ML20248C404

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Application for Amend to License DPR-61,changing Tech Specs to Reflect Upgrade of Reactor Protection Sys & Nuclear Instrumentation Sys at Plant
ML20248C404
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/1989
From: Mroczka E
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20248C406 List:
References
B13314, TAC-66948, NUDOCS 8908100004
Download: ML20248C404 (7)


Text

_ _. - ._ _ -- ._- _ _ - _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - __ - _ ___

NORTHEAST UTILITES o.n.,.i 0,,,c.. . seio n si,..i. e.,nn. connecticut l .csn x.w"i uc'aic coa ***'

m o s ..n. ao. . cw*'" P.O 80X 270 L L J C E[.'.C,#C, HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 (203) t>65-5000 July 28, 1989 Docket No. 50-213 B13314 Re: 10CFR50.90 -

ISAP Topic 2.04 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant Reactor Protection System Phase 11 and Nuclear Instrumentation System Upgrades (TAC 66948)

Proposed Chanaes to Technical Snecificatiens Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0) hereby proposes to amend Operating License DPR-61 by incorporating the attached changes into the Technical Specifications for the Haddam Neck Plant.

These proposed changes are being s@mitted to reflect the upgrade of the reactor protection system (RPS) and the nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) at the Haddam Neck Plant. A description of the proposed changes is provided in Attachment 1. The revised pages are provided in Attachment 2. These pages are being provided in the new Standard Technical Specification (STS) format only, in support of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specification conversion to STS format. " Change bars" in the margin indicate changes related to this reo"est on STS format pages that have been pr submitted to NRC Staff in letters dated August 29,1986,gously October 26,1988,g (1) E. J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications, Electrical Power Systems (TAC No. 66797)," dated August 29, 1988.

(2) E. J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Amendment Request for Sections 1.0, 3/4.2, 3/4.9, 3/4.10, 3/4.11, 5.0 and 6.0 of the Revised Technical Specifications," dated October 26, 1988.

8908100004 090728 3 Q A00l DR ADOCK 0500 l

-__- J

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13314/P.ge 2 July 28, 1989 i

{

Harch 6, 1989,(3)

July 28,1989. Y) April 21, 1989,(4) June 2, 1989,(5) June 23, 1989 (6) and ILashcround In a letter dated September 1, 1988,Ib) CYAPC0 provided the NRC Staff with information concerning Phase II of the RPS upgrade and Nuclear Instrumentation j System outage at(NIS) modifications the Haddam to be performed during the upcoming 1989 refueling Neck Plant. l In that letter, CYAPC0 stated that changos would be prcrosed to the technical specifications via a future license amend- )

ment request to reflect the RPS and NIS modifications. The proposed changes contained herein address that intention. "

A. RPS Voarades Phases II This project will resuit in the replacement of the existing four (one channel per loop) reactor coolant system (RCS) flow transmitters with  ;

twelve (3 channels per loop) QA Category 1, Class IE flow transmitters.

In addition, the existing control board circuitry and modules will be rep 12.ced with QA Category 1, Class IE equivalents. Following these changes, a low flow condition in a single loop will be determined by a 2 (3) E. J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Amendment Request for Section 3/4.1 of the Revised Technical Specifications (TAC No. 48019)," dated March 6, 1989.

(4) E. J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Section 3.6, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)," dated April 21, 1989.

(5) E. J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications 3/4.4, 3/4.6 and 3/4.7 of the Revised Technical Specifications," dated June 2, 1989.

(6) E. J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications 2.0, 3/4.3 of the Revised Technical Specifications," dated June 23, 1989. 1 (7) E, J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications, Section 3.0/4.0 and 3.4.6.2 of the Revised Technical Specifications," dated July 28, 1989. ,

{

(8) E. J. Mrotzka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Reactor Protection System Phase II and Nuclear Instrumentation System Upgrades (TAC 66948)," dated September 1, 1988.

1

s '

7 n

d an cy nE n aiId er nda nsne t '

osi t edu clama re i-n e

r 3) C eg t

e r dcus a

d f 1, d e eftire o d ib d vi sybv ei rdnrisa pr o nr ro ion agep coig es m) up e eh eS h l t rt t a l drTt a

t '

en l

asw w

i (2 Cll il wi d (Rmen ude t A r m ip ixQw l

s ge ng e s,ha te u nc t h ce suia ron n sq i r ou i

an goth ihsoeye w ch infic t t a ip th e l l

s s d ct i n io t t e e sl ns ic w n e

  • es il oi xa chT fetr re po i r t o

lu il t Th ete cf eere n t h w-enssu.ity.

r p ohw a t e i t o hi s ,r c t P l

s nd d ht r

in ce.

t l e s ecl a l 2etas k ip a o n in t s -

dcrae c wi en el r ni cipdaeb aw ctn rne Ne t r ge or sM) d ieem n b l iu f s soh ibeinli ,t ?

i y.

cit renh l

p d ig hca it n e hmde n ur chcl i da m

w r

e ra e nn eA (P c o o inl oi a o eip te t acu nq d a o e h t a sm r d e A t w ctV l t i e p t s, hg e cb ia ls i e Acr l d en eA o r H er ial d e, s. m er cn i det r o.ed n fapte l l ne re cieay wh t tc s. rnn a od ilai th nsg n t h

e o

v e r e fo ma a l r nt go s w a" i s e ce a

adificc et s rrssna erhc n r ai at ee an pe t

jewth st cac r t dne d s g.

e at t rn o a einen t odu an ro i u suatn S h r ne ig h

c em onhtiaci rs f c i o ie en at eraca ny e r o t t s prsem4c c el gce ms et NI oa n ge t inat th c sunfa rao t n t

wr n s de c is haiottnnvie e e t ra ed it se ad thst e t n cda tr es h t rr t de or mi rc fcn ieos pis oar no r e ui proo p dadnh n si e u ct

s. ni ew r e i t e t a c cl efss pn e,t u e eot d n rr n int spee ow r o ns s2t e osIbpise ra ei uu p m so r r ly o i a ra e eea s res opncra tr et g th pt o c fo r op l 2e npt r u mr up u ow n w a ma sinl phcme t e hh e t he i p y ip brt d o lni es to ofs t t fo d t t ict n "t ics iea e m i

fa ii t ip i t n n h m a eo s n e east c rad t

~

Thtt o nat fa fw e hu ret'o Ain c m nr et o s h t s ur s e c h eb u tl cd ai q tewmo U j eg: ctee on t e nn l

f o o cl e e t

Attvne ro ig r s ta b

tw. s fn c n S ri pw laa r maen t s tha e nn th npetio e pa eh n n el hl o reep l

a cc e me fo oi f c h

odls iodste etdead t

Tof s pg e t oS t e h n en ac onn c I datl eo B. o ra r l p i fu n tN sud el gcn fnmamn ooo e t ee mg nna stea ict o

r drim da e cao n n. h ai cdv e n ncrhu r.

' al l ari t noiu o tc a pea f c o edt rin edabta mp d r's 5%l o sI o we m ont o pt d u ar es n e 9.i l o resa ph mil s

e nccu9w et nt c a fa af ht easthl n ia lnt druhi w Tt ot Aiavemrt thr en ti tueaoshep t ge rt ,

s 1' N X

l' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13314/Page 4 July 28, 1989 l

L Significant Hazards Considerations

'~

In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPC0 has reviewed the attached proposed changes and has concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria

of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposad changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because u.c d'.nge would not
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability cr consequences of an accident oreviousiv evaluatgd I. RPS Voarades The proposed changes add new requirements to ensure that the RPS trip functions meet specified requirements and do not impact the consequences of any design basis events. The specific RPS response times for the low-pressure, high-pressure, pressurizer level and safety injection reactor trips are the same as assumed in previous safety analysis. The time response for the power range nuclear flux, startup rates, and low-flow reactor trips have been lengthened relative to previ-ous analysis assumptions. Each of the design basis events were evaluated to determine the impact of the lengthened response times. In every case, the effect of the lengthened response time was compensated by improved performance of new equipment, other technical specification limits, or by the characteristics of the transient itself (e.g., for the steamline break, delay-ing the reactor trip may even reduce the consequences of the event.) In addition, these changes do not increase the proba-bility of occurrence of any design basis events. These changes do not increase the probability of safety system failure and in fact actually increase the reliability of many of the impacted systems. '

II. NIS Uoarades '

o Increasing the number of setpoints in the power range channels will not' impact any event consequences. The analyses are performed assuming that the high power trip is recalibrates to be within 9% of steady state power level prior to event initiation. The increased number of setpoints will not impact the requirement and ability to maintain the trip setpoint within 9% of steady state power level.

o Increasing the number of channels of " shutdown high neutron level al' arm" from "I of 1" to "I of 2" will increase the reliability of that indication. The actual setpoints are not changed.

_. }

~U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13314/Page 5 July 28, 1989 o The addition of a " shutdown monitor alarm" specification i assures that this alarm will be available. to operate as assumed in the boron dilution design basis event.

o The addition of channel calibration requirements on the NIS provides greater assurance- that these channels will operate as required.

o Reducing the frequency of the channel functional test will not impact the ability of the safety grade channels to perferm their function. The proposed surveillance fre-quencies meet the manufacturers suggested frequencies and provide a projected reliability in excess of 99%.

o The requirement for 3 channels of wide range NIS to be operable in Modes 2 through 5 assures that adequate indication is available to the operators. The number of wide range channels is being increased to 4. The proposed technical specifications address this increase, providing additional requirements for the startup rate trip func-tion. Removing the requirement to have this trip operable in Mode 5 with the rods not capable of withdrawing is consistent with the uncontrolled rod withdrawal design basis analysis.

These proposed technical specification changes do not result in the increase in probability of any design basis event. The RPS and NIS are not a source of initiating events for any design basis accidents. These proposed changes will not increase the probability of safety system failure. ~

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previousiv evaluated The proposed technical specification changes to support both the RPS and the NIS upgrades do not modify the plant response to the degree that a new accident scenario has been created. These proposed

, changes reflect new, more advanced hardware changes that artcally improve RPS and NIS reliability and redundancy. There are no failure modes associated with the technical specifications changes.

As proposed they are either equivalent to, or an improvement over, the existing specifications.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a maroin of safety The proposed technical specification changes to support both the RPS and the NIS upgrades have been evaluated with respect to design

)- basis events to determine their impact on the margin of safety. It l

l

~ _ _ - . _ _ . - _ _ _ .

. 1, .

L

.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13314/Page 6

' July 28, 1989 was determined that these proposed changes have no impact on the plant protective boundaries (r.ladding, vessel, containment). The performance of the plant safety systems will be enhanced, not degraded by these proposed changes. Therefore, it was concluded that there is no reduction in any margins of safety. s The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the stan- )

dards in 10CFR50.92 by providing certain examples (51FR7751, March 6, 1986) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration. Although the proposed changes herein are not enveloped by a specific example, they would not involve a significant increase in the proba-bility or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. As stated earlier,-

-the proposed changes support upgrades to.the RPS and NIS and ensure increased reliability and function of these systems. In addition, the changes do not create a new unanalyzed event based on the fact that these specifications have no failure modes associated with them.

plant response enough that a new accident scenario is created.In addition, Finally, the they do margins of safety are not decreased as a result of these proposed changes.

None tions. of the protective boundaries are affected by these proposed specifica-Based upon the information contained in this submittal and the environmental assessment for the Haddam Neck Plant, there are no significant radiological or nonradiological impacts associated with the proposed action, and the proposed license amendment will not have a significant- effect on the quality of the human environment.

The Haddam. Neck Plant Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and approved the attached proposed revision and concurs with the above determinations.

In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b), CYAPC0 is providing the State of Connecticut with a copy of this amendment.

'CYAPC0 respectfully requests that this proposed license amendme n-t be reviewed and issued by October 2,1989 to support restart of the Haddam Neck Plant following the Cycle 16 refueling outage.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY E. J. MPoczka f Senior Vice President

4

- U.S. - Nuclear Re'g ulatory_ Commission B13314/Page 7-July 28,.1989-

- cc: W. T.' Russell,. Region I Administrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager,.Haddam Neck Plant LJ. T.' Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant Mr. Kevin McCarthy

  • Director, o.adiation. Control: Unit ~ .

Department of.' Environmental Protection Hartford, Connecticut 06116 STATE OF CONNECTICUT).

-) ss. Berlin COUNTY Of HARTFORD ')

Then perso'aally appeared before me, E. J. Mroczka, who being duly sworn, did state that he fis Senior Vice President of Connecticut Yankee . Atomic Power Company,. a Licensee herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensee herein, and best the that of his statements knowledgecontained in said~information are true and correct to the and belief.

44sid

' Notary p lic MyCommission Expires Mamh31,1993 9

_,,__.___._________m - . _ - - * - - " - - - - - - - - - - '