ML20234B794
| ML20234B794 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Brunswick |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1969 |
| From: | Hard J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Seiss C Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234A777 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-40 NUDOCS 8707060210 | |
| Download: ML20234B794 (8) | |
Text
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October 13, 1969 1R, y s:
i C. P. Siess, Chairman Brunswick Subconnaittee MINUTES OF BRUNSWICK SUBC01EITTEE )EETING, WASHINGTON, D.
C.,
OCTOBER 8, 1969 The draft minutes of this meeting, which are attached for your review, in-clude your comuments on the original rough draft.
Copies have been distributed to the othar ACRS nembers.
J. E. Hard Senior Staff Assistant l
Attachment:
l Draft Hinutes of the 1
Brunswick Subcoonnittee Meeting, 10/8/69 cc: Remainder ACRS Members, w/att.
FILE: Brunswick project file l
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JEE:emb 10/13/69 MINUTES OF N.'E.*.
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BRUNSWICK SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING V
WASHINGTON, D. C.
h% g OCTOBER 8, 1969 Q.gK ysfR.,*L Attendance
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E.IEe C. P. Siess R. Boyd M. Bessac H. Etherington W. Butler G. Charnoff, Consultant H. Hill D. Knuth J. Jones A. A. O ' Kelly, part-time W. Kincaid J. E. Hard, Staff ggC.
W. Lowe, Consultant N. Newman L. Smith United Engineers 6 Constrs.
.K. Woodard, Consultant R. Anderson Brown 6 Roe t,,
General Electric J. Crowley H. Kreider M. Fitch W. Chamberlin A. Molin E. Marselli R. Davis R. Vurpillat, Jr.
A. Levine R. Poe W. Smith Executive Session Dr. Siess reviewed the history of the items which resulted. in this asating.
The problems are:
1.
Main steam line - The ACRS had previously concluded that spot radiography was enough. CP6L's definition of spot radiography was that given in ASIE Code which would result in about a 17. weld inspection (6" in 50. of weld).
The Staff wants some inspection on each weld.
Dr. Bush has no objection, per Dr. Siess.
Mr. Mill felt that, originally, he was voting for some inspection of each weld.
2.
Flood protection - CP&L has calculated water levels based on the ESSA probable maximum hurricane. Watertightness to the maximum still water level and provisions for coping with effects of wave action wore spect-fied by ACRS. The Sixth Supplement states that sump systems are necessary i
to cope with in-leakage. DRL points out the lack of safety grade sump equipment and that this equipment is not emergency powered. Dr. 81ees felt that emergency power redundancy should be provided. Dr. O' Kelly agreed that he could go that far.
Mr. Hill thought it a gross oversight ak to have these pumps on emergency power. Mr. Etherington wented to reviser what had to be done in preparing for hurricanes. Yte impressien was that
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the applicant probably still doesn't feel the ESSA hurricane is credible.
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4 0R0!0. M 00 Brunswick Subcommittee Meeting October 13/dh8 j Q,.,
3.
Boghouse question - Dr. Siess reviewed the words in the ACES report'.9ph These words were originated for the Batch reactor and were adopted g for Brunswick. N words also represented a compromise between these who opposed the doghouse and those who didn't. N Brunswick pipes are considerably longer than in Hatch (18' vs 6') and 12")hrough the N
concrete torus and is not easily inspectable. DEL does not accept no guard pipe and either wants that or a second valve inside the torus.
This design would then be consistent with FWR designs which have guard pipes to and including the first valve. One possible solution on Bruas-wick wauld be to seal the bottom end of the existing guide pipe. h re was some concern that any yielding by ACRS on Brunswick could have effect on future Hatch-like reactors.
Mr. Etherington felt that the ACRS is re-viewing double-ended ruptures of actively used pipes and that failures in passive systems may also need a similar review.
Meetina with the Staff 1.
Radiography - The steam lines are 24" in diameter. Mr. Boyd stated that the DRL position is to require 100% radiography of the steam line girth welds.
In Brunswick, this position is difficult because of the ACRS re-port. Recent Staff discussions with CF&L have been held on this subject.
l One-hundred percent radiography may be very difficult at Brunswick be-cause some portions of the steam lines pass through the concrete drywell.
DRL wants to know if the applicant's position is adequate in ACRS ' opinion.
There are four steam lines in this plant and one 6" radiograph per 50' of weld represents about 1% inspection. CF6L is the only applicant to resist pressures for more steam line inspection. DEL told the applicant that what he proposed is not adequate.
2.
New contractor - CF&L requested approval of the new contractor and a letter from ACRS, per Mr. Boyd. Boyd suggested that the applicant be asked about this.
3.
Flood protection - N number of doors which have to be unterproofed has not been stated, per Butler. The power requirements for sump pumping capacity is not known. The applicant understands the Staff position of minimum requirements. DEL would require the plant design to cope with the 22 ft. MSL rtill water level; sand bags to this level would not be adequate.
4.
Dogbouse - According to Knuth, all FWR's since 1967 have had isolathig valves inside and outside the containment or guard pipes out to and'im.
eluding the first valve. Since the Hatch and Brunswick letters, theos geard pipes are disappearing. Bowever, the PWR pipes are not short'suas s
of pipe. Leakage from the torus would depressurise the containment and.
Possibly give NFSH problems with the ECCS pumps. N Estch design la a OmCE >
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Form ABC.818 (Rev. 643)
U.s sovEnnairNT PRINTmG WFKE lgt6--C>214 629
i DRCIAL UE E._Y Brunswick Subcommittee Meeting October 13,J M9 kb q
- short, 6', run of pipe which is readily inspectable and these are kq.,.
j big differences from Brunswick. If the outer and of the existing 3 sump
- wick guide pipe were sealed, this might then result in a "very short ' ens" ccasparable to Hatch. Basil pipes which penetrate the contalement are being evaluated by the staff. h oe pipes exist in large' numbers and have no automatic isolation valves or easily operated manual valves.
This is a newly identified problem and is being evaluated on the contem-
, porary applications such as Duane Arnold. DRL has told the. applicant that what he proposes does not meet what is required. Mr. gtherington questioned the status of other pipes on the containment, such as the vent pipes between torus and drywell. hoe are in the same category as the torus itself. However, other connecting pipes must meet the criterion of single passive failure.
Neeting with the Apolicant Dr. Sissa reviewed the purpose of the meeting; to review three items in the Sixth Supplement on which there are apparent differences between the staff and the applicant. N change in constructor Save no problems to ACRS. CP&L had been notified by telephone of this, according to Mr. Jones.
Flood Protection - Mr. Crowley of CP&L discussed this subject. b secondary containment equipment lock is the penetration of most concern. Air in-leakage 3
of 250 ft / min is the design basis of this lock. At an assumed continuous water level of 26.2' MSL, 60 gym of water will flow into the lock and Crowley l
stated that this number is believed to be conservative. This 60 gym is then assumed to flow for two hours. Seven to eight inches of water in the HPCI room would result, assuming no outpumping of water.
(It was not known how long the Camille high water lasted.) If pumps are operating, considerable margin exists. N FMH (probable maximum hurricane) flood was reviewed:
+22.0' HSL Still water
+23.6 Wave crest
+25.6 Wave runup Design level
+26.2 Intake struc-l
+28.3 l
ture About eleven accesses (doors) are involved, only one of which is below +22' MSL. In-leakage is generally assumed to be approximately 20 gym through
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each (essept for the 60 gym mentioned above). With no susp pumps operating, l
there is no damage for the assumed two hours of high flood level. These pumps are not on the emergency bus. N y would be an unnecessary load on the emergency buses and are not.necessary anyway, per CP&L. Ten sump pumps are i
l involved. HPCI equipment is approximately 3' above floor and diesels are approximately 2' above floor.
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.m; Brunswick subcommittee Meeting October 13, 309
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WQ kY Conservatism factors for the above assumptions were presented. This ing -j;f cluded the margins between expecte/ and assumed flood duration, wave rue = j up, flow through slits, and water head; the margins running from 1.5 to 3 for each category. The Staff felt the newly presented design was conser-vative and did in fact constitute protection against flooding to a height of +26.2' MSL.
Main Steam Line Radiograohv - Four 24 in. stesa lines are involved with approximately 120 welds total. CP&L responded in the Sixth supplement according to the code definition of spot radiography, not knowing what the ACRS meant.
Dr. Siess observed that this is less than 1% inspection and seems light. He reviewed the Staff's requirement for one radiograph per weld. CP&L is ready to do volumetric testing (RT or 0T) on a portion of gg_e.h weld.
po.ghouse - The piping orientation has been changed so the longest run of pipe between torus and the first valve la about 9', the valve being about one foot from the concrete. There is no seal at the outer and of the existing guide pipe through the concrete. No welds exist in the auction line between torus and the first valve.
If a suction line break occurred in the largest compartment on an AHR loop, the torus level could drop approximately 5' before levels are equalised.
The torus cannot drain below the suction line level. CP&L sees no problem-with levels or pump NPSH when this happens.
(This story is not documented.)
Communication between compartments is not possible, according to the appli-cant. Doses because of halogens released in a post-DBA suction line rupture may be marginal and are dependent on assumptions regarding what's in the coolant. The NPSH requirement for ths ECCS pumps is 24', not the 33' listed in the PSAR. The Staff has some questions about the adequacy of NPgH.
Mr. Crowley stated that, even if a suction line broke, the leakage through the annulus between the suction line and its guide pipe would be restricted by the presence of a retaining ring near the outer and of the pipe run; how-ever, the actual leakage has not been estimated.
Butler questioned whether or not there were doors between CSCS compartments.
No such doors exist according to L. Smith.
Nesting with the Staff Fiaodina Protection - The Staff is happy with the story heard today and points out that this seems to represent a commitment by the applicant act previously stated or documented.
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% 4, E: :4Nfg ny M= atee Line Radioaraohv - N staff will back off isosa 1001 inspeet:bem !,*
requirement in view of the Brunswick letter. N proposed regulation e$angs involving B 31.7 will not affect this since the section of line in question is outside the isolation valves.
Domhouse - N Staff is still unsatisfied with NFSH requirements but was to
- look at what the change from 33' to 24' will mean. Dr. Siess meted that these problems assume simultaneous 1yg loss of off-site power, IACA, and CSCS suction line break.
ggggra,[ ~ Mr. Hill felt that the Staf f should sit down and discuss the re-a design discussed today. Mr. Boyd felt that two things are required from ACRS: consideration of ths NFSH questions in view of the Brunewick design and reconsideration of what is needed for passive failures. Dr. giess re-stated the basic issue here; are the suction lines an extension of contain-ment or not.
For ACRS Heatina h applicant was asked for a presentation on flooding and to be ready to discuss steam line radiography. A presentation on revised suction line and th'e room flooding concept and including the NFSH question uma requested.
Mr. Charnoff asked for a letter on Amendments 8, 9 and 10, for legal purposes in the event of a contested hearing on the question of " practical vales".
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Project: Brunswick p.c ;*
Status Commaittee Review of three areas of disagreement M$'
between Staff and Applicant PY@
Chronology:
May, 1969, ACES Raview and C. P. h tter June 30, 1969 Amendment 8, Supplement 6 filed by Applicant (Answers to Comments in ACRS Report).
July 18, 1969, Amendment 9. revised plant startup dates August 20, 1969 Amendment 10. Brown & Root selected as new constructor Septenher 3,1969, DEL Supplemental Report to ACRS giving conclusions regarding Amendments 8, 9 and 10.
October B, 1969 Subcommittee review of the three areas.
Discussion:
After reviewing Supplement 6, DEL concludes that the Applicant's response is unsatisfactory in three areas; flooding protection, CSCS ' suction line design, and main steam line radiography. These areas are discussed sepa-rately below.
Flooding Protection The Applicant states in Supplement 6 that the vital plant buildings will be waterproofed for still water to an elevation +22' MSL. In addition, protection will be provided for wave runup to +26.2' MSL., Administrative procedures are to be used to maka sure the doors are closed. The reactor building is to be designed to limit inseepage of flood waters to a rate which can be handled by the building sump system. The.se provisions are not acceptable to the Staff since the sump pumps and controls are not safety grade equipment, since they are not powered from the esaargency buses, and since the Staff is unable to evaluate the degree of internal flooding which would result from loss of off-site power.
Core Standby Coolina System (CSCS) Suetion Line This is the "dogbouse" question. As can be seen in the ACES report (copy attached) the Commaittee believed that, for the very short runs of pipe from the torus to the fitst valves, with conservative design and remotely operable valves, double pipes are not needed. M ak detection and surveil-lance capability were also specified. Mr. Price was told again during the July 1969 ACRS meeting that "the Committee did not support the ICCS dog-hemse". Em Brunswick, five section lines seem to penetrate the teruis: ~ame each for the two core spray pumps, one each for the two residual heat removal (ENR) Leops, and one for the high pressure coolant injection (EPCI) loop. The first valve in each case is about 18' downstream of the torus liner; 12' of ee Im' ye g... r~. m ky..... a oto. vn eh. - r.e.,
h se fr f is not meet the requirements specified by ACES in that the tgpg,fhts_, design does,_
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I pipe is not a very short rum, it is not readily inspectable, and the ladDf /
detecties system (room sump) is not adequately reliable. h Staff feeldiIt J "!,.
that a valve inside the torus or a guard pipe to the existing valve is 44 secessary for each line.
Long-term cooling suction limas in several PWR der isms have guard pipes out to and including the first valve. Ocomee Diablo, and Rancho Seco are cited as examples. The Staff has stated informally _ that new FWE applicants have removed these guard pipes because "of the ACES stata===es om Eatch and Brums-wick".
So, the Staff is pushing hard for Brunswick guard pipes.
Main Steam Line Radiography N ERS recommended a " program of spot radiography of the field butt nelds
.. as a quality control measure". N Applicant proposes using the dafini-tion of spot radiography contained in Section VIII of the ASIE Code. This would require some inspection of some of the welds. m staff believes that some inspection should be performed on gygry weld.
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Attachment:
l ERS Report on Brunswick dtd 5/15/69 i
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