ML20238A488

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-57,consisting of NUREG/CR-3524, Organizational Interface in Reactor Emergency Planning & Response, Dtd May 1984

ML20238A488
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	05/06/1987
From:	Adler M, Copenhaver E, Mileti D, Sorensen J COLORADO STATE UNIV., FORT COLLINS, CO, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
References
CON-FIN-B-0491, CON-FIN-B-491, RTR-NUREG-CR-3524 OL-5-I-SC-057, OL-5-I-SC-57, ORNL-6010, NUDOCS 8708310096
Download: ML20238A488 (56)

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'87 AUG 24 A9 :45 NUREG/CR-3524 ORNL-6010 DiIsEt! CategoryRX f Energy Division ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACE IN REACTOR EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE J. H. Sorensen Oak Ridge National Laboratory E. D. Copenhaver l

Oak Ridge National Laboratory D. S. Mileti Colorado State University M. V. Adler Oak Ridge National Laboratory l

Manuscript Completed - September 1983 Date of Issue - May 1984 l

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Prepared for Division of Facility Operations 4 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co'mmission Washington, DC 20555 4 Under Interagency Agreement DOE 40 550 75 e

i NRC Fin No. B0491 .

I Prepared by the '

Oak Ridge National Laboratory'-

Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831 operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.

for the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY under Contract No. DE-AC05-840R21400 -

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CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT- V-EXECUTIVE SUMMNRY vii

1. . INTERFACE IN EMERGENCY. PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR. POWER PLANTS 1 1.1 Research Issue 1-1 1.2 Research Objectives 1-1 1.3 Research Framework 1-1 1.4 Research Methods 1-3

2. ' PLAN REVIEWS 2-1 2.1 Sample Selection 2-1 2.2 Data Collection 2-1 2.3 Findings by Functional Response--Tasks 2-3 2.4 General Findings 2-6

3. CASE STUDIES 3-1 3.1 Case Study One 3.2 Case Study Two _3 3-4 4 TEST EXERCISE 4-1 4.1 Interfaces During the Exercise 4-1 4.2 The View from the Utility EOF /TSC 4-2 4.3 The View from the State EOC 4-3 4.4 The View from Local E0Cs ~4-3

5. FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS '

l 5-1 5.1 Findings from the Plan Reviews 5-1 5.2 Findings from the Case Studies 5-1 5.3 Findings from. the Test Exercise 5-2 5.4- Implications for Emergency- Planning Regulations 5-2 APPENDIX A - Dynamics of Interface: Organizations During Emergencies A-1 APPENDIX B - Soce Potential _ Problems in Energency Response B-1 l APPENDIX C - Discussion Topics on Organizational Interface C-1 u

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APPENDIX D - Test Exercise Evaluation Topics D-1 APPENDIX E - Data from the Case Studies and Exercise E-1 APPENDIX F - Description of the Exercise F-1 REFERENCES R-1 l

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ABSTRACT The purpose of this research was to determine if existing regulations i have led to effective interfaces between utilities and offsite organi '

zations in emergency planning and response. Findings suggest that.

regulations have provided the necessary framework for achieving adequate interfaces. That interface has been achieved is demonstrated by compre- sl hensive response plans and good cohesiveness among organizations involved in emergency response. Interface problems identified in the research can be reduced by better implementation of existing regulations I rather than by revision of existing ones. .}

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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.Thep' urpose of this. research was to determine if existing ' regulations

'resulud in. adequate interface between utilities and of fsite organiza--

tions in emergent.y planning and response. To address this question, we -

attempted to assess two elements of emergency management which could be i

esed to measure the level of interface: the comprehensiveness and cohe-sivaness of planning and response. Comprehensiveness of planning was .

determined by a detailed review of emergency plans. Comprehensiveness L of response was determined by the evaluation of a test exercise. .To.

I assess cohesiveness, we identified, from a review of relevant litera-ture, a set of factors associated with cohesive response. Two case studies were use'd to measure the presence of these factors in planning.

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Second, a test exercise was observed to measure- the presence of these factors in response.

FINDINGS FROM THE PLAN REVIEWS The two purposes of the review of. the emergency plans were to determine whether these plans would constrain a comprehensive response to an emer-gency and to determine if planning activities were reasonably coordinated.

In general, the review suggested that there is adequate interf ace between utilities and offsite organizations in the planning process and that this interaction has led to well-coordinated planning documents.

Although .this conclusion applies in general, we also noted several areas in which interface during the planning process can be improved.

I FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES The case studies attempted to-measure and assess the. presence of factors l

that help promote cohesive response efforts both within and between organizations. We found- that, internally, organizations are quite cohe-

-ive. Cohesion tends to break down', howev^ e r, in relationships across 2

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organizational response networks. Organizations demonstrated flexibi-  ;

lity in their response systems, which increases the effectiveness of j response. '

FINDINGS FROM THE TEST EXERCISE

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The test ' exercise was used to determine if comprehensive planning led to a coordinated response and to assess how cohesiveness may change during I a simulated response. Overall., the actual ' response that we ' observed was  ;

not as well coordinated as the planned' response. This discrepancy was '

mainly-due to problems in implementing procedures and not from inade-quate plans and procedures. In addition, we found that internal cohe-siveness within an organization increased during the exercise but. that interorganizational cohesiveness decreased. 1

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CONCLUSIONS ,

Findings suggest that implementation of existing regulations have led to comprehensive planning ef forts. Minor igrovements to plans can be made, but they fall within the scope of existing rules, regulations, and .

implementation guides. On these grounds, ne regulatory changes are .

i warranted.

Findings suggest that regulations will lead to fairly comprehensive responses to an emergency. Evidence from the case studies and the test exercise suggests that problems are due to poor execution of emergency plans and to lack of resources. Existing regulations explicitly deal with these problems, which can be reduced by better enforcement- of the regulations.

More difficult and abstract to assess is the level of cohesiveness in and between emergency organizations.- Our work revealed that cohesive-ness as measured in the planning process is strong within the organiza-tions but weaker between organizations. The difference was even more pronounced for cohesiveness in errergency response. The major reason for lack of cohesiveness was poor communication and a lack of Knowledge l

about. whom to communicate with. This is made more problematic by a lack of legitimacy among organizations; that is, some organizations do not have confidence in others or do not believe they play an i@ortant role.

Overall, our research suggests that the problems experienced at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant with respect to planning and coor-dination will not occur in another emergency unless existing regulations ,

are not followed or existing plans are not properly implemented.

i However, mechanisms for ensuring that plans are properly implemented are part of the existing regulations.

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1.

INTERFACE IN EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1

1.1 RESEARCH ISSUE i 1

,1 One of the many " human factors" issues in nuclear power plants (NPPs) emphasized by the accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Plant  ;

was the problem associated with organizational conflict, comtrunication i breakdown, lack of planning, and lack of coordination.* While the uncertainty and the characteristics of the accident helped in creating these problems, so did the. nature of the organizational interfaces both

.4 prior to and during the emergency.

As a result, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued revised rules and implementation guidelines on emergency planning which set forth ~ require-ments that intend to anure adequate interfaces between the utility and offsite organizations.**,t The purpose of the research reported here was to evaluate whether existing regulations result in adequate inter-faces among organizations involved with emergency response. Where appropriate, recommendations for improved interface are offered.  ;

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES In addressing the general topic cf evaluating interfaces among response organizations, three general research objectives were advanced:

(1) to assess how utilities and power plant organizations interact with offsite organizations, (2) to determine and federal plans, if utility and plans are consistent with local, state, (3) to determine if emergency planning efforts will result in a compre-hensive and cohesive response should an accident occur.

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1.3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK Figure 1 illustrates a general model of interactions in emergency' preparedness and response which guided this research. The key eleent The Need

• President's for Change: Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.

Office Washington, D.C., The Legacy of TMI, U.S. : Government Printing 1979.

• • V.S. i Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Federal Emergency Management Agency, Res Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological {

3onse Plans and Preparedness in Support -of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev. 1, 1980.

tu.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comminion, " Emergency Planning; Final Regulations," Federal Register, Vo' . 45, No.162,1980, 55402-55418, 1-1

1-2 O R G A NIZ A TlO N A L . m m PREPAREDNESS C H AR ACTERISTICS PLANNING V

4 RELATIONS FLEXIBILITY

' W ITH I N WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS ORGANIZATIONS N RESPONSE

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NETWORK

/ N RELATIONS FLEXIBILITY BETWEEN BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS ORGANIZATIONS V

RESPONSE _

m RESPONSE COMPREHENSIVENESS CO HESIVENESS -

l ORNL Dwg. 84-10289 Figure 1 A Descriptive Model of the Relationships Between Emergency Planning  ;

j Response Network and Response Effectiveness '

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1-3 in the model is the process by which interaction takes place. As depicted in the middle box, planning and response are characterized by (1) intraorganizational relationships, that is, the set of inter-actions that take place _among members of an organization, (2) interorganizational' relationships, that is, the set of inter-actions between organizations and their members, (3) intraorganizational flexibility, or the ' ability of individual organizations to change in response to new environments or l ci rcums tances ,

(4) interorganizational flexibility, or the ability. of organizations

' to change relationships with other organizations and (5) response networks, or the pattern of interactions among all organizations in the response effort.

The nature of the relationships, ' flexibility, and network is deter-mined to a large extent by the characteristics of each organization and by the planning efforts that take place before or between emergencies.

In turn the organizational process has a direct'effect on response comprehensiveness and cohesiveness. In this research, comprehensiveness and cohesiveness were used as indicators of effective interface. This model also helps to depict the relationship between planning and response.

As such, it is possible to have comprehensive planning but not a comprehensive response or vice versa. _ Thus, in order to determine the adequacy of regulations, it is necessary to systematically assess organizational relationships, flexibility, and networks for emergency response and planning.  !

l 1.4 RESEARCH METHODS Studying interactions during NPP accidents is limited by the lack of serious accidents for which empirical studies can be conducted.

l Given this problem, a research design was formulated to study interac- l tions as they are thought to occur in an emergency and to attempt to understand how the interactions may differ during an actual' emergency. ')

i The first task of the research team was to document interaction by reviewing sets 6f emergency plans for a sample of reactor sites. The 1 second task was to review literature on organizational interaction I during disasters and other emergencies.

Based on this review a set.of j

conditions or factors that help explain cohesive response was, developed. (

The third task was to conduct interviews with representatives of all emergency response organizations at a given site. The purpose of the  ;

interviews was to measure the presence of factors that are associated i with cohesive response. Finally, a test exercise at an NPP was used to examine interactions under a simulated emergency. Pre-exercise inter-views were held with organizations to ascertain the perceived nature of interactions. Overt behavior during the exercise was then observed.

Exercise participants were subsequently interviewed about their experiences during the exercise to again determine the presence and absence of factors associated with a cohesive response network.

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2. PLAN REVIEWS 2.1 Sample Selection Resource limits prevented studying all NPP sites in the U.S. A^

non-random sample of sites 'was chosen 'to meet the following criteria:

(1) Geographic Coverage-e one site in each state with an operable reactor e one site in each NRC region a 'one site in each FEMA region (2) Multiple Jurisdictions e range in number of local political jurisdictions ,

e sites with multiple states in emergency planning zone I (3) Nuclear technology e reactor types covered e different vendors covered (4) Population in EPZ e rural and urban sites e population range Our chosen sample consisted of 23 sites that met the above goals.

We were successful in collecting data on 17 of those sites, and sets of ,

emergency plans were analyzed for each. The mix of reactor sites repre-sents a full range of variation in factors-important to consider when evaluating probable emergency responses by organizations. As a result, the purposive sample selected provides a strong, albeit nonstatistical, basis for generalizing findings.

2.2 Data Collection i

As the first step in evaluating linkages among organizations, it was necessary to determine, on the basis of information in the plans, which organizations performed specified tasks and their assumptions about which tasks other organizations were to perform. Functional emergency response tasks for a radiological emergency have been sum-marized in Table 1; both key decision points and routine tasks are iden-tified. This functional description was used to index how each organizational emergency response plan (utility, state government, local government) assigned responsibility for each task.. The purpose of this procedure was to verify that all plans written for a particular plant were consistent in organizational assignments--not to evaluate the ade-quacy of the plans.

To the extent possible, the three principles specified in the literature review as necessary to help ensure effectiveness of emergency response will also be addressed: (1) work and role definition, (2) interorganizational network integration, and (3) maintenance.of organi-zational and interorganizational flexibility. Work and role definition 2-1

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' plans of more than one organization are melded and when decision cri-teria are present regarding shif t of ~ responsibility / authority and level of participation in each emergency response task. Maintenance of organ -

izational and .interorganizational flexibility reflects. the ability to change decision making processes and. operational procedures in order to respond quickly to new circumstances; this need for flexibility is'some -

times contradictory to the earlie_r requirements for.well-defined roles' and authority. Analysis of the indexes prepared.for each of the plans i from the 17 NPPs allows us to draw generalizations about interface in relation to each general category of functional response and.about emergency . planning in general.

2.3 Findings By Functional Response Tasks Each of the major functional response tasks(see Table 1) is reviewed below.

Detection and Warning

1. Key Decisions - There is uniform agreement that the utilities must make the initial event classification to start the emergency  !

response process both onsite and offsitt. 16 each of the 17 plans, the responsibility for the sounding of a public warning is clearly specified. ,

2. Routine Tasks - likewise, there is uniform agreement that the utility must give notification to state or local officials to activate {

off-site emergency plans. Initial accident monitoring is a utility responsibility until the offsite emergency plans are activated; there-fore, no conflicts were noted in this area.

Communications and Control

1. Key Decisions - There seems to be little problem in the activa-tion of utility and state emergency operation centers, but' establishing '. ,

shif ts between state and local governments in command and' authority i remains the thorniest issue to define in written emergency plans. Most of the uncertainty may c.ome from the authority to make decisions vn/ sus the authority to implement decisions once they are made; for example, of ten a decision is made at the state level but carried out ~at the local level. It is sometimes not clear if only the state can initiate action or if the local government can set some plans in action before decisions are made at the state level. There appears to be a need for more inte-gration of' activities in state and local plans and .more specification of .

authority for segments of the integrated activities. For example, the i organization charts appearing in each plan showing who has primary and secondary' responsibilities for tasks in that organization's plan (not overall responsibility) sometimes appear to conflict with the texts of plans that do try to address interorganization responsibilities. The

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plans could also be more specific as to how interactions With voluntary organizations (such as the Red Cross) will be handled. However, more j specification of authority between organizations may be an inhibiting j factor in maintenance of organizational and interorganizational flex- 1 ibili ty .

2. Routine Tasks - Communications appear to be well defined with I regard to communication networks and the equipment available for trans-mittal. What is less clear is exactly what information is to be com- i municated and what is necessary except for the state, local, and public warning procedures interactions are necessary in addition to the state, local, and public warning procedures, which appear clear-cut and appor-tioned to more than one organizational level. i Ambiguities in exercising authority may stem from some decisions being made at the state level but carried out at the local level. Where and how the local organizations can make decisions normally reserved for j state organizations and how state disaster and emergency service organi- j zations coordinate overlapping responsibilities with state departments j of health are examples of this type of problem. Some emergency plans )

are clearer chan otners on lines of responsibilities and when they shif t from one organizational unit to another. Some plans also address what happens if utility and state governments disagree but do not resolve the differences. Tne issue, once again, may be how specifically interorgan- i

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izational authority can be spelled out without precluding flexibility.

Accident Assessment 1.

Key Decisions - The placement of radiation monitoring equipment is straightforward and not likely to cause conflict. Decisions about 1 plant conditfors ]

defined; this canand estimating cause population exposure are less clearly confusion. One possible conflict identified in l one set of emergency plans examined concerned possible disagreement be-tween the state organization anc' the utility regarding classification of the accident. The utility plan states that. the plant management will maintain the classification it believes correct and will act accordingly even if the state organization classifies the situation as more severe. i

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2. l Routine Tasks - There seems to be fairly uniform agreement about which organization exercises authority and implements most of the accident assessment tasks themselves. When more than one organization ,

is involved in accident assessment, l will coordinate activities with each other.it is sometimes unclear how they protective Action I

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Key Decisions - The authority and responsibility for key deci- I sions about sheltering, site evacuation, general evacuations, and radio-protective drug utilization appear to be well defined. The general l

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evacuation decision is an example of one that can be made by the local organization if the need is deemed hnmediate and the necessary state organization Ts not available, thus. retaining some interorganizational flexibi li ty .

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Routine Tasks - There is reasonable agreement about organiza-tional responsibilities in carrying out the protective action tasks, and no major conflicts are anticipated in this area. i Emergency Relief L 1. Key Decisions - It appears that the local. organizations make more decisions in the area of emergency relief than in any other segment of our breakdown of functional emergency response tasks. Once the state has made the decision to recommend evacuation (under Protective Action),

there is agreement in about 16 of 17 sets of plans on who is to make'

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decisions about maintaining emergency facilities. . One ambiguity was found whe the state could take over this function from local govern-ment if L' y so chose.

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2. Routine Tasks - In most cases, it is clear that the local' organizations retain primary responsibility for 'most of these tasks, with the states of fering assistance where needed. Specification of' tasks and interorganizational integration appear to be well defined in the written plans, {

l Recovery 'l I

1. Key Decisions - The decisions on reentry to contaminated zones is always the state's decision offsite and' the utility's onsite. l.i ttle ambiguity exists in this area.

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2. Routine Tasks - Again, the state plays the primary role in the recovery tasks offsite, and most of these tasks'are carried out by the state organizations, of ten assisted by local organizations. The primary reason for ambiguity lies in the minimal overlap of functions between organizational levels.

Maintaining Emeroency Preparedness  !

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the training and' equipment needed.

Key Decisions - No major conflicts exist in the plans regarding  ;

ment will be acquired. What is less clear is how the. equip- )

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Routine Tasks - All organizational levels accept that they I have significant responsibility in training and testing personnel, in l maintaining and testing equipment, and in evaluating the effectiveness-of their efforts. i I

l 2 a 2.4 GENERAL FINDINGS i

From this' analysis, we were able to assess five potential problem areas:

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1. We could identify functional emergency response tasks not covered i by any organization.  !

2. We could determine if overlapping authority existed for response j tasks.

3 We could identify faulty assumptions about the responsibilities of other organizations. _,

4. We could reveal conflicts in authority and responsibilities.

5. We could assess the level of awareners possessed by one organiza- ]

tional level of the entire response system.

In the first problem area, major gaps concerning covcrage of each of the functional response tasks were not found. If organizations carry out what they acknowledge in the plans, .a comprehensive response will be achieved. In the second problem area, we found a great amount'of over-lapping responsibilities for certain energency tasks. Plans in general, however, do not specify the boundaries of shared responsibilities nor present a mechanism for coordination of efforts. This could be problem-atic if communications during an emergency are not effective. In the third area, we found that occasionally one organizational level assumes that some other organization is going to perform a task while that other I organization does not present information in its plan about doing that task. Although this was not common, it could create problems in an emergency. In the fourth area, conflicts in authority and decision makir.g were not evident except in one case where two different organiza-tions claimed to be in charge of the same task. Thus, on paper, clearly defined lines of authority exist. In the fifth area, we found that most plans attempted to reflect the functioning of other organizations and the structure of the entire response effort. In many cases, organiza-tions could go further to improve this type of information.in their plans.

Overall, the review of emergency plans suggested that utilities are becoming reasonably well coordinated with offsite organizations in their planning efforts. The review also suggests that the weakest area of coor-dination is between the Federal government (NRC, FEMA, others) and all other organizational levels. This, we suspect, can be attributed to the fact that Federal agencies have not developed response plans commensurate in scope and finality with others. Consequently, utilities do not have a good picture of the details of Federal involvement, and this is ,

reflected in the plans.

In additia. , the reviews solidly demonstrate that planning has led to comprehensive response mechanisms. These findings demonstrate ade-quate interactions in the planning process. However, it was demon-strated that actual response may differ from that outlined in the plan i

2-7 for rumerous reasons. potential problems that might cause this dif-ference in behvaior have been listed in Appendix 8. Accordingly, the next two sections describe activities that were undertaken to assess the i adequacy of interaction in emergency response settings and the ' cohesive-ness of both planr.ing and response.

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3. CASE STUDIES Two case studies (one at a relatively new plant and one at a well-established one) were undertaken to gain greater in:ight into interface.

The studies sought to identify (1) the degree to which emergency response organizations possessed characteristics of a cohesive system and (2) site-specific factors which may influence interface but which would not be identified in reviews of emergency plans. Information was collected for the case studies through discussions with re organizations involved with emergency response. preventatives of major These included the util-ity and agencies of state and local governments. A checklist of topics was developed to measure. the existence of factors related to effective response (see Table A-1).

Two groups of factors-those measuring organ-izational relationships and interorganizational networks--were selected on the basis of the literature review (Appendix A). Several measures of flexibility were developed. Table 2 provides examples of values for each factor associated with a cohesive response.- The checklist used for the interviews is given in Appendix C.

3.1 CASE STUDY ONE 3.1.1 Evaluation of Cohesiveness Discussions were held with utility personnel, state organizations, i

affected local organizations, and federal regional offices. Five state organizations were represented, including those responsible for ' emergency l management, radiological health, human resources, and transportation.

Local organizations included were county emergency management, police departments, the Red Cross, and another volunteer organization connected with communications and radiological health services. From these discus-sions, we could code each organization's level of effective and cohesive emergency abilities according to the factors presented in Table 2 This provided us with a measure of cohesiveness for each separate organization and for each organizational level. In addition, f t allowed us to make judgments about how well the entire system rated on each of the factors.

Appendix are based.E provides a summary of data on which the following conclusions 3.1.1.1 System Cohesiveness '

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Intraorganizational Relationships. Overall, the emergency response system demonstrated a high degree of internal cohesiveness.

This means that organizations, by themselves, possess characteristics that will make them effective in an emergency.

roles in an emergency that were clearly understood.MostSecond, had clearly defined in all but one case, it was clear who was in command. Third, division of respon-sibilities among personnel within the organizations was well understood.

Fourth, organizations had mechanisms for se knew the priorities) in emergency response.tting Fif th,priorities (or already eight organizations 3-1 4

1 3-2 Table 2. Organizational factors used to evaluate cohesiveness I Factors Values Associated with Cohesiveness Organizational Relationships I Role definition Clearly defined responsibilities Authori ty Clearly defined powers and authority hiera.chy Terri tory Clearly lid ted boundaries of authority l Priority setting Understood mechanism for setting priorities l Normativeness Similarity betw0en normal and emergency  ;

l responsibilitus '

l Legitimacy Responsibilities ar' viewed as significant Communications ability Ease and clarity of access and information

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Knowledge Level of understanding about responsibilities Intra- and Inter-organizational Flexibility Formalization Ability to deviate from written procedures l Adaptability Ability to respond to new situations Control Ability to exercise and retain authority Interorganizational Network Domain Clearly defined division of responsibility Dispute resolution Mechanism for negotiating differences Legitimacy of roles Acceptance by other organizations l Resource adequacy- Sufficient resources to perform role Au tonomy Ability to relinquish for good of system Communications ability High level of linkages between organizations Authority Network hierarchies are cleariy established Ini.eraction clarity Organizations know whom to interact with Knowledge Functioning of the system is understood 1

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have emergency responsibilities that are similar to the normal duties.

Sixth, all demonstrated a sense of importance in their emergency response roles. Seventh, in all but one case, communications within the organizations were at least adequate. Finally, most organizations exhib-ited a good sense of knowledge about their emergency roles.

(2) Flexibility. The systems demonstrated a high tevel of flexi-bility, that is, the ability to respond to contingencies and unantici-pated situations. Only one organization had somewhat formalized proce-dures that would constrain flexibility. Most showed some degree of a daptabili ty . Finally, the organizations exhibited the type of control over their functioning in an emergency which allows for changing inter-nal priorities.

(3) Interorganizational Network. The cohesiveness of the system as a whole was adequate but was not as well integrated as for individual organizations. The domain of various responsibilities or the way in which responsibilities of organizations are specified were fairly well established. Few, however, had mechanisms established for resolving any disputes or conflicts that might occur. Most organizations felt accepted as an important part of the network. Resources to carry out emergency functions were identified as a potential problem area for some. One of the weaker areas concerned communications ability, where a lack of ade-quate linkages and hardware emerged as the dominant problem. Another problem area concerned clarity of interaction. Many organizations did not demonstrate a good sense of knowing with whom they would be working in an emergency, as was also the case regarding their knowledge of the functions of other organizations. The response network showed fairly clear lines of authority, and organizations displayed signs of willingness to cooperate with all involved in the response effort.

3.1.1.2 Organizational Cohesiveness (1) Utility. The NPP organization for emergency response demon-strated a reasonably ef fective structure. It was very cohesive internally and demonstrated flexibility. Some minor problems were evident in the way the utility interfaced with other organizations. Potential problem areas include resolve communications, clarity of interactions, and ability to disputes.

(2) State. Organizations within the state showed varying levels of effectiveness in their structure for response. Several rated well on almost every factor; one was notably poor. Problem areas were reflective of those for the system in general.

(3) local. Organizations at the local level showed good, although not outstanding, response structures. They were internally cohesive but were less adept at interacting with other organizational levels. Com-munications appeared to be a najor problem area.

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l 3.1.2 Observational Notes Overall, mixed appraisals of state-utility interfaces were received, although the stronger response was that of good working relationships.

The major link between the state and utility is- through interactions )

between the emergency organization and utility corporate emergency plan-ners (often not located at actual plant site). This precludes much interaction between the state and onsite personnel. The state radiolo-gical health organization felt a lack of qualified personnei for radiological emergencies. This lack can lead to'a questioning of tech-

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nical ability; such a problem can ' affect working relationships between the state government and the utility. Most felt. one great value.of the exercise was the opportunity to meet and work with the ' people who would be responding to an emergency.

Local government has a minimal ' amount of interaction with the uti-I lity regarding planning and response other than through the annual test exercises. In the past, some of the agencies have had difficulty with initial notification procedures and feel the procedures are too complex.

Another major area of concern for local government is the lack of under-standing the public has _concerning sirens and emergency response. More utility cooperation concerning public education is needed, particularly in reaching seasonal populations and in improving a utility-disseminated brochure on emergency preparedness and evacuation plans. A general overall feeling conveyed by local organizations is that the utility is not highly concerned about working with them except to meet. regulatory requirements.

We had difficulty in assessing utility / Federal interactions because they were not readily observable. This difficulty suggests that greater attention should be placed on planning Federal involvement in emergency response.

3.2 CASE STUDY TWO 3.2.1 E valuation of-Cohesiveness The same techniques for assessing cohesiveness were used in case

study two. In this study a smaller number of organizations played key l

roles in emergency response. The state emergency management organization has overall reson'isibility for response and is assisted by a separate health department, which is responsible for radiological assessment.

Although the primary responsibility for implementing response lies with local government, the state activates and maintains control over local organizations because of multiple jurisdictional involvement. All cen-l l

tacts between the utility and local government, whether for planning or response, are channeled through the state. The state emergency planning

' organ 1zation assumes responsibility for coordinating all state and local planning with the utility. In this context, the cohesiveness of the '

system and of organizations is reviewed in Sects. 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2 with respect to the factors in Table 2. '

3-5 3.2.1.1 System Cohesiveness (1)

Intraorganizational Relationships. The internal cohesiveness of emergency response organizations is extremely high. -Almost uniformly, we coded organizations high on each dimension measured. In only'one instance did an organization' display a problem. and this was a lack lof response priorities.

(2) Flexibility. As with internal relationships, 'the organizations rated well on flexibility. In every case, organizations showed evidence -

of betng able to devf ate from formal procedures, adapt to new situations, and maintain internal control.

(3) Interorganizational Response Network. . The cohesiveness of the entire network displayed greater variability, with problems in three par-ticular areas. First, the drive for autonomy, or the' desire to maintain' 1

control over responsibilities, could be detrimental to response. Second, communication abilities are not well demonstrated in some cases. Third, lines of authority for offsite response have not been well defined.

Other factors that were problems in case one did not' emerge as problems r

in this system. These include interaction clarity, knowledge of the functioning of the entire response system, and resource availability. 'i 3.2.1.2 Organizational Cohesiveness Unlike case one, no great variations between organizations were.

observed.

assessed.

The utility demonstrated. cohesiveness in nearly every factor At the state and local level, some organizations rated margin-ally better than others, but no single organization consistently measured poorly. Overall, the system reflected effective response planning. '

.t 3.2.2 Observational Notes The organizations interviewed saw no problems in getting adequate resources for an emergency response and clearly understood with which other organizations they would be working. In many cases, there was frequent contaci among the agencies.

The state emergency response organization has a somewhat military-oriented structure, and some of its staff, as well as the local emergency response directors are former military officers. The errphasis of some of these persons on the control aspects may be a reflection of both the plan and their own backgrounds. Other agencies tended to stress coor-dination. Turf battles were considered by those interviewed as more likely to occur because of personality conflicts than because of plan L deficiencies.

The state and local staff persons believed they had a clear under-standing of what their own and other agencies' responsibilities are and l

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thought that their-work was well accepted. Several stated that commit-ment to emergency planning by their upper management prompts acceptance and support throughout the rest of the organization.

l The personnel interviewed anticipated that during an emergency there might be'some communications problems, These included mechanical problems, .too few telephones, lack of direct contact between the local' .j government and the' utility, problems with interpreting technical lan-guage, a somewhat cumbersome formal message system in- the state emergency operations center (EOC), and possible personality conflicts.

Difference in time zones within the state was identified as a point 'o f possible confusion. The state EOC located at the state capital as well as the state E0C locat.ed close to the plant operate on the time zone ~of the capital. The local government response organization would operate on local time. 1 Actual interfaces between different levels of an organization had not been tested through exercises, although the set. of plans- described' the assignment for key decisions and routine response tasks. Some examples of potential problems were discussed. Although _information on )

control is given in the plans, a city or local government might not l i

accept direction from the county or state in actual practice. Enforcing control authority was expected to be difficult. Another expressed con-cern was that the state radiological health department is dependent on the utility for atmospheric-release projections, and there are .no inde-pendent checks on the utility's projections.

In summary, weak points agreed upon by all included data com-nunications (the _ utility hopes to install an automatic system), . control cf field teams from different agencies, recovery and reentry operations, notification of the public in rural areas, sheltering arrangements 1 (since a nongovernmental agency is providing them), depth of technical j ability and training for monitoring teams, adequacy .of staffing for monitoring teams, ability for timely response in a quickly developing incident since monitoring teams have several hours of travel' time to the site, and inadequate allowance for human nature and unanticipated response in the plan.

4 TEST EXERCISE In conjunction with one case study, observation of a test exercise was used as a means of collecting further data about interface. This simulated situation provided a useful surrogate for examining interaction in. an actual emergency. It is assumed tnat the interface problems .

revealed by the exercise would reflect general deficiencies in existing {

regulations as well as illustrate the problems corrected by those same l regulations.

Findings were derived from observations of activities and interac-tions in the utility technical support center (TSC) and. emergency operations facil,ity (E0F) and in the state / county EOCs. No Federal agencies participate' in, the exercise except as reviewers. Participants in the exercise representing the major emergency organizations were -

debriefed, utilizing a checklist of topics designed.to complement that developed for the case studies- (see Appendix D for the test exercise check-list). A comparison of the exercise results with those of the.

case study offers insight on. how organizational interactions may change in an actual emergency. Appendix F provides information on the nature and scope of the exercise.

4.1 INTERFACES DURING THE EXERCISE By comparing data from the case study with those from the exercise, we can systematically. observe potential differences between interf ace as reflected by planning activity and planned response and interface in actual response in an exercise. Again, we distinguish between cchesive-ness of the system and that of organizations.

4.1.1 System Cohesiveness Differences in cohesiveness between planning and exercise response refle:ted the general patterns emphasized in the case study. Organiza-tions, in general, displayed greater internal cohesion and similar levels of. flexibility, but there was poorer cohesion between organiza-tions.

l (1) Intraorganizational Relationships. Organizations. demonstrated 3

improved cohesiveness in the exercise from what was observed in the case  !

study. Responsibilities were better defined, and people within ~ organiza-tions had a clearer delineation of roles -and an improved sense of-legiti-macy. Communications, identified as a potential problem in the case study, were an even greater problem in the exercise.

(2) Flexi bi li ty. As in- the case study, organizations. demonstrated adequate flexibility. Overall, ability to respond to new situations proved higher, although ability to deviate from written procedures decreased slightly.

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4-2 (3) Intraorganizational Response Network. Problems identified in the case study were exacerbated in the exercise. Factors that did not pose problems in case studies either remained adequate or were rated more effective in the exercise.

Across organizations, three factors proved extremely problematic.

First, interorganizational communications constrained ef fective interac-tion. This was heightened by a lack of interaction clarity and any j observable means of solving differences. In addition, the exercise '

revealed some problems of legitimacy among organization.s that were not evident in the case study.

On the other hand, the exercise revealed that there was an increased level of knowledge about what other organizations do than was measured {

j in the case study. Furthermore, division of responsibilities remained I adequately defined. This suggests that organizations are adequately l

prepared, and know what to do but have some dif ficulties in coordinating  !

those efforts with others in the emergency response system.

4.1.2 Organizational Cohesiveness When the cohesiveness of a specific organization in the test exer-cise is compared with that of the same organization in the case study, several patterns emerge. First, the utility displayed less cohesiveness in the exercise. This is mainly attributed to less cohesive ratings on interorganizational factors. Second, the same trend and cause are ob- '

served for all state organizations. Third, an opposite trend is found for local government. Organizations at this level demonstrated increased cohesiveness during the exercise. _0neLossibh. explanation it i that organizations with little experience actually performing emergency. I tasks show lower cohesiveness in response than in planning. On the other hand, those with more practical experience demonstrate more cohe -

siveness in behavior in comparison to planning. This underscores the necessity of simulated response to develop cohesive organizational interaction.

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4.2 THE VIEW FROM THE UTILITY EOF /TSC The major problem observed onsite was communications with offsi*:e organizations. Difficulties with the offsite notification procedures started immediately with technical problems with phone lines. This was made more severe when the person designated as the state warning point, reached by using automated dialing to a predetermined list of persons to be notified, gave instructions to call someone else. This caused delays in notification and also undermined the utility's confidence in offsite organizations. The personnel communicating the information on the stan-dard notification form had difficulties in delivering messages and could not provide explanations or more detailed information. Information up-dates were quite untimely. Once the E0F was activated, better communi-cations ensued because of more direct and continuous lines of contact.

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Communications seemed to break down, however, during the transition of communications and other functions from the TSC to the EOF..

Some dif ficulties existed regarding the coordination'of prot'ective actions between the utility and state. Althou coordinator made a recommendation at 9:45 a.m.gh the site emergency

, following the 9:00 a.m.

General Emergency, to activate the warning system, disagreement over evacuation led to a delay in that recommendation until 11:08 a.m.

Consequently, ' evacuation was not ordered by the state until-ll:55 a.m.

This points to a ~need for more timely coordination between'the state and utility on protective action decisionmaking.

4.3 THE VIEW FROM THE STATE E0C The state's most difficult situation was with gathering enough information to make an informed decision regarding evacuations. A State.

of General Emergency was declared at 9:00 a.m., .and the evacuation deci-sf on did not become effective until 11:55 a.m. Part of the cecision-making confusion sterried from the utility declaration of a general emergency with a recommendation for no protective action. The state radiological emergency team was unable to get more than a minimum of information transmitted from the utility for up to I h before and. after the utility declared a general emergency and needed more data regarding plant status, projected doses, and other problems. Though the state and the utility had standardized dose conversion factors,, isopleths, etc.,

some confusion remained regarding population doses versus individual doses and in some field measurements. Smoother flow of information from I the utility to the state E0C would have been expedient, as would have been quicker assessments and recommendations from f.he state radiological team to the state E0C director.

Once the evacuation decision was declared, the simulation of eva- i cuation was accomplished quickly,'though both the emergency medical ser-vices and the Red Cross stated they would prefer more lead time for evacuation.

l The major in Appendix eventsF-1.

F, Table as posted at the state E0C log board are summarized 4 4.4 THE VIEW FROM LOCAL E0Cs The local county E0Cs experienced their greatest difficulties in communications as well, particularly those with the utility. The infre-quency of incoming information and their inability to open better com-munication links with the utility were frustrating. The local E0Cs

! would like to have a utility representative at the local E0Cs or at least one person per county in the utility E0F designated to provide information directly to the local E0Cs during emergency test exercises.

4-4 Since the county units maintain ongoing. relationships with the local and state units dealing with different types of emergencies, it is only the utility which does not have frequent. contact and therefore has fewer information channels through which to communicate. For example, the local E0Cs were not advised of the first radiation release for 2 h. 'i Because communications were slow, there were times when contradictory information was received and it was hard to verify what was happening. '

Particularly when the utility E0F had to be evacuated, communications were lost for a significant time period at a vital point in the test exercise.

All local organizations would.have welcomed more frequent updates. i of information; and better radio communication links / equipment are needed, although all thought the amateur radio network instituted for the first time was helpful. The shelter program worked well, but the Red Cross ,

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could have used earlier notification that evacuation was imminent. .I lack of communication between state and local' units 'about a deci-sion to distribute protective drugs -(XI) to emergency workers created l some problems on the county level. The county E0C was unsure what situation prompted this action and felt that the local health personnel should at least be informed of the decision, if not allowed to par-ticipate in making such decisions.

Better radio communications are still needed, even though the ama-teur.extremely was radio network which was used in this exercise for the first time beneficial. However, the state radio van and even the phone line to the utility did not work part of the time during the test exercise.

Sore concern was expressed about the initial message on the Emergency Broadcast System which stated that the governor had taken over I emergency problem operations at the power plant. before the public had been told that there was any This, however, may have been a function of the brevity of the overall test exercise; everything had to be done ir, a highly compressed time frame.

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5. FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

'In this section, we present the conclusions from each of the three research tory change. tasks and discuss the implication of the findings for regula-presented.

Each task is discussed and a final ~ set of implications is l

~1 5.1 FINDINGS FRUM THE PLAN REVIEWS The two purposes of the plan reviews were to-determine whether -

plans would constrain a comprehensive response to an emergency and to determine if planning activities were reasonably coordinated.

In general, the review of emergency plans suggested that there 'is adequate interface between utilities and offsite organizations in the planningdocuments.

planning process and that this interaction has led to well-coordinated Although this conclusion is generally true, we also i' noted several areas be improved. Specifically, in which interface during tue planning process can we found that '

(1) All major response functions are covered by the plans.

(2) Few conflicts about responsibilities exist.

Those that do can be (

alleviated through further communication between' the _ utility and (3) the appropriate offsite organization in the planning process. {

Plans do a good job of describing the responsibilities of other i organizations in the emergency response system. Several plans '

i reviewed could be improved by providing more details about the roles of other organizations.

(4)

One area that could be improved concerns situations where organi-zations share responsibilities on the same response task. {

Mechanisms are lacking infor thedividing plans. or coordinating the shared responsibilities (5)

A second area requiring improvement concerns the level of detail in plans about the responsibilities of Federal agencies. Although the utility plan clearly specifies the role of, and coordination with, 1 NRC, the level of information about other Federal agency involvement does not provide an adequate picture of Federal responsibility;2s.

5.2 FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES The case studies attempted to measure and assess the presence of factorsorga tween thatniza helptions promote

. cohesive response efforts both within and be-organizations are quite cohesive.We found that, internally (intraorganizationally),  :

in relationships across organizational response networks. Cohesion tends Organizations demonstrated flexibility in their response systems, which will help increase the effectiveness of response. Specific findings ' include the following:

5-1.

1 5-2 l (1) The major barrier to effective interface among organizations is communication ability and hardware.

(2) Response cohesiveness is constrained, in addition, by uncertainty over who should be communicating with whom and by a lack of know-ledge within an organization about the roles of other organizations.

(3) Response organizations showed some variability in their overall levels of cohesion as measured by the research. Key organizations such as the utility, however, rated high on an index of cohesiveness.

(4) local organizations have the weakest interfaces with the utility and rust rely on the state for information and guidance.

(5) Individual personalities within organizations play a strong role in facilitating or preventing inter 6ction in the planning process.

This will vary from site to site and with changes in personnel  ;

within organizations. 1 (6) Of fsite organizati'ons are constrained in their interf aces with I utilities by a lack of equipment and trained personnel. This is particularly evident in radiological monitoring and assessment. fj 1

5.3 FINDINGS FROM THE TEST EXERCISE The test exercise was used to determine if comprehensive planning 3 led to a coordinated response and to assess how cohesiveness may change l during a simulated response. Overall, we found that the observed response was not as well coordinated as the planned response. This was mainly due to problems in implementing procedures and not from having inadequate plans and procedures. In addition, we found that internal I

organization cohesiveness increased during the exercise but that i interorganizational cohesiveness decreased. Specific findings include the following:

(1) Communications difficulties created the major problems in achieving l effective interfaces. This was exacerbated by confusion over the proper lines and contents of communications.

(2) 1.egitimacy posed an interface problem for some organizations.

Attitudes of the utility toward offsite organizations with respect to their technical ability and resources was a constraint to inter-action. Furthermore, offsite organizations did not fully trust utility personnel regarding communications about plant status and protective action recommendations.

(3) Poor implementation of the offsite notification procedure created problems but is sound in principle.

5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING REGULATIONS The purpose of this research was to determine if existing regula-tions resulted in adequate interface between utilities and offsite organ-izations in emergency planning and response. To address this question, we attempted to assess two elements of emergency management that could be used to measure the level of interface: the comprehensiveness and l

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5-3 cohesiveness of planning and response. Comprehensiveness of planning was determined by a detailed review of emergency plans. Comprehen-siveness of response was determined by the evaluation of a test exercise and case studies of two response networks. To assess cohesiveness, we identified, from reviewing relevant literature, a set of factors asso-ciated with enhesive response. The two case studies were used to measure the presence of these factors in planning, and a test exercise was observed to measure the presence of these factors in response.

Findings suggest that implementation of existing regulations has led to comprehensive planning ef forts. Minor improvements to plans can be made, but they fall within the scope of existing rules, regulations and implementation guides. On thes e grounds , n_o . regu llt.ory. chartges are.

warranted. -

Findings suggest that regulations will lead to fairly co@rehensive responses to an emergency. Evidence from the case studies and the test exercise plans andsuggest lack of that problems are due to poor execution of emergency resources. Existing regulations explicitly deal with these problems, which can be reduced by better enforcement of regulations.

More difficult and abstract to assess is the level of cohesiveness in and between emergency organizations. Our work revealed that cohesive-ness as measured in the planning process is strong within the organiza-tions but somewhat weaker between organizations. The difference was even more pronounced for cohesiveness in emergency response. The major reason for lack of cohesiveness was poor communications and a lack of knowledge about whom to communicate with. This is made more problematic ,

by a lack of legitimacy among organizations; that is, some organizations {

d do not have confidence in others or do not believe they play an impor-tant role,  !

in a related fashion, personalities of individuals within I organizations macy problem. constrain effective interaction and heighten the legiti-We feel that the communication problem can be solved within the existing regulatory framework. It is chiefly a matter of better equip-ment, better training, and greater interaction in the planning process.

The problems and potential resolutions are acknowledged and understood by the organizations involved. The legitimacy and personality issues are not addressed by current regulations. Although they contribute to interface problems, it is our belief that they cannot be effectively or even inefficiently solved by regulatory change. Whether they can be reduced by enforcement of existing regulations is also doubtful. Any effective solution to the legitimacy problem must come from within the organizational system itself and not through regulatory change, which could create more problems than it could solve.

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APPENDIX A l

DYNAMICS OF INTERFACE: ORGANIZATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES BACXGROUND An elaborate body of literature exists on organizational oehavior '

and interorganizational relationships. A subset of this literature con-cerns the response of organizations to a variety of disasters. Several attempts to summarize this literature already exist (Mi leti, 1980; Quarantelli and Dynes,1977; Mileti et al.,1975; Barton,1969; Dynes, 1970; Fritz, 1961, 1958). Organizational response to disaster is not unique. On both theoretical and applied grounds, organizational behav-ior relationships in disaster reflect the more general findings of organ -

izations research. In this section, we review what is known about why organizations are effective or not in response to disaster, as well as what is known about why organizational coordination does or does not occu r.

To do so, we have organized the findings into four categories based on the intra- and interorganizational dichotomony and the predi-saster preparedness and warning versus the disaster response period.

From this review, we are able to specify the factors that lead to cohe-sive planning and response.

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ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN DISASTER WARNING RESPONSE Studies that have explicitly focused on the behavior of organiza-tions during disaster warnings have been scant compared to other types of organizational studies of disasters. Some dozen or so studies, however, have revealed that several factors do seem to affect the effec-tiveness of organizations during disaster warnings. ' A general conclu-sion of these studies is that disaster experience enhances the ability of an organization to participate in the warning process, as well as respond to warnings (Mileti et al.,1975; Barton,1970; Dynes,1970; McLuckie, 1970; Anderson, 1969; Moore, 1956; Eliot, 1932). The capacity of an organization for communication (Leik, Carter, and Clark,1981; Mileti et al.,1975; Kennedy,1970) has also been pointed out as central 3' to organizational effectiveness. A third factor that has been docu-mented as in.portant for organizational warning effectiveness is the per-ceived probability of the disaster (Anderson,1969; Fritz,1961; Fritz and Williams,1957; Spiegel,1957; Instituut Voor Sociaal Onderzoek Van Het Nederlandse Volk Amsterdam,1955). Organizations are quite reluc-tant to participate in warning dissemination if organizational officials are not reasonably confident that the hazard will materialize. Fear of negative public reactions for issuing a false alarm is a main reason.

The fourth factor research has shown to be linked with the effectiveness of organizations during warnings is the structure of the organization itself.

Factors of structure shown to have an influence on the ability i

of an organization to mobilize in the preimpact situation are varied.

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.I Mobilization is typically quicker and less problematic for organizations that dispersed rather than centralized and formalized decision-making structure (McLuckie,1970; Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek Van Het Nederlandse Volk Amsterdam,1955); and little role conflict for organi-zational members (Thompson and Hawkes, 1962).

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN DISASTER IMPACT RESPONSE A large number of studies have been performed which provide a sound basis for concluding what determines the effectiveness of organizations, as individual entities, in their disaster response. The findings of these studies, when brought together, point out that seven key ingre-dients are necessary for an effective response. The first of these is labeled normativeness. That is, it has been found (Adams,1970; Anderson,1969; Dynes, Haas, and Quarantelli,1967) that the less an i organization has to change its predisaster functions'and role to perform in a disaster, the more effective is ~its disaster. response. In essence, organizations whose daily operations can be switched to the topic of the  ;

emergency at hand do better than organizations who must adopt new opera- -i tions that are unique to the emergency.

Second, and closely linked to the notion of normativeness, is the ability of an organization to be flexible. Organizations that are better able to vary from standard operating procedures during the disaster are typically more effective than those that cannot be flexible (Drabek et al. ,1981; Kreps,1978; Stallings,1978; Weller,1972; Brouilette and Quarantelli,1971; Haas and Drabek,1970;' Drabek and.

j Haas,1969a,1969b; Dynes and Warheit,1969; Warheit,1968; Dynes,1966; 4 Moore, 1964; Barton, 1962; Form and Nosow, 1958). An organization that '

is rigid in structure, in general, has a difficult time dealing with the uncertainty of disaster (Dynes,1969) and adapting to its needs. The result is that effectiveness suffers. ,

A third major factor af fecting the ability of an organization to be effective in disaster emergenc4s is work definition. Extensive evi-dence exists on which'to conclude that organizations who know what.to do, how to prioritize work, and how to administer the activities are more effective. The issue of work definition is particularly important in organizations for which emergency work is not a daily routine. In l this case, definition of disaster or emergency roles as part of emergency  !

operations is essential (Haas and Drabek,1973; Adams ,1970; Kennedy, 1970; Dynes,1969; Thompson,1967; Barton,1962; Form and Nosow,1958).

Organizations must be able to see emergency response as their job and have clearly defined roles to play. In addition, the clear definition ~

of the internal authority structure of an organization must- be spelled i out (Dynes,1969; Form and Nosow,1958). This need is particularly l acute since authority in organizations during emergencies typically l shifts from what it is during routine operations.

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A-3 To complement authority, the work domains or territory of each organization, as distinct from other organizations, should be clearly defined (Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps,1972). Fourth, adequate resources are necessary for efective repsonse (Kreps,1978; Dynes. Quarante111, and Kreps,1972). It has also been suggested (Form and Nosow,1958) that interorganizational resource dependence helps ensure an adequate supply of resources. A fif th important ingredient for effectiveness is information and communication ability (Quarantelli,1970). Organiza-tions that are able to effectively get and share informatiori with others typically enhance ef festiveness .(Dynes ,1969). Sixth, organizational legitimation, or the claim to be able to do their emergency-tied work with approval and recognition from other organizations, is related to effective response.

Finally, internal organization cohesion between members is an impe-tus for organizational effectiveness. Comitment (Dynes,1970; Quaran-telli and Dyne:, 1977), group cohesion (Form and Nosow, 1958), and a lack of role conflict (Dynes,1969; Barton,1962; Thompson and Hawkes, 1962; Form and Nosow,1958) typically all signify that organizational workers are ready to get the job done.

INTER 0 ORGANIZATIONAL C0 ORDINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS IN DISASTER WARNING RESPONSE 1

Little systematic research has been performed on this topic beyond a few studies (cf. Leik Carter, and Clark,1981; Mileti, et al.,1975; McLuckie, 1970; Anderson, 1969). The results of these efforts indicate that the interorganizational elements essential for effective inter-organizational warning-tied interaction and communication are definition of an organizational role in warning (cf. Mileti, et al.,1975; Kennedy, 1970) and preemergency patterns of interorganizational communication on which to build during the emergency (cf. Barton,1969; Dynes,1970).

Put simply, for warnings and information flow between organizations to be effective, organizations must define dissemination as part of their job, and then communication will still favor familiar lines. In addi-i tion, effectiveness is enhanced if information is clear, unambiguous, and communicated in a speedy fashion (Anderson,1969).

INTER 0 ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS l IN DISASTER IMPACT RESPONSE l

A rich research history has explored the nature and character of interorganizational relationships in emergencies in an effort to trace through their impact on emergency response effectiveness. An overriding .;

conclusion of this research is that interorganizational coordination enhances the effectiveness of the overall response to the emergency.  !

This research has shown that many concepts form a basis for the effec-tiveness of overall response. When the different approaches of 1 _ __-

l l

A-4 researchers to the topic are taken into consideration, the array of con-cepts, however, fits well into four general categories: (1) domain con-sensus and role specification, (2) network definition and integration, (3) communication, and (4) autonomy maintenance.

Domain consensus and role specification refer to the degree to which each organization knows what it and other organizations are to do during the emergency (Dynes,1978; Kreps,1978; Dynes, Quarantelli, and i Kreps, 1972). Put simply, the effectiveness of overall response to an emergency escalates if all responding organizations know who is to do what and if those boundaries are well understood. Knowing, however, is not enough to ensure effective response; it is also necessary that organ-izations view each other's jobs as being important or legitimate (Dynes, 1978; 1969; Stallings,1978; Warheit, 1970). This facilitates clear lines of authority between organizations (Drabek et al.,1981; Thompson and Hawkes, 1962; Rosow, 1955). Clear lines of authority between organ-izations help avoid conflict and enable conflicts to be resolved when  ;

they do occur, although not as well as does a predetermined mechanism i for settling disputes.

Integration across organizations is a second important factor and is easier to achieve if participating organizations interact normatively during nonemergency periods (Drabek et al.,1981; Dynes,1978; Brouilette, 1971; Form and Nosow, 1958; Cli fford,1956). Organizations *"

that are used to interacting with each other are easier to coordinate for interaction in an emergency. Coordination and integration across organizations in emergencies also escalates as a function of organiza-tions having overlapping members or the same people being on boards, panels, committees, and the like across organizations (Dynes,1969).

The notion of interlocking membership suggests that interaction, com-munication, and coordination are facilitated if people have overlapping organizational roles.

In this same vein, the existence of boundary per- <

sonnel, people who are charged with interorganizational communications, j i

usually guarantees that interaction occurs (Dynes, 1969, 1978). Inter-  ;

I action escalates coordination, and coordination enhances effectiveness  !

(Drabek et al.,1981; Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps,1972; Dynes,1970; J Warheit, 1970; Barto.n, 1969; Parr,1969; Drabek,1968; Fritt and Marks, 1954: Kutak, 1928). An additional factor that has been shown to facili-tate network integration and coordination is knowledge about other organ-izations (Dynes,1978). U organizations understand about the in+.ernal operations and structure of other organizations, it is easier for them to coordinate and communciate with those other organizations. The general idea of network definition and integration for interorganiza-tional coordination, although comprised of several concepts, is straight-f orward. Interorganizational coordination increases as a result of work to integrate the organizations participating in the interorganizational emergency response. A key device for enhancing intergation is the construction of resource linkages across organizations (Drabek et al.,

1981; Dynes,1978,1970b; Kreps,1978; Stalling,1978; Ouarantelli and Dynes,1977; Warheit,1968; Demerath and Wallace,1957). Resource i

__._________.__.___-_.-__a_ ______m

A-5 i sharing and interdependence across organizations sometimes foster other avenues for interorganizational if nkages. The major conclusion of this research suggests that coordination and effectiveness of interorganiza-tional emergency reosonse increase as a result of prior efforts to cast participating organizations into an integrated response network.

Third, communication between organizations is another essential ingredient for an interorganizational energency response system to be coordinated and for heightened effectiveness (Drabek et al.,1981; Dynes,1978; Brouillette,1971; Quarantelli,1970; Dacy and Kunreuther, i 1969). Ef ficient f ntworganizational communication is essential for the provision of information between organizations regarding their spe-cialized roles and tasks and for the quick dissemination of news about the changing context of the emergency.

i Finally, autonomy maintenance (Mileti et al.,1975; Dynes,1970; Dynes and Warheit, 1969; Parr, 1969; Warheit, 1968; Quarantelli and

{;

Dynes,1967; Thompson and Hawkes,1961), or the struggle on the part of '

individual organizations to resist giving up autonomy, is a major con-straint to effectiveness. A requisite for an effective response to an emergency is that participating organizations be convinced that incon-sequential tive response.losses of autonomy are in the overall interest of an effec-l

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS Theand planning behavior or organizations is a critical component of emergency response.

Moreover, factors important to casting the effectiveness of that response are not only limited to organizational ones, but also extend to those which profile the tyne and intensity of interorganizational relationships that go on betweco organizational actors.

Table A-1 presents a summary of factors important for emergency response coordination and organizational and interorganizational system effectiveness which were derived from the 1-iterature review.Three key '

principles critical to effective response emerge from this table.

First, to do it.organizations trust know what they are supposed to do and who is Secon.d, organizations must be integrated with other organiza-tions. ~ Third, they must maintain flexibility. Each specific factor is related to one or more of these general principles. The specific fac-tors and the three overriding princ1;'les will be used to develop eval-uation criteria and to guide the analyses used in this research.

A-6 Table A-1 Summary of organizational factors related to effective response Organizational Interorganizational Relation: t'etwo rk Planning and Warning Period e Disaster experience e Role definition e Communications e Communication e Perceived probability of disaster e Organizational structure  !

- Flexible decision making

- Role conflict (territory)

Disaster Response Period e Normativeness e Flexibility e Domain consensus (boundaries) e Legitimacy e Work definition e Dispute resolution

- Role definition e Authority

- Priority setting e Interaction

- Authority e Flexibility

- Knowledge e Knowledge e Resources e Resource linkages e Information and communications e Communication e Legitimacy e Autonomy e Cchesion

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APPENDIX C DISCUSSION TOPICS ON ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACE INTRA 0 ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS la. How does your organization fit into the broader scope of emergency response activitie.s in the event of a nucl_ ear power plant accident?

b. Is it clear what your responsibilities are?

2. What things do you anticipate having to do in an emergency'that are not covered in the emergency plan and implementing procedures?

3a. In an emergency does the structure of authority within your organization change from' normal situations?

b. If yes, how?

If no, describe.

4 Is it clearly understood by all who are in charge?

Sa. Does anyone's emergency responsibilities overlap with others in your organization?

b. If yes, how?

6.

How clear are the priorities for your organization's emergency response activities?

7. In what ways do your emergency response activities differ from what you do on a daily routine?

8a. Are there people within your organization that you feel don't understand what you do in an emergency?

b.

Are tnere people who don't agree about their own emergency jobs?

9.

Are there any problems in communicating with others in your organization about emergency response activities? Why or why not?

10a. How closely are you required to follow procedures in the emergency plan and implementation procedures?

b. What are the consequences of.not following them?

11a. Does your organization have adequate resources to carry out its emergency responsibilities ?

b. If not, what'is lacking?

GS

o C-2 INTER 0 ORGANIZATION RESPONSE

12. Do you have the means of obtaining adequate resources?

13. Is' it clear which other organizations you will interact with in an emergency? Please explain.

14a. Do you interact with these organizations as part of yoJr normal activities?

b. How f requently?

15. Is someone specifically responsible for communicating with each of these other organizations during an emergency?

16. Is it clear which other organizations your organization can tell what to do in an emergency? Which can tell yours what to do?

Please explain.

17a. Do any other organizations have the same responsibilities in an emergency ?

b. If so, where do yours end and theirs begin? ,

i 18a. Are there any other organizations that are difficult to work with?

b. In what ways?

'19. Do you feel that regulations about what to do in an emergency are a burden?

20a. Are there any other organizations who do not understand what you do in an emergency?

b. Who feel what you do is not important?

FLEXIBILITY

21. What problems do you anticipate in communicating with other organizations in an emergency?

22. Do you anticipate that the control your organization has over what it does would be lost or changed in an emergency?

23a. Do you feel the entire plan and strategy for emergency response will successfully work if an emergency occurred?

b. What are the weakest links?

l

9

' APPENDIX D TEST EXERCISE EVALUATION TOPICS 4

1. What was your. role in the exercise?-

2. - Is that the role you would'actually perform in an emergency?

3. Was it clear what your responsibilities were in the exercise?

4 Was everything you did in thefexercise described in the emergency.-

plan and Emergency Operating Procedures?

5. Was it clearly understood who was in charge? Explain.

6.

Did anyone's emergency responsibilities overlap with yours? How did you coordinate your ef forts? What problems'did this cause?-

7.

Was your role in the emergency exercise similar to your normal work responsibility ?

8.

Was it clear how you were to set priorities among things to do?

9.

Did anyone disagree with you over your responsibilities or tasks?

10.

Were there others who did not understand your responsibilities?

Who did not feel they were important?

11.

Did you have adequate resources to carry out your responsibilities? '

12.

Did you have adequate means of obtaining more resources?

13.

Was it clear with whom else you were to communicate with?-

To work with (if different)?

14 Have you ever interacted with these people before? Describe.

Was the nature of your interaction different in the exercise?

15. Did you have any communications problems? Explain.

16. Was there anyone difficult to interact with?-

17. How closely did you follow written procedures ? Why ?

18. Did you ever feel things were not under control? Describe.

19.

What were the weakest aspects of the emergency response organization?

l

1 i

1 l

l l

l 3

APPENDIX E ]

)

DATA FROM THE CASE STUDIES AND EXERCISE I

I l

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E-1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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a t

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• I

, E-3 Table E-2. Case study two matrix

• Organizations State Govt. Local' Govt.

Factors Utility A 8 A B C l

INTRA 0 ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS Role definition C CC C C C Authority 'C C C C-C C Territory C C-  ? C C C Priority setting C C U C C C Normati venes s C CC Legitimacy C C C C C C 'C C C Communications ability C CC CCC Knowledge C C C C C C FLEXIBILITY Formalizati,on Adaptability C CC C C C Control C CC CCC C CC C C C INTER 0 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE NETWORK

~s Domain Dispute resolution C C N CCC

?

legitimacy of roles  ?  ?  ? ? ?

CC i

C i

Resource adequacy C CC- {

Autonony C C C C C C J C U Communications ability

? C C ?

Authori ty -

N C N C N'C C C-U C N C' Interaction clarity CC )

Knowledge C

CCC C CC C C N .;

i

• In andthis

?= table, C= cohesive inadequate data. value, U=uncohesive value, N= neutral value,

E-4 Table E-3. Test exercise matrix

• State Local Utility A B C A B C D E l

' INTRA 0 ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS {

Role definition C C N C C C -C C C Authority C- C- U C C C .C C' C Terri tory C- C C C C C C C C Priority setting C C C C C C C C 'C Normativeness 'C C C C C C C C C {

Legi timacy C C C C C. C C C C i

Communicaticas ability C U U N U C C C C Knowledge C C N C C C C C C FLEXIBILITY Formalization U C C C C C C C C Adaptabili ty C C C C C C C C C I Control C C C N N C C C C INTER 0 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE NETWORK Doma'n C N N C C C C C C Dispute resolution U  ? U N  ?  ? N

? U Legitimacy of roles C C U C C C C C U Resource adequacy N N C N N U C C N Autonomy N C C C C N C C N Communications ability V U U N U N U U ~U Authority C C U C C N C C C Interaction clarity -

U -U U C U U.. U U V Knowledge C C N C N C C C .N

• In this table, C= cohesive value, U=uncohesive value, N= neutral value, and ?= inadequate data.

1 1

1 l

i i

l l

APPENDIX F l,

DESCRIPTION OF THE EXERCISE 1

l l

l l

l l

l l

.----_.-_____m_ .mm___

j

i F-2 Table F-1. Major Exercise Events Abbreviated controller scenario from exercise plan 2000: Unusual Event reported by. personnel at Plant 0410: Radiation material detected in release piping  !

0606: Analysis of discharge canal indicates ~ radioactive. material 0730: Jet pump probleru 0800: Reactor scram 0801: Rods stuck out, reactor critical 0805: Inject stand-by liquid control 0940: Diesel generator #3 on fire 0950: Reactor subcritical l

1018: Temperature increase and increase of. airborne radioactive gases; gases in reactor building 1020: Heavy steam in minipipe tunnel 1025: Radiation alarm. sounded in reactor building i

1031: Auxiliary operator missing in reactor buildf ag l 1040: Auxiliary operator found, seriously injured and contaminated -

1040: Radiation levels in reactor building at 4 at 40 R/h 1045: Fire extinguished in diesel generator 1100: Reactor building radiation levels at 68 R/h i

1200: Reactor building radiation levels at 136 R/h 1200: (Based on above events, it is expected that the state  !

radiationprotection section, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion (NRC) the Utility Technical Support Center, and General Electric will jointly decide to do en orderly blowdown and depressurization. Expected reaction:

state activated sirens and EBS rnessage. )

F-3 l

1 Table F-1. Major Exercise Events. (continued) 1 Major Events at the Utility

.0519: - Unusual. Event declared I

-0622: Release into canal reported I 0625: Alert status declared i 1

0738: Manual scram i 1

0743: 16 rods fail to scram {

0800: Site Emergency 0900: General Emergency declared because of leak in dry well' 0905: Site evacuation sounded 0920: Decision made to tell state that evacuation cay be necessary 0945: Recommend state activate warning system to notify public as an advisory but no evacuation notification l 0945: E0F Activated l 1108: Evacuation recommendation issued 1220: EOF begins relocation 4

l l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ ________m__.___._ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ______ __ _. ._

F-4 Table F-1. Major Exercise Events (continued)

State E0C Posted Log Board 0820: Scrammed reactor. 16 fuel rods failed. Damage to core.

0912: General Emergency with no Protective Action recommended 0945: Plant did site evacuation 1015: Plant EOF at site evacuated 1030: County I reported 306 in shelter

• 1155: Decision at SERT to evacuate 4 sectors (within 2 miles of plant) 1200: County 1 opening 2 shelters 1245: KI being administered to emergency workforce 1245: Evacuation of 3 sectors complete 1300: Evacuation of 4th sector complete

• Some county tests, etc. were conducted out of sequence.

I s-

REFERENCES Adams, David. "The Red Cross: Organizational Sources of Operational Problems." American Behavioral Scientist 13(3) (Jan.-Feb.), 392-403 (1970).

Anderson, William A., "fisaster Warning and Communication Processes in Two Commun i t i es , " The Journal of Communication 19(2) (June),92-104 (1969).

Barton, Allen H, "The Emergency Social System," in Man and Society in Disaster, George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman, Eds. (Basic Books, New York ,1962).

Barton, Allen H, Communities in Disaster (Anchor Books, New York, 1969).

Brouillette, John R., " Community Organizations Under Stress: A Study of Interorganizational Communication Networks During Natural Disasters," Dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, 1971.

Brouillette, John R., ana E. L. Quarante111, " Types of Patterned Variation in Bureaucratic Adaptations to Organizational Stress,"

Sociological Quarterly 41(Winter), 39-46, (1971).

Clif ford, Roy A., The Rio Grande Flood: A Comparative Study of Border Communities, National Academy of Sciences / National Researcn Council Disaster Study #7, National Acadecrj of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1956.

Dacy, Douglas C., and Howard Kunreuther, The Economics of Natural Disasters (The Free Press, New York, 1969).

Demerath, Nicholas J.,

and Anthony F. C. Wallace, " Human Adaptation to Disaster," , Human Organization 16(Summer), 1-2 (1957).

Drabek, Thomas E.,

Disaster in Isle 13, Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University, Columbus,1968.

Drabek, Thomas E. et al., Managing Multiorganizational Emergency Responses: Emergent Search and Rescue Networks in Natural Disaster and Remote Area Settings, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Boulder, Colorado,1981.

Drabek, Thomas E.,

and J. Eugene Haas, " Laboratory Simulation of Organizational Stress," American Sociological Review 34(2) (April)

(1969a).

R-1

I 1

1 l

R-2 Drabek, Thomas E., and J. Eugene Haas, "How Police Confront Disaster,"

Transaction 6(May), 33-38 (1969b).

Drabek, Thomas E., and Enrico L. Quarante111 "When Disaster Strikes."

Journal of Acolied Social Psycholoqy 1(2) 187-203 (1971).

Dynes, Russell R, " Theoretical Problems in Disaster Research," Bulletin of Business Research 41 Sept.). 7-9 (1966).

Dynes, Russell R., Organized Behavior in Disasters: Analysis and Conceptualization., Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus,1969.

i l

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