ML20234B406
| ML20234B406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Shoreham |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1969 |
| From: | Mckinley J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Hendrie J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234A777 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-40 NUDOCS 8707060021 | |
| Download: ML20234B406 (63) | |
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December 9, IM9 4, ':MEj~,
J. M. Bendrie, Chairman Shoreham Wuclear Station Subcommittee SB0stERAM STATION SURCopMITTE METING ON EBCEMBER 4, IM9 Attached for your review are draft minates of the Shorehan Wesleer Station Subcommittee meeting held on December 4,1M9. Please forward any comments you may have se P. hat corrections may be made if needed.
Original Signed by J. C. McKinley 1
J. C. McKinley Staff Assistaat Attachments:
Minutes of Shoreham Station Subcommittee Meeting on December 4, 1969 cc: ACRS Members w/ attachments
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8707060021 870610 Form AEC-818 (Rn e-m PDR F0IA us umum""* "*
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WA81RILsGTON, D.C.
December 4, 1969 Meetinst Riabliahts N applicant reaffirmed his statement that he umuld perform the additiemal storm surge calculations and provide high water protecties to a level mesept-able to the Regulatory Staff. N plant grade will be 20' above IEX and currently protectica is provided to a height of 25' above MLW.
N applicant agreed to provide diagemal reinforcing of the cautainment struc-ture until he is abic to justify its emissies by experimental and analytical results.
N applicant stated that all pipes greater than one inch in diameter that penatrate the containment will have step valves inside the sentainment. N l
ene inch diameter instrument liams will be l' O.D. tubing but the us11 thickness has not y9t been determined. N oe lines will have a manual stop valve followed by an excess flew check valve leested immediately outside of i
the containment. This issue is still unresolved with the Regulatory Staff.
N Staff indicated that they might accept remote mammal operaties of the stop valve outside of eestainment es a satisfactory resolution.
N applicant has agreed to 100% radiography of all butt volds deumstream of the second isolation valve to the mast step valve douastraan. Be also stated that all of the larger (72") valves receive some radiography of the body castings. N as valves are purchased to GE specifications. DEL had met been aware of these requirements and had not reviewed the estent of radiography. The applicant will submit this information is an amendment.
N applicant recognises the concern of the Cemetittee regarding leakage past the main steam isolation valves and is considering various means to assure leak tightness. Be agreed to continue studying the problem sad to reach a mutually agreeable solution with the Regulatory Staff.
N applicant described the degraded een,ditions required to have the BSS pumps start to cavitate due to inadequate NPSR. Be meted that several hours of operatten would be required before the pressure suppression pool unter recebed a temperature where cavitaties became a problem and that the dis-ebares of the punca sould be meaually throttled to ease the entitation prob-lem.
SU NA E DATE>
tbrsn AEC.81f4 (Rev.9-53)
U.s soutRhMENT PRINYlhG 0FFICE.1%6--O 214 429
0FC A.US! DEY herehen Station hoeeuter
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- fG Ehe a d lisant stated that he theeght he could eeeply utth meet of the '
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eiens of the permit issued to Meeties11e by the State of Minamesta. Geseems weste discharges can be held up for up to three days. h applisant stated that the additiemal costa involved in unste handling had to be balame=d against the costs of a 300' steek and of peblic eseeptance.
N applicant stated his intent to place a remotely operated stop valve in the RCCS pump section line as elese to the sentainment structure as possible (allowing room for welding and inspecties). N valve assid be amebered to the containment structure. N piping downstream of this valve any be same-what thimmer (for flexibility) them that from the suppression pool to the valve.
N applicent stated that he is designing his piping to enamed the regstre-meets of 831.1 but met up to the requirements of 531.7. b y will esafers to the schedule of applicable specifications recently publishod by the ABC.
N y believe the only difforence between their requirements ad 331.7 is in the amount of documentation provided.
N applicast was advised that he may be required to provide se imort atmes-1 phere in the contaimeent building.
Dr. Readrie meted that the Subcommittee had met discussed the in-servies inspection program, hydrogen gaaeration fellowing a 14CA, ceuman mede failures, er anticipated transiests and failure to serm but the applicant should be prepared to answer geestions se these for the full Committes.
Attmadees i
KIS.
Ek Emmeral Elestrig J. M. Rendrie, Chairman
- 1. S. Boyd J. W. Blackley E. S. Ishin D. Eiseabst L. T. Elein C. P. Siese A. L. Gluckmann W. G. Meche11 W. R. Strattaa L. R. Geller
- p. A. Milani J. C. McKinley, Staff T. A. Ippolite E. 7. pee J. Knight E. D. Powell Stone 4, Webster E. Spector F. Weiusimmer I. Spickler N
W. O. Chatfield g
p R. 3. Flamaars D
D. Game M. C. Cerdaro 3[ s E. A. Iang
- a. A. Kabinak fj ^
D. L. Metabett M. E. Marshall i
J. E. Weble J. I. Martame 0
W. C. Shepherd J. p. Royarro T A W. U. M1 L dt >Ealker,,,,
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or A. W. Weffard SURNAME >
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Ibrm AEC.818 (Rev. 9-53) u.s sovERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ;19W--O-214129
g Shoreham Station 3-Essenhor 4e W J
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Dr. Readrie reviemed the agenda for the Sabeammittee renting and==*as Wat l
the u. ajar imenes appeared to be the Est positive Section Road (EpSI) require-l ments for the emergency core eeeling system pumps, and the failure of a pes-sive component of & BCCS during long tars eeoling eenditions. He ateo cited the question of inerting and the problems highlighting during the pali-sedes Subcommittee meeting regarding purging hydrogen from the containment and the radiation dose asseeisted with this operation.
l Meetina with the Ementatory Staff Vith regard to flood protection Mr. Geller reported that the applicant une recalculating the fleed height taking into account the items mestiemed by CERC and DEL, and are therefore approaching the CERC heights. Thus far CERC has agreed with the caleslations performed by the applicant.
Mr. Geller reported that the Shoreham plant will follow the Esteh proposals with regard to fa-service inspection of the remeter vessel.
l Mr. Coller stated that the applicant felt that his test program will show that diagonal reinforcing will met he needed in the containment etreetere to resist seismic leads.
Dr. Clucknamn pointed est that a ascend serias of tests that had been planned to demonstrate that diagemal reinforcement was met needed has been h w due to lack of fwads. Be does met believe that BEL can essert the results of the preliminary tests as being seeclusive. It is his preliminary feeling that the applicant should be required to preride diagonal reinforcement.
With regard to the inspecties of the main steen piping, Mr. Beller reported that DEL was satisfied with 100% radiographic inspecties of the butt welds, but they also wanted volumetric inspection of all castings and valve hedies doenstream of the second isolaties valve. Es said the applicant was resisting this requirement and he felt the applicant was afraid the campements te he inspected wesid met pass the inspecties. Se meted that ML's proposals are in accord with the Division of Ra'acter Standards' proposed standards, with regard to the isolation capehilities for the instrument and centrol lines penetrating the containment, Mr. Geller reported the applicant appears to be seemeieg firm en his present proposal to provide a moneal stop valve follaume an ancess flaw check valve setside of the eestainment streetere. It appears t 50-100 ene inch penetrations are involved.
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RWIT2 Aff 34 (Rev.H3b u.s sovrRhutNYPRINTINsorrect:ih6-{>214429
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Dr. Stees asked if the calculated presseres resulting fr 1
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' i. i I.117 ime. sener resites that the Desme Arnold i
plaat had gone back and recalculated the pressures and found that the peasis would not fail while Shorehen still indientaa that a penal utsbe he bleen eff.
Dr. Siess asked if the releases frem one of these failsd instrusset lines would everleed the secondary buildings elemmep systant Mr. Spisklar replied that each a failers wesid give secessive deses at the site hy but would not destroy the cleanup system.
Dr. mandrie characterized the failure of a primary instrument time amtside of containment as a easll IJX:A without any eestainment at all.
Mr. Coller pointed out that a ascendary break is an instrument line following a less-of-coolant accident semld result is a less of eere seeltag.by espriving the BCCS pumps of the containment pressere needed to asistain the NPSE.
Br. Eendrie meted that when he asked shoot a :::r M y passive failure in the ECCS following a less-of-coolant accident the Deres Arnold applicant claimed that this had mover been censidered and the Shorehen application quotes at length from the General Design Criteria. Both applicants behave as themsk they had rever heard of this rogstrement before.
Mr. Coller described the main semen lines as being the primary ones that eenid bypass the veut system. The applicant is proposing a mozimum allow-able leak rate en each of the main steam step valves of 11.5 eth which is about two orders of magnitude too high te meet the Part 100 eriterica at th? site basadary.
Mr. Spickler cale=1sted that if 0.5 eth bypassed the mais steam step valves it would give doses approaching the Part 100 limits. He justified the ese of the 11.5 efh values at Dresden by pointing est that there is more dis-tance to the boundary.
The other lines with a potential for bypassing the vent system are the purge and vest lines, but that these lines have deshle isolation valves with a bleed to the containment atmosphere.
up Mr. Sellar described the applicaat's recently proposed modificaties te D EX:S peep section lines and the NpSH problemas. Be stated that the pumps d&d not get into tremble until the containment reached atmospheric pressent and the pressure suppression poc1 unter reached 186*F.
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AgGe9 Shoreham Station December M g
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Mr. Wafford described the Shareham plant fleed protection pelating est that I
the plant grade is 20' above MLW and the current proposal is to protaet ths l
plant to 25' above MLU. Be said that LILCO would protect to a level susteelly
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agreeable with the Regulatory Staff, and that this was met a particularly l
bothersome design probles.
Dr. Hendrie noted that the applicant's thirty day meteorology was somoshat less conservative than that used by the Regulatory Staff. Mr. Spickler said that this presented no serious problem since Part 100 limita sure met asceeded using either set of assumptions.
With respoet to diagemal reinforcement of the containment building to resist seismic loads, the Shoreham design does met currently incorporate diagonal reinforcing.
t Mr. Uef ferd stated that the experimental work had been dame and a topical re-port was baing prepared.
Dr. Stass stated that he had seen the experimental results and the proposed design criteria, but he had not seen how these related to the Shoreham de-sign. Mr. Wefford said that their substission would show how Sherohen fit esto the Rolley curves, and that they weeld provide dymanic calculations for all buildings. The calculations will consider both the cracked and on-eracked conditions using the shear modulus and shear deformities reeemeended in the Belley repdat.
Dr. Gluck=ana told the applicant that the analysis shem14 include a descrip-ties of the additiemal forces that wealC be transmitted to the reacter emp-i part structures, the shear stresses Ledeced in the liner plata, and the forces that womid occur at the containment penetrations. Se had met yet sean an analysis of the additiemal forces that would occur in the liner plate and at the penetration sleeves. Es told the applicant that the analy-sia should include the deformations to be espected in the eestainment strue-tore if the diagemal reinforcement is emitted.
Mr. Wefford said that the applicant p1mmnad to embait a report sometime in the future.
Br.EsseriepelatedoutthattheACRSwasbeingaskedtodecidethis$$sen before it had an opportunity to review the report.
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4 tater la the meeting Mr. uofford stated that LILCO plans to build the plant with diagonal reinforcing, and if they can justify its emission to the Rege-laterv Staff they will perese this later. The applicant util met leave out the diagonal reinforcing withest BEL's ma C+
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SURNAME >
DATE >
IMIu AEC 818 (Rey, S-63) gggggm,a gg
JFFICIA.llSE ONLY h
horsham station Deesm6er (END (k%W Br. Gluckmana stated that he espoeted to ese the final deoip of ehe anals between the reacter floor and the eestainment heilding later as the desip is firmed up.
Mr. Wof ferd stated that the applicant plans to review the desip of the floor, the seals, the downeamers, and the solumns with the Staff as the design develops.
I N BEL Staff slee usats to review the junction of the remeter espport structure with the floor.
With regard to the fumettonal design of the conr=i====t psecours suppression system and the design methods, Mr. Wofferd stated that LI140 attempted to 1
leek at conservative boomds for the socident eenditions, and they reviemed their assumptions with DEL. N y asemoed higher reacter pressures at the time of the accident and ran through the computations again.
Dr. labia pointed est that the Moody model uns used to determine the rata of eeelant release from the loss-of-coolant accident, het that the design Astails of the code mood to caleelste the pressure buildup in the sentain-meat structure meoumed slip flow threagh the deuneemers. Se asked if the applicant had censidered '
-.- :: r flow through the h a to cales-late the peak pressure within the containment structure. Mr. Walker stated that the applicant had used both '
7 : n-and Moody flew within the reme-tor vaissel, but that they had leaked at sely slip flew La the went area. Es said that me flashing flow would eseuse in the vent area.
Dr. Ishin asked how the applicant had caleelsped the time regelred to eleer the vents into the suppression pool. N applicant has assumed a constant mass of water in the pipe and as increasing opstream preseows. Se them integrated the acceleration of the esmatant mass of water in the vent pipe te set the time before the end of the vent was clear. Simee the volume of unter in the vest pipes was small compared to the total volume of the dry-well the applicant did not allow for as increase in volume of the dryuell during the vest clearing phase. h applicant caleeleted that the peak differential pressure across the drywell fleer securred La appresiastely 0.7 see. En pointed est that the openings to the vents were raised aheve the fleer to prevent unter and debris from being directed doun the varia late the suppression pool.
j Mr. Walker stated that he had diocessed the flow models with General Elastris
'so8 femme that GE sees a similar model. Bis model acessats for eritimmt flow, however me critical flow is calestated for the Shoreham decip.
OFTICE >
SURNAME >
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Furm AEC.31tt (Rn, D-63) u.s soVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICE :1tur-O-214429
DmCIALllSE ONLY
$%'Kf assember 4ep;y shareham station 4 Dr. Is wasadvisedthattheapplicanthadmeteensideredavirtesishes model for the discharge of the water ding from the vent pipes.
Mr. Walker stated that the applicant uns estisfied simes the esapeted reestes compared well with the tests performed for Eumholdt Bay and Bodega Esad.
In reopease to Dr. Isbia's geesties regarding the dynamics of suppression and the forces indeced in the free ends of the dennesmers Mr. Wefford stated that the applicant plans to tie the ends of the douncemers together but that the details have met yet been worked est. Be alae stated that me fur-ther study is planned on models of bubble collapes, etc. since the salesla-tions presently give a good correlation with the GE test roomits.
Mr. Collar understeed that LIIAO plammed to take amether leek at the forces and vibrations in the desacomers. Mr. Hofferd stated that LI120 util leek at the jet forces, bsbbles, gas, sir, etc., to evaluate the forces em thee bottom of the pipes, but he was met sure how the calculations useld be made and suggested that possibly they weeld have to beek into the seleties by de-termining the forces that would be required to break off the vent pipes and designing against these.
In response to Dr. Isbia's guestian regarding syuumetric flow into the pres-sure suppression pool, Mr. Walkar stated that the flow was caused by a pres-sure in the drywell and he assumed that this pressure was uniferes threeghest the drywell. He knew of no reason why this would not be se end further it would take a large dif farential pressere within the containment so make a significant difference in the flow threagh the vest pipes. Mr. usiker thought that it would take the bleekage of several vent pipes to have as abeervable affect en the pressure differential across the reactor fleer.
l In response to Dr. '5endrie's questice regarding the strength test of the l
reactor floor, Mr. Wefford stated that seek a test would be made initially l
and that the desblodsealed joint between the floor and the containment strue-l ture was designed testable and to assare leak tightness.
1 Mr. Coller uns assured that mething would be done to preclude sebsequent atruetural teees ef this fleer.
The Regulatory Staff advised Dr. Ishin that unter 12' below the louer and i
of the vast pipes wesid not be given credit as a heat stak during inittet himsessa hecease mixing to this depth could met be assured. However, ems unter weald be available for long term ecoling.
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l WLeh regard to the instrument lines peestrating the containment, Mr. Woffend j
said that these lines were being provided with a manual step valve followed n
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Sr. Bundrie said that he somld be happier if the emeens flew shook values 4d-sore toested within the eestainemmt. Mr. mafford felt that this ess1d be done init that he wesid prefer met to becamme of maintenessa pechlass. Se slee said that these valves weeld be located within appea-f==*=1y one foot of the containment wall but, room asald be left for inopoetion and to pruit replacement if moedeJ. It is the applicast's intent to keep these valves as close to the eestainment as paesible and to design these to Seimada Class 1.
Be conceded that if one of these lines should fail it samid prehably blev eff one er two panels from the seeendary eestaissent structore.
Dr. Needrie asked det kind of deoes semld result if one of these lines failed with the core having 1.87, failed fuelf M replied that ases withmet eestatament this accident semld not result in deoes
- N the part 100 guidelines.
1 Mr. Geller potated out that Part 100 es directed at failures greater them these of a one inch line. E said that these would be Class 1 Lines and the design has met been finalised.
Dr. Esodrie suggested that Mr. Geller may have been trying to tell the appli-east that Part 100 deoes should be saved for the more serious antidents.
Mr. Geller noted that in other BWE's there sure analtiple instrument penetra-tiens in ene area, and that some acties exterior to the coment==amt eenld shear more than one of these instrument lines. Be asked how mesy instransat lines eeuld fail before the remeter got into tremble? The applicant emeld met anseer et this time.
i Mr. Ucfford stated that all lines penetrating the camraf amant that are greater than ene inch in diameter here valves inside the containment structure. Be j
also meted that the imetrument times are really 1" 0.3., and the us11 thick-j mess has met been est. These lines will have a facter of safety much greater than these of the larger pipes.
Mr. Hofferd stated that the applicant has not talked with EEi, se much as they useld like regarding the allevabla leak rate thru the main stems imelaties valves. The applicant has been leeking at this probles het has fesed no j
ready solution. En pointed out that they are buying the valves under rigid specifications, but realised that amee the valves unre installed and rue they ess14 met maintata the 2.5 eth limit withest a major maintenance program.
Es noted that there were a total of eight of these valves and that it usand j
he a major operation te lap the seats seek shutdeen and estimated that hem 2-18 days additional downtime would be ragstred per year to meistain this leek reta. Be felt they were going to here to rely em quality assarames and taste to get the best valves evailable and then to leek at the system as a
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uhele to contain the leakese. Be pointed est that tha --4 = me - 14 stream of the seceed 'ieelation valve is met Claims 1 Seismic Gesign het is!
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Fbrm AEC-33 (Rev. 9-53)
U.S sovERNMENT PRINTING 0FTlG : m6-*0-2M29
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Shoreham Station Boeseber 4.T h.
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elemet Class 1.
He said that if the main steam line can withstand the tutbias y
trip shock then it can also withstand an earthgoebe.
N appiteemt has not had time to evaluate all of the arenees open and he enumerated same alterne-tives as being en air seal, an expendable seat, a vest to the r:n "
talement, or melasses poured over the seat of the eter velves.
i een-Es uns ast prepared to say at this time what would be the best solutism.
Dr. Eendrie pointed out that if the Comunittee does met have some plan te look et then it will have to look at the deemstream piping and valves ameh more closely.
N applicant recognised the eeneeras with respect to mais atmas line isole-tion valve leakage in the esent of the destga homes less-ofweelant assident.
Several methods de controlling this leakage are being eensidered and entraat further study. N applicant intends to continen analysing this problem and reach a amtmally agreeable soluties with the ABC Staff.
In trying to understated the NPSE questies, Dr. Esadrie asked the appliemmt if containment pressure was required to supplement the unter hsad when the temperature of the water in the suppreestes pool aseeeded 180*F.
Mr. Wofferd replied that eene addittamal pressure was required. Be pointed est that a member of ese tiens had to be ande. One was that the unter in Long Island Sound was at 80 or better, seceed was that one E M heat eachanger was out of service, third that & water in the pressure suppression pool uns at 110*F at the start of the accident, and fourth, that fall flee is passing through the pump.
Mr. Wofford pointed est that the care spray system will fill the ehroud quickly to overflowing and at that point the ymmp discharge seald be throttled back to regain the necessary NpER. Be also pointed est that the system is de-signed se that it could pump Long Island Sound into the pressere emppres-sies chamber if it became meessaary.
h applicant pointed out that the peep venders are very relemetant to pre-vide information en the capacity of their pumps with only a 10' NPSE.
N ye are afraid that somebody weald attempt to run the pumps under these condi-tiena.
Dr. Eendrie raised the question of imortlag and psiated out that thus far all BWE's here been required to provide an inert atmosphere.
N applicant stated that the esamections fee inerting weald be peerided and they would de mottag to praetode an inerted containment.
F LN In roepense to Dr. Imbia's questies, the applicant stated that the :::- ^- y eestainment discharge rate of 700 efs was beoed en the in-leakage of 50% of the buildine wel y day==8 % 1/2" pr w T== Q eemt eencimend that ti.i
- - pecity was needed to_ pen sst earfiltratios of.. primary. containment s es leMMii.
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Furm 20 816 (Rev.9-531
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U.s sovrnurNT MMTmG WlG :NMMD L.
OfRC A. USE ON.Y
%$58 Shoreham Station m
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h Ch pp The Segulatory Staff noted that this leek rate was better than that mediastly n.
providad for Gg eenfinement buildings.
Dr. Bondrie meted that there did not seem to be any disagreement hetussa the Regulatory Staff and the applicant regarding the mixing model annuend for the secondary costalament vent system.
In response to amether questian by Dr. Isbia, the applicant stated that the 30,000 cfm recirculation rate in the secondary containment building ses se-1ected se that it could he integrated into the merest vent system for the building.
The applicant said Nre would be a separate system for vesting the inert gas from the costalmeest building.
la respeese to amether questica, Mr. Wofferd stated that LI1c0 had started to design this plant with ne stack, and that they believe the dBC limits are reasonable, but due to current public pressure they could est stop thers, se they have gone to two additiemal-features; liquid god gas treatmost.
During normal operaties the discharge gases can be held up for tem hears and during abnormal operation the gas discharge system is espable of a three day heldup, heeaver the applicant does not anticipate operaties with the three day delay.
The gas discharge system is designed se that it eam be enlarged if ancessary and imeludes tuo catalytic receabiners to reduce the volens of hydrogen is the discharge gas. Mr. Hofferd saw a potential hasard in this design in that some regulatory agency may see that a three day holdup is possible and them demand it be used for mermal operation.
Dr. Isbin noted that this applicant was designing for releases below Part 20, and that they stated they would abide by local ordnances, and attampt te minimize the radioactive enterist released to the omriremment.
Be asked if the applicant felt thet he could meet the limitations set as the usetteelle
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plant by the Minnesota state permit? The applicant replied that he themght he could meet the Minnesota limits as long as no uneenal asserrences took place in the plant. He felt that hts operation would be very elese en the isotopic limits and that he might eneeed those by the members that proceed the orders of magnitude.
In response to Mr. Ge11er's geestion, the applicant stated that redundant estalytte recombiners were provided in the off-gas system and that if both recombiners were out of service they weeld prehably shut deum the plant.
The appliaant also stated that he plass to take semples from the last task is the off gas system prior to releasing khe gas. The applicant stated that there ses mething in his PSAR regarding the release limits of iodine frem the off-ges system, however, he has added charcoal filters to this discharge system.
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Wrtu AEC-816 (Rev. 9-53)
U.s sovtRNutNT PRIN7thG OFFICE low-o214 629 i
OFRCIAl.IlSE DEY
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Shoreham Station 11 -
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\\%, I" Og*3_.4 En respouse to Dr. Isbin's geestism regarding the additiemal oests of Game
features, Mr. Wofferd said that the additional oests had to be sus $od against the costs of a 300' stack and the price of public asseptanee.
Even though the gaseous releases would be made at roof tap level, BEL womid assume a ground release for at least tbs firer, year of operaties.
The applicant stated that the processias of lignid unste uomid be 4 ^ ;r dent of the activity in t. hat usate. It useld be determined b, the tem centent j
of the liquids. Liquids with a high iam centent would be evaporated, elle i
the low ten unstes would be run threagh a deep bed doodescaliser.
With regard to the main steam lies inspection program, Dr. Esmerie noted that the applicant had volunteered loff, radiography of the bott unies deem-stream of the second imelarten valve. Be said hosever, if this system was to be considered in controlling the leak threegh the mais steam isolaties valves them it might be wise to have valuestric inspection of the valve bodies
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and fittings deumstream of the necend imelatism valve.
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Mr. Hofferd reported that doenstream of the secoed isolaties valve there were:
4 -- 24" turbine step valves l
2 -- six inch turbine feed pump stop valves 1 -- turbine bypass velve (made up of fear 18" valves La see body) 2 -- 8" seceed stage reheater valves 1 -- 10" auxiliary abutoff valve
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of these, the four turbine stop valves, tue feed pump step valves, and the turbine bypass valve receive 1007, radiography of the preneurs eestaining j
parts. The reheater valves and the enriliary shutoff valve receive radio-
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graphy of the valve body ends; the areas where webs join to the valve body, and the areas where casting heads are removed from the body. N applicant feels that this is adequate emaximaties of these valves, benever this has met been discussed with EEL.
i bl. e Mr. Wafford pointed out that LIMO espects at least see or tue interveners j
en the somstreetion permit for this plant, and they would like as eleen as application as possihte.
K-s,
)
OFFICE >
SURNAME >
DATE>
FbrIn AEC.318 (Rev. 9-63)
U.s sovtRNurNT PRINTlhG OFFICE 1966 - 0 214-629 i
____________________J
T DU%.W W a m 4,% g% T
~
Nearehen Station
- 12 f
mdke..
gp t.
With respect to & failure of the 3083 peep mosties lias, Dr. Esserie ~ add that he foemd Eakibit M very useful. Mr. Wofferd stated that the applicant still seed DEL one commitment, and that was the step valve uom14 he temated as close to the eenerete containment structure as possible. h piping between the containment and the first inelation valve would he Setemic Class 1, and weeld be at least estra sesong pipe. N piping deenstream of the fee-lation valve may be somekket thimmer in order to obtata more flerdbility.
Mr. Coller advised the applicant that the in-service inspecties of this length of pipe should be given careful eensideration becanoe of its critical nature.
In response to Dr. Hendrie's questions regarding the ability of the contain-most spray system and the hetidtag testattom system to meet the IEEE criterien, the applicant stated that he intends to meet IEEE. BEL edvised the appli-east to keep in mind the egeipesat qualifications and the requirements for unambigeons tasting of the systems.
la response to a question regarding the well thickness of the remeter vessel, the applicant apologised for the ceaeern over this that the thiekasas uma correct at. the point at which it sessnessured, however, this ses met the same location as the thickness was measured in other vessels. This vessel's well thickness is 5-7/8" in the abell eeurses.
Dr. Eendrie pointed set that the ACRS is rather feed of the 331.7 piping eede. Be asked the applicant what they were eseng beyond the miniese re-geiraments of the fermer pipe code 331.17 Mr. Uefford replied that this Laformation uma tabulated in Amendment 8, and that the ABC had recently published a chart of eedes and standards that apply af ter varians dates.
N applicant will comply ami will de better then 331.1, het that they will met reach the level of B31.7. As the applicant estrently understands R31.7 the only difference from kia program is in the degree of documentaries.
Dr. Eendrie thought that the unresolved issues identified in the Committee's reports en Esteh, Brunewick, and Dresden Unit 2 were well esvered in LnCO's Exhibit E.
He sg,gested that espies of Erhibit I he made erailable at the
{
full Ceemittee maeting.
Caecus I
w Mr. Seller stated that the in-service inspectica program ga xM by the applicant. at this time is inadegeste. Be also stated that this applicant une tammimp heavily em the GE generie atmeios to resolve the hydrogen isees and the problem of fallare to scram en anticipated transients. With regard to the radiolytic generation of hydrogen, Mr. Coller said that BEL has OFFICE >
~ ~ * -
SURNAME >
DATE >
_-------------J.
=
3brrn AEC.318 (Rev. S-53) y,$_ soyg.RNMENT PRINTlh6 0FFICE 1she--O 21dii29
0FC1llSE ONLY hereham Station Doesober I
already advised CE of the IRL eameerms regarding the use of test data M'J ^
loped at OENL esing only pere wetar without additives. Mr. Seller advisef ~
the Seheesmaittee that the sely unresolved ML issue is the isolatiam espe-bility for the instrument lines. All af the other imenes appear ta ha sa the way to resoletion. Be felt the instrument line geestiam could he re-selved if a remotely operable valve was located as eless to the ammentement as possible and opstesas of the emeses flew check valve.
Dr. Strattaa pointed set that this prehlen estats en all Est's and Mr. Galler agreed that it might he a hechfit issue.
Dr. Readrie agreed that the fell Committee mos1d have'to decide this ites, and that the Shareham letter would have to recognise the teese.
Meetime with Loar Island Li=htt== Cammen_y Dr. Eendrie hoped the in-service inspection program was eleser to the N-45 proposal them the applicant's recent embedsetems Ladicated. Es pointed est also that the Sabemenittee had not discussed the hydrogen generation issue het that it uns seeontieming prehlen, and he espected reseleties in des time.
Be pointed set to the applicaat that inerting may 'he required. Be alerted the applicant to be prepared for questions regarding ecumen made failures in the protecties system, and failure to scram en maticipated transients.
Be them asked how the tritien generated La the heres serbida control red is released to the coolant. N applicant did met have as amoser at this time. Dr. Beedrie them asked why the moderator temperature coefficient La the cold candition was similar to other plaats while the hot (no voids) condition it was less. N applicant did not have an enouer at this time.
ee**
CR M
- 9 r##
~
OFFICE >
SURNAME >
w-
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DATE >
~
Pbrm AEC=818 (Rev. 943) u.s. GOVERNMENT PRIN7thG OFFICE :1 6 214429
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O I
5 l
T A 0
E D NE EH -
NI ESL.
k MNA -
c
)
M AC 3
I S
O R T 0
0 0 T
I
=
4 C
R 6 <
E 0
G C
0 R
=
(G G
~
c N
~
0
~
I 4
l 0
3 0
=
G
)
5 X 7
- 0 R
0 <
E 3 G 2)
F A 0
=
v C5 t
SD t.
I 3
/
0 E F 5
(
b 0
S H
7 5
E 0
C 0
01(
TR H
N Y
NO
=
5 C T
0 l
EF a
H S C
3 O
AE
=
PC G
L 0
E N N
=
V I E SR G
S RE g
SA EF 5
1 BE M
MR 0
m
=
UO
=
0
~
G NT I
G 1
2 0
.y
~
7 6
5 4
3 2
1 0
0 0
0 0
0
,0 2~ 2E5E 5 ' Q E mt E" O 9
- )>fI
(
l
.4, LOFT SEMIS C AL E 1
BLOWDOWN R ES U,LT S R E SIDU AL W AT E R go.
i DA T'A n
f HO H
B v
a'
.w 30 i
p.
e 3
_J ct go O
SMBBLE RlS E VELO 2iTY
(' VA RI A B L E 3
0 s'
m l.d -
CONSTANT
/0 ggggLg
' RIS E VELOCITY g-n 0
~
(,I D E A L HOMOG Z N EO%$
S LO UJ D O '.U N O
20 40 60 50 10 0 PIPE B R E liK
.S ! Z. E
(%
OPENING) l
i 4,
- 0..
(
t 1
- 1/1.78 1
- 0. 5 1/1.78 a
Df(P) 0.19 g a
<5 (1)
V
=
O.136h(P)f(P)
, 0.136h(P)f(P)-
0.5
_1/1.78 y
f(P)
O. M a
>5 (21 V
=
B g
,0.75 h(P)f(P),
0.75h(P)f(P) where the quantities 0.32 h(P) =
pf pg 0.19 f(P) =
D (Pf - Pg) g and g = 32.2 ft/see D = hydraulic diameter a = void fraction Pg = density of saturated steam Pf = density of saturated liquid a = surface tension 9