ML20238A341
| ML20238A341 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-073, OL-5-I-SC-73, NUDOCS 8708310034 | |
| Download: ML20238A341 (62) | |
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Exercise of the New Yo~r( State and l Oswego County . .
Raciologica Emergency P ans for JA# ES A. F "ZPATR CK N CIAR GENERAT N3 5"A" ON 1
OCTOBER 29,1982 Federal Emergency Management Agen^cy 9708310034 e70507 Region E ADDCK 050 2
{DR FRANK P. PETRONE 26 FEDERAL.. PLAZA Regional Director New York, N.Y.10278
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CONTENTS iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................
1 1 INTRODUCTION...........................................................
1.1 F EMA Re s po n s i b i l i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2
1.2 Exercise Events..................................................
Ex e r c i s e 0 bj e c t i v e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3 Participating State and Local Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4 7
l 1.5 Exercise Critique................................................
7 1.6 RAC Evaluation Objectives........................................
8 1.7 Federal Observer Team............................................
9 1.8 Evaluation Criteria..............................................
9 1.9 Remedial Action Procedures.......................................
1.10 Re view and Approval Procedure s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2 E XE CUT I VE S UMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.1 0verview......................................................... 11 2.2 Summary of State Activities...................................... 11 2.3 Summa ry o f Oswe g o Co un t y Ac t ivi t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.4 Summary of Activities at the Nine Mile Point Eme r gency Op e r a tion s Fa cili t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 17 2.5 Summary o f St a tus of RAC Re commend a t ion s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 EVALUATIONS............................................................ 20 3.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Re source s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff................. 21 3.3 Eme r g e n cy Ope r a t ions Man a g eme n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4 Public Aler ting and No ti fication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.5 Public and Media Relations....................................... 25 3.6 Accident Assessment.............................................. 26 3.7 Actions to Protect the Public.................................... 30 3.8 He al t h. Me di c al and Expo sure Co nt rol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.9 Re c o v e ry and Re e n t ry Ope ra t io n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.10 Relevance of the Exercise Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.11 RAC Re c o mm e n d a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4
SUMMARY
OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES.................................... 47 4.1 Eme rgency Ope rations Facilities and Re source s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.3 Emergency Operations Management.................................. 47 4.4 Pu b l i c Al e r t i n g an d No t i f i c a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.5 Pu bl i c a nd Me d i a Re l a t io n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.6 Accident Assessment.............................................. 48 4.7 Actions to Protect the Public.................................... 48 4.8 He alt h. Me dic al and Expo s ur e Cont rol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.9 Re c o v e r y a n d Re e n t r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 i
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CONTENTS (Cont'd) 5
SUMMARY
OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES.........................'................. 50 5.1 Emer'gency Ope rations Facilitie s and Re source s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.2 Alerting and ' Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.3 Emerge ncy Op e ra tions Managemen t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.4 Public Ale r ting and No ti fica tion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.5 Public and Me d ia Re l a t io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.6 Accident As s e s s m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 l 5.7 Actions to Protect t he Pu b l i c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 l 5.8 He alth , Medical and Expos ure Cont ro1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5.9 Recovery and Reentry Operations.................................. 56 5.10 Relevance of the Exercise Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CO RRE CT I VE ACT IO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 0.1 Schedule for the Correction of Significant Deficiencies. . . . . . . . . . 58 l
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS cpm counts per minute DH Department of Health (N.Y.)
DOE Department of Energy DOT Department of Transportation DVP Disaster Warning Point EBS Emergency Broadcasting System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERPA Emergency Response Planning Area FDA Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HHS Department of Health and Human Services JAFNPP J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant KI Potassium Iodide mR milli R (.001 R) mrem /hr milli Rem /hr (.001 Rem /hr)
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ODP Office of Disaster Preparedness PAC Protective Action Guides PASNY Power Authority of State of New York PIO Public Information Of ficer FMC Personnel Monitoring Center R Nentgen (unit of radiation exposure)
RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RECS Radiological Emergency Communications System Rem Roentgen equivalent in man R/hr R per hour (radiation exposure rate)
TLD The rmoluminescent Dosimeter (radiation dose measuring device)
UE Unusual Event USDA United States Department of Agriculture 1
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I 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 FEMA RESPONSIBILITIES On De cember 7, 1979, the Pre sid eat directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. For nuclear power plants, FEMA's responsibil-ities include:
- a. Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning, and review and evaluation of adequacy of state and local government emergency plans.
- b. Determining whether the plans can be implemented, based 3
upon observation and evaluation of exercises conducted in these jurisdictions.
- c. Coordinating the activities of other involved Federal agent:1es :
- Nuclear Regulatory Coc: mission (NRC)
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Fo rmal submission of emergency plans to the RAC by the states and involved local jurisdictions is followed closely by evaluation of those plans which includes an exercise of the plan procedures. A public meeting is held to discuss the contents of the plans, answer questions about them, and receive 1.
l suggestions on the plans.
This report is an evaluation of the second joint exercise at the Nine Mile Point site. This exercise involved participation by state and local agencies and by utility personnel from the James A. Fit: Patrick Nuclear Power Plant. The previous exercise at the site involved the Nine Mile Point Nuclear
2 Station Unic No. 1, at the same site. Comments and RAC recommendations for remedial actions that were presented to the state and county based on the earlier exercise. and review of emergency plans are also listed in this report with an evaluation of their current status.
1.2 EXERCISE TIMETABLE The second joint radiological emergency exercise was conducted on August 11, 1982, to assess the adequacy of radiological emergency response plans for New York State and Oswego County, and to test the state and county capabilities to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency involving the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP), operated by the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) and located near Oswego, New York.
The timetable for the principal scenario events is given below TIMETABLE FOR PRINCIPAL EVENTS Unusual Event (UE) - Safety Relief Valve 7:00 a.m.
Generic Problem Notification of UE 7:05 a.m.
Notification of Alert 8:15 a.m.
Limited E0C Activation 8:30 a.m.
Receipt of Assessment & Evaluation Data Continuous Notification of Site Area Emergency 9:30 a.m.
Full Activation of EOC 9:45 a.m.
Activate Public Notification 9:50 a.m. I Measures to Implement Protective Actions 9:50 a.m.
Notification of General Emergency 11:00 a.m.
Protective Action Decisions 11:15 a.m.
Evacuation Ordered and Counties Notified 11:20 a.m.
Major Airborne Release to Environment 11:30 a.m.
Governor's Emergency Declaration 11:30 a.m.
Medical Drill 2:00 p.m.
Release Terminated - Site De-escalates 2:00 p.m.
to Site Area Emergency 24 Hour Time Advance 2:45 p.m.
Reentry Planning, Ingestion Pathway Monitoring 3:00 p.m.
Recovery Planning Continued 3:15 p.m.
Notify Agencies to Prepare for Reentry 4:00 p.m.
Recovery Plan Announced 4: 30 p.m.
Drill Terminated 5:00 p.m.
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1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The objective of the exercise was to test and evaluate the adequacy of l state and county plans and the capability of participating organizations to implement them. The exercise was planned to provide a demonstration of the following capabilities.
I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans
- a. Adequacy and capability of implementation of the New York State, Oswego County and the JAFNPP radiological emergency plans.
- b. Emergency response capabilities of the State authorities, local support agency, JAFNPP and appropriate Federal agencies.
- c. Capability of Oswego County, the State and JAFNPP to imple-ment their respective radiological emergency preparedness plans in a manner satisfying FEMA /NRC acceptance criteria.
Notification Procedures
- a. Ability of JAFNPP staff to classify emergencies in accord-ance with JAFNPP Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures.
- b. Capability of JAFNPP to notify the State, local and Federal levels of government in accordance with Federal guidance and established protocols,
- c. Capability for communications among JAFNPP, the State, and Oswego County. JAFNPP will also demonstrate communicating technical information to the NRC via the NRC Rot Line. ,
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- d. Capability of the State. Oswego County and JAFNPP to notify and activate emergency response personnel.
- e. Capability of Oswego County and the State to alert and notify the ef fected permanent and transient public vithin the Plume Exposure EPZ of an incident at JAFNPP and to follow up with information as required, including activa- l tion of sirens, and tone alert rndios, and the Energency Broadcast System.
l f. Notification and request for assistance to Federal l agencies.
- g. Notification to counties and provinces within the ingestion Emergency Planning Zone and to agencies such as the rail-road by the State and Oswego County.
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Emergency Com=unications
- a. JAFNPP communication capabilities among the Control Room, l Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Operations Support Center and the Emergency News Center, and the ability to maintain communications with the Federal Government.
- b. Emergency communications capability among Oswego County, the State, and JAFNPP.
- c. Adequacy of JAFNPP. local and State emergency communica-tions to:
1 (1) Transe:it instructions to activate essential staf f.
l (2) Disseminate essential information to assisting agencies.
(3) Operate a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day alert and notification j system. j
- d. Ability of JAFNPP and Oswego County to coordinate, control and de'loy radiological monitoring teams via the respective l field immunizations system.
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l Emergency Response Facilities
- a. Adequacy of the staf fing of emergency response f acilities, space and habitability for management of radiological emer-gency at:
JAFNPP Control Room JAINPP Technical Support Center JAFNPP Operations Support Center JAFNPP Escrgency Operations Facility State Emergency Operations Center l ODP Central District EOC Oswego County EOC Emergency News Center
- b. Adequacy of internal communications in the State and County Emergency Operations Centers.
- c. Adequacy and competency of State, Oswego County and JAFNPP staff to operate the emergency response facilities.
- d. Adequacy of access control and security for emergency response facilities.
Direction and Control
- a. Ability of key emergency personnel at all levels of govern-ment and JAFNPP to initiate and coordinate timely and effective decisions and clearly demonstrate "who is in charge."
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- b. That there is effective organizational control and inte-grated radiological emergency response including deployment i of field monitors, receipt and analysis of field data and ;
sharing of field data among the licensee, State and Oswego !
County for evaluation and verification.
- c. Capability of Fedural, State and County emergency response agencies to identify and provide for resource requirements.
- d. The capability in coordinating actions among organizations in order to obtain support and to make appropriate decisions. ;
- e. The capability of elected and appointed officials in imple-menting appropriate radiological emergency response actions.
Public Information l a. The adequacy of the operation of and interaction among the l State, Oswego County and JAFNPP public information syatems.
- b. The activation and manning of the Emergency News Center by utility, State and Oswego County public information person-nel and the capability to issue periodic EBS messages, public information releases, aad to control rumors.
- c. That the offsite authorities and the licensee can effec- f tively provida information to the media. !
I Accident Assessment and Evaluation
- a. Activation, operations and reporting procedures of JAFNPP and Oswego County field monitoring teams.
- b. Ability of JAFNPP, Oswego County and the State to receive and assess radiological data from both County and licensee field teams in accordance with their respective radiologi-cal e=ergency plans.
- c. Ability of JAFNPP, the State and Oswego County each to calculate dose projections, compare the projtezions to the Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and determine appropriate protective actions.
Protective Resoonse
- a. The capability of the State and Oswego County emergency response organizations to make decisions and to implement appropriate protective action response options.
- b. JAFNPP employee accountability as required by their Emergene' Plan Implementing Procedures.
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Radiological Exposure Control
- a. Decision process for limiting exposure of emergency workers.
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- b. Processing of State and Local emergency workers through Personnel Monitoring Centers - (PMC).
- c. Capability of offsite emergency response personnel to implement access control procedures.
- d. Methods and resources for distribution of dosimetry to f emergency workers.
- e. Capability of emergency personnel for recording radiation exposures of-individuals.
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Medical Support
- a. First aid treatment iof a contaminated casualty in the field, transport to and. treatment at a hospital.
1 Reentry and Recovery .
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- a. Capability of emergency personnel to identify requirements, and to assess and implement procedures for reentry.
- b. Capability of emergency personnel to identify requirements, programs and policies governing damage assessment and' recovery. i
- c. That decision making processes involving State and County- I officials.are consistent with~ procedures in radiological i emergency plans and the overall Disaster Preparedness Plan.
- d. Adequate staffing for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operations. :
- e. Implementation of recovery and/or reentry procedures by the licensee, county and State. i' l.4 PARTICIPATING STATE AND LOCAL FACILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS The principal operating area for the exercise was the E plume exposure ;
emergency planning zone around the Nine Mile Point . site. The EPZ is an area with approximately a 10-mile radius around the power - plant. Organizations and facilities that were designated to participate- in the exercise are listed below.
i JAFNPP Control Room Technical Support Center
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, Operational Support Center Emergency Operations Facility l
l 1 New York State Emergency Operations Center, Albany Office of Disaster Preparedness Central District EOC, Oneida -
Oswego County Emergency Operations Center Emergency News Center, Oswego Also participating in the exercise were county _ radiological monitoring teams, reception / congregate care centers, bus companies, and the traffic control of fic.e rs. Personnel Monitoring Centers were established in Volney, Fulton, and Pulaski. Oswego Hospith1 participated in a medical drill. Many state, county, and volunteer organizations, e.g., American Red Cross and the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) also provided support during the exercise.
1.5 EXERCISE CRITIQUE A preliminary oral critique of the August 11, 1982, exercise was pre-seated at a public meeting on August 13, 1982, in Oswego, New York.
1.6 RAC EVAI.UATION OBJECTIVES The obj ectives of the Regional Assistance Committ ee (RAC) were to observe and evaluate the exercise, focusing on the ten functional areas listed l below. These ten functional areas include approximately 75 specific criteria developed from Section II of NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1 Rev. 1, which is the basic planning document on which the state and local plans, and also the criteria l for observing and evaluating the exercise, are based.
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Functional Areas e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.
e Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staf f. j e Emergency Operations Manage =ent. J i
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8 e Public Alerting and Notification. I' s Public and Media Relations.
e Accident As s e s sme n t .
e Actions to Protect the Public.
e Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures.
e Recovery and Reentry Operations.
e Relevance of the Exercise Experience.
I In addition, the status of RAC recommendations made earlier on the lj state and county plans were evaluated. '
1 1.7 FEDERAL OBSERVER TEAM l i
A 24 member off-site federal observer team was established by the FEMA-Region II RAC Chairman for observing the response at Nine Mile Point site.
Oversight responsibility for the exercise wss provided by Roger Kowieski, RAC {
Chairman. The federal observer team included:
Observer Agency Loca* ion / Function ;
i R. Kovieski FEMA (RAC Chairman) Oversight Responsibility l
P. McIntire FEMA Oversight Responsibility, Albany l D. Bartholf NOAA EOF i R. Bernacki FDA Medical Drill J. Feldman EPA State EOC/ Accident Assessment H. Fish DOE State District EOC/ Team Leader F. Fis h=an FEMA Recovery / Reentry R. Carelik FEMA State EOC, Communications M. Goodkind ANL* County EOC/ Accident Assessment 1 L. Roffman INEL** Radiological >bnicoring R. Ronkus INEL** County FMC/ Emergency Workers I. Husar FEMA EBS Station M. Jackson FLMA Ne ws Ce n t e r , P. I. O. '
T. Jackson NRC EOF / Team Leader J. Keller INEL** State PMC/ Reception Centers and Ingestion Pathway J. Kelly FEMA Communications 3 E. Levine ANL* Reception / Congregate Care L. Lewis ANL* Radiological Monitoring /PMC j
P. Lutz DOT /USCC Access Control Points / '
Recovery & Reentry C. Malina USDA Ingestion Pathway Sampling T. Maynard FEMA County EOC/ Team Leader J. O' Sullivan FEMA Access /Traf fic Control Points R. Reynolds FEMA i
State ECC/ Team Leader I D. Tinsman DOT /USCC Access / Traffic Control Points
- Argonne National Laboratory
- Idaho National Engineering Laboratory t
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- 9 1.8 EVALUATION CRITERIA Maj or functions wi tne s sed by federal observers we re evaluated in ,
1 accordance with the folowing scheme: 1 e Capability outstanding - During the exercise no deficien-cies were noted and no improvement is needed.
- Capability fgtgd - Capabilities displayed as implied in the j plan, though sinor deficiencies may have been noted.
- Capability Acceptable - The function was understood and accomplished. However, deficiencies were noted which could limit effective performance.
l e Capability Weak - The function had significant deficiencies i or the intent of the plan was not followed.
e Capability Lacking - The scenario exercised called for a specific response which was not demonstrated.
- Capability Not Observed - For one reason or another, the observer was not able to establish a rating. Either the observer was not present to witness the function, the activity was not called for in the scenario, or not appli-cable to the site or function. This rating does not imply that a deficiency exists.
1.9 REMEDIAL ACTION PROCEDURES Provided in Section 4 of this report is a list of significant deficien-cies identified during the exercisc and recommendations for remedial actions.
l These recommendations are based on the applicable planning standards (from which the state and local plans were developed) and on evaluation criteria set
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I forth in Se c tion II of NUREC-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, Minor deficiencies I i
identified by the observers and the recommended remedial actions are listed in i Section 5.
In this report , recommendations are keyed to the state and local juris-dictions, which should submit to FEMA a description of the corrective measures they have taken and a schedule for the 's to be undertaken. If remedial actions cannot be instituted i==ediately, a detailed schedule for implementing I remedial actions must be provided to FEMA, including dates for completion.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA l
t Associate Director, Stata and Local Programs and Suppo r t , Washington, D. C. .
l that the deficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such l corrections heve been incorporated into the plan.
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l 10 1.10 REVIEW A.VD APPROVAL PROCEDLTcES A s t.a t e that seeks review and approval by FEMA of its plan and annexes submits an application for review and approval to the FEMA Regional Director of the region in which the state is located. The application, in the form of a letter f rom the Governor, or such other state of ficial as the Governor may l designate, is to contain one copy of the completed state plan with an indica-tion that deficiencies have been corrected.
i Upon receipt of a state plan, the Pegional Di rec to r initiates the l review procese us described in 44 CFR Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Number 123, June 24, 1980 (Review and Approval of State and local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness). After the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) and the FEMA Regional staff have completed their review, including the evaluation of the supporting exercise and the public meeting required 'n 44 .
CFR Part 350, the FEMA Regional Director will issue a report to FEMA Head-quarters regarding the state and local government plans, procedures, and preparedness capabilities. The report will consist of a summary of the over-f all findings and determinations with respect to the procedurer, training, resources, staffing levels, qualifications, and equipment availability. The FEMA Associate Director is to conduct such review of this report av deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies.
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. . i 11' 2 EXECUTIVE SLYMARY An exercise of the emergency preparedness? plans for the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP) at the Nine Mile . Point site was held on August 11, 1982. The offsite exercise was observed by a' team of 24 federal observers, who reported their findings to . the Federal - Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Participating in the . exercise were the owner of JAFNPP, the
, Power Authority of the State of New York, (PASNY), officials and agencies of the State of New York, and the - county of - Oswego. The primary facilities observed by FEMA were the State Emergency Operations _ Centers (EOCs) in Albany-and Oneida, the Oswego County EOC in Fulton, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in Lycoming, and the News Center in Oswego. . Activities were also ob-served in reception centers, congregate care centers, and personnel monitoring centers. Other activities tested included field monitoring, traffic control, and medical care.
2.1 OVERVIEW In general, the participants performed in a professional.and competent manner. Decision-making at the State and County levels was good, as were most resources and staff to implement the decisions. There was good participation by support organizations, e.g., Red Cross and RACES volunteers.
Deficiencies that were observed during the exercise are noted in the following summary and are discussed in greater detail in Section 3, Evalua-tions; Section 4, Summary of Significant Deficiencies; and .Section 5, Summary l
of Minor Deficiencies.
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SUMMARY
OF STATE ACTIVITIES Emergencv Ooerations Facilities and Resources The Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) in Albany. and Oneida were good.
Each facility had sufficient space, and internal communications t.ere good. A su= mary of.all incoming and outgoing messages was circulated to the partici-pants; displays were clearly visible in each room. County radiological field monitoring data were not transmitted to Albany in a timely manner and were no't-available in the Al bany EOC until mid-af ternoon. Population data for the e
12 Emergency Re s ponse Planning Areas (ERPAs) were not prominently displayed in the Albany Operations Room.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff The alerting and mobilization procedures for contacting state officials were good. Each facility was properly staffed and a 24-hour capability was demonstrated. Alerting of emergeocy response organizations was effective and accomplished by conventional telephone. However, the use of individual pagers should be considered.
Emergenev Operations Management Organization, control, and leadership were good at the EOCs. Decision-making was clear and prompt. Briefing of agency representatives was accept-able, although delayed initially.
Public Alerting and Notification No requirements.
Public and Media Relations Public inf o rmation coordination at the EOC in Albany was good.
l Preparation and coordination of press releases and EBS messages were the main functions. The state public information officer maintained contact with the News Center and distributed EBS messages and news releases to the agency representatives within the EOC. However, the receipt of two county issued EBS messages could not be verified by the Federal Observor at the Albany EOC.
Accident As se s sment Accident assessment functions were acceptable. However, evaluations were based solely on plant release rates and plant conditions, since field monitoring data were not available on a timely basis. Computational aids and I the capability to recom=end protective actions were good.
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l Actions to Protect the Public j l
State implementation of protective action responses was not required by the s c enar.io. State decision-making capabilities are discussed in Section 3.3.1 under Emergency Operations Management.
t Realth, Medical and Exposure Control Measures l Although the state plan as amended calls for the use of potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers, observers found no evidence that a supply .
l of KI was available or that workers were provided with information on its use. Personnel dosimetry was adequate.
Recovery and Reentry Plans and procedures for recovery and reentry operations were demon-strated. The decision to relax protective measures and to proceed with recovery and reentry was made jointly by the state and county af ter careful deliberation. Operations personnel contacted appropriate response agencies to simulate relaxation of protective measures.
Although sampling of milk and crops in the 50-mile ingestion pathway zone was called for in the scenario, only a few samples were taken or simulated due to ti=e constraints.
Relevance of the Exercise Experience Three groups of participants were questioned: personnel in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), in the EOF, and in the field. The maj ority of EOC and EOF personnel responses were positive. The scenario was an ade-quate test of most of the operational organizations. Many of the responding l
participants indicated satisfaction with available resource materials. !
l Participants in the field indicated that the scenario did not fully test their l capabilities. The relatively constant wind direction and speed (lack of wind j shift) and low icvel of simulated radionuclides release did not provide a thorough test of accident assessment capability. The scenario was a good test of decision making consultation among State and County officials. Federal I i
observers agreed that the scenario was clearly beneticial to the participants.
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l Public Alerting and Notification i
1 Overall, the demonstration of capabilities for public alerting and
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notification was lacking. The siren system did not activate, and the state, )
i county, and utility were not aware that the sirens failed to scund. The tone j alert receivers used for alerting sparsely populated areas worked well in most locations. Limited route alerting by State Police helicopter was demon-strated.
The coordination of EBS activation with the tone alert sounding was l
well demonstrated. However, the broadcaster at the primary EBS radio station !
i (WKFM) was unf amiliar with the county EBS plan. Several EBS messages and i press releases contained errors and omissions of important instructional ,
information. 1
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l Public and Media Relations l 1
Public and media relations were acceptable overall.
I Public education )
i materials, including brochures for residents, have been widely disseminated to I the public. Although the county provided posters for the transient population they were observed in some locations (e.g., recreational facilities) but were I not observed in some motels within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
Telephone books contained emergency public info rmation. The News Center f acilities were generally good; staffing by State and County PIO personnel was good. However, in the State and County PIO working area, there were no wall maps showing ERPAS, nor were maps used to chart plume move =ent and protective i actions. The rumor control system was well designed but the capability of 12 phone lines to handle inquiries from the public was not demonstrated due to the limited number of calls coming into the system. County public information procedures have been improved over the previous exercise.
Accident As s e s sment County accident assessment was acceptable. Staff in the Emergency Operations Cent e r (EOC) were well trained in calculating dose projections.
The decision to deploy field =enitoring teams was not timely. One radio-logical field monitoring team needed additional training to collect data more rapidly. Field sampling equipment was good, and 24-hour availability of teams was evident. a clear i=provement over the previous exercise. However. due to
16 a scenaric problem, the data supplied by the controller to the field monitoring teams was in =R/hr, while the instrument measured counts per minute. This caused some confusion.
l Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public included access control, transportation of evacuees by bus, reception and mass congregate care. The overall rating of this element was good. The demonstration of access and traf fic control was timely and adequate. Three evacuation routes were run by bus and were eval-usted'as adequate. Reception and congregate care centers had good capabili-ties. These were located well beyond the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone, were well staffed, well organized and had good resource capabilities.
Other supporting resources, e.g. ambulance and extra supplies, could be l readily furnished from the immediate area if necessary. There was noted f improvement over the previous exercise in staffing and training.
l Health. Medical and Exposure Control Measures The hesich, medical and exposure control measures were acceptable. The j overall adequacy of equip' men t , supplies, personnel dosimetry, medical l facilities and medical treatment was g0od. The ese of potassium iodide for
! emergency workers was not demonstrated. Dosimeter readings were taken frequently and were properly recorded. Hospital personnel were well trained, t
but security in the decontamination and treatment area could be improved through adherence to contamination control procedures. In general, perfor ance in this area has been improved over the previous exercise.
l Recovery and Reentry County procedures for recovery and reentry are discussed with state activities in the previous section.
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l Relevance of the Exercise Excerience l
l The relevance of the exercise experience is discussed with state activities in the previous section.
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17 2.4
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES AT THE NINE MILE POINT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY Only a few of the categories of activity listed in Se c tion 1. 6 are applicable to the EOF. Only four of the ten activities were demonstrated and evaluated for the ECF.
The emergency operating facilities and resources received an overall rating of acceptable. The only apparent problem was the difficulty the County Representative had communicating with the County EOC. This resulted primarily from the heavy craffic on the line, which caused many busy signals.
The mobilization of officials and staf f was good. The utility, state and county personnel arrived promptly and filled all of the positions specified in the State and County plans. A shift change was not demonstrated.
Accident assessment actions received an overall rating of acceptable.
l Activities at the EOF were carried out according to plan in that dose j assessment was done at the state EOC and not at the EOF. There could have been more interaction between the utility and the state regarding utility assessment and recommendations. Also, as noted in the last exercise, very little county field data reached the EOF.
The relevance of the exercise experience was rated good. All partici-pants felt that the exercise was a beneficial experience and allowed a variety of response actions.
I l 2.5 SIThiARY OF STATUS OF RAC RECOMMENDATIONS The Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), chaired by FEMA, has provided recoc=endations to the state and county based on an evaluation of the previous exercise (September 15, 1981) at the Nine Mile Point site and from a review of state and county plans. Observers of the August 11, 1982 exercise commented on the implementation of the state and county response to each recommendation.
These comments are presented in Table 3.1 and are su=marized below.
l l state In response to RAC comments, the state has helped develop c standard-l l
ized radiological emergency data form, has provided additional training for 1
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18 support staff, and has i= proved telecopying and news monitoring capabilities.
However, some problems remain in these and other comment areas as noted below:
o Page 3 of the standardized form was illegible when telecopied, e The role of the state persont.el in the EOF is not well defined, e Some EBS messages were not properly received and verified, e Coordinated procedures for collection, transmittal, display, and use of field monitoring data were not i demonstrated, and o Emergency workers were not familiar with a policy for use of potassium iodide as a thyroid-blocking agent.
Oswego County Adequate responses have been made to RAC comments in the following areas:
e Security for the EOC, e The need for television, radio, telecopiers, and additional telephones in the EOC, e The need for better maps and overlays, e Additional training of radiological and support staff, and e A defined role for the county representative in the EOF.
Procedures have also been improved by use of a standardized data form, improved public info rmation materials and rumor control methods. However, some problems remain in these areas, as noted below:
o Page 3 of the standardized form was illegible when telecopied, e
Better instruction is needed for radio announcers on use of the EBS, and e The adequacy of the rumor-control system has not been tested.
Inadequate responses have been made to recommendations made in the following areas:
e Testing of the siren system and description of a verification system, e
Improved methods for collecting, transmitting, display and use of field monitoring data, and
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Procedures to. ensure monitoring of evacuees who may bypass the reception center in accordance with breachure instructions.
Observers were unable to verify the availability of backup power and the capability for 24-hour operation of all reception and congregate care centers.
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3 EVALUATIONS This section presents a detailed discussion of the performance of the participating agencies and organizations as noted by the observers. The format used follows the ten areas listed in Section 1.6, with separate discussions of state, county, and the emergency operations facility (EOF).
3.1 EFIRGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITIES AND FISOURCES 3.1.1 State of New York During the exercise, the New York State Of fice of Disaster Preparedness activated Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) in Albany and in the Central District Office in Oneida. Facilities at both locations were good. Adequate space was available and internal communications were good. Security was very ,
good at both locations. A minor deficiency was the lack of prominently displayed population data in the Albany Operations Room. Also, radiological field monitoring data were not available in the Albany EOC until mid-af ternoon.
! Field survey data and projected doses were not well displayed in Albany. Some 1
overloading of telefax and telephone equipment was noted at the Central District EOC. In Albany, constant ringing. of the malfunctioning hotline telephone was distracting.
3.1.2 Oswere County Facilities at the Oswego County EOC in Fulton were acceptable. Minor deficiencies were noted that limited eff ective performance. These included 1 the malfunction of the Radiological E=ergency Communications System (RECS) which could not receive or transmit information, and the inefficient flow of i 1
infor=ation between the operations room and the accident assessment room due l
to the physical arrangement of the EOC which made the flow of inf o rma tion between rooms cumbersome. The availability of telephones has been improved since the previous exercise. Security was good, and map displays were out-standing. The RACES (Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service) operators were not kept informed during the exercise; use of these operators was not clearly l defined in the county plan.
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21 3.1.3 EOF Com=unications between the EOF and the Oswego County EOC were minimally acceptable. The telephone line was frequently busy so that significant delays were experienced'. in transmitting field data to the EOF, and in transmitting utility data to the EOC. Better use of the field teams to take data for early confirmation of the proj ected dosa rates calculated by .the utility is desirable. This would, however, increase the traffic load on this telephone link and make the- situation much worse. Additional telephone cap eity is needed.
3.2 ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF 3.2.1 State of New York The alerting and mobilization of officials and staff for the emergency operating center (EOC) f acility at Albany 'and for the Central District EOC facility of the Office of Disaster Preparedness (CDP)' vere good. Initial notification by the utility was to the Disaster Warning Point (DWP) manned by
- l. the state police 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. The warning point personnel notified state officials at the ODP and at the Department of Health (DH) by . telephone.
Backup communications consisted of police radio and 'the possible . dispatch of patrol. cars if required. State officials followed call-up procedures and.
call-up lists to notify by telephone the various organizations that were required to respond to the emergency. Staffing of both emergency facilities was completed in less than one hour. This included dispatching a representa-tive to the utility's emergency operating facility (EOF). The ability to l
reach emergency response personnel who night not be at home or at work could l be strengthened by using radio pager equipment. The capability for main-l taining a 24-hour per day operation was desenstrated ' by having enough staff available to man two shifts.
3.2.2 Oswego County l
Alerting of officials and staf f was good. The primary notification from the utility was to the sheriff's office. which is manned ' 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. The sheriff's office then instituted its call-out procedures for emergency workers officials and staff. These procedures utilized the
j 22 commercial telephone, and backup radio was available (police and fire). Key-links in the notification procedures included the. police and fire departments.
The Fire De partment Control Center (Oswego County) has 'several channels of Fire Department radio and police radio that were used for alerting and mobil-izing fire department workers (including field radiation monitoring teams).
Backup notification means included other radio systems and other ' telephones.
Calls from the fire control center were completed.in about 10 minutes. j
.The Oswego County EOC officials then activated the EOC. and called the staff and department representatives according - to the plan procedures. The commercial telephone was used, and backup radios'were available. The EOC was manned in about 30 minutes and a representative was dispatched to the EOF in a timely manner.
A shift change demonstrated the ability to man two shif ts for 24-hour per day operation. However, no backup for the County Director of Emergency Preparedness was demonstrated although the plans contain a list of backup personnel. The key backup for the Director was unable to participate in the exercise due to a medical emergency.
3.2.3 EOF Mobilization of officials and staff were good. The officials and staff supplied by the utility, the state, the county and by federal agencies arrived promptly and functioned in a timely manner. Sufficient staff was present~to support 24-hour per day operations except for the Oswego County representa-tive. Oswego County relief personnel were available nearby (e.g. , the Oswego County EOC).
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i 3.3 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT k
3.3.1 State of New York Organization, control, and leadership were good at both the Oneida and Albany EOCs. Decision-making was clear and prompt. Briefing of agency representatives vas acceptable, although the initial briefing in Albany var somewhat delayed.
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23 3.3.2 Oswero County Organization, control, and management were good in the Oswego County EOC. The Director of Emergency Preparedness was clearly in charge of opera-tions and consulted with appropriate staff and state and county officials before making de:isions. Response organizations participated as specified in plans and procedures. The emergency classification system was incorporated in plans and procedures and. used thoughout the exercise. Oral briefings were given for most key events and staff meetings of department heads were held as necessary.
3.3.3 EOF This function van not observed at the EOF.
3.4 PUBLIC ALERTING AND :;0TIFICATION 3.4.1 State of New York These functions were not observed at the State EOCs. However, as noted in Section 3.4.2, verification of siren activation and sounding was not accomplished.
3.4.2 Osweco County Overall, the demonstration of public alerting and notification was lacking. Significant deficiencies were noted in the performance of the siren system, in the f amiliarity of some radio broadcast personnel with EBS proce-dures, and in the effectiveness of instructional messages to the public in affected areas.
Primary means for proept public notification within the EPZ is activa-tion of the 35 outdoor warning sirens and activation of the approximately 1900 tone alert receivers. During the exercise, the sirens and tone alert radios were to have been sounded at about 10:45 a.c. However, although procedures I for siren activation were followed, sounding of the sirens did not take place due to equipment failure.
Failure of the sirens to sound was not detected by either state or county representatives thoughout the exercise. The combination of equipment failures and lack of a verification system for siren sounding
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i 24 could seriously impede protective actions, including effectiveness of instruc-tional messages and alternate public alerting procedures in the 10-mile EPZ.
At many of the observed locations, the NOAA tone alert receivers furnished by Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation worked well. However, one cone
\ alert receiver which was observed at the Oswego Bus Company did not operate.
The tone alert receiver at a campground was not in use; the superintendent had it turned off for the summer and the campground owner had hers somewhere in her house.
l Some route alerting by a state police helicopter was demonstrated, but l it was not demonstrated that this method was adequate to promptly notify the public.
i The emergency broadcast system (EBS) and news releases were used to notify the public of the reasons for the siren / cone alert sounding and to advise what actions were to be taken. During the exercise, use of the EBS was evaluated as weak. Radio station broadcast personnel at WKFM (the originating EBS station) were neither provided with nor were familiar with the county radiological emergency plan. The master message log was not utilized at the radio station to record EBS activation as called for in the plan.
The effective use of instructional messages was also evaluated as weak.
At leas two EBS messages contained serious mistakes, while other messages did not provide necessary infor=ation, e.g., when students should arrive home, specifics as to bus routes for picking up of persons without cars, and refer-ence to previously issued instructional brochures and posters. There was additional concern regarding the frequency of EBS airings.
During the exercise several county EBS messages did not mention an ERPA that had previously been advised to shelter. The initial EBS message regarding sheltering / evacuation was issued at 11:07 a.m., advising the sheltering of several ERPAs, including ERPA 7. At 11: 40 a.m., a second EBS message advised sheltering / evacuation of several ERPAs, but did not mention ERPA 7. At 1:45 p.m., the state issued an EBS message advising sheltering of ERFA 7, among others. Internal =essages also contained the error regarding ERPA 7 during this interval, despite a radiological briefing at 12:20 p.m., that stated ERPA 7 was being sheltered.
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25 EBS messages aired from WSCO in Oswego were well done and provided frequent and complete EBS reports on the accident and the protective measures required.
The coordination aspects of EBS activation with tone alert sounding was well demonstrated.
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3.4.3 EOP' I
This function was not observed at the EOF.
t 3.5 PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS l 3.5.1 State of New York Public Information Officers (Pios) coordinated media activities at tha EOC in Albany and at the News Center in Oswego. State performance of these functions was good, and consisted vainly of preparing and coordinating _ press releases and EBS messages. The FIO at Albany maintained contact with the News Center and distributed EBS messages.and news releases to,the agency represent-atives in the EOC. However, the receipt of two county ( issued EBS massages could not be verified by the federal observer at the . Albany EOC. . Some state nies releases did not provide the correct telephone number for the media to A
call.
At the News Center, wall maps for charting plwe movements and protec-tive actions were not available. v 3.5.2. hwaeoCounty 2
Public and media _ relations at the county level were acceptable, with minor deficiencies noted that limited performance. Fubl'ic education materials,
, .I i
.ntluding bnehures , have been widely disseminated c2 local residents. The \
schools that 'were chected - (in Mexico and Oswego Cityp also .had the brochures '
cya[lable. Posters for r the ' cransient population were' observe'd in some loca-t .
.e j 'tions such as recreation'al facilities;, but were not gbseryed in some motels within the 10-mile Emergendy Planning Zone (EPZ) alDE[t/gh distributed by Oswego Co un t y. Emergency information was contained in ' -he latest issued g
/ telephone books. ) w Staffing of the News Center in Oswego by county persoriftel-was hgood. Maps for charting plume movements and protective actions were not f
[7 av.411able at the Ness Center.
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! 26 The rumor control system was well designed, but the capability of twelve . lines to handle a large number of inquiries from the public was not demonstrated, due to the limited number of calls coming into the system.
County procedures for providing public information have been improved since the previous exercise; however, a better numbering system is needed to document the sequence of EBS messages and news release issuance. Different mascheads should be used for EBS messages and news releases to avoid confusing the two types of-issuances.
3.5.3 EOF This function was not observed at the EOF.
3.6 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT 3.6.1 State of New York Accident assessment capabilities at the state level were acceptable with minor deficiencies noted. Decisions and recommendations regarding pro-tective actions were based only on dose projections since field monitoring data were not available until late in the day. Projected doses and survey l
data were not well displayed. However, technical calculations and use of protective action guides (PAGs) were good.
3.6.2 Oswego County Oswego County accident assessment actions were judged to be acceptable overall with some deficiencies noted. Three teams, one from Scriba Voluntary l Fire De par t=en t , one from the Oswego City Fire Department, and one from the Sheriff's Department, were alerted and mobilized promptly after the site area e=ergency was declared. The fire control radio system was used for this.
Many additional teams have been trained so that team members are on duty at the stations during each shift.
i The field monitoring teams compared their equipment to prepared lists, l;
checked the equipment for operability, and tested them with operational check I
I sources. The teams vere then put on standby. The Scriba team was deployed first and took several readings. The state controller for the Scriba field
27 monitoring team did not understand the radiological package given to him. The Oswego team was not deployed until about 1:00 p.m., and took only one set of readings. The sheriff's team was not deployed until about 4:00 p.m. These delays in deployment prevented the rapid gathering of field data that was needed for early confirmation of the projected doses calculated by the utility .
and by the county and state accident assessment teams. Without thi>
confirmation, protective actions ordered may be inappropriate.
The instrumentation used in the field had been calibrated recently.
The high range gamma instrument was of a good non-overloading type. The low level instruments (Eber11ne) were good equipment, but were calibrated in counts per minute (epm). This led to some confusion since the controller's l data was in mR/hr which were inappropriate for the field .nstruments (CPM).
This conversion was supposed to be done in the EOC, but the conversion factor is specific to the instrument used, and use of the appropriate f actors could not be confirmed.
The air sampling equipment was good and had been recently calibrated.
Particulate filters plus charcoal and silver zeolite adsotbers were available.
The silver zeolice adsorbers were used for the exercise. The procedure was to draw a measured quantity of air through an adsorber. The adsorber was then counted (cpm). The team and the EOC stated that ordinarily they would count l the adsorber at the site of exposure and then go to an uncontaminated site to flush out the filter with clean air and then count the filter. The charcoal I i
adsorbers should not be used for radiciodine sampling if activity measurements are to be made with gross counters because of the unwanted noble gas retention of this material. Flushing with clean air is marginally effective for removal of noble gases froc charcoal. Efficient flushing (within a reasonable time) requires use of hot air.
Silver zeolite adsorbers are useable for radiciodine measurements without flushing. Because of the retention of noble gas by charcoal, these adsorbers can be used effectively to determine the presence of the plume, i.e., at any point a radiation field may be present due to the ple=e being overhead but not at ground level. Increased activity on a charcoal i
adsorber indicates the presence of the plume at the sampling point. It may be l necessary to leave the area in or under a plume to obtain an accurate reading on any sampling media. If the direct radiation readings due to the plu=e are high it is likely that all of the sampling media (particulate filter, charcoal l l
28 l-I or silver zeolice) will give count races within statistics of the plume readings. It is therefore a requirement that the fielf teams leave the area to make useful readings on the sampling media.
The iodine data were measured in epm from the filter with a particular geometry of counter probe and transmitted to the EOC. Actual converting of the counting race to microCuries of iodine was supposedly done in the EOC but no check on the accuracy of the conversion was possible.
Counting rates and radiation exposure rates were called into the EOC by the field monitoring teams by using portable radios. This was not always satisfactory because of noise problems. The Scriba team used the fire control center as its primary communication means. The backup radio functioned satis-factorily. The readings that were called in were not always verified by call-back procedures. The units on the radiation record form were in Rem /hr, but one team changed this to mrem /hr. If the EO:; uses this form for recording field data, confusion of units is possible.
The accident assessment capability in the EOC was good, but the staff did not always demonstrate the ability to keep up with the fast moving events.
! Only a few data points were called in from the field. The ut;llity data on I
plant conditions and onsite monitoring were telefaxed and were filegible.
Some utility data were telephoned in from the EOF but the heavy use of this telephone delayed and limited the amount of data received by this route. 3 Reports from observers in the EOC indicated that the units for the dose rates were not always clear.
The county accident assessment team demonstrated a good ability to ,
1 calculate independently done projections starting with utility supplied source ter=s, and meteorological data.
The ability to use the protective action guides (PACS) to determine and institute appropriate protective actions was well demonstrated.
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3.6.3 EOF l
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Accident assessment was acceptable, based on state confirmation of l utility dose projections, in accordance with the state - plan. Utility data were relayed to the state and county EOC for use in accident assessment.
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29 Confirmation of projected dose races through measurements by the field radiological monitoring teams was not demonstrated. There was very little exchange of county field data with the utility. Only one set of readings was transmitted to the county representative at the EOF. Units were missing and/or inconsistent for the reported results. Either readings were changed in the reporting chain or instruments were incorrectly read, so that the reported numbers were so inconsistent with the projaccions that they were ignored and not transmitted to the state.
The EOF functioned primarily as a communication center between the utility, the state, and the county. The state plan does not provide for evaluation / interaction with the utility at the EOF.
Appropriate protective actions based on PACS were recommended by the state. However, at approximately 1:00 p.m. the utility recommended ERPA 4 be evacuated based on a maximum projected dose of 9 Rem. It was not stated whether this was whole body or thyroid dose and no one from the state asked.
This information is essential in determining proper corrective actions. The State people at the EOF transmitted all the data they received to the state EOC.
However, transmitted data was incomplete because the " REM" dose did not contain all necessary information. State personnel could not talk directly to utility assessment people but had to go through a utility liaison and this made communication awkward at times.
The utility representatives at the EOF did not post their off-site survey readings or the locations for these readings.
It was reported that state personnel in Albany once talked directly to the utility resident manager without informing the state personnel in the EOF.
It appeared that the state was not going through normal channels to get information.
Little interaction was observed between the utility and state and local govern =ents on protective action recommendations. The utility made recommen-dacions and the state and county appeared to generally accept them. There {
should be more interaction among all parties in the development of recoc:menda-tions.
30 3.7 ACTIONS TO PROECT THE PUBLIC 3.7.1 State of New York State implementation of protective action responses was not required by the scenarie.
l 3.7.2 Oswego County l
(
Local protective response actions observed during the exercise included l the simulation of public evacuation by buses, control of craffic access within l
the emergency plantting zone, and activation of a reception and congregate care facility. The overall rating of this element was good.
The state police, and Oswego County Sheriff's department staffed three traffic control points as called for during the exercise. All were dispatched by radio and arrived on the scene promptly. Personnel were knowledgeable of the procedures. Sheriff's deputies were well equipped with some protective clothing and low and high level dosimeters which were read and reported to the dispatcher at 15 minute intervals. However, one sheriff's deputy was unclear as to what would happen if he received an unacceptably high dose. Access control was adequately demonstrated, although no road block equipment such as barricades were used at traffic control points. The EOC base station radio communication system was inadequate and three cars reported that they could not hear the base station.
Bus transportation is called for in the evacuation plan for school children and for persons without private automobiles. Three bus companies participated in the exercise and each company ran one evacuation route. All buses were radio equipped to communicate with the dispatcher. Bus drivers carried pocket dosimeters (0-200 R and 0-5 R), ard wore film badges. The drivers of evacuation routes #1 and #31 read their dosimeters frequently and called the results into the dispatcher regularly and at the last bus stop.
The driver of route #18 did not read the dosimeter. Evacuation routes were not monitored or controlled, although radic-equipped buses could info rm the dispatcher of necessary actions as they developed. Evacuation route 91 was observed to nave several dirt roads and a steep hill which may be impassable during incle=ent weather. Only one bus at the Oswego Bus Company was capable of carrying wheelchair-confined persons, with a capacity of 3 persons.
31 ]
Reception and congregate care centers were located well outside the 10-mile emergency planning zone. A pre-reception area was established to check arriving individuals for contamination prior to sending the " clean" evacuees for processing at the reception area. A fire truck was on stand-by to decontaminate vehicles with water. Washings would drain into a nearby storm sewer. The reception center at the Syracuse f airgrounds and the congregate care center at the Liverpool K1gh School were very well organized for the i caring of several hundred evacuees. Ample space was available to accomodate l!
all the necessary activities, and was logically sectioned off for various activities. At the reception center, rooms were established for a processing area, waiting area, map area, communications and even a pet holding area.
Emergency worker staffing was largely from the Red Cross and the Oswego and Onondaga Departments cf Social Services. Fire, police and an ambulance vero l
in evidence at the reception areas, but not at the congregate care center.
The f acility at the Liverpool congregate care center was well run and well staffed. The high school was well suited for serving as a mass care center; it had kitchen facilities, numerous rooms, parking, sanitary, and recreation facilities. Other supporting resources such as cots,' blankets, ambulance and medical supplies could be readily furnished from the immediate area. A Red Cross nursing station was established and attended by three nurses. Coc=unica-l tions by the phone, RACES, and radio were available. Standard personnel processing forms were available and used by a well-trained staff. A backup power generator was not available at the Liverpool High School.
l Af ter the reception and congregate care centers were alerted to acti-vate and stand by, they were not kept ir for ed of the ongoing plant status or 1
of whether additional evacuees were en route. No radio was observed for monitoring E3S notices. Observer inquiry of the plant status from a RACES operator received a relayed response within 5 minutes.
i The reception and congregate care center in Watertown was also well l organi:ed and staf fed for the caring of up to 200 evacuees. Separate rooms were available for the appropriate functions. Red Cross personnel followed ptocedures com=unicated orally by Civil Defense area officials.
3.1.3 EDT This function was not observed at the EOF.
32 i
3.8 HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURI CONT 20L 3.8.1 State of New York and 3.8.2 Oswego County The health, medical and exposure control measures were acceptable. It is the state policy not to dminister potassium iodide (KI) to the general population as a thyroid blocking agent. The state policy is for the use of KI for emergency workers when the potential exists for such persons to receive doses at predetermined levels. The county plan is to follow the state l
recoc:mendation. The state's implementing procedures were not developed at the l
1 time of the JAFMPP exercise and therefore Oswego County officials were not aware of methods or provisions for the use of KI.
The control of access to evacuated areas was well demonstrated.
Dosimeters were supplied to emergency workers. A cLid-range (0-200 mR or 0-5 R) dosimeter, a high range dosimeter (0-200 R) and a film badge were supplied to each worker. Dosimeters and film badges were adequate, however, the plan should be revised to reflect use of film badges rather than TLDs.
Dosimeters were read frequently (e.g., at 15 minute intervals), results were recorded en an exposure form, and in the case of field teams, the readings were radioed to the EOC for recording. The workers knew that they were required to report for instruction as soon as their dosimeters indicated an exposure of 1 R.
Exposures in excess of PACS were not encountered in this simulated emergency, se that no actions were needed to authorize exposure in excess of PACS.
Actions and procedures at county Personnel Monitoring Centers (PMCs) were good. Action levels for decontamination were posted at the PMCs for emergency workers. At the decontamination area of the Re ce ption Center, personnel knew the action levels that required d e co n t amin a tio n.- However, state PMC at Pulaski's state police substation was lacking, while one at Fulton was good. The state e=ployee in charge of the Pulasks' PMC was not familiar with the plan procedures or basic health physico practices.
Facilities for the decontamination of people were adequate. However, there was some question at the Reception Center about how much emergency
33 clothing might be needed by people who had been decontaminated. Facilities for the decontamination of vehicies at the State PMC were adequate except for the possible control of runoff in the winter when the ground may be frozen.
The county EOC has procedures for calculating total populat. ion expo-sure, but did not have time to complete all of these calculations due to the compressed nature of the scenario.
The medical drill began with an automobile accident with two injured persons, one of which was contaminated. The emergency rescue squad errived promptly, checked the victims for contamination, and began creating the leg injury on the contaminated victim. They did not wear protective clothing and would most likely have contaminated themselves.
Both patients were transported by ambulance. A sheet. was placed on the floor and the patient placed on it to prevent contamination of the ambulance.
A second ambulance came for the second patient, who had simulated burns on most of his back, but no contamination. Both ambulances departed promptly for the hospital. At the hospital, a radioactive material decontamination and treatment area was set up, but not secured.
The ambulance used for the decontaminated patient was not quarantined cud was left unguarded. Written procedures for decontamination and treatment of the patient were adequate and -
were used at the hospital. However, the State Radiation Health Specialist moved through the decontamination and treatment area and out again several ti=es without boots or gloves. He also touched the patient with the survey probe (covered with plastic) several times; these procedures could have resulted in the spread of contamination through the hospital and false readings on the survey meter. The patient was removed from the room after the decontamination was completed. The hospital personnel used proper procedures in removing protective clothing and leaving the decontamination area. The health physicist provided by the utility did not arrive until after the medical drill was over. Overall, the medical drill was handled well, except for a few minor deficiencies.
3.3.3 IOF This function was not observed at the EOF.
4
34 3.9 RECOVERY AND REEYrRY OPERATIONS
- 3. 9' .1 State of New York and 3.9.2 Oswego County Recovery and reentry procedures were only partially demonstrated due to the limited time available during the exercise. The decision to relax protection measures and to proceed with recovery and reentry was made jointly by the state and county af ter careful deliberation. Operations personnel-contacted appropriate response agencies to simulate relaxation of protective.
measures. Ingestion pathway sampling consisted of collecting one milk and one.
crop sample. Collection of other samples was simulated.
3.9.3 ' EOF This function was not observed at the EOF.
3.10 RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE 3.10.1 State of New York and 3.10.2 Oswego County Three groups of participants were questioned; personnel in the Emergency Operation Center (EOC), EOF and the field. The majority of EOC and EOF personnel responses were positive. A notable fraction.of the responding participants indicated satisfaction with available resource materials.
Participants in the field indicated that the' scenario was inadequate to test their capabilities. The scenario was an adequate test of most of the opera-tional organizations. However, the relatively constant wind direction' and speed (lack of wind shift), and small si=ulated radionuclides release did not' provide a thorough test of accident assessment capability. The scenario was a good test of decision making consultation among state and county officials.
Federal observers agreed that the scenario was clearly beneficial to the participants.
3.10.3 EOF All participants felt that the exercise experience was beneficial and allowed a variety of response actions.
35 3.11 RAC RECOMMENDATIONS The RAC r. embers reviewed the state and county Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan and also reviewed the performance of the previous exercise conducted at the Nine Mile Point site about one year ago. The RAC comments developed during this review have been responded to by the state and county.
The RAC comments, the state / county response and the comments that the observ-ers made based on the August 11, 1982 exercise are presented in Table 3.1.
The table contains those items that could be observed during the recent exercise. The evaluation of each. item is noted in the final column of Table 3.1.
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47 4 SL?OMRY OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES "Significant deficiencies" are capabilities which during the evaluation of the exercise performance were rated either " weak" or " lacking" (see Section 1.8). These "significant deficiencies" must be corrected in a timely fashion to ensure an adequate level of preparedness and an effective response in the event of an emergency.
4.1 E=ergency Operations Facilities and Resources. There were no significant deficiencies observed at the state or county.
4.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f. There were no signifi-cant deficiencies observed at the state or county.
4.3 Emergency Operations Management. There were no significant deficiencies observed at the state or county.
4.4 Public Alerting and Notification. (State and County)
Procedures for siren activation were followed, sounding of the sirens did not take place due to equipment failure. Failure of the sirens to sound was not detected by either state or county representatives throughout the exercise. The combination of equipment failures and lack of a verification system for siren sounding could serieucly impede protective actions in the 10-mile EPZ.
Recoe=endations
- a. The cause of the siren equipment failure during the exercise should be investigated and the problems corrected. (h'UREG-0654,II.E.6) i
- b. A separate drill testiag the corrected siren system should be performed.
- c. A system for verification of siren sounding should be implemented.
- d. All EBS announcers, particularly WKTM/WOSC should be trained on the EBS plan requirements and be provided with a copy of procedure F of the county RERP plan.
[
t
48
- e. A system such as an internal checklist should be developed to verify the content of public messages aired by EBS to include and update the status of previoasly issued shelter and evacuacion orders.
4.5 Pu blic and Media Rela tions . There were no significant deficiencies observed at the state or county. 1 4.6 Accident Assessment (State)
The state plan relies on utility data for accident assessment. These data were used for the calculations of projected doses. Very little field monitoring data were received and analyzed for confirmation of dose proj ec-tions.
Recommendation
- a. Ihe plan of operation and the procedures for the EOF need to be strengthened to ensure a cisely gathering of and transmittal of field data from the county and from the utility to the state accident assessment personnel, and between the county and the utility. (NUREG-0654, II.R.12) 4.7 Actions to Protect the Public. There were no significant deficiencies observed at the state or county.
4.8 Health. Medical and Exposure Control (State and County)
The draft of the state plan, as amended, calls for the use of KI for emergency workers when "the potential exists for such persons to receive doses at predetermined levels." The state plan does not provide for use of KI for the general population.
The county plan states that the county will follow the state's recommendation. Observers found no evidence that a supply of KI was available and found no information on the " predetermined exposure levels" requiured for its use.
49 Recommendation .
- a. Procedures for authorizing the ur,e of KI by e=ergency workers, dose level guides for such. authorization and location and methods of distribution of stockpiles of KI need to be furnished to REMA for review and demonstrated during the exe cises. (NURIG-0654, II.J.10.e and f) 4.9 Recovery and Reentry. There were no significant deficiencies observed at the state or county.
50 3
SUMMARY
OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES ,
" Minor deficiencies" are capabilities that, during the evaluation of the exercise performance, were rated either " acceptable" or " good" (see Section 1.8). Although these minor deficiencies did not prevent the state and local organizations from adequately implementing their radiological emergency response plans, correcting them will improve preparedness or facilitate operations.
5.1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITIES AND RESOURCES State of New York Population data were not Room.
prominently displayed in the Albany Operations Field survey data and projected doses were not well displayed.
Some overloading of telefax and telephone equipment was noted at the Central District EOC.
In Albany, the hotline telephone malfunctioned.
Recommendations a.
Better display is needed in the Albany EOC of important data such as population, survey results, and dose proj ections. (NUREG-0654 II, J.10.a. b) b.
Additional telefax and telephone equipment should be considered II.F.1.d) for the Central District EOC. (NUREG-0654, c.
The hotline telephone in the Albany EOC should be repaired. (NUREG-0654 II. F.1.d)
County The RECS line malfunctioned at the EOC, making com=unications with other facilities cumbersome.
Also, the flow of info rma tion between the accident assessment layout of the EOC. room and f.h e operations room was inefficient due to the physical Volunteer RACES operators were present but involved in the exercise. not adequately Rec omme ndations d.
Malfunctioning of the RECS line should be corrected.
(NURIG-0654, II.F.1.d)
51
- e. Re arrangement of the EOC space should be considered to ease information flow between the operations floor and the accident assessment room.
- f. The role of the RACES staff should be cleaf y defined.
(NLTEG-0654, II.F.1.a)
Emergency Ooerations Facility
\
Communications between the EOF and the Oswego County EOC were minimally acceptable. The phone was frequently busy so that some delays of 20 to 30 minutes were experienced in transmitting data.
Recommenda tions
- g. Additional telephone and/or radio communication between the EOF and the county EOC should be provided. A communications equipment operator may be needed in addition to the county representative. This would make it possible fer the county representative to concentrate on obtaining and making certain that the latest data and h information are provided to the utility, to the State and to the County. (NUREG-0654 II.F.1.d) 5.2 ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF State of' New York Communication equipment for alerting officials and staff was rated acceptable.
One observer noted that personnel not at home or at work might not be reached with the available equipment.
Recommendation
- a. The ability to notify key people could be strengthened by supplying them with radio paging equipment. (NUREG-0654 II.F.2.e)
Oswego County No backup for the County Director of Emergency Preparedness was demon-strated. The list of backup personnel contains a backup for this position but he was unavailable during the exercise due to a =edical emergency.
l
52 Recommendation
- b. An additional person should be trained so that sufficient backup is available to ensure the capability to maintain 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day operation. (NUREG-0654 II.A.4) 5.3 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT There were no minor deficiencies noted in this category. -
5.4 PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION There were no minor deficiencies noted.
5.5 PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS State of New York Receipt of some county EBS messages was not verified at the state EOC in Albany. Also, some of the State news releases did not provide the cele-phon'e number for the media to call. Additional wall maps were needed at the News Center.
Recommendations
- a. Procedures to verify receipt of EBS messages should be reviewed. (NUREG-0654, II.E.1)
- b. Telephone numbers to be used in emergency messages should be reviewed.
- c. Additional wall maps should be considered for the News Cen t e r.
Osueto County Some motels within the 10-mile EPZ did not display emergency informa-tion even though the county provides posters. Also, some of the EBS messages and press releases issued by the county contained serious errors and lacked important inf o rma tio n.
Recommendations
'fi
- d. The availability of information for transients vichin the 10 mile EPZ should be checked.
. m E
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- e. Precedutes for the c,' posing.(*dhocking, and numbering of W
' QBS' messages and news releasis t hould be reviewed.
, /
, f.' Wil maps should be provided in the. News Center.
4, ,
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ACC} DENT ASSE3SMENT
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The decisf.ons to deploy f';e.'sd monitor @ teams were'exnot htaely:' The delays in deplo%*,nc p,
prevented the rapid gathering 'o9 field date. needed for c.arly conf 1rmati.bn 0?,,the projected doses calculated by the utility.
s s j. j d&"
Recommendation - '
" ' S
,, 1 vi ,#,. a i
- a. Accident assessment proaedures should #ae rev2' sed to ensure deployment of the field monitoring teams as early as j '
. posJible in order to obtain an early confirm.lC'ior, of the magnitude of the release. (NUREG-0654,II.I.6) ,
l b. Procedurgs in depicyme'it of a.ed,,datu*',taking by the field (
l
' monitoring teams should be desfyned (c taximize the amount
>$ 'of data obtained during the earl'y ps-t of the release of J d,
, Yadioac ivity from the plant in ordit to provide adequate s
j f
data ,y 6bnfirm the magali9de of' the ' release, . (FUREG- 1 0654, WI.I.3) ,
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.. The sensitive ga=ma ray instrumerhs used bb. the field 'ror.1turing teams were good c 4
but were calibrated in cou*.ts per mindi:e. This conversion was stpposed to be done ar, @e EOC, but j,he 4%Nhrion factor is specific to the instrument used, and,ssv g the appropriate factors could not be cenfirmed.
i
' l Rece=mendation '
,j, d . " r. .
EOC personnel shculd be si,yplied' a teans of conver:tng the
' ' ' raw counts per hinu,e data to mrem tr (e.g., a prepared table). (NUREC-0654,II.I.8) i
/
The air sampling equipment vas good, but the data consisted of counts 7 per minut2 from tye filter insqead of mic roCu r.. a of iodine per cubic
< cent 15athe of air.
3 recommendation
'c, field t.onitoring teams should be supplied a means of converting the raw data in counts per minute to
____ ._-__-_w
2 , .
54
) nicroCuries of iodine per cubic centimeter of air (e.g., a calibration table that is specific for their equipment and counter geometry). (NUREG-0654, II.I.9)
The procedures used for the air sampling equipment were appropriate for charcoal filters since they involved flushing the filter with clean air (to remove absorbed noble gas acitivity) at a location outside of the plume before the final counting. This flushing procedure is of marginal value for the silver zeolite filter since thi, is a specific absorber for iodine. The flushing with clean air requires travel to a clean location before the data can be obtained and seriously reduces the amount of data that can be taken for an early confirmation.
b Recommendation
- e. Separate procedures should be developed for the use of the silver zeolite filters so that the data needed for early confirmation of the projected exposure rates can be taken in the most efficient manner. (NUREG-0654, II,,I.8 and I.9)
Data was transmitted from the field locations to the EOC by portable radios. There were some problems from noise, some problems with units (e.g. ,
mrem /hr, Rem /hr, cpm) . Occasionally the data and units were not confirmed by using call-back procedures. -
Reco=mendation
- f. I= proved direct coc=unications between the field monitoring teams and the EOC are needed. (NUREG-0654, II.F.1.d)
- g. Procedures for transmitting data between the field team, the EOC, the EOF and the utility should include procedures for confirming that the data are correct, that the units are correct, and that the time the data were taken and the I location of the sampling point are correctly recorded.
(NUREG-0654, II.F.1.d)
Some of the utility data that was telefaxed to the EOC was not legible, due to the use of printing that was too small on the original for=s.
- _ - - - - - - i
55 Recommendation
- h. The data forms shauld be redesigned to provide lettering of sufficient size that the telefax copies are clearly legible. (NUREG-0654, II.F.1.d)
Some of the utility data was celephoned from the EOF to the EOC ' and some of field data was telephoned to the EOF. The traffic on this line was high, so that the amount of data was limited and the receipt was delayed.
Recommendation
- h. Additional telephone capacity (e.g. , dedicated line) or a radio between the county representative at the EOF-and the accident assessment room at the EOC should be provided (NUREG-0654, II.F.1.d) 5.7 ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC Oswego County The minor deficiencies noted in section 3.7.2 for Oswego County lead to the following recommendations:
Recommendations l
- a. An improved communications system for the County EOC base stacio should be implemented.
- b. Although 15 buses were on hand at Mexico School district and 58 buses were available from oswego, it was not possible to determine whether resources were adequate for evacuation. The plan should clearly specify bus l
requirements from all facilities. (NUREG-0654, II.J.2)
- c. Consideration should be given to whether evacuation routes !
are passable during inclement weather.
- d. Arrange for standby emergency power at the Liverpool High i School Congregate Care Center. 1 5.8 HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURE C0h"rROL State and County Plans specify that TLDs would be used for pe rmanen t record devices.
Film badges were used during the exercise.
l t
l L________.______ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____m- _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
E. .
l 56 Rec >meendation I
- a. The plans should be changed to state that film badges will be used. Actual practice should be consistent with the plan. (NUREG-0654, II. K. 3. a )
l
) At the PMCs, the f acilities for decontamination of vehicles may not be able to control the run-off of contaminated waste water, especially in winter when the ground is frozen.
l Recommendation i
- b. Methods for the control of contaminated wastes generated by vehicle decontamination should be developed in detail. (NUREG-0654, II. K.5.b)
The emergency rescue squad that responded to the vehicle accidert that involved a contaminated victim did not wear protective clothing and most
! likely would have contaminated themselves. At the hospital, the decontamina-tion area and the ambulance used to transport the victim were not secured.
I Recommendation i
- c. Procedures should be used that prevent the contamination of emergency workers and ensure that contamination from i
the victim is not spread in an uncontrolled manner, j (NUREC-0654, II.L.1 and L.4)
One sheriff was unclear as to what would happen if he received an unacceptably high dose. He was not aware of the reporting requirements.
Recom=endations
- d. Additional training in the requirements for reporting doses received by field workers should be given.
5.9 RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS I Demonstration of ingestion pathway sampling and other recovery and reentry procedures was limited by the time available during the exercise.
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58 6
CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR DEFICIENCIES Sections 4 and 5 of this report list significant and minor deficien based on the findings of the federal evaluators. c esi These evaluations are based on the applicabic planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654, FEMA-1, REF. 1 (November, 1980).
Correction of the minor deficiencies noted is suggested for improved operations.
Both the state and local jurisdictions should submit to the RAC the measures they have taken or intend to take to correct significant deficien-cies. If remedial actions cannot be plan, instituted immediately, then a detailed including dates of completion, for scheduling and implementing actions must be provided. a emedi l AssociateThe Ragional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
thatthat and any significant deficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected
, such corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
(
6,1 SCHEDULE FOR THE CORRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIE To be supplied by the State of New York. l l
_ - _ _ - - - -