successful isolation case is a " Low" consequence with two backup trains
, counting containment cooling. 2BS 5A provides contaimnent isolation inside containment.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consegmence Rank O 4
O
- i 4
_ _ , . , _ - . _ _ , , . - . . . - . . , _ _ . . . __. . _ = _ . , . .
i l
Calculaten No A PENG-CAM 00,Rev 00 FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14 Sep.9 Page A24 of ASI '
Consequence ID: CSS-C-13B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35B discharge downstream of 2CV 5613 in Room 2084 during an independent demand (line 2HCB 21)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes .
1 ISO Comments: Trip pump 2P35B or close MOV 2CV 5613 (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection l phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high > vel alarm. A low RWT level alarm l will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
1 Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: In Room 2084, the potential exists for spray impacts on HPSI and LPSI discharge i valves. It is assumed there is L,fficient separation between trains as with the CSS
' valves in this room. Propagation is into Room 2073 (EL 354) where MCC 2B62 is located, but flooding of the MCC isjudged unlikely From Room 2073 propagation continues easily to El 335 (Room 2040) through floor grating and the east stairway,
- Propagation is into Room 2040 where MCC 2B52 is located in the corridor.
Isolation failure is assumed to affect this MCC. Room 2040 propagates to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and east stairway, MCC 2B52 contains
, breakers for normally closed CSS valves 2CV 5612 1 and 5649-1 (containment
! sump recirculation A). MCC 2B62 contains breakers for normally closed CSS vah>es l 2CV 5613 2 and 56501 (containment sump recirculation B). If unisolated, El 317 l will fill up and propagate into the ECCS rooms (2007,2010, & 2014) failing all l ECCS. Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high level and ECCS room flood alarms in the control room.
Initiating Event: N anitiating Event ID: N/A
- Initiating Event Recovery
- A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: SM 3 System IPE ID: CSS, HPSI, LPSI l
i System Recovery: Isolation failure is assumed to fail all ECCS due to insufficient RWT im entory in the I
containment sump to suppon recirculation.
Loss of Train: TM 1 Train 1D: CSS B l Train Recovery: Isolation success leads to loss of CSS train B, but containment cooling prmides backup.
l l Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of l challenge, all year exposure, and I backup train for failure to isolate). The successful isolation case is a " Low" consequence with two backup trains counting containment cooling. 2BS-5B provides containment isolation inside containment.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O l
Ol1 l
l 1
A FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calc"la' ion & A PENG-CALC.0ff, An. 00 Q 14.Sep 9 Page A23 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS C 14A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of Pump 2P35A discharge downstream of 2CV 5612 inside containment during an independent demand (line 2HCB 3 upstream of 2BS 5A)
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tr:p pump 2P35A or close MOV 2CV 5612, but this is not necessary to prevent additional I impacts since the RWT is being pumped to the ontainment (the pipe break affects spray effectiveness, but not the heat removal fuction). Not easy to detect except containment pressure may not reduced as fast as expected and train B is still available.
Spatial ENects: Containment Effected 1Acation: Containment Building Spatirl Effects Comments: Equipment inside containment is qualified for this event.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (hi) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: N/A less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: Loss of CSS train A occurs only if the train is isolated by the operators. The train is still capable of performing its containment heat removal function.
t Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Low" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure, and 2 backup trains - CSS A & B and ECCS A & B).
2CV 5612 and closed system outside provide containment isolation.
Consequence Category: low O Consequence Rank O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cohlation No. A PENG44LC-olf, Rev 00 14 Sep.9 Page A26 of A!)
Consequence ID: CSS-C-14B Consequence
Description:
Degrndation of Pump 2P35B discharge downstream of 2CV.5613 inside containment during an independent demand (line 2HCB-4 upstream of 2BS 5B)
Break Size: Large isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Trip pump 2P35B or close MOV 2CV 5613, but this is not necessary to prevent additional impacts since the RWT is being pumped to the containment (the pipe break affects spray effectiveness, but not the heat removal fuction). Not easy to detect except containment pressure may not reduced as tast as expected and train A is still available.
Spatial Effects: Containment Effected Location. Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: Equipment inside c intainment is qualified for this event.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: N/A Loss of Train: N Tra*n ID: N/A T rain Recovery: Loss of CSS train B occurs only if the train is isolated by the operators. The train is still capable of performing its containment heat removal function.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Low" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure, and 2 backup trains CSS A & B and ECCS A & B).
2CV 5613 and closed system outside provide containment isolation.
Consequence Category: Low O Consequence Rank O l
i l
v
. FMECA Consequence Inforsnation Repost C8'ad***a Na A.PENG-CAM 04 An. 00
} 4.sep.9 Pay A27 of All consegmence ID: _ CSS-615A Consequence
Description:
Degramation of NAOH line to Train A (line 2GCB 70) during an independent
.- demand.
Break Sise _ - Large Isolability of Betak: Yes 3-ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2CV 5630 may be required to prevent gravity ;
L draining through pmnp 2P35A from the R%T (break is assumed to occur during RWT hpection 1
phase).- Detection is based on Room 2014 flood alarm and auxiliary building sump high level i - alarm. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed
!' LOCA condition.
l Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected IACatioR:_ Room 2014 i Spatial Effects Comments: Since this is a small line (2 inch diameter), flooding of ECCS train A in Room 2014
. is assumed only ifisolation fails Also flow diversion impacts are not assumed.
] .. Failure to isolate is not assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 during i_ impection phase due to break size. Detecuan is provided by ECCS room flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room. IAss of train A must be assumed during the recirentation phase due to isolation, otherwise, the 1 containment sump would be emptied into the ECCS room.
Initiating Event: N lattiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping, j Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A
{- System Ree Loss of all ECCS during recirculation phase is possible if the containment' sump was pumped
! 'he auxiliary building. This isjudged to be equivalent to 2 isolation failures (2 backup
.ars).
!' Loss of Train: 'IW3 Train ID: CSS A,HPSI A, LPSI A i Train Recovery: Isolation of ECCS train during recirculation is required. No credit is allowed for local isolation of CSS, thus, allowing recovery of HPSI and LPSI.
l _ Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of .
i: challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS B) Containment isolation is unaffected.
j Coesequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O-i 4
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1 6
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Calculatum No. A PENG4dN U, Rev 00 FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14 Sep.9 Pop A2 i AH Consequence ID: CSS-C 15B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of NAOH liae to Train B (line 2GCB-69) during an independent demand.
Break Size: Large isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Tripping the pump and closing suction MOV 2C%5631 may be required to prevent gravity draining through pump 2P35B from the R%T (break is assumed to occur during RWT injection phase). Detection is based on Room 2007 flood alarm and auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low R%T level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2007 Spatial Effects Comments: Since this is a small line (2 inch diameter), flooding of ECCS train B in Room 2007 is assumed only ifisolation fails. Also, flow diversion impacts are not assumed.
Failure to isolate is not assumed to propagate into Rooms 2006 & 2011 during injection phase due to break size. Detection is prmided by ECCS room flood and auxiliary building sump high level alarms in the control room. Lass of train B must be assumed during the recirculation phase due to isolation, otherwise, the containment sump would be emptied into the ECCS toom.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recoven: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
less of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Loss of all ECCS during recirculation phase is possible if the containment sump was pumped to the auxiliary building. This isjudged to be equivalent to 2 isolation failures (2 backup trains).
Loss of Train: TM 3 Train ID: CSS B, HPSI B, LPSI B Train Recovery: Isolation of ECCS train during recirculation is required. No credit is allowed for local isolation of CSS, thus, allowing recovery of HPSI and LPSI.
Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, between test exposure, and I backup train - ECCS A). Containment isolation is unafIected.
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O G
3 FMECA - Consequence Information ' Report calc t.um n A.PENocuc.015,an oo
}p 14.Sep.9 Pop A29 of All Consequence ID: CSS-C-16 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of R%T suction to SFPP and charging (line 2HCB-7) during an independent demand.
Break Stae: Larg3 Isolability of Break: No ISO Cocments: Unisolable.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Ou' side Spatial Effects Comments: This piping is located both outside near the RWT and in Room 2040 Propagation from Room 2040 is down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 & 2011) through floor drains and cast stairway, Detection is provided by auxiliary building sump high level alarm, but this is irrelevant since the break is unisolable. This line is judged too small (3 inch diameter) to divert enough of the R%T to cause flow diversion or loss of ECCS.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A laitiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Pipe size is assumed too small to cause flow diversion or loss of ECCS.
Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Low" base on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure, and 2 backup trains - CSS A & B and ECCS A & B).
Containment isolation is unaffected.
Consequence Category: Low O Consequence Rank O a
Calculation No A PENG CALC Olj, Rev. 00 FMECA - Consequence Information Report 14 Sep.9 Page A30 of A31 Consequence ID: CSS-C 17A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of service air connection to Train A (line 211CB 93) during an independent demand.
Break Size Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Trip pump 2P35 A or close MOV 2CV 5612 (break is assumed to occur during RWT iqjection phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low RWT level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
Spatial Effects: Propag.' ion Effected Iecation: Room 2084 j Spatial Effects Comments: Since this is a small line (2 inch diameter), flooding impact is not assumed. Also, )
, flow diversion impacts are not assumed. Detection is prmided by auxiliary building l l sump high level alarms in the control room. Loss of train CSS A must be assumed !
during the recirculation phase due to isolation, otherwise, the containment sump l would be emptied into the auxiliary building. ]
l Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A !
Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challeng this piping. l Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A Sy stem Recovery: Loss of all ECCS during recirculation phase is possible if the containment sump was pumped to the auxiliary building. This isjudged to be equivalent to 2 isolation failures (2 backup trains).
Less of Train: T Train ID: CSS A l Train Recovery: Isolation of CSS train during recirculation is required (2CV-5612). This allows HPSI A &
( LPSI A success. Also, containment cooling system can replace CSS A.
! Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Low" based on Table 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure, and 2 backup trains; HPSI, LPSI, CSS B, and containment cooling). 2BS 5 A provides containment isolation inside containment.
Consequence Category: Low 0 Consequence Rank O l
9
4 Calndation No. A.PENG CALC 015, Rn. 00 FMECA - Consequence Inforrnation Report Page A31 of A31 O< 14.Sep.9 Consequence ID: CSS-C 17B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of service air connection to Train B (line 2HCB-94) during an independent demand.
[ Break Size: Large isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Trip pump 2P35B or close, MOV 2C%5613 (break is asamed to occur during R%T injection
! phase). Detection is based on auxiliary building sump high level alarm. A low R%T level alarm will also occur, but it could be associated with the assumed LOCA condition.
SI atla! Effects: Propagation Effected 14 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: Since this is a small line (2 inch diameter), flooding impact is not assmed. Also, flow diversion impacts are not assumed Detection is provided by auuliary building sump high level alarms in the control room. Loss of train CSS B must be assumed during the recirculation phase due to isolation, otherwise, the containment sump would be emptied into the auxiliary building.
Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: A medium LOCA (M) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping.
. Loss of System: N System IPE ID: N/A System Recovery: Loss of all ECCS during recirculation phase is possible if the containment sump was pumped to the auxiliary bailding. This isjudged to be equivalent to 2 isolation failures (2 backup 9 trains).
(U Loss of Train: T Train ID: CSS P
, Train Recovery: Isolation of CSS train during recirculation is required (2C%5613). This allows HPSI B &
LPSI B success. Also, containment cooling system can replace CSS B.
Cousequence Comment: Consequence is " Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequenef of challenge, all year exposure, and 2 backup trains, HPSI, LPSI, CSS A, and containment cooling). 2BS 5B provides containment isolation hwide containment.
Consequence Category: LOW C Consequence Rank O s
e 4
V t
1
i Calculation No. A.PENG. CALC 015, Rev. 00 Page 81 of 844 0 .
l APPE.*!.?!X 3 YMECA - DEGRADATION MECHANISMS *
(Attachment Pages 81 844)
O ABB Combustion E,ngineering Nuclear Operations
'## C"#"" " #" N""'5 R" 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms '
Page B2 of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Iecation T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-001 211CD-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 794)S9 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump 5650-7 ^ WCB-13-1) 2P-35B CSS CSS-001 211CD-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 79 4 0 Upstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump (ISO 211CB-13-1) 2P-35B CSS CSS-001 211CB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 7942 Downstream of elbow #22 No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump (ISO 2HCB-13-1) 2P-35B CSS CSS 4)01 211CB-13-24" large Pipe from Cont. 7943 Upstream orelbow f22 No No No Ho No No No No Sump to Spray Pump (ISO 211CB-13-1) 2P-35B CSS CSS-001 211CB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 7944 Downstream of elbow #21 No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump (ISO 2HCB-13-If 2P-35B CSS CSS-001 211CB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 7945 Upstream ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump (ISO 211CB-13-2) 2P-35B CSS CSS-001 211CB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 7945A Dunmishn of piping No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump section #2 (ISO 211CB 2P-35B 2)
CSS CSS-001 211CB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 7946 Downstream of MOV No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump 2CV-5648-2 (ISO 2fiCB-2P-35B 13-2)
CSS CSS-001 211CB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 79-066A Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump operateri valve 2CV-5685- 3 2P-35B 2 (211CB-13-2)
Deersdation Mechanisms T "IhennelFatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Craciang (PWSCC) M - Microbiologica ly Innuenced Cemmon (MIC) F-Flow Accelerseed Common C-Commen Cracking I-Intergranutar stress Common Cracking posCC) E - Eresson - Cavitation 0 - Other O 9 9
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'# # FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"""'" * #" "NN 8"# I Page B3 of 344 l Weld System ID Segment Line Number line Description N nnber Weld tacation T C F I M- E' F :O i CSS CSS-001 211CB-15-24" From Containment 78-051 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps - operated vahe 2CV-5649-1 (ISO 2HCB-15 3?
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" From Containment 78-054 Domestream of elbow #22 No No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" From Containment 7F-055 Upstreana ofelbow #22 Fo No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" From Containment 78-056 Domistream ofelbow #21 N2 No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" Fror Containment 78-056A Di,mistream of piping No No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps secten #1 (ISO 2HCB 1)
CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" From Containment 78-057 Upstream of piping secten N. No 'No No No No No No CSS Sump to CS Pumps #1 (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" From Containment 78-057A Domistream ofpiping No No No No No No No No CSS Sump to CS Pumps section #1 (ISO 2HCB 2)
CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" From Containment 78-058 Upstream ofpiping section No No No No No No No No CSS Sump to CS Pumps #1 (ISO 2HCB-15-2)
CSS-001 2HCB-15-24" From Containment 78-058A Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No No CSS Sump to CS Pumps operated wahr 2CV-5647-2 (ISO 2HCB-15-2) 2HCB-24M0" Large Pipe from 77-008 Domistream orreducing No No No No No No No No CSS - CSS-001 Refueling WaterTank cibow #12 (2HCB-24-2) 2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps Desradeen M-*-- -as P - Prunary Weser stress Ccrreemen crecting (PWSCC) M-ML" J ,InAmancedCommmen(MIC) F-flew AanierusedCarvemen T ThmnalFatigue C-Corressen Cracking I"a, Stress Correman Credung OGSCC) E- Eremian-Cowestson 0-other l
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- FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B4 of B44 f
W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Ieestion T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-001 - 211CB-24-20" Large Pipe from 77409 Upstream of elbow #I3 No No No No No No No No Refueling Water Tank (ISO 2HCB-24-2) 2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps i
CSS CSS-001 2HCD-24-20" Large Pipe from 77-010 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No Wo No No No No Refueling Water Tank 5630-1 (ISO 2HCB-24-2) 2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps CSS-001 2HCB-24-20" Large Pipe from 77-01I Upstream of halfcoupling No No No No No No No No, CSS Refueling Water Tank #18 (ISO 2HCB-24-2)
-2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps CSS CSS-001 211CB-24-20" Large Pipe from 77-012 Downstream of tee #14 No No No No No No No No Refueling Water Tank (ISO 2HCB-24-2}
2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps CSS CSS-001 2HCB-24-20" large Pipe fmm 7 -013 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No Refueling Water Tank 5631-2 (ISO 2HCB-24-2) 2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps CSS CSS-001 211CB-24-24" targe pipe rrom 77-001 Upstream ofelbow #2 No No No No No No No No Refueling Water Tank (ISO 2HCB-24-I) 2T-3 to Containment S;nay Pumps (and other ECCS pumps) ,
Dearadation Mechesumms T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Common Cradung (PWSCC) M- Mic%ully Infleeced Common (MIC) F- Flow Accelernsed Common C- Common Crading I- Intergranular stre Common Craciung (IOSCC) E- Fsosion-Cavitstum O -Other O O O
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FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B5 of B44 1 ,
W eld
- System ID Segment . Line Number . Line Description Number . Weld Leention T C P I M .E F 0 __
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-24-24" Large pipe from 77-002 Downstream orcibow #2 No No No No No No No No' Refueling WaterTank (ISO 2HCB-24-2) 2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps (and oil-r ECCS pumps)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-24-24" Large pipe from 77-002A Downstream olpiping No No No No No No No No Refueling Water Tank section #1 (ISO 2HCB 2T-3 to Containment 2)
Spray Pumps (and other ECCS pumps)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-24-24" Large pipe rrom 77-003 At interface mith Weldolet No No No No No No No No Refueling Water Tank #15 (ISO 2HCB-24-2) 2T-3 to Containment Spray Pumps (and other ECCS pumps)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-24-24" Large pipe from 77-007 Upstream of reducing No No N3 No No No No No Refueling WaterTank elbow #12 (ISO 2HCB 2T-3 to Containment 2)
Spray Pumps (and other ECCS pumps)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-27-20" Sectionline for CS79-001 Downstream of MOV No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B 2CV-5631-2 (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-002 Upstream orelbow #10 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-001 2HCB-27-20" Suction line for CS - 79 003 Upstream ofelbow fl6 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
I l Dear am a9-w 1-u r r.# r- r, ry ar = ~ cr.ci - u--m --m E-Eroehe-Caviession r-n --
0-Oqher c-corressee cracking I - :.. , - seress Corressee Cracking (10 SCC)
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Calculatiorr No. A-PENG-CALC-Ol3. Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms e g, 36 of 34, Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O CSS CSS-001 211CB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-004 Downstream ofelbow #16 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-20-2" CS train A interfacing 75-021 A At interface nith sockolet No No No No No No No No 2"line connection to #15 (ISO 2HCB-20-1) senice air line CSS CSS-002 2HCB-21-2" CS train B interfacing 76-026A Atinterfacewithweldolet No No No No No No No No 2"line connection to #9 (ISO 2HCB-21-1) senice air line CSS CSS-002 2HCB-3-10" CS header from 75-026 Upstream of elbow f29 No No No No No No No No containment (ISO 2HCB-3-1) !
penetration #2P-17 CSS CSS-002 211CB-3-10" C3 header from 75-027 Downstream ofelbow #29 No No No No No No No No containment (ISO 211CB-3-1) penetration #2P-17 CSS CSS-002 2HCB-3-10" CS header from 75428 Upstream ofelbow #28 No No No No No No No No containment (ISO 2HCB-3 *)
penetration #2P-17 CSS CSS-002 2HCB-3-10" CS header from 75-029 Downstream ofelbow #28 No No No No No No No No containment (ISO 2HCB-3-1) penetration #2P-17 CSS CSS-002 2HCB-3-10" CS header from 75-030 Upstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No containmerd (ISO 2HCB-3-1) penetration #2P-17 CSS CSS-002 2HCB-3-10" CS header from 75-031 Dumotsum of elbow #30 No No No No No No No No containment (ISO 2HCB-3-1) penetration #2P-17 Dearadation Mechanums T~ n=rmal ratigue P - Prunary Water Stress Corrosion Cracksng (PWSCC) M - MicrobiologpcaDy Inneenced Cerroman (MIC) F-Flow AccelerssedCareness C-Corre nonCracking I - Inter 8ranular Stress Cerrasson Craclung (IGSCC) E - Erassen-Cavitatica 0-Other O O O
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Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weldlacation T C F I M- E F O CSS CSS-002 2HCB-3-10" CS header from 75432 Upstream ofcheck valve No No No No No No No No containment 2BS-SA (ISO 2HCB-3-1) penetration #2P-17 CSS CSS-002 211CB4-10" CS header from 76-031 Downstream of flued head No No No No No No No No Containment #20 (ISO 2HCB4-1)
Penetration 2P-23 CSS CSS-002 2HCB4-10" CS header from 76-032 Upstream orcibow #9 No No No No No No No No-Containmer1 (ISO 2HCB4-1)
Penetration 2P-23 CSS CSS-002 2HCB4-10" CS header from 76-033 Downstream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No Containment (ISO 2HCB4-1)
Penetration 2P-23 CSS CSS-002 2HCB4-10" CS header from 76 034 Upstream of elbow #10 No No No No No No No No Containment (ISO 2HCB4-1)
Penetration 2P-23 CSS CSS-002 211CB4-10" CS header from 76-035 Downstream orelbow #10 No N; No No No No No No Containment (ISO 2HCB4-1)
Penetration 2P-23 1
CSS CSS-002 2HCB4-10" CS header from 76-036 Upstream ofcheck valve No No No No No No No No l Containment 2BS-5B (ISO 2HCB4-1)
Penetration 2P-23 CSS CSS 402 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-014 Upstream of piping section No No No No No No No No from RWT #1 (ISO 2HCB-7-1)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-015 Upstream of elbow #3 No No No No No No No No from RWI' (ISO 2HCB-7-1)
Desredessen Mechsmanu P - Prunary waner stres corrosion Cracting (rwscC) M - ML _'
- --, adhm icedCerro =(urC) r-m. Acceler sedcarrome.
l T.nmnal ratisue 0 - Odwr l C-Carroesen Cracking I-lesergranular Stress Cerrassen Cracbng(IGSCC) E-Eranon-Caviestica
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'*' FMECA - Degradation Mechaniems N"'""" #* "EVG-C'LC" "'" 88 Page B8 of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-002 211CB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-016 Down* ream of elbow #3 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 211CB-7-1)
CSS CSS-002 211CB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-017 Upstream of check valve No No No No No No No No from RWT 2BS-6 (ISO 2HCB-7-1)
CSS CSS-002 211C8-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-018 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No from RWT vake 2BS-6 (ISO 2HCB 2)
CSS CSS-002 211CD-7-3* Charging pump suction 77-019 Duermacam of elbow #23 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-020 Upstream of cibow #14 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 211CB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-021 Downstream orelbow #14 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-022 Upstream of elbow #15 No No No No No No No No from R%T (I"O 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-023 Downstream ofelbow #15 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCD-7-3" Charging purnp suction 77-024 Upstream of ei.w #16 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-025 Downstream ofelbew #16 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-026 Upstream of elbow #17 No No No No No Na No Fo from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-027 Downstream ofcIbow #17 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
Deeradation Mechannms T-Thennal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Waser Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PW5CC) M - MicrobeologicaDy Innueared Cerroman (MIC) F-Ibn Acreierssed Cerrossen C-Carranion Cracking I Intergranular Stress Cerrosson Oradung (IGSCC) E- Erenan -Cavitation 0-Other O O O
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'# # 7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B9 of B44 i W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Locaties T C P 1 M E F O CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-028 Upstream of 3" x 3" x 3" No No No No No No No No from RWT tee #24 (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-029 Downstream of 3" x 3" x No No No No No No No No from RWT 3" tee #24 (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 21G 7-3" Charging pump suction 77-030 Downstream of 3" x 3* x No No N No No No No No from PWT 3" tec #24 (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pu:np suctica 77-031 Upstream ormanual valve No No No No No No No No from R%T 2BS-7 (ISO 211CB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-032 UpItream of crew #18 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2; CSS-002 211CB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-033 Downstream orelbow #18 No No No No No No No No CSS from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-034 Downstiram of piping No No No No No No No No from R%T sectnen #8 (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-035 Upstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump saction 77-036 Dcwnstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No CSS from RWT (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-037 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No W from R%T section #10 (ISO 2HCB 2)
CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-018 Upstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No CSS from R%T (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-039 Downstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No CSS from RWT (150 2HCB-7-2) penr.a.eion T-Hermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Wster Stress Carronen Cracking (PWSCC) M-ML* -J 2,InnuencedCarressen(MIC) F-Flow Accelerseed Cerroman c-corremon cracking 1-Irmerar===iusiresscerro encrainsposcC) E-Ecsion Javitatien 0-Odier
a
"'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Nculan n Na AMNQl5. Retr. 00 Page BIO of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O ;
CSS-002 2HCB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-040 Upstream ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No No CSS from R%T (ISO 2HCB-7-2) 211CB-7-3" Charging pump suction 77-041 Upstream of motor No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 from RWF operated vahe 2CV-4950-2 (ISO 2HCB-7-2)
Senice airline to 75-084 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 2HCB-93-2" 2HCB-20(Train A) section #1 (ISO 2HCB 1) 2HCB-93-2" Senice air lim.to 75-085 Downstream of elbow #3 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 211CB-20(Train A) (ISO 2HCB-93-1) 211CB-93-2" Senice air line to 75-086 Upstream ofelbow #3 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 2iiCB-20(Train A) (ISO 2HCB-93-1) 2HCB-93-2" Senice air linc to 75-087 Downstream ofelbow #5 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 2HCB-20 (Train A) (ISO 2HCB-93-1) 2HCB-93-2" Senice air line to 75-088 Upstream ofelbow #5 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 21ICB-20(Train A) (ISO 2HCB-93-1)
Senice air line to 75-089 Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 2HCD-93-2" 2HCB-20(Train A) vahr 2STA-85A (ISO 2HCB-93-1) 2HCB-94-2" Senice air line to 76-086 Dumo us of piping No No No No No No No IJo CSS CSS-002 211CB-21 (Train B) section #1 (ISO 2HCB 1)76-087 Downstream ofelbow #3 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-002 2HCB-94-2" Senice airline to 2HCB-21 (Train B) (ISO 2HCB-94-1)
Dearadation Mahanums P - Pnmary Water Stress Corroseon Cracbng (PWSCC) M-ML4,1 0 7IndleencedCommon(MIC) F-now Asrelerased Common T-Tbmnal Fatigue I-Irisergranular Stress Carosion Cracbng (IGSCC) E Eremon-Cavitation 0-Oiher C-Carrosson Crackirts O O 9
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FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bil of B44 W eld -
System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Iacation T C F I M E F O CSS CSS-002 2HCB-94-2" Servicc air line to 76-088 Upstream ofelbow #3 No No No No No No No No 2HCB-21 (Train B) (ISO 2HCB-94-1)
CSS CSS-002 2HCB-94-2" Senice airline to 76-089 Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No 2HCB-21 (Train B) vahr 2SA-85B (ISO 2HCB-94-1)
CSS CSS-003 2DCD-I I-2" Minimum flow line 7541 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No from 2GCB-35 to vahr 2BS-17A (ISO e 2DCB-2 2DCB-11-1)
CSS CSS-003 2DCB-11-2" Minimum flow line 75 4 2 Upstream of tee #6 (ISO No No No No No No No No from 2GCB-35 to 2DCB-II-l) 2DCB-2 CSS CSS-003 2DCB-II-2" Minimum flow line 7543 Downstream ortec #6 No No No No No No No No from 2GCB-35 to (ISO 2DCB-11-1) 2DCB-2 CSS CSS-003 2DCB-11-2" Minimum flowline 75-064 Downstream ortee #6 No No No No No No No No from 2GCB-35 to (ISO 2DBC-11-1) 2DCB-2 CSS CSS-003 2DCB-II-2" Minimum flow line 75 4 5 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No from 2GCB-35 to operated vahe 2CV-5673-2DCB-2 1 (ISO 2DCB-11-1)
CSS CSS-003 2DCB-13-2" CS Pump 2P-35B 7645 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No Minimum flow line vaht 2BS-17B (ISO 2DCB-13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2DCB-13-2" CS Pump 2P-35B 7645 Upstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No Minimum flow line (ISO 2DCB-13-1)
Desradseian Medummes T-Hermal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Waser Stress Cavressen Crackmg (PWSCC) M - Microtisolaycauy Imamenced Ceeman (MIC) F- Flow ActulW Carromen C-Carroman Ctacting 1 - beergranmier Stress Cerrouan Cracksig (IGSCC) E - Erosian - Canentsan 0-Oswr
"# C"" lad n A'oMMWlf, Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms l' age B!2 of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O CSS CSS-003 2DCB-13-2" CS Pump 2P-35B 76 067 Downstream of elbow #14 No No No No No No No No Minimum flow line (ISO 2DCB-13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2DCB-13-2" CS Pump 2P-35B 76-068 Upstream ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No Minimum flow line (ISO 2DCB-13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2DCB-13-2" CS Pump 2P-35B 76-069 Downstream ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No Minimum flow line (ISO 2DCB-13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2DCB-13-2" CS Pump 2P-35B 76-070 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Minimum flow line operated vahr 2CV-5672-1 (ISO 2DCB-13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCD-10-10" From CS Pump 2P-25A 75-019 Downstream of l2" x 10" No No No No No No No No to SDC IN 2E-35A conantric reducer #53 at (10" portion) SDC lix 2E-35A inlet (ISO 2GCB-10-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-002 Upstream ofelbow &42 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-003 Downstream of cibow #42 No No No No No No No No to SDC IIX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-004 Upstream ofcheck vaht No No No .No No No No No to SDCIIX 2E- 2BS-4A (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2F-35A 75-005 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E- valve 2BS-4A (ISO 2GCB-35A.(12* portion) 10-1)
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i Weld System ID Segment Line Nember Line Description Number Weld Location T C F I M E F 'O ,
I CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-006 Upstream ofelbow #43 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-007 Downstream arelbow #43 No No No No No No No No to SDCIIX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-008 Upstream orelbow #44 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-010 Downstream of elbow #44 No No No No No No No No-to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-011 Upstream ofelbow #45 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-012 Downstr-am orelbow #45 No No No No No No No No
.o SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-013 Upstream orelbow s46 No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75414 Downstream ofelbow #46 No No No No No No No ' No to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion) .
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-12" From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-015 Downstream ofelbow #47 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E- (ISO 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12* portion)
Desradssone Mech ===w T-Hermal Fatigue F- ?.imary Water Stren Ca osson Cracting(PWSCC) M-M_ " . J "yhdhenced Cerrosion(MIC) F-Flow Accelsruned Carrassee C-Carras.on Cracking I- heergra mlar serem Cernman craclung OGSCC) E- Deeman-Centsese 0-other
iner-97 Cokalarme %. A-PEWCtLC-015. Pa 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bit of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Newce Line Description Number Weld Imcation T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2GCE-10-12* From CS Ptunp 2P-35A 75-016 Upstream or tec 848 (ISO 14 No ?4 No No No No &
ta SDC riX 2E- 2GCB-10-1) 35A_(12* portion)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-10-12* From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-017 Upstream of tee #48 (ISO No No No No No No No No to SDCIE 2E- 2GCB-10-1) 35A.(12" portion)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-IG-82* From CS Pump 27-35A 75-018 Upstream ell 2* x 10" No No No No No No No L to SDC HX 2E- concentric reducer #50 35A.(12* portx,n) (ISO 2GCB-10-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-3* Interfacing 3* line with 75403A At interface with widolet No No No No No No No No CS Pump 2P-35A mini- #55 (ISO 2GCB-10-1) flow line CSS CSS-003 2GCB-10-6* From CS Pump 2P-35A 75-001 Upstream of 12* x 6* No No No No No No No No discic1;e concentne reducer #49 -at pump 2P-35A discle (ISO 2GCB-10-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-10" From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-023 Downstream of l2* x 10* No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B concentric reducer #32,at (10* portion) SDC HX inlet (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-1 -12* From CS pump 2P-35B 76-002 Dums-- of l2* x 6* No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B concentnc reducer #33 -
(12* portion) 12* side (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-003 Dums-- ofelbow fl No No No Na No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
(12* portion)
Desr.dauan Mecian m.
T-Thmnal resisme r - Prunary weier stress cerronen credirs (Pum u-Micrd aleycaryInneernetCommene(MIC) F- Flow h caminen c-carremen creams I-beerpunnier sires cem,.,en creas,aosCC) E- Eremen -Cavenhee 0-Oew O 9 O
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'# GaladarNa MMWlf.Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanissus l' age BIS of B44 Weld Systese ID h Line Number Line Description Nesuber Weld Imcaties T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-Ir From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-004 Upstream orrM valve No No No No No Fo No No to SDC im 2E-35B 2BS-4B OSO 2GCB-II-1)
(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-11-12' From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-005 Don 1tstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B vahr 2BS-4B OSO 2GCB-(12" portion) 11-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-008 Dhmm ofelbow f2 No No No No No No No No to 50C IDC 2E-35B OSO 2GCB-II-1)
(12* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76 009 Upstream ofelbow #3 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B OSO 2GCB-Il-)
(12* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-010 Don 1 stream of eRxm- f3 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
(12* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-12" From CS Pump 2P-35B 76411 Upstream ofelbow #4 No No No Ne No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B OSO 2GCB-11-1)
(12* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II 12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-012 Downstream orelbow #4 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B OSO 2GCB-11-1)
(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-I I-12" From CS P2mp 2P-35B 76013 Upstream ofelbow #5 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
(12* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-ll-12" From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-014 Downstream ofelbow f5 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
(12* portion)
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Desradmisse Maammmes T-Thmnal Fatigue F - Pnmary Waser strear Common Crudmg (F%W M*~ _' ' _ _-", bdhseced Carveusen(MIC) F-Mew Anelersned Commen c- Common Cr=*ing I-:.% siress Common Credms OGSCC) E- Esessen -Cawmies o-osier
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l' age B16 of"B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nanser Weld Location T C P I M E F O CSS CSS 403 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-015 Upstream of flange #29 No No No No No No No No to SDC ILX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
(12* portion)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-016 Upstream ofelbow #6 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-358 (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
(12* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-018 Don 1rstream ofelbew #6 No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB-11-1)
(12" portion)
. CSS CSS-003 2GCB-11-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-020 Dominstream ofcibow #7 No No No No No No No No i to SDC HX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB-II-1)
(12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-11-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-021 Upstream of tec #34 (ISO No No N No No No No No !
(12* portion)
CSS CSS @3 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-022 Upstream of l2* x 10* No No No No No No No No to SDC HX 2E-35B concentnc reducer #32 (12" portion) (ISO 2GCB-II-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-12* From CS Pump 2P-358 76-071 A At interfxe with half No No No No No F4 No No to SDC HX 2E-35B coupling #39 (ISO 2GCB-(12* portion) I1-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-II-6* From CS Pump 2P-35B 76-001 Upstream of 12" x 6' No No No No No No No No discharge concentnc reducer #33 at pump da! up - 6* side .
(ISO 2GCB-11-1) pew =daan u=5====
T-Thment Fatigue F - Pnmary Wata Streu Carramen Cradang (P%W M - Mm:robeedepcmRy !afbeerical Commaan (MIC) F-fle= AccelerusedCervensee c-Carramon crocus I- 1., _.>r sire = Cerrewm Cr= ting OGSCC) E- Eres.am -Caventum O-06 er O O O
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'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' "'"*"' #" NMW #" 8' Page BIT of BH WeW System ID Segament Line Number Line Description 1%emeber WeM 14 cation T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10* Discharge from SDC 59-001 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10" 5612-1 (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10" Discharge from SDC 59-002 Upstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10* (ISO 2GCB-16-1) pomon)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10" Discharge from $DC 59-003 Downstream ofelbow #28 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10' (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portson)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10" Discharge from SDC 59-004 Upstream ofcIbow #28 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10" (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10" Discharge from SDC 59-005 Downstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No- No No
~
HX 2E-35A (10' (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10* Discharge from SDC 59-006 Upstream ofchow #26 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10* (ISO 2GCB-16-1) porten)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10" DM g from SDC 59-007 Downstream ofcibow #24 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10* (ISO 2GCB-16-l) patson) ,
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10" Discharge from SDC 59-008 Upstream ofelbow #24 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10' (ISO GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10" Discharge from SDC 59-009 Dominstreani ofelbow f22 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (10" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
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T-Tiunumi Fusigue F- Pnmary Water Stress Cerremen Ominng (FHW M '.L.? . y Indinamme Curremen(MIC) F-Flow AmmisnaudCorruman C.Canonen ondung 1 _;--. seems Carroman Creaisge(rosCC) E-Eresan-Cmemann 0-Oear
'# # N'"#'au n NoMMQIJ. Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page BIS of BH W eld Segment Line Neseber Line Description Neunber Weld Leestion T C F I M E F 0 Systen ID 2GCB-16-10* Discharge from SDC 59-010 Upstream ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 HX 2E-35A (10" (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
Discharge from SDC 59-011 Doutistream of 12* x10* No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10*
HX 2E-35A (10" concentnc reducer #20 -
portion) 10* side (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Discharge frem SDC 59-034 Upstream of 12" x 10* No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10*
ILX 2E-35A (10* concentric reducer #2 -10*
Discharge from SDC 59435 Upstream ofcIbow #1 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-10' HX 2E-35A (10* (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
Discharge from SDC 59-012 Upstream of 12* x 10' No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12*
smuu A reducer #20 -
portion) 12* side (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Discharge from SDC 59-013 Domitstream of tee #18 No No No Ne No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12*
HX 2E-35A (12* (ISO 2GCB-16-1) porten)
Discharge from SDC 59-014 Upstream ofelbow f32 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12*
HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
Discharge from SDC 59-015 Dumou-. of elbow #32 No No No No No No No 9 CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-i2*
HX 2E-35A (12* (ISO 2GCB-16-1) porten)
Discharge from SDC 59-016 Upstream ofcIbow f34 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12*
HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
Desradmoen Mahars=w T-Tbmnet Fatigue F - Pnmary Water Stress Commen Cresing (PWsCC) M-M~i W"yI4InencedCommen(1 LUC) F-Ib= AccelermaedCammawm E- Eressen-Cawtene 0-Oswr C-Common Cracking I- bergransist Stress Cemann CrecRg (IGSCC)
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Weld System ID Segment une Number Une Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC 59-017 Dowitstream ofelbow #34 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC 59-018 Upstream ofelbow #36 No No No No No No No No In 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC 59-019 Du..smu orelbow #36 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portson)
CSS CSS-003 2CCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC 59-020 Upstream of mammal vaht No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12* 2SI-5A (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC 59-021 Upstream cf tee #I8 (ISO No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12* 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC 59422 Dv-.s-- of eibow #16 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discha ge from SDC 59-023 Upstream ofcibow #16 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12* (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC 59-024 Du-.swo of flange #14 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-36-12* Discharge from SDC 59-025 Upstream of flange #13 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) -
portion) 12nedman vat =====
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'# N"' " ^" NN#'5 ^" 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms l' axe B:0 of B44
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W eld Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 System ID Segment Line Number 59-026 Domtstream ofelbow #11 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge frem SDC IE 2E-35 A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)59-027 Upstream ofelbow #11 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC IIX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)59-028 Downstream ofcIbow #8 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12" Discharge from SDC IIX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) porten)59-029 Upstream ofelbow #8 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Discharge from SDC IDC 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)59-030 Dv .swo ofelbow #6 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12" Discharge from SDC HX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Porimn)59-031 Upstream ofelbow #6 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12" Discharge from SDC IIX 2E-35A (12* (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
Dv-is n ofelbow #4 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12* Drscharge from SDC 59-032 10C 2E-35A (12* (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Portion)
No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-12" DBd-p from SDC 59-033 Domistream of reducer #2 IIX 2E-35A (12" (ISO 2GCB-16-1) portion)
No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-16-3" From CS discharge line 59-001 A Upstream ofcIbow #40 to ralve 2BS-19A (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
Desredstran Mederusnu M - MicrahiciegiceDy Innuenced Carre-en (MIC) F-Tb= Acerlerseed Commsee T-Tnermal Fatigue F - Prunary Wahr Stress Cerramen Credes (PWsCC)
E - Enunum- Centsham O.Oder c-Cerre-en Creams I- beersranular Same Common crechng (IGSCC)
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' FMECA - Degradation Mechanisans N'"*"v Na NMWIJ Ra. 00 Page B21 ef B44 Weld System ID Segneemt Liec Nuenber Line Description Nemeber Weld IAcaties T C F I M E F 0 CSS-003 2GCB-16-3* From CS discharge line 59-00IB Upstream of manual valw No No No No No No No No CSS to vahr 2BS-19A 2BS-19A (ISO 2GCB I)
CSS-003 2GCB-16-3* From CS discharge line 59-002A Atinterfacewithcibowlet No No No No No No No No CSS to valw 2BS-19A #39 (ISO 2GCB-16-l)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-16-4* Weldolet 4"line 59427A Atinterfacewithweldolet No No No & No No No No interfacing with SDC #10 (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
HX 2E-35A discharge line 2GCB-16-4* Weldolet 4* Iine 59427B Dw.ui.w ofweldolet No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 interfacing with SDC #10 (ISO 2GCB-16-1)
HX 2E-35A discharge line Discharge from SDC 60401 Upstream of MOV 2CV- No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10" HX 2E-35B (10" 5613-2 (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Paten) 2GCB-17-10* Da s sfrom SDC 60-002 Upstream ofelbow f30 No No No Ne No No No No CSS CSS-003 HX 2E-35B (10" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
Discharge from SDC 60-003 Downstream ofcibow #29 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS 403 2GCB-17-10*
HX 2E-35B (10* (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Paten)
Discharge from SDC 60 004 Upstream ofcibow #29 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10" HX 2E-35B (10* (ISO 2GCB-17-l)
Paten) pen assan%
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14-s , 97 Catalarm h. A-FENGCfLC-0/5. Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B22 of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C F I M E F 0 CSS CSS 4)o3 2GCB-17-10' Discharge from SDC 604)o5 Dv .s-o of cIbow #27 No No W No No No No No HX 2E-35B (10" (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10" Discharge from SDC 60-006 Upstream ofcIbow #27 No No No No No No No &
HX 2E-35B (IC* (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10* Discharge from SDC 60-007 Du-.s w.. of cIbow #26 No No No No No No No No IIX 2E-35B (IO* (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10' Discharge from SDC 60-008 Upstream ofcibow #26 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (10* OSO 2GCB-17-1)
Portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10" Discharge frora SDC 60-008A Downstreamofpiping No No No No No No No No 1DC 2E-35B (10* section #11 (ISO 2GCB-portion) 17-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10" Discharge from SDC 604)09 Doutistream ofcibow #25 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (10" OSO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10* Discharge from SDC 60 010 Dums-- ofcIbow f24 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (10" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) porta)
CSS CSS 4)03 2GCB-17-IO" Discharge from SDC 604)11 Upstream ofcibow F24 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (10* (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10* Discharge from SDC 60426 Upstream of 12* x 10* No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (10" concentnc reducer #33 -
portion) 10* side (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Des = derm Mec;=nnens .
T-Thenal Fatigue F - Pnmary Waer Stress Commsen Crucing (F%W M - Kicrsbielegica!!y inomenced Cam >=en (M3C) F-flow AccelermedCaminem c-Cem=.e Cracting I-Innersranular stress Cem=.en Craiang OGSCC) E- Eramen-Cavestsen 0-Other 9 9 9
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'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisans C"' '#"" " hMMWlf, Rm 00 ,
Page B23 of B44 ,
W eld System ID Sessnest Line Noesber IJee Descriipties Nuesber WeldIscaties T C F I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-10" Discharge from SDC 60427 At he froni SCD No No No No No No No f4 HX 2E-35B (10* HX 2E-35B (ISO 2GCB- r poruon) 17-1) ;
1 CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 60-012 Downstrearn offee #32 No No No No No No No No !
HX 2E-35B (12* (ISO 2GCB-17-1) !
poruon)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 60-013 Upstream orcibow #23 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-3SB (12" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion) i I
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Dischargefrom DC 60-014 Downstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) peruon) !
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 60-015 Upstreasi afelbow #22 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) !
Porbon)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12" Discharge from SDC 60-016 Upstream ofnianual vaht No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12* 2SI-5B (ISO 2GCB-17-1) porton) i CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 60-017 Upstream ortec #32 (ISO No No No No No No No No l HX 2E-35B (12* 2GCB-17-1) poruon) '
CSS .
CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 60-018 Downstream of flange #37 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) ;
portion) i CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12" Discharge from SDC 60-019 Upstreann of flange #36 No No No No No No No No !
HX 2E-35B (12" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) poruon)
Disradames W i T-Thenmal Fanisme F- Pnrmmry Waner Stress Ceresesse Crucims (FW3CC) M "A ' * . , h Camamme(MIC) F-Flow AcesteruandComosen C.Carrossan crachg I - 1,, Stress Cereoman crackm:005CC) E-Eremen-Cavenaisse O-osier i
' C""'"""' #" NMW'5
- 88 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B24 of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Leestica T C P I M E F O CSS CSS-003 1GCB-17-12" Discharge from SDC MM)l9A Dv-swm of pipe #5 No No No No No No No W IDC 2E-35B (12" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Disc'arge from SDC 60420 Du-sum ofcIbow f21 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12" (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
CSS CSS-C13 2GCB-17 Discharge from SDC 60-021 Upstream ofcibow #21 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12* (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Portron)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 6042I A Domtstream of piping No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12* section #3 (ISO 2GCI portion) I)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 60421B Dv-sum of piping No No No No No No No No IDC 2E-35B (12" section #2 (ISO 2GCB portion) I)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17 Discharge from SDC 60422 Domistream of elbow #20 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12* (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12* Discharge fror. SDC 60-023 Upstream ofcibow #20 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12* (ISO 2GCB-17-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-12" Disdwge from SDC 60-024 Du-sum ofelbow fl9 No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12* (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Portson)
CSS CSS 403 2GCB-17-12* Discharge from SDC 60425 Dv-s w- of l2' x10* No No No No No No No No HX 2E-35B (12* concentricreducer#33 -
portion) 12* side (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
Desredsson Matemens T-Thermal Trargue F - Prunary Waerr Stress Commsee Cracking (FWsCC) M - WeindegicsDy Innsenced Carresson (MPC) F-Fleur AccriernardComsman C-Commson Craduing I -Ireergranular stress Carreassa cracksig GGsCC) E . Eressen-Cevesasam 0-OSer O O O ' '
- - . . . ~ - . - . . - - _ . - . - . . - - . . .. .'
fD U
(JD J
'** FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms C ""*" ## d*M" ^" "
Page B25 of B44 WeM System ID is,a : Line Nesser Use Description Neuser Weld Imenties T C F I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-3* From CS dischargelin- 60-001B Upstreamofmanualvaht No No No No No No No No to vahr 2BS-19B 2BS-19B (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-17-3* From CS dischargeline 60-002A At interface with cibowlet No No No No No No No No to vahr 2B5-198 #38 (ISO 2GCB-17-1)
CSS CSS 003 2GCB-34-2* CS Pump 2P-35B 76-059 Upstream of pepmg secuon No No No No No No No No minimum flow line to #2 (ISO 2GCB-34-1) check s%t 2BS-17B CSS-003 2GCB-34-2* CS Pump 2P-35B 76-059A Atinterfacewithutidolet No No No No No No No No CSS minimum flow line to #36 shown on ISO 2GCB-check vahr 2BS-17B 11-1 (ISO GCB-34-1) 2GCB-34-2* CS Pump 2P-35B 76460 Upstream ofelbow #1 No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 minimum flow line to OSO 2GCB-34-1) check vahr 2BS-17B 2GCB-34-2* CS Pump 2P-35B 76-061 Dowsntream of elbow fl No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 minimum flow lin: to (ISO 2GCB-34-1) check vahr 2BS-17B 2GCB-34-2* CS Pump 2P-35B 76-062 Upstream offlow element No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 minimum flow line to 2FO-5627 (ISO 2GCB check vahr 2BS-17B 1) 2GCB-34-2* CS Pump 2P-35B 76-063 Downstream of flow No No No No No No No No CSS CSS 403 minimum flow line to element 2FO-5627 (ISO check vahr 2BS-17B 2GCB-34-1)
CS Pump 2P-35B 76-064 Upstream ofcheck vaht No No No No No ,No No No CSS CSS-003 2GCB-34-2*
minimum flow line to 2BS-17B OSO 2GCB-34-1) check vaht 2BS-17B ea e r- rnmary wenn seems commes credung (Pum M -: - ; , tidimenced cam ====OGQ F-Flow AcealerusedCame==
T-Thenet resisme 0-Oeur c-com.we oncking 1 - senery== der see== com=an cr= dung OGSCC) E-Eramen-Cavemann
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"=tauon Aommon. Raw Page B:6 of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld I.mestion T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2GCB-35-2* CS Pump 2P-35A 75-057 Du-usacam of 3* x 2* No No No No No No No No <
minimum flow line to concentnc reducer #5 -2*
check whe 2BS-17A side (ISO 2GCB-35-1) 12" portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-35-2* CS Pump 2P-35A 75458 Upstream of flow element No No No No No No No No minimum flow line to 2FO-5624 (ISO 2GCB check nhr 2BS-17A I)
(2* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-35-2* CS Pump 2P-35A 75-059 Don 1: stream of flow No No No No No No No No minimum flow line to element 2FO-5624 (ISO check valx 2BS-17A 2GBC-35-1)
(2* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-35-2* CS Pump 2P-35A 75-060 Upstream orcheck valve No No No No No No No No minimum flow line to 2BS-17A shown in ISO check vahr 2BS-17A 2DBC-11-1 (ISO 2GBC-(2* portion) 35-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-35-3* CS Pump 2P-35A 75-056 Upstn:am cf 3* x 2" No No No No No No No No minimum flow line to concentnc reducer #5 - 3" check vahr 2BS-17A side (ISO 2GCB-35-1)
(3* portion)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-69-2" From dumso.a. cf 76-071 Upstream of hal.~coepting No No No No No No No Fo check nhe 2BS-12A #39 (ISO 2GCB49-1) to the containment sprayline CSS CSS-003 2GCB-69-2" From douTistream or 76-072 Dv us,-ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No check valve 2BS-12A (ISO 2GCB49-1) to the containment sptzy line Dearadstiwi Mahannsrrs T-Thmn=3 Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser stres Cerremon Cradurg (PWsCC) M - Maaet=olopcmDy Inomenced Corresson (MIC) F-flow AccelersnedCarremen C-Correman Cracking I- beerarenatar Saress Cerroman Cradang (IGsCC) E - Eressee-Canimanas 0-Other O O O
.Q-C Q U (3 V
' *'7 N'"" " Ah A-PBMWU, Rm M FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B27 of BH WeW Systeam ID Segment Line Number IJae Descripties Number WeW Imcaties T C F I M E F 0 CSS CSS-001 2GCB49-2* From e-smo of 76-073 Upstream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12A (ISO 2GCB49-1) to the contamment spray line .
CSS CSS-003 2GCB49-2* From &-u>umo of 76-074 Dowirstream ofgate ralve No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12A 2BS-44B OSO 2GCB49-1) to the containment spray line CSS CSS-003 2GCB49-2* From downstream of 76-075 Upstream ofgate vaht No No No No No No No No 1 check vahr 2BS-12A 2BS-44B OSO 2GCB49-1) to the containment spra r line CSS CSS-003 2GCB49-2* From &-d-- of 76-076 Dv-s-- of cibow #44 No No Ne No No No No No check vaht 2BS-12A (ISO 2GCB49-1) to the contamment ;
spray line CSS CSS-003 2GCB49-2* From downstream of 76-077 Upstream ofcibow #44 - No No No No No No No No 1 check vahr 2BS-12A (ISO 2GCB49-1) :
to the containment sprarline CSS CSS-003 2GCB49-2* Frorn & - a - n of 76 078 Dowirstream ortee 861 No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12A (ISO 2GCB49-1) to the containment ;
spray line I
CSS ' CSS-003 2GCB-69-2* From e-se . of 76-079 Dominstream ortee #61 No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12A (ISO 2GCB49-1) !
to the containment spray line Desradmeme Ma*= wee T-Thermal Fatigue F. Prunary Weser Stre Cerreeman Chrisng (FEM M-SE ? . . ,ideenced Communa(MIC) F-flew Aceduinedcarresse ,
c-corre wscracung I-Irmerarannier siress Corree an cracking (xiscc) E -Ermeen-h ,
O-00mr
- i n ep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Cala'lado"Na A-SU-CALC-oliRn 00 Faxe BIS of B44 Weld System ID Fegment Line Number Line Description Number Weld I. mention T C P 1 M E F O CSS CSS 4X)3 2GCB49-2* From downstream of 76-080 Upstream of tee #61 (ISO No No No No No No No No check valve 2BS-12A 2GCB49-1) to the containment spray line CSS CSS-003 2GCB49-2* From dumahum or 76-081 Dv u2Lmn cfcheck No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12A nht 2BS-12B (ISO to the containment 2GCB49-1) spray line CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2" Frem dumonc.om or 75-066 Upstream orhalfcoepiing No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12B #59 shown on ISO 2GCB- -
to the containment 10-1 (ISO 2GCB-70-1) spray line CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From downstream of 75-066A At interface with half No No No No No No No No check valve 2BS-12B coupling #59 shown on to the containment ISO 2GCB-10-1(ISO spray line 2GCB-70-1)
CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From downstream of 75'.167 Dv.a>b-u of cibow #19 No No No No No No No No '
check vaht 2BS-12B (ISO 2GCB-70-2) to the containment spray line CSS CS m 3 2GCB-70-2* Frem downstream or 75-068 Upstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No checkvahr 2BS-12B (ISO 2GCB-70-1) to the contais.e- _-.-
sprayline CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From dv u>b-n of 75-069 Dumush n of gate valve No No No No No No No No check valve 2BS-12B 2BS-44A (ISO 2GCB to the contamment 1) spray line w--t m l T.Thenant ratigue r-rnmarywane strescarrouancracbng(rum u-Micrab.asaycnityInnuencescerro (ulc) r-rio. Ac.miesnedcorr C-Cerremen Crocidng I- beergramaler Sirens Cerroman Crochng OGSCC) E- Eroman-Cavenesee 0-Olher O O O
O O O
"*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C*""*"**
- 'j#"[
, g W eld Systens ID i, a : Line Neanber Une Description Number Weld 14esties T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS 403 2GCB-70-2* From donstream of 75470 Upstream ofgate vahe No No No No No No No Ne check vahr 2BS-12B 2BS-44A (ISO 2GCB to the containment 1) spray line CSS CSS 403 2GCB-70-2* From danstream of 75-071 Downstream ofelbow #25 No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12B (ISO 2GCB-70-1) to the containment spray line CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From downstream of 75-072 Upstream ofcibow #25 No No No No No No No W
, check vahr 2BS-12B (ISO 2GCB-70-1) to the containment spray line CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From downstream or 75-073 Dv,..sm of tee #70 No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-128 (ISO 2GCB-70-1) to the containment spray line CSS CSS 403 2GCB-70-2* From downstream of 75-074 Domestream of tee #70 No No No No No No & No check vahr 2BS-12B (ISO 2GCB-70-1) ,
to the cxmtamment
. sprayline CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From downstream of 75-075 Upstream ofelbow #71 No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12B (ISO 2GCB-70-1) .
to the containment spray line r CSS CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* Fran do .sw of 75-076 Downstream orelbow #71 No No No No No No No No '
check vahe 2BS-12B (ISO 2GCB-70-1) to the contarnment sprayline Damradseen N
- T-Tliernial remisee r-rnemarywanersereiscomm nondungO'wscC) u. :;._; _ ,his ne.4 cum poc) F-ri Acm s.rseidcar t c-corre-en osciang ! -, stres CerrouwaiOmdung OGSCC) E-Eressen-cavensson 0 -Oeur
l i4sep 97 C**lodon No. A-PNMC-0U, Rev. 00 FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms Page B30 of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C F I M E F 0 CSS' CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From downstream of 75-077 Upstream of tec #70 (ISO No No No No No No No No check vahr 2BS-12B 2GCB-70-1) to the containment pray line CSS-003 2GCB-70-2* From downstream of 75-078 Du..s-.. cf check No No No No No No No No CSS '
check vahr 2BS-12B vahr 2BS-12A (ISO to the contamment 2GCB-70-1) spray line CSS CSS-003 2HCB-11-14* Suction line for LPSI 79-038 Du .sr m of tee #33 No No No No No No No No I Pump 2P40B (14* (ISO 2HCB-13-l) porten) 2HCB-13-14* Secten line for LPSI 79-039 Upstream ofelbow #31 No No No No Ne No No No CSS CSS 403 Pump 2P40B (I4" (ISO 2HCB-13-1) portion)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-13-14* Secten line for LPSI 79440 Dvms-i. ofelbow s31 No No No No No N No No Pump 2P400 (14" (ISO 2HCI -U-1) portion) 2HCB-13-14* Suction line for LPSI 79-041 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No CSS CSS-003 Pump 2P40B (14* section #15 (ISO 2HCB-portion) 13-1)
CSS-003 2HCB-13-2* IIPSI Pump 2P-89B 79-036 Dv- s n of half No No No No No No No No CSS mini-flow recirculation coupling #I3 (ISO 2HCB-return line to pump 13-1) suction Desnuletsae Mechenemns F - Prunary Weser Stress Cerrassen Cradsng (F%W M - brarwheologicany leesenced Carremen (MIC) F-flew AcerlerusedCarwaan T-Thenal Fatigue I-Irmergranular Stress Cemmen Creding OGSCC) E-(rasien -Caveneen 0-OWier c-Comnian Craciire O O O
O C\
U pJ s- V
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnes N#" lad n Na A-PNM15. Rm 00 Page B31 of B44 W eld Systems ID Segment Line Number Line Desenpties Number WeldIAesties T C P I M E F 0 2
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-2" HPSI Pump 2P-89B 79-036A Upstream of halfcoupling No No No No No No No No mini-flow recirculation #13 (ISO 2HCB-13-1) return line to pump suction CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13 HPSI Pump 2P-89B 79-036B Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No mini-flow recirculation taht: 2BS-54 (ISO 2HCB-return line to pump 13-1) suction CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from RWT 79-034 Du==m m oftec#32 No No No No No No No No to CS Purap 2P35B OSO 2HCB-13-1) suction CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from R%T "9-035 Upstream of tee #32 (ISO No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B 2HCB-13-1) suction CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from RHT 79-037 Downstream of tec #33 No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB 13-1) suction CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from RWT 79-042 Upstream of tee #33 (ISO No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B 2HCB-11-1) suction CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Section line from RWT 79-042A Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B section 87 (ISO 2HCB suction I)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from RWT 79-043 Downstream oreitar #29 No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B GSO 2HCB-13-1) section Dearminho N T-11mynami Fatese F- Freinry Weser Sires Cannesse Osames (PWW M-1 ? .2 7 bdlemmeed Carressee OGC) F-How Acumieruned Cawsome c-Carre=se Csedes I .s., -sireiec rrome CreamsposCC) E- Eramem-Caviemmes 0-Oemr
T%w FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Caic=lano" k A-FDu catc-on. scr. oO Page B32 of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Section line from RWT 79-044 Upstream ofelbow #29 No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1) sucten CSS C55-003 2HCB-13-20" Suction line from RWT 79-044A Dawummi.ofprp-rg No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B secten #46 (ISO 2HCB-sucten 13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from RWT 79-045 Downstream ofcibow #28 No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1) sucuon CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Sucten line from RWT 79-046 Upstream ofelbow f28 No No No No No No No No
- o CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1) suaion CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Section line from R%T 79-047 pownstream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1)
<ucten CSS CSS 003 2HCB-13-20* Sucuon line from RWT 79-048 Upstream ofcibow #27 No No No No No No & No to CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1) sucuan CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from RWT 79-049 Dv-usw ofcIbow f26 No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1) sucte n CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-20* Suction line from RWT 79-050 Upstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No No No to CS Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1) suctor.
CSS CSS-003 2HC9-13-24" Imrge Pipe from Cont 79-051 Upstream of 24* x 20* No No No No No No No No Samp to Spray Pump concentnc reducer #34 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-I3-1) m p-T-Thennel Fatigue P- Prunary Waner Sness Cerroman Crackmg (PWsCC) M - MscrebleycmDy le8menced Cervesum (10C) F-fle= AcreierseedCommon c-Carrere Crocaung I-beers === tar seen Cemn== Cractmg W E- Eremen -Cavestsee 0-Osser O 9 9
n o n
( k) () '
N Mw1Na A-FMWT E Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanims ,
Page BJ3 of B44 l W eld ;
System ID Segesent Line Nember Line Descripties Nember WeldIAcanos T C P I M E F 0 CTS CSS-003 2HCB-13-24' Large Pipe from Cont.79-052 Upstream of halfcoupling No No To No No No & P4 ;
Sunp to Spray Pump #36 (ISO 2HCB-13-1) !
2P-35B ,
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-24" lAge Pipe from Cont. 79453 At interface W half No W No N No No No No .
Sump to Spray Pump coupling #37 (IMs 2HCB- '
2P-35B 13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont. 79456 IkmoLw- ofcIbow #25 No No No No N No No No Sump to Spray Pu:np (ISO 2HCB-13-1) 2P-35B CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-24" Large Pipe from Cont.79-057 Upstream ofelbow #25 No No No No No No No No Sump to Spray Pump (ISO 2HCB-13-1) 2P-35B CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-24' Large Pipe from Cont.79-058 Downstream of MOV No No No No No No & No Semp to Spray Pump 2CV-5650-2 (ISO 2HCB- ;
2P-35B 13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-8* Suction line for HPSI 79-053B Atinterfacewithweldolet No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-89B (8" #38 (ISO 2HCB-13-1) porten) i CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-8* Section line for HPSI 79454 Downstream ofweldolet No No No No W No No No i Pump 2P-898 (8" #38 at interface with ipe portion) #16 (ISO 2HCB-13-1) r CSS CSS-003 2HCB-13-8* Secten line for HPSI 79454A Downstream of 3* piping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-89B (8* secima #16 (ISO 2HCB--
porten) 13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-14" Secten tine for 13'SI 78-029 Downstream ortec #31 No No No No No No No No Pamp 2P-60A (14* (ISO 2HCB-15-1) porten) r- -
T-Themel Fatigue F - Prenary Waaer Sun Commen Crachng (PW3CC) M- .:;. / *O y buSeencedCamosen(MIC) F-Flow h Cesve===
C-Carrames Onding I .L ,, $1 rums Common Credmig 005CC) E-Lemen-Caestmesan 0-Odeur
1 i
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'*'"'"" *""##' #"#
Page B34 of B44 Weld Sptem ID Segment une Number Line Description Number Weld Leestica T C P I M E F O ,
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-14" Suction line for LPSI 78-030 Upstream ofelbow #29 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P40A (l4" (ISO 2HCB-15-1) portion)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-15-14" Section line for LPSI 78-031 DommLream ofelbow #29 No No Pb No No No No No Purr.p 2P40A (14" (iso 2HCB-15-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-14" . Suction line for LPSI 78-032 Dommtream of piping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P40A (14* sedien #13 (ISO 2HCB-portion) 15-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-2* HPSI Pump 2P-89A 78427 Upstream of halfcoupling No No No No No No No No mini . low recirculation #40 (ISO 2HCB-15-1) return line to pump suction CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-2* HPSI Pump 2P-89A 78-027A Du-omm.. of half No No No No No No No No mini-110w rectrculation coupling #40 (ISO 2HCB-return line to pump 15-1) suchon CSS CSS 403 2HCB-15-2* HPSI Pump 2P49A 78-027B Upstream cf manual vaht No No No No No No No No mini-flow recirculation 2BS-53 (ISO 2HCB-15-1) return line to pump suction CSS-003 2HCB-15-20* From CS Sump to CS78-006 Dommtream ofcheckvalve No No No No No No No No CSS Pump 2P-35A 2BS-1 A on ISO 2HCB I (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS-003 2HCB-15-20" From CS Sump to CS78-026 Adjacent to tec #32 (ISO No No No No No No No No CSS Pump 2P-35A 2HCB-15-1) ne.r.a.aic w T-Thennel Fatigue F-I rimary Water Sm Ce resem Craims (P%W M-MWkycmNyInAmemed Comesan(M:C) F-Flow AccelerunedCaminen C-Carreman Cruimg I- he , ' : Stress Carremen Crmking OGSCC) E- Eressen-Cavastsee 0-other O O O
q p] p D
~
N-) R.
'N FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnes " *"#* d * " " ' " 88 Page B35 of BH W eld System ID Segment line Number Line Descripties Noseber WeldImaties T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2ilCB-15-20" Frem CS Sump to CS78-028 Adjacent to tec #31 (ISO No No 14 No No N No No a nmp 2P-35A 2HCB-15-l)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-15-20* From CS Sump to CS 78433 Upstream of tec #31 (ISO No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-15-20' From CS Samp to CS 78-033A Connecting pipe %n~.s No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A #8 and #9 (ISO 211CB 1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-20" From CS Sump to CS78-034 bis e ofcibow #27 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-20" From CS Samp to CS78-035 Upstream of elbow #27 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-20" From CS Sump to CS78-036 Dv-as-- of elbow #26 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A OSO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-003 1riCB-15-2C" From CS Samp to CS78-037 Upstream ofcibow #26 No No No No No No No &
CSS CSS-003 2.HCB-15-20" From CS Sump to CS78-038 Downstream of elbew f25 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-20* From CS Sump to CS78-039 Upstream ofcibow #25 No No No No No No No &
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-20" From CS Sump to CS78-040 Downstream ofcibow #24 No No No No No No No No
~
CSS-003 2HCB-15-20* From CS Sump to CS78-041 Downstream of 24* x 20* No No No No No No No No CSS Pump 2P-35A concentnc reducer #33 OSO 2HCB-15-1)
Dearedse.an Medemmes F - Prunary Waer Stress Carronen Crad ing (PWSCC) M-:." 2. ' . 5, bdImencedCommune(MIC) F-flow AxshrasedCowenen T-Tbmnal Fasisme 0-Oenr C-Correman Cracking I- beerarseder seress Cenesian Credung OGSCC) E- Enessen-Cavession
1 l
'# Calcularms A'a MMWJ. Ra. R7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B36 of B44 Weld j System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcaties T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-24* From Containment 78442 Upstream of 24* x 20* No No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps concentric reducer #33 (ISO 211CB-15-1)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-15-24* From Contr.inment 78449 Dominstream orelbow f23 No No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-15-24* From Containment 78-050 Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Sump to CS Pumps operated 2CV-%45-1 (ISO 2HCB-15-1)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-154" Suction line for lIPSI 78-045 Upstream ofsweepolet #41 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P49A (8* (ISO 2HCB-15-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-154" Suetion line for HPSI 78-046 Du=.oume of sweepoie: No No No No No No No No Pump 2P49A (8* #41 portion)
CSS-003 2HCB-154* Sucten line for HPSI 78447 Dominstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No CSS Pump 2P49A (8* secten #14 (ISO 2HCB-portion) 15-1)
CSS-003 2HCB-20-10* CS from Valve 2CV- 75-020 D v-iou w ii of M O V
^
No No No No No No No No CSS
%12-1 to Flued head 2CV-%I2-1 (ISO 2HCB-2P-17 at containment 20-1) penetraten CSS-003 2HCD-20-10" CS from Valw:2CV- 75420A Upstream ofcibow #4 No No No No No No No No CSS
%I2-1 to Flued head (ISO 2HCB-20-1) 2P-17 at containment penetration paradation Medanems F - Pnmary Weser Stress Caramon CrocLeg (FW5CC) F - Micretwe4epen.fy Innsenced Corramma (MK") F-flow AccelwunedCommes T-hmnal Fatigue c-common credung E- Ereman-Cavenhen 0 -Oeur 1- freersranular sires Carreman Craims (IGSCC) 9 _
O O I
'N'7 C#""*"#" # " " #"#
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B37 of B44 WeW Systems ID Segneemt Line Number Line Description Noseber Weld Locaties T C F I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-20-10" CS from Vahr 2CV- 75421 Downstream ofelt.aw #4 No No No No No No No No 5612-1 to Rued head (ISO 2HCB-20-1)
I 2P-17 at containment penetration CSS CSS 403 2HCB-20-10' CS from Valve 2CV- 75-022 Upstream ofcibow #5 No No No No No No No No 5612-1 to Flued head (ISO 2HCB-20-1) 2P-17 at containment [
Penetation CSS CSS-003 2HCB-20-t0* CS from Vaist 2CV- 75-023 Downstream ofelbow #5 No No No No No No No No 5612-1 to Flued head (ISO 2HCB-20-1) {
2P-17 at containment Pencratum CSS CSS-003 2HCB-20-10" CS from Vahr 2CV- 75-024 Downstream ofelbow #6 Nc No No No No No No No i 5612-1 to Flued head (ISO 2HCB-20-1) 2P-17 at contamment g.a.ik-CSS CSS-003 2HCB-20-10* CS from Vahr 2CV- 75-025 Upstream er flued hed No No No No No No No No 5612-1 to Flued head #47 shown in ISO 2HCB- l 2P-17 at contamment 3-1 (ISO 2HCB-20-1) ,
Penetration l CSS CSS 't03 211CB-20-3" 2F1-5690 retura to lism 75-024A At interface sith weidolet No No No No No No No No 2HCB-20(Train A) #7 (ISO 2HCB-20-1) I CSS CSS-003 2HCB-20-3* 2FI-5690 return to line 75-079 Downstream ofeKew #1 No No No No No No No No 2HCB-20(Train A) (ISO 21sCB-20-2) l CSS CSS-003 2HCB-20-3* 2F1-5690 return to line 75480 Upstream ofelbow #1 No No No No No Jo No No [
I 2HCB-20(Train A) (ISO 2HCB-20-2)
D& M=+===m \
T-Thermal Famigue P - Pnmary Waaer Stress Cerroneo Cracbng (FWSCC) M-Af ; ,LauencedCamusen(h0C) F-&= AcunhrasedCamerim C-Cerressen Cseddag I-Innerymenlar sirens Cerrosson Crudung(IGSCC) E-Eressen-Camassmen 0-Oeser i
h - -
e *-- - - - - - -
N FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""#"'"= vo. A-rDGC4LC-015. Rev. CO rage B33 of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number WefJ Location T C F I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 211CB-20-3* 2F1-%90 return to line 75-081 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No 2HCB-20(Train A) sects.2 #3 (ISO 2HCB 2)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-20-3* 2F1-5690 return to line 75-082 Downstream o# piping No No No No No No No No 2HCB 20(Train A) sertion #4 tISO 2HCB ~co-2)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-20-3* 2F1-5690 return to line 75-083 Downstream of marmi No No No No No No No No '
2HCB-20(Trais A) vahr 2BS-20A (Leo 2HCB-20-2)
CSS CSS 003 2HCB-21-10" CS from MOV 2CV- 76-024 Downstream of MOV No No No No No No No W 5613-2 to cent;iinment 2CV-5613-2 PSO 21ICB-penetrat i on #2P-23 21-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-21-10" CS from MOV 2CV- 76-025 lip-tream erelbow s6 No No No No No No No No 5613-2 to con *.ainment (150 2HCB-21-1) penetration #2P-23 CSS CSS-003 , 2HCB-21-10" CS from MOV 2CV- 76-026 Downstream orcibow #6 No No No No No No No No 5613-2 to contamment (ISO 2HCB-21-li penetration #2P-21 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-21-10" CS from MOV 2CV- 76-027 Upstream ofelbow #5 No No No No No No No No 5613-2 to containment (ISO 2HCB-21-1) penetration #2P-21 CSS CSS 403 2HCB-21-10" CS from MOV 2C7- 76-028 Downstream ofelbow f5 No No No No No No No No 5613-2 to constainment (ISO 2HCB-21-1) penetration #2P-23 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-21-10* CS from MOV 2CV- 76-029 Dumu,b-i of elbow f4 No No No No No No No No 5613-2 to contaitanent (ISO 2HCB-21-1) penetration #2P-23 Desradstion Mechenrevis T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnrnary Wakr Stree Cermmon Cradung(PWSCC) M-M-m Jy Irdimenced Commeon OOC) F- flow Accelenard Commen C-Commian Creams I-Irmerranular Stress Common Crackmg 00 SCC) E- Emmen -Cantahan 0-Odur e @ O
- p. )
M J O(8
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " &MMWI5 Rn. N Page B39 of B44 e
W eld Sy tem ID Segsment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Lmcatier T C F I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-21-10" CS fmm MOV 2CV- 76-030 Dovmstream c'? piping No No No No No No No No .
5613-2 to containment secinon #I (ISO 2HCB , penetration #2P-23 I)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-21-3* 2F1-5693 rem to line 76-029A Atinterfacewithweidolet No No No No No No No No 2HCB-21 (Train B) #3 (ISO 2HCB-21-1)
CSS CSS 003 2HCB-21-3* 2F1-5693 return to line 76-082 Downstream ofelbow f7 No No No No N No No &
2HCB-21 (Train B) (ISO 2HCB-21-2)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-21-3* 2F1-5693 return to line 76-083 Upstream orelbow #7 No No No No No No No No 2HCB-21 (Train B) ~ ISO 2HCB-21-2)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-21-3* 2FI-5693 return to line 76-084 Doomstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No 2HCB-21 (Train By section #2 (ISO 2HCB 2)
CSS CSS-003 211CB-21-3* 2F1-5693 return to line 76-085 Dwnstream ofmanual No No No No No No No No 2HCB-21 (Train B) valve 2BS-20B (ISO 2HCB-21-2) t CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-10* CS Pump 2P-35A .'8-021 Dv.he of reducer No No No No No No No No suction line (10* #12 it inlet to CS Pump 2P-piping) 35A (ISO 2HCB-26-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14" Sucten line for CS78-007 Upstreem ofvalve 2BS-2A No No No No No No No No '
Pump 2P-35A (14* en ISO 2HCB-26-1 (ISO Porten) 2HCB-15-1) l CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14" Section line for CS78-008 Dominstream of manual No No No No No No No No ,
- Pump 2P-35A (14* vaht 2BS-2A (ISO 2HCB-portion) 26-1) t i
T-nerwinI Faniger 1 -Prunary Waner Stress Cerressen Cruchng(FW3CC) M- Ai J -% bdtmencedCarrouss=(MIC) F-Fle= AcceleresedCarmsen j c-corromen Cracking I. L , '-screesCorre anCrochngOGSCC) E- Eressen-Cavenssa . O-00er t
w 14w97 C*latm No. A-PENG-CALC-015. Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradstion Mcchanisms Page B40 of B44 W eld System ID Segment Line Nember ljne Descripfw. Number Weld lecation T C P I M E F 0 <
1 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14" Soction line for CS78-011 Upstream orcheck vaht No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (14" 2BS-3 A (ISO 2HCB-26-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14" Suction line for CS78-012 Downstream ofcheck No & No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (14" valve 2BS-3A (ISO 2HCB-portion) 26-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14* Suction line for CS '78-014 Upstream of weldolet #15 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (14* (ISO 2HCB-26-1) portion)
. CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14* Suction line for CS 78-014A Dumh.ofweldolet No No No W No No No No Pump 2P-35A (14* #15 (ISO 2HCB-26-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14' Suction line for CS78-016 Downstream of flange #5 No No No No No No No No '
Pump 2P-35A (14* (ISO 2. CB-26-1)
Port 2on)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14* Suction line for CS78-017 Upstream of flange #4 No No No No No No No No i Pump 2P-35A (I4* (ISO 2HCB-26-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14* Suction line ror CS78-018 Upst.mm ofelbow #7 No No No No No No No No 4 Pump 2P-35A (14* (ISO 2HCB-26-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14* Suction line for CS78-019 Downstream of eltx=v #7 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (14* (ISO 211CB-26-1) portion) .
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-14* Section line for CS 784123 Upstream orelbow #28 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (14" (ISO 211CB-15-1)
- portion) b _ Mea- n T-Thment reigne P - Premry Water Stress cerroman Cradurig (PWSCC) M - Micrabsologrenny Indhsenced Commean (MIC) F- Floor Amelmeed Carronce C-Carrassee Cracti 3 I-Irmerarannte Serens Cerremen 4 hclung (1GSCC) E- Eresson -Canesasse 0-Other 9 9 9
p p
(,) b V
'** C'*wlad n A'oMMI.C415. Rn. 00 FMECA- Degradation Mechanisms Page B41 of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Neanber Weld Location T C I P M E F O ,
I CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-It* Suction line for CS78-024 Downstream ortec #32 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (14* (ISO 2HCB-15-1) portion)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-26-20* Suction line for CS78-001 L-s-u of MOV No No No No '
No No No No Pump 2P-35A (20* 2CV-5630-1 (ISO 2HCB-portion) 26-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-20" Suction line for C3 78-002 Emmream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No ,
Pump 2P-35A (2'2" (ISO 2HCB-26-1) pm2on)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-20' Section line for CS 78-002A Upstreamofpipingsection No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (20" #3 (ISO 2HCB-26-1)
Porten)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-20* Suction line for CS78-003 Upstream ofcibow #8 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (20" (ISO 21!CB-26-1)
Porten)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-26-20* Suctenline for CS78-004 N-a-.; ofelbow #8 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (20* (ISO 2HCB-26-1) portion)
CSS CSS-003 2HCP-26-20* Secten line for CS 78405 Upstream ofcheck valve No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35A (20* 2BS-1 A (ISO 2HCB-26-1) portion) i CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-10* CS Pump 2P-35B 79-029 A -== --ofcIbowfl5 No No No No No No No No '
suction line (10* at inlet to CS Pump 2P-piping) 35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14* Sucten line for CS79-017 Upstream of manual valve No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B 2BS-2B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
Deers twa== Mc1=c:sms T-Thernemi Famigue F - Pnmary Weser Stress Commen Crackmg (PWsCC) M - h _"
- f E InomencedCeressen(MIC) y F- Flour Acrelerused Corrensen C-Carro crackms I Iniersranular seress com= san cracking (losCC) E- Eressen-Cavnesian 0-Other
'*7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"*"" ^'" A-I'E^"### ^" 88 Page B42 of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number WeldIAes; ion T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14" Suction line for CS79-018 Duvuoncam ormanual No No No No No No No No Purnp 2P35B vahr 2BS-2B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCD-27-14" Suction line for CS79-020 Upgream ofchei vaht No No No No No No No No Purnp 2P35B 2BS-3B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS 403 211CB-27-14" Suction line for CS79-021 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B valve 2BS-3B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14' Suction line for CS79-023 Upstream ofweldolet #21 No No No No No No No No Purnp 2P35B (ISO 211CB-27-1)
CSS CSSs>3 2HCB-27-14" Suction line for CS 7a-023A Upstream of 4" cap #24 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-21-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14" Suction line for CS79-025 Upstream of flange #20 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B (ISO 21ICB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14" Suction line for CS79-026 Downstrtam of flange #19 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14" Suction line for CS79-027 Upstream of elbow #15 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14" Suction line for CS79-030 Downstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCD-27-14" Suetion line for CS79-031 Upstream orelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P35B (ISO 2HCB-13-1)
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-27-14" Suction line for CS79-032 Downstream of tee #32 No No No No No No No No Pun.p 2P35B . (ISO 2HC3-13-1)
Dwedstm Mechanisms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corresson Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micret>iologically InGuenced Corressen (MIC) F- flow Accelerated Cerrosion C CervessenCracking I-Irdergranular Stress Cerroom Crackmg (1GSCC) E - Erossen-Cavitatson 0 - Other O O O
p n d U pb
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechan!SMS Catalan n A'a AMAMQlf.Rn. 00 Page B43 of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imstion T C P I M E F O a CSS CSS-003 211CB-27-20" Suction line ror CS79-005 Upstream orelbow #Il No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 211CB-27-20" Suction line ror CS79-006 Downstream ofelbow Jll No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 211CB-27-1)
CSS CSS 403 211CB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-007 Upstream ofelbow #17 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 211CB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-008 Upstream ofelbow #18 No No No' No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-009 Downstream orelbow #18 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 211CB-27-1) .
CSS CSS-003 2HCB-17-20" Suction line for CS 79-009A Downstreamofpiping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B section #4 (ISO 211CB 1)
CSS CSS-003 211CB-27-20" Suction line for CS 79-009B Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B section #28 (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS 003 211CB-27-20" Suction line for CS 79-009C Downstream orptping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B secten #5 (ISO 2 HLB 1)
CSS CSS-003 211CB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-011 Upstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
CSS CSS-033 2HCB-27-20" Suction line for CS 79412 Downstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 211CB-27-1)
CSS CSS 403 2HCB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-013 Upstream of elbow #13 No No Ne No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
Desradmoon Medmanms T-Thermal Fatigue P Primary Water Stress Common Cracbng (PWSCC) M - Micratmologret!y InAmazed Caraman (MIC) F-Flow AccelerseedCarramen C-CarramanCr cung 1 - Irmersrumiar stress Common Cracbng posCC) E - Eremen-Cavesasan 0-Other
'*" FMECA - Degradatina Mechanisms C"'""" " ^'" AM^NCdI5 R" 87 Page B44 of B44 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imcation T C P I M E F 0 CSS CSS 403 2ilCB-27-20* Suction line for CE 79-014 Downstream of elbow #13 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-35B (ISO 211CB-27-1)
CSS CSS-003 2ilCB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-015 Upstream of elbow #14 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-358 (ISO 2HCB-27-1)
LSS CSS 403 211CB-27-20" Suction line for CS79-016 Upstream orcheck vaht No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-353 2BS-1B (ISO 211CB-27-1) t l
t Dearadation M T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cradmg (PWSCC) M- MLMW, Innuenced Cer, men (MIC) F-flow Accelenned Commen C-Cerrosien Cracking I-Irmergranulu Stress Commen Crackmg(IOSCC) E- Erosica -Cavnahon 0 -Other O O O >
.. . . _ . - - -- - _ . .-.- -.---- - ~ - - ~ . - - . . - . . . . - . . - . - . . - - - ~ -
4
+
- Calculation No. A-PENG CALC 015, Rev 00 j Page C1 of C7 f
4 i
3 i
1 i.
l-I 1
t I
s
- APPENDIX C
( "FMECA - SEGMENT RISK RANKING REPORT' t
b l (Attac*1 ment Pages C1 C7) i i
l i .
n i
i e
i i
d 1'
1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations s
(
,. .. , _. ,. s, . -,
.m y _ 7 _ ._, ,. , , _.
.-..v_
1 **" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report ca**"a' "* *-" Ra "
re cucr Degradation Ndmber Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds ,';gment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank CSS-001 33 211CB-13-24",79-059,79-060,79- CSS-N NONE IIIGH CAT 4 MEDIUM 2HCB-15-24", 062,79-063,79 4 64, 21ICB-24-20", 7945,79-065 A,79-2flCB-24-24", 066,79-066A // 78-211CB-27-20" 051,78 4 54,78-055,78-056,78-056A,78-057, 78-057A,78-058,78-058A // 77-008,77-009, 77-010,77-01I,77-012,77-013 // 77-00l,77 -
002,77-002 A,77-003,77-007//79-00I,79 402,79 403,79-004 O O O
O O O
"*" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report G*= e d -on. *
- r, c3 nrer Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation ! Degradation Mechanism Consegmence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segiment Mechanisms Groep ID Category Category Category Rank.
CSS-002 53 211CB-20-2",75-021 A // 76426A CSS-N NONE LOW CAT 7 LOW 2HCB-21-2", //75-026,75-027,75-2ilCB-3-10", 028,75-029,75-030, 2HCB-4-10".75-031,75-032//76-2HCB-7-3",211CB- 031,76-032,76-033, 93-2",2HCB-94-2"76-034,76-035,76-036 // 77 4 14,77-0I5,77-016,77-017,77-018,77-019,77-
-020,77-021,77-022,77-023,77-024,77 025,77-026,77-027,77-028,77-029,77-030,77-031,77-032,77-033,77 434,77 035,77-036,77-037, 77-038,77-039,77-040,77-041//75-084,75-085,75-086, 75 4 87,75-088,75-089//76-086,76-087,76-088,76489 i
- . . - .....<r -.. .i .
-- .-_. - .- ii..- .-.. 1 - - . - , . , .
f d*='aa""* eN4" Ra a
' * '7 FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report rage to of c7 Degradation Number Unes in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanisme Consequence Risk Risk Segment ID ofWelds Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank 287 2DCB-l l-2", 7541,7542,75- CSS-N NONE MEDIUM CAT 6 LOW CSS-003 2DCB-13-2", 063,75 M4,7545 2GCB-10-10", //76 4 5,76-066,76-2GCB-10-12", 067,76-068,76-069, 2GCB-10-3", 76 470//75-019//
2GCB-10-6*,75-002,75-003,75-2GCB-11-10", 004,75-005,75-006, 2GCB-11-12", 75 007,75-008,75-2GCB-11-6", 010,75 4 11,75-012, 2GCB-16-10",75-013,75-0:4,75-2GCB-16-12", 015,75-016,75-017, 2GCB-16-3*,75-018 // 75-003A //
2GCB-16-4", 75-001//76-023 //
2GCB-17-10",76-002,76-003,76-2GCB-17-12", 004,76-005,76-008, 2GCB-17-3",76-009,76-010,76-2GCB-34-2", 011,76-012,76-013, 2GCB-35-2",76-014,76-015,76-2GCB-35-3", 016,76-018,76-020, 2GCB-69-2",76-021,76-022,76-2GCB-70-2", 071 A // 76-001// 59-2HCB-13-14", 001,59-002,59 003, 2HCB-13-2",59-004,59-005,59-2HCB-13-20". 006,59-007,59 408, 2HCB-13-24",59-009,59-010,59-2HCB-13-8", OI1,59-034,59-035 .
2HCB-15-14", //59-012,59-013,59-2HCB-15-2", OI4,59-015,59-016, 2HCB-15-20",59-017,59-018,59-2HCB-15-24", 019,59-020,59-021, 2HCD-15-8",59-022,59-023,59-2HCB-20-10", 024,59-025,59-026, 9 O O
7 q .q b L/. L/
! 'O7 FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report cec. w a n s.u c u c o n. m oo rose c3 ef c7 Degradation Number Lines in Weids in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Conseguemee Risk Risk Segment ID ofWelds Segment Segment Mechanismes Group ID Category Category Category Rank 2flCB-20-3",59-027,59-028,59- !
211CB-21-10", 029,59-030,59 4 3I, 211CB-21-3", .59-032,59-033//59-2HCB-26-10", 001 A,59-001B,59-2HCB-26-14", 002A // 59-027A,59-211CB-26-20", 027B // 60-001,60-2HCB-27-10", 002,60 003,60 404, 2HCB-27-14",60-005,60-006,60-2HCB-27-20" 007,60-008,60-008 A,60-009,60-010,60-011,60-026, 60-027//60-012,60-013,60-014,60-015, '60-016,60-017,60-018,60-019,60- ,
019A,60-020,60- !
021.60-021 A,60- i 021B,60-022,60-023,60-024,60-025
// 60-001B,60-002A
, // 76-059,76-059A,76-060,76-061,76-062,76-063,76-064
//75-057,75-058,75-
' 059,75-060//75- t 056 //76-071,76-072,76-073,76-074, ,76-075,76-076,76- j 077,76-078,76-079,76-086,76 081//75-066,75-066A,75- - !
067,75-068,75-069,
'*" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report NamNa AN4ff.Rm M rna ce 4c1 Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Conseggeence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Gavup ID Category Categt,ry Category Rank 75-070,75-071,75-072,75-073,75-074,75-075,75-076,75-077,75 4 78//79-038,79-039,79-040, 79-04I//79-036,79-036A,79436B // 79-034,79-035, 79-037,79-042,79-042 A,79-043,79-044,79 044A,79-045,79 -
046,79-047,79 048,79-049,79-050 //79-051,79-052,79-053,79-056,79-057,79-058 // 79-053B,79-054,79-054A // 78-029,78-030,78-031, 78-032//784 27,73-027A,78-027B // 78-006,78-026,78-028,78-033,78-033 A,78-034,78-035,78-036,78-037,78-038,78-039,78-040,78-041
//78-042,78-049,78 050//78-045,78 046,78-047//75-020, 75-020A,75-02I,75-022,75-023,75-024,75-025//75-024A,75-079,75-G 9 9
O O O t
'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report c h *
- GCEC8" * * ,
ran a af a r
Degradation Nember Linesla Welds le Degradation Degradation Mechanisse Ceasequence Risk Risk ;
Segment ID ofWelds Segment Segment Mechanisses Group ID Category Category Category Rank 080,75-081,75-082,75-083 //76-024,76- ,
025,76-026,76-027, ;76-028,76-029,76-030 // 76-029A,76-082,76-083,76-084, .76-035 //78-021// l 78-007,78 408,78- i 011,78-012,78-014,78-014 A,78-016, 78-017,78-018,78-019,78-023,78-024 //78-001,78-002,78- *
- 002A,78-003,78-004,78-005// 79- ,
029//79-017,79-l 018,79-020,79-021,79-023,79-023 A,79-025,79-026,79-027, .79-030,79-031,79-032//79-005,79-006,79-007,79-008,79-009, 79-009A, 79-009B, 79-009C,79-011,79-012,79-013, 79414,79-015,79-016 '
t
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t Calculation No. A PENG CALC 015, Rev. 00
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APPENDIX D i
- QUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICA TION FORMS O
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ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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C:Icul: tion No. A PENG CALC 015. R:v. 00 Page D2 of DS Verification Plan
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure for the CCS at ANO 2 Document Number: C-PENG CALC-015 Revision Number: 00 instructions: Describe the method (s) of verification to be employed, i.e., Design Review,Titemate Analysis, Qualification Testing, a combination of these or an altemative. The Design Analysis Veil.". cation Checklist is to be used for all Design Analyses. Other elements to consider in formulating the plan are: methods for checking calculations; comparison of results with similar analyses, etc.
Description of Verification Method:
An independent review will be conducted as appropriate with the work activities described in Project Plan PP-2006839, Revision 00. The verification willinclude:
- 1. Verification of a Design Analysis by Design Review (per OP 3.4 of the Quality Procedures Manual).
- 2. Verification that the appropriate methodology is selected and correctly implemented
- 3. Verify all design input (as applicable) is appropriately and correctly obtained from traceable sources.
- 4. Review that the assumptions, results conclusions, report format, ... etc. are made in accordance with Design Analysis Verification checklist.
Verification Plan prepared by:
Re Jaaviw W /M independent Reviewer printed name andpfgpbre i Approved by: -
&T.WWNM
'x y Managernent approver pnnted name and signature a1 g
)
i
. l ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
Calculition No. A PENG.CAI.C-015, R:v. 00 Page 03 of DS Other Design Document Checklist (Page1of3)
Instructions: ne Independent Reviewer is to complete this checklist for each Other Design Document. His Checklist is to be made part of the Quality Record package, although it need not be made a part of or distributed with the document itself. De secot.d section of this checklist lists potential toples which could be relevant for a particular"Other Design Document'. If they are applicable, then the relevant section of the Design Analysis Verification Checklist shall be completed and attached to this checklist.
(Sections of the Design Analysis Verification Checklist which are not used may be left blank.)
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure for the CCS at ANO 2 Document Number: Revision Number:
- A-PENG-CALC-015 00
- Section it To be completed for all Other Design Documents Yes N/A OVerall Assessment 1 Are the results/ conclusions correct and appropriate for their intended use? O 2 Are alllimitations on the results/ conclusions docsimented? 8 Documentation Requirements
- 1. Is the documentation legible, reproducible and in a form suitable for filing and retrieving as a Quality @
Record?
- 11. Is the document identified by title, document number and date? @
111. ' Are all pages identified with the document number including revision number? O IV. Do all pages have a unique page number? @
V. Does the content clearly identify, as applicable:
A. objective S O li. design inputs (in accordance with QP 3.2) S O C. conclusions S O VI. Is the verification status of the document indicated? @
Vil, if an independent Reviewer is the supervisor or Project Manager, has the appropriate approval been E D documented?
Assumptions
- 1. Arc all assumption identified, justified and documented? 8 0
- 11. Arc all assumptions that must be cleared listed? O E A. Is a process in place which assures that those which are CENO responsibility will be cleared? O E 4 _
B. Is a process in place which assures that those which are the custemer's responsibility to clear will O E
\
be indicated on transmittals to the customer?
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
C:Icul:ti:n No. A.PENG CALC 015, R:v. 00 Page D4 of DS Other Design Document Checklist (Page 2 of 3) g Assessment of Significant Design Changes Yes N/A
- 1. Have significant design-related changes that might impact this document been considered? g II. If any such changes have been identified, have they been adequately addressed?
O O.
Selection of Design inputs I, Are the design inputs documented? g
- 11. Are the design inputs correctly selected and traceable to their source? g 111. Are references as direct as possible to the original source or documents containing collection / tabulations of g inputs?
IV. is the reference notation appropriately specific to the information utilized? g V. Are the bases for selection of all design inputs documented?
O VI. Is the verification status of design inputs transmitted from customers appropriate and documented? 8 O Vil, is the verification status of design inputs transmitted frot.: ABB CENS appropriate and documented? O O Vill. Is the use of customer-controlled sources such as Tech Specs, UFSARs, etc. authorized, and does the authorization specify amendment level, revision number, etc.?
S O References I. Are all references listed?
Q
- 11. Do the reference citations include sufficient information to assure retrievability and unambiguous location g of the referenced material?
Section 2: Other Potentially Applicable Topic Areas-use appropriate sections of the Design Analysis Verification Checklist (QP 3.4. Exhibit 3.4 5) and attach.
Yes N/A
- 1. Use of Computer Software O g
- 2. Applicable Codes and Standards O E
- 3. Literature Searches and Background Data O O
,4. Methods O g
- 5. Hand Calculations O E
- 6. List of Computer Software O O
- 7. List of Microfiche O E
- e. List of optical disks (CD-ROM) O O 5
- 9. List of computer disks O S ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
. .. - _ = . . _ _ _ _ . _ - .. .- .. . - . . - - - . . - , - . - . . - - . .
C:Icul: tion No. A PENG CALC 015, R:v. 00 Page DS of D5 l fT !
- : U Other Design Document Checklist (Page 3 of 3)
Independent Reviewer's Comments Comment Reviewer's Comment Response Author's Response ; Response ..
l Nuinber Required? Accepted 71 1 Can we remove the 3 colons in Yes Colons have been Yes Col. 8 of page 24, without changing removed our IR'd input from Yankee?
2 Same comment for page 25 Yes Same as above Yes 3 Change " Figure 3B" to " Table 3B" Yes Concur Yes
- on page 27
. r3 L) 3 Checklist completed by:
Independent Reviewer 800,4 r cr J4 over#+
Pnnted Name
/fdrI Sggiture e//d f7 Detc
,c., 'y U
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations i
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