Text

Amend 121 to License DPR-61,revising & Combining Tech Spec Sections 3.6,3.7 & 4.3
	ML20247A465
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	09/05/1989
From:	Stolz J; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
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ML20247A454	List: ML20247A447; ML20247A465; ML20247A484;
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	NUDOCS 8909120127
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f"s. . ig"'g ' UNITED STAT Es NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i5-' < .;

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,,e t CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY D0 KET NO, 50-213 HADDAM NECK PLANT AMENCVENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 121 License No. DPR-61

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power (the licensee), dated April 21,1989, complies with the standards anc requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and tr.e Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10.CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (1) that.the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51

'of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2)' of Facility Operating License No. DPR-61 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical' Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.121, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

R THE NliCLE p EGU ATORY COMMISSION ifoh . . Stolz, Director

, f Proj ect Directorate I

[DJ41sionofReactorProjects-I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 5,1989 1

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, LATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.121

' FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-61 DOCKET NO. 50-213 a-

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with-the enclosed pages. The revised pages tre. identified by amendment number and.contain vertical lines indicating the areas of~ change.

Remove Insert 3-10 3-10 I

'3-10a 3-10a' 3-10b~ 3-10b 3-10c- 3-10c L 3-10d 3-10d 3-10e 3-10f 3-10g 3-10h 3-101 3-10j E

3-10k 3-101 3-10m 1

3-11 3-11

'4-3 4-3 4-4 . 4-4 4-4a 4 -4a 4- 4-4b 4-4b 4 -4c 4-4c l

. s ._nN--_-_____--_-_--.--..__.-__-____x_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - _ _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ - - - - _ _ - - . - - - --_--________--__----_-_-____-__--_-_---__._----_.._--.__---__-.____-._.------____.-.A--a

5 v 3.6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 0

3.6.1 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavo GREATER THAN OR EOUAL TO 350 f 4 l

i. . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.la Two independe'nt Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

1. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

2. One OPERABLE High Pressure Safety Injection pump,

3. One OPERABLE Low Pressure Safety Injection pump,

} 4 One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,

5. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and

6. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

b. The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump, which consists of four open reactor cavity pool seal hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, test the remaining High Pressure Safety Injection pump, Low Pressure Safety Injection pump, or the RHR pump within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ; restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

b. With the flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump inoperable, restore the flow path to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

! c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

i 3-10 Amendment No. )(,fff,J#,)(121 u _ __ _ _ _ _ -

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTQE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that~ the following valves are in the indicated conditions:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position RH-FCV-602 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked closed. Operator air l Bypass Line supply isolated.

RH-FCV-796 RHR Heat Exchanger Blocked in throttled position.

Discharge Line Operator air supply isolated.

RHR-MOV-22 Containment Sump Closed.

Suction Line Manual Operator is locked.

SI-MOV-24 RWST Line Locked open. Operator circuit breaker locked open.

SI-TCV-875 HPSI Miniflow Line Blocked and locked open.

RH MOV-874 RHR Recirculation Locked closed. Operator Line circuit breaker locked open.*

SI-MOV-854A HPSI Pump Locked open.

Suction Line SI-MOV-854B HPSI Pump Locked open.

Suction Line SI-MOV-901 RHR/HPSI Crosstie Locked closed.

SI-MOV-902 RHR/HFSI Crosstie Locked closed,

b. On start-up prior to entering Mode 4:

VALVE NO. LOCATION ACTION r

SI-V-905 HPSI Loop 1 Valve blocked and locked Injection Line in throttled position.

SI-V-906 HPSI loop 2 Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position SI-V-907 ,

.HPSI loop 3 Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position.

SI-V ,908 HPSI loop 4 Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position.

SI-MOV-873 Core deluge line Valve is locked open and electrically disconnected.

Except as permitted by Surveillance Requirement C.2.

3-10a Amendment No. JAf,)SJf g,121

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w -ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 2 3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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c.- At least'once per 31 days by:

' 1) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or

' automatic) .in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or.

otherwise secured in position, is in its correct-position, 2)- Manually cycling SI-MOV-24 from the full.open position to-

.approximately 1 inch of stem travel and. returning to the full open position and cycling RH-MOV-874 from the full closed L position to the full open position and back-to the full closed position by use of the motor operator.

3) Verifying that each of the following pumps develops greater than or equal to the indicated discharge head pressure and differential pressure on recirculation flow when tested:

pursuant to Section 4.10.B.

Discharge .

Head Differential Pressure Pressure a) .High Pressure Safety -A '1392 psig 1 1374 psid Injection Pump B .1392 psig 1 1374 psid b) Low Pressure-Safety A 322. psig. 1 304 psid Injection Pump B 322 psig 1 304 psid s

c) Residual Heat Removal A. 145 psig i 112 psid Pump B 145 psig' 1 112 psid 4)- Verifying the hydraulic characteristics of the centrifugal charging pumps (A and B) pursuant to Section 4.10.B.

-d. By'a visual inspection which verifies that no loose' debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. The visual inspection shall be performed:

1) Of all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.- This includes verifying all reactor cavity pool seal hatches are open, gratings installed, and also that the transfer canal drain valves WD-V-203 and WD-V-970 are open, and

2) Of the areas within containment affected by the work activity within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months following each containment entry, except for

' entries made only for surveillance or inspection, when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established. In the event of multiple containment entries, an inspection shall be performed at least once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Inspection required by this paragraph shall be performed prior to the containment air lock testing.

3-10b Amendment No. JAI.)6JHf.Df,J#,JB3,121

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,o EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that when the RCS pressure (simulated or actual) increases above 400 psig, proper interlock action occurs to protect the RHR System from being overpressurized by the RCS.

2) A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the drain trenches and cover gratings are not restricted by debris and show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1) Verifying that each automatic valve shown in Table 3.6-1 in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal,

2) Verifying that valves, RH-MOV-22 and RH-V-808A, in the flow path for suction from the containment sump can be opened by manual realignment, and

3) Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:

a) High Pressure Safety injection pump, and b) Low Pressure Safety Injection pump.

g. At least once per 18 months, during. shutdown, the remotely controlled, motor-operated containment spray water valve shall be operated under a "no-flow" condition. The test will be considered satisfactory if visual observation shows that the valve has operated satisfactorily.

i 3-10c Amendment No. 121

'. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continuedl

h. Periodic leakage testing of each ECCS check valves, SI-CV-862A, SI-CV-8628, SI-CV-862C, SI-CV-8620, SI-CV-872A, and SI-CV-8728 shall be accomplished prior to entering MODE 1 operation:

1) After.every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling.

2) After every time the plant has been placed in the colu shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months.

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3) Prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed.

Leakage may be measured indirectly using pressure indicators, if accomplished.in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compliance with the leakage criteria of Section 3.14.A.6. The minimum differential pressure across these check valves during these leakage tests shall not be less than 150 psid.

i. The correct position of each ECCS throttle valve listed below shall. be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS

. subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Numb 1r SI-V-905

-SI-V-906 SI-V-907 SI-V-908 RH-FCV-796 i

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1 Amendment No. 121 3-10d )!

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_ EMERGENCY' CORE COOLING SYSTEMS-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) l .j; A flow balance test shall be performed, during Mode 5 or 6, i following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that I alter the' subsystem flow characteristics, to verify that:

1) For the High Pressure-Safety Injection pump injection lines, with a single pump running and two lines isolated, the flow rate through each line is equal to 1000 100 gpm.

2)- For RHR pump discharge lines, with a single pump running, the flow rate through the discharge line is equal to 15001 280 gpm.

3-10e Amenament No. 121

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n7 TABLE 3.6-1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED ALITOMATIC VALVES VALVE' NUMBER SI POSITION SI-MOV-861A Open SI-MOV-8618- .Open SI-MOV-861C -

Open SI-MOV-8610 Open CD M0V-871A Open CD-MOV-871B Open BA-MOV-373 Open LD-MOV-200 Closed LD-TV-230 Closed CH-MOV-257 Closed CH-SOV-242 Closed 1

I 3-10f Amendment No, 121

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. ' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.6.2 0 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tava LESS THAN 350 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2a As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

1. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging' pump, *

2. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,

3. One OPERABLE RHR pump,

4. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and manually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

b. The flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump which consists of four open reactor cavity pool hatches and open transfer canal drain valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump, or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, containment sump or the reactor cavity to the containment sump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months ,

b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the RHR heat exchanger or RHR pump, restore at least one status or maintain the Reactor Coolant ECCSTsubsystem System to350 less than OPERABL[F by use ofr alternate heat removal methods.*V9

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenevar its value exceeds

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0.70.

f A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump, one meteritig pump, and no high pressure safety injection pumps shall be OPERABLE whenever the Low Temperature Overpressurization System (LTOP) is required.

3-10g Amendment No. 121

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

., a. The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of Specification 3.6.1 with the exception that, for valves RH-FCV-602 and RH-FCV-796, restoration of valve controls be allowed. I

b. One centrifugal charging pump and both High Pressure Safety Injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of the gCS cold legs of an unisolated loop is less than or equal to 315 F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of 3 inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent by verifying:

1) That the High Pressure Safety Injection pump motor circuit breakers are racked out and the cabinets locked,

2) That High Pressure Safety Injection pump discharge valves SI-V-855A and SI-V-855B are closed and locked, and

3) That the inoperable centrifugal charging pump's control switch is in the trip pullout position and red tagged, "Do Not Operate."

3-10h Amendment No. 121

.t EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.6.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume of 230,000 gallons,

b. A boron concentration of between 2200 and 2850 ppm, c.. A msnimum water temperature of 60'F, and

d. A maximum water temperature of 120'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the contained borate,d water volume in the tank, and

2) Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST. temperature.

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3-101 Amendment No. 121

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, ' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.6.4 DH CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4 A system for controlling the pH of the core cooling water (i.e. TSP Storage Baskets) during the recirculation phase shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:

l With the pH control system (TSP Storage Baskets) inoperable, restore the system (TSP Storage Baskets) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

. SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS The pH control system (TSP Storage Baskets) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that a minimum total of 60 cubic feet of trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained in the TSP storage baskets, and

b. Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.35 0.05 lbs. of TSP from a TSP storage, basket is submerged, without agitation, in 5015 gallons of 180 10 F borated water from the RWST, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

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t 3-10j Amendment No. 121 1

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'. 3.6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3ASES 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

'Either subsystem is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of.the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

0 With the RCS temperature below 350 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one metering pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveil hnce Requirement to verify the remainingcentrifugalchargingpumpandhighpressuresafetyinjectionpumps to be inoperable below 315 F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single low temperature overpressurization relief valve.

In order to use the HPSI pumps to provide high pressure recirculation following a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a single active failure, the following modifications to the emergency core cooling system have been made. A piping crosstie between each HPSI pump suction and the RHR pump discharge has been installed. Two valves, SI-MOV-901 and SI-MOV-902 have been installed in this crosstie. The two manual HPSI pump suction valves have been replaced with motor-operated valves, SI-MOV-854A and B, to prevent contaminated water from entering the RWST when using the HPSI pumps to provide flow to the core during recirculation. Currently, these valves are locked open.

The manual core deluge isolation valve has been replaced with a de-energized motor-operated valve, SI-MOV-873. This valve is locked open to ensure that adequate flow is available to the core deluge system.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

3-10k Amendment No. 121

4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the ,

i event of a LOCA, Valve RH-FCV-796 is required to be throttled open within a specified range.

That throttled position has been determined by separate analyses to ensure acceptable core performance during post-LOCA recirculation.

The surveillance requirements test the operability of check valves which act as primary coolant system pressure isolation valves and thereby reduces the potential for an intersystem loss of coolant accident. ,

I In order to use the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps to perform high pressure recirculation (HPR) following a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), successful operation of SI-MOV-24 and RH-MOV-874 is required. The monthly surveillance to be performed on these two valves will increase the probability that the valves are available to perform their function during the small break LOCA. Since SI-MOV-24 will not be closed to any measurable extent during the surveillance, there will be no effect on safety injection availability. Surveillance on RH-MOV-874, will only last for a short time and the probability of a small break loss of coolant accident concurrent with the surveillance is extremely low. If the valve becomes inoperable during this time, RH-V-783 in series with RH-MOV-874 can be closed. Therefore, there will be no measurable impact on HPSI system availability as a result of the surveillance.

Reference:

FSAR - Section 6.3 3.6.3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition

. following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The maximum solution temperature for the RWST is based on design basis '

accident analysis.

The minimum solution temperature for the RWST is for freeze protection concerns. In addition, the minimum solution temperature for the RWST is also based on the stress analysis for the associated piping system and pressurized thermal shock.

3-101 Amendment No. 121

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3.6.4 oH CONTROL SYSTEM The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored.in porous wire mesh baskets located adjacent to the containment sump is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking in certain metal components during operation of the ECCS in the recirculation mode.following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing a resultant pH of 17.0 based on the following conditions: (1) RWST beron concentration of 2850 ppm,160,000 gallons of RWST volume injected (120,000 gallons during the injection phase, an additional 40,000 gallons during transfer to recirculation) and, (2) RCS and PZR at hot zero power conditions with a boron concentration of 2000 ppm.

If the entire contents of the RWST were injected into containment, sufficient TSP is available to raise the sump pH to 16.5. This is sufficiently high to reduce the susceptibility of stainless steel to stress corrosion cracking.

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i 3-10m amendment No. 121

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