ML20217A470

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Proposed Tech Specs Restricting Containment Spray Use as Backup to Shutdown Cooling
ML20217A470
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 11/15/1990
From:
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20217A460 List:
References
NUDOCS 9011210101
Download: ML20217A470 (18)
v • d • e


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TABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)'

P_ajte.

2.12 Control Room Systems..................................... 2-59

, 2.13 -Nuclear Detector Cooling System.......................... 2-60 2.14' Engineered Safety Features System Initiation Instrumentation Settings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-61 L2,15- Instrumentation and Control Systems...................... 2-65 -

F 2.16 R i v e r Le ve l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 71 j 2.17 Miscellaneous Radioactive Material. Sources...............

2-72 l2.18L Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)............................. 2-73  :

O,, 2.19T Fire Protection System................................... 2-89  !

? 12.20f Staam Generator Coolant Radioactivity.................... 2-96 2.211 Post-Accident' Monitoring Instrumentation................. 2-97' >

,W 2.22 Toxic. Gas Monitors........................................ 2-99 e ,

3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS...................................... 3-0a

  1. j 3.15 L Instrumentation and Control.............................. 3-1  ;

3.2, ~ Equipment and Sampling ' Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 3-17 b, 3. 3 -: Reactor Coolant-System and Other Components Subject toL ASME-XI Boiler and Dressure Vossel Code: Inspection'

and Testing S"r'. " lance.... .. ...................... 3-21'
o  : 3.4. < Reacton Coolant s Inte e Te s t. i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 3 6

~3.'5 1 Containment < Test.. .........................;........... 3-37 4

  1. Safety Injection and Containment Cooling. Systems' Tests....:3-54 13.6 l3;7: ,LEmergency Power! System Tests..'.............;.... Periodic 3-58 4 c3.8; ? Main Steamilsolation Valves'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .~. ; 3-61 1

'g*

, " L3 ~.91. ! Auxi l iary Feedwater ' System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .: 3-62 i

< 4 3.10 SReactor, Core l Parameters.................-.................. 3-63: .

A1 ;3.11 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Programs'....... u...3-64: 'I ywD 1.f -3.12 RadiologicaliWaste; Sampling and Monitoring............... 73 ]

s 3.' 12.1 '  : Liquidrand Gaseous' Effluents....................-3-69L +V l

=3'.12.2 ? Solid Radioactive: Waste.L...'.................... 3-71aa R L 3.13 ! 'RadioactivelMaterial: Sources Surveillance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

-. 3-76 '

3 s14L Shocki suppr'essorsV(Snubbers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 3-77f 13:15' Fire. Protection System................................... 3-80.

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', 3i16 OResidu'al5 Heat lRemovalJSystem Integrity Testing............:3-84 , . l~

=3.17e Steam Generator 6 Tubes......................................

,. 13-86; 'N m ,

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'f L 4 '. 010 E S I G N : F EAIUR E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 1 :

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' Containment 10es ign ~ Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 m

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  • . 4 .' 2.h $Co$tainment'Structur'e.......................... 4 , , 24.2.21 ' Penetrations.............................'...... 4-1

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4.2.3; Containment Structure Cooling Systems.......... 4-2"

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o , ii Amendment No. 84,86,93,104,122 d th

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.l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION - TABLES

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~ TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE- CESCRIPTION PAGE-1-1 RPS LSSS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 J L 1-10a f 2-1 ESFSn I'itiation Instrumentation Setting Limits. . . . . . . . 2-64 2-64a t

,[*

2-2 Instrument Operating Requirements for RPS . . . . . . . . . . 2-67 u

2-67a

, 2-3 Instrument.0perating Requirements.for Engineered I

. Safety Features . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 2-68 2-68a 2-68b 3 L2-4 Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions . . . 2-69 .i 2-69a 12-51 Instrumentation Operating Requirements for Other Safety- R

+

Feature Functions .'. . . .-.x. ... . ... . . . . . . . . . . 2-70' i 7

7- FirefDetection: Zones. .s. .. . . . . . . . . .-. . . .-.. . . . 2-90 '

?Halon Area Fire. Zones .L.'. .-. ,,. . ... . .. . . . . . . . .

. 2-90a- r ;

m 2i8 : Fire:HoseSkationl Locations................. 2-94

,, 2-95 i

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2-9i:RCSLPressure. Isolation Valves . . ... ... . . .' -

.c. . . . .- . 2-2e l: i Y' 2-10 Post-AccidentlMonitoring'Instrumentat' ion Operating-Limits . . 98 ' ~

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2-98a.

4.

2-98b:

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(2flicToxicGas'MonitorsOperating:L'imitsL..E.:.;.-..-.... ....;. 100 l, f

, 13-11MinimumFrekuenciesIforChecks, Calibrations,:and' 'l Testingjof RPSN ' l

. . . ..- 3-3 l

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, 3-5 >

r. 3-64

?3-fi Minimum frequencies for-Checks,LCalibrations and Testing ofL LEngineered Safety Features,Linstrumentation.'and Centrols...-. 3 -~ 7 '

, 3-8L '

3-9 y

73-10 9

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L iv. Amendment NO. III L' q

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. t 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION' a Reector Coolant System (Continued) f l2.1'  ;

  • * , 2.' 1.1: poerable Components (Continued) '

3- a (c)--Iffewer-thantheaboverequiredreactorcoolantpumpsare U operable, the required pumps shall be restored to oper ale

, , status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the reactor shall be-placed in L cold shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />..

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y,  ;(3) Cold Shutdown or 210'F 5 Tcold 5 300'F

[ (a) Atleasttwo(2)ofthedecayheatremoval'loopslisted below shall be operable:

p '. ,

, , (i)- Reactor coolant loop 1 and its associated steam-

, l, generator and at.ieast one associated reactor coolant-pump.-

m

..M- .(ii) Reactor coolant loop 2 and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant IV ,

&m, , _ pump.-

Nff9 g Oneshutdowncoolingpump,one.shutdowncoolingheat:il t,i -(iii)' iexchanger,:and-associated shutdown coolingLpiping.

m , 4 (iv) 'l~- above One' shutdown; cooling' pump, in addition to that'in.(iii) addition-tothatin'(i.ii)above,andrassociated-J., shutdown cooling pip.ing.

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.(b):LAtleastone'(1)_offthe'decayheat; removal?loopstlisted g @@%,

g- ~ ~ .aboveLshall beLin' operation'.

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L(c)ifWithnol coolant 1.copnino)eration,'suspendalloperations. .

iniolvingiaireduction'in )oron concentration of the Reactor- 3

('7% f ,

M Coolant System and Linitiate1 corrective action- to : return the

.;requiredcoolantLlooptoLoperationiin8 hours'., {

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.;(4)l Refueling 3 Shutdown Condition / ;R d [(a)lfAtlleast;one1(1):shutdowncoolingloop;shallbein1 L;

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[J W i operation.-

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lM NQM~,; N q ' (b)'4Whenthewater.L1'evelabove;theltopcifsthe-irradiatedfusi  :

jyfg :  ?  ?~~ assemblies. seated within therreactorEvessel is less;than 15) o W ,, g- 7 ,

l feet both shutdown;coolingfheat(exch' angers and at=least two; ypy - '

9 TLPSI or' containment spray pumpscsha11Lbesoperable.o '

a 2Av'ailability:of the.containmentaspray ; pumps for shif tdown .

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% "i1  ? .coolingserviceis-subject 1tothe'limitationsofitem4(c) a

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, 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2;l . Reactor Coolant System (Continued)  !

,- c2il.1 OoerableComponents'(Continued). ,

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(c) Forthepurposesofitems(a)and(b)above,thecontainment

[*Lil ': spray pumps can be considered as available shutdown cooling

.y m , s pumps only if both of the following conditions are met:

(i)- Reactor Coolant System temperature less than 120'F.

. .. t NRU (ii) The Reactor Coolant System is vented with a vent area equal to or greater than that'of the pressurizer -!

manway.

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j Exceptient [

, p ,

l?g' All:decey heat removal loops may be made inoperable for up to 8 C -

Lhot.rs provided'(1)' no. operations are- permitted that would cause.

dilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,(2) 4 TJ 4

{

7 A norefuelingoperationsaretaking-place,and(3)allicontainmenti

$l; w ipenotrations providing= direct access.from the containment , j!

$fR, - atmosphere to the outside' atmosphere'are closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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'.(5)'Atlleastonetreactorcoolantpumporonelow 3ressure safety . .  :

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.injectiom pump.-inYthe shutdown cooling-mode s1allLbeiin operation 1 J

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-whenever a changeJis:beingTmade in;the boron concentration of the.  ;

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reactor coolant when fuel is in the-reactor.

'UP .j , 7(6)l Both steam' generators shallJbe filled above the law steam, pV generator; water level trip. set point andLavailable to remove ';

.g#

Fb  :: decay l heat'whenever the: average temperature of;.the reactor. Q

'coolanthis'abovei300*F. Each steam generator.:shall'be' 1 s XM J

,' demonstrated operable hyfperformance of.the inservice: inspection-we '

, ,tprogram specified in Sections 3;17-prior.to exceeding:a reactor- .! .

y& M4 coolantLtemperature ofd300'F.s T-{

em .

, a

./f ' , ' l j(7)f Muiinum reactor coolant' system hydrostatic;. test 4 3ressure shallfbe-  %

, gg p ,- :3125 psia :A maximum ofE10' cycles;of;3125 psia iydrostatic tests.

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. are.:: allowed.

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"+) * '()GReactorfcoolantisystemtle'akLandhydrostatictestshallbe:; '

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' '> conductediwithin'the limitations of; Figures'2-1A'and:2-18.  %

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)(9); Jiaximumisecondhry1 hydrostatic test pressure 1shall not exceed .1250t

psiaC LA 1 '

W 110.scyclesl ;areminimum permitted?measured temperature'of273'F-is required.1;Only3

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L(10)':uMaximumsteamgeneratorJsteam. side 51eaktestpre_ssure.shallnot

'exceedl1000. psia.:lA minimum measured temperature of 73'F'is:

a o , required.'

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"i* - K(11)/ Alnon-operating reactor coolant pump shall not-.be started unless b

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4 . l 2.0- . LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

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2.1 . Reactor Coolant System (Continued) 2.1.1 . 00erableComponents(Continued) q l

[ The requirement to have two shutdown cooling pumps operable when there P is.less than 15 feet of water above the core ensures that a single k failure of. the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in'a 1 omplete' loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and:15 feet of water above.the core, - large heat

, sink is available for core cooling; thus, in the event of a failure of .I the operating shutdown cooling loop, adequate time is provided to .

initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

g The restrictions on availability of the containment spray pumns for a shutdown cooling service. ensure that the SI/CS pumps' suction header p ping is not. subjected to an unanalyzed condition in this mode. ,

. Analysis has. determined that the minimum required RCS vent area is 47 1

- square inches.. The pressurizer manway is specified as the minimum ,

.. . vent area.to allow ventin of-the pressur.zer surge:g line.through the limiting cross-sectional area P !V LWhen reactor coolant' boron" concentration'is being changed, the process:

'must be uniform throughout-the: reactor coolant system volume to ,

)  ;

/ . prevent stratificationsof- reactor coolant at. = lower boron concentration-which could result in a1 reactivity. insertion'. ~ Sufficient. mixing of n ithe reactor coolantnis-' assured if one low pressure safety injection. f' t > v 1

. pump;or one reactor coolant is assured if one low pressure safety. ,

e, Linjection? pump or one' reactor coolant' pump;is'in. operation. The low N *~

pressure; safety injection pump will circulate the
reactor coolant : H, ,

f system-volume in less'than 35:minuteslwhen operated at rated

+

capacit$ nThe_ pressurizer volumefis;relatively inactive; therefore. .

E iitowill tend tothave a boron concentration' higher ~..than thetrest of the-5 gI ~

reactor coolantisystem~during:a dilution operation.: ' Administrative:

el 2- ' '

procedures-will provide ~for'use of<pressurizertspray's!to maintain a-nominalispre~ad;between the boron;concentratio_n in;theipr t at

. W , thereactor?coolantisystemduringthe;additionof;bo'ron.pgturizerand' U q

+ w +

y >

- Both steam generators are required-tolbeifille'd abov'e,thsjlow steam- 1

'H Egenerator water level trip; set point whenever the: temperature ~of the? ,

f, '

x reactor coolar*lis greater than the'designstemperatureiof the shutdown- d w% , , i cooling system to : assure a;redundantf heat:1 removal ~ system for; thei y a

5 m ,,

.reacMr.: '

1

.Thedss'ign[cyclictransientsforthereactor-system'aregiven.inUSAR h

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..Section 4.'2.2; :In(addition, the steam generators:are' designed for' l1W fadditiona1Lconditions111sted in USAR Section 4t.3.4.. Floodediandr L* 1 Lpressurized" conditions.on the' steam side assure < minimum tube sheet! 1 4g i ltemperatureLdifferentialiduring;1eakstesting. The minimum. temperature d a for; pressurizingJthe steam generator steam: side is' 70'F; Lin measuring cN ,

,, 'this temperature; the instrument accuracy must be added to the'70*F limitstojdetermine the actual mea tred limit. '

The measured L'l% 1

+

temperatiire limit will be 73'F basedfupon use of an instrument with a

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.maximumcinaccuracy of +'2'FJand an: additional l'F safety margin ~.- ,

i% AmendmentNo.56,s/81/0/Mf,71 2-2c i I l -

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l 2.0 : LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 1 . 2.1- Reactor Coolant System (Continued) 2.1.1 Operable Componenti (Continued)

'. Formation of a 60% steam space ensures that the resulting pressure i

'y . . , increase would not result in any overpressurization should a reactor  !

coolant pump be' started when the steam generator secondary side '

temperature is greater-than that of the RCS cold leg.-

For the' case'in.,which no pressurizer steam space exists, limitation of 3 the steam generator secondary side /RCS cold leg T to 50'F ensures that-a' single low setpoint PORV would prevent an overpressurization due to actuation of a-reactor coolant-pump.

TheexceptiontoSpecification2.1.1(4)requiringallcontainment V. -penetrations providing direct access from-the containment to the outside atmosphere-be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> requires that the )

_ equipment = hatch be closed and held in place by a minimum of four ,

bolts. '

7 References );

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7(1)' USAR =.Section ' 4.3.-7

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. TABLE 2-9

... REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION l

System Maxism (a)(b)

Valve No. Allowable leakaae High Pressure Safety Injection .

i Loop 1A, Cold Leg SI-216 1 5 gpm j SI-201 s 5 gpm Loop'18,, Cold-Leg SI-220 s 5 gpm o n

SI-204 1 5 gpm a

. Loop'2A, Cold Leg. SI-208 1 5 gpm SI-195 1 5 gpm Loop 28, Cold leg SI-212 1 5 gpm

~a SI-198 s 5 gpm <

Low-Pressure Safety; Injection

@- Loop-l1A," Cold. Leg: SI-200 15 gpm '

Loop:[1B,:ColdLeg. SI-203 s 5 gpm Loop 2A,. Cold Leg: ,

'SI-194- 1 5_gpm- ',

  1. . Loop 2Bt.Coldile'g SI-197- .s 5 gpm ,

Footnotes:-

t H, I(a) SI .1 iLeakageiratescless than: or equalt to 1.0, gpm are considered acceptable.

pg -- ~-

2? '! Leakage rates greater than
1';0 gpm butiless)thancor equal to 5;0 gpm - o 1are cons _ideredLacceptable ifsthe Llatest measured rate has not. exceeded? d O@f ' . ,'the' rate determined >by.the: previous test'by_'an-' amount that reduces the.

W.'"

margin'between: measured leakage. rat'e and theimaximum permissibl'efrate; a

^

m , , :of;5.0)gpm byc50% on-greater. R <l

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'< 3i Leakage rates greater than11.0 gpm bdtLless than. or 'equalito '5.0 j i, are considered unacceptabl.eoif the: latest measured? rate. exceeded gpm; the:

y *, =(

4

rate determined by' therpreviousstest'by; an' amount. that reducesi the;
  • marg i n between : measured ? l eakage rate land : the ' maximum L permi s si bl e rate i k- <

7 , Iofc5.0!gpm by)50%ior greater; u i

3,3 ,

%u y 3 , ,

- 4. ; Lleakage rates.preater than 5.0?gpm are considered unacceptable.

{g. ((b)  ? LMinimum test differential pressure shallinotLbe :1.essithan 150 psid. .

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}rder"-dated 4/20/811 2-2e Amendment No.- l e; n '

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.,' 3. 0 -- SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS

.3.16 Residual Heat Removal System Inteority Testino l

o Apolicability- I Applies.to determination of the integrity of the residual heat l 1

. removal systems and-associated components. 1 Ob.iective -

To verify that'the leakage.from the residual heat removal system l g ,. components is within acceptable limits. t 4'  !

Specifications  !

, (1) a. The. portion of the shutdown cooling-system that is outside W' the contai.nment, and the piping between the containment 7 sprayLpump suction and discharge . isolation valves, shall be l M examined for leakage at a pressure no less than 250 psig..

This shall be performed on a refueling. interval.

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.j a b.. ~ Piping from valves HCV-383-3 and HCV-383-4 to the suction

, s ,

isolation valves of the low pressure-safety injection pumps, 4' zand
containment s) ray ) umps _and to the high pressure safety __

j y5 ' '

injection pumps siall 3e examined forileakage at a 3ressure no.less-than 82 psig.. This shall be performed at tie-y, . testing'fre_quencyspecifiedinL(1)a..above.

L, o- '

s' W

c.D 'The-p'ortion'oftheLhighpressuresafetyinjection(HPSI) system;that is located outside the: containment and:

h, A , '

,idownstream of:the HPSI pum)s shall_'be; examined for leakage l

p Lwhen; subjected to the d.isc1arge. pressure ofia HPSI pump. O

h. 4 to)eratingLin the' minimum recirculatien mode. : This" test:

%* Y ,

A .slallibesperformedatthe< frequency lspecified.ini(1)a.7above. .,

i ,

1The leakage contribution from this .sectiorr shallebe thei n h; " , ,D 4 4

observed $ leakage.from this. piping.atette testLpressureb o. .:l 1 -

Ai " multiplied by thetsquare: root ofcthe ratio l500/P, where'PT i

J W< .isthettestdischarge_ pressure"(inpsig):offtheoperating p, 4

  1. ,s '

iHPSI pump.: .

74 . .

1. _
sde V.isualsinspection'of
thesystem'scomponentsshallbei h b

L, .performedatthefrequency:specifiedLin(1)a.; abo' veto

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?

% a . uncover any significant externalhleakage.to atmospheres

  • 2 o '

(includingleakagejfromvalvesstems,Jflanges,'andipump_. W 5  : seals). :The leakage shall.<be measured by collection and' g@@yA ,'

,  % weighino:orbyany;otherequivalentmethod.z. '

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(2);.a.- LThesum'offleakagesfrossection.(1)a,
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SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS-

' .3.0 4

3.16 Residual Heat Removal System Inteority Testina (Continued) l Basis l The: limiting external leakage to atmosphere rate from the RHR system -

(1243-'cc/ hour) is based upon a plant specific leak rate analysis for RHR system components operating after a design basis accident. l The test pressures for sections 3.16(1)a and 3.16(1)b, and the

. correction' factor in section 3.16(1)c give adequate margins over i e *

. highest. pressures within the lines after a design basis accident.\ >

E A RHR system leaka e of 1243 cc/hr will limit off-site exposurbs due i to. leakage to.insi nificant levels relative to tk.cse calculated for- 1 directcleakage from'thel containment in the design basis' accident. The i

(% safety injection system p mp rooms are equipped with individual charcoal

~

  • filters which are placed nto operttion'by means of switches-in'the <

' control room. The-radiation detectors in the_ auxiliary building exhaust

' duct are used to detect high radiation level. The 1243 cc/hr leak" rate.

3' is sufficiently high to allow for reasonable letkage'through the pump..

seals,and1 valve packings,fand yet'small-enough to be readily handled by; 1 the.pumpsLandcradioactive waste system.- Leakage"to the safety injection -l system

'  ; tanks.(gmp'roomsumpsLwillbe'returnedtothe;spentregenerant-(Additional makeup water to the containment sump inventory ey <can be?readily: accommodated via the chargingipumps from-either the SIRW q

, ztank or'the concentrated' boric acid storage tanks.

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. References, '

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i DISCUSSION A$ t M 1 CATION OF AMENDENT REQUEST The proposed amendment would modify Techrdcal Specifications 2.1.1(3),

2.1.1(4),and3.16.

Technical Specificati;,.= 2.1.1(^.) and 2.1.1(4) contain operability recuirements for decay heat removal in the Cold Shutdown and Refueling Shutdown moces. The proposed chan;es 31 ace limitations on when containment. spray (CS) pumps may be considered availa)le for shutdown cooling service.

Normal shutdown cooling operations utilize a low pressure safety injection  !

p (LPSI) pump. The shutdown cooling return line from the Reactor Coolant System ties into the LPSI pump suction lines between each LPSI pump and its associated suction isolation valve. If a containment spray pump is to be used for shutdown cooling, suction to the CS pump can only be provided by opening a LPSI suction isolation valve and routing the reactor coolant through the class 151R j SI/CS pumps' main suction header.

~"^ lass 151R" and " class 301R" refer to piping pressure class designations from Fort Calhoun s original Peter Kiewit construction contract 763. Durin shutdow cooling operations (using a LPSI pump), only 301R (or higher)g normal pressure c' lass p ping is in-service for shutdown cooling, and the class 151R piping is

isolated from the process. stream by-the LPSI pumps' suction isolation valves.-

However, as stated above, using a containment spray pump for shutdown cooling.

service places class 151R: piping. in' service.

An OPPD engineering review revealed that the class 151R piping system was not constructed or analyzed for unrestricted use in shutdown cooling service.

Shutdown cooling.'iscplaceduin service once the Reactor Coclant system is below

  • 250_psig and;300 degF, and it'is then used to bring the plant to cold / refueling shutdown.and to maintain that mode. .The proposed limitations in sections

.2.1'.1(3) and:2.1.'1(4)'will ensure that the class 151R piping is not operated in

', anjunanalyzed conditionEin this. alternate shutdown cooling. alignment.

sTechnical' Specification'2.1.1(3) applies to Cold Shutdown or-210 degF.s Tcold 5 300 degF.' Thessection'2.1.1(3) pro removal requirements'of items (iii) posed change.requiresithat and (iv) be: met only with.thethe decay heat shutdown icooling (LPSI)'. pumps, instead of " containment spray or LPSI" pumps as presently worded.

m ' ~

1The )roposed change.to~section'2.1.1(4) adds limitations for the availability-

!m ~

- of t1e containment spray pumps for shutdown cooling service. in the refueling-

. > shutdown mode., These limitations are (1) the Reactor Coolant System q temperaturemustbebelow120degF,and(2)_Thepressurizermanwayisspecified k( <J ias the minimun vent area because the pressurizer surge line cross-sectional trea;(approximately 57 scuare inches)-is more limiting, but still larger than I

l47 -square inches requirec by the analysis. The 120 degF RCS temperature i climitation ensures that the SI/CS pumps suction header piping is maintained  !

within the _ temperature bounds of :0 PPD's current analysis :of : record for. this- l

piping. The RCSLvent requirement. precludes the occurrence of  !

, overpressurization-of this piping in:the event of a transient. I 1

1

,i

A.brief paragraph explaining the restrictions for CS pump availability for shutdown cooling has been added to the 2.1.1 Basis section.

Technical Specification 3.16 contains requirements for Recirculation Heat Removal System (RHRS) integrity testing. The title of this section is being '

changed to " Residual Heat Removal..." to be consistent with nomenclature presently used in the industry. Since this system can contain post-accident reactor coolant, and it is located outside the containment, external leakage to atmosphere from the system can have radiological consequences. Section 3.16 is intended to-verify that RHR system external leakage to atmosphere is within acceptable limits.

The proposed change for section 3.16(1)a clarifies the bounds of the 250 psig pressure test. This ensures the discharge piping of the containment spray pumps is subjected to the proper test pressure. The 250 psig test boundary will extend to the suction isolation valves of the containment spray pumps.

Piping between the CS pumps and their sucthn isolation valves is the same pressure class (301R) as the piping between the LPSI-pumps and their suction isolation valves, so the 250 psig pressure test is within the rating of this piping.

Section 3.16(1)b is intended to verify the integrity of the SI/CS pumps' suction piping. The presently defined design pressure for the class 151R SI/CS pumps' suction piping is 66 psig, and its original construction code (USAS  ;

B31.7-1968) hydrostatic test pressure yas 88 psig. The 100 psig minimum test pressure presently in section 3.16(1)b is a judgement value, and it exceeds.the origina1' construction code hydrostatic test pressure for the class 151R piping.

The pro)osed minimum test pressure for section 3.16(1)b is approximately 1.25 times t1e 66 psig design pressure for_the class 151R piping. This is consistent with an ASME XI 10-year inservice hydrostatic test overpressure margin. . The proposed minimum test pressure'still provides an adequate overpressure margin to confirm the integrity of the suction piping, and it will '

allow ~ 0 PPD to^ perform a sir.gle hydrostatic test to meet both ASME.XI Inservice Testing and Technical Specification 3.16 requirements.

.The present section-3.16(1)c has been reworded and made into a new section. ,

3.16(1)d. A new.section 3.16(1)c is being added to incorporate testing of the i High Pressure-Safety Injection (HPSI) piping outside. containment. The present section 3.16 only tests HPSI discharge piping _up to the discharge isolation

' valves-in section 3.16(1)b, and then only to a relatively' low pressure.- The proposed-~section3.16(1)ctestsHPSIpipingoutsidecontainmentanddownsteam of the HPSI pumps.

'The test pressure proposed for section 3.16(1)c:is the discharge pressore-generated by a HPSI pump operating in the minimum recirculation mode. The.HPSI pump curve is virtually flat _in'the 0-50 gpm region, and each pump's minimum

.< recirculation flow l orifice is sized for 35 gpm. Thus, operating a HPSI pump in the minimum recirculat-lon-mode subjects downsteam piping to a pressure very near-the shutoff head of the pump.

In a large break LOCA, the HPSI-

. injection Refueling Water TankSIRWT). (pumps initially When SIRWTtakelevel suction from to decreases the a Safety

J ce tain point, the suction is automatically swapped to the containment sump by the-Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS). The SIRWT inventory provides for a minimum of approximately 20 minutes of safety injection flow prior to RAS. At the 20-minute point, for the limiting accident (large break LOCA), the containment atmospheric pressure would be approximately 35-40 psig (Ref. USAR Figure 14.16-2). At the time of RAS, the minimum elevation head due to the difference between the containment sump water level and the HPSI suction elevation would be approximately 10 pe' 'ef. USAR Section 6.2.1). Thus, the maximum post-accident suction pressure s W. ,?SI pumps would be on the order of 45-55 psi. Per the manufacturer's certified pump curves, HPSI pump shutoff TOH is approximately 3180 feet, or about 1380 psi;. Therefore, the expected maximum post-accident discharge pressure from a HPSI pump would be

-approximately 1435 psig.

Section 3.16(1)a and 3.16(1)b use test pressures which provide margin over the

. maximum expected post-accident pressures in their associated piping. To I provide margin over the highest expected post-accident pressure in the HPSI L discharge piping, the proposed section 3.16(1)c applies a correction factor to L the observed leakage in lieu of an elevated test pressure. In order to E generate the maximum expected post-accident pressure in the HPSI discharge L piping (or any pressure exceeding it), a hydro test aum) must be used and the suction side flanged pump nozzle connection mud be )roien and blanked off.

The class 601R piping immediately upstream of 1:1e HPSI pumps is not designed for HPSI discharge pressure and cannot be isolated any other way. (Noblank flangin l

-3.16(1)g of the LPSI a, because or CS pumps'3ressure the 250 suction connections is within theisrating necessary of theirfor section L class 301R suction piping)psig test Since t1is test is to be done every refueling L -outage, repeatedly breaking.HPSI purm suction flange connections only increases the probability of introducing a le . source. For that reason, the correction factor _for observed leakage is being used to provide' margin over the highest expected post-accident pressure in the HPSI pumps' discharge piping.

l The observed' external-leakage:to_ atmosphere in the proposed section 3.16(1)c-test is. multiplied by the square root of the ratio 1500/P, where P is the. test

>HPSI pump: discharge pressure:in psig. This calculates what the projected leakage would be at 1500 psig, a-pressure which exceeds the maximum expected

-post-accident _HPSI-) umps' discharge pressure. This assumes _the leakage area does not change wit 1 increasing pressure. This is a fair assumption, since the .

difference'between 1500.psig and the test-pressure will not be large.(<100 "

psig),soasignificant'changeinleakageareaisnotexpected.

(During'past-

. quarterly HPSI pump tests in the minimum recirculation mode, taking suction' from the SIRWT- typical HPSI discharge pressures have been greater than 1400 psig.) The correction factor in section 3.16(1)c therefore provides margin-that bounds'the highest expected post-accident HPSI pump discharge pressure.

The proposed change,for section 3.16(2)a simplifies and clarifies the:

acceptance criteria' stat ment. The external leakage to atam+here limit is not being changed.

The' Basis sectic. for. Technical Specification 3.16 has been revisad accordingly to reflect the proposed changes and to restate the origin of the external leakage limiu ~ The last paragraph in the present Basis section is being ideleted. - The way'the last paragraph is. presently worded, it implies that (1) section 3.16 i

.c i

9 tasting is done during plant operation, and (2) section 3.16 gives an allowable time limit to'make repairs if the leakage limit is exceeded. Section 3.16 tests are done during refueling outages, and section 3.16 has allowances for

.repai rs. Thus, the last paragraph serves no purpose and should be deleted.

- The only change to Table 2-9 is the ) age number and this is also reflected in the table of contents. The page num)er change was required due to incorporation of information in the previous pages, i

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-BASIS FOR N0'SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION r (1) Will the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed?

When Technical _Specificatic#ns2.1.1(3),2.1.1(4),and3.16 apply,_the plant'is'already in a shutdown condition. Of the analyzed accidents

. requiring the safety functions of the SI and/or CS systems, the only one g e alyzed by the USAR during plant shutdown is a LOCA.

Theaddedrestrictions'insections2.1.1(3)and2.1.1(4)donotincrease the likelihood of an initiating event for a LOCA during shutdown. The 1

- minimum number of pumps required to be operable'during shutdown is not being reduced, so the consequences of a LOCA during shutdown are also not  !

increased by this change.

n The-proposed revision to section 3.16 ensures that proper RHR system

, piping pressure tests'are performed to confirm that external leakage to 1 atmosphere:is within acce) table limits. The 1243 cc/ hour external leakage limittoatmosphere~(whic1isnotbeingchanged)formsthebasis.ofRHR system aost-accident external leakage to atmosphere used.in the control- 's

" :roomha)itabilityanalysis.1(PerSRP15.6.5(Rev.-1, July 1981) ..

4 guidelines, the_ control room' habitability analysis assumes ,

F' '

'RHRS leakage two times the Technical Specification limit.) post-accident The amended  !

version of section'3.'16 provides verification'that the RHRS external 'j leakage to atmosphere is within a value which formsithe basis'of.an '

n assumption in:the. control room habitability analysis.. This does not a?  : increase the; probability or consequences of a previously. analyzed-a *& , -accident.:  ;

i T'he cla^ification r of the 2501psig pressure test boundary-in section-

,0 L' l3.16(1).'atensuresthatthecontainment^spraypumps'dischargepipinglis ,

V%< ~

subjected.to proper test pressure, whil_e maintaining pressure within~the ,.

ratingjof the CS pumps'isuction piping. downstream of-the section11 solation mL '

'n  ? valves.; Theytestcprovisions of thistsection,' asfamended, will-not'. " 3 M s increase,the likelihood of a LOCA dur.ing shutdown. The. test boundary ,

f ,< . change hastn6Limpact on the consequ'ences ofLthis; accident. q

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TheLproposed min'imum test: pressure'for section 3.16(1)b provides?an
  • 1

. adequate overpressure' margin 'to confirm the: integrity of: the SI/CS: pumps-

4 g

, :suctionzpiping.1:The redefinition 1of the' test boundary only eliminatesE  !

la redundantLtesting=offLPSI!and.CS') umps'nsuctionpiping,which-islalready a

. :testedby1section3.16(1)a; Neitler.of these changes-increase the- 9

% likelihood'of!an initiating eventifor a:LOCASduring s'rutdown Lnor do they! l h@ m , 'have?any. impact:ontheconsequences;ofsuchianevent.

m*u The proposed additional HPSI discharge piping test.in section 3;.16(1)c:

i y

W ,

Jadequately confirms the integrity of this: piping, while staying within.the 1 w- . pressure ratings of the components. The'new test provision doesinot,.. . l t % < require o)erating the HPSI. system-in a-manner inconsistent with its' design i >

basis =. T1e new test provisions:of section 3.16(1)c do not increase.the f . likelihood ofcan initiating event for a LOCA during shutdown, nor do they -;

V- lhave'any impact -onVe consequences of :such an event.

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& y L' 7 1 L(9) Will the. change create the possibility of a new or different kind of- 1 accident from any previously analyzed?

~

2,1,1(3)and2.1.1(4)proposedchange:

The proposed limitations on containment spray. pump availability for

-shutdown cooling service ensure that the piping system associated: '

~with this alternate shutdown cooling mode is not subjected to an

'm unanalyzed condition. By avoiding an unanalyzed condition, the <

l'" possibility,of creating > new or different kind of accident from any a previously analyzed is a avoio d.

m f, 3.16 proposed change:

The clarification of the 250 psig pressure test' boundary:in section .i

.3.16(1)a ensures-that the containment. spray pumps' discharge piping r .

is subjected.to the proper test pressure. As discussed in the

' Description of' Amendment Request, the 250 psig test pressure is N. . c i ' a >

within the rating:of:the CS ) umps' . suction piping downstream of the suctionlisolation valves. T11s redefinition of: test boundary does <

2' *1 '

-not create an initiating event for:a new or different type of- '

4_, ,

.. accident:from any previously analyzed.

w a ,

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Theiproposed= minimum.testpressureforsection3.16(1)bprovidesan l adequate overpressure margin-to_ confirm the integrity of the~SI/CS ,

s ,- _.. '

W: pumps' suction piping.' Tl1e redefinition of, test b.oundary: for..this 1 sectionLonly eliminates redundant. testing of LPSItandlCS pumps'n 1 44}

M "y .

(suctionLpipingalreadytestedinsection3.16(1)a. Neither of,these '

  1. 4 * ,  ! changes createcthe'possibilityLfor anfinitiating event fora new or- j g

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idifferentLtypelofcaccident from any previously analyzed, a w,,, , +r . .. .;

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&g z m .m The 3.16 p(1) posed additional c adequately confirms-the ~HPSIldischarge integrity;offthispiping; piping, test 1n section _ y which '

y-4';  : meet'snthe intentzofcthe specification C Noidesig'nilimits'are '

1 Jexceeded'duringithis. test / and-it-does not, involve:a systemt

" alignment whicheis1 inconsistent with-the de' sign basis of'the'. <,

t; ;,

  • 2 c system.1 Thefadditional testfprovisions:infs'ection 3.16(1)cldo mot'.. j W' " _

createithe possibilityJof a new or;different kind'of accident from. 1 aM V.'

any previously; analyzed 4J B*

94[j[d)[Willthech'ange'invdiveLasignifihantreduction:in'themarginLof. safety?

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k2.111(3)}and2.1.1(4)fproposedchange:

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LTheco$tainment'-sprayLpumps~arenotrequir'edtofunctionatshutdown.

C ,

_ cooling" pumps:in?either.a primary or backup capacity by tha Forti d

?Calhoun? Updated Safety Analysis ReportL(USAR)for the basis set W n 4 m & x :of Technica15SpecificationJ2.1.1.. The CS pumps.were originally- q W, , ,

'includediinisections;2-1.1(3)and'2;1;1(4)'forfoperational'

. D Lflexibilt.yland maintenance convenience reasons,tnot because ofcany '

J!

- .  % jdesign! basis requirement.' The; proposed. restrictions-~on availabil.ity q

@1y ,'" m4 ,offtheiCS"psmps for? shutdown. cooling: service;therefore!may result in- '

'!a reduction;1nnthe level of' operational flexibil_ity or. maintenance; #

w OT4 9 o corivenience.J (However, this does not constitute :a reduction -in~ the

~

, 'T :marginiof/ safety'asidefined by-the Fort CalhountVSAR or the basis 1 for: Technical Specification 2.1'.1.  !

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. 3.16 proposed change: ,

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The clarification of the 250 psig pressure test boundary in section '

.3.16(1)a ensures that the' containment spray pumps' discharge piping is subjected to the prcper test pressure. As discussed in the ,

Description of Amendment Hequest, the 250 psig test pressure is

, within the rating of the CS ) umps' suction piping downstream of the suction isolation valves. T11s redefinition of the 250 psig test- ,

y 1 ,

boundary will not reduce the margin of safety. '

,. In view of.!he 66 psig design pressure.of the class 151R SI/CS  ;

i *. t pumps' suctio. oiping, there is not a significant additional margin ,

of-safety assoc hted with a 100 psig (present) versus an 82 psig

~

j

' ; ..  ;(proposed)minimumtestpressure.'forsection3.16(1)b. T'ie proposed - ,

W revision of the. ten pressure therefore does not involve a n '

.significant reduction in the margin of safety. The redefinition of. ,

W -the section 3.16(1)b t'est boundary testing of LPSI and'CS pump

.section piping already tested to a higher pressure in section .;

53.16(1)a.,

%m4 g < >

. As discussed in the. Description of Amendment. Request,.the proposed 1

'additionalHPSIdischargepipingtestinsection.3.16(1)cadequately- 1

jA" confirms the' integrity;of this piping, which meets the intent-of the D.

'7, Ls)ecification'. No design-limits.are exceeded:duringLthis. test.

,y Tlis is an additionalitest requirement not -)reviously' provided in

"' p

& .theLTechnical Specifications... Therefore, tle additional proposed ,

+ , =1 ;HPSI piping test'does not. constitute'a reduction in the. margin of

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