ML20217P204
| ML20217P204 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1998 |
| From: | OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217P197 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9803100113 | |
| Download: ML20217P204 (4) | |
Text
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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.6 Containment System l
Annlicability
' Applies to the reactor containment system.
Obiectivg To assure the integrity of the reactor containment system.
Specifications (1)
Containment Integrity a.
Containment integrity shall not be violated unless the reactor is in a cold or refueling shutdown condition. Without containment integrity, restore containment integrity within one hour or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, in at least suberitical and <300 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Normally locked or sealed-closed valves (except for PCV-742A/B/C/D) may be opened intermittently under administrative control without constituting a violation of containment integrity, b.
The personnel air lock shall be operable unless the reactor is in a cold or refueling shutdown condition. Both doors shall be closed except when the air lock is being used for no nutptrifiUhen at least one air lock door shall be closed. The entir air lock assembl leakage rate shall be in accordance with Specificatio 34(4) 5l19.
(i).
With one personnel ai door-il erable.
a.
Maintain at least the operable air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock the operable air lock door closed.
Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs of the affected air lock components without constituting a violation of containment integrity.
b.
Operation may then continue until performance of the next required entire air lock assembly leakage test provided that the operable air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
c.
Otherwise, be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
d.
Entry into another operational mode or specified condition is allowed if the provisions stated in 2.6(1)b.(i)a. above are met.
(ii).
With the personnel air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to operable ultus within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
9803100113 980303 2-30 Amendment No. 68,138,151 PDR ADOCK 05000285 P
2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2:6 Containment System (Continued)
Basis 4
- The reactor coolant system conditions of cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and, hence, there would be no pressure buildup in the containment h'ibe reactor coolant system ruptures. The shutdown margins are selected based on the.ype of activities that are being carried out. The refueling boron concentration provides a shutdown margin which precludes criticality under any circumstances. Each CEDM must be tested and some have two CEA's attached.
Regarding internal pressure limitations, the containment design pressure of 60 psig would not be exceeded if the internal pressure before a major loss-of-coolant accident were as-much as 3 psig.m The opening of locked or scaled closed containn 'nt isolation valves on an intermittent basis under adminisaative control incluces the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in
{
an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity 1
outside the containment. Operation of the purge isolation valves is prevented during normal operations due to the size of the valves (42 inches) and a concern about their ability to close against the differential pressure that could result from a LOCyS Specification 2.6(1)a applies when both doors of the PAL are declared in erable, or the entire air lock assembly leakage exceeds the requirements of Specificat n 34(4) 5;19.
Specification 2.6(1)b(ii) applies when mechanisms other than a door, s h as the inner door equalizing valve, are declared inoperable.
The Hydrogen Purge System is required to be operable in order to control the quantity of combustible gases in containment in a post-LOCA condition.* The containment integrity will be protected by ensuring the penetration valves VA-280 and VA-289 are
" locked closed" while HCV-881 and HCV-882 are normally closed during power operation. The applicable surveillance testing requirements of Table 3-5 will ensure that the system is capable of performing its design function. The blowers (VA-80A and VA-80B), associated valves, and piping are single failure proof, have been designed as a Seismic Class I System, and are redundant to the VA-82 filter header. VA-80A or VA-80B is capable of providing sufficient hydrogen removal capabilities as required by the USAR to prevent the hydrogen concentration inside of containment from exceeding the 4% Dammability limit.m Electrical Equipment qualification was not required as the radiation doses in the area of the Hydrogen Purge System equipment were below the minimum requirements.*
VA-80A or VA-80B with the associated valves and piping may be inoperable for 30 days. The redundancy of the blowers allows one blower with associated valves and piping to be removed from operation while the other train has the capability to provide 100% hydrogen control.
References (1)
USAR, Section 14.16; Figure 14.16-2 (2)
Regulatory Guide 1.7 (1971)
(3)
USAR, Section 14.17 (4)
Engineering Study 86-10, Calculation 53 j
2-31a Amendment No. 4&l51 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-98-0037 ATTACHMENT B
d DISCUSSION, JUSTIFICATION AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DISCUSSION AND JUSTIFICATION The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) provides this submittal as a supplement to two previous OPPD submittals.
The first submittal dated July 25, 1997 (LIC-97-0124) proposed revisions to the Fort Calhoun Station Unit No.1 Technical Specifications (TS) to allow implementation of Option 8 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
The changes affected existing TS 3.5, 5.9.3, the Basis to TS 3.0, and the Table of Contents.
In addition, a new administrative specification (5.19) was proposed establishing a containment leakage rate testing program including exceptions and acceptance criteria.
The ;econd submittal dated November 21, 1997 (LIC-97-0175) supplemented the July 25, 1997 letter by clarifying certain exceptions and exemptions in Specification 5.19.
On February 27, 1998, during research related to an NRC Staff question, OPPD identified a reference in TS 2.6, " Containment Systems," and its rasis which should have been changed in the initial submittal. TS 2.6(1)b and t.
Basis of TS 2.6 reference Specification 3.5(4) " Containment Penetrations Leak Rt Tests s
(Type B Tests)" for personnel air lock (PAL) leakage acceptance criteria.
However, in the initial submittal, OPPD proposed changing TS 3.5(4) to pertain to containment isolation valves leak rate tests (Type C Tests) and moved PAL acceptance criteria to TS 5.19.
However, the need to revise TS 2.6 was not identified.
Therefore, OPPD is submitting this amendment request to revise TS 2.6 and its Basis by replacing references to TS 3.5(4) with references to TS 5.19.
The proposed change is strictly administrative in nature and has no adverse safety implications. The proposed change does not affect or change the Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration previously submitted on July 25, 1997.
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