ML20236R783
| ML20236R783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1987 |
| From: | Beyea J, Leaning J, Sholly S MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF, MHB TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES, NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236R763 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8711240027 | |
| Download: ML20236R783 (160) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00CMETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges: 37 NG/19 P3 :27 Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
'. C Dr. Jerry Harbour [0CX S' h Nfkhf BRANCH
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In the Matter of )
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PUBLIC SERVICL COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos.
HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site EP)
) November 17, 1987
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( COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTED TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSES l l I. IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES Q. Please state your names, positions, and business addresses.
A. (Sholly) My name is Steven C. Sholly. I am an Associate Consultant with MHB Technical Associates of San Jose, California, 8711240027 871117 3 PDR ADOCK 05 4
l A. (Beyea) My name is Dr.'Jan Beyea, I'am the Senior Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society in New York City.
A. (Leaning) My name is.Dr. Jennifer. Leaning, I am Chief of Emergency Services for the Harvard Community Health Plan in Boston, Massachusetts, and instructor in medicine at Harvard Medical School.
A. (Thompson) My-name is Dr. Gordon Thomoson. I am l
Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Q. Briefly summarize your experience and professional qualifications.
A. (Sholly) I received a B.S. in Education from Shippensburg State College in 1975 with a major in Earth and Space Science and a minor in Environmental Education. I have seven years experience with nuclear power matters.- In particular, for four and.one-half years I was employed by the Union of Concerned Scientists where I worked on matters related to the development of emergency plans for commercial nuclear _
1 power plants and the application of probabilistic risk 1 assessment (PRA) to the analysis'of safety issues related to commercial nuclear power plants. I have been a consultant with j MHB Technical Associate for two years, during which time I have been involved in a variety of projects'related to the safety and economics on nuclear power plants, including the evaluation l
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of severe accident' issues for light water nuclea power plants generally, and for the Seabrook Station, Unit 1, specifically.
I have testified as an expert witness in proceedings before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other bodies, including the safety hearings on-Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 50-247-SP and 50-286-SP), the licensing hearings on Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414), and the licensing hearings on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-322-OL-3). I have also provided expert testimony before the Sizewell B Public Inquiry in the United Kingdom. I have served as a member of a peer review panel on regulatory applications of PRA (NRC report NUREG-1050), as a member of the Containment Performance Design Objective Workshop (NRC report NUREG/CP-0084), as a member of the Committee on ACRS Effectiveness, and as a panelist at the Severe Accident Policy Implementation External Events Workshop, Annapolis, Maryland (presentation on seismic risk assessment, 1987; forthcoming Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report). The details of my education, experience, and professional qualifications are included in my resume, which is contained in attachments to this testimony.
(Seyea) I received my doctorate in nuclear physics from Columbia University in 1968. Since then I have served as an Assistant Professor of physics at Holy Cross College in-Worcester, MA; as a member for four years of the research staff ^ i of the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton.
University; and, as of May'1980, as the. Senior Energy. Scientist for the National Audubon Society.
While at Princeton University, I' worked with Dr. Frank von-Hippel to prepare a critical quantitative 1 analysis of ' attempts to model reactor accident sequences. The lessons learned from-this general study of nuclear accidents and the computer codes written to model radioactivity releases were then. applied by me-to specific problems at the request of governmental and non-governmental bodies around the world. I have written major i reports on the safety of specific nuclear facilities for the President's Council on Environmental Quality (TMI reactor),-for the New York State Attorney General's Office (Indian Point),
for the Swedish Energy Commission (Barsebeck reactor), and the state of Lower Saxony (Gorbleben Waste' Disposal Site). I have also examined safety aspects of specific sites for the California Energy and Resources Commission, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and the New York City Council.
While at Princeton, I wrote a computer program useful'for reactor emergency planning for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. This program, appropriately modified, has been used for some of the-calculations presented in this testimony.
After-joining the National Audubon Society, I continued to work as an independent consultant on nuclear safety issues. I-participated in a study, directed by the Union of Concerned
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Scientists at the request of the Governor of Pennsylvania, concerning the proposed venting of. krypton gas at Three Mile Island. The U.S.C. study, for which I made the radiation dose calculations, was the major reason the Governor gave'for approving the venting.
I participated in the international exercise on consequence modelling (Benchmark Study)-coordinated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development.(0.E.C.D.). ~ Scientists.and engineers from fourteen countries around the.world calculated radiation doses following hypothetical " benchmark" releases l
using their own consequence models.. Participants'from the {
l United States, in addition to myself, included groups from j Sandia Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Batelle Pacific-Northwest, and Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. I also served as consultant from the environment community to the l N.R.C. in connection with their development of " Safety. Goals j i
for Nuclear Power Plants." i l
At the' request of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund, '
I supervised a'maior review of radiation doses from the Three Mile Island Accident. This report, "A Review of Dose Assessments at Three Mile Island and. Recommendations for Future .
Research" was released in August of 1984. Subsequently,-I
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organized a workship on TMI Dosimetry, the proceedings of.which f were published in early 1986.
, In 1986, I developed new dose models for the Epidemiology Department of Columbia University. These models are being_used ,
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to assess whether or not the TMI accident is correlated with excess health effects in the local population.- The new I
computer models account for complex terrain, as well as time i varying meteorology (including changes in wind direction).
Insights gained from this project have been applied to the Seabrook-situation.
In addition to reports written about specific nuclear facilities, an article of mine on resolving conflict at the Indian Point reactor site, an article on emergency planning for reactor accidents, ano a joint paper with Frank von Hippel of Princeton University on failure modes.of reactor containment systems have appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
I have also prepared risk studies covering sulfer emissions from coal-burning energy facilities. And I have managed a project that analyzed the side effects of renewable energy i sources.
I regularly testify before congressional committees on.
energy issues and have served on several advisory boards set up by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
I currently participate in a number of ongoing efforts aimed at promoting dialogue between environmental organizations and industry.
I was assisted in the early stages of my studies of Seabrook by Brian Palenik, who has worked with me on other reactor studies in the past. In subsequent answers to questions, I will use the pronoun, "we," to describe our
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o collective efforts. However, all work was carriedLout either I by me or under my direct' supervision.
Brian Palenik received his Bachelor of Science in Civil j Engineering degree with honors from Princeton University.
While an undergraduate at Princeton, Mr. Palenik worked with me l l
on "The Consequences of. Hypothetical Major Releases of i Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island"--my report to the President!s Council on Environmental' Quality.
After graduation, Mr. Palenik L joined the staff of National Audubon's Policy Research Department. While there, he and I 1
wrote, "Some Consequences of CatastrophicLAccidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," as part of our testimony before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, July 1982.
Mr. Palenik is currently a-graduate student in the Civil Engineering Department at M.I.T.
A' complete resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.
(Thompson) I received a Ph.D in applied mathematics from
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0xford University in-1973. Since then I have worked as a consulting scientists on a variety of energy,-environment, and u 1
4 international security issues. My experience has included technical analysis and presentation of expert testimony on issues related to the safety of nuclear power facilities.
In 1977, I presented testimony'before the Windscale Public Inquiry in Britain, addressing safety aspects of nuclear fuel T-
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reprocessing. During 1978 and 1979, I participated in an i international scientific review of the proposed Gorleben i nuclear fuel center in West Germany, this review being i
sponsored by the government of Lower Saxony.
Between 1982 and 1984, I coordinated an investigation of l
safety issues relevant to the proposed nuclear plant at Sizewell, England. This plant will have many similarities to the Seabrook plant. The investigation was sponsored by a group of local governments in Britain, under the aegis of the Town and Count ry Planning Association. This investigation formed the basis for testimony before the Sizewell Public Inquiry by myself and two other witnesses, j
From 1980 to 1985, first as a staff scientist and later as ]
a consultant, I was associated with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), at their head office in Cambridge, MA. On behalf of UCS, I presented testimony in 1983 before a licensing board of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), concerning the merits of a system of filtered venting at the Indian Point i
nuclear plants. Also, I undertook an extensive review of NRC l l
research on the reactor accident " source term" issue, and was co-author of a major report published by UCS on this subject (Sholly and Thompson, 1986). l Currently, I am one of three principal investigators for an emergency planning study based at Clark University, Worcester, MA. The object of the study is to develop a model emergency plan for the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. Within this
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effort, my primary responsibilities are to address the characteristics of severe reactor accidents.
My other research interests include: the efficient use of j energy; supply of energy from renewable sources; radioactive l I
waste management; the restraint of nuclear weapons l 1
proliferation; and nuclear arms control.. I have written and made public presentations in each of these areas. i l
At present, I am Executive Director of the Institute for l Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA. This.
organization is devoted to research and public education on the efficient use of natural resources, protection of the environment, and the furtherance of international peace and security.
A detailed resume is included in the attachments to this I
l l testimony. l (Leaning) I received an M.D. from the University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine in 1975 and completed a residency in internal medicine and a fellowship in emergency medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. For six years from 1978 through 1984 I practiced emergency medicine l as an attending physician at Mount Auburn Hospital, oae of the L Harvard teaching hospitals. Since 1984 I have served as Chief of Emergency Services for the Harvard Community Health Plan, responsible for the organization and delivery of emergency services to the approximately 300,000 members enrolled in the Plan.
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Since 1979 I have actively pursued an interest in disaster
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medicine, with a particular focus on emergency response to radiation disasters, whether resulting from accidents at nuclear power plants or from explosions of nuclear weapons. In 1980 I participated in a five-day course at Oak Ridge, j l
rennessee in the management of radiation emergencies. I have j lectured extensively on the organization of disaster response, i
the assessment of radiation injury, and the management of mass I l
casualties. For the last three years I have taught the acute l I
radiation and emergency response sections of the Harvard )
l Medical School course on nuclear war. I am the author of j l
several publications on radiation injury and medical response, i including a chapter on the health effects of radiation in a l'
book I co-edited, entitled The Counterfeit Ark. I serve as co-chair of the Governor's Advisory Committee on the Impact of the Nuclear Arms Race on Massachusetts and am a member of the Board of Directors of the Disaster Management Center at the University of Wisconsin. The details of my education, I training, and professional experience are contained in my resume, which is included in the attached to this testimony.
II. CONTENTIONS Q. To what contentions does your testimony refer?
A. (All) Town of Hampton revised contention VIII, SAPL revised contention 16 and NECNP contention RERP-8. These l contentions and their bases are set out in full in l
Exhibit 2. Our testimony also addresses matters raised in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) June 4, 1987
" current" position on these contentions. In addition, our testimony bears on aspects.of other contentions in this proceeding.
Q. What is the purpose of your testimony and how does it relate to the specific contentions cited here?
A. (All) These three interrelated contentions and'the FEMA position on them all' concern the issue of protection from radiological releases'of the beach populations in the vicinity of the Seabrook Plant. .Our testimony first describes the standard guidance used by the. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and FEMA for the. initiation and duration of radiological-releases to be considered in emergency planning. Then, and 1
using postulated accidents at Seabrook consistent with the spectrum of accident scenarios called for in the NRC guidance, the testimon estimates and describes.the radiation dosages which could affect the beach populations near the Seabrook ;
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Plant site. We then describe the health consequences of.those dosages on the beach population.
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l The testimony as a whole demonstrates that NHRERP Rev. 2 is fundamentally flawed and is of no real or practical use because the beachgoing public in the vicinity of the Seabrook plant will not be adequately protected in the event of'an emergency.
In particular, this testimony shows that because of the size of the beach population in the imnediate vicinity of the plant J
site, the long evacuation times, and the lack of effective sheltering, many thousands of individuals will die, suftec.
serious injuries or face the prospect of increased' likelihood of cancer if one of any number of the accidents required to be planned for by the NRC occurs. Thus, because of the. radiation dosages that would reach the beach population, there is no reasonable assurance that NHRERP Rev 2 can and will be implemented to provide adequate protection to the public:in the event of an accident.
III. OVERVIEW-Q. Please summarize your portion of this testimony.
A. (Sholly) My testimony describes the technical basis for the current NRC emergency planning rules. The testimony discusses the use in the NRC reports NUREG/CR-1311, NUREG-0396, and NUREG-0654, of the risk assessment results for the Surry Unit 1 plant (as set forth in the NRC report-WASH-1400) to derive dose-distance relationships for a spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents beyond the design basis of light water nuclear power plants. The testimony further describes-the nature of that spectrum of accidents, including release characteristics, release freque'ncies, and uncertainties.
Finally, the testimony describes how the risk-based insights from the Surry Unit 1 risk assessment were utilized by the NRC to arrive at the generic emergency planning zone distances and other guidance contained in the rules and in'the applicable NRC guidance documents (including NUREG-0654, Rev. 1).
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A. (Beyea) The situation around the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant is unusual in.the context of emergency planning for nuclear plants, because large populations make use of. nearby beaches in the summertime. In order to determine the extent of protection afforded the summer beach. population'by' current emergency plans, we have modelled the radiation doses to the population that would follow releases of radioactivity from'the-Seabrook plant. A range of releases.has been studied, patterned after the range used in the NRC's report, NUREG-0396.
In NUREG-0396, a setoof generic accident sequences (PWRl-PWR9) were defined that apply to pressurized water reactors like the Seabrook plant. These sequences span the entire range of physically-plausible release scenarios, making-them useful for assessing, at least on a theoretical basis, the effectiveness of emergency plans. For my testimony, we have-chosen accident sequences that are similar to the NRC's generic versions, but which take into account reactor-specific 1
differences at Seabrook.
In order to understand the conditions under which the-population would not be protected from "early death" (death within 60 days of the release), doses were modelled for these release categories using a range of weather parameters, plume rise heights, and dose contribution assumptions. .The results.
indicate that the potential consequences of severe accidents increase greatly during the summer months, due to the increased population in the area and the unique conditions of a beach 13 -
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release: Beach-goers caught in the open would not be shielded from radiation, and could be expected, by our calculations, to receive doses as much as five times higher than generally considered in nuclear emergency planning. This means that certain accident releases, not'normally projected to cause early fatalities, are projected to do so in the.Seabrook case'.
As a-result, it is necessary to consider a range of accident scenarios, from those with very'small releases to' those with very large releases.
l In addition to the risk of early death, we have considered' other potential accident consequences, including delayed cancer incidence. These potential outcomes dominate the risk for accident releases in classes PWR4-PWR9.
The proximity of the reactor to an unshielded summer beach population makes the Seabrook case a special and difficult one for emergency planning. The doses that would be received following a range of' releases at the Seabrook site, with emergency plans in effect, are higher than doses that would be received at most other sites in the complete absence of emergency planning.
Our results demonstrate that, with current plans, the immediate safety of the beach population is threatened for a wide range of releases and meteorological conditions. For'the-accidents studies in our testimony, many thousand of people could receive life-threatening doses.
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A. (Thompson) The issues I address are:
(1) The potential for an atmospheric release, similar-to that designated as PWR1 in the Reactor Safety Study, to occur from a steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection event.
(2) The range of variation of two parameters which affect plume rise during a "PWR1-type" release,.specifically the location of containment breach and the thermal energy release rate for the plume.
(3) The potential for "PWR1-type" releases to contain greater amounts of certain isotopes, such as those of ruthenium, than other categories of releases.
A. (Leaning) The purpose of my testimony is to discuss what is known about the acute and long-term health consequences that can be expected to befall human beings exposed to ionizing radiation in the range of dose levels that might eventuate from nuclear power plant accidents such as those described in the testimony of Mr. Sholly, Dr. Beyea and Dr. Thompson. I describe the kinds of injuries that would be received by the population in both the short and long term.
IV. SYNOPSIS OF WASH-1400 SURRY ANALYSIS Q. Please identify and describe the nature of the NRC report WASH-1400.
A. (Sholly) WASH-1400-(N.C. Rasmussen, et al., Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014,-October 1975) represents a probabilistic risk assessment of two nuclear power plants' ,
namely Surry Unit 1 and Peach Bottom Unit 2. The report consists of a Main Report and eleven Appendices. WASH-1400 represents t'e first comprehensive application of probabilistic risk assessment methods to the analysis of'the risks posed.by commercial nuclear power plants. That is, WASH-1400 includes i
system analyses, source term estimates, and accident #
consequence estimates. In the parlance of the NRC's PRA Procedures Guide, WASH-1400 is a Level 3 PRA of two plants.1!
Q. Please briefly describe the Surry Unit 1 nuclear power plant and compare its design with that of Seabrook Station, Unit 1.
A. (Sholly) The Surry Unit 1 nuclear power plant is-a three-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with dry, subatmospheric containment. The Surry Unit 1 plant has a design thermal power level of 2441 megawatts, and entered commercial operation in December 1972. Surry Unit 1 is operated by Virginia Power Corporation under operating license DPR-32, issued on May 25, 1972. Seabrook Station Unit 1 is - a-four-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with a large, j i
1/ Jack W. Hickman, et al., PRA PROCEDURES GUIDE: A Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear .
Power Plants, American Nuclear Society and. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, prepared for the U.S. j Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 2300, January 1983,- !
pages 2-2 to 2-3.
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dry containment. Seabrook has a design thermal power level of j
3650 megawatts. i Q. Please summarize the results of the WASH-1400 analysis 1
of the Surry Unit 1 plant. 1 A. (Sholly) The WASH-1400 report calculated a median core melt frequency for Surry Unit 1 of about 5 x 10' per 1
reactor-year (or about 1 in 20,000 per reactor-year).2/ The !
NUREG-1150 analysis estimated the core melt frequency for Surry i
-5 to be 2.6 x 10 per reactor year. See, NUREG-1150, draft, page 3-2. The dominant accident sequences for Surry Unit 1 which contributed to this core melt frequency are identified along with their estimated. sequence frequencies in Table A, )
I which is attached to this testimony. WASH-1400 also defined i i
nine release categories or source terms which defined the release characteristics and release frequencies for Surry Unit !
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- 1. These release categories were designated PWR-1 through I I
PWR-9. Release categories PWR-1 through PWR-7 correspond to d 1
2/ The Surry core melt frequency estimate in WASH-1400 has )
been cited as several different values. For instance, the NUREG-1150 report cites a value of 4.6 x 10-5 per reactor year. See M.L. Ernst, et al., Reactor Risk Reference Document, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1150, Vol. 1, " Main Report", draft for comment, February 1987, page 3-12 (hereinafter "NUREG-1150 d A technical report supporting NUREG-1150 cites 4.4x10gaft).
per reactor-year. See, Robert C. Bertucio, et al., Analysis of Core Damage Frequency From Internal Events: Surry Unit 1, Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-4550, SAND 86-2084, Vol. 3, November 1986 page V-68. In fact, as indicated in Attachment 3 to this testimony, if one adds the point estimate frequencies for the WASH-1400 dominant acc sequences, one obtains a core melt frequencyof1.2x10gdent per reactor-year.
core melt accidents. Release Categories PWR-8 and PWR-9 are non-core melt accidents, and are roughly equivalent'to the design. basis accident with (PWR-8) and without (PWR-9) containment spray operation. The Surry release categories are described and their characteristics and estimated frequencies defined in Table B, which is attached to this testimony. Many 1
of the WASH-1400 release categories (especially PWR-1 through PWR-4) could result in significant ground contamination offsite should accidents leading to such releases occur.
V. USE OF WASH-1400 RESULTS IN NUREG-0396 0 Please identify and describe NUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) NUREG-0396 (Task Force on Emergency Planning, Planning Basis for'the Development of State and_Lodal Emergenc_y Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~and.U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December, 1987), set a revised planning basis for commercia'l nuclear power plants. In essence, NUREG-0396 concluded that a spectrum of accidents should be used in developing a planning basis.3/
3/ H.E. Collins, B.K. Grimes & F.'Galpin, et al., Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, Task Force on Emergency Planning, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and"U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NUPEG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978, page 24 (hereinafter "NUREG-0396").
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J NUREG-0396 recommended the establishment of two generic l 1
emergency planning zones (EPZs) for nuclear power olants; a l plume exposure pathway EPZ about 10 miles in radius and an ingestion exposure pathway EPZ about 50 miles in radius. These EPZs were designated as "the areas for.which planning is recommended to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident."A A significant part of the basis for these planning zone distances was derived from accident consequence analyses (specifically dose-distance calculations) using the WASH-1400 release categories and frequencies for Surry Unit 1. )
Q. Please describe how the WASH-1400 results for Surry 1 Unit 1 were utilized in NUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning, which I wrote NUREG-0396, utilized the Surry Unit 1 results from WASH-1400 to perform consequence calculations to " illustrate 1 the likelihood of certain offsite dose levels given a core melt accident."E! While the Task Force members debated various aspects of the WASH-1400 report and considered its results to i
have limited use for plant-and site-specific factors, it was !
judged to provide "the best currently available source of information on the relative likelihood of large accidental 4/ Id. at 11, 5/ Id. at 6.
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releases ~of radioactivity given a. core melt e, vent."$/
WASH-1400 results for.Surry were also utilized to-provide guidance concerning the timing of radiological releases resulting from core melt accidents, and the' radiological characteristics of such releases.2/ The' planning basis distance, the time dependent characteristics of potential releases and exposures, and the kinds of radioactive materials that can potentially be released to the environment were identified by the Task Force as the three planning' basis-elements needed to scope the planning effort. !' WASH-1400 results for Surry Unit 1 were used to define all three of the planning basis elements in NUREG-0396.
Q. Please describe the rationale used by the Task Force in establishing the size of the EPZs recommended in NUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning considered a number of possible rationales, including risk, probability, cost effectiveness, and the accident consequence spectrum. Following a review of these rationales, "The Task Force chose to base the rationale on a full spectrum of j accidents and corresponding consequences tempered by probability considerations."E/ The rationale used by 6/ Id. at 6.
7/ Id. at 18-23.
8/ Id. at 8.
l 9/ Id. at 15. !
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the Task Force in establishing the EPZ planning distances is more fully described in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0396. I Q. Please describe the spectrum of accidents considered by the Task Force in NUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning considered a complete spectrum of accidents, including those ,
i discussed in environmental reports prepared by utilities as part of the operating license review (the so-called Class 1 )
l through Class 8 accidents), accidents postulated for the purpose of evaluating plant design (design basis accidents in j the Final Safety Analysis Report), and the spectrum of accidents identified in the WASH-1400 report. The Task Force i
concluded that the Class 1 through class 8 accident discussions in environmental reports were too limited in scope and detail to be useful in emergency planning, and instead relied on ,
l' design basis accidents and the WASH-1400 release categories.
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0 Please describe specifically how the Surry Unit 1 results from WASH-1400 were used by the Task Force, i A. (Sholl'y) Concurrently with the operation of the Task ,
Force, a report was being prepared for the NRC by Sandia Laboratories (now Sandia National Laboratories) which examined !
l offsite emergency response measures for core melt accidents. l l
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10 Id. at 1-4.
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This report, cesignateo SAND 78-0454, was pucilshea in June 1978.11/ The Sandia report grouped the hASE-1400 release categories for Surry Unit 1 into " Melt-Through" and l
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" Atmospheric" release groups (based on the location of j
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containment failure ioentifiea for the hASE-1400 release l categories).
Surry release categories PhR-1 through PhE-5 consist of accioents in which the containment was conc 1; dea to fail directly to the atmosphere as a result of structural failure or l l
containment isolation failure. These release categories were grouped into the " Atmospheric Release" class. Surry release l categories PhR-6 anc PhR-7 consist of accide..ts in which the containment base was penetrated by core debr:s. These release i
categories wert groupea into the " Melt-Through Release" class. j The likelihood of the " Atmospheric" and "Mel:-Through" classes were estimatec by summing the probabilities cf the contributing 1
bl.SH-1400 release categories; " Atmospheric" releases were l
estimatea to have a frequency of 1.4 x 10-5 . er reactor-year, l ano "helt-Through" releases were estimated t have a frequency l of 4.6 x 10 -5 per reactor-year.11/
l 11/ David C. Alarich, Peter E. McGrath & Ncrman C. Rasmur.sen, Examination of Offsite Radiological Protective Measures for '
huclear Reactor Accioents Involving Core Meit, Sancia Laboratories, preparec for the U.S. Nuclear .:.egulatory i Commission, SAND 78-0454, June 1978 (hereinaf:er
" SAND 78-0454"). This report was reissuec as SUREG/Ch-1131 :n October 1979 f ollowing the Three Mile Island accident.
12/ Id. at 43.
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i The characteristics of these release classes were then used !
as input to the WASH-1400 accident consequence code, referred to as CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences). The calculations were carried out using meteorological data from one reactor site and an assumed uniform population density of 100 persons per square mile.13/ The CRAC code calculations implemented for the Sandia study used hourly weather data for one year and 91 accident start times (a four day, thirteen-hour shift was assumed to take place for each start time; this results in each hour of the day being represented in 24 samples and a total of 91 samples are taken from one year's data).1SI The wind direction is assumed to be held constant during and following the release; other weather changes are ;
modeled as indicated in the data.15/ A revised model of 1
public evacuation (ultimately implemented in CRAC2, an improved version of the code) was also used.15/
The most frequently cited curve in NUREG-0396 which was derived from the Surry Unit 1 risk study results is a curve which plots the probability of whole-body dose versus 13/ Id. at 36, 14/ According to a recent Brookhaven National Laboratory j report, weather data from a typical year for New York City were j used in calculations. See, W.T. pratt & C. Hofmayer, et al., l Technical Evaluation of the EPZ Sensitivity Study for Seabrook, Brookhaven National Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1987, page 6-2.
t 11/ Aldrich, et al.,. supra note 11, at 37-39.. l 16/ Id. at 59. l l
i I
l
_ _a
).
(This curve, figure 1-11 from NUREG-0396, is j distance.
i attached to this testimony as part of Table C). The curves on l i
this figure were not calculated directly by the CRAC code, j i
however. As explained in a recent Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) report, these curves were interpolated. BNL i used the newer CRAC2 code to recalculate the dose vs. distance ;
curves. The results of these calculations are shown in Table D, which is attached to this testimony (this calculation is only for the 200 rem whole-body curve).
Q. What results from the Sandia study were used in .
A. (Sholly) NUREG-0396 contains a series of figures which are drawn from the Sandia report. These figures are Figures 1-11 through 1-18. These figures are reproduced as Table C, attached to this testimony.
VI. USE OF WASH-1400 INSIGHTS IN SETTING EPZ DISTANCES Q. Please describe the insights from NUREG-0396, Figures 1-11 through 1-18, that were drawn by the Task Force on Emergency Planning.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force derived a number of insights from Figures 1-11 through 1-18. These insights were set forth in terms of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
I
" Protective Action Guide" (PAG) doses. PAGs are expressed in f units of radiation dose (rem) which " represents trigger levels or initiation levels, which warrant pre-selected protective i
I
_ - _ - -_ __a
actions for the public if the. projected (future) dose received by an individual in the absence of.a protective action exceeds the ?AG." The EPA PAGs used by the Task Force.were those j
for whole-body exposure and thyroid exposure. These PAGs have
]
a range of 1-5 rem whole-body and 5-25 rem to the thyroid.
i According to EPA guidance, the lower dose in the PAG range is. i 1
to be used if "there are no major' local constraints in j providing protection-at that-level, especially to sensitive populations." If local constraints make the lower value ]
impractical to use, in no case should the higher value be exceeded in determining the need for protective action.E!
Based on the figures, the Task Force concluded that given a core melt accident, there is about a 70% chance of exceeding i i
the whole-body PAG doses at two miles, a 40% chance of j exceeding the whole-body PAG doses at ten miles. Similarly, given a core melt accident, there is a near.100% chance of 1 exceeding the 10-rem thyroid PAG dose at one mile, about an 80% )
chance at ten miles, and about a 40% chance at 25 miles. Based
)
in significant part of these observations, the Task Force recommended that EPZs of 10 miles be established for the plume exposure pathway and 50 miles E for the injection exposure I 11 / Collins, et al., supra note 3, at 3. ;;
1 M/ Office of Radiation Programs, Manual of Protective Action !
Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520/1-75-001, September 1975, Revised June 1980, page 2.5.
19/ Collins, et al., supra note 3, at 1-41 and 1-43, .)
1 j
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . . _ J
pathway.20/ t Q. Please describe how NUREG-0396 is related to the NRC's emergency planning regulations.
A. (Sholly) In October 1979, the Commission endorsed a policy of having a " conservative emergency planning policy in addition to the conservatism inherent in the defense-in-depth philosophy," ano stated that a 10-mile plume EPZ and a 50-mile injection EPZ should be established around each nuclear power plant.21/ Subsequently, these EPZs were codified in the NRC emergency planning rule when the final rule was adopted in 1980.22/ Indeed, NUREG-0396 is explicitly referenced in the j final rule.11/
NUREG-0654, which provides detailed guidance for the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency plans for i nuclear power plant accidents, also references the NUREG-0396 ;
report. NUREG-0654 states that the 10-mile radius plume EPZ was based primarily on four considerations:2f/
l 20/ Io. at 1-37, 1-41, and 1-43.
21/ Federal Register 61123, 23 october 1979.
22/ Federal Register 55402, 55406, 55411, 19 August 1980.
I 23/ 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 1, fn 2. I 24/ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1, November 1980, page 12.
I i
_ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8
- a. projected doses from the. traditional' design basis accidents would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone;
- b. projected doses from most core, melt accidents would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; c.
~
for the worst core melt accidents, immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside the zone;
- d. detailed planning within 10 mi~1es would provide a substantial base for-expansion.of response efforts in th? event that this proved necessary..
Quite clearly, two of these four considerations (i.e.,
considerations "b" and "c", above) are derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluation of doses from core melt accidents (which is based on the Surry analysis in WASH-1400). In addition, NUREG-0654 guidance on the timing and duration of releases and:
radiological characteristics of.the releases is also derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluction of core melt accidents (which is based on the Surry analysis in WASH-1400) .
VII. CONCLUSION REGARDING THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING.
Q. What is your conclusion concerning the degree to'which the NRC's emergency planning requirements are based on the ,
analysis of Surry in WASH-14007 A. (S' olly) It is evident, based on the above, that the current planning basis in NRC emergency planning regulations for nuclear power plants is substantially based on dose / distances insights derived from the risk assessment.of Surry performed in WASH-1400. Thus, the" spectrum of accidents" which were considered in establishing the EPZ distances in the NRC emergency planning rules explicity included core melt i accidents (up to and including those core melt accidents which were predicted to result in early containment failure and a large radiological release to the environment). A i
site-specific analysis which examines dose-distance l l
relationships based on similar accidents would therefore provide useful information concerning the effectiveness of offsite emergency planning measures for the Seabrook site.
Q. Have you reviewed the release categories utilized by Dr. Jan Beyea in his calculations as set forth in his testimony in this proceeding?
A. (Sholly) Yes.
l 2 Are the, release categories utilized by Dr. Beyea l l
consistent with the spectrum of releases utilized by the NRC in l setting the technical basis for the emergency planning zones? j A. (Sholly) Yes, Dr. Beyea's release categories are very similar to the PWR-1 through PWR-9 release categories utilized I l
in the NUREG-0396 report, which sets forth the technical basis l l'
for the NRC's emergency planning zones.
O. Does this conclude your testimony?
A. (Sholly) Yes, j ll 1
1 1
1
VIII. RADIATION RELEASES FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM Q. Dr. Beyea, before presenting the-results of your calculations, describe in general terms how radioactive material is released to the environment and dispersed.
A. (Beyea) For a large release of radioactive material to occur following an accident, a " release. pathway" from the.
reactor core to.the environment is. required. (See: testimony of Steven Sholly.) One set of these pathways.is generated by failure of the reactor's pressure vessel followed by failure of the containment building surrounding the vessel due to overpressurization. Researchers have outlined some, though not all, possible sequences and conditions for these failures.
Other pathways include releases occurring through a containment penetration system. Massive ~ steam generator
~
failure due to aging steam generator tubes might lead to a large release through the secondary cooling system. .A-so-called check-valve failure could connect the containment' directly to the environment.
If a large release of radioactive-material to the environment occurs, the material will leave'the' reactor as a
" plume" of gases, aerosols and water droplets. Most oif the-large releases discussed in our testimony are assumed to occur over a period of thirty to sixty minutes; a few are assumed to take longer.
This escaping plume will rise to a height which is dependent on such variables as 1) the' amount of heat released in the accident, 2) the weather condition existing at the time, and 3) whether or not the release takes place at the top or bottom of the structure. As will be shown later, there is no satisfactory formula that predicts the magnitude of plume rise.
The plume will be carried by the prevailing wind. Under the action of wind fluctuations and other weather conditions, the plume will spread in both the horizontal and vertical directions, so that the average concentration of radioactive material in the plume will decrease with time as it travels away from the reactor. (See Figure I). After a short time, the expanding edge of the plume will " touch" ground, and the non-gaseous radioactive aerosols will be dispersed along the ground, on vegetation, buildings, cars, people, etc. The rate at which material is removed from the plume, referred to as the deposition rate or " velocity", will also cause the concentration of material in the plume to decrease with time.
For the most energetic release categories, particularly the steam explosion categories which cause rapid rise of gases into the atmosphere, there is the possibility that escaping water vapor may condense to significant amounts of (radioactive) rain.
The plume may disperse radioactive material along the i ground for more than a hundred miles if there is no reversal of l
wind direction. Much of the area where the plume has passed l
1
/ WIND DIRECTION REACTOR INVISIBLE CLOUD OF MOVING RADIOACTIVITY REGION OF DEPOSITED R A DIO AC TI VITY TOP VIEW OF PLUME FIGURE I
)
will be contaminated for decades and " permanent" evacuation of the original popu] -ton will be required there. In addition, as much as 10 pet, at of the material will be resuspended by the action of wind 5.d blown about in succeeding weeks.25/
The area of contamination will increase, causing residents who live outside the initial plume path to be exposed to radiation.
Immediately after the release, the plume will be visible, due to the escape of large amounts of cloud-forming water droplets. As the plume travels downwind and as the water droplets evaporate, the plume will most likely disappear from view, making it impossible for anyone without instruments to know where radioactivity is heading.
Q. How does the population receive radiation doses? 1 A. The population in the area under the plume would receive l
most radiation doses via three dose pathways.21/ l (See Figure II):
- 1) From external radiation received directly from the radioactive plume itself. (In the 25/ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, (Washington, D.C., WASH-1400 or NUREG-75/014, 1975).
The Reactor Safety Study assumed a 50 percent retention rate for radioactivity deposited on vegetation. [See Appendices E and K] Although most of this loss is probably caused by subsequent rain, experimental data indicates that removal begins immediately after deposition. This initial loss must be due to wind action. Ten percent removal by wind seems a reasonable estimate.
26/ See Volume VI of NASH-1400, supra.
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l most serious accidents, the main part of.the plume.is projected to pass by very quickly, q within one half to one hour, well before any i significant evacuations o'f beach populations 1
could occur.)
- 2) From radiation received following inhalation.
The inhalation pathway would be-the most important contributor to the. thyroid dose..
t It could also be the major contributor to- .]
early health effects for accident sequences-in which large quantities of ruthenium are released (PWR-1 type releases), i.e. steam I
explosion or high-pressure melt ejection.
)
- 3) From radiation received from material deposited on-the ground or other surfaces f i
(cars, skin etc.). It is this " ground dose" which would usually be the most important ,
contributor to early fatalities because it would continue after the plume has passed.
- Even if evacuation is too slow to prevent inhalation of radiation, evacuation is still needed after the plume passes by to stop the accumulation of " ground dose"; the faster the evacuation, the lower the total " ground dose". ,
i We have concentrated on these three pathways in our testimony, ;
using standard methodology to calculateLdoses whenever 32 -
l
'l 1
1 1
possible. Because generic models do not consider beach 'J J
situations, it was necessary to'make special calculations for a
contributions to ground dose not normally considered in a i
accident computer. codes, but which are of special concern to 1 I
unshielded beach populations. For instance, beach users caught-in the plume >would likely receive significant doses from .
.l radioactivity deposited on their skin and hair.
Other important dose pathways exist for persons not under the original plume. These include inhalation and ground' dose ;
1 t
from resuspended and redeposited radioactivity. (As has been- {
stated earlier, as much as 10 percent of the plume's material may be resuspended within a few weeks.)11/ Also of concern i
is raciation from contaminated vehicles and' personal j i
possessions brought to emergency reception centers. Finally, -
~
doses are also possible though ingestion of contaminated food j 1
or water. l 1
Q. In what units are-doses measured? '
A. (Beyea) Doses to organs or to the whole body aremeasuredin" rems,"anindicationof'theamountbf biologically-damaging energy absorbed by tissue or bone. The units are useful because a dose in rems can be used to project the likelihood that an exposed person will be injured.
l 21/ WASH-1400, supra.
)
'1 Q. What are the dose levels that enter into your calculations?
A. (Beyea) The health consequences of radiation I i
depend upon the magnitude of the dose received. Radiation ;
1 doses to the whole body on the order of 100 rems or higher
--doses that occur relatively close to the plant--may lead I
to immediate sickness (e.g., nausea) and "early death." j
)
At a dose of 125 rems for example, 50 percent of exposed j persons would suffer from nausea.21/
1 Although not fatal by itself, nausea and vomiting should be considered in emergency planning--especially in estimating j evacuation times. It is quite conceivable that outbreaks of nausea could precipitate panic in an evacuating population, I thereby interfering with an orderly escape.
"Early death," a technical term in the radiological health l 1
field, refers to death within sixty days of exposure to a given dose. The threshold for early deaths is between 100 and 200 rems to the whole body, while the probability of early death increases with increasing dose and changes with " supportive" medical treatment E/ standard practice, we have taken 200 rem 28/ See Volume VI of WASH-1400.
29/ In this proceeding, we do not testify as expert witnesses in the biological effects of radiation. Instead, we have relied on the testimony of Jennifer Leaning and standard references to convert doses to health effects.
" Supportive" treatment is defined in the Reactor Safety Study Appendix VI, as such procedures as reverse isolation, sterilization of all objects in patient's room, use of laminar-air-flow systems, large doses of antibiotics, and transfusions of whole-blood packed cells or platelets.
'as a reference standard practice, we have taken 200 rem as a reference dose to' indicate the onset of significant probability of early death.
Q. How have you modelled the plume movement and dose pathways?
A. (Beyea) The plume movement and the three major dose pathwaysEE/ discussed previously have been modelled by us in several computer programs. The programs have been checked against other consequence codes in use around the world.21/ ,
The original programs have been cited in other repor'ts,]2/ l 30/ The major sources of radiation that contribute to early death or delayed cancer are inhaled radioiodine, as well as ]
external radiation (whole-body gamma) from the plume.and from. l contaminated ground. In the case of PWRl releases, there are I situations where inhaled isotopes such as ruthenium can cause pulmonary syndrome, leading to early death.
3J/ International Exercise in Consequence Modelling (Benchmark j Study), sponsored by the Organization of' Economic Cooperation and Development (0.E.C.D.), Nuclear Energy Agency, 38 Boulevard Suchet, 75016 Paris, France. 1 32/ Jan Beyea, Program BADAC-1,."Short-Term Doses Following a l Hypothetical Core Meltdown (with Breach of containment)"
(1978), prepared for the New Jersey Department of Environmental.
Protection.
Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, "Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity-to the Atmosphere :
from Three Mile Island," report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, Center for Environmental Studies, Princeton University, (1979), Appendix E.
A detailed discussion of the basic dose calculations used in these programs can be found in the Appendices of "A Study of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at Barseback," Jan Beyea (Stockholm: Swedish Energy Commission, 1978).
(footnote continued)
while some modifications have been made for this study.21/
It was not necessary for these proceedings to use our most recent set of programs which directly include time-varying aeather such as changing wind speed and changing turbulence.
In the Seabrook beach case, doses are so high that these smaller probability events do not dominate the risk.
The dose to the population caught directly in the plume for the release categories under consideration has been calculated by these programs as a function of time after release for a range of weather conditions and for a range of model 1
parameters. Ranges of model parameters were used because the ]
l appropriate values of parameters are currently uncertain. J The basic modelling used is similar to the approach taken .
by radiological protection agencies around the world, including l the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the New Hampshire Department of Public Health.2A!
(footnote continued)
Brian Palenik and Jan Beyea, "Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," direct testimony on behalf of New York State Attorney General, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), New York City Audubon Society, before NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, July, 1982.
33/ For this study, we have used appropriate dose scaling factors, as discussed in detail later, to include dose contributions from material deposited directly on the cars and skin of evacuees.
14/ D.V. Pergola, R.B Harvey, Jr., J.G. Parillo, "SB Metpac, A Computer Software Package Which Evaluates the Consequences of an Off-Site Radioactive Release Written for the Seabrook Station Site at Seabroo', New Hampshire" (Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Framingham, Mass., May 1986).
The only specialized aspects of our calculations involve j l
the following: l l
- 1) Radiation shielding: Radiation shielding factors for cars used in the 1975 Reactor Safety Study have been updated to account for changes in car j l
construction that have been made to improve fuel
{
economy in the intervening years.
- 2) Accounting for dispersion over water. Certain l beach sites, like Seabrook, have water between them l i
and the reactor. We have made adjustments for decreased dispersion using standard methodology.31/
- 3) Radioactivity deposited on vehicle surfaces: In some of our calculations, we have accounted for radioactivity that would be deposited on cars caught in the plume. This radioactivity could cause a significant dose to riders and should not be ignored.
- 4) Radioactivity deposited on the skin and clothing of beach-goers: In some of our calculations,.we have accounted for radioactivity that would be deposited on beach occupants while standing either on the beach, in parking lots, or outside their cars waiting for traffic to move. Although not generally a major 1
35/ In such a case (Seabrook Beach), we have shifted dispersion parameters by one stabililty class. See footnote 39.
effect to be considered at other sites, we have found' that the dose from skin contamination is significant at Seabrook because of the large beach population that could be caught outdoors.
Because doses from contaminated skin and vehicles have not to our knowledge been considered in past consequence modelling, i our calculations have been presented with and without their inclusion. Their impact is to increase, in comparison to other sites, the number of meteorological conditions during which early death would occur.
Q. In what ways have your calculations taken into account the uncertainties in the current state of consequence modelling?
A. (Beyea)
Plume Rise The treatment of plume rise due to thermal buoyancy illustrates the current uncertainty that exists in dose calculations due to inadequate knowledge of model parameters.
Since calculated doses can be very sensitive to whether or not l the edge of the plume has " touched" ground, knowledge of the 1
initial rise of the plume can be critical for projecting l
l doses. Yet, lack of understanding, both experimental and j theoretical, about plume rise makes prediction of this parameter difficult.
Figure III shows the enormous range in airborne concentration of radioactivity (and therefore inhalation and ground doses) predicted for the same release of radioactivity
by modellers from different countries under one set of weather conditions.31/ Most of this range arises because of different predictions of plume rise. These results from the international > exercise in consequence modelling demonstrate that dose predictions from a particular computer code may be highly uncertain within about 20 miles from the reactor if based on one set of model parameters.- (Output from the computer codes used to. develop our testimony were included-in this consequence modelling exercise.)
If a range of weather conditions 'is examined, the range of
~
doses predicted by different computer codes shows much 1ess of J a spread. It is for this reason that we considered a range ~of weather conditions in this study rather-than relying i
.l exclusively on predictions using one' set of model parameters. J The dose ranges used in our testimony fall well.within'the full range given in Figure III.
At Seabrook, plume rise is a critical issue only'for the PWRl-type releases. The other releases are not characterized ,
1 by sufficient thermal bouyancy to make it an issue. I l
31/ Figure III has been taken from S. Vogt, CNSI Benchmark Study of Consequence Models, International Comparison of Models Established for the Calculation of Consequences'of Accidents in Reactor Risk Studies, Comparison of Results Concerning Problem 1. SINDOC(81) 43.
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Deposition Velocity A range of deposition velocities has not been examined in this testimony. (Deposition velocity governs the rate at which i
radioactive material deposits on surfaces). Like plume rise, this parameter is also uncertain, but does not have a critical impact on any of our calculations. For simplicity we have used a mid-range value of 1 cm/sec.22/
Sea Breezes Because of the complexity involved in modelling sea breezes, we have treated them qualitatively. To obtain an understanding of the sea breeze phenomenon, it is useful to j begin with a simple case, where the inland wind speed is very 1 4
I low. A circulating cell structure would result from daytime I heating of the land, extending many miles over both land and ,
water.25/
In this example, the wind would blow toward the reactor away from the beach, yet radioactivity would still reach the .
beach for either low-rising or high-rising plumes, as radioactivity became entrained in the cell and circulated within it. However, in this scenario, because it would take several hours for the radioactivity to reach the beach, it is 37/ A complete discussion of this parameter can be found in tee Barseback Study, supra.
38/ C.S. Keen, " Sea Breezes in the Complex Terrain of the Cape Peninsula," in Third Conference Meteorology of the Coastal Zone (American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., January 1984, pp.~129-134).
i o
not possible to say, without detailed study, whether or not the i radioactivity would arrive before the beach goers had left.21/
In many other sea-breeze cases, the inland wind would be l too strong to ignore. The resulting structures can be very i complex, either causing plumes to rise above the beach and reduce doses or to slow plumes down, producing higher doses..
If the inland wind is~very strong, it will eliminate the cell
]
structure entirely or drive it offshore.
1 In general, turbulence at the beach should increase under 1 I
sea breeze conditions, leading to the possibility that {
above-ground plumes will be brought quickly.to the ground l (fumigated) once the region of excess turbulence has been 3
reached. '
The possibility must be considered that a moisture-laden j
plume could produce its own rain, following rapid mixture with I cold, turbulent sea air that would be filled ~with salt j particles capable of nucleating water droplets. Rain would be 39/ W.A. Lyons, " Lectures on Air Pollut' ion and Environmental !
Impact Analysis," American Meteorological Society, Boston, i Mass., 1975. See also, S.J. Mass and P.R. Harrison,
" Dispersion Over Water: A Case Study of a Non-Buoyant Plume in '
the Santa Barbara' Channel, California," in Joint Conference on Applications of Air Pollution Meteorology, Nov. 29-Dec. 2, 1977 (American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., pp. 12-15).
See also, S. Barr, W.E. Clements, " Diffusion Modeling:
Principles of Application," in. Atmospheric Science and Power Production, (Report DOE / TIC-27601, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 613).
, w
extremely serious for the beach goers, because unusually large l 1
amounts of radioactivity would be carried to ground level along j I
with the drops. i 1
In considering the various meteorological combinations that i
could occur, it is possible to find some conditions that l
Lj increase doses at the beach and some conditions that decrease '
doses--sometime during the course of the same day.
In light of this variation, we have assumed that our calculations without sea breeze effects represent a mid-range case.
Q. What are the characteristics of the release types you have considered and why have you chosen to use them?
A. (Beyea) Because the number of possible accident sequences is very large, it would be prohibitive to perform consequence calculations fer every possibility. Instead, folicaing standard practice, we have picked surrogate release categories that are intended to span the range of possibilities. As mentioned in the summary, releases have been chosen that generally fall into the release categories used in 1
l NUREG-0396, but which take into account site-specific l l
i l differences. The basic reference. documents utilized relating to site-specific accident sequences at the Seabrook. Plant are 1
l 1
- 1) the Licensee's Seabrook Probabalistic Safety Assessment i
(
(PSA),AE/ and the review of the PSA carried out by analysts l
l 40/ Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment, 6 volumes, December, 1983. i l 1 l
at Brookhaven National Laboratories for the NRC.A1!
In our study, we have generally accepted the Brookhaven recommendations,'although for completeness we have considered some PSA categories without modification. In such cases, we have included them as part of our generic release categories.
In the release categories used for our testimony, we have picked one specific sequence to define the release magnitude for each category. However, it is important to bear in mind that the probability of the category is not the probability of the l specific accident analyzed. The true probability is the sum of l the probabilities of all accident sequences, known or unknown, l
) that have similar release magnitudes.
- 1. Category 1 (PWR1-type): Early Containment Failure with Core Oxidation. This category is represented by an "S1" sequence as defined in l the Seabrook (PSA). Also included in this l category is a high-presure melt ejection sequence.
One of the questions raised by the Brookhaven review of the PSA concerns the assumed rate at which heat would be released during an accident--a variable which governs plume rise.
The PSA assumes uniformly high values. In particular, for the S1 case, the PSA assumes sucii o high release of thermal energy that the pJame p6sses high overhead, causing rela voly low doses to the beach population, according to 41/ M. Khatib-Rahbar, A.K. Agrawal, H. Ludewig, W.T. Pratt, "A Review of the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety f.ssessment: Containment Failure Modes and Radiological Source Term," Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, prepared for U.S. NRC, draft, September, 1985.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, (Washington, D.C., WASH-1400 or NUREG-75/014, 1975).
43 -
conventional consequence models. As indicated by Gordon Thompson (at p. 76 infra) it will not be possible to resolve this discrepancy since a large range of heat rates is possible, depending on the dynamics of the accident. Because the Brookhaven assumption on heat rates represents a mid-range value in the spectrum found by Thompson, we have used it in our calculations of doses from S1 releases, recognizing that the actual doses could be significantly higher or lower.
- 2. Category 2 (PWR2-type): Severe Containment Bypass. We include in this category an "S6V-total" sequence as defined by analysts at Brookhaven. In this release category, a direct pathway to the atmosphere is opened as a result j' of containment bypass. 43% of radiciodine, 43%
of radiocesium, and 40% of radiotelluriun in the !
core are projected to escape.
In addition to the " interfacing systems j accidents" used to define this accident in the '
PSA, we include in this category thermally- ;
induced steam generator tube failures. I We also specifically analyze the PWR2 release l overpressurization scenario utilized in the Reactor Safety Study and NUREG-0396. Note that this riease category is generally similar to the preceeding rapid bypass category represented by S6V-total. j
- 3. Category 3 (PWR3-type) Slow containment Bypass. The Seabrook PSA modelled a containment bypass release as a " puff" release in which radioactivity is assumed to escape at different times, for periods of varying duration. We refer to this release category in the Tables with the notation used in the PSA to label the first and most dangerous puff (S6V-1).
Brookhaven, in its review of the PSA assumed 1 radioactivity would be assumed to escape over a period of one hour. For our testimony, we have made consequence calculations using both sets of assumptions. S6V-total in Category 2 represents the Brookhaven approach; S6V-1 in .
Category 3 represents that taken in the PSA. I i
- 4. Category 4: (pWR4-pWR9 -types) The less severe accidents utilized in NUREG-0396 are grouped in this category. Although such accidents can cause doses in excess of protective action guidelines and can increase delayed cancer risks in exposed populations, they are not generally projected to lead to early health affects.
A summary of the characteristics of the first three releasa categories is given in Table 1.
Q. What special characteristics-around Seabrook affect the consequences of a release there?
A. (Beyea) Our investigation of the consequences of releases of radioactivity at Seabrook concentrates on the summer months. The potential consequences, especially with l
l respect to early death from a serious accident at the Seabrook plant, increase greatly during these months due to a large l summer population in the area. These summer residents, day visitors, etc. increase the exposed population, and by increasing the evacuation time necessary to clear the area, they increase the potential time exposure. Furthermore, the consequences to a beach area population may be greater than the consequences to an inland population under similar conditions due to a lack of shielding normally provided by buildings. The addition of increased consequences due to material deposited directly on the skin of a beach population must also be l considered for the Seabrook plant. Taken together, these factors make summer release scenarios at Seabrook worthy of 1
TABLE 1 1
.l RELEASE PARAMETERS PWR1 PWR2 P ,i R .
Steam Containment Over- C o r. t a t n = e n t Explosi a Bypass Pressurization Bypass y
1 4
Warning Time 0.3 1.0 1.0 ; ~
Release Duration (hrs) 0.5 1.0 0.5 .0 l Release Time (hrs) 1.4 2.5 2.5 2.2 Energy Release Rate smillion BTU /hr) 520 tow
- 170 low" l
l P lu me Rise (m)** 200-850 30 80-300 30 j i
Release Fractions Noble Gases .94 .97 0.90 .5 Iodine 75 .43 0.7
- Cesium '5 .43 0.5 .. j 1
Telurium 19 .40 0.3 .22 1
l Barium .093 .049 0.06 . 0 '. 4 j Ruthenium .46 .033 0.02 .C04; Lanthanides .0029 .0053 0.004 .2004'. j 1
- Brookhaven suggests a much lower release ratio than does the Seabro;< P S .A . I However, tne clume rise ts low in botn cases.
l ** Calculations for stac1;1ty classes A-E. Plume rise varies within ar s r~.;
I because of different wind speeds. Variations for S6V releases are a . t !
I they can be ignored. For an 51 release, the'following values apply Wind Speed Stability Class 2 m/sec 4 m/sec 8 m/sec A-D B50 m 440 m 230 m E 350 280 230 1
special consideration, and we have included them in our investigation of the potential consequences of accidents at Seabrook.
Figure IV shows the location of the Seabrook beaches.
It should be noted that for the most severe accident categories considered, as will be discussed below, doses are so far above threshold for overcast conditions, that early deaths are possible at any time of the year. Nevertheless, the number of people who would die would increase greatly during the summer. Furthermore, intermediate accidents--those that would usually not cause early deaths--would be expected to cause early deaths at the beaches. In other words, during the summer, there is a much wider spectrum of accidents that can cause early fatalities.
Q. What are the assumptions behind the evacuation times you have used?
A. (Beyea) At some point during the operation of a reactor, the nuclear facility operator (NFO) may notify the appropriate state and local officials of an " unusual event," an occurrence that may lead to an eventual release of radioactivity. Depending on the seriousness of the event or of l following events, a higher emergency level may be reached. The i
NFO may eventually recommend, in consultation with officials l l
l and technical support staff, that an evacuation is necessary of !
l all or part of the surrounding population. The appropriate
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FICURE TV: SEA 5 ROOK AND AREA BEACHES
local officials, who may or may not have received prior warning, are then notified, and the emergency warning system will presumably be activated as soon as possible.
Time elapses between an initial indication to the operator and the moment state and local officials begin notification of the population. CONSAD (a consulting firm to FEMA) estimated this time to take 19-78 minutes during the day and 50 minutes at night. 12/ Their review of historical data shows these kinds of estimates can range from one to many hours for a range ,
of natural disasters and false alerts. Our work here assumes 45 minutes. In addition, some time will be needed to actually notify the population that an evacuation is needed. We take 15 l minutes for this time, so that evacuation is assumed to begin one hour (45 plus 15 minutes) after the decision is made to evacuate.
We also assume that the NFO receives an indication of a pending release before the release. This warning time is taken as 18 minutes for a steam explosion, one hour for a rapid containment bypass (S6V-total), one hour for a PWR-2 release, and 1.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> for a slow containment bypass (S6V-1). These are, l the assumptions made by the analysts (Brookhaven, Seabrook PSA, Reactor Safety Study) who devised the release categories 42/ CONSAD Research Corportion, "An Assessment of Evacuation Time Around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station," June 20, 1980; revised June 23, 1980, p. 2.7-2.9.
l studied. When the one hour delay involved in starting the actual evacuation is accounted for, the results are as i'
follows.
Steam explosion: evacuation starts 42 minutes after radioactivity begins escaping.
PWR-2 and rapid containment bypass (S6V-total): evacuation starts at the same time as radioactivity begins to escape.
Slow containment bypass (S6V-1): Evacuation starts 42 minutes before radioactivity begins to escape.
The evacuation time estimates themselves are based on assumptions about conditions during the evacuation, the state of readiness of an evacuation system, etc. These assumptions ;
vary, leading to differences in evacuation times. Th ,
i i
evacuation times for five earlier studies of a Seabrook area l evacuation are listed in Table 2. Some of the evacuation times i
in the table for a two mile radius (and five mile radius) appear to be for a selective evacuation from within that i l i radius. We have used five hours as a representative estimate f for beach site evacuation.
Current emergency plans at Seabrook call for notification ;
of beach populations at an earlier stage in an accident than for the general population. However, for PWRl-PWR3 categories, there i's doubt as to how much time would actually be gained by this procedural modification. Although we have not taken credit for extra warning time to the beach population, our results can be easily modified to do so. It is only necessary to relabel the evacuation time assigned to our tables. In 48 -
u___________. __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _______ _
1 1
1 TABLE 2 SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME ISTIMATES #'
i SUMMER DAY SCENARIO i
l i
i RADIUS DEGREES HMM b)
Vorhees c) d) a f 'i 4 Maguire NRC~) KLD I
i 0-2 360 4:50 5:10 : ----
4:40 I l
1 l 0-3 180 East 5:20 ---- ---- ---- ----
)
I 0-5 340 5 50 f:10-5:40 ---- ----
6:20 i 0-10 360 6:05 5:10-6:10 :D 11:25 6:40 )
a) Time ( Ho u r s : minu te s ) for the population to clear the indicated area after notification.
b) " Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near d e s ; .,
j Station," HMM Document No. C-90-024A, HMM Associates, Inc., May '
1990.
c) " Final Report, Estimate of Evacuation Times," Alan M. Vorhees +
Assectates, July .930.
d) " Emergency Planning Zon" evacaation C. ear Time Estimates,' C.E.
Maquire, Inc., February 1933.
e) "An Independent Assessment of Evacuation Time Es tima tes for a P " d r:
Population S c e n a r.l o in the Emergency Planning Zone of the Seabrook Nuclear Power $tation," M.P. Mueller, et al, Pacifte N o r t hst e s t Laboratory. NUREG/CR-2903 PNL-4290.
f) " Evacuation Plan Update, Progress Report No. 3," KLD Assoc: 2tes, 3
Broadway, Huntington Station, NY 11746, Januaray 20, 1086, Tacle 19, Scenario'1A. These calcu la tion s refer to the beach population, but assuma the entire five mile population is evacuated offictally and that 2is of the population beyond five alles evacuates spontaneously. It is further assumed that beaches are at 80% of capacity and that efficials attempt to notify the beach population at the Site Alert stage, ;5 minutes before a General Site emergency is called. To make these estimates consistent with the assumptions used in our calculations, 15 minutes should be added to the numbers shown. On the.other hand, 13 minutes should be subtracted to avoid double counting the delay associated with notifying beach occupants, which is already included yn the KLD time estimatta.
other words, if beach populations are assumed to begin evacuating 15-minutes earlier than normal, the equivalent evacuation time in our calculations would be 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> minus 15 minutes, not 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
According to testimony by Thomas Adler in this proceeding, actual evacuation times from the contaminated area would be much, much longer. Some of the persons exposed in an accident will therefore likely receive larger doses than presented in our tables. Our tables, therefore, lead to-conservative estimates of the numbers of persons exposed to possible early death.
Q. Is the population around Seabrook subjected to possible "early death" for releases during the summer?
A. (Beyea) We have investigated the conditions under which the nearest beach population, at 2 miles and 4 miles, might be exposed to doses at a threshold level for early death (200 rem) for the release categories discussed previously.
According to standard references (see Moeller, et al.)b ! At 200 rem, a few percent of exposed persons would die within a two month period, a few percent of women under 40 would be 43/ J.S. Evans, D.W. Moeller, D.W. Cooper, " Health Effects Model for Nuclear Power Plant' Accident Consequence Analyses," (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., NUREG/CR-4214, 1985) The "LD50" for nausea is given as 1.4 Gy in Table 1.3, page II-29. 1.4 Gy equals about 125 rem.
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1980.
l 1
I permanently sterilized, and a few percent more would develop cataracts. Table 3 illustrates some of our findings for 2 miles. Weather stability class, wind speed, and the time it would take for the beach population to receive a 200 rem dose under those conditions are listed.
We have found these estimates for two sets of assumptions. The first set assumes that all the population is inside cars when the release occurs so that skin and clothes do not get contaminated. Doses are also reduced J 1
because of the partial shielding provided by the car from the radioactivity on the ground. The fractional decrease in i dose from shielding, here referred to as a ' dose scaling I
factor", is calculated to be .53 .78 for this set of I assumptions. The time it takes for a person in a car ;
waiting within the plume to receive a 200 rem dose is then listed in the table. We assume that vehicles remain stalled l in traffic within contaminated ground and then move rapidly l l
out of the area once the roads are cleared at the end of five hours. We also assume that a person once evacuated receives no additional dose once outside the plume path.
On the basis of our consideration of a Seabrook-type evacuation, we have decided to also use a second set of assumptions. Some of the population will not have reached their vehicles before plume passage. (Maguire, for example, assumes up to an hour for the beach population to " mobilize" TABLE 3 EX?OSURE OF 2-MILE BEACH POPULATI'*!"
- TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER AY (SKIN AND CAR DEPOSITION NOT INCLUDED)
Time in H ur2 t: Reach Risk of 200 R-m Early Death?
Stab #.And PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 111ty Speed __ , ) S6V- 56V-Class (m/sec) 51 Total 36V-1 Si tot. 56V-1 A 2 14. -21 18. ->24 >24 50% N N chance A 4 20. ->24 >24 >24 "
N N A 8 >24 >24 >24 "
N N B 2 >24 5. -7 >24 "
Y N B 4 J.5-14 13. -19 >24 N N 8 "
8 is. -21 >24 >24 N N C >24 "
2 <1 19. -24 Y N C 4 >24 2.6- 3.7 >24 "
Y N C 9 7.7-12 8.3-12 >24 N N D 2 >24 <1 5. -7.0 25% Y Y chance D 4 324 <1 12. -17 "
Y N D 9 >24 1 - 1.5 2-4 Y N a) The population two miles from the plant. out not directly across the lagoon. Times would be shorter for populations with water between them and the reac to r due to reduced dispersions.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be part! ally shielded from contaminated ground by their vanicles. Groun 1elding factors are assumed to range from 0.53 to 0.78, '
ending on the type of automobile. See Question 13 for f urthe r cetails.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hou rs is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) If the plume rises high, as at Chernobyl, the population will ce protected against early death for this release. Otherwise, the population will be exposed to risk of early death. (Both the thermal release rate and the plume rise equation are uncertain.
See text of question 12 for discussion of probabilities in table.)
itself for an evacuation.)AA# Of those that do reach their vehicles before plume passage, some will leave their windows open and some will not enter their cars until traffic starts to move. -Thus, some of the population will have radioactive material deposited directly on their skin and hair. We refer to the dose from this material as a " skin deposition" dose.
Similarly, we take into account material deposited'directly on . j 1
cars in the plume and the dose resu?. ting from this material.
l (a " car deposition" dose).
l For this second set of assumptions, we have estimated that' the dose to a person shielded by a car, but exposed'to both skin deposition and car deposition doses, would be 1.0 to 1.3 times the dose to an unshielded person exposed to a plane of-contaminated ground (see below). The dose scaling factor range is thus 1.0-1.3 Results using this range are shown in Table.4.
A great deal of information is contained in Tables 3, 4 and similar Tables to be presented later. Consider', for example, D-stability conditions.
Note that the times shown refer to i
" clearing" time, that is the time for the last person in the l i
area to be evacuated. But even a 1-hour evacuation time, which i might apply to the earliest evacuees, is insufficient to keep l 44/ C.E. Maguire, Inc., " Emergency planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates," February 1983. !
a L
l
TABLE 4 EXPOSURE OF 2-MILE BEACH POPULATION TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER CAi INCLUDES DOSE FROM SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION Time in Hours to Reach Risk of 200 Rem E a r ' 'i D e a t h ? ' ,'
Stab # Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed SoV- 36V-Class _ ) __
)
(m/sec) S1 total S6V-1 S1 tot. S6V-1 1
A 2 8.2-11 11-14 >24 50% N N chance A 4 12. -15 >24 >24 "
N N A 8 >24 >24 >24 "
N N 3.1 , "
B 2 19. -24 >24 Y N B 4 3.5-7.3 7.8-10 >24 N? N B 8 8.4-11 17.4-23 >24 N N C 2 >24 <1 12. -15 "
Y N C 4 >24 1.7-2 >24 "
'Y N C 8 4.4-5.9 5. -6.5 >24 "
Y N 1 l D 2 >24 <1 3.5-4.2 25% Y Y
)
chance D 4 >24 <1 7.6-9.6 "
Y N?
D 3 >24 <1 17.4-22.5 "
Y N l
i a) The population two miles from the plant, but not directly across the lagoon. Times would be shorter for populations with water between them and the reactor due to reduced dispersions, b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material depositea on the car and.directly on the individual. The effective ground shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile. See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect, e) If the plume rises high, as at Chernobyl, the population will be protected against early death for this release. Ot he rw is e , the population will be exposed to risk of early dea th. (Both t :. e
{ thermal release rate and the plume rise equation are uncertain.
See text of question 12 for discussion of p ro ba bili ties in table.)
doses below 200 rem for an S6V-Total release. On the other hand, the first of the evacuees to leave during an S6V-1 release would escape a 200-rem dose.
If the time to reach a 200-rem dose shown-in the tables is compared with a 5-hour evacuation time, one arrives at a "yes/no" indication of whether or not the population at 2 miles is exposed to risk of early death. This is noted in the last set of columns in each table.
Some of the entries are marked with a question mark. A question mark indicates that even though doses do not reach ;
the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for '
nausea has been reached early in the evacuation. In such cases, a 5-hour evacuation time calculated from traffic models may be optimistic. Because we were unable to determine a quantitative estimate of the likely delay in evacuation that would result from cases of nausea, we have not been able to do more than indicate uncertainty.
Note that no entries are shown in the Tables for a PWR-2 release. The results turned out to be so similar to, or worse than, the SV6-total release that it was not necessary to include separate entries.
Several caveats about the tables should be kept in mind, especially when exposure of the population is indicated.
First of all, risk of early death is much higher for persons very close to the plant where doses reach high levels very
- rapidly, i
l
Second, we have not looked at slower wind speeds for the various stability classes nor have we examined changing
)
weather conditions. Both of these situations can lead to higher doses. Thus, Tables 3 and 4 do not include the worst possible weather conditions but only the most probable.
A third caveat is that, while D conditions generally represent overcast days, we have not looked at actual-precipitation conditions that sometimes catch populations on the beach. The time for a dose to reach 200 rem is greatly decreased in this case (for the same wind speed) due to the I
increased deposition of radioactive material. Evacuation time is also increased.
On the other hand, overcast conditions in the morning would deter people from coming to the beach. The lower populations would mean reduced clear time estimates, j Recall, however, that there is a multi-hour underestimate of clear times in our work for most of the beaches (see Adler). In any case, doses tend to be so high under D-conditions for the S6-V total release that reduced clear i
times are insufficient to provide protection. The same is l true for the S1 release for low thermal release rates and low plumes rise.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the population's exposure may be increased if the shown evacuation times are, for whatever reason, longer than assumed here.
']
In any case, the results of Tables 3 and 4 can be combined with weather frequency data (Table 15) to show that for the S6V-total release which represents the severe-containment-bypass categories, if the 2-mile beach population is downwind,-
it will be exposed to risk of early death under meteorological.
conditions that would be expected.to occur about 70-75% of the' time.
In contrast, the results in Tables 3 and 4 for the slow-containment-eypass release, S6V-1, indicate that the population at 2 miles is generally not. exposed to early~ death for this release.
Surprisingly, the SI-steam-explosion release,-which represents the largest release of all, in some circumstances might causes fewer problems for the beach population at 2 miles than the PWR-3 type release. The reason for this is that the projected plume rise may be so great, as occurred at Chernobyl, that the plume passes high over the nearby populations.
We estimate a 50-percent chance that this will be the case for A,
'l B and C stability conditions and a 75-percent chance during.0 conditions. Our rationale'is that the height to whichlany.
radioactive plume rises is uncertain, as was discussed earlier. ,
-i Should the true plume rise be a factor of two less than"the mid-range value predicted by standard plume rise formulas, i which is within the range of uncertainty (see Fig. 5), early !
- 54'-
I l l
Figure 5 ,
)
VARIATION IN PLUME RISE ACCORDING TO SOME WELL-KNOWN FORMULAS l
tam i"* ' f/.,$ ./
loo ,
/
/
10 1 10 100 1000
%. Mw I
1 The vertical line at Q =150 h megawatts corresponds to an S7 j release. At this heat rate, the spread in predictions made by
- different formula is about a factor of,two.
The graph has been taken from G.A. Briggs, " Plume Rise Predictions" in Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental i Impact Analyses, American Meteorological Society, 45 Beacon J Street, Boston, Mass. 02108 U.S.A., 1975.
We quote from page 60: "It is no wonder that so many plume rise formulas have been developed. What is particularly. distressing
- is the degree to which they diverge on predicting Ah for a'. given source and given conditions."
i i
deaths from external gamma exposures become frequent for A, 9, j and C stability classes. It should also be borne in mind that the PWR-1 releases are projected to include copious amounts of l 1
1 isotopes that can give high lung doses. Thus, 1-day lung dose can contribute to early death when whole body dose is below 200 l
1 rem.
When these factors are all included, the combined uncertainty is so broad that it is a toss up (50%) as to whether or not early deaths would occur following an S1 release for A, B, and C stability classes. As for D-stability class, two independent events must conspire to produce early deaths:
l both the heat rate must be low and a low plume rise formula must be correct. As a result, we estimate that there is a 25%
l chance that doses will exceed 200 rem to the whole body or the equivalent 1-day lung dose under D-stability class for this release.
It should also be recognized that a real accident may be less severe than the S1-case assumes. Paradoxically, because of lower plume rise, a small breach of containment following a steam explosion could be more severe than a large breach as far as nearby populations are concerned.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that turbulent interaction with the sea breeze and/or condensation of l
radioactive rain could bring radioactivity down to ground level. An enormous amount of radioactivity would be passing l
overhead; even a relatively weak meteorological process, one normally not considered in reactor accident dispersion modelling, could couple the upper air-with air at ground level, causing high doses.
Note that we have not shown results for release classes PWR4 through PWR9. Athough these releases can cause doses in excess of protective action guides, they rarely lead to doses in excess of 200 rem. Doses for those categories are dominated by noble gases, so that. ground deposition can be ignored. As a result, the dose ends after plume passage. Without effective-sheltering, the only emergency measure that has any impact on doses for these release classes is pre-plume evacuation.
IX. RADIATION DOSES FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM Q. How were your dose scaling factors obtained?
A. (Beyea) The basic dose scaling factor, with car and skin deposition ignored, was calculated to have a range of ;
0.53-0.78, assuming that an evacuee is inside a car'in the plume deposition area. This range represents an updating of the 0.4-7 spielding factor range used in the Reactor Safety. )
i Study (WASH-1400). Cars are lighter today (and will.be~more j so in the future) compared to the 1975-vehicles analyzed in the Reactor Safety Study. ' Assuming that Vehicles involved' l
.e
in an evacuation will be 30% lighter than 1975 vehicles,41/ the appropriate shielding facter range turns out to be 0.53-0.78A5/
The relative contribution of various doses, including car and skin aeposition ooses, can be obtained as follows.
Dose per unit time (Relative to dose f rom a flat, contaminated plane):A1/
A) to person stancing on contaminated beich, parking lot, road, etc. 1.0 X Sgi8/
B) Dose inside car from contaminated grc;no 1.0 X Sc49/
45/ Due especially to the aecrease in the arount of steel usea in U.S.-built cars, the material weight of U.S. cars droppeo 15% between 1975 and 1981 and is prc;ected to crop l another 15% by 1965. (Table 4.3, p. 122, Transportation Energy Data Book, edition 6, G. Kulp, M.C. Ec1 comb, GRNL-5883 (special), Noyes Data Corporation.;
46/ Shielcing varies exponentially with mass per unit I area. Thus (.4) 7 = 0.53; (.7) 7 = 0.78. {
l 47/ In the absence of cetailec calculations, we assume that absorption ef f ects in air can be handled by neglecting all absorption at distances less than 100 meters and by treating absorption beyond 100 meters as total. 7hus, we replace the ;
exact proolen of a contaminated plane of infinite extent by ,
a finite circular surface of radius 100 meters. Since the l integral over the cisk turns out to be logar::hmic with radial d: stance, the total dose is insensit:ye to the cutoff cistance chosen. These calculations are conservative since they ignore grounc scattering effects which increase relative coses from ceposition close to the receptor.
Deposition is assumeo to proceea uniformly cr any external surface regardless of the surface's orientation. Thus, a square centimeter of ground is assumed to receive the same contamination as a square centimeter of skin.
48/ Snlelcing factor, S g = 0. 4 7-L . 6 5. See footnotes 26 and 60.
49/ Snielcing factor, Sc = 0.53-C. E. Eee ::-otncies 26 and 60.
C) Dose inside car from radioactivity deposited on outside of vehicle .22 X Sc 13/
D) Dose inside car from radioactivity deposited on inside of vehicle with open windows .04 .25 1/
E) Dose from skin contaminated while outside vehicle .3552/
F) Dose from skin contaminated while inside vehicles with open windows .1753/
50/ Based on numerical integration over an idealized automobile, deposition is assumed to take place on the underside of the vehicle as well as on the top surface.
51/ This case would occur 1) if windows had been left open, )
or 2) if evacuees reached their vehicles and opened windows j before plume passage were complete, j The low number corresponds to low wind speeds; the high number corresponds to high wind speeds.
52/ An estimate of the relative contribution of skin contamination to the total dose can be obtained by replacing the complex shape of the human body with a set of bounding l
geometic surfaces:
i
- 1) sphere: the dose rate at the center of a sphere 1 contaminated with N curies of radioactivity per square j centimeter is 43% of the dose rate 1 meter above a circle of l 100 meter radius that has also been contaminated with 1 N curies per unit area. l Although a cylindrical model would be more accurate, the results will not differ by a large amount, as shown below.
- 2) right circular cylinder: numerical integration in the case of a cylinder with radius 1/10th of the length indicates that the average centerline dose is approximately 17%
greater than the sphere center dose discussed previously.
For a cylinder with radius 1/5th of the length, the average centerline dose is slightly less than the sphere case.
The results of these rough calculations suggest that direct i
contamination of people must make a significant contribution to the total dose. We take the numerical relationship to be 35%, that is, the skin contribution is assumed to be 35% of the dose from contaminated ground.
53/ We take this dose to be half of the value for a person standing in the open, assuming that half of a person's surface area is pressed against a seat and, therefore, not subject to deposition.
l The total dose can be obtained by multiplying each of the-l above dose components by the amount of time. spent under each !
~
set of conditions. Unfortunately, there are a number of time parameters that must, in principle, be specified to calculate a dose precisely. Rather than make a complex model, we have chosen to simplify the calculations by ignoring a number of i
effects that should tend to cancel:
- 1) We ignore the finite duration of the'plumei that is, we assume radioactivity is deposited instantaneously. ' Thia-is equivalent to adding 30 minutes to the evacuation clear time for S6V releases, 15 minutes for the S1 release.
- 2) We ignore doses from skin and car received after evacuees reach reception centers. This neglected dose should compensate for the above simplification.
- 3) In cases when skin contamination is assumed'to take place, we assume that-at least some evacuees remain outside vehicles during the entire time that the plume passes. This appears to be a reasonable assumption, given the fact that traffic will be stalled and it will be uncomfortable inside vehicles that do-not have air conditioning.
- 4) In cases when car deposition is included, we assume that; i
a significant number of evacuees who leave their 1
)
vehicles to cool off (while waiting for traffic to move) will stand next to, or lean on, a contaminated vehicle.
The net result is that we numerically calculate doses to beachgoers in one of two ways: s When skin deposition is' neglected, we assume that'the last group:of' evacuees remains-inside or close to cars, stalled in . traffic, while exposed to. contaminated ground. Doses do not
.begin to accumulate until the wind carries'the plume ~to the vehicle. Doses continue.to accumulate until the clear time is reached, at.
which point evacuees are assumed to leave' u contaminated ground instantaneously and exit q their vehicles.- o l
When skin ~ deposition is not neglected, i
. evacuees are-assumed to receive the above dose j plus the' dose from skin contamination that is 1
-accumulated up'until the clear time..
- .. w These assumptions lead to an effectivefdose shielding factor' range of 1.0-1.3, when skin contamination is included,'and a range of 0.65-0.95 when it is not.
]
In our judgment, the net effect of these simplifications.
is to underestimate the high end of the dose' spectrum.
Tables 10, 17, and 18 (to be presented later) were calculated for winter populations,:which are initially-indoors. In these cases we have assumed cloud and inhalation sheltering factors of around 0.75.- We have also. :i j
assumed, for simplicity, a building shielding-factor range 1 that is identical to the automobile' case (0.53-0.78).
Q. How many people are located near the plant' A. (Beyea) The size of the beach area population-around '!
i Seabrook is uncertain. One estimate of this population has been made by public Service of.New Hampshire'and is.found in- L Figure 6. Although its accuracy-is uncertain,-this. estimate.
j
+
.l 1
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i
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o2 27896 c.2 4devo 2s 60237 o5 88133 8 10 AQo61 0 10 178094 ~
10-B 47632 0-B 225726 j Figure 6 Scenarios 3 and 4: Summer Weekday Popu1ation 10-52 '
s
--_-_- L
i does indicate that a substantial number of people are located within two miles of the plant. Estimates by other witnesses in l'
this proceeding are much higher.
The number of persons who would be located within a plume obviously varies not only with. wind direction but also with stability class and distance from the plant. At two miles the )
l plume could be viewed as being between a 29-wedge (A stability q class) and a 13-wedge (D stability class)5A/ compared to the 22.5 population wedges in the table. d Q. How large are doses likely to be and how do they compare with doses that would be received at other sites?
A. (Beyea) In order to gain a better appreciation of the
)
higher risk faced by the beach population (higher than that- 1 1
faced by residents at comparable distances at other sites for comparable release's), we present a series of Tables that show radiation doses likely to be received under various scenarios.
Table 8 shows tne highest-risk case, which applies to the Seabrook beach population that is separated from the reactor by 1
a lagoon. (Because plumes disperse less'over water, the plume is more concentrated by the time it reaches the population than had it traveled over land.)
The doses shown apply to a person assumed to leave the contaminated area after 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The doses are truly enormous for the S6V-Total release.- (Note that a 500-rem dose has a 54/ Wedges are assumed to have plume widths of 3 times the horizontal dispersion coefficient.
1
I I
TA" DOSES RECEIVED :N A SUMMER DAY BY HIGHEST-RISK POPULATION ON SEABROCK BEA.?"
(SKIN & CAR DEPOSIT:ON DOSE INCLUDED) I Dose 5 Hrs After b) l Evacuation starts Risk of (In Rem) Early Death?
Stab- ' Wind FWR1 PWR2 PWR3 j 111ty Speed S6V- S6V-Class
-- e ) _ ,)
(m/sec) Si total S6V-1 Si tot. isV-: !
A 2 63-74 230-270 <50 N Y N l
A 4 160-190 120-150 <50 N? N? N '
1 A 8 120-140 65 7^ <50 N? N N B 2 <50 580-d 85-98 N Y N B 4 <50 320-380 48-55 N Y N B 8 180-220 70-2. (50 Y Y N l
C 2 <50 1600-1900 230-270 N Y Y C 4 900-1100 130-150 N Y N C 9 490-590 70-83 N Y N D 2 2~00-3200 379-448 N Y Y l D 4 1600-1900 222-264 ft Y Y D 0 340-1000 120-143 N Y N?
a) Th pcpulation at 2 mi. with bay water between reac.or and beach. I b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual. The effective g rou nd shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile. See Question 13 for further details, c) Pasquill stability class. Dispersion parameters were shifted by one stability class to account for reduced dispersion over water.
(See W.A. Lyons, " Turbulent Diffusion and pollutant Transport in Shoreline Environments", in Lectures on Air Pollution and E r.v i r onme n t a l Impact Analyses. American Meteorological Society, 45
, Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02:08, (1985). Pages 141, 142, and l espectally Figure 25 on Page 149.)
I d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation t i .n e may be suspect.
e) Assuming mid-range plume rise.
j i
l mortality rate greater than 70%.) As' discussed below, doses-
)
exceed the threshold for meteorological conditions that hold
?
93% of the time.
The doses for an S6V-1 release are smaller than for S6V-Total, but still exceed threshold for meteorological conditions that hold about 33%' of the time. Doses shown for 1
the high-rising S1 release have been calculated using a standard plume rise formula, so they almost always temain below threshold. (However, as mentioned earlier, the occurrence of'a low-rising plume is expected frequently.
~
For this reason, we continue to list probability values under the-yes/no columns in Table 8.that indicate whether or not there is a risk of early death.)
Not all of the 2-mile beach population-is separated from the reactor by water. Table 9 shows the results for j l
populations separated by land. The doses are still extraordinarily high for the S6V-Total release, but are significantly less serious for an S6V-1 release. It is of q l i interest to compare these results with doses that would be j i
l accumulated at the median reactor site around the United I i
States. The results are shown in Table 10. We have taken 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the evacuation clear time within 2 miles, !
l based on an NRC estimate of the median time.11!
l 55/ T. .Urbanik.II, "An Analysis of Evacuation Time Estimates Around 52 Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, NUREG/CR-1856-(1981), <
Vol.EI, Table 10, p. 21.
t
s TABLE 9 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY 2-M:~T BEACH PCPULATION'
~
(SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSE .NC_JDED)
Dose 5 Hrs After Evacuation starts Risk of (In Rem) Early Death?
Stab # Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed S6V- S6V-Class (m/sec) I'1 * ' total S6V-1 5~1 ' tot. S6V-1 A 2 122 '.43 95-110 <50 N N N A 4 92-109 50-5s <50 N N N A 8 53-62 <50 <50 N' N N B 2 63-74 230-270 <50 N Y N B 4 160-190 120-150 <50 N? N? N B 8 120-140 65-76 <50 N N N C 2 <50 580-680 85-98 N Y N C 4 <50 320-380 48-55 N Y N C 6 180-220 170-200 <50 Y Y N D 2 (50 1600-1900 230-270 N Y Y D 4 <50 900-1100 130-150 N Y N
\
D d <50 490-590 70-83 N Y N l
1 l
I a) The pcpulation two miles from the plant, 'ut b not directly across l the lagoon.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded :
from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed to i re:et"e a dose ecmponent from radioactive material deposited on I the car and direc tly on the individual. The effective ground j shiilding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, d e pe nd irig o n the type of '
aut mobt;e. See Question 13 for f u rthe r details.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation j time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indica te s i that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death ;
threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming mid-range plume rise.
1
TABLE 10 DOSES R E C E I '/ E D BY 2-MILE POPULATION AT A MEDIAN REACTOR SITE IN THE UNITED STATES (CAR DEPOSITION LOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 1.5 Hrs'After
)
Evacuation Starts Risk of
)
(In Rem) Early Death?
Stab- ' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 111ty Speed __,) ?6V- __,) 56V-Class (m/sec) S1 :otal S6V-1 Si tot. S6V-1 A 2 53-60 <50 <50 N N N A 4 <50 <50 <50 N. N N A 8 <50 <50 < -N N N B 2 <50 ?3-110 N N N S 4 71-82 52-58 (50 N N N B 8 52-61 <50 (40 N N N C 2 <50 220-250 50 N Y N C 4 <50 130-140 <50 N N? N C 8 78-91 67-76 <50 N- N N D 2 <50 540-610 77-87 N Y N D 4 320-370 <50 N Y N D 8 170-200 <50 N Y N a) The population two miles from the plant, b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by buildings and their vehicles. They l are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material
! deposited on the car, but they are not assumed'to have had their !
l skin contaminated. The effective ground shielding factors range
.from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile. Cloud and {
-inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0.75. See Question 4 13 for further details.
c) Pasquill s r .aility c la s s. .
J d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation- i time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do net reach the 200-rem early death
't h r e s ho ld , the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In 1 such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect. I e) Assuming a mid-range plume rise.
i
=
Taole 10 shows that doses, even for S6V-Total, get very high only for two meteorological conditions (D-stability, wind speeds 2 and 4 meters /second). Doses for the other releases never rise above early-death threshold. In genetal, doses at these other sites are less than one-fifth the doses for the highest-risk Seabrook beach case.
Q. Are the beach populations beyond two miles exposed to risk of early death during a summer day?
A. (Beyea) Yes, certainly for an S6V-Total release.
Taoles 11 and 12 show the calculated.results for beach l
populations at 4 miles and an evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Note that the beach population is not protected for a low-rising S1 release either.
Additional insight into how far from the reactor threshold doses are likely to occur for an S6V-Total release can be gained from examining Table 13. It shows early death radii for D-stability class and a five-hour evacuation time. This means that an individual remaining in the plume at a radius given in the last column of the table for five hours under the given weather conditions will receive at least a 200-rem dose. These are the individuals who have not been able to evacuate earlier due to traffic congestion, etc. It should be noted, however, i
that individuals at this radius who have evacuated earlier may still receive a 200-rem dose due to the continuing dose contribution from material deposited on their skin and car.
Similarly, individuals beyond the early death radius for a 1
i
TABLE 11 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY.4-MILE BEACH POPULATION"'
(SKIN AND CAR DEPOSITION DOSES INCLUDED)
Dose 5 Frs After Evacuation , Starts b)
Risk of ,
(In Rem) Early Death?" ' j d
Stab- Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 liity Speed S6V- S6V-Class (m /s ec )
-- e ) __ , ) 4 51 total SrV-1 S1 tot. S6V-1 A 2 61-71 48-55 <50 N N N A 4 <50 <50 <50 N N N A 8 <50 (50 <50 N N N B 2 82-96 59-69 <50 N N N l
B 4 64-75 <50 <50 N N N B d <50 <:0 <50 N N N C 2 <50 160-190 <50 N N? N C 4 98-120 '~-110
<50 N N N-C S93-110 52-61 <50 N N N D 2 <50 540-640 77-89 N Y N O 4 (50 340-410 50-5B N Y U D d (50 190-230 <50 N Y N a) Tne populattoa 4 miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on tne car and directly on the individual. The effective ground shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile. See Question 13 for further detatis.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates nat even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death rareshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In I such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming e mid-range plume rise.
l l
TABLE 12 EXPOSURE OF 4-MILE BEACH POPULATION"' TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMME? OAY (SKIN & CAR DEPOSIT *0N DOSES INCLUDED) b)
Time in hours to Reach Risk of' d)
,, 200 Rem Early Death? '
Stab Wind .P W R 1 PWR2 PWR3 111ty Speed ,_ , )
S6V- S6V-
)
Class (m/s.;) Si total S6V-1 S1 tot. S6V-: j A 2 19-24 23. ->24 >24 N N N A 4. >24 >24 >24 N N N l
A B >24 >24 >24 N N N B 2 13-17 18. - 23 >24 N N N 3 4 18-24 >24 >24 N N N B 8 >24 >24 >24 N N N C 2 >24 3.4- 6.7 12-15 N Y N C 4 11-14 10.5-13.5 23->24 N N N-C 8 12-15 21.6->24 >24 N N N 1
D 2 >24 <1 3.5-4.2 N Y Y D 4 >24 1.7- 2 6.8-8.6 N Y N?
D : >24 4- 5.2 14-18 .N Y N -)
a) T 'e popu.Ati:n 4 miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be p a r '. . a l l y shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a Jose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual. The effective ground shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile. See Question 13 for further details, c) Pasquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> As assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the !OO-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect, e) Assuming a c11 d - r a n g e plume rise.
l i
l given set of conditions are not necessarily protected from a 3 200-rem dose, because we have not accounted for the doses they might receive outside the plume from skin and car deposition- q material.
As noted previously, if evacuation times for the beaches beyond 2 miles are longer than 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, as is documented by i
Adler, the consequences of these releases for a given set of )
l conditions will be more serious. The early death radii will be l
larger and many more people will be exposed, i
l Q. How would a summer evening scenario affect your j results?
A. (Beyea) There is evidence that there would still be a substantial population on or near the beaches on summer j i
evenings. Although evacuation times might be reduced due to a j i
smaller evacuating population, it is not clear that this l 1
reduction would be enough to ensure that no early deaths occurred in the population--especially since night-time plumes are more concentrated and therefore are more dangerous. In order to investigate the consequences of a summer evening scenario, we have obtained an estimate from our model of the doses at 2 miles which would be received for typical evening weather scenarios assuming a clear time of 1 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. We have assumed, in contrast to the summer scenario, that the population is wearing more clothes and could remove.them after exposure to reduce the skin deposition dose. While it is very l uncertain how much this would reduce the skin deposition dose, l
L i l
l
we have also assumed for simplicity that removing clothes would eliminate it, including the contribution from contaminated hair. We have still assumed a dose component from material deposited on cars. (The dose scaling factor range for this scenario becomes .65 .95.)
The results of our model are shown in Table 13a. The time to reach 200 rer :s usually one hour or less for the S6V-total re] ease, which means that any reduction of evacuation times during the evening is not going to protect the population for this release category.
Q. How frequently do the various weather conditions occur?
A. (Beyea) The frequencies of the Pasquill stability classes, as reported in the SB 1&2, ER-OLS,bb! are given in Table 14. The frequencies of the A,B, and C stability classes increase during the summer months, with C the most frequent of i
}
the three. D and E are the dominant stability classes.
Although not indicated in the Table (which is based on 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> i
data), C and D stability classes would probably dominate during daytime hours because the E, F, and G stability classes tend to l occur primari]y in the evening or early morning hours, l
The consequences during C, D, and E classes are all serious in terms of early death. Consequences would also be serious 56/ Public Service of *:ew Hampshire, "Seabrook Station -
Units 1 & 2, Environmental Report, Operating License Stage,"
Figure 2.1-19.
TABLE 13 EARLY DEATH RADII FOR A 5-HOUR EVACUATION TIME ON A SUMMER DAY 56V-TOTAL RELEASE EARLY DEATH STAB:LITY WIND SPEED RADIUS >
CLASS (m/sec) (miles)a) l B 2 2-3 B 4 1-2 B 8 1-2 C 2 3-4 C 4 2-3 C 8 1-2 D 2 7-8 !
D 4 6-7 l D 8 4-5 l 1 l
a) An individual in the plume at this radius under the given conditions will receive, assuming a,five-hour _ ear tine, at least a 200 rem dose. Individuals at this radius who have evacuated earlier may still receive at least a 200 rem dose due to the continuing dose !
contribution from material deposited on their skin and car Ind iv id ua ls at f arther dis tances may still receive 200 rem doses due t, skin and car deposition doses after leaving the plume.
A dose scaling factor range of 1.0-1.3 is assumed. This is equivalent to assuming 1) that some individuals are caught tn the open during plume passage, 2) that the last to evacuate are stuck in traffic and spend the full five hours in contaminated ground, and 3) that all doses cease after five hours. See Question 13 for f urthe r details.
TABLE 13a DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER EVENING BY TWO-MILE BEACH POPULATION (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED, NOT SKIN DOSE)
Dose 3 Hrs After .)
Evacuation starts Risk of (19 Rem) Early Death? d)
Stab- ' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 liity Speed S6V- S6V-3 Class (m/sec) _,S1 total S6V-1 _,S1 tot. S6V-1 D 2 <50 820-970 120-140 N Y N D 4 480-560 72-61 N Y N D a 260-310 <50 N Y N E 2 1300-1600 200-220 N Y Y E 4 790-950 120-130 N Y N E 8 430-520 64-73 N Y N a) The population 2 miles from the plant, not direct 1" across the lagoon. Doses would be higher should the plume ba b . wing over the lagcon.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car. No skin dose is included on the assumption that a) clothes keep radioactivity from reaching skin; and b)that clothes are discarded once evacuees enter their cars. The effective ground shielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile. See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pasquill stability class, d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshcid, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour e/acuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming a mid-range plume rise.
l l
TABLE 14 FREQUENCY OF PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES AT SEABROOK(a)
( Va lu e s in % of Time)
Month A B C D E F G Apr 1979 1.27 2.11 3.80 49.65 29.40 7.88 5.91 May 1.20 2.86 4'.82 52.86 26.51 5.27 6.48 Jun 2.92 6.69 12.26 39.83 25.49 6.13 6.69 Jul 4.90 6.94 11.56 29.12 28.84 12.65 5.99 Aug 2.91 4.71 9.97 43.07 26.59 7.34 5.40 Sep 1.25 7.64 11.81 30.69 27.36 10.83 ;0.42 Oct 0.81 2.96 5.79 39.30 34.05 1G.09 7.00 i
Nov 0.00 0.56 4.76 43.92 34.83 9.37 6.57 Dec 0.00 0.41 2.70 47.03 41.35 5.81 2.70 Jar. 1980 0.13 1.88 6.59 51.88 30.38 5.78 3.36 Feb 0.44 2.03 5.37 50.36 34.69 5.66 1.45 Mar 10.68 1.64 5.34 43.15 24.66 6.03 8.49 Yearly 2.22 3.37 7.08 43.31 30.38 7.76 5.87 ;
i l
a) Period of Record: April 1979 March 1980. Stability class calculated using 43'-2'9' delta temperature. Source:
SB 1&2, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-24.
TABLE 15 JOINT F R E Q 'J E N C Y DISTRIBUT_I, OF AIND SPEED. AND STABILITY CLASS FOR SEABROOKi1 (209-FOOT LEVEL) l APRIL '79 - MARCH '80-Stability Class Wind Speed (mph) Wind Speed (m/sec) % Within Class A <4 <1.8. 1.04 4-7 1.8-3.1 8.85 8-12 3.6-5.3 31.77-
>12 >5.3 58.33 B <4 <1.8 1.03 4-8 1.8-3.1 10.65 8-12 3.6-5.3 42 : 7-
>12 >5.3 44 5 C <4 <1.8 2.29. q 4-7 1.8-3.1 17.5' 9-12 3.6-5.3 36.5 ;
>12 >5.3 43.- l I
)
D <4 <1.8 3.34 !
4-7 1.0-3.1 17.92 !
8 '2 3.6-5.3 36.~0
<12 >5.3 42.33 E <4 <1.8 4.57 ;
4-7 1.8-3.1 16.78 I 8-12 3.6-5.3 44.32
>12 >5.3 34.33 a) Source: SB 182, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-'27.
b) Frequency distribution would vary with measurement level and season.
l
for F and G conditions though we have not considered them.
Our results are not based on an infrequently occurring weather scenario.
The distribution of wind speeds within the stability classes is given'in Table 15.11! Note that-these distributions are not disaggregated by season, and the summer distribution might be different.
Although the frequency data given in Tables 14 and 15 are not precisely applicable to earlier tables, it is possible to use the information to make a rough assessment of the probability that'the population would not be protected from early death should a severe release occur with the wind blowing toward a beach. For instance, it was indicated in Table 9 that for an SGV-total release, the.2-mile beach population on a summer day was not protected from early death under C and D conditions. These meteorological conditions are likely to occur 75% of the time during summer days.}8/ The probability is even higher for the highest-risk Seabrook beach population
-- around 93%.
Q. What about the S6V-1 release?
12/ New Hampshire Emergency Response Plan, Rev. 2., Vol. 6,
- p. 10-52.
58/ This assumes that C and D stability classes occur with a 75% probability on a summer day (E, F, and G do not occur during the day and about one half of the D percentages in Table 14 occuroat night.)
c_______-_________________-___=- - - _ _ _ _ _ _
d i
1 A. In this case, a similar analysis suggests that doses exceeding threshold would occur about one-third of the time for the highest-risk population at Seabrook beach, if ;
it were downwind.EA/
i Q. How many people would be contaminated during a 1 1
summer release? !
l A. (Beyea) It must be recognized that, based on Tables l 6, 9, and 11, thousands of people might be exposed to life-threatening doses should a release occur on a summer day.
In order to put some bounds on the dealth consequences i
to a beach area population, we have done a simple j calculation of the number of people who might be contaminated due to a release at Seabrook. An unknown l fraction of this number would receive doses at or above 200 rem. The others might suffer a range of consequences, from nausea within a few hours to cancer many years in the future.
I The lower bound to this limit is zero; that is, with enough l
warning time, it is possible that no one will be contaminated.
I The maximum number of persons contaminated within ten miles l
59/ The S6V-1 column in Table 8 indicates that the early ,
death threshold would occur for 1) D stability class and I wind speeds of 2 and 4 m/sec, and 2) C stability class and wind speeds around 2 m/sec.
According to Table 15, the D wind speeds would occur 60% of the time, while the C wind speeds would occur 18% of the time. The net result, based on the data for summer months )
in Table 14, is a 28% chance of early death threshold under D conditions and a 5% chance under C conditions.
l i
during an accident on a summer weekday is listed in Table 16, for a low estimate of weekday population taken from New Hampshire Seabrook Plan. (See testimony of other experts in this proceeding for an explanation of why 'the actual population may be considerably higher.) The table shows a range of between 10,000 pnd 23,000 people who may be exposed.
The table assumes no one within ten miles will have had sufficient time to evacuate before passage of the plume. -The I
purpose of the table is basically to.show the size of the population that may be of immediate concern--those persons within ten miles who will know they may have been exposed, later will presumably learn that they have been exposed, and i who will wonder what the potential consequences will be.
The maximum number is so large that it is questionable whether medical facilities will be adequate to treat those seeking treatment. (See the Testimony of Jennifer Leaning).
Q. Is the population exposed to "early death" during other '
times of the year?
A. (Beyea) Yes. We prepared Tables 17 and 18 in a manner similar to those for a summer day beach scenario and found that the population is not always protected from "early death" (200 rem) at two and four miles for the rapid bypass sequence, S6-V total, although the population is protected for other sequences I considered.
For those tables we examined evacuees who would take about three hours to evaculate as shown in Table 19. During plume I
TABLE 16 VARIATION IN POPULATION EXPOSED IN SSE SECT:R-WITHIN 10 MILES ON A SUMMER WEEKDAY PLUME ANGLE #) _
STABILITY CLASS AT 5 MILES (d eg r ee s ) MAXIMUM EXPOSED POPULA.:ON~'
1 i
A 26 23,000 '
B 20 18,000 C 15 13,000 D 11 10,000 a) Assumes a plume angle of three times the horizon tal dispe r s ton l coefficient.
1 1
b) Calculated as the population in the SSE sector (20,000) according to figure 6 multiplied by the ratto of plume angle to 22.5 degrees. Mir: mum populat io n could be zero if the wind were blowing towards the ocean and there were sufficient warning time of a release.
l l
I
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i TABLE 17 l 1
DOSES RECEIVED AT 2 MILES ON AN OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY *
(CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED) i J
l Dose 3 Hrs After Evacuation starts b) Risk of (In Rem) Early Death? d)
Stab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed S6V- S6V- l S1
~
Class ( m / s e c )' total S6V-1 51*I tot. S6V-1 1
A 2 62-73 48-55 <50 N N N A 4 47-56 <50 "
N N N A 8 <50 "
N N N )a l
" " j B 2 110- ,0 N N N
]
4 "
I B 83-94 62-72 N N N l
B 8 60 '3 <50 N N N j l C 2 <50 270-320 "
N Y .N C 4 <50 15 -180 "
N N? N l
C 8 93-110 81-94 "
N N N !
D 2 (50 690-140 97-120 N Y N 1
D 4 <30 410-490 59-68 N Y N D 4
<50 220-270 <50 N Y N
.) The resident population two miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded fr:m contaminated ground by buildings and their vehicles. They
. assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material j de osited on the car. The effective ground shielding factors {
rc ge f rom 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type o f a utomobile.
C1 ad and inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0 75. See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pesquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hou rs is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death enreshold, the IOC-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hou r evacua tion time may be suspect.
e) Assumes mid-range plume rise ;
)
passage, residents were assumed to be inside buildings with cloud and inhalation shielding factors of 0.75. We assumed a ground-dose scaling factor of 0.65-0.95, implying that the evacuees were in cars within the plume, and that the cars had radioactive material deposited on them. No skin deposition dose was assumed.
Although Table 17 shows several " unprotected" cases for the rapid bypass sequences at two miles, it should be noted that the actual doses above threshold would be considerably higher in the summer time. Doses to the highest-risk beach population would be about four times as high as those projected for an
)
off-season accident. (At four miles the corresponding ratio ;
i would be two to one.) As a result of these higher doses, the i a
total number of injuries would be greater in the summer even if the exposed populations were the same.
Furthermore, because the population during the off-season scenarios is smaller than for summer scenarios, fewer people would receive radiation doses during off-season scenarios, Therefore, there would be less of a chance that medical i facilities would be overwhelmed, and more of a chance that most of those exposed to doses about 200 rem would receive the
" supportive" medical treatment that would be needed to raise the early death threshold above 200 rem. This would be particularly important for the 4-mile case shown in Table 18.
Q. What difficulties are associated with reducing the health consequences of a large release at Seabrook?
TABLE 18 DOSES RECEIVED AT 4 MILES ON A id OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY
- iCAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation Starts Risk of d)
(In Rem) -; s r l y Death?
Stab c) Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed S6V- S6V-Class (m / s ec ) 5T * ' total S6V-1 El * ' tot. S6V-1 A 2 <50 <50 <50 N N N A 4 N N N A 8 N N N j
" " " i B 2 N N N j i
B 4 N N N l B 8 N N N 1
C 2 79-92 N '
N ]
1 i
C 4 50-58 47-55 N N N I c 8 47-56 <50 "
N N N D 2 <50 240-230 N Y N D 4 160-190 N N?
D s93-100 N N N a) The resident population four miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assu,med to be partially shielded ;
from contaminated ground by builuings and their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car. The effective ground shielding facters range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
Cloud and inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0.75. See Question 13 for further details, c) Pasquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assumes mid-range p.ume rise.
1
)
1 l
l i
i 1
TABLE 19 l 1
a i SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME E S T I M AT E S -~) l i l OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY SCENARIO 4 l
b) Vo rhee s ;) d) ei' !
RADIUS DEGREES HMM Maguire NRC ,
t 0-2 360 3:'10 - - -
0-5 360 3:10 - - -
0-10 360 4: 30 3:40 3:C0 e 3 i
g a) Time (Hours: minutes' for the population to clear the indicated area arte: )
notification, i
P " Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near Seabrcok station," HMM Document No. C-30-024A, HMM Associates, Inc., May 20, 1980.
c) " Final Report. Estimate of Evacuation Times," Alan M. Vorhees % ;
Associates, July 1980.
d) " Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates," C.E, Magt_re, Inc., February 1983. 'l e) Letter te Mitzte Solberg, Emergency Preparedness Development B r a n c ', U.S.
N.R.C. from A.E. Desrosters, Health Physics Technology Section, Battelie.
Pacift: Northwest Laboratories, August 20, 1982.
1 l
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1 j
l l
i l
I l
l l fj l
l i
_ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _-__-__-__._U
A. (Beyea) Limited options exist for reducing the severity of accidents at Seabrook.
None of the extraordinary. emergency measures that we, or other nuclear' analysts have been able to devise are likely to' eliminate or effectively reduce.the serious radiation doses that !
would result from a range of releases at Seabrook.
(A) Possibility of reducing skin and car deposition dose.
Our work here has shown that skin and car deposition 1 j
doses could make important contributions to the total dose -!
to an individual, butEno consideration'has been given to reducing these doses in emergency planning. We have considered whether or not extraordinary emergency measures could be taken to protect against them. For instance, l evacuees could be instructed to leave t,he evacuation vehicle i
as soon as possible, to shower (skin and hair) as soon as !
.i possible, and perhaps to remove hair with scissors. i Automated car spraying devices could be insta11ed'near i
important beach exit points in an attempt to' remove some:of
{
the material from cars as soon as possible, thus reducing I
doses to the occupants. The effectiveness of various methods for removing radioactive aerosols from skin, hair, and cars must be investigated, however, before credit can-be z taken for them. The logistics of washing every car.in the beach area would be formidable and would likely add to i
evacuation times. (Removal of aerosols is complicated by the fact that radioactive' aerosols attach themselves too strongly to clean surfaces to be removed easily. On the other hand, the fraction depositing on dirty or oily
~
surfaces could be removed at the same time as dirt and oil were removed.)
All these measures, if they worked, could be helpful in reducing the number of delayed cancers that would show up in i later years. However, their implementation would not: change .
the significance of.our tables with respect to early health effects. This is because post-evacuation doses are not even considered in our calculations and because not all cars could be decontaminated. Also, populations are not protect'ed, even when car deposition doses are excluded.
B) Possibility of relying on shelters.
In principle, one way to reduce the chances of early death occurring in the beach population would be to provide shielding by means of sheltering, especially from ground-dose, while people wait for roads to clear. However, shelters would only be useful if they are suitably massive, which seems doubtful in this case.5E/ Serious questions exist as to whether.they 60/ Z.G. Burson and A.E. Profio, " Structure Shielding from j Cloud and Fallout Gamma Ray Sources for-Assessing the- l Consequences of Reactor Accidents," EG & G, Inc., Los Vegas, l Nev., EGG-1183-1670. '
l l
would'actually be used by a majority of the population. As 1
is indicated by the testimony of other experts in this proceeding, sheltering is not a realistic option for the beach populations. l The possibility of having beach occupants shield themselves by immersing themselves in ocean water has been-rejected by us because of the low temperature of the water. 1 On the other hand, it would be physically possible.for exposed persons to partially shield themselves'from ground dose by covering themselves with sand prior to evacuation. <
l However, the notion that people will wait away from their cars buried in the sand or immersed in the water while ;
traffic congestion clears seems grotesquely unrealistic.
C) Possibility of evacuating on foot =or by bike.
The beach population might be instructed to walk out of l l
the area. If the release has occurred, has blown towards the beaches, and has been confined to a relatively narrow area, this might be the best strategy to r' educe doses from a theoretical nuclear physics perspective. In this way,'no one J
would wait within the plume area accumulating doses from the l d
radioactive material on the ground or'on cars. Our calculations show that a person walking out in certain i i
circumstances would have received, about five hours after the l I
release, between a 30 to 40% lower dose than a person who has j l
remained in a car within the plume while trying to evacuate.51/ However,.this type of forced march strategy flounders when faced'with normal human behavior. I providing bicycles for beachgoers might be~a strategy since it would offer the hope of relatively rapid escape.
Nevertheless, it is not clear what percentage of beachgoers would utilize the bikes and what the traffic impact would be.
In fact, access to bikes might increase the disorderliness of the ejaculation. For example, consider those beachgoers who opted for driving (with or without official permisssion),_only to return for bicycles after being stuck in traffic for an hour or so. Their abandoned automobiles could well block traffic.
l for those remaining. Certainly no credit could be given in emergency planning for reliance on bicycles without a full-scale test of the process. Yet, a convincing test would l
be impossible. How could a test reliably simulate the stress l and fear that would be generated in a real accident?
l 11/ We calculated the dose.to an individual on the beach I who waits for about one and a half hours after the release (dose scaling factor of 1.35), who then leaves the plume, i but accumulates doses froa skin deposition (dose scaling I factor .35). We also calculated the dose to an individual in a' car within the plume, accumulating doses'from the plume on skin and car deposition material.(dose scaling factor of 1.0-1.3). By comparing the doses for about five hours after 1 the release, we found a 30-40 percent lower dose for those individuals walking out, i
i J
s i
D) Possibility of ore-distributing potassium iodide.
The value of pre-distributing potassium iodide nea'r.nuclearl )
power plants has been discussed by us previously. However, pre-distribution will not work for a' transient beach population, .unless the authorities are willing'.to hand out tablets every day to everyone who visits the beaches. Also, potassium. iodide would be of limited usefulness.for the high-dose scenarios that would develop at Seabrook. beaches.-
Q. What about'the probability of the releases discussed ;
in your testimony?
A. (Beyea) PWRl-PWR9 releases are established-by NUREG-0396 as the spectrum of releases'that.mus't'be considered I
in emergency planning for nuclear power plants. The NRC took the probability and credibility of these acci' dents classes into account in developing NUREG-0396. Every emergency plan, therefore, must address the entire range of these releases, and.
should also examine the site-specific equivalent of these generic releases.
Q. What is your overall assessment of the doses that i might be delivered at Seabrook?
A. (Beyea) The summer Seabrook situation is the' worst case I have ever examined in connection with emergency p'lanning ,
! )
or hypothetical reactor accidents. The doses that would be received following a range of releases at the Seabrook site, even with the proposed emergency plans in effect, are higher.
1 l
I
.than doses that would be received at most other sites in the" .
j complete absence of emergency planning. ]
Q. Dr. Beyea, does.that complete your: testimony?
(Beyea) Yes, it does'. j A.
l l
X. PWR-1 RELEASES AT SEABROOK -
l
]lj Q. Dr. Thompson, what is the basis for your. statements in your testimony? ]
A. (Thompson) As mentioned earlier, I have co-authored i l
a review (Sholly and Thompcon,'1986) of various " source -]
)
term" issues. This review was current through mid-1985. I used that review and the documents cited within it as a basis for my statements. In addition, I have studied a j
variety of more recent documents, which collectively form J 4
the remaining basis for my. statements. These more recent documents include the draft NRC report NUREG-ll50 (NRC, 1987a) and the documents generated as a' result of a January 1987 technical meeting sponsored by the NRC (Kouts, 1987; NRC 19875). (See attached references.)
l Q. Please describe the potential for a "PWRl-type" release.
A. (Thompson) The Reactor Safet'y Study (NRC, 1975) !
l described the PWR1 release category as being " characterized by a core meltdown followed by a steam explosion on contact of molten fuel with the residual water in the reactor i'
vessel." More recent work has identified the potential for l
a similar release through a different mechanism--high-pressure melt ejection. In this case, molten core material is expelled from the reactor vessel under pressure of steam and gases within the vessel. '
O. Where might the containment breach occur during an accident sequence leading to a "PWR l-type" release?
A. (Thompson) For either steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection sequences, the location of the breach cannot be predicted. The breach might occur anywhere from the base of the containment wall to the containment l dome. In addition, a co-existing bypass pathway could lead to some release through buildings adjacent to the main i containment building. f j
Q. Please describe the range of thermal energy release I rates which could be experienced during a "PWR l-type" I
release. 1 A. (Thompson) This range is illustrated by Figure 7, which is drawn from the Seabrook Station Probabilistic ,
Safety Assessment (PLG, 1983). For present purposes, release category S1 is relevant. The table shows that the estimated energy release rate for this release category could vary from 21,000 million BTU per-hour to 60 million BTU per hour, according to the size of the containment leak area. Present knowledge of containment failure modes is t.
I V r 4
5 u o
6 3 6 0 1 2 1 5 8 D H -
N 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 1 V s 3 ) e 3 t r u 2 5 2
, h n 1 2 4 3 1 T /
u i
M E t 0 0 0 0 1 1
, B 0 T 9 n 3 E 0 o
i S 1 t s
(
E a e I
e r t R
t u u 5 6 6 O a D n 3 7 2 9 5 8 G R i
E n M 0 0 1 0 2 1 T
e w '
A s o 0 C d 1 a w E e o S l l s A e B e E R t L y u E g n 5 6 6 R r i . -
e M 3 7 2 9 5 6 R 1 2 O n '
/ -
F E S s E d T n o
A 1 5 0 7 0 8 R c 2 2 7 5 5 1 e 2 E S S
A 0 E 1 L
E R
)
Y ye d u G t r R gs B 8 6 e E ra 5 2 0 6 t N ee8 .
e E nl 0 0 1 2 1 ) m E e 1 2 a R( t i
. f D 4 (
- t 6 a n y e e 1 er r l 1 so ag A a)
V V vt E ee T T 3 T k ie L
B l t ea 3 3 5 I a e
ue qf A RC L E(
T p [.
such that the energy release rate cannot be predicted within this range, and perhaps within a wider range.
Q. Please describe the potential for "PWR l-type" releases to be relatively enriched in certain radioactive isotopes?
A. (Thompson) In Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study (NRC, 1975), release category PWR1 is shown as having a relatively large release fraction for the ruthenium group of radioactive isotopes--40% for this release category as opposed to 2% for release category PWR 2. Such an enhanced release is predicted to occur because of the physical and chemical l
behavior of a steam explosion event. More recent studies have shown that a high-pressur melt ejection event could also lead to enchanced release of certain isotopes including those of ruthenium, molybdenium and tellurium. i Q. Mr. Thompson, does this complete your testimony? !
1 A. (Thompson) Yes, it does. !
XI. HEALTH EFFECTS FROM RADIATION DOSES FROM .
l ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM Q. How does radiation cause injury?
A. (Leaning) The radiation emitted from a nuclear power plant accident is called ionizing radiation because it contains energy sufficient to remove one or more electrons from an atom and thus change its electric charge. This process of ionization creates an ion which is chemically reactive and can damage living tissue. The extent of the damage depends upon the intensity of the energy delivered and the radiation l
l
.)
sensitivityfof the target' cell. In general, those cells that divide most-rapidly or are metabolically most active are the most radiosensitive. Bone marrow, lymph 1 tissue, and i 1
gastrointestinalfepithelium are among the tissues most-susceptible to radiation injury.
At the lower range of energy intensity and cell sensitivity, radiation may affect a cell by reducing its 1 i
functional capacities or by altering its genetic material.and I thus possibly inducing malignant changes in later cell lines. L At higher ranges, radiation may destroy the cell's capacity to replicate. At still higher ranges, radiation may result in the death of that particular cell or' organ.s2!
Q. What radiation exposure levels are considered safe?.
A. (Leaning) Residents in the United States currently receive radiation from a variety of background and man-made sources, resulting in an annual exposure of approximately 1
0.05 to 0.3 rads. Much controversy is attached to what l i
effects low levels of radiation may exert in inducing cancer I
and genetic defects among exposed populations. It is prudent to begin from the perspective that any level of radiation may carry some. risk. The question is the magnitude of this risk and its relationship to other risks individuals or societies may incur.
l I f2/
Radiation (BEIR III),
Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: 1980, National Academy- l Press, Washington, D.C., 1098, pp. 11-35.-
E--_________________________ ___ _ _ - - - - _ - . _
_j
1 1
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements-(NCRP) has established guidelines that define 1 l
the permissible limits for additional radiation exposure (over and above current background levels). A member of the q
]
general public-may receive an additional 0.5 rems (for these purposes, 1 rad equals 1 rem) per year;.and a worker'in a- J peace-time industry may receive an additional.5 rems per year.51!
J Q. What'is known about the health consequences of exposure to-high levels'of radiation? )
{
L A. -(Leaning) There is also much uncertainty in the l U o _j scientific and medical community.about the health consequences of exposing human populations to radiation at i
l- higher dose levels. The principal reason for this i I
l uncertctnty is that our dhta on human response at these '
\
L higher ranges is'very medgre. 'ur O main source.for. data comes from the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, each e,
l ;. exposed in 1945 to an atrburst of a nuclear bomb and each
/ still part of an;ongoingJthorough epidemiological study.
Three other populations also exposed.to radiation at j l relatively high levels and also und,ergoing prospective ]
}'( investigation are the approximately:5,000 radium dial-painters.of the 1920's; the 253 residents of the'Rongelap-and?Jtrik Atolls in the Marshall Islands, exposed to fallout 4
?
_ __ i
. . . I f3/. '10 C.F.E. Par'E20, S 1959.
e
> 1, i
l ',
_ ___m . _________________m._ _.__m ...E_'
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __.________m_.'._ ___.. ___.-.__m_m .____m
from the 15 megaton BRAVO thermonuclear test in 1954; a Utah population exposed at school age to fallout from above-l ground tests conducted in the years'1951 to 1958; and the j l
135,000 people downwind from Chernobyl, exposed in 1986 to j l
plume and fallout effects from the world's most serious nuclear power accident known to have occurred to date.
Other data results from occupational exposures (uranium miners), from industrial accidents, and from the experience of patients involved in medical therapeutic protocols. 3 I
The circumstances surrounding the radiation exposures of l the majority of people in these populations precluded comprehensive, accurate, and detailed data collection during the initial events that created the exposure and during the ;
first few days thereafter. In retrospective analysis it has usually been impossible to define with any precision the l following key variables: the nature and intensity of the radiation received, the duration of exposure, and the i
relative individual susceptibility to a given dose received. I Within the limits of the data available, a few central general points about health consequences of radiation exposure have been identified and substantiated. .Four main ,
factors are involved: radiation quality, radiation dose, J
radiation dose rate, and the age of the exposed population.
Radiation quality ,
Linear energy transfer (LET) is the term used to describe radiation quality and refers to the density with ]
1
which radiation ionizes matter per unit distance traveled.
Alpha radiation, with high LET, ionizes more densely per unit distance traveled than does gamma or beta radiation.
This quality is frequently specified in terms of its different biological effects on different tissues. The relative biological effectiveness, or F.BE, of a given kind of radiation is directly related to its LET. The higher the LET, the greater the RBE. Alpha radiation has an RBE of 10 to 20, beta and gamma of 1.
These differences translate into the difference between a rad dose and a dose expressed in rems. A rad, (or radiation absorbed dose) reflects only the amount of ;
radiation absorbed by tissue. A rem, (or roentgen equivalent man), expresses the biological impact of that i
dose on human tissues. For a given rad dose of radiation I l
whose RBE is 1, as with gamma radiation, a rad equals a i
rem. For a given rad dose of radiation whose RBE is 10, as j with alpha radiation, a rad equals 10 rems.
In situations where it is difficult to estimate the )
i various components of the radiation released, it is the !
convention to assign an RBE of 1 to the radiation dose, according to which rads are equal to rems. Such a convention underestimates the actual biological effects of the dose received.
Radiation dose The existing data on radiation exposure-indicates that most people who receive radiation doses below 200 rems will survive, in the short-term, and that most people ~ exposed to radiation doses in excess of 500 rems will die. Much controversy surrounds the issue of where to assign with more precision the threshold for what is termed the LD50/60,.or the lethal dose for 50 percent of the people exposed, followed for 60 days from time of exposure. (Deaths occurring after that period are assumed to result from other causes.) One estimate for the LD50/60, arising from study of people exposed in industrial accidents and in medical protocols, established the range of 360 to 450 rads, depending on whether the dose is measured directly at the organ target level (the midline dose) or at the body surface.5A! In the WASH-1400 report, the LD50/60 was estimated to be 340 rads, given minimal support to victims, and 510 rads, if supportive treatment were extended.
~
(Supportive treatment is described.as including " barrier nursing, copious antibiotics, and transfusions of whole blood, packed cells, or platelets.")55/ Figure 8, from 64/ Clarence C. Lushbaugh, " Human Radiation Tolerance," in Space Radiation Biology and Related Topics, Cornelius A.
Tobias and Paul Todd, eds., Academic Press, New York, 1974,
.pp . 494-499.
15/ United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,; Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400 (NUREG 75/014),
dashington, D.C., 1975, Appendix VI, 9-3.
e 9
FIGL*RE 8 Estimated Dose-Response Curves for LD50/60 39 99 99 9 -
r M8 -
39 -
98 -
95 8 +
90 -
2e t M -
a e c b -
g to -
l60 -
b 50 - 1& 2e *8 -
1
- m -
h -
= 30 -
! 20 -
1 -
to - go -
^
5 -
x -
4 2 -
i . -
05 - -
02 - -
Of - -
v 5 -
3 5 6
, 200 400 iOO 800 -1000 1200 1400 Dow .<aosi l
Estimated dose-response carves for 50% mortality in ,
60 days with minimal treatment (curve A), supportive
.treatmen- (curve B), ,and heroic treatment (curve C).
Origin if tata points: 1, NCRP Report 42 (conver ed to rads us.ng factor -iven in NCRP Report 42); 2, *anc - -
horn (1957. Table 12, estimate for "nozinal man?")
3, Marshall Islanders (protracted exposure); 4, I he tion therapy sort.s, 22 patients (Rider and Hasse Ja (,
1968); 5, clinica. group III accident patients (Tror and Wald, 1959, with newer cases added); 6, Pittsru* h accelerator accident patient (E.D. Thomas, 1971; dal . ,
1975); 7, 37 leukemia patients (E.D. Thomas, 1977 ;
8, "best estimate" of the Biomedical and Environrant ;
Assessmen: Group at tne Brookhaven National Laborste y.
Sourc e : WASH-1400, Appendix VI, 9-4
1 I
I 1
the DASH-1400 study, illustrates the various dose-response !
I curves as derived from a range of exposure experiences analyzed in arriving at this overall summary estimate. l l
Another authoritative review of the existing database )
i has stated that the LD50/60 for humans is approximately 250 rems, measured as a midline dose.66/ See Figure 9. A recent re-analysis of the Hiroshima cata has prompted the suggestion that for populations in war or major disasters (who may already be debilitated and for whom medical supoort would be minimal) the LD50/60 may lie within the range of 150 to 250 rems.52/ To the extent that the dosimetry estimates from Chernobyl are reliable, experience from that i
accident indicates that all people exposed to levels of 200 '
rads or less survived, and that death occurred to the l
majority of people exposed to levels of 600 rads or more, despite the advanced technical support they received.{8,/
66/ Joseph Rotblat, Nuclear Radiation in Warfare, Stockholm l International Peace Research Institute, Oelseschlager, Gunn
& Hain, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1981, pp. 34-35.
17/ Joseph Rotblat, " Acute Radiation Mortality in a Nuclear War," The Medical Implications of Nuclear War, Fredric Solomon and Robert Q. Marston, eds., Institute of Medicine, 1
' National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1986, pp. 233-250.
j8/ Roger E. Linnemann, " Soviet Medical Response to the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident," Journal of the American Medical Association 258 (1987): 637-43.
j i
l 1
FIGURE 9 Probability of Death from Acute Effects l
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- i- i- i.. :i . i: - i: .>
'l00 1
,00 .',! W :
A.
- # - 11
. . ' 90 90 . '/liiz
.:ii:
i: : 1 :
i zr 80 if
' JI :
I i ' . .
80 i L
- 1. 1 1
! I I 70 . f. 70 m ! _I I I r E r.
~ 6C ;,
60 t f
50 s So 1< . : i :
g 1 :
v !
,r : -;;
I 40 :.
ri:
40
_l :
3C ,' l 30 r-
_.,I..
2C . l- 20 r.
.1 :
r:
IC .A! 1 : .
.: 1 :
80 f_ : 4! : ' :
r.. ,: i 1 . : i, .1 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dose (midline tisswe)(Gy)
Sourc e : Rotblat. 1981, 35.
l 1
f i
J l
I i
1 i
l l
_ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . - _ _ . -- _ . _ . .- _ _ _ _-__ ___ ____ _ - _- _ __ _ _ _ s
Dose rate The literature suggests that a given dose of radiation will inflict more severe immediate damage if given all'at once, in a single dose, than if fractionated and given in multiple, smaller doses over time. The dose fractionation effect pertains only to the acute _ effects of radiation, however. For long-term effects like cancer induction, it may be in fact that dose fractionation enchances development of malignant cell transformation.51!
Fractionating a given dose reduces prompt effects because it is thought that all biological systems have inate mechanisms which can serve to repair cellular damage and-compensate to some extent for the initial radiation injury received. Estimates vary as to the rate at which biological repair can be predicted to occur. Very large doses of radiation will overwhelm any biological repair mechanisms.
Below lethal thresholds, different species, different individuals within a species, and different tissues within each individual all have different rates of repair.
Ace of exposed population Children in all stages of development--those in' utero, infants, and toddlers--are known to be particularly f9/ John B. Little, " Cellular Effects of Ionizing Radiation," New England Journal of Medicine 278 (1968):
308-15, 369-76.
Arthur C. Upton, "The Biological Effects'of Low-Level Ionizing Radiation, Scientific American 246 (1982): 41-9.
'i sensitive to the acute effects of radiation and to the induction of long-term sequelae. It has also been suggested that the elderly are also more susceptible to acute radiation. The data are too limited, however, to allow a l
quantitative adjustment of the LD50/60 for people at either i 1
end of the age spectrum.2SI Q. How does radiation injure people? )
A. (Leaning) There are three main ways in which radiation can injure people: whole body irradiation, 1
external contamination, and internal contamination. j i
Depending on the type and severity of exposure, people can experience a range of acute, intermediate, and long-term j effects. Early radioactive fallout from a nuclear power plant accident primarily exposes people to risk from whole body irradiation and external contamination. Internal contamination becomes a hazard if air containing radioactive particles is inhaled or if food or water containing radioactive particles is ingested.
Q. Describe whole-body radiation and its treatment.
l 70/ H. Aceto, et al., " Mammalian' Radiobiology and Space' Flight," in Tobias and-Todd, eds., p. 374.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), Radiological Factors Affecting Decision-Making in a Nuclear Attack, NCRP Report No. 421, Washington, D.C., 1 November 15, 1974, p. 42 H Rotblatt', 1981, p. 53.
1 I
i
A. (Leaning) Acute effects of whole body irradiation occur when the whole body, or most of it, is subjected to external radiation doses in excess of 20 rads.21/ The time of onset and the severity of this initial or prodromal stage of radiation exposure indicates the intensity of dose received and helps predict whether or not the course will' progress to one of the three recognized acute radiation syndromes. The sympton of mildest exposure within this prodromal complex is anorexia, occurring within minutes to hours of exposure. With larger doses of radiation, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur. Fatigue is also considered one of the l
l 71/ Lushbaugh, 1974, pp. 485-486. For discussion of whole !
Body irradiation, see:
Ibid., pp. 476-488.
G.A. Andrews, "The Medical Management of Accidental Total-Body Irradiation," in The Medical Basis for Radiation Accident Preparedness, K.F. Hubner and S.A. Fry, eds.,
Elsevier/ North-Holland, New York, 1980, pp. 297-3210.-
H. Fanger and C.C. Lushbaugh, " Radiation Death.from Cardiovascular Shock Following Criticality Accident,"
Archives of Pathology 83 (1967): 446-60.
Stuart C. Finch,." Acute Radiation Syndrome," Journal of the American Medical Association 258 (1987): 664-667.
i Robert Peter Gale, "Immediate Medical Consequences of Nuclear Accidents," Journal of the American Medical Association 259 (1987): 625-628.
J.S. Karas and J.B. Stanbury, " Fatal Radiation from an Accidental Nuclear Excursion," New England Journal of Medicine (1959): 421-47.
I G.E. Thomas, Jr., and N. Wald, "The Diagnosis and Management ,
of Accidental Radiation Injury," Journal of Occupational Medicine (1959): 421-47.
symptoms in this complex. Since individuals vary widely in response to a given radiation dose, the symptom complex is best described in terms of statistical probability. Table 20 shows the percentage of people who will experience one or more of the prodromal symptoms at a given level of radiation exposure. ,
I If exposed to radiation in the lower range of these dose l 1evels, an individual would experience these prodromal I
symptoms for several days and would then recover. The symptoms of people exposed to doses in the higher range i I
would, after a latency period of relative well-being that I might last for days or weeks, then progress to one of the three acute radiation syndromes described below. The clinical manifestations of these syndromes overlap. In general, larger doses of radiation will result in more rapid onset of more severe symptoms.
a) Hematopoietic syndrome l
Hematologic abnormalities predominate at doses I between 200 and 600 rads. The hematologic picture yields ;
important information on prognosis and therapy. Lymphocytes in the peripheral blood plummet almost immediately. Changes in other white blood cells, in platelets, and in capacity to make new red blood cells will also be seen. From a hematological standpoint, the peak risk of death from
l TABLE 20 I
Radiation Doses Producing Symptoms of Exposure Prodrome I
- (in rads).
Percentage of Exposed Population 10 % 50 % 90 %
. Symptom 40- 100 240 Anorexia 50 170 320 Nausea 60 210 380 Vomiting 90 240- 390 Diarrhea i
.i 1
1 Source: -W.N. Langham, ed.. . Radiobiological Factors in Manned Space Flight, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.,1967, 248; cited in' Rotblat, 1981,-33.
i u ,
t- a
infection and hemorrhage occurs about three weeks from time of exposure, when the worst declines in platelets and white blood cells converge. Depending upon dose received, individual susceptibilities, and extent of intensive care, recovery may or may not proceed from that point on.
b) Gastrointestinal (GI) syndrome Within'e few days to a few weeks of exposures to 700 rads and above, loss of GI mucosa and bone marrow depression contribute-to a clinical picture marked by sudden onset of nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea. These symptoms can 1
progress to intense fluid loss, electrolyte imbalances, and-severe hemorrhage'from all mucosal surfaces. Death ensues from infection or hemorrhage..
I c) Neurovascular syndrome 1
l Neurovascular symptoms arise from exposure to over 2,000 rads and occur within the first hour to first two 1
days. Victims initially experience confusion, drowsiness,
- and weakness. Delirium and convulsions then ensue, followed I I within a matter of hours to days by death froa cerebral j l
edema (brain swelling). ;
Treatment of whole-body irradiation a) Triage. Since the treatment of people exposed to whole-body irradiation depends upon the dose of radiation j received, the first task involves efforts to estimate exposure. In disaster settings, where large numbers of people may have been exposed, the task becomes one of
triage, or sorting people into exposure categories on the basis of their presenting symptoms. Since many people in these circumstances will be agitated and anxious, it may be difficult in the first few hours to sort out psychological factors from those induced by. radiation. 'However, although nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea are normal physiological responses to stress of any kind, the time from exposure to
~
onset of vomiting appears to be sti'1 the most reliable indication of severity of doce received.- Redness of'the conjunctiva and skin. erythema may appear within several hours to days of exposure, but these. findings have. variable thresholds and, from the perspective of early triage, are less useful as indicators of exposure levels. Epilation.of' any significance usually arises from exposures to over 200 rads, but because its occurrence lags until two to.three weeks from time of exposure'it also cannot'be relied upon-to. ;
guide initial triage efforts.
Specific laboratory studies and careful questioning of-1 exposed individuals are the techniques yielding the most useful information. Both of these interventions can be l invoked if the number of people exposed are relatively few and time permits. Determining the precise-location of the ;
individual at key points in time and the exact timing of-onset of symptoms will help define the dose received.
1
l Results of a baseline complete blood count and chromosomal analysis, if resources are available to permit these tests, will also serve to define the exposure level. Based on this information, treatment protocols can be instituted.
c) Treatment. An individual exposed to 500 to 1000 rads and who received intensive care therapy might recover, although he or she would require a protracted convalescence of two to six months. Intensive care in this context would )i need to include reverse isolation techniques, matched allogeneic bone marrow transplant, fluid resuscitation,
\
antibiotics, white cell, red cell, and platelet I transfusions--performed in a setting with skilled 1
hematology, oncology and burn unit capabilities. The
)t medical interventions needed in this setting fall into the
)
i category termed " heroic" by the WASH-1400 report and {
l characterize the response given to the Soviet victims of the '
chernobyl accident. Soviet physicians have testified that l
l the effort to care for the 200 most exposed victims of the l l
Chernobyl disaster stressed their entire national health i care system to the limits of its capacity.22/ Teaching hospitals in the greater Boston area could probably each absorb approximately 5 to 10 such patients, with a total l treatment potential of about 50 to 100 victims.
72/ H. Jack Geiger, "The Accident at Chernobyl and the Medical Response," Journal of the American Medical Association 256 (1987): 609-12.
90 -
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ a
People exposed to doses of 1,000 rads or more would present with extensive GI hemorrhage in the first four days after the event and would have little chance of survival, even if treated most aggressively and appropriately.
With exposure under 500 rads, intravenous fluid and electrolyte therapy with parenteral antibiotics might support patients through the initial stages of fluid loss and, if bone marrow depression were not too severe, chances of recovery would be good.
A suggested protocol for treatment of an individual exposed to a potentially lethal radiation dose is found on Table 21.
Q. Describe external contamination and its treatment.
A. (Leaning) External contamination. When radioactive material emitted from either a nuclear power plant accident or as fallout after the explosion of nuclear weapon is l
)
deposited on the skin or clothing, external contamination is l J
said to have taken place.]3/
l l
73/ For discussion of external contamination, see: l International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Manual on Early Medical Treatment of Possible Radiation Injury, Safety Series No. 47, IAEA, Vienna, 1978, pp. 33-36, 60-62.
R.V. Leonard and R.C. Ricks, " Emergency Department Radiation .
Accident Protocol," Annals of Emergency Medicine 9 (1980):
462-70.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCNP), Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with Radionuclides, NCRP Report No. 65, NCRP, Washington, D.C.,
1980, pp. 113-119.
G.A. Poda, " Decontamination and Decorporation: The Clinical Experience," in Hubner and Fry, eds., pp. 327-332.
L_______._._.
i t
TABLE 21 Treatment Protocol for Potentially Lethal Radiation Exposure 1
Immediately after diagnosis of exposure to 100 rad or more:
Avoid hospitaliang patient except in stente environment facility. Look for preexisting infections and obtain cultures of suspicious areas- =
consider especiaUy carious teeth, gingivae, skin, and vagina. Culture a clean caught urine specimen. Culture stool speamen for identification of au organisms; run appropriate sensitivity tests for Steph. aureus and !
Gram negative rods. Treat any infection that is discovered. Start oral nystatin to reduce Candida orgarusms. Do HLA typing of patient's family, espeaally siblings, to select HLA-raatched leukocyte and platelet donors for later need.
If granulocyte count falls to less than 1500/mm':
Start oral antibiotics-vancomycin 500 mg liquid P.O. q. 4 hr, gentamy-cin 200 mg liquid P.O. q. 4 hr, nystatin 1 x 10' units liquid P.O. q. 4 he,4 x 10* uruts as tablets P.O. q. 4 hr. Isolate patient in fammar flow room or life island. Daily antiseptic bath and shampoo with chlorhexidine gluco-nate. Tnm finger and toenads carefuuy and scrub area daily. For female patients, daily Betadine douche and insert one nystahn vaginal tablet b.i.d. Culture nares, oropharynx, unne, stool, and skm of groins and axillae twice weekly. Culture blood if fever over 101 degrees F.
If granulocyte count falls to less than 750/mm':
~
In the presence of fever (101*F) or other signs of infection give antibiotics while waiting results of new cultures (especially blood cultures). The regimen suggested is ticarollin 5 gm q. 6 hr I.V., gentamycin 1.25 mgm/kg q. 6 hr I.V. For severe infection not responding within 24 hrs, gwe supplemental white ceus, and it platelet count is low give platelets .
from preselected matched donors. When cultures are reported, modify 1 antibiotic regime appropriately. Watch for tostory from antibiotics, and reduce medications as soon as practicable.
When granulocyte count nses to otwr 1000/mm' and as clearly improving: \
Discontmue isolation and antiseptic baths, antibiotics; continue nystatin for 3 additional days.
I i
source: Andrews , in Hubr.?r and Fry, eds. , 307. ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ .____J
l The health risk of such contamination varies with'the kind of contaminating particle and the duration of exposure.
If the contaminating particles emit gamma radiation, then skin and organs in the path of the gamma radiation will be exposed to a given dose. if the individual is effectively covered in gamma-emitting particles, the health consequences to that person are the same as'if the person had been exposed to a whole body radiation dose. That person should also be considered a danger to others, in that until decontaminated he' constitutes a source of radioactivity. If the person is contaminated with beta particles, the radiation is delivered over a very small-distance (measured in millimeters) with relatively high intensity. Beta burns are local radiation skin burns created by exposure of skin to beta particles. These burns can inflict extensive damage to local tissues, and, if the dose is sufficiently severe, could produce elements of the whole body radiation syndrome. Alpha particles exert effects over even smaller distances than beta particles (measured in micrometers) but at much higher levels of intensity. Alpha radiation is most damaging to humans when ingested or inhaled internally.
The time consumed and number of personnel required to decontaminate a large number of people exposed to external contamination can be envisioned by considering the medical
protoco1~ currently recommended for the external decontamination of one person. See Table 22.
Q. Describe internal contamination and its treatment.
A. (Leaning)
Internal contamination. Whenever. radioactive material i J
is inhaled or ingested, internal contamination. occurs.1AI Inhalation of aerosolized radioactive particles, consumption of- j particles dusting food or-water, and absorption of particles !
I through mucus membranes or wound surfaces may all contribute to. i J
the internal body burden of radioactivity.- If a large-scale l release of radioactivity has taken place, food chain !
l contamination, incorporating radioactivity in concentrated j forms into the food supply, creates an additional and more long-term source of internal contamination. This form of-contamination adds to whatever radiation dose an individual may j have received from whole body irradiation or from external contamination with radioactive particles.
The amount of radiation a person received from inhalation or ingestion of radioactive particles depends on complex interactions between the physical and chemical properties of I
21/ For discussion of internal contamination, see:
IAEA, pp. 39-42.
NCRp, Report No. 65, pp. 20-29. ,
i G.L. Voelz, " Current Approaches to the Management of Internally Contaminated persons," in Hubner and Pry, eds.,
pp. 315-316.
o
TABLE 22 Protocol for External Decontamination
- 1. Decor .. nation site requirements
. Separate entrance and isolated air and water systems; l
+ Drainage sluicing table:
- Personnel dressed in water-repellent disposable total garb, including masks and gloves;
- Labels for radioactive areas;
- Beta and gamma Geiger counters, hand held, battery-operated (alpha very difficult to get and maintain).
- 2. Procedure on site
- Remove victim from contaminated area;
. Remove all clothing; l
- Cotton swab samples of nares, ear canals, and mouth to test dose level at lab;
- Rinse out mouth and nose with water;
- Survey with Geiger counter;
- Wash with soap and water-especially orifices and hair;
+ Survey with Geiger counter again; I a Repeat wash if necessary and shave all body hair areas if -
necessary;
- Avoid abrading skin-enhances abscrption
- Use occlusive dressings (to be removed every stx to twelve l hours) for persistent contamination (sweating will flush out i much of the contamination from superficial horny skin ' ;
layers). l 1
1
~!
l Source: IAEA No. 47, 33-42; NCRP No. 65, 113-118.
l u
the radioactive isotope and the< biological system that i
metabolizes it. Alpha emitters, which deliver intense ionization in very focal areas, are, in general, most hazardous. The chief health consequences are expressed over years, as induction of malignancy in local affected sites. . A more acute toxic effect on the lung has been observed with high-dose inhalation injury, especially when. combined with some component of external contamination and whole body irradiation. In this setting, over a several-month period, a l I
patient can experience progressive hemorrhagic pulmonary edema (blood and fluid in the lungs) .and die from-hypoxia (low level of tissue oxygen) and infection.21!
To assess the amount of radiation a person has' absorbed internally requires a battery of tests and a series of calculations over time that often challenge the technical capacities of hospitals even when only one or two patients are involved in the treatment protocols. In disaster settings, where many people may be at risk.for internal-contamination, the assessment task may prove insurmountable.15!
Treatment. Treatment of internal contamination must be I delivered as soon as possible. procedures or antidotes that are experimental and cumbersome to employ in individual-75/ Rotblat, 1981, p. 38.
76/ IAEA, pp. 4-32.
NCRP, Report No. 65, pp. 125-158.
-94_
cases, such' as chelatioq, are not recommended on a )
population-scale. The administration of potassium iodide is.
the only antidote currently recommended for widespread use. l 1
If taken as prescribed, potassium iodide will protect populations from one of the major contributors to radioactive releases from nuclear power plants--radioactive iodine. Unless blocked, this radioactive iodine is selectively concentrated by the thyroid gland and can
)
inflict high local doses in a short time frame. '
1 Administering potassium iodide saturates the iodine j receptors in the thyroid gland and inhibits uptake.of the radioactive forms. If administered within one hour of exposure, more than 85 percent of the radioactive dose will l be blocked. The recommended dose is 100 milligrams of potassium iodide taken orally within two hours and then daily for 10 days. At this dose, administered to populations, some side effects may be observed. Levels of f thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH) may-rise slightly,-
transient and clinically insignificant hypothyroidism may be.
i induced in people with borderline thyroid function, and a percentage of the population may develop a skin reaction.22/
77/ David V. Becker, " Reactor Accidents: Public Health j 5trategies and their Medical Implications," Journal of the '
American Medical Association 258 (1987):- 649-654.
Luther J. Carter, " National Protection from Iodine-131=
Urged," Science 206 (1979).: 201-206.
Frank von Hippel, "Available Thyroid Protection," Science 204 (1979): 1032.
- _ - - - _ _ _ - - - - _ - - - - - - - - _ _ - _ - - - _ _ _ . _ - - - _ _ _ . - - - - . . . . _ . . - - - _ - _ - _ - _-s
Q. What are the long-term health consequences of !
radiation exposure?
A. (Leaning) Exposure to radiation exerts two principal long-term effects among those who survive the acute effects: induction of cancer and promotion of genetic defects. Both of these consequences appear after a significant latent period. At issue is the dose-response curve, or the relationship between th'e amount of radiation to which a population is exposed and the subsequent numbers of malignancies or genetic defects that will later develop.
Most of the data on long-term effects derives from populations exposed in the range of 100 rads or more. Since the human data is incomplete at lower levels of exposure, attempts to extrapolate back to effects at lower doses must rely on theoretical concepts of threshold doses and calculated dose-response curves. The scientific argument about this question is explored in detail in the 1980 report l
of the National Academy of Sciences, submitted by the Biological Committee on the Effects of Ionizing. Radiation'.
The BEIR III report examined the literature on long-term l effects with a particular' focus on an attempt to define.a 1
threshold radiation dose above which long-term consequences-could be predicted with some certainty. Both.the concept of-a threshold dose and the shape of the dose-response curve on either side of this threshold remain active questions in the literature.1 !
18/ BEIR III, pp. 21-23.
Cancer. In studies _of populations exposed to relatively high-dose radiation (the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Marshall Islanders, uranium miners, and others),
the carcinogenic effect of radiation--its capacity to. induce cancers--has been repeatedly demonstrated. Only certain cancers are increased in incidence by radiation exposure and the time of their peak occurrence varies by cell type.
Follow-up on Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors reveals that they have experienced increased incidence of leukemia, cancer of the breast, lung, stomach, and thyroid, and are probably at risk for an increased incidence of multiple myeloma and cancer of the colon and urinary tract. In the case of leukemia, which in the years of peak incidence occurred at a rate 10 times that in the non-exposed population, a dose-response curve can be drawn. That curve is now in dispute since the gamma and neutron dosimetry data for Hiroshima have been revised.12/
l 79/ Stuart C. Finch, "The Study of Atomic Bomb Survivors in Japan," American Journal of Medicine 66 (1979): 900.
Hiro Kato and William J. Schull, " Studies of the Mortality of A-Bomb Survivors: 7: Mortality, 1950-1978: part 1.
Cancer Mortality," Radiation Research 90 (1982): 395-432.
l l Eliot Marshall, "New A-Bomb Studies Alter Radiation Estimates," Science 212 (1981): 900-903.
Warren K. Sinclair and patricia Failla, " Dosimetry of the Atomic Bomb Survivors: A Symposium," Radiation Research 88 (1981): 437-447.
l L
1 The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has published standard estimates of cancer risks, based on extrapolations from a broad range of data, employing a linear dose-response curve. Although the linear 'l i hypothesis is controversial, the ICRP estimates presented in Table 23 serve as gross indicators of risk.
1 According to the ICRP' formula, the total risk of death ]
I
-3 from a11' cancers for both sexes comes to 12.5 x 10 per )
1 100 rems, meaning that if 10,000 people were exposed to 100 l l
rems, 125 would subsequently die of cancer who would ]
1 I
otherwise not' incur this disease. The number of non-lethel cancers induced by this radiation exposure might be double H this figure.
Genetic effects. Ionizing radiation can damage chromosomes, containing many genes, or alter the structure of just one gene. Genetic or chromosomal alterations in germ cells may be transmitted to the offspring of the exposea person. These defects may take several generations to reveal themselves in populations.
Since it is assumed that radiation-induced gentic defects will be similar to the significant spontaneous mutations that currently occur at the rate of 10 percent of all live births, scientists employ the concept of doubling dose, or the )
radiation dose required to double-the nor.5al background incidence of significance mutation from all causes. The doubling dose concept assumes that the dose response curve is linear.
i ;
TABLE 23 Risk Factors for Cancer Deaths Cancer Type" Death Rate per 100 Rems Leukemia 2.0 x 10- 3 Breast cancer . 2,5 x 10-3 Lung cancer 2.02 10-3 Bone cancer . 0.5 x 10-3 Thyroid .0.5 x 10-3 Other (stomach, 5.0 x 10-3 colon, liver, salivary glands)
Total 12.5 x 10-3 a No aDowance made for age or een of person exposed, ence bewaat cancer occws ahnose endusively in females, the nsk for them ts double what is given have as an average for both semes.
Source: ICRP No. 26, cited in Rotblat, 1981, 47.
The doubling dose in humans has been estimated 'to range I between 50 and 250 rads.SS/ Translating this range to population effects, the BEIR III Committee has suggested that exposing a population to 1 rem will induce in the first generation thereafter 5-65 significant genetic mutations per million live births. d!
k Q. Could you describe the task facing an emergency physician asked to respond and provide triage and treatment.
to people possibly exposed to a release of radioactivity from Seabrook? ,
A. (Leaning) The response to this question can'be approached by defining the problem, describing the"repources.
available, outlining the established procedure to.be I
followed, and evaluating the potential results.
The problem:
i .i l It is assumed that'the release of radioactivity has been
{
1 l significant, resulting in the likelihood that many of the l people on the beach have receivedL a potentially lethalidose.-
Notification of the disaster has occurred.,f and the evacuation of the beach population'is in progress. The] time j
.\
frame for this discussion is within the first1four toleight 9,I1 hours from the time of the accident.- ]
1 i
80/ BEIR-III, p. 84.
81/ Ibid., p. 85.
l
.i d ' - [
,, , al O_. ._ __
At one of the local community hospitals within a 10 mile radius of the Seabrook' plant, one might anticipate the arrival of at least 100 patients per' hour, experiencing a range of symptoms from anxiety to intense vomiting. j i
The Resources:
. (a) Physical Plant Tne appropriate treatment of radiation victims requires space, aqui.pment, ventilation, and waste disposal systems that are separate from the general treatment area and from the external environment. In most hospitals that j i
have paid attention to the risk of radiation accidents and j l I l have organized a response system, the physical plant is 1 1
usually arranged for multi-purpose use, so that.in the )
l . 1 actual event of a radiation emergency, necessary l
modifications in routine space must be made at very short notice.82/
1 1 ;
J l
82/
For discussion on necessary resources and recommended procedures, see: ;
J. Geiger, op cit.
Harold A. Goldstein, " Radiation Accidents and Injuries,"
Emergency Medicine, September 15, 194-215. ;
R.E. Linnemann, op. cit.
Fred A.,Mettler, " Emergency Management of Radiation Accidents," Journal of the American College of Emergency Physicians," 7:8 (3978); 302-305.
Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Radiation Accident Management: Sylla_ bus, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, November, 1980.
LL. Richter, et al., "A Systems Approach to the Management of Radiation Accidents," Annals,of Emergency Medicine, 9:6 (1980): 303-300 Frances Shepherd, " Treatment for Fatients with Radioactive Contamination," Djmensions,,iA, Health Service, June (1990): 19-20.
- 100 -
-g; ( ~ y. -
1 t
t
"(b) Personnel 1 J
The local disaster plan would be activated. For a s_ community hospital responding to a radiation alert, at most 1
( ,
20-30 physicians and nurses could be expected to assemble.
} ]
(c) Coordination ]
I In this context, the organization and coordination !
l of personnel is more crucial than the actual numbers deployed. This priority always prevails, regardless of the kind of disaster under discussion; in the case of radiation
]
accident, the various procedures that need to be performed are discrete, serial, often counter-intuitive, and carry an )
element of fear. Consequently, even in small-scale i
radiation disasters, a higher premium is placed on l 1eadership, training, and appropriate task assignment than what might otherwise be needed in a disaster response employing procedures tht physicians and nurse are more l accustomed to perform in the course of their regular work.
And, as with any disaster, even seasoned responders can find their efforts overwhelmed if the numbers of people in need outstrip the physical and human resources available.
- 101 -
r Procedure A) Standard Procedure:
Standard procedure for evaluating and treating one patient with possible exposure to_ external contamination and the. potential'for internal contamination.has been outlined in preceding sections.
The process of assessing for life-threatening injury, taking patient history, screening for radiation contamination, and implementing decontamination procedures would take two experienced people approximately 15 to 30 minutes for each patient.
The task of triage requires estimating radiation received. This estimate would be based on patient history, on evidence of-prodromal symptoms (anorexia, nausea,-
vomiting, fatigue), and on results ofEGeiger_ counter survey for external contamination. Such an estimate will often be hard to arrive at with any certainty or precision. In' making this triage decision, a protocol will have to'be in place or arrived at soon into the event as-to where and how to send patients who are deemed at risk for lethal exposures. The destination should be a hospital environment' equipped for the management of severely exposed individuals. In the example described here, preparations should be made to transport the patient by' ambulance'to teact.ing hospitals in the Greater Boston area.
- 102 -
i
B) . General triage guidelines:
- Send co tertiary hospital anyone with presumed exposures of_200 rems or more;
- Send to community hospital all patients with exposures estimated to be between 50 and-200 rems, where, pending results of blood samples, admission will provide surveillance for further symptom development; 1
l
- Send home, with information allowing for immediate re-call, any patient whose exposure is judged to be 50 rems.or less.
l 1 Procedure for Mass Casualty Response Available space, equipment and personnel, even in the most advanced and prepared radiation sites, would be stressed to-l capacity after receiving 100 patients an hour. An' orderly, comprehensive response would be disrupted. The: area around and' outside the hosptal emergency room would be crowded with j i
patients. Crowd supervision would be a matter of great I i
priority. If not handled well (and crowd management requires' .j sufficient numbers of trained people) the situation could )
1 degenerate to hysteria and mass panic. The management of large- !
numbers of children would especially complicate matters.. l i
- 103 -
'l y
J
One of two different consequences could result". .-The personnel on site could think' clearly and de-escalate their-response protocols to a minimum level of intervention aimed at identifying the mostly severely exposed-and delaying until later the assessment and treatment of chose less seriously exposed.
The key problem with this decision process in the context of radiation injury is the degree of uncertainty that is inexorably attached to the assessment of individual cases--a
~
degree of uncertainty,.given our medical knowledge, that is greater than the uncertainty with which a skilled physician approaches someone with a traumatic chest injury. The stress of this process lead to a deterioration in medical judgment over time.
If the on-site personnel become confused and anxious, they might resort to a seria1' treatment pattern (taking care of each-patient as he or she arrives). Serial intervention results in a situation where-many potentially seriously ill patients queue up, unevaluated, and untreated. Ultimate morbidity and mortality of, victims would, in this mode; be increased.
Summary The short-term response to a significant radiation accident at Seabrook, involving exposures of over 200 rems to a population in excess of 500 people, could be expected to
- overwhelm a methodical standard approach to the assessment and decontamination of radiation victims. Instead, an accelerated' l and tre.ncated treatment process would develop, and, in the best case, those most serioesly exposed would be identified,
- 104 -
__= _ _ _ _ -
1
)
decontaminated, and sent to more definitive treatment sites
]
with little delay. In the worst case, medical organization would crumble, resulting in delay in treating those wno should 1
)
be treated at once. A greater incidence of morbidity and {
mortality could be expected.
Q. In conclusion could you describe whct might be the reactions of the beach population during the first few minutes to one hour after exposure to a potentially lethal radiation release? l A. (Leaning) Radiation is invisible and' leaves no smell or taste. The first signs of the release would be the onset of nausea and vomiting in that section of the population whose sensitivity to radiation was highest and who were in the path -
of the release of radioactivity. This population would include a preponderance of children and whatever elderly adults were present on the beach. Initially, other family members, friends, and bysranders would not pay particular attention to ]
isolated instances of nausea or vomiting occurring up and down I
the beach area. However, this kind of news, recounting untoward and unexpected symptoms, travels very rapidly. Within I
minutes of onset of symptoms in a few' people, word of a strange i epidemic would spread throughout the several miles of populated beach region.
At that point, regardless of official communications and advice,massturmoilcouldbbexpected. Any exodus would be i
l l
1
- 105 -
l J
complicated by the fact that an increasing nunner of people would begin to fall ill. This expanding number would include paren,ts anc crivers of vehicles. The nausea tnat afflicts people is intense and sudden, of ten persisitn; f or several hours. This nausea will reduce energy levels, impair clarity of thought, and contrioute to emotional insta:ility. Inese acverse effects would be felt more by that se; tent of the population that immediately becomes nauseatec and soon af ter exposure cegins to vomit. The vomiting of the radiation prccrome sincreme can come on sudcenly, and ray continue relentlessly for several hours. Again, people with this conoition ma) well be unable to manage, with any dispatch or ef ficiency, the task of assemoling f amily anc celongings, getting to vehicles, and negotiating the Journey out of the affecteo area. i l
In the scenarios cescribec in the testimer.) of Professor Beyea, on any given summer cay there might ce as many as 10,000 to 23,000 people who coulc ce exposeo. Accc::ing to i
statistical probablity, basec on study of pre.;ous population experience, even at levels of radiation belo.100 rems one coulo preoict that approximately 30% of the p::ulation woulc begin to f eel loss of appetite and general ce:line in wellbeing, another 10% woulc become nauseatec, ano 10% woulc begir to vomit. A few people might experience abrupt onset of oiarrhea, with or without other symptoms.
- 106 -
Translated into numbers, within minutes of exposure to a radioactive release, 1,000 people or more on the beach would become acutely nauseated, and another 1,000 people would begin i active vomiting. It should be noted that these percentages were derived for an adult population. Higher percentages for j illness in each category should be employed for populations containing many children. Evacuation procedures in this setting would take longer and involve more complexities than j i
the evacuation of people who are not 111. l 1
Q. Does this complete your testimony?
A. (Leaning) Yes. It does.
1 l
1 I
i 1
l' 1
1 h
l 1
- 107 -
i
l l
l
. t i
TABLE A IO_IESIIAAMOF STEVEN C. SHOI i Y l J
SURRY DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES. WASH.1aen The WASH 1400 analysis of Surry Unit 1 identified twelve accident sequences which dominated the estimated median core melt frequency of 5 x 10 5 per reactor year.
.1/ These twelve accident sequences, their designations, and their estimated frequencies are described below. 2/
Sequence TMLB' - This sequence is a station blackout sequence (a loss of offsite power followed by the failure of onsste AC power and the failure to recover AC power within about three hours). WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence TMLB' at 3 x 104 per reactor-year. 3/ f/
.!/
lt we be noted that I the p of these twWwe esquences are summedp resulthrt core melt frequency le 1.24 x 10 per reactor-year.' WASH 1400 otmahed the 5 x 10 per reactor year by a Monte Carlo sempting technique, the perdeulers of which are not especiety deer. The laner value has been cited widely, and is therefore used here for reference purposes.
L Racerey, a new risk assessment lor Surry Unit 1 was performed for ete draft NRC report NUREG-1150. Aancar Alak MaAerence Document. The h3 reauts of the new Surry 1 PRA are documented in Robert C. Sertuoso, et al., Anansis W Care Dername honuancy From insamel benet: Suny Unit
.t, Sands Nedonal L.eboratortes, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer RegWatory Commason.
NUREG/CR 4880, SAPCOS3084, Vp 3, November 190s. This study sedmeted the mean frequency of oore met at 1.8 x to par renceor yuer turn internet swores' accidents (Le., not includhg *eemmel evenaf such as eenhguskas, Goods, fires, secj. ti,, page 14. WASH 1400 salueneen TMQ, TMMQ, and 25 C were found not to lead to case melt Other WASH 1400 seqJanska ter Surry were identfled as among the dominera core met esquences in the new mudy, sking umt esveraf needyidentined accident esquences. A telde tem NUREG/CR 4560 which sumnuuhes Wie restas of the newer study is prov6ded as an addendum to Exhibit 3 for compeltens purposes, 3/ N.C. Reemuseen, et al., Mascar Safetv Sanhe An Aaqaaqmant af Accident Misks in U.S.
Commaieral Nuciaer Pany Marus. U.S. Nudeer Regulacry Communion, WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014. October 1975, *Afala Maporr,' page St.
f/ The NUREG 1150 analysis of Surry identfled four esperses ention esquences. These four esquences have an a00regma core melt frequency eedmeesd a 15 x 10 per reactor year. Est, Robert C. Bertucio, et al., Analysts of Care Demone Freauencv Mom irmamot hertta. Sandie
t i
42 Sequanes TML - This sequence is a transient orther resulting from or fo by a bas of meh feedwater, with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. WASH-14 the frequency of sequence TML at 6 x 1'0-6 )
per reactor-year.1/ 6/
Sequence V - The V sequence represents an 'intersystem LOCA* resu the failure of the low pressure injection system check vahes. This results in of the low pressure injection system piping outside of the containment; th release from this core melt accident also bypasses the containment.
WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence V at 4 x 104 porreactor year. Z/ g/
Sequence 82C - Sequence Sp represents a smal LOCA in which the contamment spray injecnon system fails. This results in a inck of containment heat removal.
The containment fails due to steam overpressure, following which the emergency core coolmg systems fait des to insufficient not poenho suction head and/or damage due to containment depressu12e;cn. This' results in core me '
National iee .a ;
prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiseen, NuREG/CR-4550 SAN 0062004, Vol. 3 November 1908, pegse V4 and V4. .
l} N.C. Reemuseen, et al, Mm sdaw b& An A-^^ ^ 7. :
Cc77. rM Nuedaar Power ".':.n. & L=^ M = Minks in U S.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cansvuosion, WASH-1400, NUREG.
75/014, Octceer 1975, " Mein Aaporr,' pees at.
$/
The NUREG-1180 ansfysis andmsed the frequency of this tysm of accident esquenc per rescaer W . b Roltsort C. Bertuoin, et d., .'-" '- d dann E T = r _:=ev r,va inenmal fiena Sands Nedonal Labermortes, prepared for ele U.S. Nucteer Re Commleolon, PA#tEG/CfM880, SAPC08 2004 Vol. 3, November INN, pees V4.
If H.C. Reemussen, et d.,
C.: - ^ ^ " ^
~^ =-- Sannu 6+ An ^-^ ^ =mant d ^~~u=nr Misks in u.s.
75/01 A h 1975, " Mein Aaporr,' page 81." Anser "' n U.S. Nutdear Reg A/ A0pBeedone
!' y' 10 per remanr year,intemational Corporadon has re estimated the V es b R.L Ritzman, et al., sunv hes Tann and cc.-- ==ce An=his.
Science Appecagone traemotional Corportston, prepared for the Bearic Powur Re EPRI heport andmated No. NP the treguancyof the 006, V es Pinel Report, ~ June 199, page 24. The NUREG 1 et et .AnsAnda at caen c;- = r,quence et 9.0 x 10' per reassorw. h Robert C. Bertuem.
=== _s r,w, , _ ' fx= Sendte Nedonal Laboratones, prepared for the U.S.
November 1906. page V4.
Nutdear Regulatory Commiseen, NUMEG/CfM680, SAND 08 2064,
43 i
)
containment fadure. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S2 C at 2 x 104 per reactor year. g/1Q/
t Sequence S2D - Sequence S2D represents a small LOCA in which the ,
emergency coolant injeebon system fails. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of I sequence S2 D at 9 x 104 per reactor year. .U/
Secuence S2H - Sequence S2H represents a smal LOCA in which the emergency coolant recirculation system fails, WASH-1400 eshmated the frequency of sequence S2 H ai6 x 104 ce;' reactor-year. .tt/
t/ N.C. Reemunnen, et al., *~ w kn=4 An ^ -^ ^ : : d k *;. Misks in u s cc_T,.Tsie! Nuetaar Fc_r M;,n. U.S. Nuclear Reguistory Commission, WASH 1400, NUMEG- j 75/014, October 1975, ' Mars Aaporr,' page 90. 1 19/ Both science Applications International corporation and the !
NUREG-1150 sequence.
analyses conclude - that this is a non-core melt 133, R.L Altzman, et eL. fmv h=en Terrn and c _ =- - e Ad_:is.
Science Application treemetional Corporation, prepared for the Elemnc Power Research ineutute.
EPRI Report No. NP 4008. Pinsi Report, June 1986, page 210 ; and Robert C. Bertucio, et aL acaesad care Damaa Fr=-~ Fawn t. - ! r=;;;. Sende Nedonal Laboratories, properso for the U.S. Nucieer Magdetory Commission, NUREG/CR 4880, SAPC06 2004, Vol 3, Novemoor 1988, ; age V 70. . The NUREG-1150 analysis ' identified similar sequences with mediue and large -Incas, loss of offsite power transients, events. and loss of These sequences feedwater wer transients as initiating frequency of about 1.1 x 109 estimated to have an aggregate per reactor-year. 133, Robert C.
Bertucio, et al., AnaAmin d care amenna. Fe== - v fr_v. f.__7_
fr_. Sande National Laboratories, prepared ter the U.S. Nuedeer Regdetary Comminolon, NUREG/CR 4880, SAN 006-2004, Vol. 3. November 1988, pages V-69 to V-71. The large reduction in frequency arises from analysee which suggest that containment failure results in ECCS failura only 23 of the time, rather than 1003 of the time as assumed in NASH-1400.
11/ The PAM 1180 enefyele estimated the frequency of this esquence a 7.1 x 10 7 per remotor year.
The endpade eleo andmated a nimeer sequence ( from reasser coolert pump emel LOCAs, which wee not considered in WASH 1400) a 2.6 x 10 per reactor year. 333, Robert C. Bertucio.
a et, t.--"
e care c_T.- = r,=%v Fr w i, . r : r==. Sense Neponal h.
prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commieson, NUREG/CR4180, SAN 006 2004, Vol 3.
November 1986, pages V4 to V.4. .
12/ The NUMEG 1150 enelysis andmated the frequency of this seguance a 1.2 x 10 4 per reactor year (sequences 3 resen infama andg ass, Robert C. senuedo, a et. Anahmie d can, camean Freauene Nedonal Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commeson, NUMEG/CR 4ss0, SANO86 2084, Vol 3, November 1908, pages V4 to V4.-
F 1
i 44 I
Secuence $1D - Sequence S D $ represents a medium LOCA in which the emergency coolant inpGaxi system fails.
WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S3 D at3 x 104 per reactor-year.12/1.(/
Sequence S1H - Sequence S $H represents a medium LOCA in which the emergency coolant recirculation system fails. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of !
sequence S3H st 3 x 10 4 per reactor. year.11/1A/ I Sequence AD - Sequence AD represents a large LOCA h which the emergency coolant injection system fails. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence AD at 2 x 10 4 per reactor-year.1Z)18/
W N.C. Reemuseen, et at., n- Sanaw kn+ An A - ^- .. = d k^m-= RMs le u s.
C.:.r .._cle! Ner'-'- Power Mann. U.S. Nucieer Regulatory Commesion WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014. October 1975, *Adakt Aaporr,' page 80.
W The NUREG 1150 eneWe andmated the frequency of this esquence a 7.1 x 10*7 per reactor year, jag, Robert C. Bertucio, et eg., AnaAmis d Can Damman Fr.an mg fm l,n7,;f E;.a Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nucieer Regtiatory Commission, NUREG/CR 45 SANDe6 2004, Vol. 3 Ncwomber 1908, pages V4 to V4 W N.C. Reemuseen, et al., *^ ^ -= Sanaw **+ An ^-- m. d -M== MM= in U s.
Cc ..,,;;r:d Mr"- pmaar r_..:.
U.S. Nuclear Regtessory Commesion, WASN 1400 NUREG.
75/014, October 1975, Test Aaporr,' page 80.
J.5/ The NLNWB 1180 enalyste aanmated the frequency of this esquence a 7.7 x 10*7per reactor year.
jeg, Raben C, manuelo, en eg., AnaAmes d Cue namen. Fem tw t=r- ! .- ,
- . Sandis -
Nedonal Leningeries, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comminaion, NUMEG/CR4550. l !
) SANDOSeltpet, S, Noember 1988, pages V4 to V4
.12) N.C. Reemuseen, et ei., ~ ^ ^ ^= 2 : ;; **+ An ^ ~ ^ ^ .. d A~ % M w In U.S.
Cc.;r -,;;rld pr '
- Pmmer P- U.S. Nucieer Regulatory Commmason, WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014 October 1975,
- Admin Aaporr,' page 80.
.11/ The NUREG-1150 eneWs andmated the frequency of this esquence et 3.9 x 10*7 per reactor year, 333, Robert C. Bertucio, et ad., AnaAmis d can aan==a= Fr=a==wy Frnm l,; 7. ! E;.;1 Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer ReOulatory Comnheton, NUREG/CR4550.
SANO86 2004, Vol. 3. November 1908, pages V4 to V4 i
i 4-5 Senuance AH - Sequence AH represents a large LOCA r1 which the emergency coolant recyculadon system fails. WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence AH at 1 x 104 per reactor-year.12/ 2Q/
Sequence TKO - Sequence TKO represents a transient followed by failure of the reactor protection system and a failure of at least one pressunter safety / relief valve to reclose. WASH 1400 estimate the frequency of sequence TKO at 3 x 104 per reactor-year. 21/ 22/
Seqpence TKMO - Sequence TKO represents a loss of feedwater transient followed by failure of the reactor fxwe system and failure of at least one pressurizer l safety / relief valve to reclose. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence TKMQ at 1 x 10 6 per reactor-year. 23/ 2f/
l j
.tt/ N.C. Reemuseen, et al., ~^^ =v Sanaw *=+ An '^ - ^ ^ .. ^: d L=Yei; Mlnsin in U s.
Commerelal Nuclear Pmser Pfaram. U.S. Nucteer RegiAntory Comrvtasion, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014. October 1975, 'Adeh Aaport,' page 80.
22/ The NUREG 1150 analysis estheted the frequency of this seguance a 3.3 x 10*7per reactor year.
Sag, Robert C. Bertucio, at al., AnaAmis d Carm Damman Frmauanew From inenmal faran. Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nusdear RegtAmory Comminaion, NUREG/CR4850, SANDee 20s4, Vol 3, November 1988, pages V4 to V4.
2,t/ N.C. Reemuseen, e aL, "- - ^=-- * ' ^ m+ An ^ ^ ^ - = d L=Y- M" In U S.
Commercial Nuclear Pasar Mann. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Communion, ViASH 1400, NUREG-75/014. Oeober 1978, "Adah Aaporr,' peGe M.
22/ The N115 andyeis andmated the frequency of a aimeer esquence (TMRD 4) at 1.1 x 104 per rescIOP9mi, h Robert C. Bertucio, et at, AnaArada d Care Damman Frmausney From Imamal 63R M Ndonal Labo'esortes, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regukatory Commesson, j NURSS/45 dego, SANDOH0e4, Vol 3, November 1908, page V-69. -
21/ N.C. Reemussen, at aL, Mancear Sadant Studie An Aqwgamarr W Accident Alaks in U.S.
Commerclef Nuclear Pasar Plana. U.S. Nucieer Regidatory Comndesion, WASH 1400, NUREG.
75/014 October 1s75, 'Adairr Aaport,' page M. ;
2d/ The NUREG 1150 analysis andmated the frequency of e simter seguance (TMRZ) at 4.8 x 10 7 por reactor year. 333, Robert C. Bertucio, at al. Anahmia d Carp Demane Femausney Fnam imamal haam, Sandie Nedonal Laboratories, prepared for #m U.S. Nudaar Regulatory Commesen.
NUREG/CR4680. SANOt6 20s4, Vol. 3, November 1908, page V-49.
1 1
4-6 ADDENDUM TOnst.e A DOMINANT SURRY UNIT 1 ACCIDENT SEQUENCES. clURE 7aste v.:..
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i TABLE B TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY ._
SURRY RELBASE CATEGORIES. WASH.1 ALM This exhibit premdes a description of the WASH-1400 release categor Unit 1, as well as a table which gives the release charactenstics (frequency, relea magnitudes, etc.). Informadon for this Exhibit is taken from WASH 1400 1/
1 i
i 1/
The rolesse Mm.~ saranwcategory sm en 1--frequencies and charactertatice are taken tram MC. Reemuss
-- - == at L :t = ::= M U R e=- - ='9:'- ^ - Paww P1an U.S. Nuclear ReOulatory Commesson, WASH 1400, NUREG 75/014. October 1975, 'M peGe 97; sannw sw1he An cleocriptions
^-- ' . = at 1of the release categories are taken from KC. Roomussen,
- W: nie*= in as &--- A n =' -^ Pam e " L = U.S.
Nudeer W Commiselon, WASH 1400, NUREG 75/014, October 1975, Appensk VI,
'Celctdeaton of MeecerAccident Consequences
- pegen 21 to 2 3.
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I release eategory. For sete dets& .e ledvarteus anfo ;nysteal ;r resses tr.at defar.e esce I T.ation on ::e release categories an:
- saaer as referred te Appendices 2. V::,ue teena& ques esployed :s compute . n ans "In:.
- he taminant event :ee ser;saca eac= rolease satagery are discussed an ce 411 an aeensn 4.4 ei Apper.dex 7.
in L Tr.as releasd sn icst:n an c=nta catogsr/
- can be er.aracterssed by a core sa; frwn followed :y a stes=,
ne :: stair.asnt spray of and heat fuel wata tr.e restduas vasar as r.e ssets: resse..
selten uerefore, steen tae aataAnaent could he at a pressure aseve anstant atesmoval syster esplessoa. ass.
- t is assumed that ce steam eaglestc= vould supture .se upper tae n=a sf tr.a
- senen of 2e roaster vessel and treeen .he contaanames sorrier, wtc =a resu.
mas
- = a substantial a puff asses over a per:.ed of of radioactivity ameus 10 stautes. magat he released frsa v.e c=staar..en: 1
}
Due - to ce swseptng sett:n of :ases would : ntinue at a relatively low rate 2ereafter.ter. orated durir.g contaar.s The total release . cult ::::ur, appr:assately at saa n=a of release. 7Ct of saa
- todines and 40% of us shall =etals present sa us :=re Because e.s ecstaanment would :sstaAA het pressurizes gases i :a the contaAnannt could he aassee&ated at the staa of failure, reistively haga release wita 218 rate of sonstkle enerrt categerf.
anti: des certata potent:a1 ace: dent seguences nas would :velve tse seearrasseThis cate cf la,==re uese=elting seguances, and acesteam rate ofsapleases enerTY release after :satatament would to *:wer r:pture fue is overpressurei resatavely haga. , alsnouga st:11 sn :
- s esteger re.:: g c:acu/ is assectated wie ce taalure =f cere-eeeli:g systema and :=re l rren: was us fa& lure of coatsuJesat spra Tsdure =f tse centau.sant harrier would occur ersuga =y and r. sat = eaeval synta=s.
s; ssanual 6 ;st:.cd of fracusa aeout :3of se contaar.aer.2 asameptore s hererpressure,
=4:utes. released u.:austry a a puff :ver
- r.tainment 1:
a reistivelyvessel low ratesoittnesuge.,
cereafter. ce release of :sdisastare =ater al woulf .
- %ease.
ts. :f ce ::dir.as and 20% of the 43411 nasals preser:The total .
release veu12 ::sta.L.. appr:x
- : e :gre at : e :=a =f As as pWR release category 1, the nagt. semperance ar.d pressure vt-- - ,
re;sase rate cf sonstale er. orgy fr m me cantau.ser.t.::ntainment at me s sn :
Thaz :stectr/
- n .a taser.: tavelves as overpressure failure af .he ecstau.sent due o fa&*:re :f
?. eat f ::re a. nag. removal. Centau.asnt faAlure weste sesur prast = ce ::=r.as:s=ent ur:uga a rJptured sensa&ammat barner. Care zelung een wes14 cause radiesente mater als air.ali assals pressat la the core at tas use =f release votid he releases at:.as ynere. ce ::Ap ;
- ees of the release would secur ever a per =d f ameut :..! . :: . ine !
re.sase 6: n =a cfof radieastits gases genom mater a1 fr:a conta1 ament would :e caused by us sweepu.g .i
- ed by .as resetten of =a =elter. f.e. vac :=nerate, f.n:s ;
ene:77 release to the aeWeaere would te sacerately alga.usse gases l sut .
ints :stegsr/ tavelves fatture at tr.?acusa systen af ter 4 loss-of-tst.:me sere-essite.g systes sad me ::staassent sp:17 f ulare =f ce car. tau. ment system is :t psee
'erldest, tegener va.a a :=ncurrent re. ease af it of the tedir.es ans 4% of e1kali *y asolate.
ses *1:s would resui : ce
- une:= 3=fr. release.
curs. Most of : e release veule eeur ser.als present as : e care a .e tuseusly ever a perand f wo 11 operate to remove heat from ce centunner.s Mespaere durare 1este 28 a relauvely 1:w rate of release =f sonsthis energy
- sgerf.
cu;d to assecasted vtu = s s
i I
r 4
Pws s Sis category involves fatture of the core coeling sys release to catevery fureer reduas the 4, except quantity tass the containannt spray inMtene and is sisu of airterne
' suppress containment rad temperature and pressure.iesetave matartal and to inttiallyetten s a large leasage rate due to a eeneurrent fatlure of the ombarrier would have The contatament aisolate, persed of and most several of the hours. radisastave matertal would be releasse staaaannt system to properly metals present eentanuously ever in the core would be~ released.Apprestaately Jt of the todines
]containaar.theat-removalsystems,theenerg .
al and 0
-a Because of tas operation of the y release rate weeld te low.
Se containment sprays would not operatenis category Lavelves a ee .
sta integrity base sat. until the moltea core proce,eded to melt threega the consretbut t The radiesetive asterials would be released into the gresad e contaAnaent leasage to the amassphere securriag upward througa the greend, with some the atmospaare weeld aise escur at a low rate prior to sen .
Otteet leakage to Mest of sne release would ooeur continuously ever a persed ofta&aamat-vessel asittar present ta the core at the time of release.ne release atestwould 10 bears. include appre the anaesphere would be low and gases escaptag through theSeessee leakage free contakaa by contaes wath the soil, the energy release rase would gromdbe weeld be eseled m7 aw. very l would operate to reduce the oestasassas temperature and pr amount of aArserne radioactivity. re as well as tas and of the0.001% of the release would alkali escur evermetala a pariedpresent la the sore at the tiam Most of 10 heure. .
of releaseSe tas energy release rate wesid be very law. As is pWR release catever/ 6 Me 21s category appressmates a pWR design basis seeident that the contaaaaent would fail to isolate properly om d em(large pipe break), except safeguards are assuand to functica properly. and.
would tavelve appresAmately 0.016 et tas todines and 0 084 etThe w
The releaseeers wesad pressure would be aheve easient...ost of tse release wesid the alkali metals.
securatmeent in tae 0.5-hour per
=elstr., would not soeur, tae emergy release rate wesid alas aw.
be lSecause contata=
Me 21s catevery appresimetes a pWR design basis accident oniv cla& ding thewould actAvaty initially be releases istoeestained within the gas between the fuel pellet and(
the egetatament.
to reaeve meat from the sees and aestaiammat. assumed that the maatam 0.5-aiour period enstag which the sementamaat pressuaw would beHe release womid ;
Apprealaately esisased. aheve ambient.
As 0.00001% etestegory the iodines and 0.00006% of the bealk lt estals w a
r i in DER release 8. the energy release rate would very icv.
21 exp1 reisase ten an category reaeter is representative of a este sel's
- paast esel. So I stor would cause the releasfellowed by a steem of rad active as i a substar.tial appres tely 40% i the ted al to the taesynere. The ci contat. at tai re. Most a and alka metain present tal release la contais Iscause of he ener generated the role would eerur eve athe 1 core heur a perthe Etie the c..aractertie by a re savely hi rate of en emplesien, ate this .
category also eludes resia e egy release to tegory weeld acanophore. La c=ntatnaeat pri to the aces that volve overpress a ta.ese sessences, e rate currease f cars ael and a stesa failure of lesien. In discAssed above, a taeuga if energy would still be relatt ly hagn. smalle than for these eass woul somewnst
l l
l mn c TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY mounts 111 TO 1-1a. Nunsa. caw i
This exhibit consists of reproduced pages from NUREG4396 con Figures 1 11 through l 16. These figures are reproduced on the following 1
e 9
i S2 1-3s I
i1 k
.i 1
" .....i . . . ...g . . . . . . . ..:
?
~
~
=
k
=
1 REM '
E 0.1 EneM wa- .
u .
W .
. i.
1 g$ - .
q 5I -
a i
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50 nsu I
. i
.* i CE
&w 2 0.01 -
- c "
E -
8 - -
E -
m asu ~
,,,,, . . . .....I . . . . . ...I 1
it 100 1000 OlSTANCE thelLSS) l Figure I 11. Candidenst Prebebility of Emeneding Whoin Sody Doon Venus Dissense. Proh me Conditional en a Core Matt Aessesnt (5 m It#1.
Whole body dose seiculated instudes: enternal dess to tin whole body due to the pening sisud, espesure to radionueiides on younil, and the does to the whole body from inhaled redsenuelides. -
Does seleutetsens asumed no protsetive estens uken, and seresprt line plume irspeenry.
_ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ '
c 5=3 l-39 i
l i
1 1 .---
l ' '
'l * .
. : 1 j
a -
8 smsm !
ga 0 .1 7 I s! :
IW :
sa neu -
5 *a :
aE xw . -
f wg .
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>(
t: a =
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8 :
~
l t
20mau ,"
3000 nau 0.0e1 ' '
= =.. ..I . .
y . . ,,,,1 ,
10 . . . ....
100 im OlSTANCE (MILg3)
Figure 112. Onl:n Probability of Enesoding Lung Doses Versus Distonesare .
Probabilities Conelitional on a Care Meet Accadent (5 x 10-5).
Lung does asievissed includes:
exposure to rodeonuclides on ground, art the eloss to the lung redsonuclides wnhen 1 year.
Dees selauletaans ampumed no protective actions taken, and strj j
1 e
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
c.
I S4 1-40 1
1 1
e i .
i iisisl i
..iiig i , e i ....
~
~
=
s nau ~
O w Ba 0.i 25
- e. .
. u nau ,
l ,,- .
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C4
>z t: w g j 0.01 -
8 : :
E -
=
g . . e eie..I i . . <....l . . . . ...i l 1 10 100 1000 DISTANCs telLESI Figure 1 13. Cenetional Probability of Emeseding Thyroid Deens Versus Diesense. PrebeWiities are Condn6 enol en a Care Men Aandant (5 a 10'#). 4 Thyroid dose seleulsand instudse: enernel does to the stryroW due to the pesung cloud, enamours to radionuotides on yound, and the does to the thyrood from inheesd resonestidae.
Does seisuisdens enumed no protectsee setsons taken, and sereight line travestery, i
j
55 l
l-42 1
1 1 -
iiig i i i i . ...; . . . . . ....
o 5
a ,,
> = .
2
. i
! . . l I
w
- 1.5 REM 3*z 0.1 .
S5 - -
w l g*UW . . 15 REM .
- 30 REM -
.! I - -
$ ~
Ea<
I 0.01 =
@5 5 x .
1 w - .
B .
m .
s - .
E i
- - I gg a f I et Iee! I t i j i aei! t I 1 a t iti 1 10 100 1000 OtSTAfeCE SAILE81 Figues 1 14. Conditiosel Prohobility of Esseeding Thyroid Does to an Infant Versus Distance.
Protnshiutses ers Condinonal on e Core Melt Aandent (5 x 10 8).
Thyroid domar eslauteted is due solely to radionvalide ingescon through the milk consumpeen pettavoy.
Dese coiculeuens assumed no protestive eenons takon, and strascht line trajectory.
L_ . . , ..
u l
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a a MSIAIR 58489 FlussEM eumsamms W eImt mesen 8tsemus seenmane sur e asemesent wsema e un ammme smuuss ese,mps some ge as emn s m asem Musus aus assuemment e e EIS 84hteatemp' teams sep 4 auf Pl. .
M 8Embut Gur assumpue pseuemmetagua e 3.g.
eeumunesels AJumaeus a greme e 4.9 M gesegue tuussy sur a g 6 e seusmusadge e t
hemse ammy tue seassuem eewaum an a o sum.unamusens masenreams, . emuseus .een a me imunem e 6 4MpWBr.
eetat mR mum W Epp unmes Em leggesst tem amate am suumum i
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e a e MSTMER 94858
% MS, tutussump speentest et tumusase Espeed aus samas guer asonestam artmo m e m enseauensmannse a se M e e en *ausumussar*esaseamma Desmus tamanas see 4*ll. eseems.* feemsussassen
% tm te assures essemuusiseus e e.2 Me N e M e 4.1.
SM Se em t.
mesessue tapani to
- eseguarledus
%Inse enIP semuseast eus annadasse sonnene seriasmes eso se ene emne M
e m auf essen W W m me embase eles eut le em es aus eum es ese ameno susy stessesse 8 98EB. toepestammesame esswee easamersame e
- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - \
1 i
TARLE o, TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOI I Y SQURE s.1 FROM MARCH 1987 BNL REPORT I This Exhibit consists of Fgure 6.1 from W.T. Pratt & C. Hofmayer, et al.,
(
Technlent Evaluctkws d the EPZ Sa15)tMtv Studv tbr SanF~1k Broo i
Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Marcl
- 19. This Nure can be compared with Fgure 1-11 from NUREG 0398 (333, Exhibit 5.
attached to this testimony).
i l
i
(_ _______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
62 1
% 1A o M 1A 9 9: IB = M 18 2=M2 1 3 = M3 4 = M4 5 = PM5 5
- Summary 3 l (6.7 = 0. Risk)
E 0.1 , I \
- % s 82 1
-5 02 E i k' I
~ ,
i i y j; 1 i
. 01 '<*'
l'
- , '\ n ,
Sa
( 34
\ i t, \
g v.s 54 ,I l 1 !
i l
.001: ! . . .....i -
1 10 100 Miles Figum 6.1 Componee s of NUREE-0396 cut ve as com-puted by SNL using CRAQ. T
. curve is normalized to 6:10*p summary corv seit probability. The result differs from NUREG-03M.
l l
I C
REFERENCES TO TESTIMONY OF GORDON THOMPSON (Kouts, 1987)
H. Kouts, Review of Research on Uncertainties.in Estimates of Source Terms from Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants, Brookhaven National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4883, April 1987.
(NRC, 1975)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, October 1975.
(NRC, 1987a)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Risk Reference Document, NUREG-ll50 (3 vols.), Draft, February 1987 ;
I' (NRC, 1987b)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Uncertainty Papers on Severe Accident Source Terms, NUREG-1265, May 1987.
(PLG, 1983)
- 8. John Garrick (Study Director) et al., Seabrook Station j Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick Inc., prepared for Public Service Company of New Hampshire and i Yankee Atomic Electric Company, 6 volumes, December 1983. j l
1 1
(Sholly and Thompson, 1986)
Steven Sholly and Gordon Thompson, The Source Term Debate: A l I
Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Union of Concerned I l
Scientists, January 1986.
l 1
I 108 -
?
)
- 00tKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION '87 NOV 19 P3 :27 0FFICE Ci nukEiAr f DOCKEl m 5 SEavicf.
BRANCH
)
In the Matter of ) ;
) i PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket No.(s) 50-443/444-OL )
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) j
) i
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3 1
I, Frank W. Ostrander, hereby certify that on November 17, 1987, I l made service of the within documents, by mailing copies thereof, l
postage prepaid, by first class mail, or as indicated by an asterisk, by hand delivery to the NRC Hearings in Concord, New Hampshire:
- Ivan Smith, Chairman *Gustave A. Linenberger, J$.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission 1717 H Street 1717 H Street Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555
- Dr. Jerry Harbour *Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Director Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street Tenth Floor Washington, DC 20555 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 l *H. Joseph Flynn Esq.
- Stephen E. Merrill l Assistant General Counsel Attorney General l Office of General Counsel George Dana Bisbee Federal Emergency Management Assistant Attorney General Agency Office of the Attorney General 500 C Street, S.W. 25 Capitol Street Washington, DC 20472 Concord, NH 03301 w________________________-____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _,
T
/
b Docketing and Service
- Robert A. Backus, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Backus, Meyer & Solomon Commission -
116 Lowell Street Washington, DC. 20555 P.O. Box 516 Manchester, NH 03106
, Atomic Safety & Licensing
- Jane Doughty Appeal Board Panel Seacoast Anti-Pollution League U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 5 Market Street Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing
- Paul McEachern, Esq Board Panel Matthew T. Brock, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Shaines & McEachern Commission 25 Maplewood Avenue Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 l Sandra Gavutis, Chairperson Senator Gordon J. Humphrey
~
)
Board of Selectmen U.S. Senate i RFD 1, Box 1154 Washington, DC 20510 I Rte. 107 (Attn: Tom Burack)
E. Kingston, NH 03827
/
, Senator Gordon J. Humphrey
- William Lord ;
1 Eagle Square, Suite 507 Board of Selectmen 1 Concord, NH 03301 Town Hall (Attn: Herb Boynton) Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913
, Diane Curran, Esq.
- Thomas G. Dignan, Esq.
, Harmon & Weiss R.K Gadd III, Esq.,
l Suite 430 Ropes & Gray 2001 S Street, N.W. 225 Franklin Street Nashington, DC 20009 Boston, MA 02110
- Edward A. Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agency 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH)
Boston, MA 02109
- S Frank W. Ostrander Assistant Attorney General Nuclear Safety Unit Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727- 5575 Dated: November 17, 1987 l
L - -----------------o