ML20214R880
| ML20214R880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/05/1983 |
| From: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Harold Denton, Heltemes C, Minogue R NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213E720 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-729 NUDOCS 8612080126 | |
| Download: ML20214R880 (78) | |
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'Y@j,y MW 0 5 393 l'EMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert B. Minogue, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Clemens J. Heltemes, Director, Of'fice for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data John G. Davis, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Guy H. Cunningham, Director, Office of the Executive Legal Director FROM: Richard C. DeYoung, Director
& Office of Inspection and Enforcement .
A Y
SUBJECT:
IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR OPERATING tlUCLEAR ?0hER REACTORS (10 CFR 50.72)
Enclosed is a Comission Paper forwarding the final rule 10 CFR 50.72, "Imediate Notificatio'1 Requirement for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" to the Comission for review and approval.
The draft final rule was previously forwarded to you and the Regional n' Adninistrators in December 1982. The cornments received from you and from the Regions have been incorported, to tne extent possible, in this final rule. In addition, the draft final rule and associated document have been reviewed by the ACRS and the CRGR. The CRGR comments on the package have been resolved.
The $50.72 Rule was generally endorsed by the ACRS Subcomittee members on April 6, and no open issues or subjects were identified. The Subcomittee 1 indicated its intent to discuss a proposed ACRS letter on this rule with the full Comnittee on April 16. The full Comittee's agenda was very tight, how-M ever, and the ACRS review of these rulemakings was not completed in the April 16 meeting. 'The full Comittee may continue the review at the May meeting.
This final rule is to be forwarded to the Commision no later than May 27, 1983.
Consequently, I request that you forward your concurrence on this Comission Paper to me no later than May 20, 1983.
Centact: W iss, IE 8612080126 FOIA 861201.-
REPRA96-729
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Multiple Addressees This rulemaking has been closely coordinated with the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report Rulemaking which .will be fomarded to you separately by AE0D for review and concurrence. Both of these rulemaking packages, i.e., 50.72 and 50.73, will be forwarded to the Commission at the -
same time as a joint package.
Y RhchardC.DeYou director
[Q fice of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
As stated cc: D. Eisenhut, NRR W. Olmstead, ELD T. Dorian, ELD J. T. Beard, NRR J. Allan, Region I J. O'Reilly, Region II J. Keppler, Region III J. Collins, Region IV J. Martin, Region V E. Blackwood, DEDROGR V. Stello, DEDROGR F. Hebdon, AE0D R. Majors, ACRS B. Cchn, INPO J. Cawley, ADM L. D. Y. Ong, OPE J. Philips, ACM S. Gagner, OPA 4
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For: The Commissioners From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
FINAL RULE AMENDING: (A) 10 CFR 50.54, TO IMPLEMENT THE
'IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS MANDATED IN SECTION 201 0F NRC'S FY 1980 AUTHORIZATION ACT, AND (B) 10 CFR 50.72, TO REVISE THE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
Purpose:
To obtain . Commission approval for publication of the final rule in the Federal Register.
Category: This paper covers a minor policy matter.
Issue: Whether the NRC should implement Section 201 of NRC's FY 1980 Authorization Act in the manrer proposed, and whether the NRC shculd clarify its regulations concerning the immediate notification to NRC of significant events that occur at operating nuclear power plants.
Discussion: 10 CFR 50.54 - Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295) provides:
(a) Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "f. Each license issued for a utilization facility under this section or section 104 b. shall require as a condition thereof that in case of any accident which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission, the licensee shall immediately so notify the Commission. Viola-tion of the condition prescribed by this subsection
Contact:
Eric Weiss 492-4973
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The Commissioners 2 may, in the Commission's discretion, constitute grounds for license revocation. In accordance with section~187 of this Act, the Commission shall promptly amend each license for a utili-zation facility issued under this section or section 104 b. which is in effect on the date of enactment of this subsection to include the provisions required under this subsection."
The Conference Report accompanying Pub. L.96-295 stated that the conferees recognized the need for predictability by licensees in determining those situations which would require immediate notification. The conferees further intended that the Commission establish specific guidelines for the identification of accidents which could result in an unplanned release of radioactivity in excess of allow-able limits, and that the immediate notification require-ment would take effect when such guidelines were established. H. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1070, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (June 4, 1980). l Accordingly, the Commission published a proposed amendnent to 10 CFR 6 50.54 that would add an appropriate notification requirement as a condition in the operating license of each nuclear utilization facility licensed under Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Er.ergy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
95 2133, 2134b.* These facilities generally are the commer-cial nuclear power facilities which produce electricity for public consumption. Research and test reactors are not subject to the proposed license condition as they are licensed under Section 104a or 104c of the Act. Under the amendment to 10 CFR 50.54, licensees having Section 103 and 104b licenses would be required, as a condition of their respective operating licenses, to notify the NRC immediately of any event set forth in 10 CFR 50.72. The revisions to
@ 50.72, as set forth below, have been made with considera-tion of the language of Section 201. As a result, these revisions would constitute the guidelines for predictability l contemplated by Congress as a prerequisite to making any l changes in license conditions for Section 103 and 104b facilities.
10 CFR 50.72 - On May 4,1979, Commissioner Kennedy sent a memorandum to L. V. Gossick on the subject of Prompt and Accurate Notification to NRC of Unusual Events at Operating
- This would be accomplished by adding a new paragraph to 6 50.54, the provisions of which are deemed to be conditions in every license. The staff would not amend each license individually.
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1 n-The Commissioners 3 Reactors. In the memo, he pointed out the lack of effective and timely communication between licensees and the-NRC regarding unusual events at operating reactor facilities.
and indicated that this situation must be corrected immediately.
J. G. Davis and H. R. Denton replied to Commissioner Kennedy by memorandum dated June 1,1979. indicating the steps that were being taken to rectify the difficulties in communication.
The steps included the installation of dedicated telephone lines and the issuance of an IE Bulletin providing guidance to licensees concerning what events should be immediately reported. The memorandum also recommended the initiation of rulemaking to provide binding requirements.
The purpose of the rule was to provide the Commission with immediate reporting of 12 types of significant events where immediate Commission action to protect the public health and safety may be required or where the Commission needs accurate and timely information to respond to heightened public concern.
.Rulemaking was initiated immediately thereafter, and resulted in an immediately final regulation published in the Federal Register on February 29, 1980 (45 FR 13435). Although the regulation, 10 CFR 50.72, was published as immediately effec-tive without a prior public comment period, the public was invited to submit its views and comments. Many commenters believed the rule was in some respects either vague and ambiguous or overly broad. The staff held a meeting with
- licensee Control Room Shift Supervisors that elicited additional comments supporting the need for narrowing and clarifying 10 CFR 50.72.
After obtaining the experience abcut receiving notificatice as required by the rule, the Commission published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking on December 21, 1981 (46 FR 61894) and invited public comment.
The proposal was made to meet two objectives: Change 10 CFR 50.54 to implement section 201 of the NRC's 1980 Fiscal Year Authorization Act and change 10 CFR 50.72 to more clearly specify the significant events requiring licensees to immediately notify NRC.
The changes to 5 50.72 will accomplish the following:
- 1. Narrow the scope of reporting and raise some reporting thresholds in order to eliminate unnecessary reports such as worker injuries not involving radiation, inconsequential low level releases, and minor security problems.
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- 2. Provide terminology, phrasing and reporting thresholds
' consistent'with the closely associated % 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER) Rule.
- 3. Permit modifications of emergency planning regulations without further amendment of 6 50.72. (The staff believes the threshold at which emergencies are declared is too low and amendment of emergency planning regulations is warranted.)
- 4. Clarify several reporting criteria in 9 50.72 by eliminating certain phrases that licensees have found either vague or ambiguous.
Enclosure 1 is the Federal Register Notice of Rulemaking incorporating all of these changes as well as the previously
. mentioned change to s 50.54.
Enclosure 2 is the staff's summary and resolution of the public comments received on the various elements in the rule.
Cost Estimate: The staff does not anticipate that there will be any significant additional costs to the NRC or to licensees associated with the rule changes; however, the staff would like to point out the costs that have been asso-ciated with establishing and implementing a " prompt notification system."
- 1. Eight staff-years per year of NRC staff effort for
. manning and maintaining the telephones for notifi-cation and $1.5 million per year for dedicated telephone lines.
- 2. Cost for the entire industry of about 545,000 per year in operators' time to make telephone notifications required by 650.72.
j Recommendations: That the Commission:
- 1. Approve the notice of final rulemaking (Enclosure 1) l modifying 10 CFR 50.54 and 50.72.
- 2. Note:
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! a. That a letter such as that in Enclosure 3 will be sent to the appropriate Congressional committees.
- b. That the notice of final rulemaking (Enclosure 1) will be published in the Federal Register; and that a copy of the Federal Register notice will be
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l The Commissioners 5 sent to all applicants,' licensees, and state governments.
- c. That the information requirements contained in ;
this rule have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant- to the Paperwork
' Reduction Act, Pub. L.96-511 (clearance number 3150-0011).
- d. That the final rule contains a statement that the Commission's preliminary Regulatory Flexibility Analysis concludes that the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial rumber of small entities, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 6 605(b).
- e. That pursuant to i 51.5(d)(2) of Part 51 of the Commission's regulations, neither an environmental impact statement, a negative declaration, nor an environmental impact appraisal need be prepared in connection with the amendments since the amendments are nonsubstantive and insignificant from the stand-point of environmental impact.
- f. That a Regulatory Analysis has been prepared (Enclosure 4).
- g. That the ACRS has been informed of the final rule change.
- h. That a public announcement of the final rule will be made (Enclosure 5).
Sunshine Act: Recommend consideration at an open meeting.
Scheduling: For early consideration.
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
- 1. Federal Register Notice Supply
, 2. Staff's Suninary and Resolution of Public Comments Supply
- 3. Draft Congressional Letter Supply
- 4. Regulatory Analysis Supply
- 5. Public Announcement Supply l . . . . . - - _ - _ . . . . . _ , . . . _ . _ . _ _ . . .- - _ _._ .
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Immediate Notification Requirements For Operating Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: N.uclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations which require timely and accurate information from licensees following significant events at licensed commercial nuclear power plants. Experience with existing requirements and public comments on a proposed revision of the rule indicate that the existing regulation should be amended to clarify reporting criteria and to require early reports only on those matters of value to the exercise of the Commission's responsibilities. The amended regulation will clarify the list of reportable events and provide the Commission with more useful reports regarding the safety of operating nuclear power plants.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and v Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, Washington, D.C. 20555; Telephone (301) 492-4973.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Enclosure 1 i
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-I. BACKGROUND On February 29, 1980, the Comission amended its regulations without prior notice and comment to require timely and accurate licensee reporting of information following significant events at operating nuclear power reactors (45 FR 13434). The purpose of the rule was to provide the Comission with immediate reporting of twelve' types of significant'e' vents where imediate Comission action to protect the public health and safety may be required or where the Commission needs accurate and timely info.rmation to respond to height-ened public concern. Although the rule was made immediately effective, coments were solicited. Many comenters believed the rule was in some respec'ts either vague and ambiguous or overly broad.
After obtaining experience with notifications required by the rule, the Comission published in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of proposed rulemaking on December 21,1981 (46 FR 61894) and invited public coment. The proposal was made to meet two objectives: change 10 CFR 50.54 to implement section 201 of the NRC's 1980 Fiscal Year Authorization Act and change 10 CFR 50.72 to more clearly specify the significant events requiring licensees to immediately notify NRC.
The problems which this rulemaking addresses and the solutions that it provides l
- can be sumarized in five broad areas
- 1. Authorization Act for FY80 Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295) provides:
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"(a) Section.'103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by adding'at the end thereof the following new subsections:
"f. Each license iss.ued for a utilization facility under this section or section 104b. shall require as a condition thereof that in case of any accident which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess'of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission, the licensee shall _immediately so notify the Commission. Violation-of the condition prescribed by this subsection may, in the Commission's discretion, constitute grounds for license revoca-tion. In accordance with section 187 of this Act, the Commis-sion'shall promptly amend each license for a utilization facility issued under this section or section 104b. which is in effect on the date of enactment of this subsection to include the provisions required under this subsection."
Accordingly, this rulemaking includes an amendment to 10 CFR 550.54 that would add an appropriate notification requirement as a condition in the operating license of each nuclear utilization facility licensed under section 103 or 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 662133, 2134b. These facilities generally are the commercial nuclear power facilities which produce electricity for public consumption. Research and test reactors are not subject to the license condition as they are licensed under Section 104a L-or 104c. of the Act. Under the amendment to 10 CFR 50.54, licensees falling under sections 103 or 104b. would be required, as a condition of their respective operating licenses, to notify the NRC immediately of events specified in 10 CFR i 50.72.
- 2. Unnecessary Reports 4
Several categories of reports required by 650.72 are not useful to the NRC.
Among these categories are reports of: worker injury, small radioactive releases, and minor security problems. For example, reports are presently required if a worker onsite experiences chest pains or another illness not related to radiation
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and is sent to a hospital for evaluation, or the vent stack monitor moves upward
.a few' percent yet radiation levels remain 100,000 times below technical specifi-cation limits, or the security computer malfunctions for a few minutes.
This 'rulemaking eliminates such reporting requirementsifrom 950.72 and in general clarifies and narrows the scope of reporting. However, revision of Part 73 of the Commission's regulations is necessary to resolve all problems with security reports. - -
- 3. -Terminology, Phrasing and Reporting Thresholds The various sections of 10 CFR 50 have different phrasing, terminology, and thresholds in the reporting criteria. Even when no different meaning is intended a change in wording can cause confusion.
This rulemaking has been carefully written to use terminology, phrasing and reporting thresholds that are either identical to or similar to those in the
$50.73, whenever possible. Other conforming amendments to Parts 20, 21, and 73, to 950.55, and to Appendix E of Part 50 are under development.
As a parallel activity to the preparation of 550.72, the Commission is pronulgating a Licensee Event Report (LER) Rule (950.73) which would require licensees for operating nuclear power plants to prepare detailed written reports for certain events. On May 6,1982, the NRC published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (47 FR 19543) a notice of Proposed Rulemaking that describes the codification of i the existJng LER system.
- 4. Coordination with Licensee's Emergency Plan l The current scheme for licensee's emergency plans includes four Emergency Classes. When the licensee declares one of the four Emergency Classes, he must report this to the Commission as required by 150.72. The lowest of the four
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Emergency Classes, Notification of Unusual Event, has resulted in unnecessary emergency declarations. Events that fall within the Unusual Event class have I been neither emergencies in themselves nor precursors of more serious events that are emergencies.
Although cha.nges to the definition of the Emergency Classes are not being made in this rulemaking, a new reporting scheme that would ultimately eliminate
" Unusual Event" as an Emergency Class requiring notification can be adopted consistent with this rule. A proposed rulemaking which would redefine the Emergency Classes in 650.47 is in preparation and may soon be published for public comment. This final rulemaking makes possible the elimination of " Unusual Event" as an emergency class without further amendment of $50.72 by including in the category of non-Emergencies the subcategory of "one-hour reports."
- 5. Vague or Ambiguous Reporting Criteria The reporting criteria in 650.72 have been revised in order to clarify their scope and intent. The criteria were revised for the proposed rule and in response to public comment. The " Analysis of' Comments" portion of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice describes in more detail specific examples of changes in wording intended to eliminate vagueness or ambiguity.
II. ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS Twenty letters of comment were received in response to the FEDERAL REGISTER notice published on December 21, 1981 (46 FR 61894)I. This FEDERAL I Copies of these documents are available for public inspection and copying for a fee the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555
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REGISTER notice described the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72, " Notification of Significant Events" and 10 CFR 50.54, " Conditions of Licenses." A discussion
~of the more significant comments follows: -
Conditions of Licenses (650.54)
A few commenters said that the " Commission already has the ability to enforce its regulations and'does not need to incorporate the items as now proposed into conditions of license."
The Commission has decided to promulgate the proposed revision of $50.54,
" Conditions of Licenses," in order to satisfy the intent of Congress as expressed in section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980. This Act and its relationship to %50.54 are oiscussed in detail in the FEDERAL REGISTER notice for the proposed rule (46 FR 61894).
Coordination with other Reporting Reouirements (Final Rule 650.72)
Seven commenters said that the NRC should coordinate the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 with other rules, with NUREG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Pesponse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants," and with Regulatory Guide 1.16 " Reporting of Operating Information..." Many of these letters identified overlap, duplication, and inconsistency among NRC's reporting requirements.
The Commission is making a concerted effort to ensure consistent and
, coordinated reporting requirements. The requirements contained in the revision of10CFR50.72arebeingcoordinatedwithrevisionof$50.73,650.55(e),
Appendix E of Part 50, $20.402, 673.71, and Part 21.
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Citing 10 CFR 50.72 as Basis for Notification (Final Rule 550.72(a)(4))
A few commenters objected to citing '950.72 as a basis when making a telephone notification. The letters of comment questioned the purpose, legal effect, and burden on-the licensee.
The Commission does not believe that it is an unnecessary burden for a licensee to know and identify the basis for a telephone notification required by 950.72. There have been many occasions when a Ticensee could not tell the NRC whether the telephone notification was being made in accordance with Technical Specifications,10 CFR 50.72, some other requirement, or was just a courtesy call. Unless the licensee can identify the nature of the report, it is difficult for the NRC to know what significance the licensee attaches to the report, and it becomes more difficult for the NRC to respond quickly and properly to the event.
Immediate Shutdown (Final Rule 650.72(b)(1)(i)(A))
Several commenters objected to the use of the term "immediate shutdown,"
saying that Technical Specifications de not use such a term.
The term is used in some but not all Technical Specifications. Consequently, the Commission has revised the reporting criterion in question. The final rule requires a report upon the initiation of any nuclear power plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications.
Plant Operating and Emergency Procedures (Final Rule 650.72(b)(1)(1)(B))
Several commenters said that the reporting criteria should not make reference to plant operating and emergency procedures because:
- a. It would take operators too long to decide whether a plant condition was covered by the procedures,
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- b. The procedures cover svents that are not of concern to the NRC, and
- c. The procedures vary from plant to plant.
While the plant operating personnel should be familiar with plant proce-dures, it is true that procedures vary from plant to plant and cover events other than those which compromise plant safety. However, the wording of the reporting criteria has been modified (650.72(b)(1)(1)(8) in the final rule) to narrow the reportable events to those that significantly compromise plant safety.
Notwithstanding the fact that the procedures vary from plant-to-plant, the Commis'sion has foun'd that this criterion results in notification indicative of serious events. The narrower more specific wording will make it possible for plant operating personnel to identify reportable events under their specific operating procedures.
Buildina Evacuation (Final Rule 550.72(b)(1)(1)(C))
Ten commenters said that the proposed 650.72(b)(6)(iii) regarding "any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled release resulting in evacuatien of a building" was unclear and counterproductive in that it could cause reluctance to evacuate a building. Many of these commenters stated that the reporting of in-plant releases of radioactivity that require evacuation of individual rooms was inconsistent with the general thrust of the rule to require reporting of significant events. They noted that minor spills, small gaseous waste releases, .
or the disturbance of contaminated particulate matter (e.g., dust) may all require the temporary evacuation of individual rooms until the airborne concen-trations decrease or until respiratory protection devices are utiliz,ed. They i
noted that these events are fairly common and should not be reportable unless l
the required evacuation affects the entire facility or a major part of it.
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-The Comission agrees. The wording of this criterion has been changed to include only those events which significantly hamper-the ability of site personnel in performance of duties necessary for safe operation.
One comenter was concerned that events occurring on land owned by the utility adjacent to its plant, might be reportable. This is not the intent of this reporting requirement. The NRC is cencerned with the safety of plant and personnel on the utility's site and not with non-nuclear activities on land adjacent to the plant.
Explicit Threats (Final Rule $50.72 (b)(1)(1)(F))
A few comenters said that the intent of the term, " explicitly threatens,"
was unclear. Those commenting wondered what level of threat was involved. The term, " explicitly threatens," has been deleted from the final rule. Instead, the final rule refers to "any event that threatened the safety of the nuclear power plant" (950.72(b)(1)(1)(F)), and gives examples so that it is clear the Commission is interested in real or actual threats as opposed to threats without credibility.
Notification Timing (Final Rule 650.72(b)(2))
The commenters generally had two points to make regarding the timing of l
reports to the NRC. First, the comments supported notification of the NRC after appropriate State or local agencies have been notified. Second, two commenters requested a new four-to six-hour report category for events not warranting a report with one hour.
Allowing more time for reporting some non-Emergency events would lessen i the impact of reporting on the operators responsibilities for maintaining the l
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plant in a safe condition. Limiting the extension of the deadline to four hours ensures that the report is made when the information is fresh in the minds of those involved and that it is more likely to be made by those involved instead of by a later shift of operators.
Other more significant non-Emergency events, and all declarations of an Emergency must continue to be reported within one-hour. The one-hour deadline is necessary for the Comission to fulfill its responsibilities during and ,
following the most serious events occurring at operating nuclear power plants.
A shorter deadline than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> was not adopted because the Commission does not want to interfere with the operator's ability to deal with an accident or transient in the first few critical minutes.
Therefore, based on these comments and its experience, the NRC has established a "four-hour report," as was suggested.
Reactor Scrams (Final Rule %50.72(b)(2)(1)(B))
Several commenters said that reactor scrams, particularly those scrams below power operation, should not require notification of the NRC within one hour, in response to these comments, the Commission has changed the reporting deadline to four hours. However, the Commission does not regard reactor scrams as "non-events," as stated in some letters of comment. Information related to reactor scrams has been useful in identifying safety-related problems. The Commission agrees that four hours is an appropriate deadline for this reporting requirement because such events are not as important to immediate safety as are some other events.
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Radioactive Release-Threshold (Final Rule 650.72(b)(2)(i)(D))
Several comments said that the threshold of 25% of allowable limits for radioactive releases was too low for one hour. reporting.
Based upon this comment and its experience, the Commission has changed the threshold of reporting to releases exceeding two times Part 20 concentrations when averaged over a period of.one hour. This will climinate reports of releases that represent ~ negligible risk to the public.
The Commission has found that low level radioactive release below two times Part 20 concentrations do not in themselves warrant immeidate radiological
-response.
This paragraph requires those events to be reported that cause an unplanned or uncontrolled release of a significant amount of radioactive material to offsite areas. Unplanned releases should occur infrequently; however, when they occur, at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational control established to avoid their occurrence and, the fore, such events should be reported.
Personnel Radioactive Contamination (Final Rule 650.72(b)(2)(1)(E))
Several commenters objected to the use of vague terms such as " extensive i
onsite contamination" and "readily removed" in one of the reporting criteria of the proposed rule.
Based on this comment, new criteria have been prepared that use more specific terms. For example, one new criterion requires reporting of "Any event i
requiring transport of a radioactively centaminated person to an offsite medical facility." Experience with telephone notification made to the NRC Operation Center suggests that this new criterion will be easily understood.
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III. PARAGRAPH-BY-PAR'AGRAPH EXPLANATION OF THE RULE
' Paragraph 50.72(a) reflects some consolidation of language that was repeated in various subparagraphs of the proposed rule. In general, the intent and scope of this paragraph.do not reflect any change from the proposed rule.
- Several titles were added to this and subsequent sections. For example, paragraph 50.72(b) is titled "Non-Emergency Events" and it has two subpara-graphs: (b)(1), titled "One-Hour Reports".and (b)(2), "Four-Hour Reports."
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The events wh'ich have a one-hour deadline are those having the potential to escalate to an Emergency Class. The four-hour deadline is explained in the analysisofparagraph(b)(2).
Paragraph 50.72 (b)(1)(1)(A) requires reporting of: "The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications." Although the intent and scope have not changed, the change in wording between the proposed and final rule is intended to clarify that prompt notification is required once a shutdown is initiated.
In response to public comment, the term "immediate shutdown" that was used in the proposed rule is not used in the final rule. The term was vague and unfamiliar to those licensees who did not have Technical Specifications using the term.
This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events for which Technical Specifications require the initiation of reactor shutdown. This will provide the NRC with early warning of safety significant conditions serious enough to warrant shutdown of the plant.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(i)(B), encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events and some events captured by proposed $50.72(b)(1) was added to
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provide for consistent, coordinated reporting requirements between this rule and 10 CFR 50.73 which has a similar provision. Public coment suggested that there should be similarity of terminology, phrasing, and reporting thresholds between 550.72 and 650.73. The intent of this paragraph is to capture those events where the plant, including its principal safety barriers, was seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition. For example, small voids in systems designed to remove heat from the reactor core wh'ch i have been previously shown through analyseis not to be safety significant need not be reported. However, the accumulation of voids that could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under natural circulation conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and would be reportable. In addition, voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the operstor to misunder-stand the true condition of the plant is also an unanalyzed condition and should be reported.
The Commission recognizes that the licensee may use engineering judgment and experience to determine whether an unanalyzed condition existed. It is not
[
intended that this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters.
or to problems concerning single pieces of equipment. For example, at any time, one or more safety-related components may be out of service due to testing, maintenance, or a fault that has not yet been repaired. Any trivial single failure or minor error in performing surveillance tests could produce a situa-tion in which two or more often unrelated, safety-grade components are out-of-service. Technically, this is an unanalyzed condition. However, these events should be reported only if they involve functionally related components or if they significantly compromise plant safety.
. f7590-01]
Finally, this paragraph also includes material (e.g., metallurgical or chemical) problems that cause abnormal degradation of the principal safety barriers (i.e., the fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or thecontainment). Examples of this type of situation include:
(a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor, or in the storage pool, that
. exceed expected values, or that are unique or widespread, or that are caused by unexpected factors, and would involve a release of significant quantities of
~
fission products.
. (b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestressed concrete) or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc.).
(c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system.
(d) Serious temperature or pressure transients.
(e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during ooeration.
(f) Loss of containment function or integrity including:
(i) ccntainment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits (ii) loss of containment isolation valve function during tests or operation, (iii) loss of main steam isolation valve function during test or operation, or (iv) loss of containment cooling capability.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(1)(C) encompassing a portion of proposed 50.72(b)(2) was reworded to correspond to a similar provision of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii).
Making the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 similar in language increases the clarity of these rules and minimizes confusion
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[7590-01]
The paragraph has also been reworded to make it clear that it applies only to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes) and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank car explosion). References to acts of sabotage have been removed, since these are covered by 673.71. In addition, threats to personnel from internal hazards (e.g., radioactivity releases) that hamper personnel in the performance of necessary duties are now covered by paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(1)(F). This paragraph covers those events involving an actual threat to the plant from an external condition or natural phenomenon, and where the threat or damage challenges the ability of the plant to continue to operate in a safe manner (including the orderly shutdown and maintenance of shutdown conditions). The licensee should decide if a phenomenon or condition actually threatens the plant. For example, a minor brush fire in a remote area of the site that is quickly controlled by fire fighting personnel and, as a result, did not present a threat to the plant should not be reported. However, a major forest fire, large-scale flood, or major earthquake that presents a clear threat to the plant should be reported.
As another example, an industrial or transportation accident which occurs near the site, creating a plant safety concern, should be reoorted.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(1)(D) encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events requires the reporting of those events that result in either automatic or manual actuation of the ECCS or would have resulted in activation of the ECCS if some component had not failed or an operator action had not been taken.
For example, if a valid ECCS signal were generated by plant conditions, and the operator were to put all ECCS pumps in pull-to-lock; though no ECCS discharge occurred, the event would be reportable.
l l
[7590-01]
A " valid signal" refers to the actua'l plant conditions.or parameters satisfying the requirements for ECCS initiation. Excluded from this reporting requirement would be 'those instances where instrument drift, spurious signals, human error, or other invalid signals caused actuation of the ECCS, However, such events may be reportable under other sections of the Commission's regulations based upon other details, in particular, paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(1)(B) requires a report within four hours if an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) is actuated.
Experience with notifications made pursuant to $50.72 has shown that events involving ECCS discharge to the vessel are generally more serious than ESF actuations without discharge to the vessel. Based on this experience, the Commission has made this reporting criterion a "One-Hour Report." '
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(1)(E) encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events covers those events that would impair a licensee's ability to deal with an accident or emergency. Notifying the NRC of these events may permit the NRC to take some compensating measures and to more completely assess the consequences of such a loss should it occur during an accident or emergency.
Examples of events that this criterion is intended to cover are those in which any of the following are not available:
- 2. Emergency Response Facilities (ERF's) f 3. Emergency communications facilities and equipment including the Emergency Notification system (ENS).
- 4. Public prompt Notification System including sirens.
- 6. Plant monitors necessary for accident assessment.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(1)(F) encompassing some portions of the proposed
$650.72(b)(2) and (6) has been revised to add the phrase " including toxic"
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[7590-01]
_ gases or radioactive releases." This addition covers the " evacuation" portion of paragraph 50.72(b)(6)(iii) of the proposed' rule. This change in wording for the final rule was made in response to public comments discussed above.
While paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(1)(C) of the final rule primarily captures acts of nature, paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(1)(F) captures other events, part,1,cularly acts by personnel. The Commission believes this arrangement of the reporting criteria in the fina'l rule lends itself to more precise interpretation and is consistent with those public comments that requested closer coordination between the reporting requirements in this rule and other portions of the Connission's regulations.
This provision requires reporting of events, particularly those caused by acts of personnel, which endanger the safety of the plant or interfere with personnel in performance of duties necessary for safe plant operations.
The licensee must exercise some judgment in reporting under this section.
For example, a small fire on site that did not endanger any plant equipment and that did not and could not reasonably be expected to endanger the plant, is not reportable.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1) of the proposed rule was split into 650.72(b)(1)(1)(B) and $50.72(b)(2)(1)(A) in the final rule in order to permit some type of reports to be made within four hours instead of one hour because these reports have less safety significance. In terms of their combined effect, the overall intent and scope of these paragraphs have not changed from those in the proposed rule. Since the types of events intended to be captured by this reporting requirement are similar to 150.72(b)(1)(1)(B), except that the reactor is shut down, the reader should refer to the explanation of $50.72(b)(1)(1)(B) for more details on intent.
}9; -p. A h590-01]
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2) -
Although the reporting criteria contained in tha subparagraphs of 650.72(b)(2) were in the proposed rule, in response to public coment the Comission established this "Non-Emergency" category for those events with slightly less urgency and less safety significance that may be reported within four hours instead of one hour. ,
The Comission wants to obtain.such reports from personnel who were on -
shift at the ' time of the event, when this is possible, because these personnel will have a better knowledge of the circumstances associated with the event.
i Reports made within four hours of the event should make this possible while not imposing the more rigid more one hour requirements.
The reporting requirement in paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(1)A is similar to a requirement in 550.73. Moreover, except for referring to a shutdown reactor, this
- reporting requirement is also similar to the "One-Hour Report" in 950.72(b)(1)(1)(B).
However this paragraph applied to a reactor in shutdown condition. Events within this requirement have less urgency and can be reported within four hours 3
as a "Non-Emergency."
l Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(1)(B) proposed 50.72(b)(5) is made a "Non-Emergency" in response to public coment because the Comission agrees that the covered events generally have slightly.less urgency and safety significance than those events included in the "One-Hour Reports."
The intent and scope of this reporting requirement have not changed from the proposed rule. This paragraph is intended to capture events during which an ESF actuates, either manually or automatically, or fails to actuate. ESFs
' are provided to mitigate the consequences of the event; therefore, (1) they should work properly when called upon and (2) they should not be challenged i
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[7590-01]
unnecessarily. The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences of the event (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF operated unnecessarily.
" Actuation" of multichannel ESF Actuation Systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic. Therefore, single channel actuations, whether caused by failures or otherwi.se, are not reportabi,e if they do not complete the minimum actuation logic.
Operation of an ESF as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported. However, if during the test or evolution the ESF actuates in a way that is not part of the planned. procedure, that actuation should be reported. For example, if the normal reactor shutdown procedure requires that the control rods be inserted by a manual reactor trip, the reactor trip need not be reported. However, if conditions develop during the shutdown that require an automatic reactor trip, such a reactor trip should be reported. The fact that the safety analysis assumes that an ESF will actuate automatically during an event does not eliminate the need to report that actuation. Actuations that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event (e.g., at the discretion of the licensee as part of a planned procedure).
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(1)(C), proposed 50.72(b)(4) has been revised and simplified.
The words "any instance of personal error, equipment failure, or discovery of design or procedural inadequacies" that appeared in the proposed rule have been replaced by the words " event or condition." This simplification in language is intended to clarify what was a confusing phrase to many of those who commented on the proposed rule. Also in response to public comment, this
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i reporting requirement is a "Non-Emergency" to be reported within four hours instead of within one hour. , ,,
This paragraph is b'ased on the assumption that safety-relatied systems -
and structures are intended to mitigate the consequences
- of an a'cgident. While paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(1)(B)appliestoactualdemandsfd?'actuationof,anESF, paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(1)(C) covers an event where a saft:ty system could have failed to perform its intended function because of one or more personnel errors, ,
including procedure violations; equipment failuns; or design, analysis, fabrication, construction, or procedural deficien:ies _ The event should be
/;
reported regardless of the situation 'or condition that caused the sh,ructure or system to be unavailable. e This reporting requirenent is similar to one contained in 950.73, thus .
reflecting public comment identifying the need for closer coordination of ,
s reporting requirements between 650.7.E and $50.73. ,
This paragraph includes those safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (e.g., containment isolation,. emergency filtration).
Hence, minor operational events such as valve packing leaks,<wnich co;1d be considered a lack of control of radioactive material, should not ce reported under this paragraph. System leaks or other similar. events may, however, be reportable under other paragraphs.
This paragraph does not include those cases where a system or component is removed from service as part of a planned evolution, in accordance with an approved procedure, and in accordante with tne plant's Technical Specifications.
For example, if the licensee removes part of a system from service to perform maintenance, and the Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration,
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and the system or component is returned to service within the time limit speci-o fied in the Technical Specifications, the acticn need not be reported under this paragraph. However, if, while the component is out of service, the licensee identifies a condition that could have prevented the system from performing its intended function (e.g., the licensee finds a set of relays that is wired incorrectly), that condition must be reported.
It should be noted th,at there are a limited number of single-train systems that perform safety functions (e.g., the High Pressure Coolant Injection System inBWRs). For such systems, loss of the single train would prevent the fulfill-ment of the safety function of that . system and, therefore, must be reported even though the plant Technical Specifications may allow such a condition to exist for a specified length of time. Potentially serious human error is made that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, but recovery factors resulted in the error being corrected, the error is still reportable.
The Commission recognizes that the application of this and other paragraphs of this section involves a technical judgment by licensees. In this case, a technical judgment cust be made whether a failure or operator action that disabled one train of a safety system and could have, but did not, affect a redundant train. If so, this would constitute an event that "could have prevented" the fulfillment of a safety function, and, accordingly, must be reported.
If a component fails by an apparently random mechanism, it may or may not be reportable if the functionally redundant component could fail by the same mechanism. To be reportable, it is necessary that the failure constitute a condition where there is reasonable doubt that the functionally redundant
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- 22 -
train or channel would remain operational until it completed its safety function or is repaired. For' example, if a pump fails because of improper lubrication, there is a reasonable expectation that the functionally redundant i pump, which was also imprcperly lubricated, would have also failed before it completed its safety function, then the failure is reportable and the potential failure of the functionally redundant pump must be reported.- ,
' Interaction between systems., particularly a safety system and a non-safety
~
system, is also included in this criterion. For example, the Commission is increasingly concerned about the effect of a loss or degradation of what had been assumed to be nonessential inputs to safety systems. Therefore, this paragraph also includes those cases where a service (e.g., heating, ventilation, and c'coling) or input (e.g., compressed air) which is necessary for reliable er long-term operation of a safety system is lost or degraded. Such loss or degradation is reportable, if the proper fulfillment of the safety function is not or can not be assured. Failures that affect inputs or services to systens that have no safety function need not be reported.
Finally, the Commission recognizes that the licensee have to decide when personnel actions could have previnted fulfillment of a safety function. For example, when an individual improperly operates or maintains a component, he might conceivably have made the same error for all of the functionally redundant components (e.g., if he incorrectly calibrates one bistable amplifier in the Reactor Protection System, he could conceivably incorrectly calibrate all bistable' amplifiers). However, for an event to be reportable it is necessary that the actions actually affect or involve components in more than one train or channel of a safety system, and the result of the actions must be undersirable l
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from the perspective of protecting'the health and safety of the public. The components can be functionally redundant (e.g., two pumps ~in different trains)'
or not functionally redundant (e.g., the operator correctly stops a pump in Train "A" and, instead of shutting the pump discharge valve in Train "A," he mistakenly shuts the pump discharge valve in Train "B").
Paragraphs 50.72(b)(2)(1)(D) proposed 50.72(b)(6)havebeenchangedto clarify the requirements to report releases of radioactive material. These two paragraphs are similar to 920.403 but place a lower threshold for reporting events at commercial power reactors. The lower threshold is based on the signific$nce of the breakdown of the licensee's program necessary to have a release of this size, rather than on the significance of the impact of the actual release. The existing licensee radioactive material effluent release monitoring programs and their associated assessment capabilities are sufficient
. tosatisfytheintentof50.72(b)(2)(1)(D).
Based upon public comment and a reevaluation by the Commission staff, the reporting threshold has been changed from "25%" in the proposed rule to "2 times" in the final rule and has been reclassified as a "Non-Emergency" to be reportec within four hours instead of within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Also this reporting requirement has been changed to make a more uniform requirement by referring to specific release criteria instead of referring only to Technical Specifications that may vary somewhat among facilities.
This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that constitute unplanned or uncontrolled releases of a significant amount of radioactive material to offsite areas. Unplanned releases should occur infrequently; however, when they occur, at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational control established to avoid their occurrence and, therefore, such events should be reported.
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Paragraph 50,72(b)(2)(1)(E) proposed rule 5'0.72(b)(7).has three changes.
One is to eliminate the phrase " occurring onsite" because it is implied by the scope of the rule. The second change is to replace " injury involving radiation" with " radioactively contaminated person." This change was made because cf the difficulty in defining injury due to radiation and more importantly because 10 CFR Part 20 captures events involving radiation exposure.
The third change, in response to public comment, was to make this reporting requirement a four-hour notification, instead of one-hour notification.
. This change was made because these events have slightly less safety significance than those required to be reported within one hour.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)41)(F)[notinproposedrule]tesidescoveringsome situations such as release of radioactively contaminated tools or equipment to the public that may warrent NRC attention, also covers those events or situations that would not otherwise warrant NRC attention except for the interest of the news media, other government agencies, or the public. In terms of its effect on licensees, this is not a new reporting requirement because the threshold for reporting injuries and radioactive releases was much lower urder the proposed rule. This criterion will capture those events previously reported under other criteria when such events require the NRC to respond because of media or public attention.
l Paragraph 50.72(c) proposed 50.72(c), has remained essentially unchanged from the proposed rule, except for addition of the title " Followup Notification" l
and some renumbering.
This paragraph is intended to provide the NRC with timely notification when an event becomes more serious and additional information or new analyses i
clarify an event.
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[7590-01]
This paragraph also permits the NRC to maintain a continuous communications channel because of the need for continuing follow-up information or because of telecomunication problems.
IV. REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the Rule as considered by the ,
Comission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copying for a fee at t' e hNRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C.
20555. Telephone (301) 492-4973.
V. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
, The information requirements contained in the regulation have been approved by the Office of Menagement and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act, l Pub. L.96-511 (clearance number 3150-0011).
VI. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605 (b), the Comission hereby certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic impact on E. substantial number of small entities. This l
l regulation affects electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas and that own and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The l amendments clarify and modify presently existing notification requirements.
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[7590-01]
Accordingly, there is no nets, significant economic impact on these licensees, nor do the affected licensees fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.
VII. LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors. Penalty, Radiation Protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting requirements.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorgani-zation Act of 1974, as amended, and section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 are published as a document subject to codification.
PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING 0F PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
- 1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat.
i 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42U.S.C.5851). Section 50.58, 50.91 and 50.92 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec.186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C 2236).
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[7590-01]
I 27 -
For. the purposes of sec. 223, .68 ' Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),
$l50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 6950.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2201(i)); and $$50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
- 2. A new paragraph (z) is added to 950.54 to read as follows:
550.54 Conditions of'ifcenses.
W w * * *
(z) In the case of every utilization facility licensed pursuant to Section 103 or 104b of the Act, the licensee shall immediately notify the NRC Operations Center of the occurrence of the events specified in f 50.72 of this part.
- 3. Section 50.72 is revised to read as follows:
$50.72 Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power-reactors.
(a) General Requirements.1 (1) Each nuclear power reactor licensee licensed under 650.21(b) or 650.22 of this part shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System of:
i 1
0ther requirements for immediate notification of the NRC by licensed operating nuclear power reactors are contained elsewhere in this chapter, in particular,
$20.205, $20.403, 550.36, and 673.71.
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[7590-J1]
(1) The declaration of any of the Emergency Classes specified in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan;2 or (ii) Of those non-Emergency events specified in paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) If the Emergency Notification. System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required notifications via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone system, or any other method which will ensure that a report is made as soon as practical to the NRC Operations Center.3 ,
(3) The licensee shall notify the NRC imnediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes.
(4) When making a report under paragraph (a)(3) of this section, the licensee shall identify:
(i) The Emergency Class declared; or (ii) Either paragraph (b)(1), "One-Hour Report," or paragraph (b)(2),
"Four-Hour Report," as the paragraph of this section requiring notification of the Non-Emergency Event.
(b) Non-Emergency Events.
2 These Emergency Classes are addressed in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" Rev. 1, November 1980. Copies of NUREG documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Attention: Publications Sales Manager Coninercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (202) 951-0550.
. - ,. l
[7590-01]
4 (1) One-Hour Reports. (1) If not reported as a declaration of an Emergency Class under paragraph (a) of this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any of the following:
(A) The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the Plant Technical Specifications.
(B) Any event or condition during operation that results in the condition
~
of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or results in the nuclear power plant being:
(1) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety; (2) In a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant; or (3) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.
(C) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that poses an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power, plant or signifi-cantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant.
(D) Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a j result of a valid signal.
l (E) Any event which results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).
(F) Any event that threatened the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties l
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30 -
. necessary for the safe operation of the nuc. ear power plant including fires, and toxic gas, or radioactive releases.
(2) Four-Hour Reports. (i) If not reported under paragraphs (a) or (b)(1) of this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as possible and in all cases, within four hours of the occurrence of any of the following:
-(A) Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.
(B) Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported.
(C) Any event or condition that alore could have prevented the fulfill-ment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(1,) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (2_) Remove residual heat,
( (3) Control the-release of radioactive material, or
(,4_) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
(D) (1) Any airborne radioactive release that exceeds 2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of one hour. (2_) Any liquid effluent i
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release that exceeds 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) at the point of entry into.the receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour.
Immediata notifications made under this paragraph also satisfy the requirements of paragraphs and (a)(2) and (b)(2) of 650.403.of Part
. 20 of this chapter.
(E) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.
(F) Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel or protection of the environment and for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. These events may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.
(c) Followup Notification. (1) With respect to the telephone notifications made under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, in addition to making the required initial notification, each licensee, shall during the course of the event:
(i) Immediately report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions including those that require the declaration of any of the Emergency Classes if such a declaration has not been previously made, or the change from one Emergency Class to another or a termination of the Emergency Class.
(ii) Immediately report: (A) the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, (B) the effectiveness of response or
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protective measures taken, and (C) information related to plant behavior that is not unders'tood. *
(iii) Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC.
Dated at Washington, D.C., this ,
day of 198 .
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.
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- e ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS Twenty letters of comment were received in response to the Federal Register Notice (46 FR 61894) publisned on December 21, 1981*. This Federal Register Notice described the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72 " Notification of Significant Events" and 10 CFR 50.54 " Conditions of Licenses." A list of the commentors and a more detailed analysis of these comments is provided in the following pages. The number in parentnesis 'following each comment identifies the person making the comment in accordance with the list appearing on the next page.
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a Copies of the Federal Register Notice as well as the letters of comment are available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555.
Enclosure 2 1
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LETTERS-OF COMMENT No. Name ,
Affiliation 1 Marvin I. Lewis -
2 George Keister -
3 E. Erie Jones Illinois Emergency-Services and Disaster Agency 4 F. L. Clayton, Jr. Alabama Power
- 5. Donald F. Knott KMC, Inc. and' Action Plan Utility Group 6 John R. Thorpe GPU Nuclear 7 C.W. Fay Wisconsin Power Elec. Company 8 Charles M. Pratt Power Authority of the State of New York 9 J. A. Tiernan Baltimore Gas and Electric 10 J. H. Moody Yankee Electric Company 11 T. C. Nichols South Carolina Electric and Gas Company 12 E. R. Mathews Wisconsin Public Services Company 13 William D. Parker, Jr. Duke Power Company 14 L. O. DelGeorge Commonwealth Ecison 15 N. M. Curtis Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 16 J. T. Beckham Georgia Power 17 John R. Marshall Arkansas Power & Light Company 18 E. L. Zebroski Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 19 W. G. Counsil Northeast Utilities 20 Bart D. Withers Portland General Electric 2
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COMMENTS - GENERAL The Staff should write a document to explain what is needed to meet the f' requirement of 50.72 (b) (1) anc circulate for comment with this proposed I rule or make it a part of this proposed rule (as appendix is a part of 10 CFR 50). (1)
Although the technical requirements of the proposed rule could be generally accepted as an evolutionary upgrade we view with concern the stated need for the upgrade. The statement of considerations reads:
" Violation of the condition prescribed by this subsection may, in the Commission's discretion, constitute grounds for license revocation.",
If this is the sole imoetus to make another rule (50.54) in addition to 50.72 which is now adhered to by industry, we believe the Commission is embarking on a program which will ultimately yield questionable and probably negative results.
'If the Commission believes that a failure to make a report will be used as the basis for revoking a license, the reporting event must be of a most serious nature and not characteristic of those listed in the proposed rule.
In summary, we believe that the Commission already has the ability to enforce its regulations (which ~could include license revocation for serious problems) and does not need to incorporate the items as now proposed into conditions of license. .We believe the specific working of the desired reporting in Section 103 of the NRC Authorization Act for FY 1980 (PL 96-295) could be made part of 50.72'without the need for the " legal over-kill" of the proposed regulation. (5)
We recommend that the proposed 10 CFR 50.72 be withdrawn. It is our belief that these new provisions go beyond congressional intent. (10)
The new Subsection states in part, ". . in case of any accicent that could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products .
It would be more appropriate to substitute results for could result in the above sentence since there are a variety of anticipated transients or accidents considered in the FSAR that eventually "could result" in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products considering the worst of an infinite set of variables. (17)
Federal Register page 61894, Column 2, paragraph 3:
It is not clear whether or not Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is being amended by this rule change or if it already has been amended by some other mechanism. (17)
Finally, it has always been the case that the NRC Commissioners can revoke an operating license; however, Subsection (f) threatens license revocation for non-compliance to vague, undefined and interpretable terms such as "immediately" and "could result". Such wording is not in the best interests of AP&L or the nuclear industry. (17) 3
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RESPONSE
With regard to the comment suggesting that NRC write additional documents to explain what is meant by the rule, the NRC staff is preparing a Federal Register Notice that will clarify some points. The staff intends that the rule be as clear as possible. Additional guidance in the form of NUREG reports or regulatory guides may be prepared if necessary. The NRC staff is prepared to help licensees with any problems of interpretation on a case-by-case basis.
With regard to the comment that if.the quoted language is the sole impetus then the Commission is enlarging on a program with negative results, the NRC staff is primarily motivated to modify the regulations to improve reporting in order to protect the public health and safety. The quoted language regarding the possibility of license revocation is part of Congressionally charted legislation reaffirming Congress' intent that the NRC shall have sufficient power to enforce the importaht function of receiving safety significant infor-mation. The'NRC desires to make reporting of information meaningful, timely
. and efficient. The NRC sees the revision of regulations described here as substantial progress toward the goal of protecting public health and safety.
One comment (17) suggested revision of the legislation and clearly did not understand that this rule does not amend legislation. The NRC is promul-gating an amendment of $50.54 to satisfy the intent of Congress.
COMMENT - PR0p0 SED RULE WAS IMPROVEMENT, BUT I applaud your proposal to revise reporting requirements for nuclear power plant operators. (2)
The proposed revision is generally a commendable step in better defining reporting requirements. There are, however, some items in the proposal that are of concern to us: (4)
In addition, we are encouraged by the Commission's recognition that the existing Section 50.72 is vague, too broad in scope, and ambiguous. Generally, we view the proposed changes to Section 50.72 as an improvement to the existing requirements but we offer the following specific comments directed at further improvements: (6)
We welcome this effort by the NRC to cla.'ify these reporting requirements.
(7)
Although the proposed rule has substantially improved the specificity of the reporting requirements, we wish to make further comments . . . . (7)
The proposed notification requirements are a significant improvement over previous requirements, however, deficiencies still exist in the list of signi-l ficant events to be reported in 10 CFR 50.72. (19) l l 4
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RESPONSE. i l
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. We are pleased that our intent to clarify and coordinate 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements with other rules and NRC guidance is recognized as an 4 improvement.
COMMENT - TOO MUCH REPORTING CAUSES UNNECESSARY PUBLIC CONCERN Further, as expressed in our comment letter to you dated June 4, we remain concerned about the Comm,ission's use of information supplied by means of these prompt notifications. 'The Commission apparently has proposed no ,
criteria, guidelines, limitations, or requirements for screening, disclosing, .
or acting upon the information received from' licensees in these telephone calls. The NRC regional offices have already developed the practice of 3
releasing throughout the NRC and sending to state officials " Preliminary Notifications" regarding events at licensed facilities without consulting the licensee. Unbridled dissemination of preliminary information received'through
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.the prompt notification system could create premature or unreasonable reactions based on a misunderstanding of an otherwise trivial event. As we have suggested nreviously, criteria for NRC use and disclosure of this type information should include technical agreement between the NRC and the licensee as to the factsJof the event and what has occurred. (7)
Our difficulties with the interpretation of the existing listing in 10 CFR 50.72 have been the subject of several letters including our comments to you dated June 4, 1980 and our letter to Mr. H. R. Denton dated December 8, 1980; additional correspondence has been exchanged with Region III on this subject. In considering these comments, it should be noted that we inform the media of any event requiring immediate reporting to the NRC as part of our effort to keep the public informed regarding the operation of Point Beach Nuclear ~ Plant. Honoring such commitments results in unnecessary public concern where NRC reporting requirements involve.truly insignificant events so far as public safety is concerned. (7)
As discussed in our meeting of February 9, 1982, there is also a basic issue which is left indeterminate. The regulations and industry practice since 1979, assure that even minor events, posing no threat to the public, are promptly reported. There is no comparable effort, regulation, or articulated policy aimed at minimizing false alarms, or undue exaggeration of minor events. There is no penalty - or even disincentive against such exaggeration.
Indeed, the present apprcach appears to bias the system towards false alarms or the reporting of minor events in a mode which commonly results in reinforc-ing unwarranted public apprehensions. The posture that this unwarranted public apprehension results only from media exaggeration is not readily defensible. For example, the immediate reporting system is structured to operate in haste to announce minor events. The use of the emergency channels for dissemination of such minor events often seems designed to imply imminent catastrophe.
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This1 pattern unavoidably has the result of arousing and reinforcing public apprehension. The'_NRC should consider whether policies which avoid producing such results, even if inaovertent, are in the interests of NRC, the
- NRC staff, or the public. (18)
RESPONSE
. .The NRC agrees with the general thrust of these comments that activating an Emergenc9 Plan too frequently and unnecessarily generates unwarranted concern. The need for reducing the number of activations of Emergency Plans has come to the attention of the NRC as a result of public comment on the
_ proposed rule. The NRC cannot amend those portions of the regulations defining the Emergency Classes, Appendix E of Part 50 and 50.47, without first issuing another proposed rule and giving the public an opportunity to comment on specific changes.
The subject of this final rulemaking, s50.54 arid $50.72 are being amended in such a way as to permit reduced number of activations of the licensee's Emergency Plans without further modificatien, once Appendix E to Part 50 and 550.47 are amended. Ultimately, it is the Commission's intent to amend Appen-dix E to Part 50 and $50.47 to eliminate Manusual Event" as an Emergency Class, thus raising the threshold for activatior. of the licensee's Emergency Plan.
With regard to release of Preliminary Notifications (PN's), PN's are not the subject of this rulqmaking. This is a separate _ issue.
Likewise, releases of any information to the public is not an issue to be addressed in this rulemaking. The primary purpose of this rulemaking is to
- ensure that the NRC has the information so that it can protect the public health and safety. Nothing in this rulemaking will either enhance or detract from release of information to the media or public.
COMMENT - PLANT OPERATING AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES The same lack of specifics apply to the actual " events to be reported."
Paragraph 50.72 (1) "not. governed by the plants operating and emergency proce-dures." That comes out of 50.72 (b)(1). Does this refer to Tech Specs, or what? Each plant has its own set of operating procedures. They vary greatly,
' are difficult to read, and are written by the licensee to favor his point of view. Using the procedures written by the licensee is not necessarily the best way to protect the health and safety of the public or get the best infor-mation as quickly as possible. (1)
Section 50.72(b)(1):
i We find this item to be still too vague to eliminate unnecessary reporting.
l There are many times that conditions are encountered that are not explic-itly governed by plant opereting and emergency procedures but are of an insignificant nature. We do not want our operators spending a lot of j
time during a transient trying to decide whether a plant condition not l
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covered by ops or EPs must be reported within one hour. Further clarifi-E : cation of the. Commission's intent with respect to this requirement needs
' .to,be provided in the rule. (6) 4 A requirement for immediate notification of an event to the NRC.and/or local. authorities implies that the event being reported has,- or could have i . immediate significance with respect to the health and safety of-the plant, personnel, or general public. . As the proposed rule is currently phrased, Criterion.(1)-provides for the reporting of any event that results in the nuclear power plant- being in a condition not governed by operating or emer-gency procedures.
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This may include events which do not present an immediate concern. This ;
j requirement should be revised to include only those events which have nuclear safety-significance. The following wording for Criterion (1) is suggested:
- j. Any event having nuclear safety s.ignificance that.results in the nuclear power plant being in a condition not governed by the plant's operating or
. emergency procedures. (13) 2' In paragraph (b)(1) of the revised Section 50.72 the requirement'for immediate notification of a deviation from plant operating procedures should be deleted, while retaining the notification ~ requirement for emergency proce-dures. .The reason for this deletion is that many vacancies from operating procedures do not affect plant safety. This proposed requirement would.necessi-tate constant.and strict review of all plant procedures no matter how minor L their significance and would require frecuent immediate notification of these events. This would tend to dilute the impact of the emergency notification-l since frequent reporting of rather insignificant events would probably take
. place. :The net. result would more than likely be an unnecessary increase in the demands on both the plant operations personnel and the NRC Operations Center staff in handling these reports. A reporting time limit of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for operations procedures ' violations would probably be more practical and would allow for more details to be reported. (16)
This event category requires notification whenever the plant is in a conoition not governeo by the plant's operating or emergency procedures. As written, this could be interpreted to in'clude conditions such as plant tests
, which may involve operation of equipment in manners not prescribed in the operating or emergency plant procedures. Since these events would be of no 2 consequence or concern, additional specificity is required as to the kinds of i events requiring immediate notification. (20) i
RESPONSE
{ The NRC believes that the operating staffs of nuclear power plants should
. be familiar with plant operating and emergency procedures. However, the
- wording of the reporting criteria in the final rule (10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(i)(B))
i has been modified to narrow the events captioned to those that significantly i compromise plant safety. Not withstanding the fact the procedures do vary
[. from plant to plant, this is a useful reporting criterion. When a plant is i
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l being operated in a manner not consistent with approved procedures it tends to be indicative of a more serious problem. -
By way of clarification, the NRC does not intend that approved plant testing should be interpreted as requiring a report under 'this criterion.
COMMENT - EXPLICIT THREATS More deficiencies in the 8 events that require Notification 50.72(b)(2)
" explicitly threatens the safety". What is the nature and severity of the threat referred to here? Does this refer'to a branch being blown off a tree by the wind and hitting a worker on the way into the plant? Or conversely unless the severity of the threat is.so great that it obviously threatens life and limb immediately such as a spill of special nuclear material when people are near the spilled material? Some indication of the nature and severity of the threat which requires reporting must be included in the rule. (1) -
The proposed rule should clarify whether or not the words " explicitly threaten" have the equivalent meaning to the definition of " explicit threat" presented in the footnote to 10 CFR Section 73.71. (7)
This category includes acts of natural events or personnel acts that explicitly threaten the safety of the nuclear power plant or site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear plant or the security of special nuclear material. Acts of nature that threaten the safety of the plant or plant personnel are covered in the Emergency Initiating Conditions i~n NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, and are, therefore, included-in Section 50.72 (a) which requires notification upon activation of the emer-gency plan. Since this category is redundant its deletion is recommended. If it is determined that this category is separately required, the term "explic-itly threaten the safety" needs to be defined so as to make this category more specific. (20)
RESPONSE
The term " explicitly threatens" that appeared in the proposed rule has been deleted from the final rule.
COMMENT - STRIKES OF OPERATING PERSONNEL 50.72(b)(2) reads "Any act of nature, event, or personnel act that explicitly threatens the safety of the nuclear power plant or site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear plant or the security of special nuclear material, including strikes of operating personnel . . ." (emphasis added). This wording implies that strikes by operating personnel provide a de facto threat to nuclear plant or special nuclear material safety. We do not ooject to providing notice of strikes by operating personnel. However, strikes by operating personnel should be striken from 50.72(b)(2) and made a separate entry under 50.72(b) to avoid the unfounded 8
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implication that strikes automatically pose an explicit threat to nuclear safety. (4)
Included in the reporting category of ' paragraph 50.72(b)(2) are " strikes of operating personnel". A job action or strike by operating personnel does not, by itself, constitute a threat to the safety of a nuclear power plant.
Reference to strikes should be removed from this paragraph or qualified to require such reports only if. plant staffing is reduced below Technical Speci-fication requirements. (7)
RESPONSE
The Commission has deleted reference to strikes from the reporting criteria. Other criteria are used to obtain reports regarding events that threaten the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hamper site personnel.
COMMENT - IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN If a plant is shut down, how can you say that it is due to a Tech Spec requirement or because the plant was going down for some other reason? This should be written: (3) Any event for which plant Tech Specs require initia-tion of immediate shutdown of the nuclear power plant no matter whether the plant was shut down for~that reason or some other reason." (1) 50.72(b)(3) reads "Any event for which plant Technical Specifications require initiation of immediate shutdown of the nuclear power plant." Standard Technical Specifications do not use the term "immediate" in action statements requiring shutdown but rather "within one hour", etc. Thus, this requirement is unclear. Revising 50.72(b)(3) to read " Shutdown of the nuclear power plant recuired by Technical Specifications" would correct this problem and prevent any. misunderstanoing that notification must be made of ooeration in a degraded mode allowed by technical specifications prior to shutdown. (4)
Section 50.72(b)(3):
There are very few events for which plant technical specifications require an immediate shutdown. If it is the Commission's intent to have only these reported, the requirement is correctly stated. However, if this will be later interpreted to include shutdowns required within 15 minutes, or one hour, or some other short time frame, an explicit quantitative
, time frame should be specified in the regulation now. (6)
Section 50.72(b)(3) - Reports would not be required under this proposed provision since the Technical Specifications are written to allow an oppor-tunity to correct a problem prior to shutdown. More appropriate wording would be "any event for which plant technical specifications require immediate initiation of nuclear power plant shutdown". This wording would allow for the grace period provided by the technical specifications and comply with the intent of this proposed provision. We now report any initiation of a plant 9
shutdown required by the Technical Specifications. Another alternative is to leave the rule as it now stands, without the word "immediate." (9)
. RESPONSE Since not all plants have technical specifications that use the term "immediate shutdown," the term was confusing to some commentors. The NRC has revised the reporting criterion in question so that the final rule requires a report upon the initiation of a shutdown required by Technical Specification.
COMMENT - INSTANCES OF PERSONAL ERROR, EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR DISCOVERY OF DESIGN OR PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY (4) change "alone" to "alone or in combination with likely events, procedures or Wash 1400' fault trees." (1)
Item (iii) of paragraph 50.72(b)(4) should be deleted. Instances of personnel e'ror, equipment failure, or discovery of design or procedural inadequacies that prevent fulfillment of the safety function for the contrcl or release of radioactive material would be immediately reportable under paragraph 50.72(b)(6) should such a release occur. Leaving this item in paragraph 50.72(b)(4) invites the same interpretation difficulties existing presently with 10 CFR 50.72 regarding radioactive releases. (7)
Criterion (4) should be eliminated as an immediate notification item.
Occurrences in this category which are not covered by Criterion (3) wculd not pose any continued threat to the plant or personnel. Clearly, the discovery of a failure, design flaw, or procedurai inadequacy, which may have existed for sn/e amount of time undetected, does not warrant an immediate notifica-tion. If actions are required to change the status of the plant as the result of such discoveries, the situation would be addressed by other criteria. (13) 50.72(b)(a) - Proposed paragraph 50.72(b) requires that the NRC be notified "... as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any of the following events ...". Proposed paragraph 50.72(b)(4) states, "Any instance of personnel error, ... , or discovery of design or procedural inadequacies that alone could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function...". These are events which could occur and subsequently be discovered.
As such, these events may represent a circumstance where meeting the specified reporting requirements would be impossible. When does the one hour reportabil-ity clock start running in the case of design or procedural inadequacies? How does the one hour reporting time frame relate to the civil penalties proposed by the 45FR66754 Proposed General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions for cases of design or procedural inadequacies? (15)
In paragraph (b)(4) c' revised Section 50.72 the allowance for reporting "on discovery" should be extended to personnel error aad equipment failure reporting. In many cases a personnel error on an equipment failure is not readily apparent and may go undiscovered for some time. This shoulo be taken into account in reporting time limits. (16) 10
- -s (b)(4)(iii) "Any instance of personnel error, ... to control the release of radioactive material."
Altnough the NRC has cnanged the wording from limit to control, the
- requirement still remains too vague. .Some reference to a limitation, i.e., a curie limit, coolant activity level, etc. , should be incorporated into this requirement. (~19)
RESPONSE
The intent o.f this criterion is to have timely reporting of any event that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function. The operability of safety systems is well defined by technical specification and other plant performance documents. The clock for reporting begins when the licensee has discovered or becomes aware of such an event.
The NRC does not agree that this criterion should be eliminated. It is, however, incorporated in the "four-hour notification" instead of the "one-hour notification." Other criteria will not necessarily capture these important events.
The NRC chose not to' adopt the suggested language of commentor 1 believing such language would not substantially clarify the intent or meaning of this criterion.
The NRC chose not to specify specific limits (i.e. curie limit, coolant activity) because regardless of such limits, if a safety function can not be fulfilled it should be reported.
COMMENT - ESF/RPS ACTUATION Section 50.72(b)(5):
This requirement would aopear to require one-hour notification for any reactor trip, even those which occur due to instrument drift or personnel error, even though no Technical Specification limits were exceeded. In our judgment this is too broad and is not necessary to implement Section 201 of the Authorization Act. (6)
Proposed paragraph 50.72(b)(5) is an improvement over previous guidance but still would require reporting of such "non-events" as a reactor trip from below the level of power operation as defined in Technical Specifications.
Such trips, particularly where the cause of the trip is understood and evaluated as having no safety significance, offer no hazard to the reactor or to the public. It is, therefore, recommended that this requirement be modified to read "(5) Any event resulting in manual or automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF). This includes events actuating the Reactor Protection System (RPS) which occur during power ocerations ...". (7) i a
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There is a significant distinction between actuation of the Engineering Safety Features and the Reactor Protection System. Normal functioning of the Reactor Protection System, in the manner it was designed, does not logically fall under any of the four defined emergency c. lasses. Notification to NRC within one hour of RPS actuations is an unnecessary burden on Licensees and provides information of questionable value to the NRC. For the above reasons, thi.s requirement should be deleted. (17) 10 CFR 50.72, Paragraph (5), " Reporting ESF and RPS" INP0 recommends elimination of the requirement to report this information in the proposed Rule and recommends that the data called for be accumulated during the NRC's daily plant status telephone check. (18)
(b)(5) "Any event resulting in manual or automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features . .. (. . . testing or normal reactor shutdown need not be reported)."
We do not agree all Reactor Protection System or Engineering Safety Features actuation (except during normal reactor shutdown or during surveil-lance testing) needs reporting. A spurious trip has no effect on the health and safety of the public and no obvious benefits for reporting. We recommend that spurious trips need 00t be reported. (19)
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RESPONSE
In response to these comments, the NRC staff has changed the reporting deadline to 4-hours instead of one hour. However, the NRC does not regard reactor scrams as "non-events" as do some commentators. Information related to reactor scrams has been extremely useful to the NRC in identifying incipient safety related problems. Even a pattern of repeated scrams is indicative of a safety problem in itself because of frequent challenges to safety systems.
COMMENT - BUILDING EVACUATION 50.72(b)(6)(iii) reads "Any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled radioactive release that results in evacuation of a building." The placement of this requirement relative to 50.72(b)(6)(i) and 50.72(b)(6)(ii) makes it unclear whether it applies to all facilities or only those that do not have instantaneous release rate technical specifications. If applicable to all facilities, it should be numbered 50.72(b)(6)(i). Additionally, we are con-cerned that the requirement as written may be counterproductive by causing personnel responsible for initiating building evacuations to be reluctant to order precautionary evacuations. To preclude such an undesired effect, we recommend that the requirement be limited to ". . . evactuation of a building due to airborne concentration in excess of .. " some numoer of maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs) . specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, l Table I." This wording would delay notification until air samples determined
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notification to those instances where evacuations were truly necessary and not just_ precautionary. (4) .
In addition, extending the requirement to include cases "that result in-the evacuation of a building" is much too broad. Evacuation of a building may not be indicative of an excessive release,.but rather a cautious, conservative approach to an off-normal conditicn. . We recommend recasting this requirement with these considerations in mind. (6)
Section 50.72 paragraph (b) subpararaph (6')(fii) requires reporting of "any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled radioactive release that results in the evacuation of.a building".
This subparagraph should.be revised to read: ,
"Any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled radioactive release that results in the evacuation of a building and could potentially result in a radioactive release offsite that exceeds the limits proscribed in subparagraph (ii).
Since_ reporting requirements of subparagraph (b)(2) relate to site personnel safety and subparagraph (b)(6)(ii) relate to offsite population safety, subparagraph (b)(6)(iii), if it serves any purpose other than redun-dancy, must exist as an early warning mechanism for offsite releases posing a threat to safety. The reporting of releases which do not pose a threat to safety either onsite or offsite merely because a building is evacuated is unnecessary and counterproductive to the purposes of the rule. For instance, during plant outages localized short term releases of radioactivity may occur in the reactor containment building thus triggering a oetector alarm. Standard practice dictates that even where no offsite threat exists, personnel in the vicinity of the detector or the building be evacuated. (8)
Section 50.72(b)(6)(iii) - Define " building" and add " complete" before the word " evacuation" was necessary. If-a building is partially evacuated to comply witn ALARA oncepts, it snould not be reportable. Deletion of the entire section 50.72(b)(6)(iii) woula also satisfy our concern and remove any amoiguity which could lead to inconsistent reporting among various plants.
(9)
It is considered that the requirements contained in Criteria (6)(i) and (ii) provide for necessary reporting of significant releases, and therefore, (6)(iii) should be deleted, or at least modified significantly. For example, the evacuation of a building is usually done on potential rather than confirmed radiological hazards. Events should not be reported only because a building was evacuated without considering the significance of the release. Indeed, making a release reportable if an evacuation occurs could result in less conservative attitudes with respect to precautionary evacuations. Also, the -
proposed rule is unclear as to whether a partial evacuation of a building is reportable. An evacuation of only a portion of a building should not be reportable. And finally, many operational, maintenance and testing activities have the potential for a small " release." These would be unplanned but not necessarily unexpected and should not ce reported. (13) 13
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We have cne specific comment regarding the new paragraph 50.72(b)(6)(iii).
As-proposed, it will generate.a considerable number of unnecessary red phone calls. It should be clarified-to indicate a release exceeding the limits _such as:
"(iii) Any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release to a building that exceeds ten., times the applicable limits of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table I for greater than one hour and that results in the
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evacuation of the building." (14)
In paragraph (b)(6)(iii) there is a requirement for NRC notification (within one hour via Emergency Notification System) of "any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release.which results in the evacuation of a building" (10 CFR 50.72(b)(6)(iii)). Building evacuations are, at times, initiated when ventilation gas, particulate,.or iodine monitors alarm. Alarm setpoints are normally.well below levels whi'h"could c dictate (based on MPC
-hours for example) evacuation. In addition, alarms based on equipment mal-functions or temporary activities, such as transporting a drum of radioactive waste past a monitor, may also be expected. Thus, building evacuations may result from minor events which should be not reportable.
We would recommend changing this section to read: "any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release which requires-evacuation of a building." With this wording, releases would not be reportable until they were of a magnitude to re, quire evacuation (i.e., concentrations in excess of 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Table 1 Column 1 values). (16)
This paragraph app ~ ears to be overly restrictive and is somewhat unclear.
For example, it is not clear whether an evacuation of a building means any portion of a building such as a single room or all of it. If the release is to a local plant area and is contained and controlled in accordance with plant procedures and technical specifications, or if the evacuation is strictly precautionary pending situational assessment, again it is not clear that this be reported via ENS. One example would be the accidental spillage of contami-nated water in a room. If an area is designed to accomodate a release and process it properly even though the area must initially be evacuated, this should not have to be reported via ENS. Perhaps one of the keys to implement-ing this paragraph lies in the definition of " release". If the material is contained and controlled, it should not be considered released. If there is a specified quantity of released material contemplated, this should be defined.
For ALARA considerations, even a very minor release may be cause to evacuate an area,'but not infringe on standard radiation protection limits.
The term " building" should be clarified tn mean those areas not designed to accomodate and properly process a release in accordance with plant design and procedure. The paragraph should specify the quantity of released material contemplated as was done in paragraphs (6)(i) and (6)(ii). (17)
Paragraph 6(iii), " Requirement for Evacuation of a Building" This paragraph of the proposed Rule is inconsistent with a similar section of the proposed LER Rule, 50.73. Resolution of the conflict is required. Our previous comments on 10 CFR 50.73 should be considered as your resolve this apparent inconsistency. (18) i i
14
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(b)(6)(iii) "Any accidental, unplanned, cr uncontrolled .. that results
.in the evacuation of a building."
In many cases, a building is evacuated as a precautionary measure when airborne activity is detected and the immediate extent is not known. This requirement shoulc be further defined to require reporting only in those cases-which would result in personnel reaching a radiological limit, i.e., Maximum Permissible Concentration, if an evacuation was not conducted. (19) 4 [50.72(b)(6)(iii)] - This event category includes any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled radioactive release that results in the evacuation of a building. This category should be made more specific, requiring the complete evacuation of all personnel from an entire plant building. Evacua-tions of . portions of buildings and evacuations of unnecessary personnel from
.- areas of plant buildings occur fairly frequently at operating plants and most
, times are of no safety. concern. The majority of these evacuations are of.a precautionary nature and are generally due to airborne radioactivity levels due to minor spills or leaks. (20)
RESPONSE
Based on these comments, the NRC nas eliminated reference to building evacuation and instead re1y-on specific radiological release criteria.
COMMENT - RADIOACTIVE RELEASE Define " instantaneous." Explain now this used in non-continuous reading meters, cumulative meters, other plant meters. Can the licensee, post facto, say that any particular release was planned? If a licensee can say a release is planned, this rule is useless. All a licensee has to say about a release is that it was planned er controlled whether it was or not. This rule must stipulate that all releases must be censidered unplanned and uncontrolled unless announced I hour before the release to tne NRC tnat a release is clanned and how mu;n that release will be. (1)
Section 50.72(b)(6):
This requirement is also overly conservative from the standpoint of Section 201 of the Authorization Act which requires notification in case of releases in excess of allowable limits. This requirement further reduces this threshold to 25 percent cf allowable limits. (6)
Section 50.72(b)(6)(i) and (ii) - As long as the release is less than technical specification limits, no immediate reports should be required unless the situation is deteriorating. Certainly, if some warning indication is needed, it should be closer to 100% of Technical Specification limits or 100%
of 10 CFR Part 10, Appendix B, Table II limits instead of 25%. (9)
Section 50.72(b)(6)(i) and (ii) - Unless tecnnical justification exists, only one of the two (i) or (ii) reporting requirements should be used. Thus, 15
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any bias for some plants reporting more '~
'or less,0ften than others would be -
eliminated. (9)
Paragraph 6 (i)(ii)," Radioactive Release Rate" INP0 recommends elimination of this requireuent sjnce releases belos technical specifications reporting red.uirements should, fall into the Public Interest Notifications category (Six hour Rule). (18)
(b)(6)(i) and (ii) "... Any accidental, unplanned ~ or uncontrollec 3
radioactive release offsite that exceeds .. 25% of the Tect.r.ical Specification limits (or 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B,. Table II)." The incorporation of a specific threshold value represents a significant improvement, however,-there is still no guidance as to what constitutes an " accidental, unplanned, er uncontrolled" radioactive release as opposed to a nor.3al. or expected release.
- The problems associated with this lack of guidance were presented in Reference (2), which is attached for your convenience. As.inaicated in Reference (2),
the imposition of a one hodr reporting requiremen't for this particular itea would result'in a number of unnecessary reports. NUSCO does not feel that;one hour is always an adequate amount of time to detemine whether or not an actual release has occurred, and whether the release was due to an "unpleaned" or " expected" event. Rather, we suggest a time requirement of "promptlyj but in no case more than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />" whicn we feel'would ' prevent unnecessary reprts, yet still comply with the intent of 10 CFR 50.72. Releases t m t are signifi-cant public. health and safety concerns are reported immediately per 10 CFR 50.72(a). (19)
Reference (1) states that the reporting threshold of 25% Mf the applicable Technical Specifications was based on ".. engineering judgment and experience as to what percentage level was appropriate to adequately protect the public health and safety." The basis for 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Table II was that no public health and safety consequence would be recognized if individuals offsite were exposed to these specified concentrations continuously for an entire year. It is, therefore, contradictory to state that re bases of 25%fof these limits for a very small fraction of the year should be. reported immediately to adequately protect tne public health and safety. NUSCO suggests trat the threshold limit be revised to the actual Technical Specification (ar 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix 8) limits. This would still be conservative in regard to public health and safety, but would be consistent with other reporting criteria.
(19)
[50.72(b)(6)(i) AND (ii)]
This event category includes an accidental, unplanned or.uncontrollec release that exceeds 25 percent of Technical Specification limits, or 25 percent of the applicable offsite concentrations of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II.
There is no basis either in the regulations or in the literature fcr a release of 25 percent of the Technical Specifications Limits (or 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II concentrations) being a potential threat to the.public health and safety.
16
._ . . - . . . - . . - . -..-.-....,....-.-------,.--~~--.-v-m.-
This reporting requirement also conflicts with NUREG-0654 Unusual Event Initiating Event Number 2, which requires notification of the NRC [uncer Section 50.72(a)] if radiological effluent technical specification limits are.
exceeded. In addition,10 CFR 20.403 currently requires immediate notifi-cation of .the NRC if radioactive material is released in concentrations which, if averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, would exceed 5000. times the 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Table II limits, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notification if the Table II-limits are exceeded by a factor of 500 and only a 30 day report if the Table II limits are exceeded by a factor of 10. As a result, between 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 20.493 there are five separate reporting requirements, three of which are requirea immediately with three different release limits.
-To be consistent with the intent of this rule, it is recommended that reporting be required at 100 percent of the Technical Specification release limi,t (or 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II). Since exceeding Technical Speci- -
fication release limits is a NUREG-0654, Appendix I Unusual Event Initiating Condition, this category would then be included in Section 50.72(a) and,
'therefore, could be deleted from Section 50.72(b). In addition, the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.403 snould be revised to be consistent with 10 CFR 50.72. (20) ,
RESPONSE
Based upon the above' comments, the NRC has changed the threshold of reporting to two times allowable limits. This higher reporting threshold should reduce unnecessary reporting.
The NRC chose to adopt the suggestion of comment 9 and use only one of the two (i) or (ii) reporting requirements (now 50.72(b)(2)(i)(D).
The NRC adopted the suggestion that this type of report be included in the larger reporting time frame (i.e. , 4-hours notification instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).
Based upon the comments received, tne words " accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled",have been deleted for the sake of clarity.
COMMENT - EMERGENCIES CLASSES 10 CFR 50.72(c)(1)
It is not evident what purpose is served by requiring the Licensee to
" guess" and promptly report via ENS whether or not an Emergency Class may be initiated or changed to another Class level. The paragraph should be rewritten as follows: "Promptly report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions which requires initiation of any of the four Emergency Classes . . .". (17) 17
, - - - - - - ~ . - -
RESPONSE
The $RC does not believe that a licensee should have to guess what Emergency Class'is appropriate. The licensee is responsible for classifying any emergency. He does this in accordance with approved criteria in order to communicate-the relative seriousness of the emergency. Prompt reporting of any degradation is necessary in order for the NRC to know when an emergency becomes worse.
COMMENT - CITING 50.72 AS BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION
- 1. iSection 50 72 paragraphs (a) and (b)' require that when the -
- NRC'is notified of a significant event that the licensee indicate
-that such notification is made pursuant to this section. The following words should be deleted from paragraphs (a) and (b): "and shall identify that the notice is being made under this paragraph"
, While such a requirement seems innocuous, it does introduce minor and unnecessary burdens into the notification process and raises questions which the NRC should answer. It would seem that the intent is to alert tne NRC as
.to tne section of the regulations that govern requirements for notification, however, ,it has no imp,act on the actual response to the situation. In fact, the operator in addition to reacting to the significant event and supplying technical information to the NRC now nas the additional burden of supplying legal citations. Any requirement wnicn distracts the operator from responding to the significant event'should be carefully scrutinized.
If this requirement is imposed, the NRC should answer the following questions:
(a) What is the purpose of this requirement?
(b) If a legal citation is not given, what practical effect will that have on NRC's response to a significant event?
(c) If a legal citation is not given, what is the legal effect?
(a) If a signi5icant event report is identified as made under this paragraph, does that preclude it fecm satisfying the reporting requirements of other sections el Part 10? >
While the Power Authority certr1r5 he- no objection to identification of legal citations in written reports, 17 cte r where time may be of the essence, requiring citation to the Cooe of Feceral Regulations seems inconsistent with the purposes of the regulation. (8)
The proposed rule requires that the notification of an ;.mergency event "shall identify that the notice is being made under this paragraph (50.72)." This is an unnecessary statement from the standpoint of satisfying the goal of immediate notification and failure to make this statement would leave the licensee subject to fine. (15)
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i
' The NRC- does not believe that it is an unnecessary burden for a . licensee to know ano identify the basis for a. telephone notification required by 10 CFR 50:72. There has been many occasions when the licensee could not tell the NRC whether the telephone notification was ceing made in accordance with technical specifications, 10 CFR 50.72', some other requirement, or just a courtesy call.
Unless the licensee can identify the nature of the report, it is difficult for the hRC to know what significance the licensee attaches to the report anc it becomes more difficult for the NRC to quickly and properly respond to the' report.
COMMENT - ONSITE FATALITY OR INJURY ,
(7) Rewrite this that any person wh'o is injured and radioactively contaminated will be considered a reportable injury. (1)"
The definition of the reporting category under paragraph 50.72(b)(7) is too broad. Although this paragraph represents an improvement on the present requirement to report any injuries or fatalities at a facility, it still gives no consideration to the seriousness of the injury or to the extent of the radioactive contamination. Minor first aid, even if some contamination is
' involved, does not represent a hazard to the public or serve as a precursor of more serious problems. We believe reporting of serious injuries involving radiation, fer which hispitalization for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is a probability, is a more appropriate guideline and should be incorporated into this section.
Furthermore, the' radioactive contamination reportability of such injuries should be limited to only those injuries involving exposure or body burden in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits. (7)
The proposed change to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(7) would require notification in the event of "on-site" fatality or any injury involving radiation occurring on-site that requires transport to an off-site medical facility for treatment."
WPS believes that "on-site" should be defined as that area of WPS owned property exclusively.used by WPS. This definition is of concern due to the leasing of WPS owned property surrounding the plant by area farmers. A fatality on this land unrelated to the operation of the plant should not be a reportable event.
(12) 00 the reportability requirements of this paragraph apply to all fatalities or only those fatalities caused by radiological exposure?
(15)
Paragraph 7, " Reporting of Fatality or Personal Injury" INP0 recommends either the elimination of this item from one-hour reporting, elimination of the requirement entirely, or moving this item to the proposed "Public Interest Notifications" category of the Rule. (18) 19 m - r.. - - + - - - - - .- ,----g -- ----y
e, . .
[50.72 (b)(7)]
This event category consists of any cnsite fatality or any injury involving radiation occurring onsite that requires transport of an offsite medical facility for treatment. " Injury involving radiation" is defined to include contamination incidents as well as radiation exposure incidents. The transcor-tation of an injured, contaminated individual to an offsite medical facility is covered in NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, Unusual Event Initiating Condition 16 and is therefore included in Section 50.72(a). Thus, this event category should be limited to radiation exposure events and should read "Any onsite fatality or any injury involving radiation exposure occurring onsite that requires transport to an offsite medical facility for treatment". (20)
RESPONSE
Based upon these comments, this criterion is included in the "four hour notification" instead of "one hour notif.ication" section. (18)
The NRC believes that such injuries requiring transport to an offsite medical facility could not be considered " minor first aid" as some commentors suggest. (7)
The reporting criter.ia in the final rule requires notification of any fatality involving radiation if the death was caused by radiation, and any fatality that receives , media attention or is part of notification to state and local authorities. (15)
The reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 now explicitly include criteria to capture " Unusual Events." (20)
'The NRC does not intend that the term "on-site" should take on a meaning beyond that area regulated by the NRC. (12)
COMMENT - PERSONNEL RADICACTIVE CONTAMINATION Section 50.72(b)(8):
This requirement is quite subjective in its use of the terms " extensive onsite decontamination" and "readily removed". A wide variation in interpretation is likely to result. A quantitative definition of what constitutes " extensive" needs to be provided along with an elaboration of what is meant by "readily removed". (6) 50.72(b)(8) - Are all cases of personnel contamination which cannot be removed using routine onsite decontamination procedures considered " extensive"? (15) 20
. c , c 4
10CRF 50.72(b)(8)
This paragraph uses vague terms, su.ch as "axtensive", "readily removed" and " routine", making it difficult to implement. The first sentence should be rewritten as follows: "Any personnel radioactive contamination requiring
-extensive onsite decontamination or outside assistance and which results in limiting the individual from access to radiation and contamination areas".
(17)
Paragraph 8, " Decontamination and Off-Site Treatment" INPO recommends either the elimination of this item from one-hour reporting, elimination of the requirement entirely, or moving this item to the proposed "Public Interest Notification" category of the Rule. (18)
(b)(8) "Any personnel radioactive contamination requiring extensive...
routine decontamination procedures need not be repo.rted."
This appears to allow a great deal of interpretation on what the word'
" extensive" means. One utility may determine two hours as extensive whereas another utility may determine 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> or assistance from a doctor (medical director) as extensive. It is recommended that additional guidance be given on-this item. (19)
RESPONSE
I Based on the comments received, vague terms such as " extensive onsite contamination" and "readily removed" are not used in the final rule.
COMMENT - CONTINUOUS PHONE CONTACT We are very concerned with the proposed requirement of paragraph 50.72 (c)(3) that the-licensee maintain an open communications channel with the NRC upon request. There is no justifiable concern for requiring an open line immediately after a prompt notification. Rather, the Licensee should be allowed to devote full attention to plant operation while the NRC reviews the information provided. If additional information is required, the Operations Center can simply call back to request such information or contact the NRC Resident Inspector. In the unlikely event of the failure of the ringing mechanism, one of the redundant communications channels, such as commercial telephone, can be utilized to contact the licensee's facility. We repeat the suggestion made in our June 4, 1980 letter that consideration be given to utilization of one of the Resident Inspectors as communicator if it becomes necessary to maintain an open channel of communications. (7)
Section 50.72(c)(3) - We believe this section is most appropriate with the latitude given by the words "upon request by the NRC." (9)
The proposed rule also states " Maintain an open, continuous
, communication channel with the NRC Operation Center upon request by i
21
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the NRC." There is no neeo to maintain an open communication channel in light of the installed Emergency Notification System.
The emergency notification system is a hotline connecting the control. room, TSC or EOF with the NRC's Operation Center and thus, there is no need to have someone continuously manning that channel.
(15)
Paragraph C (1), " Requirement for On-Going and Foll.ow Up Phone Contact"
.The requirements.of this paragraph as written add an unnecessary burden upon the plant operating staff. Unless the event meets some criteria for severity, followup and end of incident telephone conversations should not be required. (18)
RESPONSE
. The NRC will not always require a continuous open communications channel, but the NRC will on certain occasions require it. An example of when this would be necessary is - during an accident, the ENS is unavailable and to hang-up on commercial line would mean indefinite loss of commuhication of a' busy phone system. Another example would be when the NRC finds it necessary to have continuous communication because of the need for information during a complex rapidly evolving -emergency.
COMMENT - DUPLICATE PHO'NE CCNTACT Station operations personnel need to devote their attention to the emergency or security situation at hand. Duplicate reports to different organizations within the NRC deprive Station personnel of valuable reaction time and could result in a " rushed" decision which may prove later to be ill-advised because of inccmplete information or limited assessment time. The Licensee's telephone reporting requirement should be limited to a single call to the NRC in a timely manner; the NRC shculd be responsible for disseminating the information to all sub-organizations who may have an interest. (11)
The proposed change to 10 CFR 50.72(a) states, "If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required t notifications via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone j system, or any other method which will ensure a report being made promptly to the NRC Operations Center." WPS believes that when the NRC " Director of Site Operations" (defined in NUREG-0726 Report to Congress NRC Incident Response Plan) arrives at the site, required notifications should be made to this NRC cfficial who can then provide notification to the appro;*iate NRC Operations Centers. This will eliminate the redundancy of the license notifying the on-site NRC personnel and repeating the message to the NRC Operations Center.
- (12)
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RESPONSE
The NRC is organized to disseminate information as the commentor (11) suggests by use of the NRC Operations Center. However, more than one call may be necessary in order to oescribe an event.
If the NRC has personnel on-site-during a particular event, then the NRC operations center.will obtain some information from them. However, this does
'not obviate the need for the licensee to make the required initial notifi-cation to the NRC Operation Center and such subsequenc notifications as are necessary to keep the NRC fully informed.
COMMENT - NOTIFICATION TIMING This notice refers to a change and formulation of what constitutes events that must be immediately reported to the NRC. However, Immediate in tne rule does not really mean what immediate means in common usage. For instance, the rule states that "Each Licensee. . . shall notify the NRC Operations Center. . .
each time there is an initiation of any of the four Emergency Classes. ."
There is no idea of what " initiation" means. Does initiation mean all the criteria for a class has been observed or calculated or found out thru some other means? Which data must be communicated to whom before an " initiation" is an accomplished fact? Must off site management be contacted and approved before an " initiation" ,is an accomplished fact? (1)
The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency is the principal State Agency charged with the development of the protective action plan, under NUREG 0654 to protect the citizens in the vicinity of nuclear generating in the unlikely event of an accident. As the most nuclearized State in the Nation, Illinois has developed solid plans and procedures to respond to any significant event that should occur at one of the nuclear generating facilities.
Specifically germaine to the proposed rule change is the graduated response necessary following the declaration of an emergency classification. The revision to the Section 50.72 (a), " Notification of significant events" addresses directly one of our few remaining concerns, i.e., the prompt notifi-cation to the state upon the initiation of any one of the four emergency classifications. The inclusion in the revision that "All such notifications to the NRC shall be made immediately after notification to the appropriate State or local agency..." is a significant improvement and deserves the most positive consideration by the NRC. Illinois ESDA strongly supports the inclu-sion of the above quoted revision in that the operative word "after" will reduce the response time for those governmental entities most directly affected should an accident occur. (3)
We support the declaration in paragraph 50.72(a) that all notification to the NRC concerning activation of a site emergency plan for any of the four emergency classes be made af ter notification of state and local agencies, since if prompt (15-minute) notification becomes necessary, time might be lost in attempts to first complete the NRC notification. (7) 23 3- - ~ 3-
., c.
Section 50.-72 (b) - If a real- emergency exists, 'the notification is immediate under 50.72(a). Other situations reportable under 50.72(b) do not have a timeliness associated with the notification. Unless notifi-cation is , mandated under section 50.72(a) a "four-hour" time frame for notifications under section 50.72(b) should be more than adequate.
Section 50.72 (a) - We believe this section is appropriate in that notifications to the NRC_are made immediately after notification to the appropriate ' State or local agencies. However, it would seem to be more correct if the words "and" was placed between State and local;versus the word "or". (9)
It appears that the new Subsection (f) is deficient in several areas.
. First, it does not define a time limit for notification of accidents to the commission, instead-it uses the word "immediately". (17).
. INPO commented during draft review of the development of the proposed
- . Rule,10 CFR 50.73, in a letter dated November 10, 1981,- that in light of requirements in the LER Rule, reporting requirements under 10 CFR 50.72 should be modified to reduce one-hour reporting requirements to those events requiring an immediate notification. It was recommended that 10 CFR 50.72 notification no longer be required for~the following events under the present Rule 50.72(4),
(5), (7), (8), and (11), (18)
It is recommended that the proposed Rule be divided into two sections:
those events and conditions that have safety' impact on the plant requiring one-hour notification and another section headed, "Public Interest Notifi-cations," which would e'ncompass events whose nature would require reporting in a longer time frame. It is suggested that this time frame be "as soon as practical but not later than six hours after the initiation of the event."
This would indicate to the public the lesser importance of these types of events. (18) .
~
RESPONSE
Initiation of any Emergency Class means that the licensee has declared an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Each licensee has an approved emergency plan. (1)
[ The NRC staff has adopted commentor's (9) suggestion and developed a "four-hour notification" for some types o,f events. This also satisfies the
- . thrust of comment (18).
Commentor (17) is referring to Congressionally enacted legislation which is not subject to NRC rulemaking.
I COMMENT - PROMPT REPORTING (c)(1) and (2) What does promptly mean? Is there a time limit? Speci fy within 15 minutes. I hour or some other proper time period. (Seconds?) (1) 24
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Paragraph (c) (2), " Reporting Not Understocd Plant Events" This paragraph would be clearer if the words, "information related to" were celeted as noted.
"(2) Promptly report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information related to plant behavior that is not understood."
(18) .
RESPONSE
Promptly means immediately, without delay. If a licensee were extremely busy dealing with an emergency, he should still have sufficient staff available to notify the NRC promptly of an emergency or if an emergency becomes worse.
(1)
The NRC chose to exclude the phrase "information related to plant behavior that is not understood." (18)
COMMENT - COORDINATION BETWEEN 50.72 AND 50.73, CTHER RULES REG. GUIDE 1.16 AND NUREG 0654 .
The requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 in some instances overlap with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.403 giving rise to conflicts in how and to whom the notification is to be made (see proposed 10 CFR 50.72 (a) and (b) vs.
10 CFR 20.403(a) and (b)), what event levels require notification (see proposed 10 CFR 50.72(b)(6) vs. 10 CFR 20.403(a)(2)) and how rapidly the notification is to be made. To simplify licensee compliance with these regulations, we recommend that consideration be given to consolidating the two sets of require-ments as tney aaply to nucleaa power reactors licensed under 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 10 CFR 50.22. If such consolidation is not possible, every effort should oe made to eliminate conflicts between the two regulations. (4)
_ We wish to again call your attention to the need for the NRC to review
. and consolidate reporting requirements to eliminate inconsistencies which presently exist and to minimize the possibility that a required report may be inadvertently omitted. (7) l Proposed paragraph 50.72(b)(2) requires that events which explicitly threaten the safety of the nuclear power plant or site personnel be promptly reported to the NRC Operations Center. This paragraph also specifies that when reporting events involving threats to the security of special nuclear .
material, licensee is also required to comply with the additional reporting l requirements of 10 CFR Section 73.71. This requirement necessitates duplicate reports to different groups within the NRC since the Section 73.71 reports
! must be made to the NRC Regional Office. With the routine internal notifi-
[ cation of the NRC Operations Center to the Regional Office duty officer of all i red phone reports, the second NRC notification by the licensee is redundant f
and unnecessary. The words of the proposed rule should be modified to state 25
that if a notification is made pursuant to 10 CFR paragraph 50.72(b)(2) concerning an event +hich. threatens the security of special nuclear material, additional notification pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 is not required. (7)
They are redundant to existing reporting requirements and inconsistent with many existing ones. In addition, they pose an unnecessary burden on licensees with no clear compensatory benefit to anyone. . Finally, 50.54(w) should be either withdrawn or made to reference the final emergency planning rule (10 CFR 50,' Appendix E). (10) -
. Those portions of 10 CFR 50.72 that are not duplicated by Appendix E are already existing reporting requirements by Technical Specifica-tions (Reg. Guide 1.16 - LER System) and 10 CFR 21. Justification for increased administrative burden, caused by making these immediate notification items, should be thoroughly examined. If justified, Reg. Guide 1.16, Technical Specifications, 10 CFR 21, etc. should be revised to maintain consistency. (10)
. As stated in the subject Federal Register Notice, the conferees
" . intended that the Commission establish specific guidelines for the identification of accidents whicn could result in unplanned release of radioactivity in excess of allowable limits ..." (emphasis added). These guidelines have already been elaborated and imple-mented by licensees as a result of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. It seems clear that the detailed guidelines in 10 CFR 50.72 will merely result in immediate notification for situations not normally asso-ciated with accident scenarios. (10)
. Section 201 of Public Law 96-295 required that ". . . in case of any accident which could result in an unplanned release ... the licensee shall immediately so notify the Commission. ...
The NRC's recent final rule on emergency planning (10 CFR 50, Appendix E) now requires that procedures be established for immediate notification of the NRC and state and local emergency response personnel in situations which could lead to an unplanned release. This requirement seems to pretty well satisfy the congressional mandate, therefore, 10 CFR 50.72 appears totally unnecessary.
l (10)
The proposed rulemaking regarding 10 CFR 50.72 requires that certain 73.11 security events be reported to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System. An existing regulation, 10 CFR 73.71, requires that security events by reported to the appropriate NRC Regional Office. (11)
NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, states that the declaration of an Unusual Event is required if " Radiological effluent technical specification limits are exceeded." 10 CFR 50.72(a) requires notification of the NRC within one hour following the declaration of any of the four emergency classes. The proposed reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(6) establishes an additional notifi-cation for releases that neither coincides with Technical Specifications nor suggested Emergency Action Levels from NUREG-0654 Consideration should be given to eliminating an additional reporting value in situations where the event has previously been repcrted per emergency planning procedures. (12) i I
l 26 t
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go,me e.
Tne NRC has immediate reporting requirements contained in other sections of 10 CFR (parts 20, 70, 73 for example) that are ignored, duplicated or encompassed by the 50.72 requirements. Reporting under these other sections is t'o the Regional Office rather than via the Emergency Notification System, creating a situation which is confusing and has a high potential for error.
It is recommended that the NRC unify,.in one regulation, all short-term (less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) reporting requirement and that regulation designate one location only for the transmittal of such notifications. (15)
The Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR), has directed that reporting requirements presently existing under 10 CFR 50.72, 10 CFR 50.73, and NUREG-0654 be consolidated. We think that moving forward with the publi-cation of a revised Rule on immediate notification requirements (10 CFR 50.72) at this time (only to be substantially revised in the near future) would be wasteful of both NRC effort and that of many utilities. Proceeding would result in duplication of effort for licensees to modify their internal proce-dures at the time of the new Rule becoming effective and again upon the publi-cation of the new consolidated version of 50.72 and 50.73). (This comment is conditional upon the NRC being able to maintain substantially the same timetable for the publication of 10 CFR 50.73 which presently exists; new Rule in early 1983). (18)
We think that the invoking of NUREG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of the Nuclear Power Plants," as part of the rulemaking under Paragraph (a) of the proposed revision is inappropriate.
A recent NRC memor*andum dated January 29, 1982 on the subject of Emergency Responses stated, "The CRGR recommends that the NRC issue a policy statement such as: The folicwing NUREG documents are to be used as information only and Regulatory Guides are to be considered as guidance or as a possible approach to meeting formal requirements. Under no circumstances should the items, by virtue of their inclusion in these documents, be misconstrued as requirements to be leveled on licensees or as inflexible criteria to be used by the NRC staff reviewers." NUREG-0654 is explicitly listed. In addition to greatly increasing the scope of reporting, the NUREG-0654 also reduces tne reporting time from one hour to 15 minutes. This internal NRC inconsistency srould be resolved. We believe that the record of recent years, since 1979, has shown a consistent tendency to over rate the safety significance of plant events.
(18)
RESPONSE
Tne NRC is making a concerted effort to ensure consistent and coordinated requirements. The reporting requirements contained in the revision of 10 CFR 50.72 are being coordinated with revision of 50.73, 50.55e, 50 Appendix E, 20.402, 20.403, 73.71 and Part 21. The staff intends to reduce or eliminate any overlap and provide for coordinate reporting thresholds, timing and report submissions. In addition the " Unusual Event" category previously defined in NUREG 0654 is now explicitly defined by reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph (b).
27
f COM. MENT - SPECIFY AGENT OF LICENSEE
. "Each licensee" is que'stionable. The specific agent of tne licensee having this responsibility must be oesignated. This agent must be civilly and criminally responsible for any delay in reporting. An agent that is onsite is preferable such as Shift Technical Advisor or Senior Operator. These speci-fics should at least be referred to in.the regulation. There is not one mention of any specifics concerning an agent of the licensee and who he should be and what his other duties in the plant are in the regulation. This is important. Specifics will make or break the effe'ctiveness of a rule. The lack of specifics in this rule is an invitation to the licensee to ignore this reporting requirement until forced to do so often too late. (1)
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RESPONSE
The NRC chose not to adopt this suggestion, but*to continue to hold the licensee responsible for activities associated with the conditions of the license and the safe operation of the plant.
COMMENT - CHAIN OF REPORTING Generally the " chain of reporting" is not defined. By " chain of report-ing" I mean who gets the info, when do they get the info, who do they give the info to, how fast must they send the info up the chain, at wnat point in the chain are decisions made that this is a reportable event, how fast must those decisions be made from the time the info is received, whose responsibility is it to notify the NRC. Too often all these questions are left to the Licensee to answer in a manner most favorable to himself. This was shown to be the case very strongly in several answer sessions with Dr. Denton and Victor Stello concerning the flow of information at TMI #2. (1)
RESPONSE
The NRC has chosen not to address the issue of " chain of reporting" in this rulemaking. Nevertheless, the licensee is responsible for making such reports as are required by 10 CFR 50.72.
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DRAFT CONGRESSIONAL LETTERS
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Enclosed for your information is a ' copy of a' notice of rulemaking to be published in the Federal Register.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is publishing a rule that amends its regulations which require timely and accurate information from licensees following significant events at licensed commercial nuclear power plants. The amended regulation (10 CFR 50.72) will clarify the list of reportable events and provide the Commission with more useful reports regarding the safety of operating nuclear power plants.
As part of this rulemaking, the Commission is also promulgating an amendment to 10 CFR 50.54, " Conditions of Licenses," in order to satisfy the intent of Congress as expressed in section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295.) This amendment would make the notification requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 a condition of each license for operating commercial nuclear power plants.
Sincerely, Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman
Enclosure:
Notice of Rulemaking i
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Enclosurg 3 2-i . . _ . . .
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REGULATORY ANALYSIS
(%50.72)
OBJECTIVE The objective of the revised Immediate Notification System described in 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" is to enhance the safety of nuclear plants by providing for timely notification to the NRC should safety significant events occur at operating nuclear reactors.
BACKGROUND The existing provisions of 10 CFR 50.72 have generated basically three types of problems. One problem is that certain safety significant events are not required to be reported. A second problem is that certain events are insignificant from the perspective of protecting the public health and safety but are required to be reported. The third and perhaps most important problen is that existing reporting requirements are not coordinated. For example, 10 CFR 50.73, the new " Licensee Event Report" rule and the existing 10 CFR 50.72 do not use similar terminology, phrasing, or reporting thresholds.
In addition to the reporting problems noted above, special consideration must also be given to Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295). The intent of Congress as expressed in that law was that the Commission establish specific guidelines for identifying t accidents which could result in an unplanned release of radioactivity in excess of allowable limits and to require immediate notification of these incidents. The revision of $50.54 and $50.72 is consistent with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980.
The NRC published a proposed rule in the Federal Register on December 21, 1981 (46 FR 81894), and subsequently received twenty letters of public comment.
Enclosure 4
These letters were generally supportive of the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72 and these letters were most useful in the development of this final rule.
ALTERNATIVES At the outset of this rulemaking, a wide variety of regulatory alternatives were considered. One alternative that was rejected was the possibility of simply revising 10 CFR 50.72 without regard.for coordination with 'other reporting requirements. The need for coordination with other provisions of 10 CFR, most notably the new LER system (10 CFR 50.73), resulted in the selection of the approach defined in the final rule. Each of the reporting criteria adopted in the final rule was selected from a range of possible alternatives and each was considered carefully, usually by a committee representing the various elements of the NRC staff familiar with the required information and the way the informa-tion could be collected from licensees in the least burdensome manner through a particular reporting requirement.
l The alternatives considered for the reporting requirements contained in 550.72 would have the folicwing results:
- 1. have approximately the same number of reports,
- 2. reduce the number of reports, or
- 3. increase the number of reports Alternative 1 would impose the approximately same burden on licensees.
However, the Commissions has determined that some reports now required are not necessary. ,
Alternative 2 would eliminate reports that have not been useful to the Commission. Experience with telephone notifications to the NRC Operations Center has demonstrated that there are three categories of reports that have not been useful. One category is worker injury reports. Worker injury reports typically
- e. . .
9 have little or no relationship to the general public health and safety. If for example, a worker has chest pains, he is usually sent to a local hospital to determine if he has had a heart attack, but this information has not been useful to the NRC. A second category, minor radiation release, has not been useful to the NRC. Often the NRC Operations Center receives reports of releases that can
. barely be measured at the point of release, and have no radiological significance -
to the public health. The third category, minor security problems has proven to be of little value to the NRC.
Alternative 3 is unwarranted because improvements can be made at the present level of reporting by eliminating unnecessary notifications and substituting useful notifications. The Commission is not aware of any compelling reason for increasing the number of reports.
Consequently, alternative 2 was selected.
BENEFITS AND COSTS The NRC staff weighed the costs and benefits associated with revising 10 CFR 50.72. The optimum benefit is derived by revising both 10 CFR 50.72 and related portions of other reporting requirements because this wcaid provide a coherent reporting system using similar terminology, phrasing and reporting thresholds. Accordingly, revision of 10 CFR 50.72 is being coordinated with development of 10 CFR 50.73. In addition, a number of substantive or admini-strative changes are being developed that will amend other sections of 10 CFR Part 50, Part 20, and Part 21.
The value of revising 10 CFR 50.72 goes beyond dollar benefits. The capability of the NRC to make timely decisions and to provide adequate assur-ances regarding actual or potential threats to public health and safety depends heavily on how rapidily significant events at nuclear power plants are
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communicated by licensees to NRC. The majority of events occurring throughout the nuclear industry pose little or no serious or immediate threats to the public health and safety; however, certain events do pose such threats or generate fear or unusual concern.
NRC has an obligation to collect facts quichly and accurately about significant events; assess the facts; take necessary action; and inform the
- public about the extent of the threat, if any, to public health and safety.
Not only must NRC act promptly to prevent or minimize injury to the public, it must also take appropriate action to alleviate fear or concern created as a result of such events.
The staff expects that there will be little significant additional cost to the NRC or to licensees associated with the effective rule changes, however, the staff would like to point out the costs that have been associated with establishing and implementing a " prompt notification system." These costs are 6 man-years per year of NRC staff ' effort for nanning the telephones for notification and $1.5 million per year for dedicated telephone lines to each operating commercial power reactor facility.
Other Government Agencies Improvements to the immediate notification requirements would contribute to improved State and local emergency response around nuclear power reactors.
Applicant agencies (e.g., TVA, DOE) would be affected as presented under the Industry section below.
Industry There should be little additional cost to the industry associated with implementing the final rule changes in addition to those incurred in order to
! comply with NRC's emergency preparedness regulations.
.. - ......-.-......,_-_...._._.-n..,_..
- n The present cost of reporting under $50.72 for the entire industry is estimated to be $46,000 per year exclusive of the costs incurred in order to comply with NRC's emergency preparedness regulation. This basis of this cost estimate is as follows:
The person who makes the notification pursuant to $50.72 is usually the shift supervisor who is a licensed senior reactor operator. When taking into account salar,y, cost of training, and overhead, his time is worth approximately
$100 per hour.
Each telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to 150.72 takes aan average about 15 minutes, although.most notifications take less time and a few take much more time.
The NRC Operations Center typically receives 5 telephone notification pursuant to 150.72 per day.
A computation at the present cost to the industry is:
calls ) x ( l hours ) x ( 365 days ) x 100 dollars = $45,625 (5
day 4 call year hour If the revised $50.72 is promulgated, the cost of reporting is estimated to remain unchanged. A survey of telephone notifications.made to the NRC Operations Center during January 1983 showed the following:
E 95 - were reports by licensees which would still be reported under the
' revised 650.72.
67 - were reports which would not be required by the revised 650.72.
11 - were courtesy calls and other calls made by licensees which are not required by $50.72.
6 - courtesy calls and other calls requesting assistance regarding events c
not related to power reactors.
179 - total event oriented calls.
This suggests an approximate 41% (
67 ) reduction in the number of 95+67 reports mode pursuant to 650.72. However, a small countervailing increase in reporting could be expected from such new reporting criteria as " loss of emergency assessment or communications capability" (50.72 (b)(1)(1)(E)) and " news release or notification to other government agencies" (50.72(b)(2)(1)(F)).
Public Improvements to the immediate notification requirements would provide increased confidence that the health and safety of the public would be protected during a radiological emergency because State and local governments would be better informed.
Decision on the Action Since the final rule reflects many of the public consnents on the proposed rule, and should improve the public health and safety, the final rule changes should be approved and published in the Federal Reoister to become effective within 60 days of the date of publication.
. ., . . .. . ..._........._..._,...m.. .._ _ --,-.
SPECIFICATION OF CRITERIA A number of commenters found the revised $50.72 to be an improvement. The changes adopted for promulgation in the final . rule reflect many of the changes '
recommended by commenters.
The revised 50.72 should be a substantial improvement in terms of:
Cla ri ty' The final rule clearly and explicitly includes reporting criteria for events that were previously described by examples in NUREG-0654.
Order The order of the criteria in the final rule has changed from that in the proposed rule. By reorganizing the criteria, improvements can be made in consistency with similar criteria in 10 CFR 50.73. The final rule incorporates many of the same types of reporting criteria used in 10 CFR 50.73.
Report timing Both the proposed and final rules contain a provision that requires licensee to notify the NRC "as socn as possible and in all cases within ene hour of the occurrence" of certain events. In aod'. tion, the final rule incorporates a provision for reporting some occurrences within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
This is permitted because occurrences satisfying some of the criteria are less serious or have less immediate safety significance than other events. The 1-hour reports are covered in paragraph (b)(1) of $50.72 while the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reports are coveredinparagraph(b)(2).
FINAL DECISION Based on the comments received on the proposed rule, and its own assessment of the impact of this rule, the staff has concluded that the revised 10 CFR
8-50.72 will: (1) not place an unacceptable burden on the licensees, (2) have significant safety benefits for the public, (3) reduce reporting burden on licensees, (4) increase the effectiveness of the Immediate Notification System.
Therefore, the staff concludes that 10 CFR 50.72 rule should be promulgated.
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' NRC ADOPTS CHANGES TO DNEDI ATE REPORTING REQUIRE' TENTS' FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The Nuclear Regulatory Conmission is changina its
- regulations to. provide further guidance to operators of nuclear power plants on significant events that must be
.repor et d immediately by telep' hone to the'NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Maryland.
On December 21, 1981, the Commission published a pro-posed rule to revise and clarify its notification require-ments issued on February 29, 1980. Experience with the existing reauirements and public comments on the changes proposed in 1981 indicate that the regulations should be amended to clarify reporting criteria and require early reports only on matters of value to the exercise of the Commission's responsibilities.
Several categories of events required to be reported within one hour have been found to be not useful on an
- immediate basis. Examples include worker injury not related
( to radiation, small releases of radioactive material below the limits permitted by the license and minor security problems such as a short malfunction of the security conputer.
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_2 Under the new regulations, a licensee must notify the NRC Operations Center'within one hour after it declares an emergency or one of the following non-emergency. conditions
. cccurs:
(1) .The initiation of any nuclear power plant shutdown reo,uired by the plant's operating license; (2) Any event or condition during operation that results in the condition of the plant being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety, a condition outside the design basis of the plant or a condition not covered by the plant's operating and energency procedures; (3) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that poses an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant; (4) Any event that results or should have resulted in an emergency core cooling system discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal;
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(5) Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment or communications capability; (6) Any event that threatens the safety of the plant or significant1v hampers site personnel in the nerformance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant, including fires and toxic gas or radioactive releases.
Further details on the revised requirements, which are contained in Part 50 of the Commission's regulations, are provided in a Federal P.egister notice published on .
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