ML20217E987
| ML20217E987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1997 |
| From: | Bauer A, Jaquith R, Weston R ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217E904 | List:
|
| References | |
| A-PENG-CALC-017, A-PENG-CALC-017-R00, A-PENG-CALC-17, A-PENG-CALC-17-R, NUDOCS 9710070336 | |
| Download: ML20217E987 (184) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. l Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Pilot Plant Study Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation for the Emergency Feedwater System September 1997
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AI Design Analysis Title Page A PENG CALC-017, Revision 00 Page1cfS4
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk Infonned Inservice Inspection Evaluation Proceduty for the EFW at ANO 2 Document Number: A-PENG-CALC-017 Revision Number: 00 Quality Class: O QC 1(safety Related) O QC-2 (Not Safety Relatc# @ QC 3 (Not Safety-Related) 4
- 1. Approvalof Completed Analysis This Design Analysis is complete and verified. Management authodzes tie use ofits results.
Printed Nanne Signature Date Cognizant Eagleeer(s) R. A. Weston [ j(g fly /q7
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A. V. Bauer [ Mg g Mentor , (g None /4 g jj i l independent Reviewer (s) R. E. Jaquith {Q (( g//gp p
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Managessent Approval B. T.1,ubin 8 15h] em> Manager b ' '
- 2. Package Contents (this section may be completed aner Management apprmW):
Total page cx)unt, including body, apperx! ices, attachments, esc. 175 List associated CD-ROM di.sk Volume Numbers and path names: @ None Note: CD-ROM are stored as separate Quality Records CD-ROM Volune Path Names (to Icmest dmetory which uruquely apphes to this document) Numbers _ Total number of sheets of microfiche: @ None Number of sheets: Other attachments (specify):
- 3. Distdbution:
- 3. Boya(2 copies)
O~ i:\ data \lubirfibsfrar\apeng017. doc
_ ._ - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - ^ - ~ ~ - ^ - - ' l Calculation No. A PENG CALC 017, Rev. 00 RECORD OF REVISIONS Page 2 of 54
&l l O Date Pages Changed Prepared By Approved By
[ l$ & Original R. A. Weston R. E. Jaquith A. V. Bauer I l l 9 l l l O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations l
ABB O) \
'u Calculation No. A.PENG. CAL C.017. Rev. 00 Page 3 of 54 '
l l 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE...............................................................................................................5 2.0 SC0Pe..................................................................................................................5 3.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICA TION AND BOUNDARY DEFINITION....................................~...... 6 ,
- 4. 0 C0NSEQ UENCES EVA L UA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '
4.1 CONSEO UENCE A SS UMP TIONSflNPU T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 C0NSEQ UENCE IDEN TlFICA Tl0N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 SHUTDOWN OPERA TION AND EXTERNAL EVENTS........................................... 14 6.0 DEGRA DA TION MECHA NISMS EVA L UA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 5. I DA MA GE GR O UPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND IDENTIFICA TION ........................... 29 5.3 BASICDATA.................................................................................................35 6.0 SERVICE HISTOR Y AND SUSCEPTIBILITY REVIEW.................................................... 41 7.0 RISK EVA L UA Tl0N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 EL EMEN T SEL EC Tl0N . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 9. 0 REFERENCES........................................................................................................51 qO) v' NUMBER LIST OF TAB {ff PAGE 1
ERV S YS TEM BO UNDA RIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 EFW CONSEO UENCE A SSESSMEN T SUMMA R Y. . . . ....... ............ ..... . . . .. .. . ..... .. ...... . ... ... 18 3A EFW CONSEOUENCE. FIGURES AND ISOMETRIC DRA WINGS..................................... 22 3B ERV PIPING AND APPLICABLE CONSEQUENCE AND LOCA T10N................................. 23 4 O A MA GE GR O UPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND SUSCEPTIBLE REGIONS......................... 30 6 EMERGENCY FEEDWA TER SYSTEM LINES AND OPERA TING CONDITIONS.................. 36 7 WA TER CHEMIS TR Y OF SUPPL Y TO THE EFW. .... .. ... .... ... . ....... . ... . .... . ....... .. .... . . ........ 40 8 SERVICE HISTORY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY EMERGENCY FEEDWA TER SYSTEM .......... 43 9 RISK SEGMEN T IDENTiflCA TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 RISK INSPEC Tl0N SC0PE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ELEMENT SELEC TION RISK CA TEGOR Y 5 ............ ... ............ . ..... .. .. ............. . .. ..... .... 50 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 017, Rev. 00 Page 4 of 64 UST OF FIGURES b2LA!RfB PAGE 1 A N O 2 EFW S YS TEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 EMERGENC Y FEED WA TER IERV) SUC TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3 EMERGENCY FEED WA TER (EFW) PUMP DISCHARGE................................................. 25 4 EMERGENCY FEEDWA TER (EFW) DISCHARGE TO MAIN FEEDWA TER & SGs ............... 26 LIST OF APPENDICfy A FMECA
- CONSEQUENCE INFORMA TION REPORT B FMECA DEGRADATION MECHANISMS C FMECA SEGMENT RISK RANKING REPORT D QUAUTY ASSURANCE VERIFICA TION FORMS O
O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB (O
/ Calculation No. A.PENG CALC 017 Rev. 00 Page 6 of 64 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation is to document the implementation of the Electric Power Research Institute IEPRI) Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure (RISI) of Reference 9.1 for the Emergency feedwater (EFW) system at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO 2), Entergy Operations, Inc. The RISI evaluation process provides an attemative to the requirements in ASME Section XI for selecting inspection locations. The purpose of RISI is to identify risk significant pipe segments, define the locations that are to be inspected within these segments, and identify appropriate inspection methods.
This evaluation is performed using the guidelines of the EPRI Risk Informed inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure of Reference 9.1 and in accordance with the requirements of the ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations Quality Procedures Manual (OPM 101). I 2.0 SCOPE This evaluation procedure applies to the EFW system at ANO 2, and utilizes the ISIS Software (Reference 9.2), which has been specifically developed to support and document l this procedure. O As part of the procedure, the system bounderin and functions are identified. A risk Q',) evaluation is performed by dividing the system into piping segments which are determined to have the some failure consequences and degradation mechanisms. The failure consequences and degradation mechanisms are evaluated by assigning the segment to the appropriate risk category and identifying the risk significant segments. Finally, the inspection locations are selected. The guidelines used in determining the degradation mechanisms, the failure consequences and the risk significant segments are those described \ in Reference 9.1, A V ABB Cornbustion Engineering Nuclear Operations ; o
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( ABB Calculation No. A PENG cal.C-017, Rev, 00 Page 6 of 64
- 3. 0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICA TION AND BOUNDARY DEFINITION 3.1 System Description The Emergency feedwater (ERV) system is designed to provide means of supplying water to the intact steam generator (s) foHowing a postulated main steam line rupture or loss of main feedwater to remove the reactor decay heat and provide for cooldown of the reactor coolant system (RCS) to within the temperature and pressure at which the shutdown cooling system (SDC) can be placed in operation. The ERV system employs two safety related pumps (turbine driven sad motor driven) with two independent feedwater trains, each capable of supplying either of the two steam generators, and a non safety related pump whose discharge line is interconnected to each of the safety related Env pump's discharge line and to the main feedwater di.* charge line.
The ERV system is designed so that the non safety Auxhiary Feedwater pump may be used 1 to supply water to the steam generators during non emergency conditions to avoid challenging the safety related ERVpumps. During an emergency condition, the safety related ERVpumps (2P7A & 2P78) are designed to automatickHy supply water to the steam generators upon the actuation of an EFAS temergency feedwater actuator signal). In addition, in the unlikely failure of both safety related ERV pumps during an emergency condition, the AuxHiery Feedwater pump can be
,m manually actuated to supply water to the steam generators.
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\ 3.2 System Boundary The Emergency feedwater (ERV) system is described consistent with the FSAR (Reference 9.3). The scope of this analysis includes au Class 3 piping in this system which is currently examined in the ANO 2, ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program (Reference
- 9. 6). Additional Class 2 and non code piping (Power Piping Ccde), which is not currently inspected, was also included in this scope. The code and non-code lines which are part of or interface with the ERV system were evaluated to determine their risk significance. The system boundaries are definedin figure t and Table 1. Certain line segments contain welds that were not enteredin the database (Reference 9.2) as outlined below:
- 3. 2.1 Service water supply lines upstream of check valves 2ERV 2A and 2ERV 28 (2HBC-86 6", 2HBC 85-6')
These line segments provide an alternate source of emergency feedwater from the service water loops, if the preferred source of emergency feedwater becomes unavailable. The portions of the line segments upstream of check valves 2ERV 2A and 2ERV.2B are included as part of the Service Water System and are therefore not includedin the ovaluation of the ERVSystem. 3.2.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2P 75 suction and discharge lines (2HBD-883-8', 2DBD. 344', 2DBD-34 6', 2DBD 35 6') These line segments in the auxiliary feedwater pump flow path are used to supply l} Q) condensate to the steam generators during routine operations such as plant startup and hot standby conditions. Failure in a pipe segment would be readily detected and ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations e _ ;
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 017, Rev. 00 Page 7 of 64 isolated during these types of operation. These line segments would not cause an initiating event if a failure were to occur. These lines are not required to accomplish or support any of the safety functions following a design basis event. A LOW consequence is therefore assigned to the segment failure. No degradation mechanisms were identified for the welds in the above line segments. Based on this assigned consequence category and no degradation potential, the risk significance of a segment failure is LOW (i.e., CAT. 7). Since no element selections are needed for low risk significant segments, the welds for these lines were not entered in the database. 3.2.3 Env System flush lines from downstream of valves 2CV-07141 and 2CV 07981 (2GBD 216 4*) The above line segment provides a path for flushing the discharge piping for each of the ERYpumps. Flushing of the Envpiping is performed as a routine operation and prL vides a means of meeting the feedwater quality requirements. The above line segment is isolated during normal power operation and is not required to accomplish or support any of the safety functions needed for shutting down the plant. A failure in the above line segment would not cause an initiating event. Note that this line is isolated, except for pump minimum flow, upon actuation of an emergency feedwater actuation signal. A NONE consequence category would therefore be assigned to the segment failure. Based on this category assignment, the risk significance of a segment failure is LOW (i.e., CAT 7). Since no element selections are needed for low risk significant segments, the welds for this line were not entered in the database. 3.2.4 ERVpump recirculation lines from downstream of valves 2ERV 10A and 2ERV 108 (2GBD-214 2',2GBD-215 2') The above line segments provide a minimum recirculation flow path for each of the ERY pumps. A flow orifice is located in each recirculation line upstream of the manual recirculation valve. The orifice limits and regulates flow through the line thus precluding pump run out if a failure occurs in any of the above line segments. A segment failure would not cause an initiating event and these lines segments are not needed to support EFW function. Because the line segments downstream of the mini flow recirculation valves are not needed to support ERV function, a NONE consequence category would be assigned as a result of a segment failure. Based on this assigned consequence category, the risk significance of the segment taikste would be LOW (i.e., CAT 7). Since no element selections are needed for low risk-significant segments, the welds for these lines were not enteredin the database. 3.2. 5 Lines with Nominal Diameter of 1* or less Piping with a nominal diameter of 1* or less was not explicitly evaluated to determine its risk significance. Since volumetric examination of this piping is not practicable, the most effective means to ensure its integrity is via conduction of a system leakage test. Consequently, since this piping is already subject to system leakage testing by the ASME Code, a risk assessment of this piping is not warranted. ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB f} V Calculation No. A PENG cal.C-017, Rev. 00 Page 8 of S4 TABLE 1 EFWSYSTEAf BOUNDARIES Ltne Ltne ISI Ptpe Ptpe Number Description Drawing Code Nominal Number Class Diameter (In l 2DBB 3 4' ERI' Discharge to SG 2E 24A 2DBB 31 2 4 2DRB-4-4" Eni' Discharge to SG 2E 24B 2DBB-41 2 4 2DBC I-4~ Eni' Pump 2P-1B Discharge Paths 2DBCII& 3 4 2DBC 12 y 2DBC 12-4* Dischargefrom AFIl' Pump 2P 73 to EFil' Pump 2P 7B 2DBC 12-1 3 4 Discharge Line 2DBC 13-4" Dischargefrom AFil' Pump 2P-73 to Eni' Pump 2P-7A 2DBC 13-1 3 4 Discharge Line 2DBC 2 4" Eni' Pump 2P-7A Discharge Paths 2DBC 21 & 3 4 2DBC 2 2 2DBC 3 4" EFit' Pump 2P 7B Discharge to SG 2E 24B 2DBC 31 3 4 2DBC-4-4" EFis' Pump 2P 7A Discharge to SG 2E 24A 2DBC 4-1 3 4 2DBC 7 2* EFit' Pump 2P 2A Aftnimum Bypass Line 2DBC-7-1 3 2 2DBC-8 2* EFil' Pump 2P 2B Afontmum Bypass line 2DBC-81 3 2 2HBC-85 6* EFis' Pump 2P 7B 6* Suction Line 2HBC-851 3 6
, . , 2HBC-85-8" EFII' pump 8" suction imefrom Condensate Storage 2HBC-851 3 8 Tanks (CST) 2T 41A & B O) 2HBC 86-6" EFil' pump 2P 7A 6* Suction Line 2HBC86-1 3 6 2HBC-86-R' EFli' pump 2P 7A 8" Suction Line 2HBC-86-1 3 8 l 2HBD-883-8
- Demon Tank Discharge 2HBD-883 1 PPC 8 2HBD 918" CST 2T 41A & B ' Detain Tank Discharge to Eni' Pump 2HBD-91 1 & 2 PPC 8 Suttwn 2HCC 28210' EFil' pump 10~ Suction Linefrom Condensate Storage 2HCC 282-6 3 10 Tank (CSD T-4)B 2HCC 28212* EFll' pump i2" Suction Lmefrom Condensate Storage 2HCC 2821 thrv 3 12 Tank CD T-41B 2HCC 282-6 2HCC 282-8" EFit' pump 8"Suctuon Linefrom Condensate Storage 2HCC 282-6 3 8 Tank (CSD T-41B 2HCD-193 10" Condensate Storage Tank 2T-41A & B Discharge 10" 2HCD-1931 PPC 10 piping 2HCD-l93-8* Condensate Storage Tank 2T-41A & B Discharge - S' 2HCD1932 PPC 8 piping 2HCD-23810" Conitensate Storage Tank 2T-41A & B Descharge 10' 2HCD-2381 PPC 10 piping 2HCD 238 6* Condensate Storage Tank 2T-4/A & B Discha';e 6" 2HCD-238 2 PPC 6 otping ON
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(D ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 017, Rev. 00 V Page 10 of 54
- 4. 0 CONSEQUENCE EVALUA TION The Emergency feedwater (ERV) System is the primary backup for the Main feedwater thinV) System. The ERV provides makeup to the intact steam generator (s) in order to remove decay heat from Reactor Coolant System through the intact steam generator (s). If main feedwater flow is interrupted, the ERV system is automaticaHy actuated to restore and maintain steam generator level foHowing a consequential reactor trip. The ERV System consists of two redundant and diverse trains. Ecch train is capable of supplying emergency feedwater to either steam generator. During normalpower operation, the ERV System is in the standby mode. During an emergency condition, the ERV System is automaticaHy actuated by a low level condition in either steam generator. A low steam generator level event causes an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) to be generated. An EFAS starts both EFW pumps and opens aH valves in the flow paths to the intact steam generator (s). The ERV system is normany aligned to provide pump suction from the condensate tanks. Pressure indication is provided in the control room for the condensate tank discharge line. If the pressure in the tank discharge line drops below a pre set value and EFAS is generated, the isolation valves in the condensate line win close automaticany and the valves in the service water lines wiH open simultaneously. This ensures that makcup to the intact steam generator (s) win continue.
The consequence evaluation for the ERY was performed based on the guidance provided in the EPRI procedure (Reference 9.1). The evaluation focused on the impcct of a pipe n segment failure on the capability of ERV system to perform its design functions, and on the ( overall operation of the plant. Impacts due to direct andindirect effects were considered. I % ' Generauy, the effects of a direct impact are confined to the ERV system itself. An indirect impact resulting from the failure of a pipe segment would affect neighboring equipment within the ERY system or other systemis). Indirect impacts would generaHy be caused by flooding, spraying, or jet impingement of neighboring equipment. Determination of the consequences of a segment failure considers the potential of losing effected mitigating systems, or trains thereof, and the consequentialimpact on the safety functions. The spatial effects of a segment feiture are primarily associated with flooding, spraying, or jet impingement. Piant locations as defined in the Intemal Flood Screening Study (Reference 9.14) were used in this evaluation. The locations are summarized in Section 4.2.1 of Reference 9.18. On November 19 and 20,19E6, a walkdown was performed at ANO 2 to assess potential spatialinteractions associated with splashing, spraying, and flooding, including propagation paths. The following individuals participatedin the walkdown and meetings at ANO-2: Rick Fougerousse (ANO ISI) Tim Rush (ANO PRA G;oup) Randy Smith (ANO ISI) Jim Afoody (YAEC Consultant) Pat O'Regan (YAEC) The plant was in an unexpected outage and radiological controls would not aHow access to the south piping penetration rooms (Rooms 2084 and 2050) and Elevation 317' O' (Rooms ()) L 2006, 2011, 2014, 2007, and 2010). However, this is not judged to have an impact on the analysis since spatial questions were answered for these areas during the visit. The ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations _o
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC-017 Rev. 00 Page 11 of 54 focus of the walkdown was in those areas where analysis scope piping exists and their propagation paths andimpacts. The following summarises the walkdown observations: (a) North Piping Penetration (Room 2081) was walked down. ERV and main feedwater valves were identified in the room. Grating and a spiral stelt ensures easy propagation to elevation 335'0* where there is a door with its latch removed (required due to high energy line break analysis) opening out to Room 2040. A door at elevation 354' 0* opens into the room and provides access to a steltwell and the turbine auxiliary building. It would be difficult for floods to access Room 2081 from the turbine auxiliary building side. Propagation into 2081 from 2040 would not affect any equipment as the ERV and MnV volves are above the floor. (b) Elevation 335' O' (Room 2040) is a very large area containing general access, corridors, and severallarge non safety related rooms. Several floor drains were noted. ERV and containment spray piping is located here, including RWT suction MOVs. The MOVs are located high off the floor in the tank room, protected from floods. Also, the ERV steam admission volve 2CV 0340 2 and 2SV 0205 is located behind a well and sufficiently off the floor to be protected. Several rooms connect to this room from elevation 354' 0* (Room 2073) and the piping penetration rooms (Rooms 2055 and 2084) at elevation 335. The most critical component identified in this area is MCC 2852 which powers several train A components. Although the l MCC is not near analysis scope piping, it is at the east stairway entrance (the propagation path to elevation 317' 0'). If six inches of water could be accumulated at elevation 335' O' or if a very large pipe break occurred, it is considered likely that the MCC could fall. (c) ERY pump rooms (2024 and 2025) at elevation 329' 0" were Inspected. The stairs from Room 2040 down to the ERV pump room entrances are protected from flooding because the stairs start about 8 inches off the floor at elevation 335. Also, the pump rooms have a floodprotection door that opens into each room. P! ping and valves in each room wsre identified and confirmed. Also, the rooms were noted to be water tight; any Icakage out of the room lassuming the room fills from a pipe break) would be small and within the capacity of drainage systems. Room flood detectors ed floor drains were observed. The type of inputs used and the assumptions made in performing this evaluation are documented in Reference 9.18. Key inputs and assumptions, extracted from Reference 9.18, are provided in Section 4.1. Twenty-five consequence segme sts were identified for ERV lines entered in the database. Of the twenty five, ten were isssigned as " MEDIUM" and fifteen as ' LOW'. The consequence assessment summary for these segments is provided in Section 4.2. The bases and justifications for earn category assignment are l provided in Appendix A. This appendix contains reports obtained from the ISIS software \ (Reference 9.2) for the ERV system. For Env lines not entered in the database, one segment was assigned as " LOW
- consequerke and two segments were assigned as
'NONE"(see Section 3.2).
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c\ ABB (G Calculation No. A PENG CALC 017 Rev. 00 Page 12 of 64 4.1 CONSEQUENCE ASSUMPTIONS / INPUT The following assumptions and input were extracted from Reference 9.18. The type of initiating events and mitigcting capabilities considered in this evaluation are described in detaHin Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of Reference 9.18. 4.1.1 Pipe failure can occur at anytime; three configurations have been defined as shown in Table 41 of Reference 9.18. These are normal (operating or standby), test, and accident demand. This table alsc summarlies }vdgments and assumptions regarding which configurations are most important, if pipe failure does not cause a direct initiating event, it is assumed that pipe faHure occurs during the accident demand configuration, if applicable. This assumes Is/pe failure occurs during the most conservative exposure time and accounts fur the higher stress placed on the operators with resultant delay in operator response. 4.1.2 Pipe failures in moderate energy lines (<200'F and <275 psig) are assumed to be large. This analysis goes beyond the design basis by evaluating the consequences of unisolated large breaks (i.e., flooding) even though they are considered less likely in moderate energy lines. SmaHer breaks would sHow more time for the flooding impacts to occur. Most studies would consider such events almost incredible. 4.1.3 Draining one CST labout 200,000 gaHons each) into the auxHiery building can not flood the LPSI, HPSI, and containment spray pumps. The equalized flood levelis ( about 8 feet above floor elevation 317 which is below the elevation of ventilation openings into these flood protected rooms. However, EnV suction would transfer to service water on low pressure. Thus, for Env breaks downstream of the crosstle isolation MO (2CV 07891 and 2CV 0795 2), it is possible that aH ECCS on elevation 317' O' could be thoded if service water is not isolated or tripped or the ventilation openings closed. The ventilation openings are closed on a safety injection signal or by the operators in response to flooding. Because there are I numerous indications and time for the operators to prev *nt such events, they are considered to be very unlikely in this analysis. 4.1.4 ERV piping breaks inside the containment building and upstream of the steam generator isolation check valves (2ERV-9A & 98) have the potential to empty at least a portion of a CST. Emptying a l.STinto the containment building is assumed not to impact reactivity controlif once through cooling is required for successful heat removal and inventory makeup fl.e., recirculation with CST in containment). Also, continued flooding of the containment with service water is assumed to be unlikely and is not analyzed (i.e., Env transfer to service water). 4.1. 5 Unisolated ERYpipe failures are comervatively assumed to cause flow diverulon and failure of the affected EAV trains. This is judged particularly conservativs for the lines downstream of 2ERV 7A & B and 8A & B because this assumption fails all EAY. 4.1. 6 The valve arrangement in Room 2084 and the failure of fire doors into Room 2073 are assumed to preclude flooding of the ECCS valves in Room 2084. Some of the HPSI valves appear to be close to the floor (i.e., I to 2 feet above elevation 360'- O'), but their motor operators are a few feet higher. Spray from EnVlines above ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations 1
1 ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC 017, Rev. 00 Page 13 of 64 could impact some valves, but there are a number of HPSI supp4 valves and the containment spray valves are separate'l such that there should always be a dischstge path for these systems. Also, flooding to a level of 3 to 5 feet in a room is assumed to fail the door and drain the room. 4.1. 7 MCCs at elevation 354* 0* (Room 2073) and Elevation 335'0* (Room 2040) are assumed to 100 if water accumulates to a height of 6 inches et the MCCs. At elevation 354' 0", there is a large grated opening to e.svation 335' 0* on the west end of the building. Thus, it is assumed that breaks in this enslysis scope can not accumulate 6 inches at this location. It takes a significant time to flood to a level of 6 inches at elevation 335' O', but it is assumed that faHure to isolate results in MCC isHure.
- 4. l.8 This analysis assumes that fining of an ERYpump room (CST or service water as the source) wiH not cause gross structural failure of the room or door. The watertight doors are very heavy and open into the rooms.
4.1.9 The IPF Internal flooding study Identifies impacts in rooms from cable terminst points. Since mostlunction boxes, terminalboxes, etc. noted during the walkdown were at least a few feet off the floor, these impacts were ignored in the oneysis. Also, }vnction boxes appeared to be tight and sealed, therefore, even if water reached them, an electrical fault appeared unlikely. 4.1.10 Suction piping from the CST (ERV) is assumed to fall during an accident demand. This is conservative because the demand stress may not be significant4 different than the standby condition. 1 \ 4.1.11 The IPEEE lextemal hazards analysis) assessment neglects (1) the potentialImpacts of relay Chatter from relays with unknown capacity (possible optimism, although this is scheduled to be resolved), (2) an improvement if the seismic capacity of EDG tanks is increased, and (3) a detailed review of fire scensrios (not provided in the IPEEE). These are not judged to sigroificant4 impact the analysis results. 4.1.12 The auxiliary feedwater pump (2P75) is located in the turbine building (elevation 325' O' below the main feedwater pumps) and can discharge into the main feedwater cumps discharge header or into the ERV lines downstream of the ERV pumps. This is a manual operator action, but controls and indications are available in the control room. When isolation failure occurs, ARV is not credited (human dependency, CST wHlbe pumped down, and ERV trcnsferc to service water). l 4.1.13 ERV suction transfer to service water requires both an EFAS (emergency fondwater actuation signal) and ERVlow suction pressure (< 5 psig). 4.1.14 Each ERV pump is designed to pruvide >485 ppm at a discharge pressure of l > 1200 psig when steum generator pressure is > 800 psia. 4.1.15 Normal ERV suction is from the CST through 2CV 0107 (located in the turbine building). Overload hesters have been removed from normaHy open 2CV-0707 to prevent spurious operation of the valve. ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
( ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC-017 Itev. 00 N Page 14 of 64 4.1.16 According to Table 3.2 of Reference 9.1, the unreliability of unaffected backup trains is as follows.* sero backup train
- 1.0 one backup train
- 1.0E 2 two backup trains
- 1.0E 4 three or more backup trains
- 1.0E 6 The probability of not performing corrective actions based on adequate information in the control room is typically 1.0E 2 (Reference 9.22). Therefore, failure of the operators to isolate a segment is treated as equivalent to one backup train.
4.2 CONSEQUENCEIDENTiflCATION The consequence summary assessment is provided in tabular form in this section. Simplified schematics are providedin Figures 2 through 4 to illustrate the boundaries for each of the EAV consequmces. Dottedlines are used to identify the boundaries for each consequence. Major Env equipment are shown on these figures for ease of identification. Table 2, which was extracted from Reference 9.18, summarizes the consequence evaluation for the ERV system. The ' Systems impact
- and
- Backup Trains
- columns in Table 2 provide results for both isolation success and isolation failure cases, when appropriate. The isolation success case is presented first followed by the isolation failure case. An "gr* is used to seperate the
, y cases. Also, "Once Through B* refers to availability of the train B discharge valves for once G
through cooling (both trains of pumps are available). Likewise, "Once Through A
- refers to train A once through cooling discharge valves. (Refer to Section 5.3 of Reference 9.18.)
The bases and justifications for each of the assigned consequences are documented in Appendix A. The ISIS (Reference 9.2) software was used as a tool to prepare the documentation in this appendix. The documentation of the spatial effects are currently based on a review of the Intemal Flood Screening Study (Reference 9.14) and the walkdown that was conducted for the ERV system. A description of the detailed spatial arrangement is providedin Section 4.2.1 of Reference 9.18. The walkdown captured subtle interactions which could not be readily identified using only the Intemal Flood Screening study. Observations from the walkdown are factored into the consequence evaluation. Table 3A presents the ERV consequences, their corresponding figure numbers and Isometric Drawings. In addition, Table 3B identifies the pipe line numbers and their corresponding locations. 4.3 SHUTDOWN OPERA TION AND EXTERNAL EVENTS ShyJfpwn Operation The consequence evaluation is on assessment assuming the plant is at-power. Generally, the at power plant configuration is considered to present the greatest risk for piping failures since the plant requires immediate response to satisfy reactivity control, heat removal, and inventory control. By satisfying these safety functions, the plant will be shut down and maintained in a stable s:ste. At-power, the plant is critical, and is at higher pressure and
/3 temperature in comparison to shutdown operation. The current version of the methodology Q (Reference 9.1) provides no guidance on consequence evaluation during shutdown ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations 1
-. ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .- _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - . _ - - . . . __
ABB Calculation No. A PENG. CALC 017, Rev. 00 Page 15 of 64 operation. This Fmitation is assessed herein to gain some level of confidence that the consequence ranking during shutdown would not be more limiting. Pipe segments that are stready ranked as 'HIGH' consequence from the evaluation st power need not be evaluated for shutdown. Those that are stready ' MEDIUM' require some confidence that 'HIGH' would not occur due to shutdown configurations. However, the
' LOW" consequences for power operation require more confidence that a 'HIGH" would not l occur and some confidence that a ' MEDIUM' consequence would not occur. Recognizing l this, a review and comparison of system consequence results for power operation versus l potential consequence during shutdown operation was conducted.
The results of the comparison indicate that during st power operation, the ERV segments are ranked as ' MEDIUM' or ' LOW' depending on the consent nce impact. During shutdown operation, the ERV could be operating during the initialphase of plant cooldown when the steam generators are available and before siunificant maintenance is started. During the latter phase of . shutdown, the frequency of chauengang EFW is judged to be similar to or less than tha frequency of chsNenge during at-power operation. The EFW system requires manual sc*ustion during shutdown operation and portions of the system is more likely w be in maintenance. If the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is intact with a [ steam generator available, there is more time sysHable for establishing emergency feedwater l flow to the intact steam generator (s). If RCS is not intact (i.e., vesselhead is removed) then l the ERV is not a relevant mitigating system. The EFW consequence ranking during st- \ power operation is considered to be bounding. i External Events O Although extemst events are not addresssd in the current version of the methodology (Reference 9.1), the potentialimportance of piping failures during extemal event is also considered. The ANO 2 IPEEE was reviewed to determine whether extemal initiating events, with their potential common cause impacts on mitiosting systems, could affect consequence ranking. This information, along with information from other extemal event PRAs, is considered to derive insights and confidence that consequenc0 ranking is not more significant during on extemal event. The foHowing summarizes the review for each of the major hazards (seismic, fire and others). Seismic Challenges The potential effects of seismic initiating events on consequence ranking is assessed by considering the frequency of chauenging plant mitigating systems and the potentialimpact on the existing consequunce ranking. The foHowing summarizes this assessment: GenersHy, the EFW piping considered in this evaluation has a seismic fragility capacity much greater than the 0.3g screening value and is not considered likely to fait during a seismic event. With regard to the impact on mitigating systems, the most likely scenario is scismic inducedloss of offsite power. Based on a typicalfragility forloss of offsite power, o High Confidence of Low Probability of failure (HCLPF) of 0.1g (Reference 9.19) is assumed. Combing this fragility with the seismic hazards developed for the ANO sits . References 9.20 and 9.21), the frequency of seismic induced loss of offsite poweris less than 1.0E 4 per year. 1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB ~' Calculation No. A PENG CALC 017. Rev. 00 Page 16 of 54 Considering the scenario where an induced loss of offsite power occurs and both dieselgenerators are available, both trains of ERVare initiaHy available. However, in response to the event, one ERV train is assumed to fail with the remaining ERV train providing backup. Once through cooling would also be avaHable as e additional backup train. Assuming a probability of 1.0E 2 for either backup train and an 'aN year' exposure time, the Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) for this scenario is approximately 1 DE 6. Thus the resulting consequence is " LOW'. For the scenario where an induced loss of offsite power and non seismic failure of one diesel generator occur, only the turbine 4dven ERV train is initiaHy available lassuming that the motor 4dven ERV train is powered by the faHed diesel). However, in response to the event, the turalne4dven EFW train is assumed to fail with once through cooling providing backup. Assuming a probability of 0.1 for failure of the dieselgenerator and 1.0E 2 for failure of once through cooling and an
'all year' exposure time, the CCDP for this scenario should be less than 1.0E 6.
Thus the resulting consequence is ' LOW'. For the scenario wh'se an induced loss of offsite power and failure of both diesel generators occur, only the turbine 4 riven ERV train is initiaHy available. However, in response to the event, the ERV turbine 4 riven train is assumed to faH. Assuming a probability of 1.0E.2 for faHure of both diesel generators and an "aN year' exposure time, the CCDP for this scenario is approximately 1.0E 6. The resulting consequence is therefore
- LOW'.
G i Based on the above, the consequence ranking for ERV during a seismic event is enveloped by the at power consequence ranking. Y Fire ChaNenges The ANO-2 IPEEE indicates that the fire core damage fregs ency is dominated by fires initiated outside the containment. Based on fire core damage frequency of 3.5E 5 per year in the ANO 2 IPEEE, a fire inducedloss of offsite power is assumed to be less than 1.0E 2 per year. With regard to the impact on mitigating systems, the most likely scenario is fire inducedloss of offsite power. Considering the scenario where an induced loss of offsite power occurs and both dieselgenerators are available, both trains of EFW are initially available. However, in response to the event, one ERV train is assumed to fail with the remaining ERV train providing backup. Once through cooling would also be available as e additional backup train. Assuming a probability of 1.0E 2 for either backup train and an *all year' exposure time, the Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) for this scenario is approximately 1.0E-6. Thus the resulting consequence is " LOW'. For the scenario where an inducedloss of offsite power and non-seismic failure of one diesel generator occur, only the turbine 4 riven EFW train is initiaHy available (assuming that the motor 4 riven ERY train is powered by the failed diesel). However, in response to the event, the turbine 4 riven ERV train is assumed to fail with once through cooling providing backup. Assuming a probability of 0.1 for failure of the diesel generator and 1.0E 2 for failure of once through cooling and an "all year" exposure time, the CCDP for this scenario should be
, less than 1.0E 5. Thus the resulting consequence is 'AfEDIUAf'.
V ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG CALC-017, Rev. 00 Fage 17 of 54 For the scenario where an inducedloss of offsite power and failure of both dieselgenerators occur, only the turbine 4 riven ERV train is in/tially available. However, in response to the event, the EFW lurbinedriven troln Is assumed to fail. Assuming a probability of 1.0E 2 for failure of both diesel generators and on 'all year" exposure time, the CCDP for this scenario is less than 1.0E-4. The resulting consequence is therefore
- MEDIUM'.
Since the at-power consequence ranking is already " MEDIUM' or " LOW', the resulting consequences during a fire would not be of greater significance. Other External Challenges . Other hazards were screened in the ANO 2 IPEEE and are assumed to have little or no risk significant impact on Env. O O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
_,A '**% [ V) g 'G) w) 2%EE CalculatiOrt NO. A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 Page 18 Of 54 Table 2 ERV Consequence Assessment Sunwnsty JD Descr& tion Spetini Conf w* kattietor esotermn System knpoets Bactup Trains Conterament Exposur Table Used knt locetion towte il fenote il eTM tRd 9181 EFW-C-OTA UW to SG A C- ;-- ;.- .t Oomend Assumed 2EnYSA PCS(T21. U W 2 (EFW & AFW ZEM7A & bernweerr 22 MEIM/M kuside T2 kssMe & to SG *A* so SG *B*, TB cutsnde test Conteenment M OVs y once Through oursede PCs, UW, AFW g isoleson & On Throught EFW-C-018 EFW to SG B Com% a- .^ Demand Assumed 2EFWSB PCS LT2L EFW 2 (UW & AFW 20W4A & between 2-2 MEDIUM kneMe T2 inside & so SG *B* 00 SG *A *, 88 outsafe test Cv ;- ~;.; MOVs y Osco Through outs *de PCS. EM, AFW qisolenon & Cnce T'. -;,; EFW-CD EFW so SG A 2064 Demand Assumed 2EsWSA PCS (T21. EFW 2 (EFW & AFW a M SA bernween 22 MEDIUFC Outsde T2 kuside & soSG*A* to SG *B*, kuside sest Contennment MOVs y Once Through cartsede PCS, UW, yisolution & AFW, Or,ce Once Tfrough Thvough A By EFW-C-028 UW to SG B 2061 Demand Assumed 2E M SB PCS LTIL UW 2 (UW & AFW ZEFW-SB betmewen 2-2 WEDKJnt Osttside T2 beside & soSG*B" no SG *A *, kasMe test C .;- ,a .^ MOVs q Once Throup*> outsde PCS, UW, yisoletion & AFW, Osce once Through Tr*eoug^r A 81 EFW-C43A EFWto SG A 2084 Demend Assumed 2CV- PCS iT21. UW 3 (EFW, AFW, Useffected between 22 LOW between 2CV- T2 1026or B to SG *A
- Osce Treough test 1037and 1037 g g isolseiore, 2E M 7A PCS, SWA. EFW 8 & Once AFW, once Tleough 81 neough A EFW-C-038 EFWno SG A 2084 Demand Assumed 2CV- PCS(T21 EFW 2.5 (EFW, use*1ected betweerr 22 LOW between 2CV- 72 1025 or A no SG *A
- AFW, Once test 1038and 1038 g Through q IU W-78 PCS, EFWB. Jeatedorn, EFW AFw, O,ce A & O,c, Through A Through B1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
N lS MWW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 Page 19 of 54 Table 2 (Cont'd) ERV Consequence Assesesent SummatV K1 Descr#rten Spetial Corrf;gureters knitiator holetern System brpects Bechte Trairw Contaanrnent Esposure Table Used Rank loce'n3- (note 11 (note 11 Tiene tref. 9.131 EFW C43C EFW to SG B 2081 Ou .J As.i-.A
- 2CV- PCS (12], EFW 3 (ETW, AFW, thseff~ted betweerr 22 LGW betweers 2CV- T2 1076 er A to SG *B" Once Through rest 1039 aruf 1039 q g ist.te6an, 2EFW-8A PCS, EFWA. EFWB & Owe AFW, Once Throamh 81 Treougfu A EFW-C-C30 EFW to SG B 2081 C- . ~. J Assurned 2CV- PCS LT21, EFW 2.5 (EFW, thse*fected betweers 2-2 LOW between 2CV- 72 1075 or B 'o SC *B* AFW, Once test 1036 and 1036 g Through g 2EFW88 PCs, EFW B, asotsbort EFW AFW, Owe A & Osco EFW-C-04A T' .~f. A Thvough 81 EFW to SG A 2084 De. -.J Ai,3 ;.J 2CV- PCS (T21. EFW 3 (EFW, AFW, thseffected betweers 2-2 LOW between 2CV- 72 1026 A to SG *A
- Once T?eough test 1026 and 1037 y q isolatiers, PCS, EFW A. EFWB & Owe AFW, Once Through 81 Treough A EFW-C-C48 EFWto SG A 2084 D -. J Asst ;-d 2CV- PCS(721 EFW 2.5 (EFW, (kseffected between 2-2 LOW between 2CV- T2 1025 8 to SG *A
- AF W, Once 1025 and 1038 test g Through g PCS, EFWB, isoleticn, EFW i AFW, Once A & Osco Through A Through 81 EFW-C-04C EFW to SG B 2081 D.enend Assurned 2CV- PCS (T21. EFW 3 (EFW, AFW, lkseffected between 2-2 LOW between 2CV- T2 i:16 A to SG ~B* Once Through test 1076 and 1939 y y isolatierr, PCs, EFWA, EFWB & Osce AFW, Owe Through B1 Through A EFW-C-040 EFW to SG B 2081 Demand Asst ,-d 2CV- PCS (721, EFW 2.5 (EFW, (kseffected betweerr 2-2 LOW between 2CV- T2 1075 8 to SG *B* AFW, Owe 1075 erx11036 test g 7?eough g PCS, ETWB, isolstiver, EFW ;
AF W, Osce A & Once T*, ,,J. A TF-4 81 , ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations e O O
m \ O l O i V ggg / 7%WW Calculatior! No. A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 Page 20 of 54 Table 2 (cont'd) j EFW Consequence Assessenent Summary ; O Descrption Spedal Corrngwat kaltietor Asolatiors System knpects BecAmp Trairas Contavamorrt Emosure Tono Used Rard I locetion son (note il (note 19 Time IR.f. 9.181 EFW-C 05A EFWA to SGs 2084 Demand Assurned 2P7A trp PCS LT21. EFWA 2.5 (EFWB, L% effected betweers 2-2 LOW Outside Purm 2081 T2 & suctiorr y AFW, once test Rooms 2055 M OVs PCS, EFWA. Through y 2040 AFW,Chee &soletion. EFW Through A B & Once T M ugh By EFWC-058 EFW B to SGs 2084 Demand Assumed 2P7B tr> PCS (T21. EFW 8 2 IEFWA. Unoffected between 22 MEDIUM Onstside Purrwr 2081 T2 & suction y AF W, Once test Rooms 2055 , MOVs PCS, EFW B. Through or 2040 AF W,06ce isolatiors, EFW Through A A & Osco Treough 89 EFWC-06A EF W A hr 2024 Demand Assumed 2P7A tr> PCS (72). EFW A 2.5 (EFW B, (kneffected bet *eeere 22 LOW Pump Room T2 or room AFW, Chee test RoccGng Thro w y EFWC-068 EFW8 kr PJrm 2025 Demand AssW 2P78 tr# PCS(T21 EFWB 2 (EFWA, Uheffected betweers . . MEDetint Room T2 or room AFW, Once test noodng Tleought EFWCDT Between 2024 Demand Assumed Yes (ppe PCS (T21. EFW 1(Once Cheffected aR prar 22 wW 2EFW5A and 2025 T2and cheMonge due to che6enge Treought 58 addtionet requires of crossties faabres bee #y tunemocted openmg frequency enheest of cheRengel EFW-C-08A Er~'NA Suetsorr 2024 Demend Assumed 2CVD795 PCS (721. EFWA 2.5 (EFWB, Cheffected betweers 22 LOW kr 1%rnp Room T2 and 0111 AFW, Osce test and SWS Trecemhy EFW-C488 EFW8 Suction 2025 Demand Assumed 2CV4789 PCs (T21. EFW 8 2 (EFWA, Cheffacted betweers 22 MEDfJM kr 1%rnp Room T2 and 0716 AFW, once test and SWS Throught ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations c___ .. .. . .. . . .
NSS D'1B W 1 1 Calculation No. A-FYNG-CALC-017, ReV. 00 Page 21 of 54 Table 2 (cont'd) ERVConsequence Assessmen. Sv* nary D Descrip6cn Spatief Configwerion hitiator holeren System hwsets Beetep Treirar Conterwnent Emonwe TeWe Used Marat locerion (note 11 innte il Time tRe". 9.181 EFW-C Common CST 2024 Demand Assenned 2CV- PCS IT2L UW 2.5(U W B. L% effected between 2-2 LOW 09A PYpe k EFWA T2 0707 A AF W. Once test Anv Room be=W T?vouchi and Sws EFW C-098 Common CST 2025 Demand Asswned 2CV- PCS (721. EFW 2(UWA. L% effected between 2-2 MEDount Pfpe in EFW8 T2 0707 8 AF W. Once test Asv Room keeW T!wought endSws EfW-C to Common CST Outside Demand Assumed M PCS .T21 3 (EFW. AfW. L% effected between 22 LOW Pipe Outside 2223 T2 O we T1roughi sest 2225 206O EfW C11 UWt 1 CST Outs (de Domend Assumed NA PCS 1T21 2 (EfW A. E,heffected et peer 22 LOW Pipkg testroom 20C5 T2 & Lkw't 1 AFW. Owe of check veNes 20< 0 CST T?rought 844 & 845 20:5 chenenge funenpecte d frequency of chenengel EFWC- EFW to SG *A* Contenwnent Stenc6y T5 No PCS (T51 & EFW NA thoffected NA 2-1 htEDIUM 12A downsweem of to SC *A
- due 2EFW-9A so 75 EFW-C128 EFWto SG *B* Conteesment Stenc6y T5 No PCs (151 & UW NA Chaffected NA 2-1 MEDIUnt L, e; .. of to SG *B* doe 20W-98 to T5 Note 1: Successfadisoletkn resuft k shown first and then isolation fe&se cose separated by "g* when oppnceste. *Osce 71 rough B* refers no once strough coonne mode ofinveneory controland heet removal wittu trek 8 dscharge wakes evenable Rwth pwrp traine are evadebte but the A Voirs discherpe wofwes are feiedt. ShnWerty.
- Owe T? rough A* refers se usin A discharge vekes.
ABB Combustion Engi g Nuclear Operations _.._..____..__.m
b ABB (Y
Calculation No. A.PENG. CALC.017, Rev. 00 Page 22 of 54 , Table 3A EFW Consequence, Figures and Isometric Drawings Consequence 10 figure , Isometric Drawings l Number ' EnV CDIA 4 20B8 31 EnV C-019 4 2088-4 1 EnV-C 02A 4 2088 3 1 EFW.C 028 4 2DBB-4 1 \ Eny-C.03A 4 2D88 31 Eny C-038 4 2D88-3 1 EnV C-03C 4 2D88-4 1 EnV C-030 4 2DBB-4 1 EnV-C-04A 4 2DBC-4 1 Eny C-048 4 2DBC.11 EnV C-04C 4 2DBC 21 EfW.C-04D 4 2DBC 31 EnV C-OSA 3 2DBC 2 2 2DBC 21 2DBC.7 1 2DGC.4 1 EnV-C-058 3 2DBC.11 2DBC.4 1 2DBC-81 2DBC-3 1 2DBC 21 ERV.C-06A 3 2DBC.2 2 2DBC 131 Eny-C-068 3 2DBC-12 2DBC 121 2DBC 1 1 EnV-C-07 3 2DBC 12 EnV C-0BA 2 2HBC 861 2HBC.85 1 EnV-C.088 2 2HBC-85 1 {} Eny C-09A Env.C-098 2 2HBC.85 1 \ ,;' 2 2HBC-85 1 2HBD 91 1 2HBD 912 2HBD-8831 2HCD 195-2 2HCC.282 6 EnV-C 10 2 2HCD 1951 2HCD 2581 2HCD.185 2 2HBD.912 ERV C.11 2 2HCC.2821 2HCC 282 2 2HCC.282 3 2HCC 282-4 2HCC.282 5 2HCC 282 6 Eny-C-12A 4 2DBB 31 EnV-C.12B 4 2DBB-4 1 L) ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A lB Calculation No. A-PENG CALC 017, ReV. 00 Page 23 of 64 T8bl8 30 E9"W Piping and Applic8ble Consequence & Locatl0n EFW SucInon e' ping
%e Deservtion Consequence Loretoon 2HCD 136 from CST 2T-41A & B to 2EnY16 (2HSD-91) 10 Outside 2CV-0707 is k v4powey troom 2060) 10 2223-KK 2EnY16 is k Envroom (2026) 10 2226 WW 2CT 6,40 and 41 ero out neer the CSTs 10 2060 098 2026JJ 2HCD 268 from 2HCD 196 out near the CSie to normetty closed 2CT.113 (Unit 11 10 Outside 2HSD 91 from 2HCD 196 (2EFW 16) & 2EFW-0706 to 2EnV801 (2HBC 86) OSB 20264./
2EFW 16 snd 801is k Envroom (2026) 10 2060 2FFW-0706 is in pipowey troom 20009
,2HBD-883 from 2HRD 91 to 2ifW 23 isouth weR to AFWpurre 2P761 038 2026J./
2HBC 86 from 2ERY801 to 2P18,% anchodes common auction crosstre 088,038 20264) 08A, 09A 2024 JJ 2HCC282 from CST T 418 to 2HBC-86 11 Outsode Check volves 2CS-844 and 846 are k EFWtoom (2026) 11 2066J./ 2CS 816 and 811 are out neer the Unit 1 CSTs 11 204&JJ 098,11 2026J./ 2HBC 86 from 2HBC 86 to 2P7A & mcludes SW connection OCA 20244J EFW Ptomp Descherge PpMg ope Descretoon ConseqJonce location 2DBC1 from 2P7B to 2CV 1038-2 Ithrough 2CV.102619 068,07 2026JJ 2CV 1038 and 1026 are kceted M 2084 07 20244J 2EnV6A & 6 are k 2026 068 2040JJ 2CV-0714 (test retum)is k 2066 068 20664J (See Bobwl 1084-DD
- 2DBC-3 from 2DBC 1 to 2CV 1036 2 (through 2CV 107611 068 2040 J./
\ 2CV 1036 and 1076 are kceted M 2001 (See Bekw) 2081RH 2CV-0198 frost returnt is M 2081 2DBC 2 from 2P7A to 2CV 10391 (through 2CV 1076 21 06A 20244J 2CV 1039 and 1076 are locatedin 2081 06A 204&JJ 2EnV68is k 2024 (See Below) 2081-HH 2EFW.I18 to 2DBC-3 in 2081 2DBC-4 from 2DBC 2 to 2CV 10371 (ttrough 2CV 1026-2) 06A 204&J./ 2CV-1037 and 1026 are located M 2084 06A 20664.1 2EFW 11A to 2DBC 1 is en 2066 (See Belowl 2084-00 2DBC 1 2P7A trwumum bypass from 20BC 2 to 2EFW 10A 06A 2081 HH 2DBC8 2P78 rrurumum bmess from 2DBC 1 to 2Eny 108 068 2066-DD 2DBC 12 from 2DBC 1 to 2ERY31 (AFW syppfyl 068 20264) 2DBC 13 from 2DBC 2 to 2EFW 29 (AFWsuppfyl 06A 20244.1
.EFWDascharge Ptpmg to Men feedwater & SGs Pee Descretoon Consequence Loretson 2DBC-1 from 2P78 (between 2CV 1026 end 2CV 1038) 048 2004 2DBC 3
- rom 2DBC 1 (between 2CV-1076 and 2CV 1036) 04D 2081 2DBC 2 from 2P7A (between 2CV 1076 and 2CV 1039) 04C 2081 2DBC-4 from 2DBC 2 lbetween 2CV.1026 and 2CV 1037) 04A 2004 2D88-3 from 2CV.10311 end 2CV 1038-2 to Stes *n Generator 2E-24A 01A,12A Contomment 02A,03A,038 2084-0D 2DBB-4 from 2CV.10391 and 2CV 1036 2 to Steem Generator 2E-248 018,128 Conteorvnent 028,03C,03D 2081 HH ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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(m~) Q ARR D'1 B W Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 Page 24 of 54
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Page 27 of 54 5.0 DEG"4DA TION MECHANISMS EVALUA TION The purpose of this section is to identify the degradation mechanisms that can be present in the piping within the selected system hote*Jarias for the ANO-2 EFW system, as described in Section 3.2 of this report. The condations considered in this evaluation are: design characteristics, fabrication practices, , operating conditions, and service experience. The degradation mechanisrns to be identified (Reference 9.1) are:
- ThermalFatigue (TF)
Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS)
- Thermal Transients (TT)
- Stress Corrosion Ct.:cking (SCC)
Intergranular Stress Corrowan Cracking (IGSCC) Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC)
- Extemal Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC) primary Water S*ress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)
Localized Corrosion (LC)
- Microbiologically Infi.ienced Corrosion (MIC)
- Pitting (PIT)
Crevice Corrosion (CC) Flow Sensitive (FS) Erosion-Cavitation (E-C)
~
Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) } Q;% in performing this evaluation, some basic inputs were used. These inputs are discussed in Section 5.3. The criteria andjustifications are providedin Section 5.2. In accordance with Reference 9.1, degradation mechanisms a., organized into three categories: "Large Leak",
*Small Leak", and "None".
The results indicate that two degradation mechanisms are poterotially presont: thermal fatigue and microbiologically influenced corrosion. The EFW system was divided into four damsge groups based upon the material types and the estimated metal temperatures dudng normalplant operation, when the EFWsystem is in the stand by mode. The groups are: EFW CS-TH1; Carbon steel, not considered to be significantly affected by check valve back leakage, temperature less than 150'F EFW-CS-TH2; Carbon steel, potentially susceptible to significant check valve back leakage effects, temperature 150 to 455*F EFW-CS-TH3; Carbon steel, susceptible to turbulent penetration, tempcrature f 50 to 455'F EFW SS; Austenitic Stainless steel The damage groups snd potential damage mechanism are defined in Table 4. The damage mechanistn (DM) groups result in failure Potential Category: 'Small Leak". O O _ ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A R R_ MIHF Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 28 of 54 Table 4 Damage Groups l Demere Damere Mechenleme Femure Graw Thermat fetique sueee Conoaion Crockine Leonised Conoelon Mew sonettke Potential D TAsCs TT IGyCC TGsCC ECsCC PWsCC MC PtT CC E-C FAC Ceterary EFWCs THt No No No No No No No No No No No None EFW-Cs-TH2 Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No smeR Leek EFW-Cs-TH3 Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No smen leak EFW-ss No No No No No No No No No No No None 6.1 DAMAGE GROUPS 5.1.1 DM GROUPS: ERV-CS TH1 and EFW-SS The ERV-CS-TH1 and ERV SS DM groups extend from the various EFW evaluation starting points (i.e., Condensate Storage Tanks 2T-41A/418 and T-418, St. rtup and Blowdown Demineralizer Effluent MOV 2ERV-0706, Service Water supply MOVs 2CV-07112/07161) to the horizontalpiping sections upstream of MFWinlet check valves 2EFW9A snd 2EFW-98. These lines are normally stagnant with operating L temperatures ranging from 60* to 110*F (see Table 6). A slight potential for thermalstratification exists only ifleakage occurs psst two series check valves and a normally closed block valve. In accordance with ANO Procedure No. 2106.006 (Reference 9.10), the temperature at the discharge of the EFWpumps is monitored to ensure that steam binding does not occur. A review of EFW pump outlet temperature data recorded for the period from 1993 1996 revealed severalinstances (< 5 times per year) where tempstatures have been measured upwards of 150*F. However, a review of Control Room Stathn Logs for this time period reves'ed that these temperature increases coincided with surveillance testing. It is surmised that the water supply source during these surveillances was provided by the Startup and Blowdown Demineralizer which would account for the elevated temperatures recorded. Even if backleakage were to occur, due to the heat dissipation which would occur along the lengthy tortuous path, thermal stratification would be unlikely. Consequently, for this reason, and due to the lack of direct evidence of backleaxage, thermal stratification is not considered a potential mechanism for this piping. The water cntering the EFW system is of high purity, but is not treated with biocide. Based upon the lack of biocide treatment these DM groups are considerod potentially susceptible to MIC and/or pitting. However, the high purity wator condition combined with the excellent industry experience with this system (see Section 5.2.3) suggest that the likelihood of occurrence of MIC and/or pitting is extremely low. O 1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations l 1 l
A Ik R F%IFIF (3 Calculation No. A.PENG-cal.C-017, Rev. 00 O Page 29 of S4 S.1.2 DM GROUP: ER*!-CS TH2 The ERV-CS TH2 DM group consists of the horizontal piping section irr. mediately upstream of MRVinlet check valves 2ERV-9A and 2ERV-98. As discussed above, ' the potential for backleakage is considered very low. However, if leakage were to occur these horizontal sections could be subject to thermal stratification. Also, the potential would then exist for thermal transients upon initiation of auxiliary feedwater during plant startups and shutdowns via this ERV flow path and during quarterly surveillance testing of MRVinlet check valves 2ERV 9A and 2E3V 98. 5.1.3 DM GROUP: ERV-CS TH3 The ERV-CS TH3 group consists of the piping sections downstream of the MAV inlet check valves 2ERV-9A and 2ERV-98 to the latrolet connections to the WAV headers. Each of these lines is in the horizontal plane except for a 45* inclined section adjacent to the MAV header lines that is approximately 36 inches in length. The inclined piping is approximately 9 diameters in length from the MRV header line such that it would be expected to run hot due to turbulent penetration and may experience some cycling at the elbow between the horizontal and upward sloping section (Per Reference 9.17, turbulent penetration con carry hot fluid into normally stagnant lines for distances between 5 and 25 diameters). Thus, the horizontal piping sections extending from the above mentioned elbows upstream to MRVinlet check valves 2ERV-9A and 2ERV-98 could be subject to thermal stratification due l } V to the convective current established. This region of piping is also subjected to thermal transients upon initiation of auxiliary feedwater during plant startups and shutdowns via this ERV flow path and during quarterly surveillance testing of MFWinlet check valves 2ERV-9A and 2ERV-98. 5.2 DEGRADA TION MECHANISM CRITERIA AND IDENTIFICA TION The degradation mechanisms and criteria assessed are presented in Table S. O U ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations s
N lI lI, F%IFIF Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 30 of 54 Table 6 Degradation Mechanism Criteria and Susceptible Regions
*0 #
,'g ,, ," Criteria Susceptible Regions TF TASCS -nps > 1 inch, and nonles, branch pipe
-pipe segment has a slope <43*from harizontal (includes elbow or connections, safe ends, tee into a verticalpipe), and welds, hect afected
-potential existsfor lowpow in apipe section connected to a sones (EMI), base component allowing miring ofhot and coldpuids, or metal, andregions of potential existsfor leakagepow past a valve (i.e., in-leakage, out. stress concentration leakage, cross-leakage) allowmg mixing ofhot and coldpuids, or potential existsfor convection heating in dead-endedpipe sections connected to a source ofhotpuid, or potential existsfor two phase (steam / water) pow, or potential existsfor turbulent penetration in branch pipe connected to headerpiping containing hotpuid with high turbulentpow, and
-calculated or measured AT > $0*F, and
-Richardson number > 4.0 TT -operating temperature > 270*Ffor stainless steel, or operating temperature > 220*Ffor carbon steel, and
-potentialfor relatively rapid terperature changes includmg coldpuid injection into hot pipe segment, or hotpuid injection into coldpipe segment, and
?
-lATl> 200*Ffor stainless steel, or lATl> 130*Ffor carbon steel, or lATl> AT allowable (applicable to both stainless and carbon)
SCC IGSCC -evaluatedin accordance with existingplantIGSCCprogram per austenitic stainless steel (BWR) NRC Generic Letter 88-01 welds andEMZ IGSCC -operating temperature > 200*F and (PWR) -susceptible material (carbon content 2 0.033%), and
-tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and
-ongen or oxids:ing species are present OR
-operating temperature <200*F, the attributes above apply, and
-initiating contaminants (e.g., thiosulfate,fuoride, chloride) are also required to bepresent TGSCC -operating temperature > 130*F, and austenitic stainless steel
-tensile stress (including residual stress) is present, and base metal, welds, and
-halides (e.g., fuoride, chloride) are present, or EMZ caustic (NaOH)ispresent, and
-oxygen or oxidi:ing species are present (only required to be present in conjunction w/ halides, not required w caustic)
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations < 1
N lI SI A'%IFIF (3 Calculation No. A PENG CALC-017, Rev. 00 O Page 31 of 54 Table 6 (cont'd) Degradation Mechanism Criteria and Susceptible Regions
',", Criteria Susceptible Regions SCC ECSCC -operating temperature >150*F, and austenitic stainless steel
-tensile stress ispresent, and base metal, welds, and
-an outside piping surface is withinpre diameters ofa probable IMZ leak path (e.g., valve stems) and is covered with non-metallic insulation that is not in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.36, or an outside piping surface is exposed to wettingfrom chloride bearing environments (e.g., seawater, brackish water, brine)
PHSCC -piping materialisinconel(Alloy 600), and nonles, welds, andHAZ
-exposed to primag water at T > 620*F, and without stress relief
-the material is mill annealed and cold worked, or cold worked and welded without stress relief LC MIC -operating wmperature <150*F, and pitings, welds, HAZ, 1
-low or intermittentpow, and base metal, dissimilar
-pH <10, and metaljoints (e.g., welds,
-presence! intrusion oforganic material (e.g., raw water system), or fanges), andregions
- n water source is not treated w!blocides (e.g., refueling water tank) containing crevices i
/\
O PIT -potential existsfor lowpow, and } -omgen or oxidi:mg species are present, and l -imtiating contaminants (e.g., fuoride, chloride) are present CC
-crevice condition exists (e.g., thermalsleeves), and
-operating temperature > 150*F, and
-ongen or oxids:mg species are present FS E-C -operating temperature <250*F, and Attings, welds, HAZ, and
-pow present > 100 hrsy, end base metal
-velocity > 30JVs, and
-(Ps - P,1/ AP <3 FAC -evaluated in accordance with existmg plant FACprogram perplant FACprogram 5.2.1 ThermalFatigue (TF)
Thermal fatigue is a mechanism caused by alternating stresses due to thermal cycling of a component which results in accumulated fatigue usage and can lead to crack initiation and growth.
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ABB Cornbustion Engineering Nuclear Operations w
A It R M IFIF Calculation No. A PENG CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 32 of 54 5.2.1.1 Thermal Stratification, Cycling, and Striping (TASCS) I The applicable piping sections from the ERV-CS TH2 and ERV-CS TH3 damage groups, as definedin Section 5.1, are considered subject to thermal stratification. Even though the ERV system piping extends downward from the main feedwater lines at a 45' angle, turbulent penetration is expected which wi/I allow high temperature (455*) main feedwater to mix with water in the adjacent horizontal piping sections. Therefore, the ERV-CS TH3 damage group as defined in Section 5.1.3 and Table 6 willbe subject to TASCS. Back leakage of hot water through the MAV inlet check valves would allow high temperature water to flow into the upstream piping creating the potential for a stratified condition in the first horizontal piping section. it is assumed that the temperatures will be high enough such that the ERV CS TH2 group as defined in Section 5.1.2 and Table 6 willbe subject to TASCS. 5.2.1.2 Thermal Transients (7T) The applicable piping sections from the ERV-CS-TH2 and ERV-CS TH3 damage groups, as defined in Section 5.1, are considered subject to thermal transients. The emergency feedwater lines in the ERV-CS-TH3 damage group will be heated by turbulent penetration of hot main feedwater. The ERV-CS TH2 damage group may be heated by back leakage past the MAVinlet check valves. Thus, both of these damage groups are potentially subjected to thermal transients during system operation when cold water willbe introduced. 5.2.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) The electrochemical reaction caused by a corrosive or oxygenated media within a piping system can lead to cracking when combined with other factors such as a susceptible material, temperature, and stress. This mechanism has several forms with varying attributes including intergranular stress corrosion cracking, transgranular stress corrosion cracking, extemal chloride stress corrosion cracking, and primary water stress corrosion cracking. 5.2.2.1/ntergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) The emergency feedwater system consists of both carbon steel and stainless steel piping. The carbon steelpiping is not susceptible to IGSCC. None of the austenitic stainless steel piping in this system operates in excess of the IGSCC temperature threshold of 200*F. Also, plant chemistry controls ensure that initiating contaminant (e.g., thiosulfate, fluoride, chloride) levels are negligible. Consequently, this piping is not considered susceptible to IGSCC. O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
NSIIk 7%IFIF (~N Calculation No. A PENG CALC-017. Rev. 00 Page 33 of 54 5.2.2.2 Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (TGSCC) None of the austenitic stainless steelpiping in this system operates in excess of the TGSCC threshold of 150* F. In addition, plant chemistry controls ensure that the levels of halides or caustics present in the system are maintained extremely low (see Table 7). Therefore, this piping is not considered susceptible to TGSCC. 5.2.2.3 External Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (ECSCC) ANO-2 complies with the requirements of Regulatary Guide 1.36 for non-metallic thermalinsulation and consequently the potential for ECSCC to occur does not exist. 5.2.2.4 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) PWSCC is not applicable as a potential damage mechanism for the EFW system due to the fact that there is no inconel(Alloy 600) present in the system, 5.2.3 Localized Corrosion (LC) In addition to SCC, other phenomena can produce localized degradation in piping components. These phenomena typically require oxygen or oxidizing environments I and are often associated with low flow or
- hideout" regions, such as exists beneath corrosion products or in crevices. This mechanism includes microbiologically influenced corrosion, pitting, and crevice coriosion.
! 5.2.3.1Microbiologically influenced Corrosion (MIC) The portions of this system that operate at a temperature of less than 150*F are considered potentially susceptible to MIC. All of the water sources for the EFW systems are potential sources of microbes since biological controls (i.e., biocides) (Reference 9.11) are not utilized and the temperature range is appropriate for MIC to exist. MIC has not, however, ever been observed to exist in the EFW system at ANO-2. On occasions when the system has been opened for maintenance (e.g., valve disassembly), no evidence of MIC has been discovered. Also, prior inspections of this system have not revealed the presence of any degradation attributable to MIC attack. Furthermore, from an overallindustry standpoint, MIC has not historically been a source of degradation in EFWsystems. Consequently, although the system conditions fail to preclude MIC attack, the potentialis considered low on the basis of the lack of ANO-2 or industry historical evidence, and this mechanism is therefore not considered active for the EFW system. b3 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A4B Calculatfor' No. A-PENG CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 34 of 54 S.2.3.2 Pitting (PIT) The essentially stagnant flow conditions and the potential for oxygen containing water from CST 2T-41A provide en environment for pitting to occur. However, the low concentration (5 I ppb) ofinitiating contaminants (e.g., fluoride, chloride) in the system (Reference 9.11) indicate the likelihood is extremely low. Additionally, similar to the observations made in the MIC assessment above, pitting has not historically been a source of degradation in the EFW system for ANO-2 or in tha industry. Consequently, the potential for pitting attack is considered low due to both the absence of initiating contaminants in the system and the lack of ANO 2 or industry historical evidence, and therefore this mechanism is not considered active for the EFW system. 5.2.3.3 Crevice Corrosion (CC) Crevice corrosion is not applicable due to the fact that there are no crevice regions included within the boundaries of the EFW system evaluation. There are no thermal sleeves identified in this system. S.2.4 Flow Sensitive (FS) When a high fluid velocity is combined with various other requisite factors it can result in the erosion and/or corrosion of a piping materialleading to a reduction in wall thickness. Mechanisms that are flow sensitive, and can create this form of degradation include erosion-cavitation and flow accelerated corrosion. 5.2.4.1 Erosion Cavitation (E C) All of the piping in this system, with the exception of the DM group EFW-CS TH3 segments, operates below the E-C upper temperature limit of 250*. However, the EFW system experiences flow less than 100 hrs /y?, and the flow velocity is less than 30 ft/s. Consequently, this system is not considered susceptible to E-C. 5.2.4.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) The EFW system is comprised primarily of carbon steel piping. Stainless steelis used for lines from the condensate storage tanks. FAC is a phenomenon that only affects carbon steel piping. Per Reference 9.12, the EFW system was excluded from the ANO-2 FAC progrom since the piping segments operate with no flow or usage less than 2% of the plant operating time. Hence, the EFW system is considered to be non-susceptible to FAC. O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A R Ik MIFIF 3 Calculation No. A PENG cal.C-017, Rev. 00 (O Page 35 of 54 5.2. 5 Vibration Fatigue Vibration fatigue is not specifically made part of the EPRI risk-informed ISI process. Most documented vibrational fatigue failures in power plants piping indicate that they are restricted to socket welds in small bore piping. Most of the vibration 31 fatigue damage occurs in the initiation phase and crack propagation proceeds at a rapid rate once a crack forms. As such, this mechanism does not lend itself to typicalperiodic inservice examinations (i.e., volumetric, surface, etc.) as a means of managing this degradation mechanism. Management of vibrational fatigue should be performed under an entirely separate program taking guidance from the EPRI Fatigue Management Handbook (Reference 9.13). If a vibration problem is discovered, then corrective actions must be taken to either remove the vibration source or reduce the vibration levels to ensure future component operability. Frequent system walkdowns, leakage monitoring systems, and current ASME Section XI system leak test requirements are some of the practical measures to address this issue. Because these measures are employed either singly or in combination for most plant systems it is not necessary to use a risk-informed inspection selection process for vibration fatigue. 5.3 BASIC DATA 5.3.1 Under normal plant operating conditions, the EFW system, as defined by the (v; boundaries in Section 3.2, functions as indicatedin Table 6. 5.3.2 Due to the cyclic nature of thermal transients, only those transients which occur during the initiating events Categories I and ll as described in Reference 9.1, Table 3.1 are considered in the evaluation of degradation mechanisms due to thermal fatigue. Category I consists of those events which occur during routine operation, e.g., startup, shutdown, standby, refueling. Category ll consists of those events which have anticipated operational occurrence, e.g., reactor trip, turbine trip, partial loss of feedwater. Therefore, the transients to be evaluated are those transients which occur under normal operating and upset conditions. fD LJ ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
n - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A Ik R FLINN Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 36 of 54 Table 6 Emergency feedwater System Unes and Operating Conditions Damage Component Component Description Material Design Specification Conditions During Normal Plant l Group ID Line [Ref. 9.16, I-4) (1) Operation [9.5] No. [Refs. 9.7.9.9] ! Design Operating Press Temp Press Temp Temp Flow psig 'F psig 'F *F (2) (3) EFW-CS-T111 2DBB-03-4" From vahr 2CV-1037-1 (EFW Pump 2P7A & line 2DBC-04-4") to CS 1360 460 985 455 85 to 150 Stagnant horiz. section upstream of 2EFW-9A (2a) B. D EFW-CS-Till 2DBB-03-4* From vahr 2CV-1038-2 (EFW Pump 2P7B & line 2DBC-01-4") to CS 1360 460 985 455 85 to 150 Stagnant check vahr 2EFW-7B to tee utid (2a) B, D EFW-CS-T112 2DBB-03-4" From horiz. section immediately upstream of 2EFW-9A to MFW CS 1360 460 985 455 150 to 455 Stagnant inlet check vahr 2EFW-9A (2b) B. D EFW-CS-T113 2DBB-03-4" From MFW inlet check valve 2EFW-9A to main feedwater line CS 1360 460 985 455 455 Stagnant 1 2DDB41-24" B. D EFW-CS-T111 2DBB44-4" From vahr 2CV-1039-1 (EFW Pump 2P7A & line 2DBC-02-4*) to CS 1360 460 985 455 85 to 150 Stagnant horiz. section upstream of 2EFW-9B (2a) B, D __ EFW-CS-T111 2DBB-04-4" From vahr 2CV-1036-2 (EFW Pump 2P7B & line 2DBC-03-4") to CS 1360 460 985 455 85 to 150 Stagnant check vahr 2EFW-8B to tee weld (2a) B, D EFW-CS-7112 2DBB-04-4" From horiz. section immediately upstream of 2EFW-9B to MFW CS 1360 460 985 455 150 to 455 Stagnant inlet check valve 2EFW-9B (2t) B, D EFW-CS-T113 2DBB-04-4" From MFW inlet check vahe 2EFW-9B to main feedwater line CS 1360 460 985 455 455 Stagnant 2DBB-02-24" B, D EFW-CS-T111 2DBC-01-4" From EFW Pump 2P7B discharge to valves 2CV-1038-2 and 2CV- CS 1400 150 1200 85 85 to 150 Stagnant 0714-1 (2a) A-2, B, D-2, G-2, G-3 EFW-CS-1111 2DBC-02-4" From EFW Pump 2P7A discharge to vahr 2CV-1039-1 and Tee CS 1400 150 1200 85 85 to 150 Stagnant connection to line 2DBC-03-4" (2a) B. C-2 D-2, G-2, G-3 ABB Combustion Engine g Nuclear Operations
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%- l D'1WEF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 1 Page 37 of 54 Table 6 (cont'd)
Emergency Feedwater System Unes and Operating Conditions Damage Component Component Description Material Design Specification Conditions During Normal Group ID Line [Ref. 9.16,1-4] Plant Operation (1) [9.5] No. IRef. 9 7,9.9) Design Operating Press Temp Piess Temp Temp FImv peig "F psig 'F *F (2) (3) EFW-CS-Till 2DBC-01-4"/ Cross-mer line between 2DBC-I-4" and 2DBC-2-4" incimiing CS 1400 150 1200 85 85t0150 Stagnant 3 2DBC-02-4" valves 2EFW-5A and 2EFW-5B (2a) EFW-CS-Till 2DBC-03-4" From Tee connection to line 2DBC-01-4" to valves 2CV-1036-2 CS I400 150 I200 85 85 to 150 Stagnant and 2CV-0798-1 (2a) B, C-1. D i EFW-CS-Till 2DBC44-4" From Tee connection to line 2DBC-02-4" to vahr 2CV-1037-1 and CS 1400 150 1200 85 85 to 150 Stagnant Tee connection to line 2DBC-014" (2a) B, D EFW-CS-Dil 2DBC-07-2" From Tee connection to line 2DBC-02-4" to vahc 2EFW-10A CS I400 120 1300 100 85 to 150 Stagnant (Pump 2P7A Bypass) (2a 2c) B,C,D,G EFW-CS-Dil 2DBC-08-2" From Tee connection to line 2DBC-01-4" to valve 2EFW-10B CS I400 120 1300 100 85 to 150 Stagnant (Pump 2P7B Bypass) (2a, 2c) A,B D G EFW-CS-Till 2DBC-l?-4" From Tee connection to 2DBC-01-4" to check valve 2EFW-30 CS 1600 180 1421 161 85 to 150 Stagnant (2a,2c) D. G EFW-CS-Till 2DBC-13-4" From Tee connection to 2DBC-02-4" to check valve 2EFW-28 CS 1850 190 1676 166 85 to 150 Stagnant (2a,2c) D, G EFW-CS-Bil 2DBD-34-4" From check valve 2EFW-28 to vahe 2CV-0761, and from check CS 1500 160 1356 143 143 Stagnaat valve 2EFW-30 to valve 2CV-0760 D, G EFW-CS-Till 2IIBC-85-6" From valve 2CV-0716-1 to check vahe 2EFW-2B CS 150 130 89 60 60 Drained, E EFW-CS-Till 21[BC-85-6" From check valve 2EFW-2B to 8"X6" reducing Tee in 8" line CS 150 130 89 60 60 (2d) Stagnant F EFW-CS-Ull 21(BC-85-8" From 8"X6* reducing Tee connection to 211BC-86-6"/8" line and CS 150 130 89 60 60 (2d) Stagnant check vahr 2EFW-801 to EFW Pump 2P7B A-1, B ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations I w__. -
A Ik R D'1EE E Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 l Page 38 of 54 Table 6 (cont'd) Emergency Feedwater System Unes and Operating Conditions Damage Component Component Description Material Design SpeciFxation Conditions During Normal Group ID Line [Ref. 9.16,1-4] (1) Plant Operation [9.5] No. [Refs. 9.7, 9.9j Design Operating Press Temp Press Temp Temp Flow psig 'F psig 'F 'F (2) (3) EFW-CS ~Hil 211BC-86-6" From valve 2CV-0711-2 to check valve 2EFW-2A CS 150 130 89 60 60 Drained, E EFW-CS-Till 211BC-86-6" From check vahr 2EFW-2A to 8"X6" reducing Tee in 8" line CS 150 130 89 60 60 (2d) Stagnant, F EFW-CS-Till 211BC-86-8" From 8"X6" reducing Tee connection to 211BC-86-6" and 21IBC- CS 150 130 89 60 60 (2d) Stagnant 35-8" lines to EFW Pump 2P7A B, C EFW-CS-Till 211BD-91-8" From valve 2EFW-0706 to check vahts 2EFW-801 and 2EFW-16 CS 30 133 0 110 110 Stagnant A, B, C, D-1, G-1 EFW-CS-Til1 211BD-883- From connection to 211BD-91-8" line to vahr 2EFW Upstream CS 40 160 35 130 110 Stagnant 8" of the AFW Pump 2P75 D, G EFW-SS 211CC-282- From connections to Condensate Storage Tank T-41B to connection SS 26 105 26 80 80 Stagnant 12"/8" to 21IBC-35-8* EFW-SS 211CD-195- From CST's 2T-41 A to Tee connection to 2EFW-16 SS 15 100 10 80 80 Stagnant 10"/8" A,B,C EFW-SS 2flCD-195- From CST 2T-41B to Tee connection to 211CD-195-10" from CST SS 15 100 10 80 80 Stagnant 10" 2T-41 A EFW-SS 211CD-258- From connection to line 211CD-195-10" (from CST 2T-41B) to SS 60 120 29 80 80 Stagnant 6/10" valves 2CT-113 and 2CT-4B ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations e 9 9
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p p f} 0 D't B EF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 39 of 54 Table 6 (cont'd) Emergency feedwater System Unes and Operating Conditions Notes:
- 1. Material (From Reference 9.4)
CS = Carbon steel SS = Austenitic stainless steel
- 2. Temperature during normalplant operation when the line is stagnant is estimated to be equal to the Design Spedfication (Ref. 9.51 except:
2a. Une may be subject to back leakage, through the valves, from the main feedwater line, therefore, the temperature is estimated to be between the Design Specification Operating Temperature for the pump discharge (85*F1 and the maximum allowed for the pump discharge of 150'F [Ref. 9.101. 2b. Une may be subject to back leakage through the MFWinlet check valve, therefore, the temperature is estimated to be between the maximum allowed for the pump discharge of 150'F(Ref. 9.101 and the main feedwater temperature of 455'F. 2c. Une supplying water to this line shows a lower Design Specification Operating Temperature, therefore, the lower temperature is shown. i 2d. Temperature during normalplant operation may be higher since the lines supplying water are at a higher design operating temperature.
- 3. The flow conditions during normal operation are based on the standby nature of this system. During system tests water wi7l flow through lines defined by the follo;ving identifications (Ref. 9.7]:
A. Unes used formonthly test of 2P-78. A-1 No flow in 2P-7A direction after suction tee. A-2 No flow in leg to 2CV-1025-1. B. Unes used for cuarterly test of system check valves utilizing treated water from CST's 2T-41A/B or SU & BD Demin. Eff. C. Unes used for monthly test of 2P-7A. C-1 No flow in 2P-7B direction after suction tee. C-2 No flow in leg to 2CV-1076-2. D. Unes used by AFW to supply feedwater during plant startup, shutdown, hot standby and normal conditions D-1 No flow downstream of tee to 2P-7A/B D-2 No flow upstream of AFWconnecting tee E. Unes are drained during normal operation. Closed at one end by gate valve to SWS and other end by gate valve. F. Une used during service water flush ofline upstream of pumps during refueling outages. Final flush ofline performed using treated water from SU/BD Demin Eff. or CST's G. Une used for AFW oump 2P-75 quarterly test utRizing treated water from S/U & B/D Demin. Eff. or CST's 2T-41A/B G-1 No flow a ~ vnstream of tee to 2P-7A/B G-2 No flow upstream of AFWconnecting tee G-3 No flow downstream of tee to isolation valves 2EFW-11A and 2EFW-118. I ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations o
A Ik R 7%IFIF Calculation No. A PEdG. CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 40 of 54 Table 7 Water Chemistry of Supply to the EFWSystem (Service water system and Unit 1 Tank T418 not shown, usage only in Extreme Circumstances) (Ref. 9.11]
< T 41A : t*-41B Startup and Blowdown Demineralizer Conductivity 0.5 PS/cm 0.10.15 pS/cm 0.07 pS/cm Chlorides (Halides) Cl = 1 ppb Cl< 1 ppb F < 0.1 ppb Cl< 0.1 ppb Sodium < 1 ppb < 1 ppb < 0.1 ppb Sulfate 5 8 ppb < 2 ppb < 0.2 ppb Dissolved Oxyoen 600 - 800 ppb 50 - 100 ppb Note 1 pH 6. 5 6. 5 7. 0 Biocide None None None inhibitor Not added to tank Not added to tank Not added to tank Note 1: Dissolved oxygen not reported routinely. Maximura expectedis 10 ppb. Samples when measured contained 2 3 ppb.
O O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It It 7%IFIp p Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 0, Page 41 of 54
- 6. 0 SERVICE HISTORY AND SUSCEPTIBlUTY REVIEW An exhaustive review was conducted from mid '96 to Spring '97 of databases (plant and industry) and station documents to characterize ANO.2's operating experience with respect to piping pressure boundary degradation. The results of this review are provided in a condensed form in Table 8 for :he Emergency feedwater System.
Although several cre-commercial references are iracluded for completeness, the timeframe for identifying items applicable to this effort was focused on post-commercial operation (Commercial Operation date of March 26,1980). This was done to avoidinclusion ofitems primarily associated with construction deficiencies as opposed to inservice degradation. The following databases and other sources were queried to accomplish this review: Station Information Management System (SIMS) The SIMS datsbase was queried for all ANO-2 job orders on Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components which involved corrective maintenance (CM) c;' modifications (MOD). Additionsity, a separate *]uery was performed in order to capture certain non Code, O compcnent failures. This query was for non-Code O and SR (safety related) components. This database contains information from approximately 1985 to the present. p - Condition Report (CR) Database The CR database was queried for any pipe lesk/ rupture events or other conditions associated with identified damage mechanisms at ANO 2. The keywords searched under were; pipe, piping, line, water hammer, leak, leaking and leakage. CR's are written on O F or S equipment failures or other conditions potentially adverse to safety. This database contains information from 1988 to the present.
- licensing Research System (LRS)
The LRS database was queried using a keyword search specific to ANO-2. The keywords searched under were: thermal cycling, thermal stratification, thermal fatigue, defect, flaw, indication, fatigue, cavitation and corrosion. This search captured all communication between ANO and the NRC, both plant specific and generic industry, associated with these topics. However, for the purpose of this review, only communication from ANO to the NRC was reviewed. Additionally, this search system was used to query Industry Events Analysis files (captures INPO documents) for ANO-2 events or conditions relevant to this review. The keywords searched under for this portion of the query were: pipe & stratification, thermal & fatigue, thermal & trsnsient, pipe & leak, vibration & fatigue and pipe & rupture. ' Fuzzy' search logic was employed to reduce the possibility of failing to identify a pertinent document. This database conts. ins information from prior to commercial operatun to the present for ANO-2.
;O) v ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ABB Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 017, Rev. 00 Page 42 of S4 Nuclear Nnt ReliabHity Database System (NPRDS) NPROS was queried for ANO-2 entries for pipe failures. The keywords searched under were: pipe. This database contains information from 1991 to the present. ANO 2 ISIProgram Records The ISI program findings were compiled and reviewed for all outage and non-outage inservice inspections conduct.:d at ANO 2 since commercial operation.
- ControlRoom Station Log The station log was utilized as a source of information for recent operational events.
The log exists in electronic format from early 1994 to the present and has search capabilities which allowed a review for events of interest. The keywords searched under were: water hammer, leak and leakage. System Upper LevelDocument (ULD) The ULO was reviewed as a source for historical perspective of issues related to the system snd identification of modifications made to the system or changes to operational procedures to address those issues (e.g., water hammer, corrosion or vibrational fatigue). I Other Station Documents ? l This source of information consists of such documents as the SAR, Technical Specifications, operationalprocedures and the damage mechanism analysis done as part of this effort. I O ABS Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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t "J C/ ggg V 9%WW Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 f Page 43 of 54 Table 8 Service History and SusceptibMty Review - Emergency Feedwater System Source Doewnents / Databasee Reviewed for Damage Mecheroeme Add %A Conandered Evidence of hVstoricalP4 pine Freesure Bormdery ThennelFaergue Streen Correndon Crack'ng Loce& red Correnden Row Senerefew Mechardce! Water Other Deptedaden 0, . . at AN04 TASCS TT IGSCC TGSCC ECSCC PW3CC nhC PIT CC E-C FAC VF Hermner Rndnpa Station krformation Management System None None None None None None None None None None None None None None I Condition Report Database JPf(1) None None None None None None None None None None None None lPS2f[ licensing Research System None None None Nons None None None None None None None None None None Iwsclear fiant Reliabinty Database System None None None None None None None None None None None None None None ANO-2 /SIIYogram Records None None None None None None Ncne None None None None None None None Control Room Station log None None None None None None None None None None None None None None System l#per leve/ Documents None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Other Station Documents [P(33 Y
$3)' None None None None None None None None None None Ifme None Legend:
P (Precursor) - TNe category includes identification of postulated damage mechanisms and loadings through knowfedge of operating perameters, water chemistry, etc. No physical evidence of pressure boundary degradation currently exists. TNs category includes postuteted mechanisme identified as a result of this review. PE (Pfent Event) - This category includes identification of postulated damage mechanisme end loadinge se e result of en observed or potentief p8ent event (e.g., water hornmer). No physical evidence of pressure boundary degradation currently existe. PD (Phyeical Damage) - This category includes identification of cheerved pressure boundary degradetion se evidenced by cracking. pitting, westege, thinning. physical deformenon or other deterioration. PSF (Pressure Boundary Feiture)- This category includes identification of through-wall flaws resulting from the effects of an identified demoge mechanism. Notes:
- 1. Reference CR 2-89-0023 and CR 2-89-0024 which document volve backfeekage which could have resulted in a thermal stratification condition.
- 2. Reference CR 2-89-0064 which documents e potential water hemmer event that occurred when a procedural step wee emitted during the performance of a survedtence. Procedural adherence wi!! practude any recurrence.
- 3. Reference Section 5 of this document wNeh identifies the potential for TASCS and TT in specific portions of the EFW System.
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
A It Ik 7"IkIFIF t Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 J Page 44 of 54
- 7. 0 RISK EVALUA TION The first step in the risk evaluation is the defining of the risk segments. Risk segments consist of continuous runs of piping that, if failed, have the same consequences (i.e.,
consequence segments), and are exposed to the same degradation mechanisms (i.e., damage groups). The next step in the risk evaluation is the determination of the segment risk categories. This is accomplished by combining the consequence and damage
' mechanism categories to produce a risk category for each segment. Application of the above criteria results in the formation of 29 risk segments of which 4 are medium risk (risk category 5) and 25 are low risk (9 are risk category 6 and 16 are risk category 7). The risk segments are identified in Table 9 below.
I( O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ADR A'1W W Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 45 O! 54 Table 9 l Ritt Segment Mendliication Msk Segment 1D ConsequenceID Demoge Group 10 Msk Region MM Line Nos. Msk Segmeet Start Pbint Msk Segrent EndP6 int l ) Category feRure Futentiel Msk Category Isometric Drawirnys l EFW-R-01A-1 EFWC01A ERYCS-TH2 Medin.nn 2DBB 34* 119 Wsweem side of 4" ebow (1) Wsweem of 2EFWSA
^
Medium SmaRleek 5 (112DBB 31 Sh 1 ERYR 01A-2 EnYC01A ERYCS-TH1 low 2DBB 34" til Penetration 2P-35 til Wstroom siete of 4* etow
~ "
Medium None 6 til 2DBB St Sh.1 EFW-R-018- 1 ERVC018 EFW CS-TH2 Mediwn 2DBB44' (1) Wstroom side of 4* ebow ill Wstreem of 2EFW98
- trom 20 Meetium SmeNiesk 6 1112DBB41 EFW-R 018-2 EFW-C01B EnYCS-TH1 low 2988 4 4" 111 Penetration 2P 65 til Wstream skfe of 4"ebow
~
Mediwn None 6 til 2DBB41 EFW-R-02A EFW-CO2A EFW-CS-TH1 low 2DBB34' (1) Downstreem of 2EFW-7A (11 Penetration 2P 35 (1) Downsweem of 2EFW-78 \ Mediwn None 6 til 2DBB-31 Sh 1 EFWR--028 EFWCO2B EFW CS-TH1 Low 2D8844" (11 Downstream et2ETW8o. 111 P*netration 2P-65 l (11 Downstroom of 2EnYBB 1 Mediwn None 6 1112DBB41 EnYR03A EFWC03A EFW CS-THE Low 2DB6 34' fil Downstroom of 2CV-1037- 111 Wstroom of 2EFW-7A 1 low None 7 til 2DBB-31 Sh.1 EFWR-038 EFWC038 EFW-CS-TH1 Low 2DBB-34' (1) Downsveem of 2CV-1038- til Wstream of 2ETW-78 low None 7 til 2DBB-31 Sh.1 EnVR-03C EFW C-03C EFW CS-TH1 Low 2D8844' ill C_e e. of 2CV-1039- (11 Wstreem o!2ERYBA 1 Low None 7 it! 2DBB41 EFW-R-030 EFWC-030 EFW CS-TH1 low 2DBB44" (11 C-. o e of 2CV-1036-
- fil Wstreem ot 2EFW-8B tow None 7 til 2DBB41 EFW-R-04A EFW-C04A EFW-CS-THE low 2DBC44' ill C.... o e .. of 2CV-1026- 41) Wstream of 2CV-1037-1 low None 7 (112DBC41 Sh. 2
$ ABB Combustion Engi.hing Nuclear Operations h
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ARR E'% WIF Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 46 Of 54 Table 9 Risk Segment identWcation (Cont'd) Risk Segment ID ConsequenceID Damage GroupID Risk Region l Mping Line Nos. Msk Segrrtent Start Pbint Msk Segment EndIWnt Category FeRure Futential Risk Category isometric Drawings EFWR-048 EFWC048 EFWCS-TH1 Low 2DBC- 1-4 * (1) Downstrsam of 2CV-1025- til Wstroem of 2CV-1038-2 tcw None 7 (1) 2DBC-1-1 Sh. 2 ERVR 04C ERVC04C EfW CS-TH1 Low 2DBC-24* (1) Downsweem ot 2CV-1076- (1) Wsveem ot2CV-10391 Low None 7 (112DBC-2-1 Sh.1 EFWR 04D EFWC04D EfW CS-TH1 Low 2DBC-3 4* (11 Downsweem ot 2CV-1075- (1) Wstreem ot2CV-1036-2 1 Low None 7 (1) 2DBC31 Sh.1 EFWR 05A EFWCOSA EFWCS-TH1 Law 2DBC-2-4 * (2) Foemed Penetration 2024- (11 Wstroem ot 2CV-1076-2 Low 2DBC-4 4* 0004 (1) Wstreem cf 2ETW-118 None 7 2DBC-7-2 * (3) Wstreem ot 2CV-1026-2 (1) 2DBC-2-1 Sh.1 (31 Wstream of 2ERY11A (2) 2DBC2-2 Sh.1 (4l Wstruem of 2EFW-10A 2DBC-4-1 Sh.1 (4) Wstream of 2*x %~ Reducing knsert - from 16 (3) 2DBC41 Sh 2 (4) 2DBC-7-1 Sh.1 EFWR-OSB EFWC058 EFW CS-TH1 Low 2DBC- 1-4" (1) FoemedPeneverion 2025- (2) Wstroom of 2CV-1025-1 M nan 2DBC-2-4* 0047 (2) Wstreem ot2CV-0714-1 None 6 ggggy4 gg, g ,,,,, , ,yggy y yyy 2DBC-4-4 * (4) Wstreem of 2CV-1075-1 2DBC8-2* (4) Wstream of 2CV-0798-1 (1) 2DBC-1-1 Sh.1 (2) 2DBC-1-1 Sh. 2 (312DBC2-1 Sh.1 (412DBC-31 Sh.1 (5) 2DBC-4-1 Sh. 2 (6) 2DBC-8-1 Sh.1 EfWR-06A EFW-C06A EfW-CS-TH1 Low 2DBC-2-4* (11 Discharge of 2P-7A (1) foemed Penetration 2024-2DBC-134
- 0004
, ,, ,g, _, , (11 Wstreem ot 2EFW-58
,g ,_, , (2) Downsweem of 2EfW-29 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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. I E'1 W W Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 47 of 54 Table 9 Risk Segment iden6fics6cn (Cont'd)
Msk SegmentID Consequence ID Damage GroupID Msk Region Mpfng Line Nos. Msk Segment Start /Wste Msk Segment EndIWnt l Category FaRure Pdtential Msk Category isometric Drewings l
. 1 EFWl'-068 ERYC 068 ERYCS-TH1 Low 2DBC-1-4 * (2) Discharge of 2P-78 (1) l'oemed Penetration 2O25-Medium Nor'e 2DBC-12-4
- 0047 6
(19 2DBC-1-1 Sh.1 (21 Upstroom of 2EnY5A (2) 2DBC-1-2 Sh.1 (31 Downsurem of 2EFW31 (312 OBC-12-1 Sh.1 EnVR 07 EFW C07 EFW CS-TH1 Low 2DBC- 1-4 ~ til Downstroom of 2EnV 5A (1) @ stream of 2EFW-6B low None 7 (1) 2DBC-1-2 Sh.1 ERYR 08A EFWCOSA EnVCS-TH1 Lov 2HBC85-8' (1) Downsweem of 2CV-0795- (2) Suction of 2P-7A Lw None 2HBC86-8* 2 7 2HBC-86-6" (2) Downstream of 2CV4711-ill 2HBC851 Sh.1 (2) 2HBC86-1 Sh.1 EFWR 08B EFWC088 EFW-CS-TH1 Low 2HBC85-8' lif Downstream of 2CVD789- til Suction of 2P-78 y , 2HBC85-6* 1
,,, ,g, ,_, ,
(1) Downstreem of 2CV-0716-EnV R-09A EFWC09A EFWCS-TH1 low 2HBC85-8" (11 hseccessiNo Penetration (1) @ stream of 2CV-0795-2 Low None 7 # (1) 2HBC85-1 Sh.1 1 EFWR-098-1 EFWCO99 EFWCS-TH1 Low 2HBC-85-8' (2) Downstream of 2EFW-16 (1) hseccessbie Penetration Medium None 2HBO-918* (31 UhidentifiedPenetration 2024 0029 6 2HBO-8838' (1) @ stream of 2CV-0789-1 (1) 2HBC85-1 Sh.1 ** " # (2) 2HBO-91-1 Sh.1 (3) 2HBO-91-2 (4) 2HBO-883-1 EFW-R-098-2 EFWC-O99 EFWSS Low 2HCC282-12' (1) Downsueem of 2CS-344 11] Weldolet Connection - from Medinan None 6 2HCO28210' (1) Downstream of 2Cs-845 105 2HCC-282-8 * (2) UhidentifiedPenetration- (21 Wstream of 2ERV-16 2HCD-195-8
- Cokann H2 f t) 2HCO282-6 Sh.1 (2) 2HCD-195-2 g ABB Combustion Engir(g Nuclear Operations h L_ . _ _ _ _ _
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FtIFIF Calculation NO. A-PENG-CALC-017 Rev. 00 Page 48 Of S4 Tabhr 9 Risk Segment iden66cadon (Cont'd) Msk SegmentID Consequence 10 Damage Gnwp10 Msk. legion 11 ping line Nos. Msk Segment Start P6 int Msk Segment EndJWrtt Category FeMare Potentiel Msk Category isometric Drawings EF W R-1 0 1 ERV C-10 EFW-CS-TH1 Low 2HBO-91-8" til Downstream of 2ERV- (1) LMidentifia. 'enetration low None 7 (1) 2HBO 91-2 EnYR-102 EFW-C-10 EnVSS Low 2HCD- 195-10" (19 Outlet of 2T-41A (11 Wstream of 2CT-4B j 2HCD-195-8* III Outlet of 2T-418 (1) 10* Cap l E*" *"* I 2HCD-258-10" (3) Downstream of 2CT-113 (2) Uhidentified Penetration - \ 2HCD-258-6* Cohann H2 (1) 2HCD 195-1 l 1212HCD-195-2 ; (3) 2HCD-258-1 l EFWR-11 EnVC-11 ERVSS Low 2HCC-282-12' (1) Gittet of T-418 (Norrie H2) (2) Wstream of 2CS-864 2HCC-282- 10* (1) Outlet of T-41B (Norste L21 (2) Wstroom of 2CS-845 (1) 2HCC-282-1 Sh.1 2HCC-282-2 Sh.1 2HCC-282-3 Sh.1 2HCC-282-3 Sh. 2 2HCC-282-4 Sh. I 2HCC-282-5 Sh.1 (2) 2HCC-282-6 Sh.1 ERYR-12A EFWC-12A ERYCS-TH3 Medium 2DBB-3-4* (1) Downstream of 2ERY9A (2) Letrolet Connection to Medium " Smenleek 6 (1) 2DBB 31 Sh. I (2) 2088-3-1 Sh. 2 EnYR-12B EFW C-128 EFW-CS-TH3 Medium 2DBB-4-4 * (1) Downstream of 2EFW-98 2) Lotrolet Connecten to Medium " Smenieek 5 (1) 2DBB-4-1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
O I L O h 9
k MIDIF Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC 017, Rev. 00 f) L/ Page 49 of S4 To facilitate application of the sampling percentages to determine the inspection scope, ISIS combines like segments (i.e., same consequence category and damage group) into segment groups. A total of 6 segment grovos have been identified and are summarized in Table 10 below. Table 10 Risk Inspection Scope Segment Consequence FaRure Risk Risk Total Selections Selections Groups Category Potential Region Category Welds Required Made EFWS-001 Low None Low 7 190 0 0 EFWS-002 Low None Low 7 160 0 0 EfWSD03 Medium None Low 6 255 0 0 EFWS-004 004 - + 10 and Medium SmallLeak Medium 5 005 -+ 16 EFWS 005 total -+ 26 3 3 EFWS-006 Medium None low 6 21 0 0
- 8. 0 ELEMENT SELECTION O
Q ,/ The ne.iber of elements to be examined as part of the risk-informed developed program depends upon the risk categories for the risk-significant segment groups as indicated in Table 10 above. An element is defined as a portion of the segment where a potential degradation mechanism has been identified eccording to the criteria of Section 5.0. The selection ofindividualinspection locations within a risk category depends upon the relative severity of the degradation mechanism present, the physical access constraints, and radiation exposure. In the absence of any identified degradation mechanisms (i.e., risk category 4), selections are focused on terminal ends and other locations (i.e., structural discontinuities) of high stress and/or high fatigue usage. An inspection for cause process shall be implemented utilizing examination methods and volumes defined specifically for the degradation mechanism postulated to be active at the inspection location. Table 11 depicts the element selections and other pertinent information (e.g., examination methods and volumes, basis for selection) for risk-significant segment groups EFWS-004 and EFWS-005. As indicatedin the Risk Inspection Scope of Table 10, a total of 3 eleme*sts have been selected for examination from segment groups EFWS-004 and EFWS-005. The examination methods and volumes specified in Table 11 (risk category 5) are defined in Reference 9.1 and are based upon the degradation mechanism (s) postulated to be active at each selected element. O v ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
aam ; D'1W W Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 50 of S4 Table 11 Element Seikredort - Risk Category 5 segment GroeApe Coneequence feCure Potential Riek Catersrv Miek Morten Total 1 et anamente 10% of adenents EFWS-004 & EFWS 005 Meditan Smenleek 5 Medium 26 3 Sarnents Safected line No. Esem Method Rish Segment D Descolpden See Dws No. Esem Vehene C..- a /DM Grong D*s Reneen for Sedeceen 85-3-169 2DBB 3-4* Volumetric EFWR-12A TNs risk segment is seMected to thermer transients mon AFW iritiation and duing quarterfy surveinance testing of MFWirdet check Pipe-to-latrolet Connection 2DBB-3-1 Sh. 2 Rgure No. 7.1-2 EFW C-12A /EFWCS-TH volve 2EFWSA and the honzontalporten ofit is potentiaRy rubrected Weld to thermal stratification (TASCSI doe to turbulent penetration. TNs terminal end element has been selected shee it would be sutvected to the Nghest bending snoment ira dis risk segment idue to TASCSI. 35 4-133 2DBB 4-4* Vohenetric EFW R-128 TNs risk segment is subtected to therme! transies amon AFW fritiation and during quarterfy surveMance testing o MFWinlet check Elbow to-Pipe Weld 2DBB-4-1 Figure No. 7.1-2 EFWC-128/EFW-CS-TH vdve 2EFW98 end the horizontalportson of it is potentiany subjected to thermal stratification ITASCSI due to turbulent penetration. This element, which has also been repaired once (FW67R11 and rowekfed icreating Ngher residualstressesi, how been selected since tNs abow between the honzontal and upward slopkg sections may exponence some thermalcycKng. 85-4-134 2DBB-4-4
- Vohenetric EFW-R-128 TNs risk segment is st4ected to thermet transients upon AFW kitiation and daing quarterfy survemance testing of MFWirdet check 1%pe-to-lo trolet Connection 2DBB 1 Rgure No. 7.1-2 EFWC-128/EFW-CS-TH3 ,,y, ggyy gy ,,g gg, go,g,,,g,q p ,,g,, ,y ;g g, ,,,,,q;,gy ,,4,,,,4 W*U to thermet stratification (TASCSI due to ensbulent penetration. TNs terrrunef end element has been selected since it woukt be subjected to the highest bornKng snomentin tNs risk segment idue to TASCSt.
g ABB Combustion Engihing Nuclear Operations
A Ik It MIfIP f) Calculation No. A PENG CALC-017, Rev. 00 0 Page 51 of 54
9.0 REFERENCES
9.1
- Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure," EPRI Report No. TR-106706, Interim Report, June 1996.
9.2 EPRIinservice Inspection Software (ISIS *),1996. 9.3 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, " Safety Analysis Report," Amendment No.13. 9.4 " Design Specification for ASME Section ill Nuclear Piping for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, Arkansas Power and Ught Company," Specification No. 6600-M 2200, Revision 9. 9.5 "ANO-2 SIMS Components Database,'(Plant Piping Une Ust (M 2083), dated 3 96).
- 9. 6 "ANO-2 ISI Plant Piping Une Ust," from Revision 4 of ANO 2 Inservice Inspection Plan.
- 9. 7 ' Emergency feedwater System Operations, Supplements 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8', ANO ProcedureMork Plan No. 2106.006, Rev. 44.
9.8 " Technical Specification for Insulation for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit : of the O Arkansas Power and Ught Company," Specification No. 6600 M 2136, Revision 9. 9.9 'SW to EFW Flush and Mov DP Tests", ANO ProcedureMork Plan No. 2305.020. Rev. 4, dated 10/2/95. 9.10 ' Emergency Feedwater Systems Operations,15.0 Recovery From Check Valve Back Leakage and Steam Binding of EFWPumps", ANO Procedure / Work Plan No. 2106.006, Rev. 44. 9.11 Private communication with Dan Meatheany at Entergy, dated 11/22/96. 9.12 'ANO-2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion System Susceptibility Report' ANO Report No. 95-R-2004-01, Rev. O, dated 8/18/95. 9.13 'EPRI Fatigue Management Handbook," Report No. TR-104534-V1,-V2 V3 -V4, Project 332101, Fina! Report, December 1994. 9.14 Gaertner, J. P., et. al ' Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Internal Flood Screening Study," prepared for Entergy Operations, Inc. Calculation No. 89-E-OO48-35, Rev. O, May 1992. 9.15 ' Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Individual Plant Examination Submittal,' 94-R 2005-01, Rev. O, August 1992. O LJ ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
ARR B"E W W Calculation No. A PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page 52 of 54 9.16 Entergy, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, P&lDs and Isometric Drawings: 1.0 Drawing No. M 2204, Sheet 4, Rev. 55; ' Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Safety injection System." l 2.0 Drawing No. M 204, Sheet 5, Rev. 12, " Piping & Instrument Diagram Emergency Feedwater Storage." 1 3.0 Drawing No. M-2206, Sheet 1, Rev.122, " Piping and Instrument Diagram Steam Generator Secondary System.' 4.0 Drawing No. M 2212, Sheet 4, Rev. 21, " Piping and Instrument Diagram Make-Up Water Demineralization System."
- 5. 0 Drawing No. 2DBB-31, Sheet 1, Rev. 21, *Large Pipe Isometric Emergency Feedwater Supply from 2CV 10371 & 2CV 1038 2 to Line 2DBB-124'."
- 6. 0 Drawing No. 2DBB-31, Sheet 2, Rev. 2 " Lame Pipe isometric Ememency Feedwater Supply from 2CV 1037-1 & 2CV 1038 2 to Line 2DBB 1-24'."
- 7. 0 Drawing No. 2DBB-4 1, Rev. 23, "Large Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater from 2CV 1036-2, and 2CV 1039-1 to 2DBB-2 2."
8.0 Drawing No. 2DBC-1-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 20, "Large Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-78 Dischame to Steam Generator 2E-24A." 9.0 Drawing No. 2DBC 1-1, Sheet 2, Rev.1, " Lame Pipe Isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-78 Discharge to Steam Generator 2E 24A.* 10.0 Drawing No. 2DBC 12, Sheet 1, Rev. 21, "Large Pipe isometric from Emergency feedwater Pump 2P-78 to Steam Generator 2E 248." 11.0 Drawing No. 2DBC-21, Sheet 1, Rev.14, " Lame Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A Dischame to Steam Generator 2E-24A.' 12.0 Drawing No. 2DBC 2 2, Sheet 1, Rev. 18, "Large Pipe isometric 2P 7A Emergency Feedwater Pump Discharge Piping to 2E 24A Steam Generator." 13.0 Drawing No. 2DBC-31, Sheet 1, Rev.14, " Lame Pipe Isometric Ememency Feedwater Pump 2P-7B Discharge to Steam Generator 2E-248." 14.0 Drawing No. 2DBC-41, Sheet 1, Rev.13,
- Lame Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P 7A Discharge to Steam Generator 2E-24A."
15.0 Drawing No. 2DBC-4-1, Sheet 2, Rev. 2, "Large Pipe Isometric Ememency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A Dischame to Steam Generator 2E-24A." 16.0 Drawing No. 2DBC 71, Sheet 1, Rev. 7, 'Small Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A Minimur.1 Bypass.' 17.0 Drawing No. 2DBC-81, Sheet 1, Rev. 4, "Small Pipe Isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7B Minimum Bypass." 18.0 Drawing No. 2DBC 121, Sheet 1, Rev. 2, "Large Pipe Isometric Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2P75) Check Valve Test Connections." 19.0 Drawing No. 2DBC-13-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 3, " Lame Pipe Isometric Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2P75) Check Valve Test Connections." 20.0 Drawing No. 2HBC-85-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 26, " Lame Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-78 Inlet from Service Water Header #1.* 21.0 Drawing No. 2HBC-85-1, Sheet 2, Rev. 3, " Lame Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-78 Inlet from Service Water Header #1." 22.0 Drawing No. 2HBC-86-1, Sheet 1, Rev. 23, "Large Pipe Isometric Ememency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A Inlet from Service Water Heac'er #2
- 23.0 Drawing No. 2HBC-86-1, Sheet 2, Rev. 4, "Large Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A Inlet from Service Water Header #2."
24.0 Drawing No. 2HBD-91-1, Sheet 1, Rev.14, "Large Pipe Isometric Emergency Feedwater Pumps 2P 7A&B Inlet from Main Condenser.' ABB Cornbustion Engineering Nuclear Operationc
A Ik Ik 7"EIfIF f) Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 017, Rev. 00 O Page 53 of 54 25.0 Drawing No. 2HBD-912, Rev. 4, ' Isometric - Turbine Auxiliary Building, Condensate System." 26.0 Drawing No. 2HCD-883-1, Rev. O, 'Large Pipe Isometric Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2P75) Suction. " 27.0 Drawing No. 2HCC 2821, Sheet 1, Rev. 1, "Large Pipe isometric Emergency Feedwater From T-418 to 2P-7A & 78." 28.0 Drawing No. 2HCC-282 2, Sheet 1, Rev.1, 'Large Pipe Isometric from Condensate Storege Tank T-41B to Emergency Feedwater Pumps 2P-7A & 2P 78. " 29.0 Drawing No. 2HCC 282 3, Sheet 1. Rev. 1, "Large Pipe Isometric Condensate Storage Tank T-41B Supply to Emergency Feedwater Pumps 2P-7A & B." 30.0 Drawing No. 2HCC 282-3, Sheet 2, Rev. O, "Large Pipe isometric Condensate Storage Tank T-41B Supply to Emergency Faedwater Pumps 2P-7A & B." 31.0 Drawing No. 2HCC 282 4, Sheet 1, Rev. 1, "Large Pipe Isometric Condensate Storage Tank T-41B Supply to Emergency feedwater Pumps 2P-7A & B.' 32.0 Drawing No. 2HCC 282 5, Sheet 1, Rev.1, "Large Pipe Isometric from Condensate Storage Tank T-41B to Emergency Feedwater Pumps 2P-7A & 7B. ' 33.0 Drawing No. 2HCC 282 6, Sheet 1, Rev. 2, "Large Pipc Isometric from Condensate Storage Tank T-41B to Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P 7A & B. '
&a 34.0 Drawing No. 2HCD 19S 1, Rev. 7, " Isometric - Yard Area Plant Make-Up.'
35.0 Drawing No. 2HCD-195-2, Rev. 9, " Isometric Turbine Auxiliary Building, Plant Make-Up." 36.0 Drawing No. 2HCD-2581, Rev. 8, " Isometric Condensate Storage To:rk Area Condensate." 9.17 EPRI Report TR 103581, " Thermal Stratification, Cycling and Striping (TASCS)", Electric Power Research Institute, March 1994. 9.18 "Consecuence Evaluation of ANO-2 EFW, Containment Spray, and Main Steam and Feedwater System Piping," Arkansas Nuclear 1 Unit 2, Yankee Nuclear Services Division Calculation No. NSD-018, Rev. O, August 1997. i 9.19 North Atlantic Energy Services Corp. " Individual Plant Examination Extemal Events", t Report for Seabrook Station, Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, September 1992. 1 9.20 "Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Evaluations at Nuclear Plant Sites in Central and ) Eastern United States: Resolution of the Charleston Earthquake issue" EPRI NP-l 6395-D, April 1989, Prepared by Risk Engineering, Inc., Yankee Atomic Electric Company, and Woodward-Clyde f:onsultants. 9.21 ' Revised Uvermore Seismic Hazard Estimates for 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains", NUREG-1488 (FinalReport), April 1994. ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations l
A 5B Calculstion No. A.PENG CALC 017, Rev. 00 Page 54 of 54 9.22 Swain, A. D. and Guttmann, H. E.;
- Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Operations', NUREG CR 1278, August 1993.
9.23 Intcroffice Correspondence from A. V. Bauer to Oustity Records Letter No. PENG. 97 140, " Submittal of SIA Calculations,' dated July 21,1997. O O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
- j. .
- l. ~
I l Calculation No. A PENG CALC 017, Mov, 00 l 1 Pege A t of A26 i-i i 1 i i i I 1 i 1 e i e 1-k- 1-i I e APPENDIXA i l 'FMECA CONSEQUENCE INFORMA TION MEPORT* t n (Attachment Peges A1 A26) 2 1 4 4 4 i 2 4 e I 1: i' e i 1 1 h ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
FMECA - Consequence Inforrnation Report Cah! =,n A raccu.c on an oo 14sep97 regrA2ofA26 Consequence ID: EFW C CI A Consequence
Description:
Degradadon of EFW flow to steam generator 2E 24 A inside containment during an independent denumd (line 2DDB 3 tetween containment penetration and check vah e 2EFW.9A) Break Stie: Large Isolability of Break Yes ISO Comments: 2C%10251 or 1038 2 and 2CW1026 2 or 10371 can te closed by the operator to prevent dumping part of the CST into containment. Detection is based on flow indication from EFW pumps, with a continued lowering of steam generator level (i.e., faulted steam generator). Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and armunciation (>400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Eventually, containment sump level would provide indication of lost steam generator inventory due to EFW water not reaching the steam generator. Spatial Effects: Containment Effected location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: None. Equipment located within the containment is quall'ied. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from steam generator by 2EFW 9A. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. less of System: SDM 2 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW System Recovery: PCS less is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW flow to steam generator "A" Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from both EFW trains. less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure time,3 backup trains EFW, AFW . rad once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is ' Medium" with 2 backup trains (isolation failure and once thruugh cooling). 2EFW 7A & 7B prmide containment isolation outside the contairunent building, thus, the consequence remains unchanged. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O O
FMECA ConsequenceInformation Report Calcald'u= Na A PENG CALC 017 R" 00 lGsg91 Page A3 of A!6 Consequence ID: EFW C-OlB Consequence De9eription: Degradation of EFW flow to steam generator 2E 24B inside containment during an independent demand (line 2DBB 4 between contairunent penetration and clwck valve 2E7W 98) BreakStae: Iarge Isolability of Break Yes ISO Consements: 2C%10751 or 10M 2 and 2C%10% 2 or 10391 can be closed by the operator to prevent dumping part of the CST into containment. Detection 14 based on flow indication from EFW l pmps, with a continued lowering of steam generator les el (i.e., faulted steam generator). Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 spm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Eventually, contairunent surnp level would provide indication of i 1 lost steam generator inventory due to EFW water not reaching the steam generator. Spatial Effects: Containment Effected 14 cation: Containment Building Spatial Effects Cosaments: None. Equipment located within the containment is qualified. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: laitiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from steam ge trator by 2EFW 98. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. Loss of System: SDM 2 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW I System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW flow to 6 team generator 'B". Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from both EFW trains. Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recmery: N/A Consequence Counment: Consequence is " law" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure time,3 backup trains EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is ' Medium" with 2 backup trains (isolation failure and once through cooling). 2EFW-8A & 8B provide containment isolation outside the containment building, thus, the consequence remains unchanged. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Co seque.ce Ra k O C ( m
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Ca'alanm h A PII,0 CALC-017. Rev 00 14 se97 Parc At of A2d Consequence ID: EITWC 02A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW flow to steam generator 2E 24 A outside containment during an independent dernand (line 2DBB 3 downstream of check valves 2EFW 7A & D) Break Slie: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CW10251 or 1038 2 and 2CW1026-2 or 10371 can be closed by the operator. Detection is based on flow indicadon from EFW pumps, with a continued lowering of steam generator level (i.e., faulted steam generator). Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Also, propagation to auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides further detection capability. Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected lacation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagadon through a door is into Room 2073 and then through floor grating to elevation 335 (Room 2040). Also, the cast 6taltway and elevator shaft provide propagation paths. There are floor drains in Rooms 2084,2073, and 2040. Because of tne case of drainage from Room 2073, no impacts are assumed. It is assumed that sufficient water can not accumulate in Room 2084 to fail all ECCS supply valves. From Room 2040, propagation is into the east stairway (door) and don to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201I). The auxiliary buildmg sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the control room. It is assumed for the unisolated case, tN enough water accumulates at El 335 (Room 2040) to fail MCC 2B52. EFW at ~:.1335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the uhole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure again after EFW transfer to senice water is considered unlikely, initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from 6e steam generator by 2EFW 9A. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. IAss of System: SDM 5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, }{ PSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator, Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW flow te steam generator "A", Isolation falhtre is assumed to cause flos, diversion from both EFW trains and water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2852 affecting train A supply vahes for containment spray, LPSI, and IIPSI. less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequer.ce is
- Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure tirre,3 backup trains EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the imlation failure case, the consequence is " Medium" with 2 backup trains (isolation failure and train B of once through cooling tupply vah es).
2EFW 9A provides automatic containment isolation inside the containment building, thus, the consequence remains unchanged. Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O g l 1
A FMECA Consequence Information Report Cahla'"* Na A PEW CALC 017 h 00 () 144ep 91 Page AS of A26 i Consequence ID: EFW C 02B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW flow to steam generator 2E 24B outside containment during an independent demand (line 2DDB-4 donstream of check valves 2EFW 8A & B) Break Size: Large isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CV 10751 or 1036 2 and 2C%l076 2 or 10391 can be closed by the operator. Detection is based on flow indication from EFW pumps, with a continued lowering of steam generator le tl (i.e., faulted steam generator). Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Also, propagation to auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides further detection capability. Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2081 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagation through a door is into Room 2040 and then into the cast stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 2011). There are floor drains in Rooms 2081 and 2040. The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the control room. It is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (2040) to fail MCC 2B52. There are no flooding impacts in Room 2081. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2110 & 20l4) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 mill not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure again aller EFW transfer to service water is considered unlikely. O Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Esent Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generator by 2EFW 9B. A loss of PCS (T2) irdtiator is assumed to challenge this piping. 14ss of Syctem: SDM 5 PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI S) stem IPE ID: Syrtem Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW flow to steam generator 'B". Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from both EFW trains and water accumulation at El 335 w hich fails MCC 2B52 affecting train A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. 14ss of Traln: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Conwquence Comment: Consequence is ' Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure time, 3 backup trains - EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation fsilure case, the consequence is " Medium" with I backup trains (isolation failure and train B of once through cooling supply vahrs). 2EFW 98 provides automatic containment isolation inside the containment building. thns, the consequence remains unchanged. Conwquence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence nank O O v I l l
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calculdm Na A PENG CE 017, Rev 00 14-ser91 Pagt A6 of A26 Consequence ID: EFW C 03A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7A flow to steam generator 2E 24 A du S y an independent demand (line 2DDB 3 between 2CW10371 and check valve 2EFW-7A) Break Stre: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2C%l026 2 or 10371 can be closed by the operator. Propagation to auxiliary building sump and its high level alar a provides detection capability. Further detection is based on !!ow indication from EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <250 gpm). Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected 14eation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagation through a door is into Room 2073 and then through floor grating to elevation 335 (Room 2040). Also, the east stairway and elevator shaft provide propagation paths. There are floor drains in Rooms 2084,2073, and 2040. Because of the case of dralnage from Room 2073, no impacts are assumed. It is assumed that sufficient water can not accumulate in Room 2084 to fail all ECCS supply valves. From Room 2040, propagation is into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201I). The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the control room. It is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (Room 2040) to fail MCC 2B52. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure again after EFW transfer to service water is considered unlikely. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generator by 2 check valves. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. less of System: SDM 5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI Sy stem Recos cry: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7A flow to steam generator "A". Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from EFW pump 2P7A and water accumulation at El 335 which falls MCC 2B52 affecting train A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure time,3 backup trains EFW, AFW, ami once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is *14w' with 3 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW B, and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: LOW C Consequence Rank O O
O FMECA Consequence Information Report WM Cablarum Na A PENG C4LC.0U,h 00 Page A1 qf A26 Consequence ID: EFW.C 03B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW Pump 2P78 flow to steam generator 2E.24 A during an independent demand (line 2DBD.3 between 2C%l038 2 and check valve 2EFW. 7B) Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CW10251 or 1038 2 can be closed by the operator. Propagation to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides detection capability, Further detection is based on flow indication from the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected 14 cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagation through a door is into Room 2073 and then through floor grating to elevation 335 (Room 2040). Also, the cast stairway and elevator shaA prmide propagation paths There are floor drains in Rooms 2084,2073, and 2040. Because of the case of drainage from Room 2073, no impacts are assumed. It is assumed that sufficient water can not accumulate in Room 2084 to fall all ECCS supply vahes. From Room 2040, propagation is into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201!). The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the control room. It is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (Room 2040) to fail MCC 2B52, EFW at El 335 (Rooms b O 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2610 & 20l4) are protected by waturtight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS roorr.s. Failure to isolate and then failure again after EFW transfer to service water J is considered unlikely. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: laitiating Event Recmery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generator by 2 check valves. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. 14ss of System: SDM.5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7B flow to steam generator 'A', Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from EFW pump 2P7B and water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2B52 affecting train A supply valves foi containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. - less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Low' based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frcquency of challenge, between tests exposure time,3 backup trains - EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is ' Medium" with 2.5 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW A, and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: low D Consequence Rank O 0. v
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Isser91 Catala'ma h A /EG CAM 0U I* 00 l' age A8 of A26 g Consequence ID: EFW C 03C Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7A flow to steam generator 2E 24B during an independent demand (line 2DBB 4 between 2CW10391 and check valve 2EFW 8A) Break Size: Large leolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CW1076-2 or 103 Al can be closed by the operator. Propagation to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm presides detection capability. Furth:r detection is based on flow indication from the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2081 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagation through a door is into Room 2040 and then into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201l). There are floor drains in Rooms 2081 and 2040, The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the control room. It is assumed for the unisoited case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (2040) to fail MCC 2B52. There are no flooding impacts in Room 2081. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS ai El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure again afler EFW transfer l to service water is considered unlikely. Initiating Egent: N Initiating Event ID: l'intiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generator by 2 check valves. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. Loss of System: SDM 5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7A flow I to steam generator "B*. Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from EFW pump 2P7A and water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2B52 affecting train A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequenci r ' Low" based on lable 2-2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure time,3 backup trains EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is ' Low" with 3 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW B, and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No itnpact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: LOW D Consequence aank O O
O FMECA Consequence laformation Report 14-sv91 corn,i.u<m n. A.rno-cate air. Rw. oo rm A9 efA26 Consegeeece ID: EFW.C 03D Ceasegmence Descripties: Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7B flow to steam generator 2E.24B during an independent demand (line 2DBB 4 between 2CW1036 2 and check valve 2EFW. 8B) Break Sise Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Ceements: 2CV 1075 1 or 1036 2 can be closed by the operator. Propagation to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides detection capability. Further detection is based on flow indication from the EFW paunps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 spm (line dependent) and <240 spm). Spatial Effects: Propagation EWected IAcaties: Room 2081 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagation through a door is into Room 2040 and then into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201l). There are floor drains in Rooms 2081 and 2040. The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the control room. It is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (2040) to fail MCC 29$2. Dere are no flooding impacts in Room 2081. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & > 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure again after EFW transfer to service water is considered unlikely. lentiating Event: N lentiating Event ID: lettiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generator by 2 check valves. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. less of System: SDM5--- System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI - System Recosery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7B flow to steam generator "B". Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from EFW pump 2P7B and water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2B52 affecting train A supply vahts for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. 14es of Trale: .N Trale ID: N/A Trale Recovery: N/A Consequence Conament: Consequence is ' law' based on Table 2 2 of Ref, 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure time, 3 backup trains . EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is ' Medium" with 2.5 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW A, and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isolation. Ceasequence Category: low D.- Com.eguence Rank O J
FMECA - Consequence Information Report l44ey91 cahl ro.No A.Pauctooi7.R,e oo Page A10 of A26 g Consequence ID: EFW C 04A Consequence Det;ription: Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7A flow to steam generator 2E 24A during !an independent dernand (line 2DBC-4 between 2CV 1026 2 and 2CV 10371) Break Stre: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2CV 1026 2 can be closed by the operator. Propagadon to the auxiliary building suinp and high level alarm provides detection capability. Further detection is based on flow indication from the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 gpm and <250 gpm). Spatial Effects: Pmpagation Effected beation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagation through a door is into Room 2073 and then through floor grating elevation 335 (Room 2040). Also, the cast staltway and elevator shaft prmide propagation paths. There are floor drains in Rooms 2084,2073, and 2040. Because of the case of drainage from Room 2073, no impacts are asumed. It is assumed that sufficient water can not accumulate in Room 2084 to fall all ECCS supply vahrs. From Room 2040, propagation is into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 2011). The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the control room. it is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (Room 2040) to fall MCC 2D52. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS tooms. Failure to isolate and then failure to isolate again after EFW transfer to service water is considered unlikely. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generator by 2 check vahrs. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. Loss of System: SDM 5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P to steam generator "A". Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from EFW pump 2P7A and water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2D52 affecting train A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency challenge, between tests exposure time,3 backup trains . EFW, AFW, and once through coolinf,). For the imlation failure case, the consequence is " Low" with 3 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW B, and train B of orce through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: LOW D Consequence Rank O O
FMECA ConsequenceInfonnation Report Cahla'u= No A PEAU catc.017. R,v. oo 144er9? Page All of A26 Consequence ID: EFW-C 04B Consequence
Description:
Degradation o"iW Pump 2P7B flow to steam generator 2E 24 A during an independent demand (line 2DBC 1 between 2C%IO251 and 2C%1038 2) Break Size Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: 2C%1025 1 can be closed by the operator. Prop gation to the auxihary building sump and its high level alarm provides detection capability. Further detection is based on flow indicadon from the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indicadon and annunciation (>400 or 325 spm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Spatial ENects: Propagation ENected 1ACation: Room 2084 Spatial ENects Comments: Prcpagadon through a door is into Room 2073 and then through floor grating to elevation 335 (Room 2040). Also, the east stairway and elevator shaft prmide propagation paths. There are floor drains in Rooms 2084, 2073, and 2040. Because of the case of drainage from Room 2073, no impacts are assumed it is assumed that sufficient water can not accumulate in Room 2084 to fail all ECCS supply valves. From Room 2040, propagadon is into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Roonu 2006 and 201I). The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a hign level alarm in the control room. It is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (Room 2040) to fall MCC 2B52. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 20l4) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure to isolate again after EFW transfer to service water is considered unlikely, laitiating Event: N lattiatiet Ivent IDt Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely sino ds piping is isolated from the steam generator by 2 check valves. A loss of PCS ( / j initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. 14ss of S) stem: SDM 5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7B flow to steam generator "A". Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from EFW pump 2P7B and water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2B52 aNocting train A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. 14ss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Trale Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is " law" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, b; tween tests exposure time,3 backup trains EFW, AFW, and once through cooling), For the isolation failure case, the consequence is " law" with 2.5 backup trains (isolation failure. EFW A, and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: - low D Co. seq.e.c. Ra.k D O
FMECA Consequence Information Report Cahlaro:No. A rau ce-017 Rev oo 144er-91 Page A12 of A26 Consequence ID: EFW C 04C Consequence Descripilon: Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7A flow to steam generator 2E 24B during an independent demand (line 2DBC 2 between 2CW1076 2 and 2CV 10391) Break Str.e: Large Isolability of Break Yes ISO Comments: 2C%l076 2 can be closed by the operator. Propagation to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides detection capability. Further detection is based on flow indication from the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation
&400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <240 gpm).
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Location: Room 2081 Spatial Effects Comments: Propagation through a door is into Room 2040 and then into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201I). There are floor drains in Rooms 2081 and 2040. The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alarm in the conuol room. It is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (2040) to fail MCC 2B52. There are no flooding impacts in Room 2081. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failur to isolate and then failure again after EFW transfer to service water is considered unlikely, initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from tle steam generator by 2 check velves. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. IAss of System: SDM 5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7A flow to steam generator 'B". Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion from EFW pump 2P7A and water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2B52 affecting trair A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is
- Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticirsted frequency of challenge, between tests exposuit time,3 backup trains EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is ' low" with 3 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW B, and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isolation.
Consequence Category: low D Consequence nank O O
O FMECA - Consequence Inforination Report 14-s , 91 Cahtaa'* Na A PEW C4LC 017.h 00 rw AH grAN Commequence ID: EFW-C 04D Ceasequence Descripties: Degradation of EFW Pump 2P78 Dow to steam generator 2E.24B during an independent demand (line 2DBC 3 between 2C%l0751 and 2C%l036 2) Break Sise Large teolability of Break: Yes
!$0 Comments: 2CW1075 1 can be closed by the operator. Propagation to the au liiary building sump and its high level alarm provides detocuon capability. Further detection is based on flow indication frem the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation
(>400 or 325 spm (line dependent) and <240 spm). i Spatial ENects: Propagation ENected 14caties: Room 2081 Spatial ENeets Comanents: Propagation through a door is into Room 2040 and then into the ust stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 2011). There are floor drains in Rooms 2081 and 2040. The auxiliary building sump at El 317 has a high level alann in the l I' control room it is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (2040) to fall MCC 2D52. 'Iliere are no flooding impacts in Room 2081. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure again aAer EFW transfer to service water is considered unlikely, taltiating Event: N lattiatlag Event ID: O laitiatlag Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is leolated from steam generator by 2 check valves. A loss of PCS (T2) inidator is assumed to challenge this piping. 14es of System: SDM 5 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW, CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7B flow to steam generator "B", Isolation failure is assumed to cause flow diversion froni EFW pump 2P7B and water accumuladon at El 335 which fails MCC 2B52 afecting train A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. Imes of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comament: Consequence is "14w" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 8.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between tests exposure time, 3 backup trains . EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is " law" with 2.5 backup trains (isolation failure. EFW A, and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isoladon.
- Consequence Category: low D Co.seg.e.ce Ra.k O O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cahlatweh A FMG-C4M 017 An 00 loser-97 Pere A14 o/A26 Conocquence ID: EIT-C 05A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7A flow to both steam generators during an independent demand (hne 2DBC 2 & 4 outside EFW pump rooms upstream of 2CV 1026 2 & 2CW1076 2 and n,m bypass line 2DBC 7) Break Slic: Large Isolability of Breakt Yes ISO Comments: Pump 2P7A can be tripped, but CST may gravity drain through the pump, therefore, pump suction MOVs may require isoladon. Propagation to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alann provides detection capability. Further detection is based on flow indication from the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has flow indication and annunciation (>400 or 325 gpm (line dependent) and <240 gpm). Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected L cation: Room 2084 Spatial Effects Comments: This piping is located in Rooms 2084,2081,2055, and 2040. Propagation is eventually down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 2011) via El 335 (Room 2040) for all cases with 2084 first passing through Room 2073. There are floor drains in all rooms. Because of the case of drainage from Room 2073, no irnpacts are assumed. It is assumed that sufficient water can not accumulate in Room 2084 to fail all ECCS supply valves. There are no flooding impacts in Rooms 2081 and 2055. Room 2040 propagates into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201I). It is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El 335 (Room 2040) to fail MCC 2B52. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2025) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007,2010 & 2014) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not flood the ECCS rooms. Failure to , isolate and then failure to isolate again after EFW transfer to service nter is considered unlikely. Initiating Event: N Initiating Esent ID: Ir.itiating Event Reco cry: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from steam generators. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. Less of System: SDM 4 System IPE ID: PCS, CSS, IIPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Isolation failure is assumed to cause water accumulation at El 335 which fails MCC 2B52 affecting train A supply valves for containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. Loss of Train: T Train ID: EFW "A" Train Recovery: Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7A flow to both steam generators. Consequence Comment: Consequence is
- Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time, 2.5 backup trains . EFW "B", AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is " Low" with 3 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW B, and train D nf one through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isoladon.
Consequence Category: LOW D Consequence aank O 9
FMECA - Consequence Inforsnation Report Cablem Na A PEW C4tf 017, b 00
' ***W" Pese Al$ qf AN Ceasequence ID: - EFW C OSB Ceasegmence Descripties: Degradation of EFW Pwnp JP7B Aow to both steam generators during an independent demand (line 2DBC.I & 3 outside EFW pump Rooms upstream of 2C%10251 & 2CW10731 and min bypass line 2DBC 8)
Break Sise Large laelsbuity of Break Yes ISO Comments: Pump 2P78 can be tripped, but CST :nay grwity drain throuch the pump, therefore, pump suction MOVs may require isolation. Propagation is to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm prmides detection capability. Fwther detection is based on flow indication from the EFW pumps. Each of the 4 EFW discharge lines has now indication and annunciation (>400 or 32$ spm (llne dep&nt)and <240 spm). Spatial EWeets:_ Propagation ENected IAcaties: Room 2084 Spatial ENects Comments: This piping is located in Rooms 2084, 2081, 20$$, and 2040, Propagation is eventually down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 2011) via El 335 (Room 2040) for all cases with 2084 Grst passing through Room 2073. '!here are floor drains in all rooms. Because of the ease of drainage from Room 2073, no impacts are ma==aA It is assumed that suf5cient water can not accumulate in Room 2084 to fail all ECCS supply valves /Ihere are no Aooding impacts in Rooms 2081 and 20$$. Room 2040 propagates into the east stairway (door) and down to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 2011). b is assumed for the unisolated case, that enough water accumulates at El O 33$ (Room 2040) to fail MCC 2B$2. EFW at El 335 (Rooms 2024 & 2023) and ECCS at El 317 (Rooms 2007, 2010 & 20l4) are protected by watertight doors. Emptying the whole CST to El 317 will not nood the ECCS rooms. Failure to isolate and then failure to isolate again aner EFW trantfer to service water is considered unlikely, laitiettag Event: N- Initiating Ewet ID: laitistlag Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from meam generators. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. 14ss of System: SDM 4 System IPE ID: PCS, CSS, HPSI, LPSI System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator, Isolation failure is assumed to cause water accumulation at El 33$ which fails MCC 2832 affecting train A supply valves for = containment spray, LPSI, and HPSI. Laos of Train: T Train IB: EFW "B" Train Recoveryt Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7B Aow to both meam generators. Conseguence Comment: Consequence is " Medium
- based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of-
- challenge, between test exposure time,2 backup trains EFW "A', AFW, and once through cooling). For the isolation failure case, the consequence is ' Low" with 2.3 backup trains (isolation failure, EFW A and train B of once through cooling supply valves). No impact on containment isolation.
Ceasequeste Category: MEDIUM 'O Ceasequence Rank O O
1 s FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cah'a ^'a dMGN-017 ^"* l&Sg91 Page All of A26 Consequence ID: EFW-C 06A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7A flow to both steam generators dunng an independent demand in Room 2024 (line 2DBC 2 and 2DBC 13 from AFW) Break Stre: Large isolability of Bnak: Yes ISO Comments: Pump 2P7A can be tripped or flooding the room will trip the pump. There is flood detection in room 2024 with alarm in the control room. Propagation through the floor drain to the auxiliary building sump t.nd its high level alarm prwides additional detection capability. Failure of the pump due to room flooding and a watertight room provides the equivalence ofisolation. Spatial Effects: Propagadon Effected Imcation: Room 2024 Spatial Effects Comments: The turbine driven pump is assumed flooded and unavailable. Propagation is through floor drain to El 317 and any leakage out of the room is assumed to be within floor drainage capability outside, laitiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generators. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. less of System: S System IPE ID: PCS System Recosery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. IAss of Train: T Train ID: EFW "A" Train Recovery: Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7A flow to both steam generators. Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time,2.5 backup trains EFW 'B", AFW, and once through cooling). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: low D Consequence aank O O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report O 1&sgD1 Cahlda Na A PENG CAC 017.R'v 00 Page Al7 cf A26 Consequence ID: EFW C-06B Consequence Descripties: Degradation of EFW Pump 2P78 flow to both steam generators during an independent demand in Room 2025 (line 2DBC 1 and 2DBC 12 from AFW) Break Stae: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Pump 2P7B can be tripped or flooding the room will trip the pump. There is flood detection in room 2025 with alarm in the control room. Propagation through the floor drain to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides additional detection capability. Failure of the pump due to room flooding and a watertight room provides the equivalence ofisolation. i Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected Imation: Room 2025 Spatial Effects Comments: The motor driven pump is assumed flooded and unavailable. Propagation is through floor drain to El 317 and any leakage out of the room is assumed to be within floor drainage capability outside. laitiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recoveryt Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the , steam generators. A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. Loss of System: S System IPE ID: PCS System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Loss of Trala: T TralaID: EFW'B' Train Recovery: Pipe deg:adation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7B flow to both steam generators. Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time,2 backup trains . EFW *A*, AFW, and once through cooling). No impact on containment isolation Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Conseq.e.ce Ra.k O
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t FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cah'd** Na AMNGC4ff 0U h 00 14 ssy91 Page Al8 of A26 Consequence ID: EFW-C 07 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW Pump flow to both steam generators during an independent demand of piping between 2EFW.$ A and $8 (line 2DBC 1). Break Slee: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: Pump can be tripped or its suction MOVs may be closed to isolate the break, in order to challenge this piping, manual valves 2EFW $ A and $B must be opened locally, thus, detection woud be almost immediate from the demand. There is flood detection in room 2024 and 2025 with alarm in the control rmm. Porpagation through the floor drain to the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides additional detection capability. Failure to isolate could overpressurize the room and propagate to Room 2040. Spatial Effects: Propagation EtYected tacation Room 2024 Spatial Effects Comments: This pipe is located it both rooms 2024 and 202$. Depending on which room the pipe break occurs in, the pump is assumed flooded and unavailabic, Propagation is through the floor drain to El 317 and failure to isolate will result in propagation to Room 2040 uith subsequent impact on MCC 2BS2. Room 2040 propagates to El 317 (Rooms 2006 and 201I) through the east stairway, All propagation is into the auxiliary building sump and its high level alarm provides, detection. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: N/A Initiating Event Recovery: Pipe break during normal operation is unlikely since this piping is isolated from the steam generators. A loss of PCS (T2) irdtiator is assumW to challenge this piping. less of System: SM 2 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Also, to challenge this piping one EFW pump train as well as multiple SO discharge paths on the other train would have to fail. Then, AFW would also have is fall. This is a very unhkely event. Failure to isolate impacts are even less likely since the pipe is challenged by local operator action. Given, the unlikely derr nd for this pipe and its fallare, all EFW is assumed to be lost. less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: Isolation failure can overpresswizer Room 2024 or 2025, and flood Room 2040 affecting MCC 2BS2 (train A ECCS supply valves), but this is extremely unlikely. Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Low" based on Table 2 2 nf Ref. 9.18 (unanticipated frequency of challenge, all year exposure time, I backup train - once through cooling). Unanticipated frequency in this case has a value of 2 backup trains (multiple failures to challenge this piping). Consequence Category: low D Consequence nank O O
FMECA - Consequence Information Report Calc *la'"a Na M NGCALC 017 Arv 00 ( t4 ser 91 Page At9 of A26 Conwquence ID: EFW C 08A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of EFW Pump 2P7A suction during an independent demand (line 2HBC tr downttream of check valve 2EFW 2A and line 211BC 8$ downstream of 2CV 0795 2) Break Slut Large isolability of Break Yes ISO Comments: Depending on the pipe break location nd sir.e, low suction pressure could isolate the CST (2CV 0795 2) and open the senice water supply (2CV 0711 2) to pump 2P7A. Otherwise, flooding the room could disable these MOVs before the low pressure transfer to senice water. Given transfer to senice water, operators would need to isolate senice water supply to 2P7A. Flood detecdon in the room alanns in the control room. The room is also watertight, except for a floor drain to the auxiliary building sump, w hich also has a high level alarm in the control room. Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected 14catlos: Room 2024 Spatial Effects Comments: The turbine driven pump is assumed flooded and unavailable. Propagation is through a floor drain to El 317 and any leakage out of the room is usumed to be within the ficor drainage capability outside. laitiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: taltlating Event Recovery: A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This may be conservative since pipe break during normal standby may bejust as likely (i.e., O less of System S demand stress of CST head is not significantly different during demand). System IPE ID: PCS Sy stem Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Failurs w isolate senice water (assuming auto transfer success) could eventually flood all ECCS at El 317. It is assumed senice water would be isolated before such consequences occur (propagation through a floor drain and leakage out of ; Room 2024 would take significant time to flood ECCS). ' less of Trale: T Train ID: EFW"A" Train Recovery: Pipe degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7A suction. Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time,2.5 backup trains EFW "B", AFW, and once through cooling). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: Low O Coasequence Rank O O
FMECA Consequence Information Report Cal (*l'uu~' Na A mmon. Rn. 00 l4-sm91 Page A20 of A26 Consequenu ID: EFW-C 08B Consequence
Description:
Degradadon of EFW Pump 2P7B suedon during an independent demand (line 21!BC-85 downstream of check vahr 2EF\W2B and 2CV 07891) Break Stres Large Isolability of Break Yes ISO Comments: Depending on the pipe break locadon and size, low suction pressure could isolate the CST (2CV 07891) and open the senice water supply (2CV 07161) to pump 2P7B. Otherwise, flooding the room could disable these MOVs before the low pressure transfer to senice water. Given transfer to senice water, operators would need to isolate senice water supply to 2P7B. Flood detecdon in the room alarms in the control room. The room is also watertight, except for a floor drain te the auxiliary building sump, which also has a Idgh level alarm in the control room. Spatial Effec's: Propagadon Effected location: Room 2025 l l Spatial Effects Comments: The motor driven pump is assumed flooded and unavailable. Propagation is through a floor drain to El 317 and any leakage out of the room is assumed to be within the ' floor drainage capability outside. Initiating Event: N Inltisting Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This may be conservadre since pipe break during nonnal standby may bejust as likely (i.e., demand stress of CST head is not significantly different during demand). l less of System: S System IPE ID: PCS 1 System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Failure to isolate senice water (assuming auto transfer I success) could eventually flood all ECCS at El 317. It is assumed senice water would be -l isolated before such consequences occur (propagation through a floor drain and leakage out of Room 2025 would take significant time to flood ECCS). Loss of Train: T Train ID: EFW "B" Train Recovery: Pipe. degradation causes loss of EFW pump 2P7B suction. Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time,2 backup traine . EFW 'A", AFW, and once through cooling), No impact on contaimnent isolation. Consequence Category: MEDIUM C Consequence Rank O 9
O FMECA - Consequence Information Report is ser 97 cohton< Na A rrNo-c4Lc oir. ncv. oo Page A21 of A26 Commequence ID: EFW C 09A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of common CST stiction in EFW Pump 2P7A Room during an independent demand (line 21{BC 85 upstream of 2CV 0795 2 in Room 2024) Break Site Large teolability of Break: Yes 150 Comments: Low suction pressure could isolate CST (2CV-0795 2) and open the senice water supply (2CV. 0711 2) to pump 2P7A. The CST could drain through Room 2024 if not isolated. IAcal isolation of CST at 2CV 0707 in the turbine building or 2CT.5 at the CST is required. Also, failure of 2CV 0795 2 to close and successful opening of 2CV 07112 would require operators to isolate the senice water supply to 2P7A. Flood detection in the room alarms in the control room. The room is also watertight. except for a floor drain to the auxiliary building sump, which also has a high level alarm in the control room. Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected 14 cation: Room 2024 l Spatial Effects Comments: The turbine driven pump is assumed flooded and unavailable. Propagation is through a floor drain to El 317 and any leakage out of the room is assumed to be within the floor drainage capability outside. Initiating Event: 1 Initistlog Event ID: Initiating Event Recovery: A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This may be conservative since pipe break during normal standby may bejust as likely (i.e., 7 demand stress of CST head 15 not significantly different during demand). tess of System: S Systeam IPE ID: PCS System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Failure to isolate CST can not flood ECCS at El 317 and failure to isolate senice water before flooding ECCS is not considered likely (propagation through a floor drain and leakage out of Room 2024 would take signficant time). less of Trala: T Trala ID: EFW "A" Train Recovery: Flooding is assumed to cause loss of EFW pump 2P7A before isolation occurs Failure of 2CV. 0789 to close will fall all EFW, but this valve is included as part of EFW B. Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time, 2.5 backup trains - EFW 'B", AFW, and once through cooling). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: low D Con.eque.c na.k O O O
FMECA - Consequence Ir formation Report Col <vlarum & A #EW C4LC-0U, Rn. 00 14-sty 91 Page A22 of A26 Consequence ID: EFW-C 09B Consequence
Description:
Degradation of cornmon CST suction in EFW Pump 2P7B Room daring an independent dernand (suction piping in Room 2025, including line 211BC 85 upstream of 2CV 07891, line 2ilBD 91, line 211BD 883,211CC 282, t.nd 211CD-195) Break Slic: Large Isolability of Break: Yes ISO Comments: law suction pressure cotdd isolate CST (2CV 07891) and open the senice water supply (2CW 0716 1) to pump 2P78. The CST could drain through Room 2025 if not isolated. local isolation of CST at 2C%0707 in the turbine building or 2CT 5 at the CST is required. Also, failure of 2C%0789-1 to close and successful opening of 2C%07161 would require operators to isolate the service water supp!y to 2P7B. Flood detection in the room alarms in the control room The room is also watertight, except for a floor drain to the auxiliary building sump, which also has a high level alarm in the control room. Spatial Effects: Propagation Eff',cted location: Room 2025 Spatial Effects Comments: The motor driven pump is assumed flooded and unavailable. Propagation is through a floor drain to El 317 and any leakage out of the room is assumed to be within the floor drainage capability outside. Initiating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Reco cry: A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This may be conservative since pipe break during normal standby may bejust as likely (i.e., demand stress of CST head is not significantly different during demand). Loss of System: S System IPE ID: PCS System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator. Failure to isolate CST can not flood ECCS at El 317 and failure to isolate senice water before flooding ECCS is not considered likely (propagation through a floor drain and leakage out of Room 2024 would take signficant time). Loss of Trale: T Train ID: EFW "B" Train Recovery: Flooding is assumed to cause loss of EFW pump 2P7B before isolation occurs. Failure of 2CW 0795 to close will fail all EFW, but this valve is included as part of EFW A. Consequence Comment: Consequence is
- Medium" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time,2 badup trains EFW "A", AFW, and once through cooling)
Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence Rank O l 9 l l
SJ FMECA Consequence Inforsnation Report Catalaam h d TEW-CdC 017. An 00 l4-Sep 91
}'agt All t{ A!6 Compequence ID: EFW C 10 2 Consequence
Description:
Degradation of cornmon CST suction outside stalliary building during an independent demand (line 211CD 195 located outside and in Roonu 2223,222$. and 20$0, and line 2ilCD 258 located outside) Break Stae: Large Isolability of Break Yes ISO Comments: Low suction pressure will isolate CST (2CV 0795 2) and open the senice water supply (2CV. 07112) to pump 2P7A. Similarly,2CV 07891 could close and 2CV 0716 1 open to pump 2P7B, Also, MOV 2CV 0707 in the turbine building can be closed for piping downstream of j this valve and 2CT $ can be closed locally at the CST. Failure toisolate crains the CST either
- outside or into the turbine auxiliary building.
Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected 1Acation: Outside l Spatial Effects Comments: This consequence combines several locations (outside, and Rooms 2223,2225, and 2050) because it is very unlikely that propagation froin these locations can affect important equipment. I initiating Esent: N Initiating EtemiID: laitiating Event Recovery: A loss of PCS (T2) initiator is assumed to challenge this piping. This inay be conservative since pipe break during normal standby may be lust as lil,ely (i.e., demand stress of CST head is not significantly diferent during demand). Loss of System: S System IPE ID: PCS
\
System Recovery: PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator, less of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A ' Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' Low" based on Table 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (anticipated frequency of challenge, between test exposure time, 3 backup trains . EFW, AFW, and once through cooling). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: Low O Consegnence nank O l 4
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FMECA Consequence Information Report Calculaacch A-PEG 44ff 017. Arv 00 l4 sv91 Page A2A of A26 Consequence ID: EFW C ll Consequence
Description:
Suction from Unit I CST T41D (line 2HCC.282 from outside to check valves 2CS. 844 and 845) Break Stics Large isolability of Break Yes ISO Comments: This piping is norrnlly isolated at the CST by 2C5 816 and 817. Also check valves 2CS 844 and 845 prevent flow from the other suction sources. In the unlikely event this path is opened and used, then pipe failure occurs, the operators would have to close the same vah es they had just opened. Spatial Effects: Propagation Effected location: Outside Spatial Effects Comments: This consequence combines metal locations (outside, and Rooms 2055,2040, and 2025) because the piping is nornully isolated and unlikely to be challenged. Room 2025 impact is assumed since it floods the motor driven pump. Inidating Event: N Initiating Event ID: Initiating Event Recm cry: The ficquency of challenge is assumed to require failure of the normal Unit 2 CST supply combined with a loss of PCS initiator, less of System: S 53stem IPE ID: PCS System Recm er): PCS loss is assumed to be the initiator in combination with normal Unit 2 CST failure. Given that operators successfully align Unit i CST to caust this went, it is assumed that operators will isolate the event before ECCS is flooded at El 317. 14ss of Train: T Train ID: EFW "B" Tsmin Recovery: Given alignment to Unit I CST, it is assumed that the motor driven pump (Room 2025)is inunediately flooded. Consequence Comment: Consequence is ' low" toed on Tab!c 2 2 of Ref. 9.18 (unexpected frequency of challenge, all year exposure and at least 2 backup trains - EFW 'A", AFW, and once through cooling). No impact on containment isolation. Consequence Category: low D Consequence Rank O e e 9
p FMECA - Consequence Information Report Cablarmes h A PENG CdC-017, /(n 0C Q tes+91 Page A23 qf A26 Consequence ID: EFW.C.12A Consequence
Description:
Degradation of main feedwater flow to steam generator 2E44 A inside containment during normal operation (EFW line 2DBB 3 downstream of 2EFW 9A). Break Slae: Large Isolability of Break No 150 Comments: Feedwater isolation and feedwater pump trip will occur on low steam generator pressure. Also, EFW will remain isolated to the faulted steam generator via a differential pressure between the faulted and good steam generators. However, blowdown of the faulted steam generator can not be isolated. Spatial Effects: Containment Effected Location: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: Feedwater line breaks are within the design basis and the necessary safety components located inside the containment building are qualified fa 'such events. Initiating Event: I initiating Event ID: T3 4 Initiating Event Recovery: No recovery from an tmisolable feedwater line break. This results in an immediate plant trip due to low steam generator level. Loss of System: SDM 2 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW Systern Recovery: MSIV isolation, feedwater isolation and pump trips occur on low steam generator pressure. It is possible to recover a condensate pump and makeup to the unfaulted steam generator. EFW discharge to the faulted steam generator is isolated and unavailable. However, there is a (. discharge path from each EFW pump to the tmfaulted steam generator, I. mss of Train: N TraleID: N/A Trale Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 1 of Ref. 9.18. Containment isolation is unaffected. Consequence Category; MEDIUM O C weequence aank O l V
FMECA - Consequence Information Report calcularo. No A. inn-cac 017. Rev. oo l4-Sey91 Page A26 of A26 Consequence ID: EFW C 128
- Consequence Descriptiont Degrada: ion of main feedwater flow to steam generator 2E 24B inside containment during rormal operation (EFW line 2DDB-4 downstream of 2EFW 9B).
Break Size: Large Isolability of Break: No ISO Comments: Feedwater isolation and feedwater pump trip will occur on low steam generator pressure. Also, EFW will remain isolated to the faulted steam generator via a differential pressure between the faulted and good steam generators. Ilowtver, blowdon of the faulted steam generator can not be isolated. Spatial Effects: Containment Effected lacation: Containment Building Spatial Effects Comments: Feedwater line breaks are vWn the design basis and the necessary safety components located inside the containment building are qualified for such n>cnts. Initiating Event: I inillating Event ID: T5 Initiating Event Recovery: No recovery from an unisolable feedwater line bmak. This results in an immediate plant trip du. to low steam generator Intl. less of System: SDM f2 System IPE ID: PCS, EFW System Recovery: MSIV isolation, feedwater isolation and pump trips occur on low steam generator pressure. It is possible to recover a condensate pump and makeup to the unfaulted steam generator. EFW discharge to the faulted steam generator is isolated and unavailable. Ilowever, there is a discharge path from each EFW pump to the unfaulted steam generator. Loss of Train: N Train ID: N/A Train Recovery: N/A Consequence Comment: Consequence is " Medium" based on Table 2 1 of Ref. 9.18. Containment isolation is unaffected Consequence Category: MEDIUM O Consequence aank O i Ol
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; Calculation No A.PENG CALC 017, Mov. 00 $
Page 81 of 875 , i a l i l j-i ' i l J ; i i i : 1 ' i 1 1 I i 4 l .I APPENDIX 8 ' 1 -
'FMECA -
DEGRADATION MECHANISMS' a l (Attachment Pages 81 875) l I 4 i I 1 4 B e j , i I t 4
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14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Cataaanon so. a-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 Page B2 of B75
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Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 > EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-101 Dumswe of motor- No No No No No No No No 2F-24A operated ulve 2CV-1038-2 (ISO 2DBB-3-I-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBP i-4" EFW Disclage to SG 85-3-102 Downstream of f,iping No No No No No No No No 2E-24A .xtion #24 f!SO 2DBB i 1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-103 14meam ofekow #54 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Dischargc to SG 85-3-104 Dowr. stream ofelbow #54 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-I-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-105 Ups+ ream ofcibow #53 No No No No No No No N 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-106 Downstream ofelbow #53 No No 1% No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFW4001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-107 Upstream ofcibow #52 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-108 Dca1tstream ofelbow #52 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS Er'T'S-001 2DDB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-109 Dumamm of motor- No No No No No No No No 2E-24A operated valve 2CV-1037-1 (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) , EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Disch rge to SG 85-3-110 Dumamm of piping No No No No No No No No j 2E-74A section #25 (ISO 2DBB 1-1) Dearadation Mechanums T-TW Fatigue P - Prenery Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M-Microbiologically sien (M'C) F-flow Accelerated Cerrasson C-Corresme Cracking I- Intergranular Stress Cerrossen Crackeg (IOSCC) E - Ernsson - Cavitarier. O-Other O O O
O
/n V O '## Nc" lad n N MMW17. Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradstion Mechanisms Page B3 of B73 W eld System ID Sel; ment Line Number Line Description Number Weld tecaties T. 'C P I M' E F. O I EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-111 Upstream orpiping section No No No No No No No No 4 2E-24A #27 (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) i EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-112 Upstream ofelbow #56 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1)
EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-l'3 Downstream ofelbow #56 No No No No No N& -No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EI~#S EFWS-001 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-114 Upstream ofelbo v #55 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-I-1) EFWS ' EFWS4)01 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-115 Downstream of cibow #55 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-I-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBb-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-116 Upstream ofcheck ulve No No No No No No No No 2E-24A 2EFW-7A (ISO 2DBB-3 1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB4-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-101 Downstr*=ns ormotor- No No No No No No No No 2E-24B operated valve 2CV-1036-2 (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS4)01 2DBB-4-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-102 Donnstream of piping No No No No No No No No 2E-24B section #16 (ISO 2DBB 1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-103 Upstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-104 Downstream orelbow #26 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-105 Upstream ofcheck valw No No No No No No No No 2E-24B 2EFW-M (ISO 2DBB-4-l) Dearedem Maharness T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prunary Wate- Stress Commen Cracking (FWSCC) M- Microhoolop sy in!her 4 Corresson (MIC) F- Flow Accelerused Cermum C-Common Crackg I-Inte granular Stress Cerroman chaciung (IGSCC) E- Ereman -Cavitation 0 -Other
'# # 7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms " "*"""A * " "R" "'
. Page B4 of B73 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld-%ation T C P ' M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-110 Downstream of motor- No No No No 34 o No No No 2E-24B operated wahr 2CV-1039-1 (ISO 2DBB-4-1)
EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-11I Upstream ofcibow #27 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-112 Upstream ofcIbow #28 No No No No No No No No 2F-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-113 Dowinstream of elbow #28 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85 4-114 Upstream ofcibow #17 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 20BE-4-l) EFWS EFWS-001 2DDB-4-4" EFW 'lischarge to SG 85-4-115 Downstream ofelbow #17 No No No No No No No No 2E-24P (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS401 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85 4-116 Upstream ofcibow #23 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-117 Upstream ofcheck vaht No No No No No No No No 2E-24B 2EFW-8A (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-015 Dowwtream of manual No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths vahr 2EFW-5A (ISO 2DBC-1-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-016 Upuream ofvaht 2EFW- No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths SB simiiin ISO 2DPC 2 (ISO 2DBC-2-1) Deerh Mat -ssens T-Thermal Fatigue F - Frunary Water Stress Cermien Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micratnologically Influenced Cerrasson (MIC) F-finw AccelmsedCmossen C- Cerrassen Crackmg 1- Intergranular Stress Cerrasson Crac6ing (IOSCC) E- frrden-Cavitatm O-other e 9 9
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14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"#'"#""** #" # #
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Weld. System ID Segnio.t Line Number Line Description Number Weld Lacdon T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B . 85-1-086 Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths operated valm 2CV-1025-1 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DDC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B R$ 1-087 Down? ream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths secten #44 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-13-4" Discharge from AFW 5-13-00 Don 1: stream orcheck No No No - No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW valve 2EFW-29 (ISO Pump 2P-7A Discharge 2DBC-13-1) Line EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-13-4" Discharge from AFW 5-13-00 Downstream ofelbow f20 No No No No No No' No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW (ISO 2DBC-13-1) Pump 2P-7A Discharge Line EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-13-4" Discharge from AFW 5-13-00 Upstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW (SIO 2DBC-13-1) Pump 2P-7A Discharge Line EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-13-4" IMscharge from AFW 5-13-00 Downstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW (ISO 2DBC-13-1) Pump 2P-7A Discharge . Line EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-13-4" Discharge from AFW 5-13-00 Upstream ortee #15 (ISO No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW 2DBC-13-1) Pump 2P-7A Discharge Line Ihne!= tion Wi=a== T-Thwmnl Fetigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Craciung (PWSCC) E(- bricrobeologicmHy influenced Corremen (MIC) F- flow Accelerased Corresson C- Commen Cracking I - Imeergranular Stress Corrnsson Creciung (IOSCC) E-Eremen-Caviestion 0 -Other
i 14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017, Rev. 00 Page B6 of B75 j Weld I System ID Seraent Line Number Iine Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 l FFWJ EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-001 Du iubmii of EFW Discharge Paths No No No No No No No No l pump discharge 2P-7A { (ISO 2DBC-2-2) i EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-002 Downstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-003 Upstream of check valve No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2EFW-4A (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-004 Dmynstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths valve 2EFW-4A (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-005 Downstream ofcIbow #11 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-006 Upstream ortee #15 - No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths shown in ISO 2DBC-13-1 (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2D'3C-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-74 85-2-007 Downstream ortec #15 - No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths shown on ISO 2DBC-13-1 (ISO 2DBC-2-2) YSWS EFWS401 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-098 Upstream orcibow #10 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths ISO (2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-009 Du-uabwn of elbow fl0 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2410 Upstream ortee #8 (ISO No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2DBC-2-2) Dearmianoe u.charsem. T- Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracting (PWSCC) M-Mi AL.; ::,InfluencedCaraman(MIC) F-Ibw AccelerstedCaramon C- Cemaan Crackmg 1 - Intergrumtw Stress Cmroman Cruims (10 SCC) E-Eroman-Cavisseian O. Other G G 9
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"# FMECA - Degradation Mechanisins C""'"" " Na A-FM7-C4Wl7, Rm 00 Page B7 uf B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Nember . Line Description Number Weld Imaties T C P I M E' F 0 EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-011 Downstream of tec #8 to No No No No No No No No' Discharge Paths EFW-3B (ISO 2DBC-2-2)
EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-012 Upstream ofvalve 2EFW- No No No No No No No & Discharge Paths SB (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-083 Downstream cf tee #8 to No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths pipe segment #2 (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-014 Downstream of piping . No No No No No No No- No Discliarge Paths section #2 (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A . 85-2 015 Upstream of elbow #21 No No No No No No No No Discharge Pa'.hs (ISO 2DBC-2-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-016 Downstream ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-017 Upstream ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EI"#S EFWS401 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-018 Downstream ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4* EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-019 Dominstream of piping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #19 (ISO 2DBC 1) EFWS EFWS401 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-020 Upstream ofelbow #23 No No No N- % No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-021 Downstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) Dreedsam Meduuume T- 4ermal Fatigue P - Pnnmary Water Seems Carosean Cractung (PWSCC) M-L * '; ", ImAmanced Cerrassen(MIC) F-mw AccelerseedCerrosum C CerrossanCracking 1 - Insaryanular Stress Cerrosaan Cradung (10 SCC) E Eressan-Caviestien 0- Other i L__.__ ..-. - , . . - - . . . . - . . . .- - - - ...
N '7 FMECA - Degradstion Mechanisms N#"#""#"#"A * ",, j';f #"[ Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld I4 cation T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-022 Upstream of tee #35 (ISO No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2DBC-2-1) 2DBC-2-4" EFWS EFWS-001 EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-023 Downstream ortee #35 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-24" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-024 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No , Discharge Paths section #16 (2DBC-2-1) l EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 35-2-025 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #15 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-026 Upstream ofelbow #25 No No No No No No No .No l Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A i5-2-027 Domistream ofelbow #25 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS ECWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-028 Upstream of elbow #26 No No No No No No No No i Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) l EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-029 Domtstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-030 Upstream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-031 Domistream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-032 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #12 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-033 Upstream of elbow #28 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) Dearadetson W T-Thermal Fmigue P - thrnary Wakr Stress Commsor. Cracking (PWSCC) M - MicrobeologicmHy Innuenced Carroman (MIC) F-Flow AccelermedCorresen C-Ce"osion Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IOSCC) E- Eranon - Cavitatice 0 - Other e 9 8
14-sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculatiort No. A-PENG-GtLC-017, Rev. 00 , p,,, 3, ,f 37, Wehi System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-034 Downstream orelbow #28 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-00! 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-035 Upstream of flange #36 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-036 Downstream ofilange #37 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-037 Upstream of elbow #29 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFbS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-038 Downstream ofelbow #29 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-039 Upstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No' No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-040 Downstream of elbow #30 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths - (2DBC-21) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-041 Upstream of motor-' No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths operated vahr 2CV-1076-2 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-042 Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths operated wahr 2CV-1076-2 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-043 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No' No No Discharge Paths operated vahr 2CV-1039-1 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2 044 Downstream ortee #34 - No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths branch line (2DBC-2-1) Dserminan Mana=== T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cracksag (FWSCC) M - Miaobsologically Innuenced Common (MIC) F-Flow AmlerusedCarroman C .Cerroman Cracung I- 1rnersrintier Stre. Common Crackms (noSCC) E- Eremen -Cavitation 0-Oiher
'## Calcsd ti n N . A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B10 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Nevaber Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M rT, F O EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4* EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-045 Upstream orelbow #31 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1)
EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-24" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-046 Downstream orcibow #31 No No No No No Na No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) FFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-t* EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-047 Donstream ofelbow #32 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-2-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-048 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #5 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-24" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-049 Upstream ortalve 2EFW- No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 1IB (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-040 Du orucam of motor- No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- operated valve 2CV-1075-24B 1 (ISO 2DBC-3-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-3-4" EFb Pump 2P-7B 85-3-041 Downstream of elbow #31 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3 042 Upstream ofelbow f32 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DCB-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-043 Downstream of elbow #32 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-001 Downstream ortee #35 - No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- shown in ISO 2DBC-2-1 24A (ISO 2DBC-4-1) Dearadshon Mechanisms T-Thermal ratigue r- rnmary weier stress Corressen cracking (rwscC) M - Micreemologically Innnenced Carresian (MIC) r-rio. AccelermiedCommon C- Cenesica Cracking I-Interparastar Stress Cerressen Crackmg 00 SCC) E- Eressen- Cavitation 0- Other e O O
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'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""lation No. A-PENG-C4LC-017. Rev. 00 -
Page Bil of B75 i Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nusaber Weld Loestion T C P I M E F 0 I EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-002 Upstream ofelbow #41 No No No No No No No - No- -= Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A - 85-4-003 Donstream orelbow #41 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4404 Upstream of elbow #40 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-095 Downstream ofelbow #40 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-I-l) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-006 Upstream ofelbow #39 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-I) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-007 Downstream of elbow #39 No No No No No No No No Disci arge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-008 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section i?24 (ISO 2DBC 24A 1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-009 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #23 (ISO 2DB' 4-24A 1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-010 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #91 (ISO 2DBC 24A 1-1) Dewadation Mechanums T-Thmnal Fasigue P - Pnmary Water Strew Corremon Cracking (PWSCC) M-Microheakecap bdheencedCorresson(MIC) y F- flow Accelerated Common C Commoncracking I - Irmersrarmlar Stress Commun Cracking 00 SCC) E -Eranon- Ceviestion 0- Other L____ _ _
' #*" C"I ,tauon sa mecai7, Rn. 00 l l FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bi2 of B73 l Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nurder Weld Imation T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-011 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No l Discharge to SG 2E- section #22 (ISO 2DBC {
24A 1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EN Pump 2P-7A 85-4-012 Upstream of elbow #38 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-I-1) 24A-EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-013 Downstream of elbow #38 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC4-1-1) l 24A ' EFWS EFWS401 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4414 Upstream ofelbow #45 No No No No No No No No Discharfe to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-015 Downstream of elbow #45 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS401 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-016 Upstreani ofelbow #37 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFV!S-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-017 Dcwnstream ofelbow f37 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-018 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #18 (!SO 2DBC 24A 1-1) EFWS EFWSool 2DBC-44" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-019 Downstream of piping No No No No Nc No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #16 (ISO 2DBC 24A I-1) Dearadetxwi Mecharusms T.Thmnal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress Common Crackmg (PWSCC) M-ML2. " W,InnuencedCommon(MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Common C-Commen Craclung I-Intergranular Stress Common Crackmg (IGSCQ E- Eremen -Cavitetson 0 - Other e O O
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'# " 7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"##"'"" " ^'" A-' B " C ##' # " 88 '
Page B13 of B15 Weld System ID Segment Line Number - Line Description Number Weld Isation T C P I M E F 0 1
^
3 E*.'WS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-020 Upstream of elbow d36 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-021 Downstream ofelbow #36 No No No No No No No No. Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-022 Doniistream of piping No No No No No No -No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #15 (ISO 2DBC 24A 1-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-023 Upstream ofelbow #48 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-024 Downstream ofelbow #48 No No No No No No No No" Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-025 Upstream ofelbow #35 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-026 Downstream ofelbow #35 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Prmp 2P-7A 85-4-027 Upstream ofelbow #34 No No No~ No No No N3 No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 35-4-028 Downstream ofelbow #34 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- - (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A Daaradma Mh_ T-Therrnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser Stress Carrasien Craciang (PWSCC) M-MacrebsolossemityIrdh aredCarrossen(MIC) F-Flow AcceleratedCommion C-Carremen oncking I-linergranular seresa Cerroman crackms 00 scc) - Eremian-Caviamaian 0 -Odwr
"~*" C"lada# n A'a A-PEAMC417.Rm 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page Bit of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAestion T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWMJ01 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-029 Upstream ofelbow #33 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-030 Dmmstream ofelbow f33 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO DBC-4-1-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC 4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-031 Upstream orelbow #32 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-I-1) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-032 Du-inam of elbow #32 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4 033 Downstream of pipag No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #10 (ISO 2DBC 24A l-2) l EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-034 Upstream of flange #79 No No No No No No No No !
Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) . 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-035 Downstream of flange #78 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (!SO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-036 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #4 (ISO 2DBC-4 24A 2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-037 Upstream ortee #42 (ISO No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A Dearadstum Mechanisms T- Thmnal Fatigue P - Primary Wster Stress Canusson Craclung (PWSCC) M Miaobsological:yInfhsencedCommen(MIC) F-Flow AcceleratedCarramen C-Carrossen Cracking I-Inte granularStressCommonCractung(10 SCC) E-Evoeion -Cavitation 0 - Other e G #
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'## FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I"" " "* 'l-PSMN17. Rn. 00 Page Bl3 of B75 Weld I System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Iacetion T C. P I M E F 0 EFWS- EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-038 Dovestream ortec #42 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-039 Upstream of elbow #29 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-040 Upstream ofvalve EFW- No No No No No No No No l Discharge to SG 2E- 11 A (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-043 Domistreem 3f tee #42 No No No No No No .No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 202C-;-1-2) 24A
.EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-044 Upstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A ,
EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-045 Downstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-5-I-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-046 Upstream ofelbow #43 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 20BC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-047 Downstream ofelbow #43 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-048 Upstream ofelbow #44 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A g = y% T-Thermal Fatigue P Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - MicrainolopesNy Innuenced Cornman (MIC) F-flow AcceleraardCarremon C-Cone ion Cract.ing I Insergyanular Stress Cerrosion Cracking (1GSCC) E- Eresion-Cavitation O - Other
' 4-8*"
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnas C"Ic"'"""" ^'" d -**" ^" 88 Page B16 of B73 Weld System ID Segment Line Nambtv Une Descriotion Number Weld I4 cation T C P I M E F 0 l EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-049 Dumistiesm ofelbow #44 No No No No No i4o No No ) Disclurge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-050 Upstream ofelbow #31 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-051 Downstream ofcIbow #31 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-052 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- operated wahr 2CV-1026-24A 2 (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) s EFWS EFWS401 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-053 Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No ^ No Discharge to SG 2E- operated vahr 2CV-1026-24A 1 CSO 2DBC-4-I-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-4-4" EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-054 Upstream of motor- Nc No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- operated vahr 2CV-1037-24A I - shown in ISO 2DBB I-1 (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7 001 Upstream orpiping section No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line #25 (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-002 Upstream of elbow #24 No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-003 Downstream ofelbow #24 No No No No No No N, No Minimum B 3pass Line (ISO 2DBC-7-1) } Dearadstiesi Meanneru T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser Stress Cerremon Csachng (PWSCC) M MicrabsologicallyInnuencedCerrenen(MIC) F- Flow Accescreted Carroman C -Corrence Cracking I-Irmergramfar stress Cerramen Crachng 00 SCC) E-Eremen-Cavitetsan 0- Other e O O
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- " **P'7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisans C"'""*'*"
##';#"[
Weld System ID Segiment . IJee Nunter Line Descriptism Namsber WeldImaties T- C F I M- E' F O EFWS FFWS401 2DBC-7-2" EFW Panp 2P-2A ~ ' 85-7-004 Upstream of tee #15 (ISO N No No No. No No ' No No-Mininnen Bypass Line 2DBC-7-l) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Punp 2P-2A 85-7 005 Upstrensn ef 2" x 3/4" No No No No No No -W. No Minimum Bypass Line reducing insert #16 (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 ' 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-006 Downstream ortee #15 No No N No No & . No No Minimum Bypass Line . (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS401 2DBC-7-2" EFV/ Penp 2P-2A 85-7407 Upstrearn ofelbow #13 No W No No No1 & W N Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A - 85-7-008 Downstream ofelbow C3 & W No W No No' No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" - EFW Punp 2P-2A - 85-7-009 Upstream ofelbow #11 & No No No No & & W Mininium Bypass Line - (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-010 Downstream ofelbow #11 W Ne N No No No- N No Mininnna Bypass Line - (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS -EFWS401 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-011 Upstream of flance #9 W No No & & No W W Mrnrmum Bypass Line ' (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Punp 2P-2A ' 85-7412 Downstream of flange #8 No & No N No & No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-013 Upstream of flange #6 No No No No No N W No ' Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-7 " EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A - 85-7-014 Downstream of flange #5 No & & No No No & N Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-7-1) EFWS EFWS401 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7415 Upstream ofelbow #3 N No No No 'N No- No No-Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-7-1) DiandammMedemais T-11sennel Fasipse P - Prumary Weser Stress Canonen Creduns (PWSCC) M" . , h Cerremsen(MIC) F-Flow Accelsrease Carreden - C.Carrossen Credtims I - 1._ . siress Carrossen Oracisms 00 SCC) E- Eressen-Cavissessa 0-Oiher
"# C"I donon N . A-l'ENN-017,Rew 00 FMECA - Degradatien Mechanisms Page BIS of B75 W ela System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-016 Downstream ofetimw #3 No No No No Minimur- Bypass Line No No No No i (ISO 2DBC-7-1) i EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-7-2" EFW Pump 2P-2A 85-7-017 Upstream ofysive 2EFW- No No .No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line 10A (ISO 2DBC-7-1) , EFWS EFWS-001 2ilBC-85-8" EFW pump 8" suction 2-85 43 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No line from Condensate operated vahr 2CV-0795- 1 Storage Tanks (CST) 2 (ISO 211BC45-1) 2T-41 A & 2 EFWS EFV13401 2HBC45-8" EFW pump 8" suction 2-85-03 Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No No line froni Condensate operated wahr 2CV-0795-Storage Tanks (CST) 2 (ISO 2HBC45-1) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-001 2ilBC-85-8" EFW pump 8" suction 2-85-03 Upstream orcibow #21 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 211BC45-1) StorageTanks(CST) 2T-41A & B EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-85-8" EFW pump 8' suction 2-85-03 Downstream ofeltow #21 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 211BC-85-1) StorageTanks(CST) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-001 211BC-85-8" EFW pump 8" suction 245-03 Upstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 211BC-85-1) Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B Dearadetson M+ ' T-uc enal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWsCC) M - Mi..:-.;:W:y influenced Corroman(MIC) F- Flour Accelerated Carromon C CorressonCracking I - Irmergranular Stres Cerrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E-Eresen -Cavitation O-Other e _ 9 9
O O O'
'*" FMECA - Degradstion Mechanisnes C"'""#" A'oMMN17. Rev. K Page B19 taf B75 W eld System ID Segment Line Number ~ Line Description Number Weld I4 cation -T C P I M -E F 0 EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-85-8" EFW pump 8" suction 2-85-03 Downstream of elbow #23 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 2HBC-85-1)
Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B ' EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-854" EFW pump h" suction 2-85-04 Downstream ofelbow #24 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 2HBC-85-1) Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-864" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-02 Upstream ofell>'w #28 No No No No No No No No Suction Line . (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-864" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-02 Downstream ofelbow #28 No No No No No No No No Section Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS- EFWS-001 2HBC-86-6" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-02 Upstream ofelbow #29 No No No No No No No No Secten Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-00I 2HBC-864" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-8643 Downstream of elbow #29 No No No No No No No No Section Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC464" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-03 Upstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EPzYS EFWS-001 2HBC-864" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-03 Du .hiiofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2 HEC-864" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-03 Upstream of tee #58 - No No No No No No No No Section Line branch line (ISO 2HBC 1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-864" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-8643 Downstream of 8" x 6" No No No No No No Na No Suction Line conantric reducer #59 - 6" side (ISO 2HBC-86-1) - Desradmas N T-11mrmal Fseigne P - Prunary Waser Stress Commsen Craclung (PwSCC) M - Mk:reboologicaNy ImAmenced Camian (MIC) F-flew Aaelerseed Cerrasien C-Cerre.sen Craddas I - In=rsrun=ler Stress Corressen Crackms (IGSCC) E- Eraman-Caviemason 0-Olher i _ _ _ _ _ _ - n
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I"'lah n A'a MN-017. Rm 00 Page B20 of B75 Weld System ID Segment 1.iae Number Line Description Nr mber Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 l
EFWS EFWS 001 2ilBC-86-6" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-03 Downstream ofilange #61 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC 86-1) l . 2HBC-86-6" 2-86-03 Upstseam of flange #62 EFWS EFWS-001 EFW pump 2P-7A 6" No No No No No No No No j Suction Line (ISO 211BC-86-1) l EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-86-6" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-04 Upstream of manual vaht No No No No No No No No Suction Line 28?l W-3A (ISO 2HBC 1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-86-6" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-04 Downstream ofmanual No No No No No No No No Suction Line vahr 2EFW-3A (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-86-6" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-04 Downstream ofelbow #31 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 211BC-86-6" EFW pump 2P-7A 6" 2-86-04 Upstream of flange #71 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS FFWS-001 211BC-86-8" EFW pump 2P-7A 8" 2-86 03 Upstream of tee #58 (ISO No No No No No No No No Suction line 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-86-8" EFW pump 2P-7A 8" 2-86-03 Downstream of tee #58 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBC-86-8" EFW pump 2P-7A 8" 2-86-03 Upstream c.f 8" x 6" No No No No No No No No Suction Line enncentric reducer - 8" side (ISO 2HBC-86-1) EFWS EFWS-001 2HBD-91-8" CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-00 Downstream ofvaht No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 2EFW-0706 (ISO 2HBD-
. Discharge to EFW 91-2)
Pump Suction rearednesen Mahanan. T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnrnuy Water Stress Cwassen Crackms (PWSCC) M - Microtnologically Irdloenced Cerramen (MIC) F- Flow Acretersted Common C-Carrasion Crading I- Irmergranular Stress Carrossin Cracking (!OSCC) E- Ersaan-Cavitation 0- Other e O O
en i C-) U U 14 * '7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms '
" "'"""" *~-#' * [,, ~##[f 3 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Nember WeldImation T C P I M E' F 0 EFWS EFWS-001 2HBD-91-8" CST 2T-41 A & 4-91-00 Uparcam offirst elbow- No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank downstream ofvalve EFW-Discharge to EFW 0706 (ISO-2HBD-91-2)
Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-001 211BD-91-8" CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-00 Downstrer.m of elbow - No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank downstream ofvaln: Discharge to EFW 2EFW-0706 (ISO-2HBD-Pump Suction 91-2) EFWS EFWS401 2HBD-91-8" CST 2T-41 A & 4-91-00 Upstream ofelbow No No No No No No- No No B/Demin Tank downstream ofitem #3 Discharge to EFW (ISO 2HBD-91-2) Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-001 2HBD 91-8" CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-0C Downstream ofelbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank dontistream ofitem #3 Discharge to EFW (ISO 2HBD-91-2) Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-001 2HBD-91-8" CST 2T-4I A A 4-91-00 Upstream ofelbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank upssseam ofitem #4 (ISO Discharge to EFW 2HB3-91-2) Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-10" EFW pump 10" 4-282-10 Downstream of 12" x 10" No No No No No No No No Suction Line from concentric reducer #8 (ISO Condensate Storage 2HCC-282-6) Tank (CSTj T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-10" EFW pump 10" 4-282-11 Downstream of l2" x 10" No No No No No No No No Suction Line from concentne reducer #12 Condensate Storage (ISO 2HCC-282-6) Tank (CST)T-41B o.sraan M.ch.n n. T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prunary Weser Stress Cerressen Creciang (PwSCC) M . MR J r,InDeencedCerroman(MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Carrosses C-Carrossen Cracking I - Imerpanular Swess Cerrosion Onclung OGSCC) E - Eres=en-Cavitseian 0 - Odwr I f L .. . .. . . . . - . . . . . - . . -. . . . -- - -
' #*" n No. A-MMMOI7, Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"""
Page B22 of B73 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descrip: ion Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump l2" 4-282-00 Downstream of CST T- Mo No No No No No No No Suction Line from 4iB discharge nozzle H2 Conderuate Storage (ISO 211CC-282-1) Tank (CST) T-41B i EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-00 Upstream of cIbow #19 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump l2" 4-282-00 Downstream ofe! bow #19 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage ; Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-00 Upstream of manual vaht No No No No No No No No Suction Line from 2CS-816 (ISO 2HCC-282-Condensate Storage 1) Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-00 Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No Suction Line from vahe 2CS-816 (ISO Condensate Storage 2HCC-282-1) Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-00 Upstream ore! bow #22 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS&2 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-00 Downstream ofelbow f22 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-418 Dearv aation Mecherusms T-Mrsmal Fatigue P - Prenary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M -ML Q' y Influenced Correason (MIC) F-Flow AcceleratedCerrasson C-Commen Cracking I - traergranular Stress Carrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E- Ercason-Cavitauen 0 - Other 9 9 9
g O & ~ 14*" FMECA - Degradation Mechadisms Calculatwn No. A-PENG-GtLC-017 Rev. 00 Page s23 of s75 Weld l System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weldlaatice T C P I M E F 0 ! EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-00 Upstream of tee #24 (ISO No No No No No No No No Suction Line from 2HCC-282-!) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB , EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-00 Downstream of CST T- No No No No No No No No Suction Line from 4IB discharge nozzle L2 Condensate Storage (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Tank (CST) T-41B , EFWS EFW3-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Upstream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" - EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Downstream of elbow #18 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-01 Upstream of manual vaht No No No No No No No No Suction Line from 2CS-817 (ISO 2HCC-282- ) Condensate Storage 1) Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No Suction Line from valve 2CS-817 (ISO Condensate Storage 2HCC-282-1) Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Upstream of 12" tee #24 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B Dearadstumi Mechamano T-Thmnal ratigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corressen Cracting (PWSCC) M - MicrobiolopenDy influenced Common (h0C) F-mw Accelerated Commian C -Cerrosien Cracking I- Intergram.lar Stress Cerrosion Cractung (10 SCC) E-Erasue- Cavitation 0- Other t . . . . . _ . . . . . . .
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' 'lan n Na mmWI7, Rm 00 Page B24 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Upstream of elbow #21 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-1)
Condensate Storage 1 ' Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Downstream of elbow #21 No No No No No No No No I Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 'liCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Upstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2flCC-282 12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-01 Downstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No i Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1)
]
Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-01 Upsticam of piping section No No No No No No No No Suction Line fr,m #11 (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate c<orage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2flCC-282-12" dFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section #11 (ISO 2HCC-Condensate Storage 282-1) Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS&2 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Upstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB Desradetson Mechannms T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corrreson Cracbng (PWSCC) M - Microtmalogically Inouenced Common (MIC) F- Nw Accelerated Cerrosion C-Cerroesen Cracking I - ledergrarestar Stress Cerrosion Ctschng (IOSCC) E- Eresson-Cavitation 0 - Other e O O
O O O 8 4*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanissus Calculation No. A-PDVG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 p,y, 32, ,f 37, Weed System ID &,, a ; Line Number Line Description Nonser Weld Imestion T C F I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Downstream ofelbow #23 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section #9 (ISO 2HCC-Condensate Storage 282-1) Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Upstream of piping section No No No No No No No No Suction Line from #1 (ISO 2HCC-282-2) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB , EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Upstream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-2) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 DownsticamofcIbow #9 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-2) Cendensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Upstream of piping section No No No No No No No No Suction Line from #4 (ISO 2HCC-282-2) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B > EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Dumeuin. fpiping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section 44 (ISO 2HCC- ' Condensate Storage 282-2) Tank (CST) T-41B Dearadation Ms T- Therrnal Fatig".ne P - Prunary Wder Stress Corresson Crackmg (PWsCC) M - Micretnologscally Iremenced Corranon (MIC) F-Flow AccelmaniCorvesean C - Corrosion Crackeg I - Irmergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracbng (IGsCC) E - Eramen - Cantation 0-Other
l 7 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"d"" "" N"##' #" 88 l' age B26 of B75 W eld S3stem ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-232-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-02 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section #5 (ISO 2HCC-Condensate Storage 282-2) Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS4)02 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section #6 (ISO 2HCC-Condensate Storage 282-2) Tank (CST) T-4IB j EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Sr: tion Line from section #7 (ISO 2HCC-Co.Aensate Storage 282-2) Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Upstream orcibow #16 No No No N, No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-2) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2ilCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Downstream ofcibow #16 Na No two No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-2) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Downstream of cIbow #17 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-2) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB , EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-03 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section #19 (ISO 2HCC-Condensate Storage 282-2) Tank (CST, T-41B Dewsdation Mechamwru T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerrossen Crackmg (PWSCC) M-MMM :tyInnuencedCarnexm(MIC) F-flow Acceleratedunrosum C-Cerresien Cracking I-Intergranular Stress Corfassen Crackeg (10 SCC) E - Eraseen - Cavitation 0 -Other e O O
O~ O O FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""lan n A'a AMG-CAIGI7. Rn. 00 Page B27 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number WelCIAcation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Upstream of elbow #13 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 21!CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Downstream orelbow #13 No No No No No No Ne No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Downstream ofelbow #I4 No No No No No No No No Suction Lir.e from (ISO 211CC-282-3) Condensate Storage
, Tank (CST) T-4IB ,
EFWS EFWS-002 - 211CC-282-12* EFW pump 12" 4-282-03 Upstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS402 2ilCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Downstream orelbow #20 No No No No No No No No , Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) Condensate Storage i Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Upstream of cIbow #21 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS402 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Downstream ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) , Condensate Storage f Tank (CST) T-4IB i Dearadation Mechamsms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prunary Weser Stress Cerrasson Cracking (PWSCC) M - Murotnologicativ Innumced Correseen (MIC) F-flow AccelecaedCommon C-Cerrosion Oncking I- begranular Stress Cerrosson Cracksng (!GSCC) E -Erossen-Carismuca 0-Other
14-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculadon No. A-PENG-C4LC-017. Rev, 00 Page B28 of B73 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Upstream ofelbow #1 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2iiCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Downstream oralbow #1 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Downstream ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No Suction Lir- nn (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 li" Z;2-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Upstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS4)02 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Downstream of elbow #19 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section #36 (ISO 2HCC-Condensate Storage 282-3) Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-04 Upstream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condennte Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB Lunradstian Mechanums T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnrnary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - MMeiMy Influenced Common (MIC) F. Flow AcceleratedCement C-Common Crackes 1 - Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Crackmg (IGsCC) E - Eremen - Cavitatson 0- Other e 9 9
m n (%
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Page B29 of B73 , W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C F I M E F O EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-05 Downstresm ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Cendensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-05 Upstream ofelbow #17 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-3) . Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-05 Watistream orelbow #17 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-05 Upstream ofelbow #16 No No No No No No No No + Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump !2" 4-282-05 Downstream of elbow #16 No No No ' No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-05 Upstream orelbow #15 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump li" 4-28245 Downstream ofelbow #15 No No i No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-3) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B Dearadauan Mechensoms T-Tkrmal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Corresson Cracking (PEW M - Microbiologicany Innuenced Cenosmi (MIC) F- Flow Accelerused Cenesien i C-Carrosion Cracking I- Irmergranular Stress Corrneson Cracking (IGSCC) E- Ermanca-Caviescon 0 -Odier
I4-Sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms ~ 'araum No. A Psvo-citcai7, n, oo Page B30 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-05 Upstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from OSO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-05 Downstream orelbow #14 No No No No No No No Suction Line from No (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-05 Upstream orelbow #15 No No No No No Na No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-2824 Downstream ofcibow #15 No No No Po No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) ' Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-2824 Upstream ofelbow #16 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW ' pump 12" 4-2824 Downstream ofelbow #16 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-222-12" EFW pump 12" 4-2a24 Upstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB Dear % MM- -sms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) C-Cerrosion Cracking M - Microtwologically Infhsenced Cerrassen (MIC) F- flow Accelerated Common I - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracting (IGSCC) E - Eremon - Cavitation 0 - Other e G #
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Page B31 of B75 ; wehl - - System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld IAcation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-06 Downstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No' i Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) t Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB t EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-06 Downstream of piping No No No Suction Line from No No No No No [ section #4 (ISO 2HCC- i Condensate Storage 282-4) Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-06 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from secten #5 (ISO 2HCC- i Condensate Storage 282-4) Tank (CST)T-41B
'EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282 06 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Sucten Line from section #9 (ISO 2HCC-Condensate Storage 282-4)
Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-06 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Sucten Line from section #8 (ISO 2.HCC-Condensate Storage 282-4) Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-06 Upstream orelbow #17 No No No No No No No No Sucuon Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Downstream ofelbow #17 No No No No No No No No Secten Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B
% v_-
T-nermal resigue P - Pnenary Weser Stress Comnean Crechng (PWSCC) M - Micrabsokycally Edhwseced Correseau (MIC) F- Flow Accelerssed Carreman C-Common Cracking I - Innerpunnfer Stress Corresson Cradting (IOsCC) E- Eranon- Cavsesseen 0-Other . i
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"I'"'"" " ^'" ANGN-8'7 R'" 88 Page BH of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Upstream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Downstream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No Suction Line from No (ISO 2HCC-282-4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) TJ IB EFWS EFWS 002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-28247 Upstream ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Dominstream ofelbow #13 Na No No No No No No Suction Line from No (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-81B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Upstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Downstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Siorage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-07 Upstream orelbow #21 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B Dm ? r- ; Mdwa. T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Crackmg (PWSCC) C- Corremon Crackmg M - MianbiolopcaDy Idhienced Corremon (M*C) F-Nw AccelerusedCommon ! I - InterErnemler Stress Carrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E - Eremon - Cavitation 0-Other e 9 9
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,f W eld System ID Segment Line Nember Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Downstream of cibow #21 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-5)
Conder. sate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFW5-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-07 Downstream of elbow #42 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Upstream ofcibow #22 No No No No No No No No 1 Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B - EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Downstream ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 211CC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Suction Line from section #3 (ISO 211CC-Condensate Storage 282-5) Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-2824)8 Upstream oreBow #23 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Downstream of elbow #23 No No No No No No N- Nc Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tanst (CST)T-41B Desradstion Mechannens T-Thermal fstigue P . Prunary v' ster Stress Carrosion Creciting (PWSCC) M - Micrabsolopeally inftvericed Cerrosson (MIC) C -Corroman Cracking F- flow Accelerseed Corns 1 -Ireergrarmilar Stress Cerrezion Crsciung (10 SCC) - E- Eronon-Cantation 0- Other i
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calcula# n A"a AMMI.C-017. Rn. 00 i Pagz B34 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld location T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Upstream of piping section No No No No No No No No Suction Line from #4 (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Taak (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Upstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Downstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS402 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-28248 Downstream ore! bow #25 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-08 Upstream ofcIbow #28 No No No No No No No No Suction.Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS402 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-09 Downstream of elbow #28 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS402 2HCC-282-12" EFW primp 12" 4-282-09 Upstream orelbow #29 No No No No No No No No Suction Line fmm (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B Dearadation Mecherums T-Hermal Tatigue P - Pnrnary Water Seems Corrosion Craciung (PWSCC) M - Micrainologically infleemed Corrimon (MIC) F-Nw Accelerated Carmen C- Carmnon Cracting I-Intergranulaa Stress Corroman Crackmg (IOSCC) E- Eremian - Cavitahan 0- Other 9 9 8 ,
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EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-09 Downstream orelbow f29 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4iB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4
^
J Upstream orelbow #27 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-09 Downstream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Ccchie Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-09 Upstream orelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-09 Downstream ofelbow #30 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-09 Downstream ofelbow #31 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2ilCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-09 Upstream orelbow #32 No Na No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB oe. rad e w __ _ T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Seems Corrosion Craclung &WSCC) M - MxredwekycmHy Innuenced Common (MIC) F-Flow Accelerseed Camwoon C-Common creams I-Inseryannt r stress Cerros on crachas(losCC) E- Eresson-Caviestice 0-Oiher i
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calatad nNa A&MC417 Rm M Page B36 of B73 , Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imention T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS402 2ilCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-09 Downstream ofelbow #32 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12* 4-282-10 Upstream ofc8 bow #33 No No No No No No No No i Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB , EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-10 Downstream of elbow #33 No No No No No No No No l Suction Lice from (ISO 2HCC-282-5) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-10 Upstream of elbow #3 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from -(ISO 2HCC-282-6) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-10 Downstream ofcibow #3 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-6) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump I2" 4-282-10 Upstream ortee #6 (ISO No No No No No No No No Suction Line from 2HCC-282-6) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS402 2HCC-282-12" EFW;mmp 12" 4-282-10 Downstresm ortee #6 No No No No No No No No Section Line from (ISO 2HCC-282-6) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B ixer.a.non u-we T-Themen ratigue r-Prvnaryw urstressCarros,=oncking(twscC) u - ML usj irdioenced Corro-on (MIC) r slow Accelersee.as.re. ion C-Common Cracking I-Irmergranular Stress Common Crackmg OGSCC) E - Eroman - Cavnsbon 0- Other e G #
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'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " Na AMN-0I7, Rn. 00 Page B37 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld 1mcation T C I P M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-10 Upstream of 12" x 10" No No No No No. No No No-Suction Line from concentric reducer #8 (ISO Condensate Storage 2HCC-2824)
Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-11 Downstream ortee #6 No No No No No No No . No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-2824) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 - 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-11 Upstream of elbow #I0 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-2824) Condensate Storsge Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-002 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12" 4-282-11 Upstream of l2" x 10" No No No No No No No No Suction Line from concentnc reducer #12 Condensate Storage (ISO 2HCC-2824) Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Dom stream of CST 2T- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B 41B (ISO 2HCD-195-1) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS42 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Upstream of first cibow- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B downstream of CST 2T-Discharge - 10" piping 4IB (ISO 2HCD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Dowstream offirst elbow - No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B downstream of CST 2T-Discharge - 10" piping 4iB (ISO 2HCD-195-1) Desradmian Mecewnmns T-Thermal Fatigue P- Prunary Water Stress Common Cracking (P%W M - Microlwalogicany inRuenced Comnum (MIC) F-Flow AccelerusedCommon c-Cmamen Cracking I- Insergranular seress Cerrosion Crackang (IGSCC) E- Ereman-Cavies an 0-Other E. ~
l '## ) FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'""'"
#* A""~##' #" 8' I Page B38 of B73 l Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage -195-00 Upstream orsecond No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B elbow-downstream of Discharge - 10* piping CST 2T-4IB (ISO 211CD-195-1)
EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Downstream of second No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B clbow-downstream of Discharge - 10" piping CST 2T-41B (ISO 211CD-195-l) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Upstream of'.alve 2CT-40 No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B (ISO 211CD-195-l) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Downstream of vahr 2CT- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B 40 (ISO 2HCD-195-1) Discharge - 10* piping EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Upstream ofs2ht - shown No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B in ISO 2HCD-191-3 (ISO Discharge - 10" piping 211CD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Downstream of tee - No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B downstream ofvahr 2CT-Discharge - 10" piping 40 (ISO 211CD-195-1) EFWS EFWS4)02 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-00 Upstream ortee-upstream No No No No No No Ne No Tank 2T-4I A & B of manual vahr 2CT-41 Discharge - 10" piping (ISO 211CD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-01 Dumah-n of tee - No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B upstream of 10* cap (ISO Discharge - 10" piping 2HCD-195-1) Deeradation Mechemsms T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Wahr Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) M-Mi.14 ::,InnuencedCommon(MiC) F-Flow AcceleratedCommean C- Commen Cracking I-Irmery==lar swew Commion Crackmg 00 SCC) E- Erasien-Cavumtien 0-Other e 9 9
3 <~y. m't j (J) I -8 P . Calculatiort No. A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 FMECA - Degshdation Mechanisms p,,, 33p of 37,
. w eid System ID Segment Line Neseber IJee Description Fusster Weld IAcaties T C F I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condent. ate Storage 4 195-01 Upstream ofmanual nive No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4i A & B 2CT-4I (ISO 2HCD-195-1)
Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-01 Domistream of manual No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B vahc 2CT-4I (ISO 2HCD-Discharge- 10" piping 195-1) EFWS EFWS 002 211CD-395-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-01 Dowsntream of CST 2T- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B 41 A (ISO 2HCD-195-1) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-01 Upstream orfirst elbow- No No No No No No No No i Tank 2T-41 A & B downstream of CST 2T-Discharge - 10" piping 41 A (ISO 2HCD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-19541 Downstream of first No No No No No No No No I Tank 2T-41 A & B elbow - downstream of Discharge- 10" piping CST 2T-41 A (ISO 2HCD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10* Condensate Storage 4-195-01 Upstream ofvalve 2CT-5 No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B (ISO 2HCD-195-1) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condcasate Storage 4-195-01 Downstream ofvahr 2CT- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B 5 (ISO 2HCD-195-l) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-01 Downstream of tee No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B downstream ofvalves 2CT-Discharge - 10" piping 4I and 2CT-5 (ISO 2HCD-195-1) Dearadsta Mechanums T-Thermal Fetigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Ccerosson Cracking (s'WSCC) M - MicrobiologiceDy bifhsenced Cerramon (M*C)
. F. Flow Accelerused Cerrounn C-Cerrosica Cracking I - beergranular Stress Corrown Crackmig (IGSCC) E-Erossen-Cavitetson 0- Odar
' '## C"'"d"" " ^'* Ad^*W'7 R" 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B40 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Imation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CC-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-01 Upstream of first elbow No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B downstream ofvahrs 2CT-Discharge - 10" piping 4I and 2CT-5 (ISO 211CD-195-1)
EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 %wnstream of first cibow No No No No No No No No j Tank 2T-4I A & B downstream of vahrs 2CT-Discharge - 10" piping 4I and 2CT-5 (ISO 211CD- ) 195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Upstream of elbow - No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B downstream of piping Discharge - 10" piping section item #2 (ISO 211CD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Downstream ot first No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B elbow - duvmstream of l Discharge - 10" piping piping section item #2 (ISO lllCD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Upstream ofelbow- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B hwnstrrtm of piping Discharge - 10" piping section item #3 (ISO 2ilCD-195-l) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Downstream ofcibow - No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B dowsntream of piping Discharge - 10" piping section item #3 (ISO 2HCD-195-1) EFWS El - S-002 2ilCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B section item #4 (ISO Discharge - 10" piping 211CD-195-1) Desradation Mechanisun T-Themel Fatigue P - Psirnar= Water Stress Cormrion Cracksng (PWSCC M - Mi.MWy In!Laenced Ceeresson (MIC) F- Flow Axelersted Cermoon C-Corresson Cracking I - Intergranular Stress Common Cracking (1GsCC) E - Eremon -Cavits4e 0- Other O O O
O O O FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms " "" *^'"J " " " #7 8" 88 Page B41 of B75 j weid System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Emestion T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Downstream ofpiping No No No No- No No- No No Tank 2T-41 A & B section item #5 (ISO Discharge - 10" piping 2HCD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 2ilCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Dowsntream orpiping No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B section i'- % ;O Discharge - 10* piping 2HCD-195-1) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Upstream ofelbow- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4I A & B domtstream ofpiping Discharge - 10" piping section item #7 (ISO 2HCD-195-1) -EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-02 Dowirstreamof first No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B elbow - tspstream of first Discharge - 10" piping piping section (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-03 Upstream ofelbow item #1 No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4i A & B (ISO 2HCD-195-2) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10* Condensate Storage 4-195-03 Downstream ofelbow item No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B #1 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-03 Upstream ofelbow item #2 No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B ISO 2HCD-195-2) Discharge- 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4 195-03 Dum&wi ofelbow item No No No No No No No- No Tank 2T-41 A & B #2 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) Discharge- 10" piping Desradmason Mahansens T-Dermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Cerroman Cracking (PwSCC) M-ML' 'J My Inomenced Cerrassan (MIC) C-Corranon Craddng F-Flow Accelerated"arroman I- Ireergranular Stress Cerrosma Cradung OGSCC) E- Erosian - Cavitsaien 0 -Other
l FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""" " #" NN-8 #" #3 i l' age B42 of B75 i Weld I System ID Segment Line fiumber Line Description Number Weld 1Acation T C P I M E F O ) l EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-03 Upstream of 4* cap (ISO No No No No No Nr No No ; Tank 2T-41 A & B 211CD-195-2) Discharge - 10" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-10" Condensate Storage 4-195-03 Upst. cam of 10" x 8* No No No Fo No No No No Tank 21'-4i A & B concentric reducer - 10" Discharge - 10" piping side (ISO 21 ICD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-8" Condensate Storage 4-195-03 Dowsntream of 10" x 8" No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B concentric reducer - 8" Discharge - 8" piping side (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-8" Condmsate Storage 4-195-03 Upstream orelbow - No No No No No No No No Tan' 2T-41 A & B downstream ofitem #3 Discharge - 8" piping (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-8" Condensate Storage 4-19543 Duwnstream ofelbow - No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B downarcam ofitem #3 Discharge - 8" piping (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-8" Condensate Storage 4-195-03 Downstream of second No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B elbow- downstream of Discharge - 8" piping item #3 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-195-8" Condensate Storage 4-195-64 Downstream of third No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A e B clbow -downstream of Discharge - 8" piping item #3 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-195-8" Condensate Storage 4-195-04 Upstream ofvaht 2CV- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B 0707 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) Discharge - 8" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-IPS-8" Condensate Storage 4-19544 Downstream of vaht 2CV- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B 0707 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) Discharge - 8" piping Dearndsten klecharusms T-nerrnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cracking (PWSCC) M- Mi.MMinneenced Cereceum (kUC) F- flow Accelerated Cerros==i C-Corre ien Cruting I-Intergnentar Stress Common Cradung OGSCC) E-Eresson -Cavitation 0-Ottwr 9 9 9 .
<J u) J
'# # C"I'"'"""" Na N C-017, Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B43 of B75 Weld Systent ID Segment Line Number Line Descripticq Nember WeldIscation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS4X)2 2HCD-195-8" Condensate Storage 4-195-04 Downstream of first No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B elbow-domistream of Discharge- 8" piping . vahr 2CV-0707 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-258-10" Condensate Storage 4-2584,0 Upstream of 10" x 6" No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B concentric reducer - 10* Discharge - 10* piping side (ISO 2HCD-258-1) EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-2584* Condensate Storage 4-258-00 Downstream of 10' x 6* No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B concentric reducer - 6* Discharge -6* piping side (ISO 2HCD-258-1) EFWS EFWS-002 211CD-2584" Condensate Storage 4-258410 Downstream ofvahe 2CT- No No No No No No Nw No Tank 2T-41 A & B 113 (ISO 2HCD-258-l) Discharge - 6" piping EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-2584" Condensate Storage 4-258-00 Upstream ofelbow No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B downstream ofva'
- XT-Discharge- 6" piping i13 (ISO 2HCD-258-1)
EFWS EFWS-002 2HCD-2584* Condensate Storage 4-2584)0 Downstream ofvahr 2CT- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B !!3 (ISO 2HCD-258-1) Discharge- 6" piping EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-117 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No' No 2E-24A vahr 2EFW-7A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-118 Upstream of tee #58 (ISO Nr No No No No No No No 2E-24A 2DBB-3-1-1) EFW3 EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-119 Dvmia.e.. of tee #58 - No No No No No No No No 2E-24A branch line (ISO 2DBB I-1) Desradme== Ma*= nuns T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress Cevasen Craciung (PWSCC) M - MicrolmelopcmNy Innuenced Caroven (MIC) F-Flow AcceleraardCommon C -Corronan Cracking I - Inierpennin seess Common Cracking (sosCC) E- Eraman-Caviessian U- Other
"# Colalan n Na A-FNW17. Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B44 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-120 Downstream of tee #58 No No No No No No No N 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-121 Upstream ofcontainment No No No No No No No Ne j 2E-24A penetration 2P35 (ISO l 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-122 Downstream of No No No No No No No No j 2E-24A contaim.nent penetration l 2P35 (ISO 2D'3B-3-1-1) l EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-123 Upstream of cibow #51 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 29BB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-124 Domistream of elbow #51 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-125 Upstream ofcibow #50 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS4)03 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-126 Downstr am ofelbow #50 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS El-WS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-127 Upstream ofelbow #49 No No No No No No No No l 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-128 Downstream ofcibow #49 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-129 Upstream ofelbow #43 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-130 Downstream ofcibow #43 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) A h Mechenseis T-Thrmal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Commion Craclung (PWSCC) M - h~screbsologically IrsbenW Cerroman (MIC) F-flow AcceleratedCommen C-Common Cracung I-Irnerer nutarstressComnionCruchns00 SCC) E - Ernsson -Cavnetson 0- Other e 9 9
O O O
' d *
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"""" #" ""~'# #" #8 - Page B45 of B75 ' Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number WeldImcation T C P I M E F 0 EFW3 EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-131 Opstream ofelbow #48 No No No No No No No. No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-l) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-132 Downstream ofelbow # 48 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-133 Upstream of elbow #47 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-134 Upstream ofelbow #46 No No No
; No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-135 Downstream orelbow #46 No No No No No No, No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-136 Upstream of elbow #42 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-137 Downstream ofelbow #42 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-I-l) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-138 Upstream ofelbow #41 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-l) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-139 Downstream ofelbow #41 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-140 Upstream of elbow #40 No No No Ne No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-14I Downstream of elbow #40 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-142 Upstream ofelbow #39 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) 1% Ma*en=rns T-nmnal Fatigue P - Pnniary Weser Stress Commagi Cradung (PWSCC) M - Microbiolaycany bufhsenced Cenomen (MIC) F- Flow Accelerated Carmman C-Cerroman Creding I - Intergranular sirne Cems.on Cradung (10 SCC) E-Eressen-Cavassion 0-Odier w - __ - .
t ' d*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"#"""#" ^'*
- G " " #'*# " "
Page B46 of B73 W eld System ID Segment Line Number I *ne Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-3-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-143 Downstream ofelbow #39 No No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-34" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-144 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No 2E-24A No sectior 48 (ISO 2DBB-3 1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-106 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No 2E-24B vahr 2EFW-8B (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB44" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-107 Downstream ofcibow #25 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB44" EFW Discharge to SG 854-108 Upstream ofelbow #24 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-109 Downstream ofcibow #24 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-44" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-118 Downstream orcheck No No No No No No No No 2E-24B valve 2EFW-8A (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB44" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-119 Upstream orcontainment No No No No No No No No 2E-24B penetration 2P65 (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-120 Upstream ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-121 Dumundm ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) L h iMed-__. T-Thermal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stress Common Crackmg (PWSCC) C- Cerrasson Cracking I-IWergranular Stress Cerrosion Craebng (IGSCC) M -Mk. . . 43 Ldimenced Corrosion (MIC) F- Flow Accelerused Common E- Eremen - Cavitation 0 -Other e G G
(") u 14-Sep-9y FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnes Calculation Na A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 f,,, 3,7 of 37, Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line DescriPtion Number Weldlecation T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-003 , 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-122 Upstre m ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No No ! 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) i EFWS EFWS-003 2DBB-4-4" EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-123 Downstream ofelbow #21 No No No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-001 Domistream ofEFW No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths discharge pump 2P-7B (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-002 Downstream ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-003 Upstream ofmanual vahe No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2EFW-4B (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-78 85-1-004 Downstream ofmanual No No No No No No No No > Discharge Paths valve 2EFW-4B (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-005 Domistreamorelbow #8 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-14106 Upstream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-007 Dv swn ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-008 Upstream of tec 135 (ISO No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2DBC-1-2) EFWS EFWS4)03 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-009 Dv-&mo of tee #35 - No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths side of 2DBC-12-4"line (ISO 2DBC-I-2) Desradasson Mechensams T-Thermal Fatigue P - Prunary Water Stress Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - Micrainalogically Indleenced Cerrassee (M:C) F- flow Accelerused Cerree.on C-Cerroman CracUng I- hm* granular Stress Conomen Crachng (10$CC) E- Eranon-Cavitatina 0-Oiher L__ . . . . . . . . .
1 I "# ""' lad n A'u. A-SMQ17.Rm 00 4 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B48 of B73 Weld System ID Segment Line Nember Line Description Number Weld 14 cation T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-010 Dowitstream ortee #35 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-011 Upuream ofelbow #I0 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISD 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-012 Downstream orepaw #10 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-013 Upstream ortee #17 (ISO No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-014 Upstream of mvrual vake No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2EFW-5A (ISO 2DBC-I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-017 Dowtistream of tee #1,7 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7D 85-1-018 Upstream orelbow fil No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-019 Downstream ofcIbow #11 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-020 Downstream of manual No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths valve 2EFW-6 (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-021 Upstream of elbow #28 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-022 Dowrou mn ofelbow f28 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Famp 2P-7B 85-1-023 Upstream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) Dearadstum Mechanisme T-Thermal Fatigue P - Pnenary Weer Stress Cerrosion Crecimg (PWSCC) M - MicreendagicaDy Innuent*4 Cerroman (MIC) F- Flow Accelerused Corromen C-Common Cracting I - Intergrar-dar Stress Carranon Cradung (10 SCC) E- Erossan-Cevitarke 0- Other O O O
FMECA - Degradatien Mechanisms C"la'fanon Na AMMWI7, Rm 00 Page B49 of B75 Weld System ID Syment Line Number Line Dewription Number Weld Locatica T C I P M E F O EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-024 Dcwnstream ofelbow #27 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) ' EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-025 Upstream ofelbow #19 No No No No No No No No < Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-026 Downstream cTelbow #19 No No No No No No No No , Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS4)03 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-027 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No ' No No Discharge Paths section #74 (ISO 2DBC-I-I) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-028 Upstream of elbow #18 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-029 Domistream ofelbow #18 No No No No No No No No
' Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-030 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #72 (ISO 2DBC 1) i EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-031 Upstream ofelbow #17 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P 7B 85-1-032 Downstream ofelbow #17 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBO-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1 033 Upstream ofelbow #16 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-034 Downstream ofelbow fl6 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) Desradaseri Mechanig T-nmnal ratigue r - rnreary weier stress corremen credung (rwscc) u - Ma:ree.olopenny teneenced commen (uic) r-Flow AccelerseedCerrosion c-corronan cracks I - Ireerpanular sereis common cracbg (IGsCC) E -Damian-cavnesian 0-other
'd-Se97 . FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculation No. A-PENG-CALC-017. Rev. 00 y,y, 3,g of 373 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P M E F I O EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-035 Upstream ofelbow #15 No No No No No No No No l Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-036 Downstream of elbow #15 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) l EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-037 Upstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-038 Downstream ofelbow #14 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-039 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #67 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-040 Upstream ortee #107 (ISO No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2DBC-1-!) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-041 Downstream oitee #107 - No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths side of 2DCB-3-4"line (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-042 Downstream ortee #107 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-043 Upstream ofelbow #13 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-044 Downstream of cIbow #13 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1-) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-045 Upstream ofelbow s12 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) Desradatson Mechanisms T-Hermal Fatigue P - Pnmary Water Strees Carramen Crachng (PWSOC) M - Mi. ' .JMy L-fluenmi Cerrosum (MIC) F- Flow Acceirruted Cmosan C -Carrosion Cracking I - Intersrarmelar Stress Commen Cracbng (IOSCC) E- Eresson -Cavitatum O - Other e . O O
('~~N /O N l 'd s: 14 4 97 "'"#""*" #" " FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Weld
".iystem ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M F E 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1 046 Downsucam ofelbow #12 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-047 Downstream orpiping No No No No' No No No No Discharge Paths section #63 (ISO 2DBC 1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-78 85-1-048 Upstream of piping section No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths #62 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1049 Downstream of piping No No No No No No . No No Discharge Paths section #62 (ISO 2DBC-I-
- 1) 1 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-050 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #61 (ISO 2DBC-I-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-051 Upstream orelbow fl1 No No No No Ne No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-l) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-052 Downstream o'eibow #11 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISC 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-053 Upstream of elbow #10 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-054 Downstream ofelbow #10 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-l) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-055 Upstream of elbow #9 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-!) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Purnp 2P-7B 3" l-056 Downstream ofelbow #9 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) peeredshan Matanesaw T-Themel Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Sims Cerrosion Cracking (PWSCC) M - MicretnologicaDy InGuenced Cerroseco (MIC) F-flow Accelerated Common c-Common Crackins I-beersranularStresscorre anonckingcoSCC) E - Erossen - Caviimhan 0-Odier E
'*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""" " #* NN 8#7 R" 88 Page B32 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Line Number Line Description Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 i EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-057 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No l Discharge Pr.ths section #57 (ISO 2DBC t-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-058 Upstream ofelbow #26 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-059 Downstream :leibow #26 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-140 Upstream of elbow #25 No No No No No Ns- No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-141 Downstream of elbow #25 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-142 Downstreamefpiping No No No No No No No Ny Discharge Paths section #54 (ISO 2DBC 1) , EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-143 Downstream orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #53 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" i.FW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-064 Upstream ofelbow #8 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-145 Dumucen of elbow #8 No No - No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1 066 Upstream ofelbow #7 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-067 Downstream of elbow #7 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) Desradation Mecherusms T TherrM Fatigue P- Pnmary Wster Stress Corresson Crociang (PWSCC) M - ML M,_.3y influenced Commen (AUC) F-flow AcceleratedCerrossen C- Con: mon Cracting I - Intergranular Stress Commion Craclung (IOsCC) E - Eresson -Cavitation 0 -Other O O O
O U (J~h (V)
'*" FMECA - Dcgradation Mechanismas Cc"#"'""' kMMW17. Rm M Page B33 ef BU WeW System ID Segment une Number Line Description Number WeWImcaties T C F I M E F 0 )
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-068 Upstream ofelbow s6(ISO No No ?b No No No No No Discharge Paths 2DBC-I-1) , EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-l# EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-069 Downstream orefbow #6 & No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DDC-1-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I 070 Upstream ofcR war #24 No No No No No No & No Cischarge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I ~.f EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-071 Downstream ofelbow f24 No No No No No No & No Dir.harge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-J72 Upgream ofcibow #23 No No No No No No & & Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS403 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-073 D-mb--ofcIbow f23 No No No No No No No M Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-303 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2"-7B 85-1-074 Upstream orflow element No No No No No No No No DAge Paths 2FE4710-1 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 35-I-075 Downstream of flow No No ?b & No No No No Discir:1;e Pa:bs element 2FE-0710-1 (ISO 2DBC-I-Is EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-076 Downstremm orpiping No No No No & No No No Discharge Paths sectum #46 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-077 Upstream of tee #1% (ISO No No No No & No No No Dhg Paths 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS 003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-078 Upstream orcibow S4 No No & No No No No No Discharge Paths (LW 2DBC-I-1) Desradmian Mechen=== T-Thmnal Fatigue P- Prunary Waner Stress Commen Crackmg (PWsCC) M-M.-.ildi unuencedCarmeen(MIC) l F-Flew Accelerse JC--remen C-Commum Crochng I - beerpannier Stress Carmaan Crachng OGsCC) E- Ercuxe-Centuan O-Other
14-sep-97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Cak**" No. A-PENGCILC-017. Rev. 00 Page B54 of B75 W eld System ID Segment Line Number IJee Description Number Weld Imcation T C P I F4 E F 0 EFWS EFWS-001 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1479 Upstream ofelbow f22 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pomp 2P-7B 85-1-080 Domtstream ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-081 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #40 (ISO 2DBC 1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-082 Upstream ofelbe< 45 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4
- EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-083 Dums m ofcIbow #5 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1)
EFWS EFWS-00_i 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-084 Dumhm orpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #42 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-085 Upstream ofmotor- No No No No' No No No No Discharge Paths operated nht 2CV-1025-1 (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-088 Domistream ortee #106 - No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths branch line (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-089 Upstream ofcFoow f3 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-l) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-090 Dumswu ofelbow f3 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) Dearadasen wher=== T-Therms: Fatigue P - Phmery Water swew Commen Cruciang (PWsCC) M-MR'
- Wy influenced Common (MIC) F-flow Accelerseed Comman C-Cerrassan Oncksne I - Irmergrenatar swess Common Crackmg (103CC) E - Erossen-Cawtshan 0- Odwr O O O
m ) C) C) U ' " *"NW'7 R" " FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'"* Page BS$ ef B73 W eld System ID Segseest IJee Number Line Description Nemeber Weld Imesties T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS@3 2DBC-14* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-091 Upstream of fee #105 (ISO No No No No No No No No Dischar*: Paths 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1492 Dumsmo of tee #105 - No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths on side 2DBC4-4* (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS@3 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-093 Domistream ortec #105 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-094 Upstream ofcIbow #2 No No No ?4 No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-D EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-095 Dvmsm.i ofelbow #2 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS@3 2DBC-14* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-096 Dowinstrezm of piping No No No No No No No & Discharge Paths section #36 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-097 Upstream orcibow f21 No No ?- No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-098 Dvms m.i ofelbow f21 No No No No No No No No DMe.is ePaths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-1-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-099 Dumamm ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #34 (ISO 2DBC 1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-100 Upstream ofelbow f20 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS@3 2DBC-I-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-101 Downstream ofelbow #20 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-1-1) Dewedm== Man ==== T-Thmnal Fatigue F- Prunary Water Stras Commen Creams (F%W M-E _ *
. , bdhsenced Comsmen(MIC) F-flour M. A 1 Comnian C-Commeno ams I-heeryan=ler siress Comme.Cr anne (tosCC) E- Eresecus - Cavestien 0 -Osier
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""* " * * " W 17 # " Page B56 of B75 Wed System ID Segment Une Number une Description Number Weld Iecation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-102 Dum&au of piping No No No No No No No No Disciurge Path- section #32 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFVS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-I-:03 Upstream offlange #102 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-104 Domrstream of flange No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths #101 (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-105 Upstream orelbow #1 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7J 85-1-l% Dom stream ofelbow #1 No No No No No No No No Discnarge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14* EFW Pump 2P-78 85-1-107 Upstream of flange #100 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-14" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-1-108 Dom stream of flange #99 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (ISO 2DBC-I-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-124" Dischargefrom AFW 5-12m Upstream of tee #18 (ISO No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW 2DBC-12-1) Pump 2P-7B Discharge une EFY!S EFWS-003 2DBC-124" Dischargefrom AFW 5-124)0 Upstream ofpiping secuon No No No No No No No No , Pump 2P-75 to EFW
#23 (ISO 2DBC-12-1)
Pump 2P-7B Discharge une
% =:=-
T-Thermal Fangue P- Prunary % aner Saras Cerresem Crasing (F%W M - MicrebearegicaEy bilmenced Cerreman (MC) F-Fkm AccelerseedCemssace C-Carre en crect=s I- beersnes:ar surns Commen Credurg OGSCC) E- Eremen-Cavenhoe 0-O6wr e e O
~
N O C) J G
'" N"'"*'" Na WMWI7 Rn. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B57 of B75
, W eld System ID Segneemt Une Neinber une Description Number Weld I.mcation T C F M I E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-12-4* Discharge from AFW 5-1240 Du ioL- ofpiping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW sechon #22 (ISO 2DBC-Pump 2P-7B Discharge 12-1) Line EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-124* Discharge from AFW 5-12-00 Upstream ofpiping secuan No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW #22 (ISO 2DBC-12-1) Pump 2P-7B Discharge Line ! EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-124" Discharge from AFW 5-12-00 Don 1: stream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW secuon 821 (ISO 2DBC-Pump 2P-7B Discharge 12-1) une EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-124* Discharge from AFW 5-12-00 Upstream of piping secuon No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW #21 ( ISO 2DBC-12-1) Pump 2P-7B Discharge une EFWS EFWS403 2DBC-124" Discharge from AFW 5-12-00 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW secuan #20 (ISO 2DBC-Pump 2P-7B Discharge 12-1) Line EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-124* Dischargefrom AFW 5-1240 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No Pump 2P-75 to EFW valve 2EFW-3I (ISO Pump 2P-7B Discharge 2DBC-12-1) Line EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-24" EFW Pump 2P-7A 35-2450 Doniastream ofvalve No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths 2EFW-1IB (2DBC-2-1) Desadmuen Medum=== 7-Thermel Faeque F- Phmery Water stress Cerrassen Crudung (PWSCC) M-MC _ 2,IsdimencedCneressen(MIC) F-flew Acce4erusedCerranen C-Common Creatics I-Innery.n , seres.CerresumCreams(IG9CC) E-Erennen-Cavetshan 0-Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C'*"'"" #* A *M Page E ~ > . .
~n W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descripties Number Weld IAcation T C F I M E F D m- ,
EFWS EFWS 003 2DBC-2-4* EFW Pump 2P-7A 95-2-051 LW ofelbow f33 No No No No No No No N, Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-2-8* EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-052 Domswu oreIbow #33 No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-2-4* EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-2-053 Dvmsum ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge Paths section #2 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-2-4* EFW Pump 2P-7A 55-2-054 Upstream of tee 842 - No No rio No No No No No Discharge Paths shown in ISO 2DBC-3-1 (2DBC-2-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-001 Upstream orcibow #22 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-002 Dvmemu ofelbow #22 No No No No No No No No t Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-003 Upstream orcibow #23 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-004 Dumsmu ofcIbow #23 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS403 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-005 Upstream ofcibew #24 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B L- Maham== T-Thmnal Fatigue P- Pnmary Water Stres Corremon Cracking (F%W C-Commen Crackmg M - EGerebeelcycm3y Inthemced Carramen (MIC) F- flow ha a " Cerroma 1 -Iraerpenster stress Cemmen ciacing (IGsCC) E- Erown-Cavenhen 0 -Other e G #
p "s ,o V J V
'## C"#* Ao. A-PENGC4LC-0IT, Rev. 00 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B39 of B7.r WeM System ID L,.a : Ilse Number Liec Desenyties Number WeW Locaties T C F I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3406 Domistream orelbow #24 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2D81C-3-1) 248 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-2-007 Upstresm ofelbow #34 No No No No No No No W Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-008 Domistream ofelbow #34 W No W No No No No No Discharge to SG IE- (ISO 2DBC-3-l) 24B EFW3 EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-009 Upstrean ofelbow #25 No No No No No No No No Did-p to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4~ EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-010 Downstream ofelbow #25 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1)
.~4B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3411 Upstream cfelbow s26 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2EBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-012 D-m-n ofelbew f26 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DDC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3483 Domistream ofpiping No No No No No No do No Discharge to SG 2E- section #7 (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-014 Downstream or piping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- secuon #8 (ISO 2DBC-3-I) 24B Desradoxm M-6-- --
T-Thmnal Fatigue P - Pnmary Waser swess Carres==i Crachns (rwsoc) M-Micro 6 tcycznyinseeicedCommsen(MIC) F-11== AccelersmedCerre=n= C-Common Cracking I ".L , 5treesCommum Crackes(IGsCC) E - Escues-Cavennam o-Oonr (_ ____ _ . . . . . . . . -. - - . . _ . - ~ -- -- - - - -
' Cd'c"I"**"
- A #EVG O LC-8'7 R'" 80 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms 1-4:e B60 of B75 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descriptica Number Weld Location T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-015 Upstream of fiange #35 No No No No No No No No Descharge to SG 2E- GSO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-016 Dv-iscm of flange #36 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- OSO 2DBC-3-I) 248 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-017 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #10 (ISO 2DBC 24B 1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-018 Downstream of piping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section A65 (ISO 2DBC 24B I) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-019 Upstream cTelbow #27 No No No N<, No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-020 Downstream ofelbow F27 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- GSO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-021 Upstream ofelbow s28 No No No No No No f4 No Discharge to SG 2E- OSO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-022 Dv->swn ofelbow s28 No No No No No No No No Dhuwge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-023 Du s- ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- sxtion #13 050 2DBC 24B 1) Desraam:xxi Maharm== T-henal Fatigue F- Pwnery Waser Stress Corressan Cracking (FRW M - Mandme4cgically bilae iced Cerremen (M3C) F-flow AccelerusedCarmees C-Cerraman Cracking 1 - hers-unster Stress Cermeen Craclung (1GSCC) E - Emmen -Cavemenen 0 -other e O O
V $ FMECA - Degradation Mechanisses N'"'"*"r h. AMWQ17. Ra. M Page B61 of B75 WeM Systems ID Segmeest LinePreenber Lise Description Neanber WeMImesties T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4" EFW Pump 2P-7B 35-3424 Upstream ortee *41 (ISO No No No No No No No No , Discharge to SG 2E- 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pamp 2P-7B 85-3425 Dowiistremm ortec #41 No No No No No No No No DischarEe to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-026 Upstream of tec #42 0SO No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-027 Downstream of tee #42 No No No No No No No No ( } , Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pamp 2P-7B 85-3-028 Dominstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- secten #19 (ISO 2DBC 24B 1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3429 Upstream of flange #37 No No No No No No No No l Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pamp 2P-7B 85-3430 Downstream of flange #38 No No No No No No No No l Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1)
- 24B !
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pamp 2P-78 85-3-031 Upstream of tlange #39 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-032 Dominst: cam of flange #40 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 9 24B Desradisse= N T-Thermal Fatiger P - Prunary Weser Stress Carrouce CancLais (PWsCC) M-12 . ",lessencedCarremen(h0C) ' c-Commen Cracking F-Flow AmlerseedCarresem I- inseryannier stress Cerreemen CW (1Gs0C) E- Eremen -Camsuhen 0 -Odier i I
tw97 FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Ca'c"lahoer No. A-PDUCILC-017. Rev. 00 Page B62 of B75 W eld System ID Segment Une Number Une Description Number Weld Imation T C P I - M E F O EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-1* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-033 Domistream ofelbow f33 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24 8 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-034 Upstream orair-operated No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- valw 2CV-0798-1 (ISO 24B 2DBC-3-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-34)35 Du..s-. of fee #41 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-036 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- section #15 (ISO 2DBC 248 I) EFWS EFWS-093 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-71 85-3-037 Upstream ofelbow #29 No No No No No Na No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1)
, 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-038 Dv .acam of elbow f29 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-3-1) 24B EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-3-4* EFW Pump 2P-7B 85-3-039 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- operated valve 2CV-1075-24B 1 (ISO 2DBC-3-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-4-4* EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-041 Dv..& - .ofvalw No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- 2EFW-11 A (ISO 2 DDC 24A I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-4-4* EFW Pump 2P-7A 85-4-042 Dv. s- ofelbow #28 No No No No No No No No Discharge to SG 2E- (ISO 2DBC-4-1-2) 24A Deersdation W -_ T-11 crman F.eisme r-rn,neryw.eerseresscami an%(twscc) M-ui- -p,Innermcedcem =(u2c) r-m. Accchrased comi a= c-comie.on chiing 1-6 a same cerres.ca credung(1GSCC) E - Enouce-caventses. O-Other e 9 9 -
~^ ~h (3 (O (G LJ FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"k*'"'#* N* A-PEVG-C'LC-8 R'" 88 Page B63 of B75 W eld System ID Segment Line Nueser Une Description Noenber Weld Ementice T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC4-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 854-001 Upstream ofpiping secDon No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line #8 ISO 2DBC4-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-8-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 85-8402 Upstream offlange #2 No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC4-1) L EFWS EFWS403 27)BC4-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 85 4-003 Dominstream offlange #3 No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC4-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 854-004 Upstream ofcibow #6 No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC4-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-8-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 85 4-005 Dominstream ofelbow #6 No No No No No No No No Minimum Cypass Line (ISO 2DBC-8-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-8-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 854-006 Upstream of flange #4 No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-8-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC-8-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 854-007 Downstremm of flange #5 No No No No No No No No Minimum Bypass Line (ISO 2DBC-8-1) 1 EFWS EFWS-003 2DBC4-2* EFW Pump 2P-2B 85-8-008 Upstream ofvalvc 2EFW- No No No No No No No No , Minimum Bypass Line 10B GSO.2DBC-8-1) EFWS EFWS-003 211BC-85-6* EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 245-02 Dv. &-;orcheck 1 No No No No No No No No Secten Line valve 2EFW-2B OSO 2HBC45-1) EFWS EFWS 003 2HBC45-6* EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 245-02 Dv.. scam ofelbow f37 No No No No No No No No Secten Line (ISO 2HBC45-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454" EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 245-02 Upstream orcibow #34 No No No No No No No No Secten Line (ISO 2HBC45-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC-85-6* EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 24542 Dv .& e.ofelbow s34 No No No No No No No No Sacuon Line (ISO 2HBC45-1) u- x-T-nerent Fatigue P- Pnenary Water Sere = Cervensen Cracket(FWsCC) M-M L 2 "y hdimenced Comnion(MIC) F-flew AccelerssedCorev= wee c-Comme.CracLes t - Leerar==Isr s=== Cerroman Crecing OGsCC) E-Emman-Covemame 0 -Oiher
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N'"'""'" #" *"##' #" 88 Page B64 of B73 Weld System ID Segment Line Number une Descriptica Number Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454' EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 245-02 Upstream of 8* x 6* No No No No No No No No Suction Line reducing tee #31 -6* side (ISO 21BC-85-1) EFWS EFWS-003 211BC454" EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 245-05 Dumab-. of 8* x 6" No No No No No No No No Suction Line concentric reducer #48 - 6* side (ISO 2ilBC45-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC-854* EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 2-85-05 Downstream of flange #50 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC45-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454* EFW Pump 2P -'B 6* 245-05 Upstream of flange #52 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC-85-1) EFWS EFWS-093 2HBC-854* EFW Pump 2P-7B 6' 245-05 LW of manual nht No No No P4 No No No No Suction Line 2EFW-3B (ISO 2HBC45-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454* EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 2-8 M 5 Domisstream ofmarmal No No No No No No No No Suction Line rahr 2EFW-3B (ISO
. 2HBC45-l)
EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454" EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 24M5 Downstream of cibow #55 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC-85-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454* EFW Pump 2P-7B 6* 24M5 Upstream of flange #57 No No No No No No No No Suction Line (ISO 2HBC45-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC45-8* EFW pump 8* suction 2-8 M 2 Upstream of 8* x 6' No No No No No No No No line from Condensate reducing tee #31 -8' side Storage Tanks (CST) (ISO 2HBC45-1) 2T-41 A A B Des =dstian Med===== T-Tiennel Fatigue P- P vury Water Stress Commean Crackmg (PW3CC) M - Murebeslogicany inAmenced Cerre=== (WC) F -Flow hiM Camamen C- Commen Cmhes I- beergrenaler Stress Comnum Oncias (1GSCC) E - Eremen -Cavemenen 0 -Other l 9 O O
] ] p J O
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C&wlas s A~a AMMWI7.RnE Fage B65 of B75 WeM Systens ID b; Une Nweeber Une Descriptian Noneber WeW IAcation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 21IPC454- EFW pmnp 8" suction 245-02 Downstream of motor- No No No No No No No No line from Condensate operated wahr 2CV-0789-Storage Tanks (CST) I (ISO 21BC-35-1) 2T41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454" EFW pump 8* suction 24543 Upstream of motor- No No No No No No No No line from Condensate operated waht 2CV-0789-Storay Tanks (CST) 1 (ISO 21BC45-1) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 21EC454* EFW pump 3* suction 245-03 Dominstream ortee #17 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 2HBC45-1) Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454* EFW pump 8" sucten 245-03 Upstream of tee 817 (ISO No No No No No No No No line from Condensate 2HBC45-1) Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC45-8* EFW pump 8* section 245-03 D - oL - noftee#17 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 2HBC-85-1) Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454* EFW pmnp 8* suction 245-04 Downstream ofcheck No No No No No No No No line from Cendensate vaht 2EFW-801 USO Storage Tanks (CST) 2HBC45-1) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454- EFW pump 8* section 245-04 Upstream Melbow #3 No No No No No No No No line from Condensate (ISO 2HBC45-1) Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B c_ _ wh==== T-Thermal Fatigue F- Prsnary Waser stress Common Crackmg (FWSCC) M-Ma',2 h6mmcedCerremen(MIC) 7 F-Fleur Accelernauf Comune c-Cam o cLes I- Issersr==hr svens Carroman cr=1=g (IGsCC) E-Lessen-Cavesten 0 -Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"' """ No AMM-017. Rm M Page B66 of B73 W eld System ID Segment use Number Une Description Number Weld 1Acation T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 21BC45-8* EFW pump 8* suction 24544 Domistream ofcibow #3 No No No No No No No No ' line from Cm Ao.ie (ISO 21EC45-1) StorageTanks (CST) 2T-4I A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2ilBC454' EFW pump 8* suction 24544 Upstream ofcheck ulve No No No No No No No No line from Condensate 2EFW-1 (ISO 21GC45-1) Storage Tanks (CST) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454" EFW pump 8* sucten 245-04 Awohum orcheck No No No No & No No No ' line from Condensate uhr 2EFW-1 (ISO 2IEC-Storage Tanks (CST) 85-1) 2T-4I A & B EFWS EFWS-003 21mC454* EFW pump 8' suction 245-04 Upstream ofmanual valve No No No No No No No No line from Condensate 2EFW-802 (ISO 2HBC-Storage Tanks (CST) 85-1) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS403 2HBC-854" EFW pump 8" suction 245-04 A-1 stream of manual No No No No No No No & line from Condensate vahr 2EFW402 (ISO StorageTanks(CST) 21mC-85-1) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 21BC-854* EFW pump 8* suction 245-04 Domistream of 8* x 6' No No No No No No No & lire from CWte reducing tee #31 - 8' side Storage Tanks (CST) (ISO 2HBC45-1) 2T-41 A & B EFWS EFWS-003 2HBC454" EFW pump 8* suction 24545 Upstream of 8" x 6' No No No No & No No & line from Co.-Ao.ie conantne redu r #48 - Storage Tanks (CST) 8* side (ISO 21mC45-1) 2T-41 A & B Dearedshan Mechasmarus T-Thermal Fatigue P- Prunary Weser Stress Cerrasen Cracking (PHW C-Cerramon Oracking 1 - Interranular Stress Carmuen Cracking OGSCC) M - C12Mr basenced Carremenn(MIC) F- flew Accelersted Commne E - Eraman -Cam O-Other O O O
m V(^\ {d f~'\ O '*" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms N *" " A'a NMWI7 Rn 00 Page B67 of 873 WeM System ID Segeent Line Noseber Line Desenpties Number WeW Locatise T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS-003 21BD4534* Demin Tank Discharge 4483-00 Dom 1: stream of tee - No No No No No No No No shown in ISO 21BD-91-2 (ISO 2HBD483-1) EFWS EFWS-003 2MBD4834" Demin Tank Discharge 443340 Upstream ofvalve 2EFW- No No No No No No No No
, 23 (ISO 2HBD483-1)
EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-00 Dowinstream ofelbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank oym ofitem #4 (ISO Discharge to EFW 2HBD-91-2) Pump Sucten EFWS EFWS-003 2HDD-914* CST 2T-41A A 4-9140 Upstream orelbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank biou i ofitem #4 Discharge to EFW (ISO 2HBD-91-2) Pamp Secuon EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T 41 A A 4-91-00 Dumou- ofelbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank oym-.e ofitem #5 (ISO Discharge to EFW 2HBD-91-2) Pump Section EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-01 Upstream of first elbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank downstream ofitem #5 Discharge to EFW (ISO 2HBD-9I-2) Pump Socoon l EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-01 Don 1: stream of first elbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank downstream ofitem #5 ; Discharge to EFW (ISO 2HBD-91-2) Pump Secuon T-Therinal Fatigue P- Prunary Water Stress Commen Chisig (P%W M-M~.' - My behsenced Carrousen(MIC) F-Ilaw Acreierused Cerremen C-Carrossen Cracking I- Leersrarustar stress Corresum Creciting (IGsCC) E - Ereason-Canesasaa 0-Other
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C""'"" " ^'" d * " # #' # " " Page B68 of B75 > Weld Systems ID Segment Une Number Une Description Nearber Weld Location T C P I M E F O EFWS EFWS403 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A & 4-91-01 Upstream ofsecond elbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank downstream ofitem #5 Discittrge to EFW (ISO 2HBD-91-2) Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-01 Downstream of second No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank elbow dumouum ofitem Discharge to EFW #5 (ISO 2HBD-91-2) Pump Section EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-01 Weld at hanger #6 (ISO No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 21BD-91-2) Discharge to EFW Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914*
- CST 2T-41 A & 4-91-01 Upstream cf tee #10 (ISO No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 2HBD-91-2)
Discharge to EFW Pump Suction EFWS EFWS403 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A & 4-91-01 DumoL-n of tee #10 No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank (ISO 2HBD-9I-2) Discharge to EFW Pump Suction EFWS EFWS403 2HED-914* CST 2T-41 A a 4-91-01 Upstream oferoow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank downstream ofitem #6 Discharge to EFW (ISO 2HBD-91-2) Pump Suction EFWS EFWS403 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A & 4-91-01 Dowristream ofelbow No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tari dumou-n ofitem #6 Discharge to EFW (ISO 21BD-91-2) Pump Suction Deersonson Medunime T-Thmnal Feigne P - Pnmary Water Stress Common Cradung (PRW M - Mientadae'enny influenced Cerremen (MIC) F-No AcadecanedCemiersa C-Common Cracking 1 - treenrenular Stress Common Oedmg (IGSCC) E - Erween-Cavemasen 0-Oemr e 9 9
'" FMECA - Degradatiert Mechanisms C'dc"""" #" A**"#7 R" 88 Page B69 of B73 Weld System ID Segment Liec Noseber Line Description Number Weld Locaties T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-01 Upstream ofelbow located No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank upstream of tee M shom1 Discharge to EFW in ISO 2HBD-91-1 (ISO Pump Suction 2HBD-9I-2) EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-02 Upstream ortee M (ISO No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 2HBD-91-1) Discharge to EFW Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-02 Domiistream ortee M No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank (ISO 2HBD-91-1) Discharge to EFW Pump Suctum i EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914" CST 2T-41 A a 4-91-02 Dums-- of pipir,g No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank section #2 (ISO 2HBD-9:- Discharge to EFW 1) Pump Sucten EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914" CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-02 Dvms-n of piping No No No No No No No No , B/Demin Tank section #3 (ISO 2HBD Discharge to EFW 1) Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914* CST 2T-4I A A 4-91-02 Upstream of taht 2EFW- No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 801 (ISO 2HBD-9I-1) . Discharge to EFW Pump Suction EFWS EFWS-003 2HBD-914" CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-02 Upstream ofcheck vaht No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 2EFW-16 (ISO 2HBD Discharge to EFW 1) Pump Suction Dearmheen Med===== T-Thermal Fatigue P- Prunary Weser Stress Cerrassen Crecise (FWscC) M -:J _" ' , i IndescedCermusesi(MIC) F-N= AccelerseedCarmswei C.CarmeenCr cus I% sereis Carmeem cLming 00 SCC) E- Erman-Cnemme o-oeur
-- m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Calculatum No. A-PEXG-CALC-017.Rev 00 Page B70 of B75 Weld System ID Segment Une Number Une Description Nusrber Weld 14esties T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-003 211BD-91-8* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-02 Downstream orcheck No No No No No ~4 No No B/Demin Tank valw 2EFW-16 (ISO Discharge to EFW 2HBD-91-1) Pump Soction EFWS EFWS-003 21ED-91-3* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-02 Upstream ercibow #5 No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 050 2HBD-91-1) Discharge to EFW Pump Section EFWS EFWS403 2HBD-91-8* CST 2T-41 A A 4-91-02 Downstream orelbow #5 No No No No No No No No B/Demin Tank 050 2HBD-91-1) Discharge to EFW Pump Section EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-145 Upstreamofelbow A45 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A OSO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-146 Downstream ofc! bow #45 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A USO 2DBB-3-1-l) EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-147 Upstream ofcIbew #38 Yes No ' No No No No No NJ 2E-24A USO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-148 Upstream ofcheck valve Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A 2EFW-9A OSO 2DBB-3 1) EFWs EFWS-004 2DBB-4-4* EFW Day to SG 85 4-124 Upstream ofelbow #20 Yes No No No No No No No i 2E-24B OSO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB-44* EFW Discharge to SG 8%4-125 Dv-ummu ofelbow r20 Yes No Na No No No No No 2E-24B OSO 2DBB4-1) tx mMechannes T.'Nrrnal Fahgt-e P - Prunary Water Stress Cerramen Credth (PWsCC) M - MacresolopcaDy Irdleeced Carramen (loc) F-Nw AccelerusedCarmsen C-Cerroman Cradung I-Ireergranuier Stress Cerrassen Crackang OGsCC) E- Ernenn -Cavesnan 0-other e O O
p pd U d
'" FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Gcularavr MMMWI7. RnE Page 871 of B75 WeW System ID Segment Line N aser Une Description Nesser WeM Locaties T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EF%W 2DBB-44* EFW Discharge to SG 854-126 L4streamofcibow#29 Yes No No No No No N No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB-4-1)
EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB44* EFW Discharge to SG 854-127 Doniistream ofcibow #29 Yes No 'No No No No No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB4-4* EFW Discharge to SG 854-128 Dominstream ofpiping Yes No No No No No No No 2E-248 sectron #5 (ISO 2DPS-4-1) EFWS EFWS-004 2DBB4-4* EFW DMi.,y to SG 85 4-129 Upstream ofcheck valw Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24B 2EFW-9B (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-005 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-149 Du.w.u m - orcheck Yes No No No No No No Nc 2E-24A uthe 2EFW-9A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFW3 EF% 9 05 2DBB-34* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-150 Upstream ofcibow #37 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS ENS-005 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-151 Downstream ofcibow #37 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A f SO 2DBB-3-1-1) EFWS EFWS-005 2DBB-34* EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-152 Upstream ofcibow #44 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-2) EFWS EF% % 5 2DBB-3-4* E* W Discharge no SG 85-3-153 Du.nm,- of elbow #44 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-2) EFWS EFWS-005 2DBB-34* EFW Dischary:to SG 85-3-154 Dv.o=,-- of cIbow f36 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-2) EFWS EFWS&5 2DBB-3-4* EFW Discharge to SG LS-3-155 Upstress of:Ibow #35 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-2) EFWS EF% % 05 2DBB-3-4' EFW DM :p to SG 85-3-156 Downstream ofcibow #35 No No N Yes No No No N 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-2) Demadsta= W ^ T-nernia w r - rn,nery wer sir- c- cr.aung (twscc) u-n . , .ne cedc psic) r-m. Aa,ieredc c-com or.o.dting I.Innerymederser carr =enOedang(IGsCc) E-Eramen-cavesesse 0-Oeur
'N" . FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms catcarans W.rrssc4tcon. hr. oo . g n, g.,
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W eld System ID Segment Line Nember Line Description Number Weld Imention T C P I M E 7 O EFWS EFWS@5 2DBB-34" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-157 Opstream ofelbow #34 Yes No No No W !io & & ! 2E-24A USO 2DBB-1-1-2) l 1 EFWS EFWS-005 2DBB-34" EFW Discharge to SG 85-3-158 Downstream ofc! bow #34 Yes No to No No No No Fo l 2E-24A (ISO 2DBB-3-1-2) 1 EFWS EFWS@5 2DBB-3-4* EFYJ Discharge to SG 85-3-159 boatistream ofpiping Yes Ne A No ho No No No 2E-24A section #1 (ISO 2DBB-3 2) EFWS EFWS@S 2DBB44" EFW Discharge to SG 854-130 Douttstream ofcheck Yes No No Ne No No No & 2E-24B nive 2EFW-9B (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-005 2DBB4-4* EFW Discharge to SG 854-131 Dowtistream cfcitew #19 Yes No No No No Ne No No 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB4-l) EFWS EFWS-005 2DBB-44* EFW Discharge to SG 854-132 Upstream ofcibow #18 Yes No No No No No No No 2E-24B GSO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS4)05 2DBB4-4* EFW Discharge to SG 85-4-133 Dumouwu ofelbow fl8 Yes No No No No No No & 2E-24B (ISO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-005 2DBB44" EFW Discharge to SG 854-134 Dumou-o ofpiping Yes No No No No No No No 2E-248 section #2 OSO 2DBB4-1) EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-10" EFW pump 10" 4-282-10 Upstream of 12" x 13* No N No No No No No No Saction Line from concentric reducer 89 (ISO Condensate Storage 2HCC-2824) Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-10* EFW pump 10' 4-282-1I Upstream of12"x 10' No No No No No No No No Section Line from concentric reducer #13 CoAo.ie Storage (ISO 2HCC-2824) Tank (CST) T-4IB Desnderan Mahannaw T.'her,.I Fatigue P - Pnrnary Water Strees Carmnen Crecing (FWsCC) M - MscreteelegicnDy inMuenred Carreewme (MIC) F- Flow Accelerused Cornmen C-Cerrnseae Crudurig I-Ireeryanaler Stress Carmeen Cracking (KisCC) E - Ernummi-Cantarian 0-Other e 9 - 9
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FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms Page B73 of B73 WeW System ID Segmect use Neenber Use Description Number WeldIAcarice T C P I M E F 0 EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-2a2-12* EFW pump 12" 4-282-10 Dv .sw.. of 12' x 10' No No No No No No No No Section Line from concentnc reducer #9 (ISO Co.-Aowie Storage 2HCC-2824) Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12* EFW pump 12* 4-282-11 Dv un.mu of 12* x 10' No No No No No No No No Suchon Line from concentric reducer #13 Cv.Aomic Storage (ISO 2HCC-2824) Tank (CST) T-41B EFWS EF N 2HCC-282-12* EF# pump 12" 4-282-11 Upstream orelbow #Il No No No No No No No No Sucuon Line from (ISO 2HCC-2824) j CWAomie Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12* 4-282-11 Cv- .s-.. of e'lxrv 811 No No No No No No No No Ssetion Line from (ISO 2HCC-2824) C.- -2..u:e Storage Tank (CST) T-41B ' EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12" EFW punip 12* 4-282-1I Upstream of tee #7 (ISO No No No No No No No No Suchon Line from 2HCC-2824) Co.An-ie Storage Tank (CST)T-4tB EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12* 4-282-11 Co..s - ooftec#7 No No No No No No No No 1 Section Une from (ISO 2HCC-2824) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-4IB EFWS EFWS-0J6 2HCC-282-12* EFW pump 12" 4-282-12 Upstream of flange #20 No No No No No No No No Section Line from (ISO 2HCC-2824) Condensate Storage ' Tank (CST)T-4ID c- u-+ - T-Thennel Fatigue P - Prunary Weser Stress Cemiseen Credang (PnW M - Mscrohielogically Indimeurd Comissen (MIC) F-I' sow AccelerenedCer.esian C-Cerresson Crudung 1- Innerpannter serens Corressen Crachng (10 SCC) E- Eremiam-Centensen 0-Oeur
FMECA - Degradation Mechanisms C"'""""
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Page B74 of B75 W eld System ID Segment Line Number Line Descripties Nuneber Weld Leestion T C F I M E F O EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12* EFW pump 12" 4-282-12 Downstream of flange #21 No No No No No No No No Suctwn Line from (1502HCC-2824) Condensate Storage T nk (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12* CW pump 12* 4-282-12 Upstream of flange #23 No No No No No No No No Suction Line from (ISO 2HCC-2824) CerAnuie Storage Tank (CST) T-4IB EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12* 4-282-12 Domistresm of flange #22 No No No No No No No No Sucten Line from (ISO 2HCC-2824) Condensate Storage Tank (CST)T-41B EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-12" EFW pump 12* 4-282-12. Upstream of 12* x 8* No No No No No No No No Sucten Line from concentricreducer#5 - Condensate Storage 12* side (ISO 2HCC-282-Tank (CST) T-4IB 6) EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-8* EFW pump 8* Suction 4-282-12 Downstream of 12" x 8' No No No No No No No No Line from Co Aio.ie concentric reducer #5 - 8* Storage Tank (CST)T- side (ISO 2HCC-2824) 41B EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-8* EFW pump 3* Suction 4-282-12 Du-minam orpiping No No No No ?4 No No No Line from Condensate section #2 (ISO 2HCC-Storage Tank (CST) T- 282 4) 41B EFWS EF% W 2HCC-282-8* EFW pump 5* Suction 4-282-12 Du..obwu ofpiping No No No No No No No No Line from Condensate secten #39(ISO 2HCC-Storage Tank (CST) T- 2824) 4IB m Meannerm T-Thermal Fatigue F- Pnemary Waner Sirens Corresum Crectang (FWSCC) M - Mscrv6eologicaDy Inomencel Camamur (MIC) F-flew AcreieratedCemeen c- Cerras.ee Cracking I-innereranular sire Cerros64 Cracks g(105CC) E- Erneson -Cavesasaus 0-Other o e 9 9
(N /" ' x k h FMECA - Degradation Mechanisnes C"'a'"" " ## " " C-8 " "' Page B75 ef B73 l wesd Systene ID Seguient IJee Neunber Line Descriptive Number Weld Leesties T C F I M E F 0 l EFWS EFWS-006 2HCC-282-8* EFW pump 8' Secten 4-282-12 Downstream ofpiping No No No No No No No No Line from Condensate secten #36 (ISO 2HCC-Storage Tank (CST)T- 282-6) 4IB EFWS EFWS 6 2HCD-195-8* Condensate Storage 4-195-04 Upstream of second No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B clbow - b=i-, of Discharge - 8* piping valve 2CV-07G7 (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-006 2HCD-195-8* Condensate Storage 4-195-04 Dovmstream of second No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-8I A & B dbow - b -L-- of Discharge - 8* piping 2CV4707 (ISO 21,1CD-195-2) EFWS EFWS-006 2HCD-195-8* Condensate Storage 4-195-04 Upstream of elbow- No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-41 A & B dousntream ofitem #5 Discharge - 8* piping (ISO 2HCD-195-2) EFWS EFWS M 2HCD-195-8* Condensate Storage 4-195-04 Downstream ofcibow - No No No No No No No No Tank 2T-4!A & B bus-e ofitem #5 Discharge - 8" piping (ISO 2HCD-195-2) DesredumW T-11wernal Faigue F. Frunary Waner Swen cerroman Cradung,(FW3Cc) M *L "
- J 2, hdluenced carresem(M!c) c- com=== cracking F-flew AccelerseedCarmene 1-tmery m ierswascem semondungposec) r-Demse-canimsee o-over t - - - .
Calculation No. A PENG cal.C 017, Rev. 00 Page C1 of CIS ,O l APPENDIX C
'FMECA SEGMENT RISK RANKING REPORT *
(Attachment Pages C1 C16) O ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
1 'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report ch * "cGrec-*F *
- re cz 4cn Degradation Number Lines in Welds la Degradation Degrada* ion Mechanise Cee p Risk Risk
& g.a m ID of Welds Segiment Segmeet Mechssisnes Group ID Category Category Categwy Radc EFWS-001 190 2DBB-3-4*,2DBB- 85-3-101,85-3-102, EFW-CS-THI NONE LOW CAT 7 LOW 4-4*, 2DBC- I-4*, 85-3-103 85-3-104, 2DBC-13-4*, 85-3-105,85-3-106, 2DBC-2-4*, 85-3-107,85-3-108, 2DBC-3-4", 85-3-109,85-3-110, 2DBC-4-4*, 85-3-11I,85-3-112, 2DBC-7-2*,2HBC- 85-3-113 RS-3-1I4, 85-8*,2HBC 85-3-115,85-3-116 //
6*, 21F3C-86-8*, 85-4-101.85 3-102, 2HBD-91-8* 85-4-103,85-4-104, 85-4-105,85-4-110, 85-4-1I1,85-4-112, 85-4-113, 85-4-114, 85-4-115, 85-5-116, 85-4-117//85-1 015, 85-1-016,85-1-086, 85-1-087//85 001,85-13-002,85-13-003,85-13-004, 85-13 4 05//85 00I,85-2-002,85 003,85-2-004,85 005,85-2-006,85 007, 85-2-005,85 009,85-2 4 10,85 011,85-2-012,85 013,85-2-014,85 015,85-2-016,85 017,85-24I8, d5 019, 85-2-020, 85 021, 85-2-022, 85 023,85-2-024,85 O O O
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'*" FMECA-Segment Risk Ranking Report c"'--* - n**
l r, c3 4cn t Degradaties a Number Lines in Welds in Degradaties L.,___'_^*___ Mechanisen Ceasequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segnment Segment Mechanisms Creep ID Cseegory l Category Category Rank i 025,85-2-026,85 ! 027,85-2-028,85 029,85-2-030,85 I 031, 85-2-032,85 , 033,85-2-034,85 035,85-2-036,85 037,85-2-038,85 039,85-2-040,85 I 041,85-2-042,85 043,85-2-044,85 045,85-2-046,85 ' 047,85-2 448,85 049//85-3-040,85 041,85-3-042,85 ; 043//85-4401,854-002,85-4-001,85 004,85-4-005,85 4-006,85-4-007..'5 4 008,85-4-009,8' 010,854 011,85 t 012,854-013,854 - ' 014,85-4-015,25 016,85-4-017,85 018 85-4 4 19,85 020,85 4-02I,85 4-022,854-023,85 4- , 024,85-4-025,85 026,85-4-027,85 028,85-4-029,85 030, 85-4-031, 85 032,85-4-033,85 034,85 4-035,85 _ _ _ - _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
l
'N" FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report C h
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- rna co .1cn Degrad tion
?! amber Linesin Weids in Degradatme Degradation Mechanism C;; + a Risk Risk Segun:it ID ofWelds Segament Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Raek 036,35-4-037,85 038,85-4-039,85 040,85-4-043,35 044,85-4-045,85 046,85-4 447,85 048,85-4-049,85 050,85-4-051,85 052, 85-4-053,85 054 //85-7-00I,85 t 002,85-7-003,85 ~. -
004,85-7-005,85 006, 85-7-007,85 008,85-7-009,85 010,85-7-01I,85 012,85-7-013,85 014,85-7-015,85 016,85-7-017//72-85-034,72 4 5-035, 7245-036,7245-037,72 4 5-038,72-85-039,72 4 5-040 // 72-86-027, 72 028,72-86 4 29,72-86-030,72-86-031, 72-86-032, 72 033, 72-86 4 37,72-86-038,72-86 039, 72-86-040,72 041, 72-86-042, 72-86-043 // 72-86-034, 72-86-035,72 036 // 84-91-901, 84-O O O
p 3 i I
'N" FMECA -Segment Risk Ranking Report CN* *Gcuc* *<
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Degradaties Number IJees in Welds le Degradatise Degradation Mechseine Ce w Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segneemt Segment Mechanismes Group ID Category Category Category Rani-9l-002,84-91 003 84-91-004, 84 005,84-91-006 . ' i I i I .i i i u i I i i i t i i i I [ l e
'*" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report cah h
- d'E s cA r-oir8 oo Page C6 ef Cl3 Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Coesequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rack EFWS-002 160 2ilCC-282-10", 94-282-107, 94-282 EFW-SS NONE LOW CAT 7 LOW 21ICC-282-12", 1I3 //94-282-001, 211CD-195-10", 94-282-002, 94-282-2ilCD-195-8", 003,94-282-004,94-211CD-258-10", 282-005,94-282-21{CD-2584* 006, 94-282-007, 94-282-008,94-282-009, 94-282-010, 94-282-011, 94-282-
- 012, 94-282 o 13, 94-282-014,94-282-015, 94-282-016, 94-282-017, 94-280-018, 94-282-019, 94-282-020,94-282-021, 94-282-022,94-282-023,94-282-024,94-282-025,94 282-026, 94-282-027, 94-282-028,94-282-029,94-282-030,94-282-031,94-282-032, 94-282-033, 94-282-034, 94-282-035,94-282-036, 94-282-037, 94-282-038,94-282-039, 94-282-080, 94-282 441,94-282-
~ 042,94-282-043,94-282-044, S:-282-045,94-282-046,94-e O O
. . . - - - - - - _ _ - . . - - - . - . - - . . .- .- . . - . - ~ . - - . - . . . -.
O O O ! 'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report CNNa mec-*'7 8- a ras, cr <cn Degradation Nonsber Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Consequence Segment ID Risk Risk of Welds Segment Segument Mechanisms Grump ID Category Category Category Rank 282-047, 94-282-
- 048,94-282-049,94-
'282-050, 94-282-051,94-282-052,94-282-053,94-282-054, 94-282-055, 94-282-056,94-282-057,94-282-058,94-282-059,94-282-060,94-282 4 1, 94- l 282 4 2,94-282- '
063,94-282-064, 94- ! 282 4 5,94-282-t 066, 94-282 4 7, 94- ! 282-068, 94-282- ! 069,94-282-070,94-282-071,94-282-072,94-282-073,94-282-074, 94-282-075,94-282-076,94-282-077,94-282-078, 94-282-079, 94-282-080,94-282-081, 94-282-082, 94-282-083, 94-282- , 084, 94-282-085, 92: 282 086,94-282-087,94-282-088,94-282-089,94-282-090,94-282-091,94- t 282-092, 94-282-093,94-282-094,94- i i 5 i
'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report c k=f aoaN*d-'DGC4LC-Of 7,Rev. 00 raza ca .rcn Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degrada5an Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank 282-095, 94-282-096, 94-282-097, 94-282-098,94-282-099,94-282-100,94-282-101, 94-282-102, 94-282-103, 94-282-104, 94-282-105, 94-282-106, 94-282-110, 94-282-111, 94-282-112 # 84-195 4 01, 84-195-002, 84-195 4 03, 84-195-003 A, 84-195-004, 84-195-005, 84-195-006, 84-195-007, 84-195-008,84- { 195-009, 84-195-010, 84-195-011, 84-195-012, 84-195-013, 84-195 4 14, 84-195-0l', 84-195-016, 84-195-017, 84-195-018, 84-195-019, 84-195-020, 84 195-021, 84-195-022, 84-195-023, 84-195-024, 84-195-025,84-195-026,84-195-027, 84-195-028, 84-195-029, 84-195-030, 84-195-031,84-195-032,84-0 0 0
O ' N '7 FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report h NaAm m COI7,RnM rna cs gen Degradation Number Lines in Welds la Degradation Segment ID Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk ofWelds Segment Segnient Mechanismes Group ID Category Category Category Raek I 195-033, 84-195- t 034,84-195-035 // 84-195-036, 84-195-037, 84-195 4 38, 84-195-039,84-195-040, 84-195-041, 84-l 195-042, 84-195-043 3
// 84-258-00I// 84-i 258-002, 84-258-003, 84-258-004, 84- '
258-005 i t t
14-S997 FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report C="'a** "* NN#' 7 ^~ " Page CIO ef CIS Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Segment ID Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank EFWS-003 255 2DBB-3-4",2DBB- 85-3-117,85-3-118 EFW-CS-THI NONE MEDIUM CAT 6 LOW 4-4", 2DBC-I-4", 85-3-119,85-3-120, 2DBC-12-4", 85-3-121,85-3-122, 2GBC-2-4", 85-3-123, 85-3-124, 2DBC-3-4", 85-3-125,85-3-126, 2DBC-4-4", 85-3-127,85-3-128, 2DBC-8-2",2HBC- 85-3-129,85-3-130, 85-6", 2HBC 85-3-131,85-3-132, 8", 2HBD-883-8", 85-3-133,85-3-134, 2HBD-91-8" 85-3-135,85-3-136, 85-3-137,85-3-138, 85-3-139,85-3-140, 85-3-141,85-3-142, 85-3-143, 85-3-144 // 85-4-106,85-4-107, 85-4-108,85-4-109, 85-4-1I8,85-4-119, 85-4-120,85-4-121, 85-4-122,85-4-123 // 85-I-001,85-1-002, 85-I-003, 85-1-004, 85-1-005,85-1-006, 85-1-007, 85-1-003, 85-1-009,85-1-010, 85-I 011,85-1-012, 85-1-013,85-1-014, 85-1-017,85-1-018, 85-1-019,85-1-020, 85-1-021,85-1-022, 85-1-023,85-1-024, 85-1-025,85-1-026, 85-1-027,85-1-028, O O O
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'N" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report Ca * = "*
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- rage cis of css Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Segment ID Degradation Mechanisme Consequence Risk Risk ofWelds Segment Segment Mechanisnes Group ID Category Category Category Rank 85-1-029,85-1-030, 85-1-031,85-1-032, 85-1-033,85-1-034, 85-1-035,85-1-036, 85-1-037,85-1-038, 85-1-039,85-1-040, 85-I-041,85-I-042, 85-1-043,85-I-044, 85-1-045, 85-1-046, 85-1-047,85-I-048, 85-1-049,85-1-050, 85-1-051,85-1-052, 85-I-053, 85-!-054, 85-1-055,85-1-056, t 85-1 057,85-1-058, 85-1 059,85-1 060, 85-1-061,85-1-062, 85-1 4 3,85-1-064, 85-1-065,85-I-066, 85-1-067,85-1-068, 85-1-069,85-I-070, 85-1-071,85-1-072, ,
85-I-073,85-I-074, ; 85-1-075,85-I-076, 85-1-077,85-1-078, 85-1-079,85-1-080, 85-1-081,85-1-082, 85-1-083,85-1-084, 85-1-085, 85-1-088, 85-I-089,85-1-090, ' 85-1-091,85-I-092, 85-1-093, 85-1-094, ! t I i 1 un _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i l&Sep.97 FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report C"'a'**" "a d*""' 7 #" " f*ege Cl2 of Cl3 Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank 85-1 095,85-1-096, 85-I-097, 85-1-098, I 85-1-099,85-1-100, 85-1-101, 85-1-102, 35-I-103, 85-1-104, 85-1-105,85-1-106, i 85-1-107, 85-1-108 // 85-12-001,85 002, 85-12 4 03,85-12-004, 85-12-005, 85-12-006, 85 007,85-12-008 //85-2-050,85-2-051,85-2-052,85-2-053,85-2 4 54 // 85-3-001, 85-3-002,85-3-003,85-3-004,85-3-005,85-3-006,85-3-007,85-3-008,85-3-009,85-3-010,85-3-011,85-3-012,85-3-013,85-3-014,85-3-015,85-3-016,85-3-017,85-3 4 18,85-3-019, 85-3-020,85-3-021,85-3-022,85-3-023,85-3-024,85-3-025,85-3-026,85-3-027, 85-3-028,85-3-029,85-3-030,85-3-031,85-3-032, 85-3-033,85-3-034,85-3-035,85-G G S
- .. . ... - . . _ . . - - . . _. . _-_ - . . ~_
l O O
'*" FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report ca'c= h h M G 4 G C M .Rn. M rm cuoren Degradation Number Linesla Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Consequence Risk Risk Segment ID of Welds Segment - Segnsent Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank 3 436, 85-3-037,85-3-038,85-3-039//85- '
4-041,85-4-042//85-8 001,85-8-002,35-8-003,85 4 4 04,85-8405,85-8406,85- ( 8-007,854-008 //72-854 23,72 4 5-024, 72-85 425, 72 026,72-85-027,72-85-051, 72-85-052, 72-85-053, 72 054,72-85-055, 72-85-056,72 4 5-057// 72-85-028, 72 029,72 4 5-030,72-85-031,72-85-032, 72-85-033, 72 4 5-042, 72 4 5-043, 72- I 85-044,72-85-045, 72-85-046, 72 047, 72-85-048, 72-85-049,72 4 5-050 // - 84 4 83 4 01,84-883- ! 002//84-9l-007, 84-91-008, 84-91-009, 84-91-010,84 0I1, 84-91-012, 84- t 91-013, 84-91-014, 84-91 4 15, 84 016,84-91-017, 84- ! 91-018,84-91-019, i o
t l ' N'7 l FMFCA - Segment Risk Ranking Report ca'c='aaa" * "aSc*c-8'7 ^' " Page Cid of CIS Degradation Number Lines in Welds in Degradation Degradation Mechanism Conseamence Segment ID Risk Risk of Welds Segment Segment Mechanisms Group ID Category Category Category Rank 84-91 020, 84 021, 84-91-022, 84-91 023,84-91-024, 84-9I 4 25, 84 026,84-91-027,84-91-028 EFWS-004 10 2DBB-3-4",2 DUB- 85-3-145,85-3-146 T EFW-CS-TH2 SMALL MEDIUM CATS MEDIUM 4-4" 85-3-147,85-3-148// LEAK 85-4-124, 85 4-125, 85-4-126,85-4-127, 85-4-128,85-4-129 EFWS-005 16 2DBB-3-4",2DBB- 85-3-149,85-3-150, T EFW-CS-TH3 SMALL MEDIUM CATS MEDIUM 4-4" 85-3-151,85-3-152, LEAK 85-3-153, 85-3-154, 85-3-155, 85-3-156, 85-3-157,85-3-158, 85-3-159//85-4-130, 85-4-131, 85-4-132, 85-4-133,85-4-134 ' e G G
( ) 9
'*S W FMECA - Segment Risk Ranking Report catafaonNaNMC-017 Rn M !
Page C13 < CES Degradates Noenber Lines in Welds is Degradation Degradation Mechanism Ceasequence Risk Risk Segneemt ID of Welds Segment Seginent Mechanismas Group ID Category Category Category Rank EFWS406 '21 2HCC-282-10", 94-282-108.94-282- EFW-SS NONE MEDIUM CAT 6 LOW 2iiCC-282-12", i14 // 94-282-109, 211CC-282-8*, 94-282-115, 94-282-2ilCD-195-8" 116,94-282-117, 94- ' 282-118, 94-282-119, 94-282-120,94- t 282-121,94-282-122,94-282-123, 94-282-124 //94-282-125, 94-282-126, 94-282-127, 94-282-128
// 84-195-044, 84-195-045, 84-195- '
046, 84-195-047 - P i i
1 1 Calculation No. A PENG-CALC 017, Rev, 00 Page Of of DS 1 4 2 i 1 J-t 4 4 i i i t i APPENOlX D i QUAllTY ASSURANCE VERIFICA TION FORMS i 1 f 4 a i, 4 i 4 4 4 i i i a i i i ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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C:Icul: tion No. A-PENC cal.C 017, R:v. 00 j Page D2 of DS { Verification Plan
)
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure for the EFW at ANO 2 Document Number: C-PENG-CALC-017 Revision Number: 00 Instructions: Describe the method (s) of venfication to be employed, i.e., Design Review. Attemate Analysis, Qualification Testing, a combination of these or an attemative. The Design Analysis Verification Checklist is to be used for all Design Analyses. Other elements to consider in formulating the plan are: methods for checking calculations; comparison of results with similar analyses, etc. Descriotion of Verification Method: An independent review will ba conducted as appropriate with the work activities described in Project Plan PP 2006839, Revision 00. The verification will include: *
- 1. Verification of a Design Analysis by Design Review (per OP 3.4 of the Quality Procedures Manual).
- 2. Verification that the appropriate methodology is salected and correctly implemented
- 3. Verify all design input (as applicable) is appropria*ely and correctly obtained from traceable sources.
- 4. Review that the assumptions, results, conclusions, report format, ... etc. are made in accordance with Design Analysis Verification checklist.
Verification Pla1 prepared by: Approved by: s
. / L bib /
- 8 independent Reviewer pemted name and siggdpW Management approver phyited name and signature
/V )
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
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l l Calcubtion No. A PENG cal.C 017, Rsv 00 \ Page D3 of DS ' ('; D Other Design Document Checklist (PageIof3) in11 ructions: The independent Reviewer is to complete this checklist for each Other Design Document. This Checkhst is to be made part of the Quality Record package, although it need not be made a part of or distributed with the document itself. The second section of this checklist lists potential topics which could be relevant for a particular"Other Design Document', If they are applicable, then the relevant section of the Design Analysis Verification Checklist shall be completed and attached to this checklist. (Sections of the Design Analysis Verification Checklist which are not used may be left blank.)
Title:
Implementation of the EPRI Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure for the EFW at ANO-2 Document Number: Revision Number: A PENG-CALC-017 00 Section 1: To be completed for all Other Design Documents Yes N/A OVerall Assessment 1 Are the results/ conclusions correct and appropriate for their intended use? S 2 Arc alllimitations on the results/ conclusions documented? S Documentation Requirements I. Is the documentation legible, reproducible and in a form suitable for filing and retrieving as a Quality B Record?
- 11. Is the document identified by title, document number and date?
111. Are all pages identified with the document number including revision number? IV. Do all pages have a unique page number? V. Does the content clearly identify, as applicable: A. objective E O B. design inputs (in accordance with QP 3.2) S O C. conclusions E O VI, is the verification status of the document indicateC7 Vil, if ar, independent Reviewer is the supervisor or Project Manager, has the appropriate approval been documented? ER O Assumptions I. Are all assumption identified, justified and do:umented? O O
- 11. Are all assumptions that must be cleared listed?
O S A. Is a process in place which assures that those which are CENO nesponsibility will be cleared? O E B. ( } Is a process in place which assures that those which are the customer's responsibility to clear will O O be indicated on transmittals to the customer? ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
i l C:Icul:ti:n No. A PENG-cal.C-017, R:v. 00 Page D4 of DS Other Design Document Checklist (Page 2 of 3) Assessment of Significant Design Changes Yes N/A
- 1. Have significant design related changes that might impact this document been considered? g
!!. If any such changes have been identified, have they been adequately addressed?
O S Selection of Design Inputs
- 1. Are the design inputs documented? g
- 11. Are the design inputs correctly selected and treceable to their source? g 111. Are references as direct as possible to the original source or documents containing collectionbbulations of g inputs?
IV. Is the reference notation appropriately specific to the information utilized? p V. Are the bases for selection of all design inputs documented? g VI. Is the verification status of design inputs transmitted from customers appropriate and documented? 8 O VII. Is the verification status of design inputs transmitted from ABB CENS appropriate and documented? O 8 VIII. is the use of c'tstomer-controlled sources such as Tech Specs, UFSARs, etc. authorized, and does the authorization specify amendment level, revision number, etc.? S O References
- 1. Are all n.ferences listed? g II. Do the reference citations include sufficient information to assure retrievability and unambiguous location of the referenced material?
3 Section 2: Other Potentially Applicable Topic Areas use appropriate sections of the Design Analysis Verification Checklist (QP 3.4, Exhibit 3.4 5) and attac:.. Yes N/A
- 1. Use of Computer Software O S
- 2. Applicable Codes and Standards O O
- 3. Literature Searches and Background Data O 8
- 4. Methods O 8 l S. Hand Calculations O E
- 6. List of Computer Software O E
- 7. List of Microfiche O O
- 8. List of optical disks (CD-ROM)
O S
- 9. List of computer disks O S g ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
C:Icul: tion No. A PENG CALC 017, Rev. 00 Page OS of DS O (d Other Design Document Checklist (Page 3 of 3) - Independent Reviewer's Comments Comment Reviewer's Comment Response Author's Response : Response - Number Required? - Accepted? 1 Page 6, first sentence - the EFW Yes 'Ihis is consistent Yes design basis seems very limited; with the design to SLB + LOFW. Is this correct? basis description provided in SAR Section 10.4.9.1 2 Page 6, para 3.2, line 3 -Is the term Yes Yes, this is a Yes
" Power Piping Code" correct? type of non-code piping (ANSI B31.1) l V
Checklist completed by: Independent Reviewer [gg4g,g Pnnted Name [ g/jppy
/ Anaturei Date
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