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i August 27, 1970 W. J. Kaufman, Chairman Limerick Subcomedttes I
S. R. Bush, Vice Chairman, ACES CATEGokY B REPORTS - L13ERICK - 3RL LETTER
, 1970 subject correspondence. Attached is a brief swanary of the informati ented in the No ACES action appears warranted.
This item may be destroyed when you have soupleted yo of this matter.
ur evaluation Original Signed by J. C. McKinley J. C. McKinley i
Staff Assistant Attachments:
- 1) Summary
- 2) DEL ler dcd 8/7/70 ACES Members w/attats cc:
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Form AI.C-318 (Rev,9-53) AECM 0240
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t LDERICK BRL letter dated E==t 7.1970 requests addittenal informatten regarding the applicaties for a cometreaties permit.
information is regwosted in the erses of Supplemental j
1.
Site i
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Rasetor design l
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Reactor Coelant System design 4.
Containment design 1
5.
Core standby Cooling System design j
6.
Plant Safety Analysis
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No ACRS action required.
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Form AEC-518 (Rev. 9-$3) AECM 0240
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t sw Meeting Date: July 29, 1971,,p(p g y:
LIMRICK SUBC00MITTEE METING
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l WASHINGTON, D. C.
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JULY 29, 1971 1-Einh11ahts N applicant (philadelphia Electric Company) has incorporated almost all of the changes and improvements recommended for Newbold Island. Those changes that he has not incorporated are strengthening the biological shield to with-I stand some reactor vessel failures (he has not been requested to do this) and g
providing a reactor building capable of containing 2 pois internal pressure.
He is.Providing improved EpCI and LpCI but the LpCI will be brought to the
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reactor in two independent lines (instead of four) and injected into the core shroud through four separate nossies.
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The applicant has engaged a consultant to develop an environmental monitoring program. This development is well underway and a member of samples have already been taken. The applicant is cooperating with state and federal officials in the development of the program.
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The reactor building is provided with blowout panels that give way at a pressure of 7 inches.of water. N applicant claims that higher pressures i
. would pose more dif ficult operating environment conditions (pressure, temper-
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ature and moisture) on the engineered safety components housed in the reactor building. The~ applicant believes it is undesirable from a personnel hasard and building cleanup point of view to contain the affluents from relatively i
small' process system ruptures. For major rupturea_the blowout panels would be carried away in either case. N applicant estimated that the 7" building could contain 11 instrument line failures while the 2 peig building could withstand about 15 similar failures, i
The applicant estimated that the Standby Gas Treatment System (SCTS) in the reactor building could accMate the fission products released from a 5" diameter hole in the primary containment in the event of a LOCA. A hole i
somewhat larger than 5" in diameter would cause the blowout panels to carry l
evay. N applicant described the proposed reactor building ventilation and mixing system with its filters and the SCTS filter system.
N applicant has agreed to meet the safety Guide on hydrogen control. 'En is seasidering a catalytic recombiner being developed by a number of utilities at Southern Nuclear. No specific design has been proposed however.
0FFICE >
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Form AFC418 (Rev 9-53) AECM 0240 U. S. GOYMNMGT PRINTING OFFICE : m0 0. MS.H6 l
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j Limerick-Meeting Date: July 29.-1971 The applicant has agreed to design and analyse the main steam lies to Class I L
seismic requirements and to apply Group B quality assurance criteria. Be L
raised a question of application of Class I requirements to breme.h line piping L
and its reistionship to his proposal to use a water seal en the main steam l
l line isolation valves. If the applicant can take credit for the time delay of leakage flow through the main steen line he has considerable time to establish the water seal at the isolation valves. If he must assume the toes of piping that -is not Class I (small branch pipes) then he has only a few minutes to establish the seal. This is a new question and is generie to all l
current BURS. Basically it asks if credit can be given to the amistence of less than Class I piping following a LOCA caused by a DBE.
l The Staff and applicant have not yet agreed on the filter efficiencies to be l
allowed for the intake filters on the control room ventilation system.
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The appiteent proposes a bracing system on the wetwell downeomers to prevent i
excessive vibration.
The applicant proposes a liquid radweste treatment system that is improved over those provided at other BWRs.
Attendees-l E
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W. J. Kaufman, Chairman G. E. Lear D. Lang A. A. O' Kelly A. Kar.neke R. Maccary C. F. Siess D. F. Knuth J. C. McKinley, Staff C0:I GE-San Jose GB-AFED f
T. F. Westerman I. F. 8tuart L. 8. Cifford R. Cordova R. L. Lebre Radiation Manamoment Coro
- 8. W. Porter OFFICE >
SURNAME >
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. Form AEC-518 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240
- u. s. comisurst rmTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 406-346
A 0TCIAL USi GNLY h..k}
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. ay Limerick Meeting Date: July %}971
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Attendees Continued Bechtel 3
C. W. Dick R. A. k 1 ford K. E. Schwartstrauber R. E. Logue i
C. 8. Kraft V. 8. Boyer M. J. Hauf J. L. Allen A. M. Appleford A. J. St-s R. F. Schmitz R. L. Fiske H. B. Friend
- 8. L. Daltroff
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J. 8. Kemper L. F. Embino L. B. Fyrih i
Executive session Dr. Kaufman advised the other Subcoemsittee members of the geestions submitted by Dr. Isbin. N other members mentioned the various areas they wanted to explore with either the Regulatory Staff or the applicant. N oe included:
1.
Control Room doses 2.
External. pressure capability of primary containdsent J
3.
Cooling water availability during periods of drought i
4.
Diagonal reinforcing of primary containment structure i
5.
Seismic design eriteria i
6.
Additional sealing of main steam line at the isolation valves
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7.
Testing of engineered safsty festures 8.
Radwaste treatment and release 9.
Hydrogen control Meetina with the Reruistorv Staff Mr. Lear advisejk doeSants most of the cha*ges proposed.
thy 1Subcomunittee that the applicant has submitted Amendment No. 9 to hiefESa Copies of this assadment will be sent to the Commaittee.
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Dr. Rauth noted that this applicant has agreed to meet the safety guide en hydrogen control and is considering a catalytic recombiner but he has met sehmitted any details of the design. Philadelphia Electric has joined several other utilities in sponsoring development of a hydrogen control system by Southern Nuclear Inc.
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Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1910 0 405 346
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DRCIA. USE ONJ Limerick Meeting Date: July 19 1971
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Dr. Easth reported that BEL was satisfied with the reactor building desigm and did not believe that it need be designed to withstand any internal pressure.
In response to Dr. O' Kelly's question regarding the possibility of installing a more highly enriched fuel element in a low enrichment position, Mr. Lear stated the dimensions of the high enrichment elements were euch as to prevent their insertion in a low enrichment zone. It was also noted that this applicant has also gone to the gadolinia type of burnable poison.
Dr. Kaufman suggested that it is about time to stop referring to Part 20 concentrations for reduaste releases and to start referring to the specific values listed in Part 50. Mr. Lear pointed out that the changes in Part 50 are not yet effective but agreed that the AEC would have to refer to Part 50 in its public safety evaluation, j
Mr. Lear felt that the applicant's environmental monitoring program was inadequately documented and noted that the AEC is developing a safety guide i
on this topic. Mr. Lear also reported that, at last, DEL and CE have developed an acceptable seismic design stress limit and it is documented in this application.
Dr. Knuth said that this applicant was upgrading his BCCS to performance in oncess of the 1969 product line. The applicant has agreed to the Newbold Island changes with a few minor variations. He has agreed to inject the LPCI water into the reactor vessel through four separate aossles but feeds these noasles from two instead of four separate risers.
The Staff still has a problem with the applicant's proposal to transfer vital loads to whichever diesel generator set that starts and assumes a load; this is the " swing bus" problem. DEL would prefer that vital leads be supplied by redundant diesels and not rely on automatic transfer devices.
The applicant's proposals on cable installation and identification is documented in Amendment No. 9 and is satisfactory to DEL.
Mr. Lear reported that the applicant has proposed a cryogenic waste gas treatment system that will lipify the menon and krypton gases. These may be bottled or released after a decay period. The system proposed, however, does not have sufficient capacity to handle the gases discharged by the mechanical vacuum pump during plant startups. With the system proposed it appears that the off site dose from gaseous releases will be well below 10 ar/yr.
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t Limerick Meeting Date: July 19, 1971 l
It was also reported that the emergency service water pumps have been put in l
separate cubicles to assure that a pipe failure in one will not flood out the I
other pumps.
The Staff briefly discussed its assumptions for dose calculations for the plant operators in the control room.
Following an accident it is assumed l
that the gases released go through the SGTS and up the stack then out and down onto the control room and into itsventilation system. Since the gases were filtered in the SGTS it is assumed that the control room filters can remove nothing more and they are assigned a sero efficiency. The Staff believes that control room doses can be reduced by using a recirculating ventilation mode for a period of time and by providing at least two widely separated intakes for the ventilation system. The dosas that were calculated included exposure to the operators as theyapproached and departed from the j
facility.
Dr. Siess thought it interesting that the operators that might be right on top of the accident might receive an exposure of only about 30 rem while the general public might get up to 300 rem thyroid dose.
j Dr. Kaufman expressed his concern for an adequate supply of cooling water during periods of drought on stresas whose flow tan be regulated. He said l
that he would be more comfortable if the regdating agencier wocid snake assurances that certain minimum flows would be maintained.
The Staff plans to require only confirmatory tests on the vibration character-l 1stics of the reactor vessel and internals.
DEL is currently evaluating CE's claim that there is a safety factor of 3 against possible collapse of the control rod guide tubes.
l Dr. Siess noted that the ASME code on nuclear vessels does not require l
safety valves be provided if a report is prepared that analyses the con-sequences of overprassuring the vcesel. He thought that he had recently seen a DEL request for such a report. It was noted that in this plant 1
GE has reduced the number of safety valves from four to two.
In response to Dr. O' Kelly's request, it was learned that this applicant has not requested an exemption to proceed with construction.
It was noted that the Fish and Wildlife letter recosamends that no construction permit be issued until its recommendations for cooperation with state and federal agencies are complied with.
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Form AEC-318 lRev. 9 53) AECM 0240
- v. s oornurNT nmTmc orrier i te'io o. sos. sea
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j, Limerick Meeting Date: July 39,~1971' I$-
Noetina with the philadelphia Electrie C=-esy Mr. Kemper opened the applicant's presentation with a listing of 19 changes and improvements (Figure 1) that have been made in the plant since the initial application. All but three of these changes have been documented by amendments to the application. h three remaining will be covered by Amendment No. 10.
The applicant's consultant, Mr. Porter from Radiation Management Corporation, described the environmental monitoring program being developed and stated that some data has already been taken. Routine radiation monitoring statione are being established on ette, on the near side of Pottstown, in Pottstown, Pa.
and sufficiently far from the reactor as to represent a background reading.
l These stations will each have two thermoluminescent dosimeters. The applicant l
hopes that this system will be able to measure the dose to the population.
Two months worth of data has been collected thus far and the background radiation level appears to be about 813.5 aren/mo. or about the some as Bethesda, Maryland.
A system of air particle monitoring stations is being established as well as a program to sample surface and well water upstream und downstream from the plant. 2aw water and treated water at several municipalities will be sampled.
1 An independent study is being made of the migration of ground water under the Limytek site. It is estimated that it will take surface' water 1-1/2 years l
to percolate to the river and 4-1/2 years to reach the other site boundary.
Milk and a number of other food products will be gathered directly from local farms for monitoring. Sampling of aquatic plants and animals will take place upstream, at the plant outfall and at the Vincent reservoir downstream.
l Thus far the monitorips program has been discussed with the state health
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j officials but not with the fish and game department.
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In response to Dr. Kaufman's concern fer activity released from exposed mud flats, the Subcoassittee was told that the Vincent reservoir is used as a silt settling basin and is kept at a constant height so there is no problem with enposed mud banks.
It is also planned to take semples of game, off site.
C Mr. Porter hoped that the program being developed would permit him to salestate j
the man-rom exposure within a 50 mile radius. He indicated that he westd leek l
at food paths but probably only those that are most obvious.
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j form AIC-MB (Rev. 9 53) ALCM 0240 U. 6. novrNNMENT PRDrTDeG OFrtCf: i 1910 O. 40$ 346 a
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t Limerick Meeting Date: July H. M 71 l
l In response to a question regarding the attitude of state officials with i
I respect to the hardening public attitude of the Governor, the applicant said that he has met with many state agencies and has obtained agreements at the technical level. He does not know what af feet the Governor's attitedt will have.
I Mr. Fiske described the reactor building as being a Class I structure founded on sound rock with a concrete roof supported on concrete walls.
The refueling crane rails are supported on separate columns. The roof is 18" thick and the walls are 2 to 2-1/2 ft thick. The building is provided with blowout panels to relieve the internal pressure when it reaches 7" of Operating with higher pressures would present problems of engineered water.
safety features having to operate at high temperature and humidity. Even though the primary containment can withsta.d at least 5 psig external pressure (the steel head appears to be the weak link), the applicant believes it is undesirable to bottle up the ef fluents from a modarste rupture. The applicant expressed some concern for the floor diaphram loads that could exist at higher pressures. He was also concerned for the safety of his i
operators in the building and their ability to reenter in the recovery phase of a minor accident.
The applicant believes that there is an absence of Lucentive to going to l
higher building pressures and several disadvantages. He claimed that there is no significant improvement in the dose delivered to the public. He pointed out that the current design could contain the failure of 11 instrument lines (3/4" orifices) while the 2 peig building could withstand only about
- 15. He presented his design critaris (Figure 2) and his position statement (Figure 3).
Dr. Siess noted that the Standby Gas Treatment System (SCTS) was designed to accommodate at least 1/2%/ day primary containment leakage. He was told that SGTS could accoussodate a hole about 5" in diameter in the primary containment.
A hole slightly larger would cause the blowout panels to open. The applicant presented a curve of containment hole sine vs reactor building pressure and discharge flow rate.
The applicant was aware of the coarseness of this presentation and said that it would be more polished and concise for the full Committee.
The reactor building cleanup and recirculation system is designed to aim and fittar 60,000 sefm. The full flow filter includes HEPA and chareeal elements. About 1% of this recirculatedfflow is taken off to the SCTS where d
it passes through a deep bed charcoal filter (about 15 deep). HEPA filters are located downstream of this charcoal to catch ray charcoal partic les that
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?p f1mm A - mea dennah a bed of larte train charcoal oned Rhe... applicant believes there is no problem with satura' tion of the bed.
Form AIC-518 (Rev.943) AFCM 0240 c, s. covrn.o4ENT PMNTosc orrtcr : as ro o. 40s.34s
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j N applicant pointed out that he has rearranged the refooling floor of the i
reactor building so that the spent fuel transfer cask fits in one section of the canal. Under the sask pit there is a 3 f t thick eencrete well that esteeds all the way down to the reactor building foundation.
In response to Dr. O' Kelly's request for details on the catalytic hydrogen recombiner, the applicant stated that be did not have any yet. Es has agreed to comply with the ABC safety guide on combustible gases. N applicant has joined other utilities in sponsoring work at Southern Buclear to develop a catalytic recombiner but no schedule has been developed.
Mr. Boyer said that the applicant was studying the biological shield to
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balance the accessibility needed for inservice inspection against the l
requirements to protect against a large reactor vessel break. He said that l
break protection could be provided at the expense of the ability to inspect the reactor vessel. N shield itself is a simple composite structure with a 1/2" thick steel shall on the inside,1-1/2" plate on the outside and l
l' 9" of magnetite concrete between. This shield can withstand 70 poi internal j
pressure and will be locally reinforced to withstand the jet forces from the failure of any nossle to safe-end' weld. N proposed design does not have plugs around the nossles and the clearance between the piping and the shield is smaller. There is some concern that this space is too sus 11 to permit adequate inspection.
Dr. Stess inquired into the potential for the shield to produce missiles in l
the event of a vessel rupture and into the ability of the concrete containment I
structure to absorb impact without rupture. The applicant had not analysed I
these possibilities. He had rearranged the steam piping to take advantage to the containment structure to provfde anchorages agair.at pipe whip.
Mr. Boyer assured the Subcommittee that a more definitive design would be presented at the ACES meeting. (Subsequent to the Subcommittee meeting, the applicant was advised that PEL would require studs be used on the outer steel shell to assure that the shield behaved as a composite structure).
l Dr. Siess noted that Newbold Island site letter seid to design for vessel splits. He suggested that such a split might occur at a mossle and extend longitudinally a nossle diameter on each side of the nossle. Es thought it would be nice if the applicant could show that his design could to1 stage seek a failure. Mr. Boyer agreed to look at that case.
3 Mr. Boyer said that the applicant intended to provide additional assuramee against steam leakage past the main steam line isolation valves. This any be accomplished by either putting a water seal on the upstream side of the isolation valves or by providing a third valve. N applicant is hesitant tomjkewaterinjeejtionintothesteamlineam automatic foeture since 3% Nous operation 7ould cause severe-operati ng problemer-N approach taker. will depend somewhat on seismic design sectsions sim:e they will
" M 4tmine what~1eakhge paths uset-be considered and"thus-hoursoon-a-ti54 mesi h et..be..estab1!ished.
Form AEC-518 (Rn. 9-53) ALCM 0240
- c. s, oorrasur:NT PRDiTDIG OFFICE 19'l0 O. 408-346 1
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Limerick MeetingDatetJuly}30s 9F1 l
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w' Ubon considering a 14CA caused by the DRE it has been sustomary to assume that all non Class I components fails thus all non Class I branch piping off of the main sesam line is assumed to be ruptured. If this is the case then the water seal must be established quickly to provent leakage from the containment to the turbine building and release to the atmosphere. If one assumee a TID-14844 release in the reactor vessel anlfission products at the isolation valve plugs instantly then the allowable leak rate of 11 cfh would produce a radiation esposure in the order of 100 rem per minute of leakage. In the past when BEL has looked at this in determining Technical Specification leakage limits, it has allowed the piping to exist and act as a duct to conduct the fission products through a tortuous path l
and allow time for decay.
This applicant has agreed to design and analyse the main steam line to Class I standards and he now is asking if these standards must be applied to smaller branch piping and if so, down to what piping siae.
Mr. Lear said that piping under 2-1/2" diameter need not be Class I.
Be also noted that the calculated doses for the 1ACA are based on leakage from the containment but not including leakage through the main steam isolation valves.
Mr. Boyer agreed to try to clear up this issue before the ACES meeting.
With regard to the calculated control room dose, Mr. Lear explained that DEL had assumed the SGTS deep bed filter had a 90% efficiency for removing eleniental iodine, 70% for methyl iodide, and that 11 of all todine is unremovable. In addition DEL assumed that the centrol room filter was unable to remove anything more from the effluent.
The applicant contended that there is a 90% reduction due to wake effect, dilution, etc. as the effluent goes from the stack to the control room intaka. In addition the operators can cut off the intake of outside air by a manual operation.
DEL hopes to have this resolved by the time of the ACRS meeting.
The applicant has calculated the maximum vibrational displacement of the lower end of the wetwell downcomer pipes to be about 0.2 inches. Be is proposing an extensive system of cross braces to prevent emeessive vibration.
Be is also reexamining the back flow valves in the sides of some dovesemers that serve as vacuum breakers for the drywell. Be is no longer considertag the use of sats valves. Be believes that the drywell peak pressure westd imarease by about 4 pai for each square foot of flow bypass area (that is the area where steam may flow from the drywell to the space above t'as water of the wetwell without bubbling through the pool).
OFTICE >
SURhAME >
DATE>
Form AEC-Sla (Rev. 943) AECM 0240 U. s. novnNMUT MINTING OFFICE : 1910 O. 400-ses
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Dr. Kaufman commented that the lipid redweste treatment system looked abent the same as for other GE systems. Be wondered how this system was going to keep releases below 1% of Part 20 and how it sente recycle the drains from j
the drywell.
N applicant stated that he was gaviding an improved system erer that normally designed by GE.
This improved design imelades two 75,000 gal collecting tanks and an evaporator. h applicant aspoets to be able to recycle all floor and epipment drains. The water will be treated until it is of sufficient polity to be returned to the domineralised water storage tanks. The operators plan to release only the lamadry drains. They claim that no operating plant has a temperable tipid weste system.
In addition the applicant has jotaed a proep of utilities with GE at the Nine Mile point plant to study and better understand redweste handling technipes.
"tth regard to the buildup of trition in the coolant. Mr. Kamper thought that some coolant may have to be discharged to maintain operating limits but that when releases are necessary they esuld be made withoet aseeeding 1% of the allowable release eencontration.
l The applicant has agreed to a cryogenie waste gas trestment system bat has not yet decided upon the ultimate disposition of the menos sait kryptos. It was suggested that these could be released under optimum (hurricans) eenditions.
The applicant espects to collect about two cylinders per year of these noble gases.
The applicant owns the pettstown airport and assured the Subcommittee that it was suitable only for small planes. Be has recently tastalled additiemal electronie navigational aids at the airport. The FAA has agreed to the loestion and height of the site weather towers and wants to fly over the cooling towers when they are completed.
Caucus with the Reaulatory Staff l
It was agreed that the applicant needed to sharpen his presentattees. )
BEL was reposted to explain to the full Ceamittee the staan line water seal he941emandtheleakrateeffectsadoses.
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The applicant is to be prepared with a presentation on low river flow ]
protaction in addition to presentations on the reactor building and bionsgieel shield.
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Date Iseued: August 4, 1971 sunuur >
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1, Form AEC-418 (Rev.9 53) AECM 0240
- v. s. coupurvr PRINTING OFFICE : 19'io O. 405-846
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LOJA-Eg T..navc3. Syste:1 cnd Cent 2Lrent~ Iharting 9.
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- 10. Scpa m ed Fu n Occ;: Pit end R*el Cank Path.
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11;. 11PCI - Core B. re.- Floodinu
- 35. L1'CI Indo.cer. '=t Sr.u.n15 cs
- 16. Bin Sture. L5ne C1tns I Seirnic fin d;ynin
- 17. Sacrificing Shield Reinic.ccement
- 18. Conservative Sein uc Design 19 Desi gn Code T.a. c.u..
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l FIGURE 2 l
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
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Steam Venting Criteria l
s (a)
Pips failure within the secondary containment spaces shall not prohibit adequate core cooling or fail secondary containment structures (b)
Pressure relief and venting shall be provided such that the design pressure of the containment structure and internal partitions is not exceeded.
(c)
Venting of steam via the most direct route to the containment external atmosphere shall be provided.
within the capability of the structural design.
(d)
Venting paths and locations shall be designed such that multiple flooding of containment spaces is excluded and exposure risk of plant personnelis minimized.
(e)
Offsite dose levels shall meet the guidelines set forth in 10CFRIC3.
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FIGURE 3 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION l
. SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Steam Venting Position Statement i
The Steam Venting Criteria utilized in the design of the secondary l
i containment is considered favorable to that of a pressure contain-ment for the following reasons:
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1.
PROTECTION of safety components and plant personnel
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from exposure to extreme environment (temperature, pressure, mdst"-:'.
2.
PROTECTIVE not required by operator ACTION 3.
ISOLATION of pipe break not required to maintain containment structural integrity.
4.
ACCEPTABILITY of radiological consequences resulting from venting of secondary containment.
i 5.
ACCESSIBILITY of building spaces and equipment.
6.
INS PECTABILITY of plant components and systems.
7.
MAINTAINABILITY of system equipment and components.
8.
TESTABILITY of critical components during operation.
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I liIIRTCS ETCTY-THIRD FLETIUG 1
ADVISORY C0ffIITIEE ON REACTOR SATEGUARDS Washington, D. C.
January 28-30, 1960 Attendance:
ACRS I/a bers L. Silverman, Chairran C. R.11cCullou6h, Vice Chairmn W. P. Conner, Jr.
R. L. Doan 7
W. K. Ergen
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F. A. Gifford, Jr.
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H. W. Devson K. R. Osborn D. A. Rogers R. C. Stratton T. J. 'Eno=pscn C. R. Willic=s ACRS Staff J. B. Gralm:1, hecutive Secretary R. F. Praley, Assistant to E::ecutive Secretary D. Duffey, Technical Secretary T. Uaner Consultants A. J. Kirschbaum H. D. Earkins (part time)
J. M. Harrer, AHL D. Ohrent, AKL i
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_TArLE OF COINS Page No.
I.
Executive Session
'A.
Dr. Edvard Teller.....................................
2 1.
Fermi Reactor.....................................
2 2.
PlutoProject(SECRET /RD).........................
4 B.
Me eti:y; with AEC......................................
5 C.
Procedures............................................
6 1.
ORNL and Idaho Incidents..........................
7 2.
Inspections.......................................
7 3
Site Criteria and other Regulations...............
8 4.
ACRS Attorney.....................................
8 D.
Subcornitt e e s.........................................
9 E.
Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor (C71R)................
9 F.
Miscellaneous.........................................
9 G.
Eazards Evaluation Branch (EB) and Division of Inspection 1
1.
Radiation PJfects Reactor (RER)...................
11 j
2.
ArntePackagePoverReactor(APPR).................
11 3
Dresden...........................................
12
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4.
Pathfinder Reactor................................
12 5
PZtE-3A...........................................
12 i
6.
Unl i n n Rea cter....................................
12 l
7 EB Act i ons.......................................
12 8.
Inspections.......................................
12 9
Miscellaneous.....................................
13 II. Vallecitos Boiling ' Tater Reactor (VBTR)
A.
Executive Session.....................................
14 B.
Hazards Evaluation Branch ( EB).......................
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C.
GeneralElectric(Vallecitoslaborator/')..............
14
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III. Plutonium Recycle 'Iest Reactor (PRTR)
A.
Executive Session.....................................
16 B.
Bazards Evaluation Branch (EEB).......................
16 C.
General Electric (G.E.)...............................
16 IV. Yankee Atomic Electric Con:peny A.
Executive Session.....................................
18 B.
Hazards Evaluation Branch ( EB).......................
18 C.
Yankee and Westinghouse...............................
18 l
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Page No.
V.
NS SAVANWJI A.
Executive Gescion....................................
20 B.
Hazards 1, valuation Branch (BEB)......................
CO C.
Ihritte Ministration, U. S. Coast Guard, Babecck & Wilcox, States Ihrine, and New York Shipbuilding Corporation.............................
20 VI.
Irtters A.
Sumn ry Intter ( AFPENDIX "A")........................
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B.
General Elcetric Vallecitos Boilira Water i
Reactor ( GEVBTR) (AFPEIDIX "B")......................
25 '
I C.
Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PKPR) (APPENDIX "C").
28 /
)
D.
Yankee Nuclear Power Station - Yankee Atomic l
Electric Company (APE E IX "D")......................
32 -
E.
Nuclear Merchant Ship (I;. S. SAVAIHIAH) (APPENDIX "E").
34 F.
Experiantal Boiling Water Reactor (EBTR)
(APPENPIX "F").......................................
38 -
G.
Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor (CVTR) - ExcItsion Area (APPENDIX "G")..................................
39 -
3 H.
Northern States Power Company - Pathfinder Atomic I
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PowerP2 ant (AFFEUDIX"H")...........................
40 v l
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Hal'nm IIuclear Power Facility (MTF) (APPENDIX "I")..
42 j
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EXECUTIVE SESSION l
Dr. Edward Teller l
l Dr. A. J. Kirschbaum, Livermore laboratory, Mr. Price, Dr. Booth and Dr.
Beck, Division of Licensing and Regulation, joined the Comittee during the greater portion of Dr. Teller's presentation.
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l Fer.ni Reactor.
Dr. Teller, who had read recent technical reports on this reactor and had discussions with Dr. T. Pigford, now teachin6 nuclear engineering at the University of California, comented as follows:
At the end of World War II, the fast breeder vaD given a top priority in the United States; however, as yet this country, unfortunately, has no sizable reactor cif this type, while both the Russians and the British do.
i The Fermi reactor presents many hazards even though the safety study is l
probably the most thorough to date and the experience from the EBR-I has been available.
Situations of particular interest from a hazards point of view are: the t
presence of a large arount of fissionable raterial in the reactor; there my be uncertainties regarding the Doppler effect, although it seems this f
coefficient for U 238 can be unde to override that of the U 235 in fast systems by appropriate design; certain chemical changes with the core and l
blanket materials might result in an increase of reactivity rather than a i
decrease as in most other reactors; any slight addition of hydrogen or other moderating materials, perhaps with chemical combination, would be extremely serious so that orscnic materials must be kept from the system; molybdenum is used to stabilize the core metal and there is likely to be unkmwns in the metallurgical phase diagrcm for this system, which has not had extensive study or use; finally, if a coolant channel should over-heat, the sodium might boil causing melting of the fuel and blocking of that thannel with more overheating.
(Dr. McCullough said sodium hydride had been, identified in the Sodium Reactor Experiment [Sq7d As a msult of such circu= stances, the internal reactor constitution is subject to variation and difficult to predict.
Accident calculations can never be exhaustive, and it is hopeless to try to make them so.
In any case, one cannot discount the possibility of a nuclear accident equivalent to the release to several tons of TUT of energy which might be sufficient to rupture the containment vessel. All this make it 1:qperative that the operator keep accurate records of all events during l
carly operations and rehe a co=plete investigation of any unexplained l
phenomnon.
Dr. W ller believes construction above ground of this reactor was a mistake and that for sometime future reactors of this type, particularly those that might be plutonium fueled, should be underground. Bowever, he felt OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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l OFFICIAL USE OIEY that the urgency to demonstrate operation of a fast breeder reactor is such that the Femi pile n:ust be allowed to operate where it is, since any underground requirement would uean a delay of at least a year or two.
The depth of an underground chamber to contain nuclear explosions is fairly vell known from recent tests; this is about 500 feet underground for an explosion with a yield equivalent to a kiloton and perhaps 200 feet for 100 tons of TNT energy release (scaling is roughly as the cube). Based on this, perhaps a few hundred feet underground vould be satisfactory for containment of a fast reactor accidental explosion. The Swedes build reactors underground and say it is no more expensive; however, it was pointed out by Dr. Williams that the Swedish geology may be more favorable for such construction than is much of the geology in the United States.
Dr. Teller stated he had avoided testifying at the Femi react.or hearings, since there vere good arguments on both sides. Dr. Iban said he had ex-pressed an opinion towards a remote site for a fast breeder pIttotype and had not been asked to testify at the he.arings. The Femi reactor is to be kept at low power for at least a year, and Dr. Silveman noted that useful Dounreay experience is becoming available.
With regard to the positive temperature coefficient noted with the EBR-I,
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IXC-I core and attributed to bowing of the fuel elements, Dr. McCullough j
reported the IMIE-III core,which was constructed to eliminate bowing, showed no positive coefficient; however, loosening this core so that bowing might occur did not reproduce the positive coefficient of the 1%RK-I core. This has left some uneasiness with Dr. Brooks, & nirman of the Subco:nittee.
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v 0FFICIAL USE ONLY Meeting with AEC Prior to meetin6 with the Atomic EnerEy Commissioners, the Comittee in a separate meeting outlined possible items for discussion. AEC site selection without early notification of the ACES appeared to be the principal item needing discussion.
Members of the Comission and its staff present included Mr. McCone, Mr. Graham, Mr. Floberg, General Luedecke and Mr. Finan.
Mr. McCone reaffirmed the AEC's desire to promote reactors only with the appropriate safety, since an accident is likely to delay the program. Dr. Silverman asked for earlier information on reactor site actions by the AEC; the Piqua situation was cited as an example where early site information vould have been quite helpful to the ACRS.
Dr. McCullough said the Brookhaven High Flux Reactor and the Saline Water Plant at Point Ia:n near San Diego, California, are other reactors in which an official press release, including location, was recently made with no notification to the ACRS. Mr. McCone said Dr. Beck's Hazards Evaluation Branch (HEB) has given advice on the Point Ioma site, which I
was a joint choice of the Department of Interior and the AEC; Mr. McCone j
believes the EEB, which is always consulted on new sites, should have
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the same feelings as the ACRS because of the close contact, which should lessen the need for close ACES consultation on each site.
Mr. McCone related a recent request to him by a California group for i
site criteria for a 300 ST reactor and asked what e.re tbc ACRS site criteria.
Dr. Tho:::pson said there is probably not sufficient infomation available as yet to set very definite site criteria without requiring considerable over-design in containment and the like, which brings economics into the picture. He reported that a group, of which he is a member, set up by Dr. Beck to study the general problem has been unable to Get the radiological hazards man to prescribe an allwable dose for
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outside personnel, which is a fud!nm ntal value for any criterie. Dr.
Gifford stated scce site criteria could probably be set now.
Dr. Ergen said past guidelines for locating reactors may be becoming generally acceptable, but that giving such general rules an official status so that they are inflexible to change may be undesirable. Mr. McCone saw no need for such guidelines to be for official publication since they would be of use only to a limited group composed of power plant p h e rs and designers. A number of safety aspects of reactors in which the public is likely to be concerned was discussed; Dr. Silverman said many of the reactors have special features, often added after the initial conception of the project to acenmnante research and development, which makes ACRS judgment difficult. Competence of the or6anization is a particular problem; Dr. Ergen said that the least competent reactor builders are often the biggest comp 2niners because they are probably unaware as to CFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Whether or not they are being held up by the AEC or ACRS.
Dr. Bompson said he felt the competency of the AEC reactor hazards staff has been steadily improving.
Complaints vere reFistered on the unavailability to the ACRS of pertinent AEC documnts, for example, reports on the Experimental Ibiling Water Reactor (EEWR) by the Division of Inspection and on reviews of the NS SAVANNAH. Se EIMR report was requested by letter to Mr. Nelson with no ansver; the reason given was that it contained much infomation beyond safety procedures not of concern to ACRS - later Dr. Pittman give the ACRS this report. An AEC Staff Paper on the NS SAVANNAH vas desired but the ACRS was given only an excerpt.
l Procedures Recently, the Division of Licensing and Regulation notified the Joint Comittee an Atonic 1%ergy of a new procedure to set hearing dates on applica-l tions soon after the scheduled ACRS review, pending, of course, the results of this review; the letter from Mr. Price to Senator Anderson i
was read. Also included were procedures on document room availability
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of infortntion and press releases. Se principal change is the schedul-I j
ing of a hearing prior to any ACRS action. Several Comittee members j
j believe this definitely pressures the ACRS for action and may imply that the ACRS has been a delaying factor in past cases.
Dr. Doan suggested that time might be saved by limiting the extent of reviews at the con-i struction pemit stage and having the major presentation when the operating license is desired.
(With respect to scheduling, Dr.
Silvermn outlined certain history of the Pathfinder Reactor which i
vas first proposed in the fall of 1957; fourteen months later the ACRS was officially informd. Se superheat feature was added later l
vithout notifying the ACRS, and it was only Inst summer that the ermittee mde its reviev. ) Under the proposed AEC rules, site clearance and excavation vould requ'.re no pemit; the construction permit would specify certain construction conditions, and the operating licenee would set three stages of activities, namely, fuel loading, criticality and starteup, i
and finn 11y, full power operation. Bere would be two Icarings or operations; one for the loading and the start-up stages,and another for i
the full power operation.
Mr. Finan has checked into the activities of the Federal Aviation Agency with respect to aircraft licensing and found that certain of their methods might be applied to reactor licensing.
Dr. Silverran reviewed the regulating procedure by which an airplane company develops a new plane and finally obtains a license; this may cover a perioul of several years.
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?r. McCullough said the record of the Hearing P==4=r on the Dresden case was well written and reviewing such records might be helpful to the I
ACPS. Some believed this would be requesting vork which the ACRS should not perfom unless specifically asked. A motion for the ACRS to review l
4 such record when requested by the Hearing P=m4=r was not passed. The
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consensus was that the ACRS was not volunteering and each case would be given separate attention.
ORNL and Idaho Incidents. Dr. Ergen described releases of radioactivity at ORNL in October and November. The first was while replacing a fan on off-gas blowers to a stack. Certain accu:mdated debris, including radio-active ruthenium, was loosened and blown out; large particulate settled on the site. The latter was a chemical explosion in a processing cell near the graphite pile. A little plutonium from the solutions got out into the street and was tracked into the pile building. _The entire area was given a very thorough cleanind; there was new construction, including l
new roofs, and the total cost was about $160,000. As a result of these i
and other incidents, Mr. Frank Bruce has been placed at the head of a l
radiation hazards and control group to review all local operations hav.
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ing in mind such incidents, f
Dr. Doan recounted the recent release of radioactivity at the Idaho l
Chemical Processing Plant. Stainless steel fuel elements were being processed and because the dissolving is quite slow there was storage of intermediate product. The solution level in the storage tanks (tall, l 3 en11 diameter tanks for a non-critical configuration) exceeded the i
usual height. Vent piping from these tanks goes to a vaste tank in the l
lower reaches of the building, where it is shielded from the operating levels. Sparge air for mixing was being introduced to the tanks as part of a sacpling procedure. Too much air was used and solution was forced into a vaste tank where a critical amount accumulated.
It is believed that a flash of steam stopped the flow of solution, and the system vent sub-critical. The fission products released went through j
the ventilation system and out the stack, and the cloud, which remained only briefly in the area, exposed four people. There was very little activity at the working area of the plant. Had this occurred during the day rather than late at night, more persons probab4y would have been exposed. The incident stemed from the extensive provisions for plant flexibility.
Inspections. The EBWR report of the Division of Inspection, referred to at the meeting with the Commissioners was read; much of the criticism was more administrative than technical.
It was suggested that copies of adverse criticism should go to the indivianM a or organizations involved. Se comittee voted to write a follow up to its November 14, 1959 letter on the EBIR. It is attached as Appendix "F."
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- v OFFICIAL LEE ONLY The Division of Inspection appears to some Comittee members to be greatly understaffed to perform satisfactorily; however, Colonel Stratton stated that, in any case, a very thorough job should be done on the facilities which are inspected. A comment was made that the unsatis-factory nature of many reactor instrument systems may have escaped the attention of the inspectors because of no inspection or only a cursory l
one.
Site criteria and other Regulations. Dr. Thompson said members of Dr.
Beck's interim group to lay out a program on site criteria included other than himself:
Sterner (EastmanKodak),leverett,Nyer,Spinrad,Worthington (Babcock represented him), Western, man, and Dalzell, Mr. Finan told the group that standards are necessary for any firm regulatory function. This group is to be a steering comittee with the work being done by the national laboratories and others.
Recently, the ASE code on containment vessels had been distributed to the ACRS for coment. The American St.nnelmis Association (ASA), which formlizes standards but does not create them, held a meeting in January on reactor st.nMnvds. A gas cooled reactor symposium is to be held in
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Philadelphia on February 11 and scxne ACRS members plan to attend.
A recent letter from Admiral Rickover to the Chief of Naval Operations relaxes certain procedures on nuclear submarine operations. Routine movements no longer require contacting the Naval Reactors Branch (NRB).
3 Home and other regularly visited ports have been identified. Another I
letter from Admiral Rickover to Dr. Pittman formalizes certain safety review methods of the NRB.
ACRS Attorney. The AEC vishes to assign as the attorney to assist the ACRS, Mr. Axelrad, who was believed by Mr. Naiden to be uniquely qualified because of a background as both an engineer and a lawyer (Mr. Flaine has left the AEC for a private position). Mr. Axelrad works with Mr.
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Iowenstein, who is a counsel for the DLvision of Licensing and Regula-i tion. A rotion was passed that the ACRS counsel should have no attach-I ment to the Division of Licensing and Regulation. Mr. Naiden was sub..
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sequently informed of the ACES decision; off-hand, he did not see any t
reason for an objecticn to this dual responsibility of Mr. Axelrad.
A private attorney with the ACES perhaps as a acmber was suggested by Dr.
Silverman; he might be of particular assistance in drafting letters.
An attorney on the ACRS would be a departure from the concept of this Com=1ttee as a purely technical one; of course, the AEC must appoint members. There has been a little criticism of the briefness of the i
ACRS letters and Dr. McCullough believed more detail might be of help to the Hearing Pmm4nar.
The ACRS often brings out points which the EB misses, which are of interest to the PraMner. The AEC Hearing Reder was said to have kept h4-1f vell apart frcan the other AEC officials and I
employees.
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-9 Subcommittees The following subco::nittees were appointed:
Boiling Nuclear Superheater (BONUD, Puerto Rico)
W. K. ErSen, Chaiman L. Silveman H. W. Newson C. R. W1111er.s l
D. A. Rogers Consumers of Michigan (RLg Rock Plant)
R. C. Stratton, Cha1 man W. K. Ergen B. L. Doan K. R. Osborn J.M.Harrer(Consultant)
Peach Botton Atomic Power Station (Philadelphia Electric C e ny)
R. L. Doan, Chairman F. A. Gifford y
D. A. Rogers T. J. Thompson
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C. R. Williams I
NASA Plum Brook Reactor Facility 4
D. A. Rogers, Chaiman H. W. Nevson R. C. Stratton A. Wolman Consolidated Edison Reactor (fienbership revised)
K. R. Osborn, Chaiman C. R. McCullou6h l
L. Silveman R. C. Stratton T. J. Thompson i
Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor (CVTR) k l
The Comittee was asked by the Division of Licensing and Regulation if the i
proposal to provide right of way for a State bridge to be built through the exclusion area for the Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor would change its i
advice as to the suitability of the site. The Comittee furnished advice in a letter, which is attached as Appendix "G."
Miscellaneous Dr. Silveman recently visited mMk River, and talked at length with l
l Dr. George Invrence, a member of the Canadian counterpart of the ACRS.
l The Canadians desire very much to cooperate with the ACRS and are quite OFFICIAL USE ONLY l
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY villing to transmit on an unofficial basis a copy of the ha m ds report on the CANDU reactor (it is to be operated by a utility).
Dr. Invrence would like to listen to the ACRS review of the Femi reactor. Mr. Osborn saw a difficulty in that if a representative of a foreign country were allowed to do this, a state official, e.g., from Michigan or New York might reasonably request a similar privilege; perhaps Dr. Lavrence's attendance as a consultant would be more appropriate. The nnna& fans desire a joint meeting of the safety groups of the two countries to exchange ideas; implementation is a problem.
Dr. McCullough reported on a conference with Gen. Luedecke and Mr. Finan in which the latter's duties were outlined. One task is to write a sort of charter for the ACRS to define the points of contact for the public and others reganling safety.
Dr. McCullough believes certain of the AEC would just as soon see the ACRS disbanded by repealing the law, specifying it but Congress seems unHkely to do this. The conflict between the prcoo-tional aspects of the AEC and its regulatory function results in this attitude towards the ACRS advisory position. Dr. McCullough believes that on several occasions the ACRS has probably kept the AEC out of trouble over reactor cases.
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The point Ioma installation is to make fresh water from sea vater and is to provide for both oil and nuclear heating. There is controversy over j.
this being a satisfactory site because of nearby submrine activities.
A motion to appoint a Point Iom Reactor subcommittee was not passed.
I Bowever, a rotion for a subcom=ittee to consult with the AEC and to render inform 1 advice to the Committee on saline water was passed; Dr. McCullough, Chairman, Dr. Gifford and Dr. Wolman were appointed.
Recent tests on condensing steam in water in the pressure suppression fashion (proposed by the Humboldt Bay reactor group) have been carried out for private utilitics by Sargent and Lundy. The early results with the steam nozzles pointed down and the steam suddenly released by the bursting l
j of a diaphragm seemed satisfactory; pictures shoved the action was quite j
violent. Subsequent tests with the nozzles pointed horizontally cracked the outside vessel and the fractures appeared to be brittle. There was indication of shock waves. Since the vessel was a used item of equipment whose history was not well known, conclusions are conjectural. However, the utilities withdrev support and now Sargent and Lundy is seeking AEC funds. The CANDU group vas interested in these experiments, and is now concerned by the vessel failure.
One of the recent Russdan visitors, Alexandroff, project engineer on the innin (the Icebreaker), was reported to have remarked on three occasions j
to the effect that the Consolidated Edison Reactor was quite dangerous
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and would not be built in Russia. His concern was apparently the increased reactivity from the build-up of U-233 and the multi-region OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Be relatively slow decay of Pa-233 to U-233 (27-day half-life) means an appreciable delay in the appearance of this fissionable mterial. This reactor has cost abcut twice the original estimates and like the NS SAVANNAH it is new technical endeavor for Babcock & Wilecx.
Hazards Evaluation Branch (HEB) and Division of Inspection Radiation Effects Reactor (RER). Dr. Martin Biles reported on his three-day visit to the Dawsonv111e lockheed reactor, at the request of the Air Force, to give the usual reactor operator examinations to fifteen memlers of the staff (eight were of professional level). On the written questions, the grades were relatively high and ranged from 93, which is very high, down to 54, which was quite lov (the highest grade at Dresden was 88).
n e three failures were men of routine operating level (not professional people) who were encouraged to try the m m h tion at the last minute.
The grades on the emergency procedulwes were lover.
During reactor operation a five-mn team is in the control room of which three are professional level. A supervisor directs the operator who f
handles the control rod drives. Dr. Biles was complimentary of the
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team's work, and as a comparison, he would rate the lockheed group a little stronger than the Westinghouse Testing Reactor operating crew.
Continuity of the Iockheed crew may be a problem since it has been mentioned that members of the group may assist in sta241ng the Ohio State reactor. A veakness in the operation is that the staff above the
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operator level does not seem very interested in the project; this my result from the fact that during the six hours of operation for one shift the centrol room is isolated which discourages nnnntement visits.
The start-up channel is still poor, and the recorders fluctuated considerably. The period meter also oscillated but is not used at power. A second start-up channel is being installed, which is kmvhat
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difficult because of the m,n11 size of the core; an available critical facility is assisting. Current operations are at 3 W with the reactor in the exposed position and no troubles were noted during the three days.
Dr. Beck stated he vould not allow 10 W operation until the start-up channel was repaired. The control over access to the reactor area seemd satisfactory to Dr. Biles. Any opening of doors to the area scrams the reactor.
Army Package Power Reactor (APPR). Radioactivity from Cobalt-60, apparently from the stainless steel of the fuel elements, is building up in the water coolant section away from the core. Somhow it dissolves into the water and deposits outside in the cooler regions. This is unique with the APPR. Se radioactive film which also contains iron, chro=1um, manganese my be as much as 0 5 to 0.8 mmigrams per C8 thick. The radiation level is as high as 8 to 9 roentgens per hour of gamma rays. Water win wash away much of this deposit.
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Dresden.
Dr. Beck said about 3% of the fuel elemnts had cracks in the zircaloy cladding. After a re-check of an the fuel, the core was loaded; then the control rods were found to stick and shear pins broke. Se con-trol rod design was described.
In scre eing, the looseness in the coupling and sudden stopping caused the shear pins to give. Speeds have been changed s omvhat, linkaces were tightened, and stronger pins have been instaned.
The pcsition indicators on the console read only the rod follower position, so there was some danger in not knowing where the actual absorbing section is.
These rod changes did not require a license amendment. Dr. McCullough was concerned over the fcilure of the very thorough preliminary courponent tests to show these diffic 11 ties.
pathfinder Reactor.
Dr. Beck said Amendants 4 and 5 to the Pathfinder application, submitted since the ACRS letter, give a summary of meteorology and site informtion and certain financial procedures of the cargpany which do not significantly alter the prer$cus hasard picture. Possibly the amendments my indicate A1113, r'hahrn is plaming more testing. (Appendix "H")
HTRE-3A.
Mr. Neve11 reported on last week's neting on the air cleaning problem.
Certain electrostatic precipitator uperiments shoved iodine I
removal from air of about 50%; vith the addition of carbon black of 40
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micron size, oil mist, and alumina this vent to about 85% to 90%. Better
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control of the carbon addition might improve these figures. 'fests have showna50%to75%iodinereleasefrommeltedfuelwhichisaboutthat j
expected from the metal fuel. Conclusions have not yet been reached on the usefulness of such a precipitator. A decision must be made about March 15 on the future of the program, and air cleaning vin be a factor.
Hallan Reactor. The Scdium Reactor Experiment (SRE) fuel failure has led to a delay in the Hallam project, but the AEC has not mentioned any pos-sible cancenation of the program. The Division of Inspection vill probably be asked to inspect Hallam, although this is not required.
Causes for the power excursions noted in the SKE have not been detem.ined;
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fuel movement is a suspected cause. Perhaps ten half-rods of fuel are stin in the bottom of this reactor.
(Onthefavorablesideofthe picture, the SEA WOLF reactor, which operated for about two years, had a very clean sodium system when dismntled.) The Committee is unhappy about the operation of the SRE after irregularities were noted. (See Appendix "T.")
HEB Actions. Recent EEB actions were reviewed and two were specifically cited. Consumers of Michigan submitted its hazard report recently. EEB has concluded that operation of the PM-1 Nuclear Power Plant (a 9 3 thermal megawatt APPR-type reactor) Sundance, Wyo=ing, vin not constitute a public hazard; this reactor vin be only partly contained.
Inspections. Dr. Mann reported the inspecting is by Dr. Marris and four others; some operate out of field offices, e.g., Idaho. There is a shortaEe of manpcr,rer for this work. There is no resident inspector at OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Dresden; in general, Dr. mnn is against this, because it my tend to relieve the mmgement of its responsibility. Other coments were:
General Electric has much talent at Dresden for the start-up. %ere is agitation for inspection of the NS SAVAHNAH, but Dr. 2 nn is uncertain as to his role with this reactor. The method of checking on reactor control rod design was described. The General Electric Test Reactor (GETR) bypasses its period instruments, at full power as do other boiling systems, because of fluctuations.
Miscellaneous. Items which are fairly definite for the March agenda are:
BONtB (Puerto Rico), Consu:aers of Michi ca, Banford Power Ievels, NPR, 6
C ast Reactor, and BTHE-3A. The first two of these vill be Florida West o
at the construction per=it stage. The Consolidated Edison group my appear for information purposes; the Humboldt Bay, Peach Bottom, NASA, and Point Io:na reactors and a report on a site for smil nuclear power plant are other possibilities.
Pacific Gas 8e Electric considered asking for a hearing on the Humboldt Bay reactor but gave it up for the moment; HEB is still avaiting informa-tion on the method of extrapolation 6 data from laboratory tests to full scale on the pressure suppression system.
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Dr. Beck vas asked to furnish informtion on his technical staff and to identify individuals concerned with specific reactor reports to the ACRS.
(In blay 1958 there was a similar request. The names and background vere mde available but the contributors to EEB reports were not; the excuse was that nearly all HEB reports were contributions from most of the HEB staff rather than an individual.) Dr. Gifford asked Dr. Beck for information on diffusion coefficients in air over water, which is important, particularly for the Humboldt Bly, Point Ic=a, NASA, and Peach Ibttom reacters. The Division of Licensing and Regulation plans a report soon on the oil-air explosion hazaris and consequences for all reactors.
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY VALLECITOS BOILING WATER RIlTTGR (VWR)
I I
Deccutive Session Dr. Ergen reported for the Subcorcittee. The VBWR staff had not been aware 2
of explosions with air systems at low pressure, i.e., 150 lbs/in ; fire resistant synthetic oilo vill now be used in the air pressure system. An explosion with soap lubrication was reported by Dr. McCullough; however, this my have been from oil left from earlier operations. The problem of the control rods sticking in the stuffing boxes remains; each rod is to l
have a separate air accu::ndator supply.
The grazing in the controlled area was discussed. There is little precedent i
for control of such off-site activities. Certain regulations exist limiting l
l the amount of radioactivity in mat and other foods, but the extent of i
enforcement of these regulations is a question. This ray be more of a legal problem than of health safety.
l Hazards Evaluation Branch (EB) 1 EB is satisfied with the plans to safeguard a6ainst air-oil eglosions;
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compressors are to have carbon piston rin6s.
Dr. Beck said gnmaa exposure during the grazing activities is probably j
more important than contamination of mat. The problem is a procedural j
i one in monitoring, which other sites also have. Sometime ago, Dr. Libby proposed in New England the possibility of having controlled exclusion areas around reactors as a part of the State Park system.
The force required for insertion of rods has been reduced from over 1400 lbs. to about 800 lbs. by improving the chevron seals. There is a complex interlock system between the code of reactor operation under atu'ty, e.g.,
the different coolant circulation methods, and the controls. Mr. Harrer g
stated that consistent rod performance rather than just measured drop times is of more importance.
General Electric (Vallecitos Iaboratory)
This reactor started in 1957 and reached 30 MR in 1938. Most operations have been with just natural circulation; forced circulation is now desired by the experimental program. An all UO2 core is p hnned. The interlocks between both the forced and natural circulation system were outlined.
Ibffles in the core rmst be changed for the new recirculation. A plot was drawn of the log of the heat flux at burn-out versus the log of the quality of the steau; the regions of data from work at University of California, Ion Angeles, Bettis Field, and VBWR vere indicated. Estimates OFFICIAL USE ONLY l
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have been rade of the raximum rod worth for different cores under considera.
I tion and the worth of the control rods vill be determined during initial start-up of new cores.
The clou droppinc rods were discovered last September, power level was I
curtailed, and tests to investigate were initiated. The plans are to l
reduce the stroke of the rods, to increase their weight, and speed and to eliminate the e:tplosion possibilities in the air system. Se drives, I
which are above the missile shield, were shown in a slide. Diagrams were shown of the pneumatic system with its two scram air teaks. Plots were presented of: time versus the pressure, friction, rod travel, and acceleration; coefficient of friction versus speed with different loads; the distance traveled by the rods versus time for the original rods, for a rod with a rodified seal, and for one with a modified ser1 lubricated by molybdenum disulfide, which was the fastest of the group.
4 The stuffing box rod drives vere chosen instead of other types be:.ause of the feeling of safety frou having the working parts und.er lover pressure 1
ani from having the power supply in an air environment. We rods have I
never stuck to prevent insertion, although they have stuck en occasion on withdrawal because of increased friction from standing with the rods inserted, poison injection system backs up the rods. The plen is to test the rods for transient information when the system is thermally hot. About 5 minutes are required to perform a test of rod drop for time versus position.
The total of 7 rods are involved and G.E. vill perform a statistically i
significant nurber of tests on the new rods.
In the original design, the rod driving force was about 2000 lbs. With the friction, which is velocity dependent, ranging from 430 to a 1350 lb. peak. With a bigger cylinder the new rods vill have a driving force of about 2300 lbs. and the friction vill range from 300 to a peak of something over S30 lbs.
0.E. c1mfm consistent frictien data on the rods.
Dr. Doan and Dr. W1111 cms said the synthetic compressor oil.s vould probably only reduce the air-oi' e::plosion hazard rather than eliminate it.
(Sese
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synthetic oils are usunUy either chlorinated hydrocarbons or phosphate esters.) Uitrogen is not used instead of air, because of the large quantity required.
Although the exposure of the pressure vessel, "nyt," could not be recalled by G.E., it was believcd to be relatively low because of the large amount of water around the core.
The Comittee, in executive session, prepared a letter to the AEC Chairman on this project, chown ts /ppendix "E."
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0FFICIAL USE OIEY I PIUTOIGUM RECYCLE TEST REACCOR (PRTR)
Executive Session Dr. Nevson reported for the subecmmittee and reviewed their reservations on this reactor. He noted that the Hanford nactors of var design had by-j pass arrangements for an safety controls because of uncertainties in instrument reliability and the desire to pemit operations at all times.
Dr. McCullough suggested it desirable to see if persons experienced in Banford operations would be employed for start-up. The use of moderator level control, although a very good idea, is relatively untried, and Mr.
Harrer doubted if the amount and kind of control planned is possible.
There is a possibility of a mtal water n action. Reactivity coefficients may be relatively unknmin, because of the fever delayed neutrons from the l
plutoniu=. Use of manual control for a while in lieu of the automatic l
moderator system seems desirable.
Hazards Evaluatien Branch (EE3)
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Certain rod drives which have given difficulties have been changed. There l
l are to be two start-up channels, which vill not be used after the fission product inventory has been built up so the gamma ray neutron reactions cause the intermediate range instruments to read. The assumptions on core melting are not clear.
General Eleetric (G.E.)
This 70 themal megavatt reactor heavy water (Dgo) cooled and rederated has about 85 tubes. The 410 psi steam produced in a heat exchanger v111 be condensed and discarded in the Columbia River. Because of the steel strike, the construction contractor has changed the original completion i
date to May 20.
Control, which can be automatic, is to be by varying the D20 level. Icakage of neutrons replaced absorption loss in rods. Shere are provisions for water injection for reserve cooling. The hazards review group of the General Electric Compary has studied this reactor and their recommendations have been taken into account.
General Electric is confident that the moderator control obtained by balancing helium gas pressure a6ainst the D 0 level is workable; the 2
system was described vith aid of slides. DgG 1evel control is believed by G.E. to be more foolproof from mechanical failure and to reduce flux dipping fn the system. Scra
- g is by dumping D 0.
Tests have showed 2
the dump valves to open in 0.03 sec. (meximum time was 0.05 sec. so that I>20 loss vould be in at'least 0.1 sec.). The duqp velves are held closed by a magnet and opened by a 4000-pound spring. If contact points of the direct current relays of this dump system should veld, the coincidence circuity would requim that both veld for a failure.
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a OFFICIAL USE ONLY As now envisioned the reactor vill be shut down and started about weekly to change five or six fuel elements to serve the testing program, which means the position of the D 0 level for criticality vill vary. Se 2
Canadian's Chalk River reactor (!'RX) is the only other reactor that has used heavy vater level control; however, their KPD and CANDU reactors are to have sMh control. Shift supervisors have worked briefly at both the Chalk River and Savannah River plants.
"he reactor characteristics with the D 0 at the operation level have been 2
studied thoroughly by multi-group amlysi%
A measured coefficient is used in the Doppler calculations.
Dcperiments on pu=p seal tests have shown lov lecka6e. Tests on pressure
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tubes, being completed now, have revealed no hazardous conditions.
G.E.
believes the existing data on metal vater reactions is satisfactory for predicting the behavior of the zircaloy pressure tubes. A particle size of 3 mm. of zirconium was said to give a 10# reaction with vater. The p
autoclave tests on fuel elements are continuing; the recent explosion was from too much electrical energy and the type of reaction is not considered unusual for the conditions.
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A full-sized model has been used for fluid dynamics tests of the level
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control procedure. Oscillator tests have been mde on this model and resonances were found at betusen 45 and 50 cycles a minute which would have a::cunted to a build-up in heavy vnter height equivalent to about.25 x 10-3 of reactivity. A neutron signal determines the gas pressure which sets the D 0 level, and, of course, the operator can override any automtic 2
control condition. There are limits on the rate of reactivity addition.
The opinion was expressed by Dr. Doan that the liquid level method is equivalent to only one control rod.
It was pointed out by G.E. that all experiments on the control system can be carried at low power. Waves in the liquid level system to vary the reactivity are a possibility. Be Comittee I
was not sure the automatic control 2 tally added to the safety of the i
reactor and suggested using liquid level for the basic control with shim rods for automatic contrci. There is some possibility of a slight positive reactivity on loss of water but calculations show this to be small.
l The Comittee, in executive session, prepared t. letter to the AEC Chairman and a letter to the AEC General lhunger on this project, shown as Appendix "C."
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OFFICIAL LEE ONLY YAEEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC col @ANY Executive Session Dr. Williams reported for the subcommittee. Meetings have been held with l
the EB vhich desires a letter relating to an operating license. This hazards report is probably the most detciled to date. Since this is the second big power reactor built with private funds, the case is a very important one and vin help fom a precedent for future reactors. Any future technical information submitted may result in a Hearing Praminar request for /$CRS nyiew.
Dr. Doan related the experience in going to full power with the Engineering Test Reactor (ETR) in which his start-up group just mentioned halting the power escalation at half power, and EB immediately made this a requirement, which resulted in a delay. Dr. Doan was against limiting start-up activities in this fashion.
Hazards Evaluation Branch (ES) j Mr. Case reviewed recent meetings with the Yankee group and scid EB has no reservations on operations. A power escalating procedure is planned.
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Dr. Hann said his men do not intend to witness tests, such as on pressure
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vessels, but instead vill assure themselves of the adequacy of such tests.
Yankee ani Westinghouse Mr. Coe stated the reactor vessel has been pressure-tested by Babcock &
Wilcox at Barberton, Ohio, and the original schedule for operation still stands. p_hnning is for a March 3 hearing. All the piping and about 30 of 76 fuel assemblies are at the site; five assemblies are being delivered about every two weeks. The control rods and followers are now under con-straction; tests on rods, coolant motors, and other components an still under way.
The control rods and position iniicator vere described with the help of an electric model and model sections of a rod, including a fun-size dash pot with springs. The dash pot uses the main coolant.
If the spring should break the next fan r.ight cause yielding of the lod parts. 'Ibere is about a 100 mil clearance betecen the cruciform control and the fuel elements which act as a guide. Measurement of electrical cura nts in the lift mechanism, which is not normany planned, could show rubbing. Dismantling of the absorber section of the control rod from the zirconium fonower was demonstrated.
The neutron measuring devices vi n furnish currdnt, and no voltage monitoring of the ion chambers is planned. Voltage change in the ionization chamhars is expected only from the radiation breakdown of the chamber materials themselves. Should one ionization chamber fail, operations vould continue until a normal shutdown when replacement would be made.
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OFFICIAL LEE ONLY Release of activity from the steam generator during a blow down was discussed; estimates on radioactivity in the main coolant system are felt to be conserva-tive. A failed fuel unit would be noted first by periodic, perhaps daily, sampling of the main coolant system ani later by any leakage in the steam generator. Gross activity analyses are planned daily on the primary coolant water and isotopic analyses weekly. There vill be some activity in the water anyhow, so a base must be established.
Since September 1955 the designers have had doubts about first core develop-ing the nominal power desired and the hot c h - 1 factors assumed indicate 392 thermal megevatts; however, a higher power of about lx35 megawatts is considered possible and is the basis for the hazards raport. More core instrumentation, costing about $300,000, vould be required to reach the hicher figure. Nucleate boiling is not expected at 392 megawatts; the instrumentation is not now designed particularly to detect boiling, b'It there ray be atte= pts to do this -- detection of boiling in the Tonh reactors was referred to. Core flow instrumentation is not included.
}bdel tests have been made; the highest flow is in the middle of the core.
i A license for operation at 392 IG vith a procedure outlined for reaching l
the higher figure with little administrative vcch is desired. She Cocnit-tee said power may not be the best limit to indicate safety of a reactor since other parameters in which the power in inplicit may be much nere 1mportant.
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The Con:ittee, in executive session, prepared a letter to the AEC Cbairman on this project, shown as Appendix "D."
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B 0FFICIAL USE OliLY
OFFICIAL IGE OIEY RS SAVAIWJI Executive Session An important problem is the start-up location. A nn"rnittee vote showed nine utreilling for any full power operation at the Camden site until after the ship has been proved. Two were villing for som full power operation.
l Operations at Camden might be justified on basis of the short tim, maybe three months, and the extrem caution expected for the start-up personnel.
There are indications that EB is split over this issue.
Dr. Conner believes there is probably not enough infomation to permit a judgment on criticality operations at the Ocmden site; also there is lack of information on accidents from UO2 cores, which differ significantly from metal cores in themal conductivity.
Se list of ports of call requested recently has not been received, although such a list is probably prelinimrily set. Se extent of pressure testing desirable for this reactor is in doubt. S e design of the structural end pressure features of the plant is probably detailed f
and co=plete; the Coast Guard group has redone much of this design as a check. The contractor has been reluctant for 50% over design pressure testing because of overstrecsing. Bere are designers who question if anypressurevesselshouldbetestedfor10%overtheoperatingpressure for fear of damse and later hazards.
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The past start-up of nuclear suhnnvines and the fact that several of them are often berthed in bases such as the New Iondon area was mentioned as perhaps justification for pemitting Camien start-up. Bere does not seem to be much objection from the builders for the alternate start-up at Yorktown and, if the ACRS vishes to restrict the start-up location, now is probably the time to act.
_ Hazards Dvaluation Emnch (EB) 2e reactor and ship construction a xi over-all design are 60%,'75% an:LSb%
cot:plete, respectively. Start-up plans are not available, and the final hazards report is due in lurch. At present, EB is against Camien for full power operation, since no prototype has operated and the crew is inexperienced, but is inclined to permit lower power operation. Balf power operation was mentioned.
Dr. Doan noted that after low power operations the crev might no lonCer be considered inexperienced.
EB believes contain-ment is satisfactory and the penetration problem is solved, but EB does not vant to rely on good containment to contml a Canien accident. Iov leaka6e, the filters, and the stack dilution should reduce the possible exposure level to outsiders to tens of millirens.
OFFICIAL USE OIEY
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0FFICIAL USE ONLY l Dr. Conner remarked the reactor is relatively a small one, only 70 W,
which limits tM size of an accident; however, its trability does allow operations away imm populated areas. The fission product inventory, 1
considering release by melting on coolant loss, is probably more important
)
than actual power level, and the problem is more of one of policy of the extent to arrange operations so as to minimize exposure in case of an accident.
thritime Administration, U. S. Coast Guard, l
Babcock & Wilcox, States Fhrine, ani i
New York Shipbni W nc Corporation l
A 2hort report on endurance tests of the main steamline expansion joints l
vas distributed c.nd the tests described. These fatigue tests showed failure at 13,000 cycles, which was well above the 5000-cycle requirement. Valves l
are undergoing tests. Ocntrol rod friction estimated from a prototype
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amounted to 6% to 10% of the driving force. A sizable statistical study i
of rod behavior is p1 m ed.
Special actbods for passing instrument and power cables through the con +^4w"t vessels have bad to be developed.
A report on gaseous vaste collection performance, low voltage interlock l
system on control.s, generel ship and reacter operations, ani vater chemistry l
l 1 was presented. The tightnest of the containment vill not be monitored l {
continuously; however, operation vill be under a slight pressure, which l
may possibly permit some checks. A gaseous collection system using refrigerated charcoal absorption has been fabricated and subjected to tests with a mixture of ar6on and hydrogen; the results are being used in the design for the US SAVME:AH.
(Fires in chartum absorbers frcm hydrocarbons have been reported in the literature.)
Iodine re::cyal filters, believed to be 99.% effective, vill have silver plate on copper ribbons. Copper is effective as an iodine remover too, but it alone vill soon coat and lose its retention power. At Windscale, and on other occasions, a tendency for iodine to stick in the system, and thus lower the hazards, has been noted. Of course, relocating of the ship can assist in avoiding unfavorable t.eteorolo6y.
The nucicar instrumentation was dir. cussed in view of the overheating incident with the IGRE caused by: reduced coolant flow disabling certain instrument channels; initial full power operation with automatic control; mindjustment of the instrument power supplies, and current limiting noise filters. Some features of the N3 SAVA12WI to prevent such a situation are:
water cooling, manual control initially, provisions for a scram if M ant flow decreases significantly, full time use of instrumentation, and individual power supplies for ionization chambers.
Dr. Nevson said incorrect readings from ionization chambers because of voltage difficulties must always be kept in mind. Analog co=puters have given much information on transient te=peratures.
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OEICIAL USE OIEY Stress corzesion of stainless steel by chloride ion has been considered.
The pH of the primary system is to be kept between 6.5 ani 8.5 with the chloride at one ppm enximum, ani hydro 6en is to be between 1.8 and 3.6 ppm, with hydrazine to be used for the initial start-up. Se correspond-1ng data for the boiler vater and the boiler feedvater vere given. Bere 5
vill be careful ronitoring nnAlyses of the system.
Stress pis indicates the reactor supports vin yield should the ship ron 90 ; about 30 is the design value.
Sway bracing is to be installed.
he reactor vould hang if the ship vere upside down. The rods should insert if the reactor vere horizontal, although there are no tests.
The pressure vessel for the reactor does not par;s the ASIE code *acause of its unusual shape; special ASIE codes are now being drawn up. A missile s.vady indicates the containment is satisfactory.
The York River has been studied as a sea trial area, although initial operation is stin planned at Carden, which has advantages from the avail-ability of construction equipment and shore personnel who might assist in any system failures. Dockside testing is est* anted at six weeks, and 100 to 200 accu =ulated fun power hours are pinnned at Osrxlen with the energy being dunped to the condenser. Ibvever, the reco=mendation of New York j
Shipbuilding and the builders as to the extent of the canden start-up is
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still unsettled.
l The York River site is about a m.lle and a half below the Yorktown bridge l
and about 10 miles above Cheaspeike Bay. There is a pier about 2200 feet lorc; and the river is about two miles vide. Electric power, fresh water, fire equipment, and steam plant facilities are available; there is no shop.
The Comnittee, in executive session, prepared a letter to the AEC Chairman on this project, shown as Appendix "E."
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l O RICIAL USE OHLY 1
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l UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "A" I I
i February 8, 1960 l
l Honorable John A. McCone Chair::ian U. S. Atomic Energy Co::cission Washington 25, D. C.
Subject:
7WENTY-THIRD IEETING OF THE ADV~SORY COMMITIEE ON REAC'IOR SAFEGUARDS HELD IN WASHINGTOH, D. C., JANUARY 28-30, 1960.
Dear fir. McCone:
The tventy-third meeting of the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safe-guards was held in Washingten, D. C., on January 28-30, 1960. A brief sun'*ey of the meeting follows.
I l
Specific Reactors i
Se ACRS met with representatives of the Hazards Evaluation Branch and the Yankee Atomic Electric Ccupany to consider the application by that company for an operating license. A separate letter expressing the Co=11ttee's views on this has been sent to you.
The Co=ittee in a meeting with the Hazards Evaluation Branch and the applicant considered plans by the General Electric Ocepany to modify the design and operation of the Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor. A separate letter on this has been sent to you.
l The Co:rittee heard a presentation by representatives of the General Electric Company (Hanford Operations) concerning its plans to operate the Plutoniu::1Eecycle Test Reactor. A letter of advice on this has been sent to you. There are some ite=s of design and operating proce-dure which the Con:11ttee believes the staff should study in further detail prior to operation of the reactor. These items have been identified in a separate letter to the General Itnager.
Further discussions of the Nuclear Merchant Ship (N. S. Savarmah) vere held with representatives of the Eazards Evaluation Branch, Division of Reactor Development, The Babcock & Wilcox Co=pany, New York Ship-APPENDIX A" UNCLASSIFIED
l 4
v UNCLASSIFIED j
1 APPENDIX "A" (Cont.) Honorable John A, McCene Feb. 8, 1960
Subject:
ACRS 23rd Meeting building Corporation, and States Marine Corporation. The Committee's letter expressing its advice for the present stage of review has been sent to you.
Additional information was reviewed with the Hazards Praluation Branch relative to the granting of construction permits for the _Ballem Nuclear Power Facility and the Pathfinder Atomic Power Plant. Separate letters covering these items have been sent to you.
Discussion was held with representatives of the Hazards P/aluation Branch on the BTRE-3A proposal. A fuller review of this project had been scheduled but was dropped due to transportation difficulties encountered by the contractor's representatives. A subco=mittee has been appointed j
and vill study this case further.
I l
Miscellaneous. Representatives of the Division of Inspection briefed the Co=mittee on the results of their recent visits to reactor facilities, including a review of the status of the Dresden control rods and fuel elements.
f The Co=mittee is actively reviewing the questions of site criteria, g
reactor containment, control rods and control systems.
4 Puture Meeting Ihtes and Agenda Items. The following vere proposed by I
the Division of Licensing and Regulation as items for consideration at the next meeting of the ACRS on March 10-12, 1960:
Boiling Nuclear Superheater (BONUS) Power Station Consu=ers Pover Company of Michigan (Big Roch Plant)
Hanford Power levels New Production Reactor Florida West Coast Nuclear Group HTRE-3A t
l In addition it is possible that one or more of the items list,ed belev vill be ready:
Humboldt Bay Power Plant (PG&E)
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (Philadelphia Electric NASA Plum Brook Reacter Facility Co::;pany)
No projects were specified for future meetings of the Co::nittee.
Sincerely yours, Ieslie Silverman ec:
A. R. Luedecke, GM Chairman W. F. Finan, OGM H. L. Price, DL&R APPENDIX "A" UNCLASSIFIED
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.o UNCIASS m 2w APPENDIX "B" February 8, 1960 Honorable John A. McCone Chair:en U. S. Atomic Energy Comission Washington 25, D. C.
l
Subject:
GENERAL ELECTRIC VALLECITOS BOILDIG WATER LEACTOR (GEVBWR)
Dear Mr. McCone:
At its twenty-third meting on January 28-30, 1960, the Advisory Cor=ittee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed the General Electric Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor Final Hazards Sm vry Report, SG-Val-2 up to and including the Third Edition; the Amendm nts to License Application for Vanecitos Boiling Water Reactor up to and including Amendmnt //43; the Division of Licensing and Regulation Reports to the ACRS on Reactor Safeguards on GEVBUR up to and including the one dated January 12, 1960; and the material presented at this meeting by representatives of the General Electric Company.
i The reactor control rods have two features which might cause difficulties: 1) a pneumatic system for the rod motion and 2) sliding seals en the rod shafts. The Comittee anticipates j
satisfactory opemtion of the control rods because of the applicant's past experience with this type of mcknnism and because of his stated intent to:
l l
a) Use a separate pneumatic system for each set of two rods:
b) Test initially, at operating temperature and pressure, at least one pair of the rods sufficient tims to obtain reliable statictics on drop time, and the remaining rods sufficient tims to show that all rods behave in a similar way; c) Elininnte conventional lubricating oil from the pneumatic scram system and to minimize the oil explosion hazard from this system.
APPENDIX "B" UNCLASSIFIED
r UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "B" (Cont.) Honorable John A. McCene 2/8/60
Subject:
GEVBWR The multiple purpose nature of plant inherent.ly results in a some-what unusual nur.ber of interlocks and administrative procedures to insure that each cenponent fulfills at any given tim its required function. This places a heavy responsibility on the operational i
m nagement.
i The Cocnittee believes that the worth of the control rods for each substantially different core should be measured and evaluated during core loading in tar =s of the excess reactivity possibly available in that core loading,. and in tems of any possible malfunction of the i
control rods to insure an adequate shutdown margin under foreseeable conditions. This may limit or preclude certain types of operation.
The exclusion area is being used for agricultural purposes. The prablem of the use of a reactor exclusion area for purposes unrelated to reactor operation is obviously applicable to mny other sites. The Comittee I
believes that such use is compatible with the health and safety of the j
public in many cases, including the case of the Vallecitos Boiling
{
Water Reactor, and reccmends that the required monitoring rules for people, crops, livestock, and equipment be established.
The Cormittee believes the plant can be modified as proposed, and operated in accord with the above without undue hazard to the hesith and safety of the public.
Sincerely yours, I
i Leslie Silverman I
Niman cc:
A. R. Luedecke, GM H. L. Price, DIAR W. F. Finan, OGM i
APPENDIX "B" UNCLASSIFIED
s UNCLASSIFIED l
1 APPENDIX "B" (Cont.) l 1
Honorable John A. McCone 2/8/60 l
Subject:
GE"nMR l
References:
1
- 1) SG-VAIr2, Third Filition - Final Hazards Streary Report, November 30, L959
- 2) Amendment No. 43 to License Application for vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor, January 22, 1960.
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- 3) Report to ACRS by Division of LicensiDE and Regulation l
dated January 12, 1960.
- 4) General Electric Co:pany letter to H. L. Price dated November 7, 1959 5)
U. S. Weather Bureau Connents en SG-VAIe2, Third Edition, I
dated January 8, 1960.
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- 6) Memorandum from J. E. Turner to E. R. Price, Subject -
Vanecitos Boiling Water Reactor, A=endment f41 dated January 29, 1960.
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appgypyx n3n UNCLASSIFIED
..s v.
UNCIASSIF1TD APPENDIX "C",
' February 1, 1960 1
Honorable John A. ItCone Chairmn U. S. Atomic Energy Comission Washington 25, D. C.
1
Subject:
PLUTONIUM RECYCIE TEST REACTOR (PRTR) l l
Dear Mr. McCone:
At its twenty-third meeting, January 28.30, 1960, the. Advisory-9 Comittee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed the Plutonium Rccycle Test Reactor. We considered the Final Safeguards Analysis 1
(HW-61236), information presented orally by suiford personnel, and the views of the Hazards Evaluatic 2 Branch.
f On December 15, 1958, the ACRS advised the Comission that the proposed site and centatoment were suitable to the general reactor as concotted at that tim. For the most part, the casign objectives mentioned in our previous letter have been attatued and we see no difficulties which probably cannot be resolved prior to the completion of construction. Operating procedures and certain design details are still under consideration and we must reserve our final judgment until we l
are inform d on the results of these studies.
Sincerely yours, i
f Ieslie Silverman Chairman ec: A.R.Inedecke, GM W.F.Finan, OGI!
H.L. Price, DI&R APPENDIX "C" UNCLASSIFIED
e i
UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "C" (Cont. ) Honorable John A. McCone Feb. 1, 1960
Subject:
PRTR References
- 1) HW-61236 - Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor Final Safe-guards Analysis, October 1, 1959 2)
U. S. Weather Bureau Comments on ER-61236, December 16, 1959
- 3) Division of Licensing and Regulation Report to the ACRS onthePlutoniumRecycleTestReactor(PRTR), January 22, 1960.
- 4) Comments of the Office of Health and Safety on the Plu-tonium Recycle Test T3enetor Final Safeguards Analysis, January 15, 1960.
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i APPENDIX "C" UNCLASSIFIED l
/
UNCLASSIFIED !
APPENDIX "C" (Cont. )
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Fbbruary 1, 1960 i
Mr. A. R. Inedecke General Manager U. S. Atomic Energy Comission Washington 25, D. C.
Subject:
PLur0NR M RECYCLE TEST REACTOR (PRTR) a
Dear Mr. Luedecke:
We list below a number of technical matters on the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) which the subcommittee on this reactor vants to pursue with the AEC Staff.
A.
Study 5
i 1.
Possible positive void coefficients. Finally measure j
usir4 the cceplete reactor as a critical assembly and include information in accident calculations. These measurement and calculations should be repeated with
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each substantial change of core loading. Physics I
studies on the all-plutonium core should precede such critical experiments.
2.
Effect of broken pressure tubes. The Comittee does not understand the analysis of this effect in the Bazard Report (HW-61236).
j B.
Interlocks 1.
Shim rods and moderator level should not move simultaneously.
l 2.
It should be impossible ?..o increase reactivity at the maximum rate except when the high level trip is set at about one-tenth full pover.
3 There should be a varning Iignal if the voltage across any ionization chambers falls appreciably below the specified value.
1 Standard interlocks should prevent startup without a 4
positive signal from startup or period channel..
APPENDIX "C" UNCLASSIFIED L-
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UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "C" (Cont.) A. R. Luedecke 2/1/60
Subject:
PRTR C.
Procedure 1.
Itxica rate of increasing reactivity should not be used during a prolonged shakedown period. The rate should be decreased by about a factor of four during this time.
2.
The Comittee cannot understand the claimed advantages of automatic control under any other condition than constant power.
3 Manual operation should be utilized during initial startup tests and fu n power tests. 'Ihe automatic level centrol should be used only after initial tests.
l y
Sincerely yours, I
I Leslie Silverman l
Chaiman
References:
HJ-61236 - Plutoniu:n Recycle Test Reactor Final Safe-I guards Analysis, October 1, 1959 U. S. Weather Bureau Co= cents on EW-61236, December 16, 1959 Division of Licensing and Regulation Report to the ACRS on the Plutoniu:n Recycle 2st Reactor (PRTR), Janus 1712,1960.
Co::raents of the Office of Health and Safety on the Plutoniu:n Recycle hst Reactor Final Safeguards Analysis, Janusr/ 15, 1960.
cc:
H. L. Price, DIAR W. F. Finan, OG4 l
APPENDIX "C" l
UNCLASSIFIED l
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UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "D",
Ebbruary 1, 1960 Honorable John A. McCone Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy Com:::ission Washington 25, D. C.
s
Subject:
YANKEE NUCIEAR POWER STATION - YAIEEE ATOMIC EIECTRIC 00!LDANY*
l
Dear Mr. McCone:
At its twenty-third meeting, January 28-29-30, 1960, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards considered various safety aspects of the Yankee Atomic Electric Cb=pany 485 W (thermal) pressurized water power plant. In addition to the reports referenced below, discussions I
were held with the Hazards Evaluation Branch, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, and Westing-house Electric Corporation.
In our letter of September 16, 1957, relative to the Yankee construc-l j tion permit, the ACES pointed out that the design of this reactor I
included three novel features: addition of soluble neutron absorbers, j
intentional design into the reactor of nucleate boiling, and large l
plutonium buildup, all of which would require extensive investigation.
I l
The problem of nucleate boiling and the use of boric acid as a soluble l
poison to supplement the control rods during cold shut down have been i
thoroughly investigated and solutions to these proble=s satisfactory i
l to the HEB and the Committee have been reported in the Final Hazards Se mtry Report, l '
)
l AmMent No. 7 proposes determination of effect of plutonium buildup in an experimental program to measure temperature coefficients, prompt
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and overall, in the actual power reactor at startup, after 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> of operation, and at intervals while plutonium is growing into the j
core.
In a letter dated October 21, 1958, the ACRS agreed that effect of l
plutonium buildup on these coefficients vould be ren11 enough to per-l mit these measurements to be made with safety in the actual reactor.
APPENDIX "D" UNCLASSIFIED
i e O.
e UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX"D"(Cont.) !
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Honorable John A. McCone Ibb. 1, 1960
Subject:
YtJEEE Amendment No. 8 covered a plant for disposal of gaseous liquid and con-bustible solid vastes. In the letter of October 21, 1958, the ACRS agreed with HEB that proposed facilities will pemit dispocal of vastes without undue hazard to on-site or off-site personnel.
Amendment No. 18 is a proposal stating intent to modify the reactor design to pemit continuca operation of the plant even with leakage from the primary to the secondary system. The changes are discussed in general, but no design details were supplied. Se Comittee concurs in principle that the general plan can pemit this leakage without undue hazard to the public, but cannot ccx:xnent on design detail.
The general design of the reactor and the proposed startup procedures and schedules are considered acceptable. The applicant's proposal to review its operation at the 392 at (themal) power level before pro-ceeding to higher powers is endorsed.
I The Comitt(e believes that the broad problems indicated at the tim of f
the issuance of the construction pemit have been resolved.
It is the Comittee's opinion that this reactor can be operated without undue risk l
to the health and safety of the public.
(
Sincerely yours, i
Ias11e Silveman Chairma cc: A.R.Luedecke, Gi W.F.Finan, OG4 l
H.L. Price, DI&R References
- 1) Final Bazards Summary Report, Volu:aes I and II, (undated) received September 1959
- 2) A
- nt No.15 to License Application dated Jitly 29, 1956, i
October 2, 1959
- 3) Amendment No. 16 to License Application, December 4, 1959
- 4) Amendment No.17 to License Application, January 11, 1960.
5 Amendment No.18 to License Application, January 13, 1960.
6 Office of Bealth and Safety Coments, October 23, 1959 7
Division of Licensing Report to ACES, October 28, 1959
- 8) Division of Licensing and Regulation Report to ACRS, Jan. 12, 1960
- Dr. Theos J. Thompson did not participate in these reviews or discussions.
1 3ppgpyx np.,
UNCIASSIFED
UNCIAS517I$11 APPENDIX "E" 34 -
February 1, 1960 Honorable John A. McCone Chairmn U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington 25, D. C.
Subject:
NUCLEAR MERCHANT SHIP (N. S. SAVAtWJI)
Dear Mr. McCone:
At its twenty-third meting, January 28-30, 1960, the Advisory Comittee i
on Reactor Safeguards continued its review of the N. S. Savannah. The Comittee had been asked by the Division of Licensing and Regulation to l
make an interim report especially regarding current conclusions as to the general design features of the reactor system and to include vbat i
other statements the Comittee could make at this time relative to any other features of the reactor complex. The Committee vas presanted with 3
additional information from the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, The
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Babcock & Wilcox Company, the Maritime Reactors Branch cf the Division I
of Reactor Ibvelopment, and the Hazards Evaluation Branch. The documents so far available to the ACRS are listed below.
I j
The Committee agrees with the HEB that, in general, the design of the nuclear power system and its containment appears to be adequate for a nuclear propelled merchant ship subject to proof of component integrity in an extensive tect program. However, there still remains an uncertainty as to the achievable filter efficiency of the iodine remval system. Since this filter is an important item affecting the adequacy of the overall containment, this problem needs further clarification.
i Because containment is such c.n important factor in the free movement of i
this ship, the Co=tittee believes that more consideration should be given to this item than is now planned:
- 1) The strength of the containment vessel has been confirmed l
l by a hydrostatic test at static design pressure rather than at overpressure as is customary for a code vessel.
Additional information should be supplied which will indicate the mrimm stresses in the containment vessel and its structural supports under full loading of shielding and under the dynamic stresses of roll and pitch.
APPENDIX "E" UNCLASSIFIED J
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UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX"E"(Cont.). Honorable John A. McCone Feb. 1, 1960
Subject:
N. S. Savannah
- 2) Careful consideration should be given to identify and tie down all co@onents which could penetrate the contMnmnt vessel as missiles.
- 3) Periodic checks to establish the reliability of the filters in the ventilating system should be installed.
- 4) More consideration should be given to the feasibility of a device to monitor continuously the leakage through the containment vessel.
It is to be expected that the testing program vill indicate that minor changes in design should be made. With the inft;mation now available, the Co=mittee believes that the changes indicated by the testing program l
are not likely to require major design modifications in order to insure that the operating ship vill not jeopardize the health and safety of l
the public.
}
j Because of the prototype nature of the reactor during initial startup and early power operation, an unforeseen event might occur which would cause a major release of radioactivity at a time when the containment I
system is inoperative. Further=cre, the Committee believec that it is u wise to expose the public to radiation resulting from an accident in the crperimental phasen of the startup program when the number of individuals so exposed can be greatly reduced by moving this inherently mobile reactor. The Committee therefore recommends that extensive l
nuclear testing be carried out only at a site which has a far en11er I
population density than does the Camden site. The problem of setting the upper limit to the nuclear operation whieb my be carried out at l
Camden is complex. The Co=mittee therefore recomaends that a thorough stuly be made to resolve this question of upper limit and to nmlyze the problems of a specific alternate site.
The Comittee wants to e@hasize that its recornendation for an alter-nate startup site does not necessarily indicate, as of now, a belief that the N. S. Savannah should not enter highly populated ports after the characteristics of the reactor system are fully known. The entry into ports vill be reviewed at c future time.
Sincerely yours, leslie Silverman Chairman cc: A.R.Luedecke, G4 W.F.Finan, OQ4 H.L. Price, DIAR APPENDIX "E" UNCLASSIFIED s
a, i.
UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "E" (Cont.) Honorable John A. McCom Feb. 1, 1960
Subject:
N. S. Savannah References
- 1) BMI-Bw 634 - Simulation of the Heat-Transfer Characteristics of the Fuel Pins in a Nuclear Reactor, September 27, 1957
- 2) EMI-B&W-639 - Sinalation of a Control System for a Merchant-Ship Pressurized-Water Reactor, January 14, 1958.
i
- 3) PAW-11_1_T (Revision 1, December 22,1958) Volume I - Nuclear
)
lerchant Ship Reactor Project Preliminstry Safeguards Report, September 15, 1958.
l l
- 4) BAW 1117, Volume II, November 3,1958 - Nuclear Merchant Ship l
Reactor Preliminary Safeguards Report.
]
- 5) BAW-H50 Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor Project Supplementary Info n tion on Reactor Safeguards, June 1, 1959 1
j
- 6) BAW-115L Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor Project Control Bod j
l j Dependability Study, June 22, 1959 6
- 7) BAW-1176, C-81, AEC FAD Report - Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor Control Rod Driveline Tests, November 1959 I
- 8) EMI-B&W-650 - Investigation of the Effect of a Stean-Bypass Syctem on Control of the NMSR Plant, October 14, 1959
10)
N. S. Savannah Preliminary Safeguards Report Test, Start-up and Trials, prepared by New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden, H.
J., November 23, 1959
- 11) DIAR Report to the ACRS on the N. S. Savannah, November 4,1958.
~
i l 12)
U. S. Weather Bureau Comments on BAW-1117, September 15, 1958.
- 13) DIAR Report to the ACRS on the N. S. Savannah with letter of transmittal to C. Rogers McCullough from H. L. Price, dated January 6, 1959
- 14) DI&R Report to the ACRS on the N. S. Savannah, February 24, 1959 APPENDIX "E" UNCLASSIFIED t
UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "E" (Cont.) Honorable John A. McCone
-L Feb. 1, 1960
Subject:
N. S. Savannah References (continued)
- 15) DIAR Report to the ACRS on the N. S. Savnnnsth, June 30, 1959 16)
U.S. Weather Bureau Co=ments on BAN-1150, July 9,1959 l
- 17) Di&R Report to the ACRS on the N. S. Savnnnah, November 25,1959
- 18) US Weather Bureau Co: rents on "U. S. Savnnnnh Preliminary Safe-l guards Report: Test, Start-up and Trials", December 1,1959.
19)
U.S. Weather Bureau Comments on ORNL 59-9-9 (rev.), " Environ-mental Analysis of N.S. Savannah Operation at Camien",
December 3, 1959,
- 20) Office of Health and Safety Comments on " Environmental Analysis j
of NS Savannnh Operation at Chtxlen", December 7, 1959
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- 21) DIAR Report to the ACRS on N. S. Savann th, January 12, 1960
}
l i
j
- 22) Report of the "N.S. Savannah" Review Comnittee to Dr. Frank K.
l Pittaan, Director, Division of Reactor Development, October 1959 I
- 23) Main Condenser Design Integrity with Regard to Prevention of t
Condensate Conta74. nation with feavater, by The Babcock & Wilcox l
Cocpany, received October 1959 t
- 24) ORNI-CF-59-6 Application of Electroless-Nickel Brazing to Tubular Fuel Elements for the N. S. Savannah, June 2, 1959 l
- 25) BAN - N.
S'. Savannah - Reactor Safeguards Information, Sections I,
}
II, and III, December 3, 1959
- 26) Main Condenser Isolation Support Plate Temperature Gradient During Steam Dump, N. S. Savnnnnh, by The Babcock & Wilcox Co=pany, January 6, 1959 i
- 27) Me=orandum from Frank K. Pittman to A. R. Luedecke, " Design j
Reviews of the N. S. Savannah", December 28, 1959 l
- 28) Reactor Safeguards Information, The Babcock & Wilcox Company, January 27, 1960.
29)
N. S. Savannah - Contract No. 529 - Report of Endurance Test -
Main Steam Expansion Joints, January 21, 1960.
30)
N. S. Savannah Summnry of Iodine Removal Facters, received January 29,1960(undated).
j UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "E" l
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UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "F" I I
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l February 1, 1960 l
l Honorable Jolm A. McCone Chairmn U. S. Atomic Energy Comission Washington 25, D. C.
1 l
Subject:
EXPEJtIIGNTAL EOILING WAm RE!.CTOR (EBWR)
Dear th. McCone:
On November 14, 1959, the Advisory Co==ittee on Reactor Safeguards vrote giving advice on the request from Argonne National Isboratory to raice the power level of the Experimental Boiling Water Reactor i
to 100 MT (thermal). In this letter the Comittee said:
1
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' The Comittee reco= ends that this reactor installation be given rigorous, periodic inspection equivalent to that given l
f commercial power reactors by the Division of Inspection.
1 The reasons for this are several. The reactor vill operate at i
a sizable power level for long periods of time and in this j
respect is similar to commercial plants.
In the early stages of the operation the EBWR Staff vill be emphasizing the research aspect of the EBUR project.
It is important that the su.ne111ance during the routine phases of the operation not be lessened because of the overriding attrac-tion of the research progra=."
l This recot::mendation is of importance in preserving adequate safety of reactor operation. Accordingly, the Comittee vould appreciate knowing what steps the Comission is taking with regard to this l
problem.
Sincerely yours, Ieslie Silverman Chairman ec: A.R.Luedecke, Gi V.F.Finan, OG1 H L.Priee, DI&R APPENDIX "F" UNCLASSIFIED
o, UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "G" February 1, 1950 l
Honorable John A. McCone Chairmn U. S. Atomic Energy Comission Washington 25, D. C.
l
Subject:
CAROLINAS VIRGINIA TUEE REAC'IOR (CVTR) - EXCLUSION AREA
Dear It. McCone:
It has been brought to the attention of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards that a portion (the southerrrost h6 acres) of Empton Island is to be removed from the exclusion area of the Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor in order to provide right of way for a bridge to be built by the State of Sourth Carolina.
I l
j Since the location of the road over which the bridge is to be i
l
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built was known to the Co::nittee at the time of issuance of its previous advice on this site (reference letter dated December 14, 1959), and moreover the exclusion radius of the CVTR is not affected, the Committee agrees that this change vill not ::sterially I
affect the health and safety of the public.
Sincerely yours, leslie Silverman Chairman i
l cc: A.R.Luedecke, GM W.F.Finan, CGk H.L. Price, DIAR I
Reference CVRA 27 - PreWirm7 Hazards Summary Report,VolumeI,7/15/s9 ACRS letter to Mr. McCone on CVTR dtd December 14, 1959 JLTENDIX "G" UNCLASSIFIED t
o, UNCIASS17IED APPENDIX "H" February 1, 1960 Honorable John A. McCone Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy. Commission Washin6 ton 25, D. C.
Subject:
NORTERN STATES POWER C012ANY PATHFINDER KIOMIC POUER PIAI1T
Dear Mr. McCone:
At its twenty-second meeting, December 10-11, 1959, and as stated in its letter of December 14, 1959, to you, the Advisory Co=mittee on Reactor Safeguards considered that s
"the approach suggested as above by the applicant will enable
)
construction of the reactor proposed at its site with reason-
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able assurance that it can be operated without undue hazard 1
to the health and safety of the public."
I
/cendments No. 4 and No. 5 to the application have since been I
received and vere considered at the tventy-third meeting of the Co=mittee on January 28-30, 1960. The opinion of the Committee is not chan6ed due to these amendments.
Sincerely yours, Ieslie Silveman Chairman ec:A.R.Luedecke, GI l
W.F,Finan, OGM H.L. Price, DIAR I
APPENDIX "H" UNCLASSIFII:D t
J
UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "H" (Cont.)
- 41 Honorable John A. McCone Feb. 1,~1960
Subject:
Pathfinder i
References:
i
- 1) Amendment No. h to the Safeguards Report (ACNP-5905),
and Supplement No. 3, November 20, 1959
- 2) Amendment No. 5 to the Safeguards Report (ACNP-5905),
December 18, 1959 3)
U. S. Weather Bureau Comments on Amendment No. 4 and Supplement No. 3 to Safeguards Report ACNP-5905, December 22, 1959
- 4) Division of Licensing and Regulation Report to the ACRS on Pathfinder A=Ments No. 4 and No. 5, j
January 12, 1960.
I l.
i e
i l
I i
1 i
l APPENDIX "H" UNCLASSIFIED 4
,e 4 e UNCIASSIFED APPENDIX "I" February 8, 1960 l
1 Honorable John A. McCone Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy _Cv-dssion i
Washington 25, D. C.
Subject:
HAIIAM NUCIFJC POWER FACILITY (EPF) 1
Dear Mr. McCone:
At its twenty-third meetins on January 28-30, 1950, the Advisory I
Comnittee on Reactor Safeguards considered the Hallem Nuclear Power Facility (EliPF). A letter was addressed to you on this subject July 25, 1959 This letter indicated that a portion of its safety evaluation was based upon the Sodium Reactor Experiment experieace.
In Docenber l
1959, Report NAA-SR-4505, " Safe 6uards Evaluation of Recent SM l
Experience Applicable to HHPF," was distributed to the Co=mittee.
)
This report has been reviewed by an ACRS Suboc=fxttie in conjunc-
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tion with a review prepared by the Hazards Evaluc. tion Branch. It appears the SRE experience has been utilized to produce new design features which vill be incorporated in the HNPF.
Based upon the report of the ACES Subco==ittee and the review of the EB, the ACRS considers no revision of its opinion relative to the construction permit as recorded in the letter of July 25, 1959, is required at this time.
l Sincerely yours, l
0 Ieslie Silverman Chairman cc: A.R.Luedecke, GM W.F.Finan, OGM H.L. Price, DIldR References NAA-Sh-4504 - Safeguards Evaluation cf Recent SRE B:perience Applicable to ENPF (undated)
DIAR Report to th; ACRS on Hallcm Huclear Power Facility, January 12, 1960 APPENDIX "I" UNCLASSIFIED J