ML20212G830

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 221 & 226 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively
ML20212G830
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/24/1997
From:
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212G820 List:
References
NUDOCS 9711070122
Download: ML20212G830 (3)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30eeHo01 t

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION ftELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 221 AND 226 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-44 and DPR-56 PECO ENERGY COMPANY '

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPAN1 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION. UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 4, 1997, PECO Energy Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would eliminate an inconsistency between emergency core cooling system (ECC3) operability requirements and the auto-start and protective trip bypass of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) on an ECCS initiation signal during certain plant configurations.

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.2.1 will be annotated with a note which specifies that the requirements for SR 3.8.2.12, SR 3.8.1.13, and SR 3.8.1.19 are not required to be met when the associated ECCS is not required to be operable.

The Bases section for SR 3.8.2.1 will be revised to include the explanation for the note added to SR 3.8.2.1, and to indicate that the periods for which the ECCS are required are specified in Limiting Condition for Operatian (LCO) 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown."

2.0 EVALUATION Current TS 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown requires two EDGs each capable of supporting one onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem be available during MODES 4, 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. As part of the compliance with this TS, SR 3.8.2.1 invokes the applicability of SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.13, and SR 3.8.1.19 to ensure the operability of the EDGs in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.2.12 requires the verification that, on an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal, each EDG automatically starts from the standby condition. SR 3.8.1.13 requires verification that certain EDG protective trips are bypassed on an actual or simulated ECCS signal. SR 3.8.1.19 9711070122 971024 PDR ADOCK 05000277 P PDR .

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i* requires the verification that on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal. in conjunction with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal, each EDG automatically starts from the standby conditions. The purpose of SR-3.8.1.12 and SR 3.8.1.19 is to demonstrate that the EDG automatically.

starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds on a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) signal and operates for 5 minutes. The purpose of 3.8.1.13 is to demonstrate that non-critical protective trips are bypassed on an ECCS initiation signal. Under the current TSs, SR 3.8.1.13 and SR 3.8.1.19 are not required to be performed when the unit is in MDDES 4 and 5. However, the capability to meet the associated requirements must be set.

The licensee has pro >osed to revise Section 3.8.2.1 of the PBAPS, Units 2 and 3 TSs to eliminate tie requirements for the auto-st. art and protective trip bypass of the EDGs on an ECCS signal during MODE 5 when the spent fuel storage pool gates are removed, water level is 2458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero, and there are no Operations with-the Potential of Draining the Reactor Vessel (OPDRVs) in progress. The ability of the EDGs to auto-start on a loss-of-offsite power or degraded voltage will remain unchanged.

TS 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown," requires that two low-pressure ECCS injection / spray subsystems be operable during MODE 4 and MGDE 5, except when the spent fuel- storage pool gates are removed, water level is 1458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero, and there are no OPDRVs in progress. Since under these conditions no ECCS subsystems are required to be operable, the licensee claims that it is unnecessary to impose requirements of SR 3.8.1.12 SR 3.8.1.13, and SR 3.8.1.19 for EDGs to auto-start and trip bypass on the ECCS initiation signal. Further, the ECCS instrumentation that auto-start the EDGs and bypass the protective devices is not required to be~

operable during MODE 5 when the spent fuel storage pool gates are removed, water level is 2458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero, and there are no OPDRVs in progress.

The ECCS initiation signal for an EDG auto-start consists of two signals. The two signals are a drywell pressure-high signal or a reactor vessel water level low-low-low level signal. According to TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, " Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation," the instrumentation for drywell pressure-high does not have to be operable in MODES 4 and 5. The reactor vessel water level low-low-low level signal, on the' other hand, is not required to be operable in MODES 4 and 5, when the associated subsystems are not required to be operable.

As stated above, since the ECCS' subsystems are not required to be operable during these conditinns, the reactor water level instrumentation is not required to be operable to support ECCS operability _

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Based on the above, the staff concludes that, since ECCS is not required at PBAPS during MODE 5 when the spent fuel storage pool gates are removed, water level is 2458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero, and there are no OPDRVs in progress, the EDG design. capability to auto-start and trip bypass on a ECCS signal is not required. Hence..the capability to meet the

. associated requirements of SR 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.13, and 3.8.1.19 is not required to be maintained.. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed change to be acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect te installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments-involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62-FR 43373). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22 environmental assessment need be prepar(b) no environmental ed in connection impact.ofstatement or with the issuance the-amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: On Chopra Date: October 24, 1997 1

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