ML20213E739
| ML20213E739 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/15/1984 |
| From: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Kerr G NRC OFFICE OF STATE PROGRAMS (OSP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213E720 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-729, RTR-NUREG-1022 NUDOCS 8402230406 | |
| Download: ML20213E739 (24) | |
Text
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q . : .%- FEB 151984 MEMORANDUM FOR: G.' Wayne Kerr, Director Office of Stat,e Programs Richard C. DeYoung, Director p FROM: Office of Inspection and Enforcement SUSJECT: NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS The NRC has recently revised its requirements for licensed commercial nuclear power plants to notify the NRC of significant events. We believe it appropriate that State governments be advised of the basis for these changes. The changes to the NRC's regulations are delineated in: 10 CFR 50.73, " Licensee Event ' Report System" published in the Federal Register (48 FR 338S0) on July 26, 1983. (Enclosure 1) 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements of Significant A, Events at Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" published in the Federal
\ l Register (48 FR 39039) on August 29, 1983. (Enclosure 2)
These two rules which became effective on January 1, 1984, are augmented by clarifying examples contai.ned in NUREG-1022 and a supplement to NUREG-1022 to be published soon. Among the changes of particular interest to State governments is the threshold for reporting radiological relesses [650.72(b)(2)(iv) and $50.73(a) (2)(viii) in Title 10, Chapter 1, of tne Code of Federal Regulations]. The NRC requires an immediate telephone notification and a written report within 30 days for: (A) Any airborne radioactive release that exceeds 2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of one hour. (B) Any liquid effluent release that exceeds 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC)(see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry into l the receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time l period of one hour. Although reported to the NRC in the past, very low level radioactive releases I have proven to neither impact on health nor to be indicative of serious i
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i 3 . G. Wayre Kerr ' ( . degradation of plant systems. . Consequently, the above criteria were promulgated to eliminate reports on events that entail only the relatively routine very low level releases. NUREG-1022 contains some specif.ic explanatory examples intended to clarify these reporting criteria. In'particular, the relevant explanatory examples are highlighted in enclosure 3. We suggest that you contact the State governments and other related organizations to bring to their attention the recently published $50.72 and
$50.73 rules.
50riginal Signed By R. C. DeYoung" Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosures:
- 1. Federal Register Notice 48 FR 33850
- 2. Federal Register Notice ,
4 48 FR 39039
- 3. Excerpts from NUREG-1022 ,
Distribution: CDS EAB File DEPER File RCDeYoung JMTay' lor SASchwartz CERossi (2) GFlanik EWeiss FHebdon,AE00 CJHeltemes,AE0D JWigginton
*SEE PREVIOUS WHITE FOR CONCURRENCES.
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$85'O Federal R'elgister f Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Reguiation's . 1 d:ci<lon en whether the order should be Acmost Final rule.- II. Rdemaking Initiation ,
d to lower the pooling standard aanner proposed. In the ab ence
SUMMARY
- De Commission is amending . De Nuclear Plant Reliability Data its regulations to require the reporting of ) sys e is ry gam cf a suspension. costly and ineffir71 p g ty y m1vements of producer milk wr nave operational experience at nuclear power to be make solely for the purpose of plante by establishing the Licensee nuclear power plant licensees. On o: ling the milk of dairy farmers who Event Report (I.ER) system. The final January 30,1980 (45 FR 6793)' the NRC ave historically supplied the fluid milk rule is needed to codify the LER s ed ^ '
,, d R a a needs cf the market. . reporting requirementsin order to t des . bed 'the It is hereby found and deteunined that establish a single set of requirements stem a u g,, g , _
thirty days notice of the effective date that apply to all operating nuclear here:fis Impraetical. unnecessary and power plants. The final rule applies ody mandatory. Forty.four letters were , contrary to the public interestin that: receivedin response to the advanced tolicensees of commercialnuclear (3) This suspension is necessary to power planta.The final rule will change "** "' ** ""* '#'" 8 '""'D ref1rct current marketing conditions'and opposed making the NPRD system the requirements that define the events ta m:intain orderly marketing mandat ry on the grounds that reporting end situations that must be reported, d d not be mede a conditions in the marketing area in that and willdefine the information that ",a ' with ut the suspension costly and. - must be provided in each report. - In December 1980. the Comm.issioti.. . inefficient movements ofinilk would -
' arrscm AmJanuary1.1964.'T"he . - decided that the requirem-ents for ,
hava to be made solely for the purpose - incorporation by reference of certain reporting of operational experiene.e data cf pooling the milk of dairy farmers who publications lis.ted in the regulations is hava historically supplied the fluid milk
- neededmajor revision and approved the approved by the Director of the Federal development cf an!ntegated -
needs of the market. Register as of January 1,1984. . - Operational Experience Reporting (b)His suspension does not require cf p:rsons affected stibsthntial or PoR FURTHER tNFORMAMON COMTAcr: (!OER) system. The 10ER system would' - cxtensive preparation prior to the , Frederick J. Hebdon Chief. Program beve combined, modified. and made - e!I:ctive date: and . Technology Branch. Office for Analysis mandatory the existing Licensee Event , (c)ne marketing problems that and Evaluation of Operational Data. Report (LER) syste= and the NPRD provide the basis for this suspension U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commission, eystem. SECY 80-507' discusses the action were fully reviewed at a public Washington. D.C. 20555:Telephbne (331) IOER system. he '
- beld on November 9-10,1982. 492-4480. As a result of the Ccmmlesion's w ,1) interested parties had an suPPlJEMENTARY INFORM ADOlc approva} of the concept of anIOER ct .anity to be heard on this matter. . systern, the NRC publishsd another Derefore, good cause exists for L Background advance notice on january 15.1981 (46 making this order effective upon On May 6.1982. the NRC published in FR3m@ ahancende e$aW publication in the Federal Register. * "' @
the Federal Register (47 FR 19543)* a
' data and des b t.
List cf Subjects in 7 CFR Part 1131 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would modify and codify the existing
*]'h'c des Milk marketing c;ders. Milk. Dairy NPRD systems. .
produc.s. a
- Licensee Event Report (LER) system.
Interested persons were invited to On June 8.1981, the Institute of y p PART 1131--{ AMENDED) submit written comments to the Secretary of the CommJssion by July 6. announced that because cfits role as an i I *dl 1982. Numerous, comments were active user of NPP.Ds data it would It is therefore ordered. That the assume responsibility for management received. After consideration of the aforesaid pfovisions in i 1131.7(c) of the and fundmg of the NPRD system. comments and other factors involved. order are bereby suspended for the Further. INPO decided to develop the Commission has amended the nunths of August and September 1983. proposed requirements published for criteria that would be used inits Effective deter July 25.1983. public comment by clarifying the scope ",'"',8]e' e fd a e on (Sec.1-19. 48 Stat. 31. as amended (r U.S.C. ar.d content of the requirements, particularly the criteria that define in the N.PRD system. ect-e74)) ed at Washingto=. D.C. cri:J4,2:. which o erational events must be ' iP ! b ad sy an inadequate source of reliability cata
- c. W. McMmaa. The majority of the comments on the Asis:en Secer cey.MerAeungcod proposed rule:(1) Questioned the *',7,
, t to p the' Inspection S*rvica. meaning and intent of the criteria that necessary technical direction and a low gra on. ai.=ner n.g r.aa.= us -q defined the events whir.h must be level of participation by the utilities. De owwa cooe me :.= -
reported. (2) questioned the need for commitments and actions by WPO - , reporting certain specific types of provided a basis for confidence that ' events, and (3) questioned the need for thne two deficiencies would be N1, . ,, R T GULATORY 4 certaininfortnation that would be .:errected. For example, centrali:ing the ( - M required to be included in an LER. management and funding of NPRDS
;0 CFT1 Parts 20 and 50 Se ti I f tps notice discusses the within INPO should overcome the comments'in more detai , predous difficulties associated with Ucensee Event Report System usuc r: Nuclear Regulstory
.co U,'e.."$"dm*.NNsI'N.."$nso.
of the documenu arv ereilaw
$ $$ (,*na e . t for public e ganizations. Further. with LNPO Coramission. o c. focusing upon a utility's parncipatien in
Federal Registir / Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday. }uly 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 33851 NPRDS as a specific evaluation comprehensive integrated analyticaUy. 2. Four com= enters felt that the lev'el versatile system. of effort would be increased but not parameter during routine management significantly. sad plant audit activitics, the level of The Brookhaven Study. published as * . ( BNL/NUREG 51609, NUREQ/Cl} 3206. 3. One commenter felt that the utility participation. and the'refore, the discusses data collection and storage 4 proposed rule would have a minimal quality and quantity of,NPRDS data. effect on the level of effort required. should sig :15cantly increase. However. procedures to support multivariate, the Commission will continue to have an multicase analysis. While the range of 4.Two commenters felt that the active role in NPRDS by participating in reactor configurations in the U.S. proposed rule would significantly reduce an NPRDS User's Group, by periodicaUy nutlearindustry presents some the nu=ber.of LERs filed. assessing the quality and quantity of methodological and interpretative 5. Thirteen commenters endorsed the information available from NPRDS. and problems, these difficulties should not ' objective ofimproving L'R reporting but by auditing the timely ave _ilability of the be insurmountable.The Commission felt that changes in the proposed ru.le information to the NRC. b'lieves e that the NRC should have as a were needed.These commenters did n'ot Since there was a likelihood that specific objective the development. directly address the resource issue. NPRDS under INPO direction would demonstration, and implementation of 6. Five commenters endorsed the meet the NRC's need for reliability data, an integrated system for collecting and proposed rule and/or felt that it was a it was no longer necessary to proceed analyzing operational data that will significant improvement over the with the IOERS. Hence. the collection of employ the predictive and analytical existing reporting requirements. detailed technical descriptions of potential of multicase. multivariate Based on these comments and its own significant events could be addressed in analyses. Accordingly.the staff has assessment of the impac't of this rule. the a separate rule =aking to modify and been directed to undertake the work Commission has concluded that the codify the ex.' sting LER reporting necessary to develop and demonstrate impact of this rule will be no greater requirements. See SECY 81-4H for such a cost effective integrated system than the impact of the existing LER additon11 details conceming IOERS. of operational data collection and require =ents, and this rule will not However, the Co==ission wishes to analyses. place an unacceptable burden on the make it explicitly clear that it is relaxing If the design of the system affectedlicensees. - the reporting requirements with the th "h ' expectation that sufficient utility d',"jse g, ; a $co fective,d v 1 pment Relationship Between theIJR # Rule , M*" partcipation cooperation. and suppo.-t , of the system to the oint ofinitiating E ## # ## of the NPRD system will be forthcoming. rule should be camp eted by July 1986. A" # EMN if the NPRD system does not become As a parallel activity to the s operati onal at a satisfactorylevelin a IIL Analys.ts of Comments preparation of i 5053. the Commission
' The Commission received forty.seven is amending its regulations (i 50J2) o ssi ein t e fo - of ad o (47) letters commenting on the proposed which require that licensees for nuclear sary. rule. Copies of those letters and a power plants notify the NRC Cperations
'rdeab'IrYb On Octob 1981, the detailed analysis of the comments are Center of significant events that occur at published an advanced notice (46 FR available for public inspection and thetr plants. On December 21.1981, the 49134) that deferred development of the copying for a fee at the NRC Public Com=fssion published in the Federal IOER system and sought public Re:pster a proposed rule (46 FR 618%)
Document Room at 1717 H Street. NW that described the planned changes in comment on the scope and content of Washington, D.C. A number of the more the I.ER system. Six comment letters I5032. . i substan*ive issues are discussed below. ,
. were received in response to this .
The FederalRegister notice ANPRM. All of the comments received I.icensee Resources , accompanying the proposed 1.ER rule were reviewed by the staff and were Of particular concern to the . (i.e 5 5053) stated that additional consideredin the development of the Commission was the impact that the changes anticipated to i 5052 would be proposed LER rule. See SECY 8:-3
- for proposed rule would have on the made but they would be "' '
- largely
. additional details. - resources used by licensees to prepare administrative and de revised i 50J2
- This rule identifies the types of LERs.The Commission's goal was to
- would not be significantly modified nor
- reactor events and problems that are assure thatbe scope of the rule would wouldit be published again for pubbe believed to be significant and useful to - comment." Several commenters the NRC in its effort to identify and not increase the overalllevel of effort ,
above that currently required to ccmply disagreed with this conclusion. resolve threats to public safety. It is The commenters did. however, agree with the existing LER requirements. designed to provide the informatics with the Com=ission's position that necessary for engineering studies of Thirtyletters of the 47 received .ll inconsistencies and overlapping operational anomalies and trends and contained comments on the ove.ra acceptability of the proposed rule or requirements between the two rules partems analysis of operational cammented directly on the question of need to be eliminated. occurrences.The same information can scope and/or resources associated with The Commission has carefully also be used for other analytic reviewed the proposed requirements in the proposed mle.The views of'the procedure: that will aid in identifying the LER and Immediate Notification accident precursors. commenters can be characterized as follows: rules and has concluded that although i The Commission believes that the - 1. Five commenters felt that the scope changes to both have been rnade NFC should continue to seek an (largely in response to pub!ic comments) m ed operational data system that and level of effort would be greatly expanded by the proposed rule. to clarify the intent of the rules the I c.. aximize the value of operational Esumates included an increase of100 originalintent and scope have not been
- m. The system should encompass and significantly changed. Therefore. the tntegrate operational data of events and man. years for the entire industry, an l
problem sequeness identified in this increase of three times the current effort.two Com=ission has concludec that these rules need not be published again I rule. NPRDS data, and such other and an increase of $100.000 an'd 2 man-years annually for each plant. for public comment. information as is required for a
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N852 Federal Register / Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday. July 28. 1983 / Rules and Regulations "LERs).%ey noted that reports of RPS this rule, but did not chanFe the original Engineeringfudgment actuations are already reported to the scope of intent of the requirements. In Tederal Register notice that NRCin the Monthly Operating Status addition.in order to make the l aci. 4nied the proposed rule. the Report as well as telephoned to the requirements in il 50s 2 and 5033 more Commission stated that licensee's NRC Opersh,ons Center. compat!ble.the order (i.e numbering)of enginering judgment may be used to in addition, the Institute of Nuclear the criteria in i 50J3 has been changed. . decid)if an event is reportable. Several Power Opers;tions (INPO) analyzed the The changes are noted in the discussion commenters expressed the belief that frequency of reactor scrams during a of each paragraph below. some w:rding should be added to the . one. month period.This analysis
- Finally, conforming amendments are rul2 of reflect that the NRC will also tise I".dicated est an average of 55 reactor being made to various sections of Parts judgmentin enforcement of this tnps would be reportable each month 20 and 50in order to reduce the .s regul: tion where thelicensee is under the proposed rule.INPO equated redundancy in reporting requirements requ:sted to use engineering ludgment. this to 660 additional LERs per year for ' that apply to operating nuclear power The Commission believes that the LER all canently operating planta, or plants. In general. these amendments rule cd:quately discusses the need for appandmaW 32 macyean d willrequire than and cpplication of the concept of. additional effort for all the curandy 1. Licensees that have an Emergency ,
"cngineering judgment." Th cencept oP* rating Pl ants based upon the Noti $ cation System (ENS) make the-itrlf includes the acordtion of the assump i a that each LER mquins 100 reports required by the subject sections existence of a reasoned.. range of "" * '.to papays and via the ENS. All other licensees wil! :
- interpatation regarding this rule. and continue to make the reports to the cons quently the Commission ""[Commissi bdli f .-
- A Wa 8pp @ 44 N
- recognizes and hereby acknciwledges ESF actuations. Including r a r tn s. Y" ***
the need for flexioliityin enforcement
- frequently are associated with * '"
actlins associated with this rule.The significant plant transients and are ect seen.mPorts as su rn mquimdby ad tde , 6e Commission believes that this concept is indicative of events that are of safety suffici:ntly clear and that additional significance.In additio~n. If the ESFs are NRC Documentwn as agtonR. ControlDeskin a copy to e. , s. - explicit guidance is not necessary. being challenged during routine '
*
- transients, that fact le of safety. . 'Pprgp 3 ate
, , Re
,f ce o perate a Arporting Schedul, nuclear power plant submit the written In the FederalRegister notice that ddit o te o si d e not reports required by the subject sections l -
acctmpanied the proposed rule. the. agree with the estimate that e'ach LER in accordance with the procedures 7sion stated thatit had not yet submitted for a routine reactor trip desenbed in i 50.73(b). ' d ,1f the reports should be would require. on the average. 200 man. The criteria contained in the subject
- s i.s. ied in fifteen days or thirty days hours to prepare and analyze.!Jeansees sections which define a reportable event fall
- wing discovery of a mportable are already required to make internal have not been modified.
l event.Many commenters stated that the evaluation of and document significant Similar changes are also planned as , time ftme for reporting LERs should not. events. Including reactor trips. part of curent activities to make more . ' be less than thi.ty days after the
- Therefore, the incrementalimpact of substantive changes to Part 21.
dise:very of a reportable event. preparing and analyzing the LER should - One commenter estimated the impact be significantly less than 100-man hours. I 50.55(e). and i 73.71. of a requirement to submit a report in addition, the actualincrease in NonconservativeInterdependence s:ener than 30 days following discovery burden would be o!! set by reductions in Several commenters expressed cf a reportable event would be an the burden of reporting less significant difficulty in snderstanding the meaning increase of approximately 40 man years events that would no longer be cf the phrase"nonconservative per year for the currently operating reportable.
- interdependence" as used in the plants.In addition the commenter Coordination With OtherReporting proposed i 5053(a)(3).The wording of estimated that if a summary report were Ragmmments i 50J3(a)(3)(i 5033(a)(2)(vil) of this also required the reporting burden final rule) has been changed to eliminate would increase an additlenal12 man Several commenters noted.that the proposed rule did not appear to be the phrase "non conservative years for the currently operating plants. interdependence" by specifically
'In response to these comments, the coordinated with other existing defining the types of events that should Commission has decided to require that reporting requirements, and that be reported. The revised paragraph does LERs be submitted whhin 30 days of duplication oflicensee e!! ort might not. however, change the intent of the diservery of a reportable event or result. They recommended that LER reporting be consolidated to eliminate original paragraph. ,
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situ: tion. ' "I Sobotage and Thrects of Violence R1 porting ofReactor Trips P,* * *h* **
,,g *f
- e Commission has reviewed Seve'ral commenters noted that the Section 5053ta)(1) of the proposed security related reporting requirements existing NRC mporting requirements .
rule (150J3(a)(2)(iv)of the finalrule)s (e.g 10 CFR Parts 20 and 21. I 50.55(e). of I 5053(a)(6)(i 50J3(a)(2)(iii) of this required reporting of any event which final rule)) were already contained in results in an unplanned manual or i 50J2. I 50J3 I 73J1. and NUREG greater detailin 10 CFR 73J1.For
" + wustion of any Engineered 0654) and has attempted. to the extent instance. I 7351 requires an act of I e . . (EST) including the
> practicable to eliminete redundant sabotage to be t'eported immediately, f . war Protection System (RPS). Many reporting and to ensure that the various followed by a wntien report within 15 amin.nters agreed that these events reportingreqhtrements are consistent. days.Le proposed rule would have i shru!d be tanded and analyzed. but hiany of the changes in the final LER required an LER to be filed within 30 disarmed that they deserve to be rule are as a result of this effort.These days. Although distribution of reports is singled out se events of special changes resulted in extensive revisions somewhat different redundant reporting in the wording of criteria contained in si 3T.ificance (1 e events reportable as
Fcd:ral Regist:r / Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesd y. }uly 26. 1983 / Ru%s and Regulations 338S3 would have occurred.The comrnenters in hTRDS as an alternative. !!is'our Several commenters argued that the recommended that the Co= mission understanding. however, the hTRDS will inclusion of the requinment that the ensun consistency between il 50.73 soon adopt the EIIS system titles, so a licensee perform an engineering and 73.71. . distinction should no longer exist. In evaluation of certain events at the staff's ( In re nddition. LERs frequently include request appeared uhjustified and would
.Comca,sponse to these ssion has deleted the comments the reporting of systems that are not included in the , add substantially to the burden of
- sabotage and thresta of violence from scope of hTRDS (i.e an NPRDS system . reporting.They argued &at the licensee 150,73 because these situations are identification does not exist) while EIIS. , should be required to submit only the adequately covered by the reporting on the other hand. includes all of'the specific additional information required
. requirements contained in i 73.71. ~ systems commonly found in co'mmemial for the necessary engineering evaluation Evocuation ofRooms' orb'uildihgs nclear pown pinntsJurbu. WRDS raber kan to pufom the evaluation.
includes only 39 component identifiers ne rule has been modified to require Many commenters stated that the (e.g.: valve. pump). The Commission only the submittalof Any necessa reporung ofin plant releases of believes that this limited number does additionalinformation requested y the radioactidty that require evacuation of not provide a sufficiently detailed Commissionin writin - individual rooms (i 50.73(a)(7) in the . description of the component function proposed rule or (l 50.73(a)(2)(x) of thas IV. SPeciBc Findings
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! involved.
- Enal rule) was inconsistent with the Overviewof the LER System general thrust oi the rule to requite Function ofFailed Components and reporting of significant events.Dey Status ofRedundant Components kVhen this finall.ER rule becomes noted that minor spills, small gaseous Many commenters said that effective. the LER will be a detailed waste releases, or the disturbance of information required in (i 50.73(b)(2) (vi) _ narrative description of potentially contaminated particulate matter (e.g., and (vii) of the proposed rule should not significant safety events. By describing dust) may all require the temporary be a requirement in the LER.They in detail the event and the planned evacuation of Individual rooms until the argued that this infor=aticn is readily corrective action,it will prodde the ,
airborne concentrations decrease or available in documents previously . basis for the careful study cf events or until respiratory protection devices are submitted to the NRC by licensees and conditions that mightlead to serious utilizad.They noted that these events are available for reference. accidents. lf the NRC staff decides that an fair:y ccmmon and should not be the event was especially significant nportable unless the required The Enal rule (i 50.73(b)(2)(1)(G)) has been modi 5ed to narrow the scope of from the standpoint of safety, the staff evacuation afects the entin facility or a may request that the licensee provide the information requested by the Com=ission. additionalinformation and data respons to thes comments the
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wording of iis criterion (i 50.73(a)(2)(x) While this'geheraMormation may be associated with the event. available in licensee documents The licensee will prepan an LER for i in the final rule) has been changed to those events or conditions that meet one
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significan'Jy narrow the scope of the previously submitted to the NRC. the Com=ission believes that a general or more of the criteria contained in enterion to belude only those events which significantly hamper the ability of understandag of the event andits i 50.73(a).The criteria are based signi5cance should be possible without primarily on the nature, course, and site personnel to perform safety.related consequences of the event.Therefere. activides (e.g. evacuation of the main reference to additional documentation which may net be readily or widely the Enal LER rule requires that events control room). available, particularly to the public. which meet the criteria are to be Energy Industry Identification System The Com=ission continues to believe reported regardless of the plant Many co== enters noted that the that the licensee should prepare an LER operating mode or power level. and requirement to report the Energy in sufScient depth so that regardless of the safety sig.ificance of Industry 1dentiBeation System (EHS) knowledgeable readers who are the components, systems, or structures component function identiner and conversant with the design of . involved. In trying to develop criteria for commercial nuclear power plants, but the identi5 cation of events npertebre as system came of each component or system referred to in the LER are not familiar with the details of a
- LERs. the Co=.=Ission has concentrated
. on the potentialconsequencat of the
, desciption would be a significant particular plant.can understand the general chancteristics of the event (e.g., event as the measun of signi5cance.
burden on the licensee. They suggested instead that the - the cause the signi5cance,the Therefore, the reporting criteria. in NPRDS component identiners be used in corrective action). As suggested bythe general, do not speci5caDy address . commenters, more detailed information classu ofinitiating events or causes of place of the EHS component identifiers to support engineering evaluations and the event. For exa=ple, there i Yo ' which are not yet widely used by the industry, case studies will be obtained. as requirement that aH personnel errors be The Commission continues to believe needed, directly from the previously reported. However. many reportable that EDS system names and component submitted licenses documents. events wiHinvolve or have been
. it.itiated by personnel errors.
function identifiers are needed in order I #"#I#II"#I###I### that LERs from diferent plants can be ##8 '*
, Finally,it should be noted that compared.We do not however, suggest The overview discussion of the licensees are permitted and encouraged that the ens identifiers be used proposed rule contains the following to report any event that does not meet throughout the plant. but only that they statement:"If the NRC staff decides that the criteria contained in i 50.73(a). if the v "cded to the LER as itis wntten. A the event was especiaDy significant licensee believes that the event might be l . : pie, inexpensive isble could be used - frc= the standpoint of safety,the staff of safety sig.incance, er of generic 14 translate plant identifiers into may request that the licensee perform interest or concern. Reportmg ens alent ERS identifiers. an engineering evaluataan of the event requirements aside. assurance of safe The Commission considered the and describe the results of that cperation of au plants depends on system and component identifiers used evaluation." - accurate and complete reporttng by each t
i
338S4 Federal Register T Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday July 26. 1983 / Rules and Regulations licensee of all events having potential consequences of an event (e g., at the accident (e.g containment isolation. I se' significance. discretion of the licensee si part of a emergency filtration). Hence, minor - planned procedure or evolution). operational events involving e specific M iph.by.Paregraph Explanation of Sections 50.73(a)(2)(v) and (vi) component sucn as valve packing leaks. . th] 4.cR Rule (proposed I 50.73(a)(2]) require reporting which could be considerd a lack of Tha signi!1 cant provisions of the final of: control of radioactive material, shou'd * '
!.ER rule are explained below.The . . . . . not be reported under this paragraph.
expirnation follows the orderin the . (v) Any event or condition that alone could Systemleaks or other similar events prop sed rule. have prevented the fulfillment of the safety may, however, be reportable under other Paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv) (propos ed , function of structures or systems that are paragraphs. paragraph 50.73(a)(1)) requires reporting needed to: 11 should be noted that there afe a ~ of:"Any event or condition that resulted (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it limited number of single-train systems in manual or automttic actuation of any in a safe shutdown condibon: *
&at pedorm sdety bctions (e g., ee
'neered Safety Feature (ESF) (B) Remove residual best: .
. High Pressure Coolant Injecticn System ,
uding the Reactor Protection System (C) Control the release of radioactive matuishor . in r such systems. loss of de (RPS).H: wever, actuation of an ESF* (D) Mitigate the consequences of an single train would prevent the including the RPS that resulted from accident. ' fulHilment of the safety function'of that and wts part of the preplanned . ,,,; . (vi) Events covered in paragrsph (s)(2)(v) system and, therefore, must be reported . sequenca during testing or react,or. . of this section may include one or more even though the plant Technical operati:n need not be reported. This paragraph requires events to be personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design. analysis, fabrication
- Specifications may allow such a' '."
condition to exist for a speciSed limited [, " reported whenever an ESF actuates construction, s,nd/or prccedural inadequacies. However. Individual length 4 time.
- Cith:r mrtually or automatically, . .
It should also be noted that.if a regard!:ss of plant status. It is based on component failures need not be reported . 1 pursuant to this paragre;h if redundant potentially serious human error is made the premise that the ESFs are provided that could have prevented fu1Silment of equipment in the same system was operable - 12 mitigate the consequences of a 8Ad 8vai!8bl8 to perform the required safety a safety function,but recovery factors , significant event and, therefore: (1) They function. . resulted in the error being corrected, the-shruld work propetly when called upon. and (2) they should not be challenged . The wording of this parag-aph has . error is still reportable. been changed from the proposed rule to The Commission recognizes that the frequently or unnecessarily.*fhe make it easier to read.The intent and application of this and otherparagraphs Commission is interested both in events wF sn ESF was needed to mitigate scope of the paragraph have not been of this section involves the use of equences (whether or not the changed. engineering judgment cn the part of th licensees. In this case, a technical eg. .cnt performed properly) and The intent of this paragraphis to events where an ESF operated capture those events where there would judgment must be made whether .: unn:c:ssarily, have been a failure of a safety system to
~
failure or operator action that did
" Actuation" of multichannel ESF properly complete a safety function, actually disable one train of a safety Actuatiin Systems is defined as regardless of when the failures were system, could have, but did not, affect a.
actu:tisn of enough channels to discovered or whether the system was redundant train within the ESF system, c:mplete the minimum actuation logic needed at the time. If so, this would constitute an event that This paragraph is also based on the "could have prevented" the fulfi!! ment (i.e activation of sufficient channels to cause activation of the ESF Actuation assumption that safety-related syste=s of a safety function, and, accordingly. System).Therefcre, single channel and structures are intended to mitigate must be reported. actuations, whether caused by failures the consequences of an accident.While If a component fails by an apparently or otherwise, are not reportable if they ( 50.73(a)(2)(iv) of this final rule applies random mechanism it may or may not do net complete the minimum actuation to actual actuat!ons of an ESF. be reportable if the functiona!!y II.-ic. . I 50.73(a)(2)(v) of this final rule covers redundant component could fail by the Operation of an ESF as part of a an event or condition where redundant same mechanism. Reporting is -r uired planned operational procedure or test structures, components, or trains of a if the failure constitutes a cond2uon (e.g startup testing) need not be safety system could have failed to where there is reasonable doubt that the rep:rted. However. if during the planned perform their intended function because functionally redundant train or channel cperating procedure or test the ESF of: one or more personnel errors, would remain operationaluntilit actuates in a way that is not part of the including procedure violations; completedits safety function or is planned procedure, that actuation must equipment failures: or design analysis, repaired.For example,if a pump in one be r:p:rted.For example.if the normal fabrication. construct!on or procedural train of an ESF system fails because of react:r shutdown procedure requires deficiencies.The event must be reported improper lubrication, and engineering judgment indicates that thereis a
. that the control rods be inserted by a regardless of the situation or condition 'manu:1 reactor trip the reactor trip need that caused the. structure or systems to reasonable expectation that the j not be reported. However,if conditions be unavallable, and regardless of functionally redundant pump in the -
develsp during the shutdown that whether or not an alternate safety other train, which was also improperly require en automatic reactor trip, such a system could have been used so perform lubricated. would have also failed i
"ip must be reported. the safety function (e.g, High Pressure before it completed its safety function.
- 'Yt the safety analysis Core Cooling failed. but feed.and. bleed then the scrual failure is repertable and
( t $ .F st an ESF will actuate or Low Pressure Core Cooling were the potential failure of the functionally Sutw.4. .u!y dunng certain plant available'to pfevide the safety function redundant pump must be discussed in c:nditi:ns does not eliminate the need of,. core cooling). the LER.
- la rep rt that actuation. Actuations that The applicability of this paragraph For safety systems that include three n=d n
- t be reported are those initiated includes those safety systems designed or more trains the failure of two or more fit reas:ns other than to mitigate the to mitigate the consequences of an trains should be reponed if. in the ,
Federal Register / Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday. July 26,1983 /' Rules and Regulations 33855 (D) Mitigate the consequences of an within the time limit specified in the judgement of the licensee, the functional accident" Technical Specifications, the action capability of the overall system was need not be reported under this jeopardized. This paragraph has been changed tB 4 ( clarify the intent of the phpase, paragraph.However. if. while the train
- Interaction between systems',
"nonconservative interdependence,"! or component is out of service. the particularly a safety system and a non.
safety system. is also included in this Numerouscommentletters expressed licensee identifies a condition that could difficulty in understanding what this have prevented the whole system from criterion .For example, the Commission Phrase meant:so the paragraph has performingits intended function (e.g la increasingly concerned about the the licensee finds a set of relays that is
~
effect of a loss ordegradation of what been changed to be more specific.The newparagraph is narrowerin scope wired incorrectly). that condition must had ban assumedte be non. essential than the original paragraph because the be sported. inputs to safety systems.Therefore, this term is specifically defined, but the Section 50.n(s)(2)(1)(proposed . paragraph also includes those cases where a service (e.g., heating, basic intent is the same. L 30.n(al(4)) requires reporting of: ventila tion, and cooling) or input (e.g This paragraph requires those events "(A)The completion of an compressed alr) which is necessary for to be reported where a single cause plant shutdown requiredby e plant's bnu ' reliable orlong. term operation of a produced a component or group of T&ical SpcincanoW compone"ts to become inoperable in hi t d the safety system is lost or degraded. Such
' loss or degradation is reportable if the redundant or independent portions (i.e p],, B) ,
ejtion pe p proper fuiSilment of the safety function trains or channels) of one or more ,,(C) Any deviation froni the plant's systems having a safety function.These is not cannot be assured. Fauures that events can identify previously Technical SpeciBeations authorized affect inputs or services to systems that unncognized common cause failures pursuant to i 50.54(x) of this part., have no safety function need not b's This paragraph has been reworded to and systems interactions. Such failures reported. - can be simultaneous failures which more clearly define the events that must Finally the Commission recognizes - occur because of a single initiating be reported. In addition, the scope has that the licensee may also use been changed to require the reporting 4f cause (i.e., the single cause or
- engineering judgment to decide when . mechanism serves as a comrnon input to events or conditions "pronibited by the i personnel actions could have prevente.d plant's Technical Specifications" rather fulfillment of a safety function.For the failures):or the failures can be
! sequential (Leo cascade failures). such than events where "a plant Technical i example, when an individual improperly as the case where a single component Specification Action Statement is not
- operates or maintains a component. he failure results in the failure of one or met." This change accommodates planta
, might conceivably have made the same more additional components. that do not have requirements that are
'. error for al! of the functionally specifically defined as Action To be upojtable,however the event i redundant components (e 3 If he or failste mi:st result in orinvolve the Statements.
incorrectly calibrates one bistable failure ofindependent portions of more This paragraph now requires eventa tc i ampliSerin the Reactor Protection than one train or channel in the same or be reported where the licensee is
- System, he could conceivably . dRerent sy' stems.For example. if a required to shut down the plantbecause 1 inco'rrectly calibrate all bistable the requirements of the-Technical ampli5ers). However, for an event to be
*** ',condium caused components I
in Train A and 'B of's single syste=r Spuificatiens were not' met.For the. I reportable it is necessary that the to become inoperable. even if additional purpose of &Is paragraph.." shutdown" actions actually affect orinvolve treins (e.g Train."C")wem stul is defined as the pomLh time where the components in more than one train or avadable, the ennt must be mported. In Technical Spec!Scations require that the channel of a safety system. and the addition.if the cause or conditio,,n plant be in the first shutdown condition ' result of the actions must be undesirable C*md C mponentsinTrain A of one required by a Limiting Cendtion for from the perspective of protecting the system andinTrain F of ano6er Operation (e.g hot standby (Mode 3) foi health and safety of the public.The systan U.e. a train that is assumed in PWRs with the StandardTechnical . components can be functionally e safety analysis to be independent) to Speci$ cations).lf theconditionla . redundant (e'g two pumps in different *
- I"'P"' ' ?"*t ""' . . ' corrected before the time limit for being
. trains) or not functionally redundant ' shot down (La befor's completion of the
('e.g., the operator correctly stops a pump "Eon [u n"caus'e"d c nentsbTrain ; shutdown), the event need not be in Train "A" and. instead of shutting the "A" of one system and Train "A" of - pump discharge valve in Train "A." he MPorted. . . another system (Ls trains that are not ,
. In addition. if a condition that was mistakenly shuts the pump discharge assumed in the safety enalysis to be prohibited by the Technical
. valve in Train "B"). independent), the event need not be
- Section 50.n(s)(2)(vii)(proposed reported unless it meets one o'r more of .Specificatfons exfsted for a period of time longer than that permitted by the I 50.n(a)(3)) requires the reporting of: the other criteria in this section. Technical Specifications it must be l "Any event where a single cause or in addition this paragraph does not reported even if the condition was not condition caused atleast one include those cases where one train of a discovered until after the allowable time .'
independent train of channel to become system or a component was removed had elapsed and the condition was Inoperable in multiple systems or two from service as part of a planned rectified immediately after discovery. independent trains channels or to evolution. in accordance with an approved rocedure, and in accordance Section 50.n(s)(:)(li) (proposed b nme inoperable in a system designed with the p ant's Technical ! 50.n(s)(3)) requbes reporting of:"Any l event or condition that resulted in the (A) Shut down the reactor and Specifications. For example. if the licensee removes part of a system from condition of the nuefearpowerplant.
.mintain it in a safe shutdown .
' serv ce to perform maintenance and the including its principal safety barriers.
condition.. being seriously degraded, or that (B) Remove residual heat. Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration. and the system resulted in the nuclest power plant (C) Control the release of radioactive being: material: or or component is returned to service
l 33656 Federal Register / 'Vol. 48. No'.'144 / Tuesday, July 26. 1983 / Rules and Regulations .
' "(A)1n an unanalyzed condition that radioactivity. levels at a BWR air elector safety of the nuclear power plant or str" sntly compromised plant safety: monitor that exceeded the Technical significantly hampered site personnelin '
i a condition that was outside Specification hmits. . the performance of duties ne'cessary for th(6 .gn basis of the plant; or (c) Cracks and breaks in piping, the the safe operation of the nuclear power
"(C)In a condition not covered by the reactor vessel, or major components in plant including fires, toxic gas release's.
pl:nt's operating and emergency the primary coolant circuit that have or radioactive releases." I procedures." safety relevance (steam generators. This paragraph has been reworded to I This paragraph requires events to be reactor coolant pumps. valves, etc.) . ' include physical hazards (intemal to the rep:rted where the plant, including its - (d) Significant welding or material plant) to personnel (e.g., electrical fires). principal safety barriers, was seriously defects in the primary coolant system. In addition. in response to numerous I degrfdid or in an unanalyzed condition. (e) Senous. temperature or pressure comments, the scope has been narrowed Fir example, smalf voids in systems - transients (e.g., transients that violate so that the hazard must hamper the . ' design:d to remove heat from the - the plant's Technical Specifications). ability of site personnel to perform re:ct:r core which have been previously (f)1.os: of relief and/or safety valve safety-related activides affecting plant sh:wn through analysis not to ba safety operability during test or operation ,,g,'Y' ' significant need not be reported. (such that the number of operable H: wever, the accumulation of voids that valves or man.way closures is less than in. plant releases must be reported if required by the Technical they nquim evacuation of rooms or c uld inhibit the ability to adequately buildings containing systems important - remtve heat from the reactor core. Specifications). . (g) Loss of containment function or. to safety and, as a result, the ability of. particula'rly under natural circulation coriditi:ns, would constitute an - integrity (e g./containmentleakage rates the operators to perform necessary ,' exceeding the authorized' limits), safety functions is significantly unanalyzed condition and must be Section 50.73(a)(2)(iii) (proposed hampered. Precautionary evacuations of rep:rted. In addition. voiding in rooms and buildings that subsequent
- instrument lines that results in an i 50.73(a)(6)) requires reporting of. "Any natural phenomenon or other external evaluation determines were not required err:nnus indication causing the condition that posed an actual threat to need not be reported. .
operatrr to significantly misunderstand , the true condition of the plant is also an the safety of the nuclear power plant or Proposed i 50J3(a)(8) was intended to unantlyzed condition and must be significantly hampered site personnelin capture an event thatinvolved a rep:rted. the performance of duties necessary for controlled release of a significant . The Ccmmission recognizes that the the safe operation of the nuclear power sm6unt of radioactive material to offsite licensee may use engineering judgment plant." .
. areas. In addition. "significant" was ar"' ~ Herience to determine whether an This paragraph bas been reworded to based on the plant's Technical
- u. zed conditico exjsted. lt is not make it clear that it applies only to acts Specification limits for the release of in. sd that this paragraph apply to of nature (e.g., tornadoes) and external radioactive material. However, this min:t variations in individual , hazards (e.g railroad tank car section has been deleted because the parameters, or to problems concerning explosion). References to acts of reporting of these events is already i sing): pieces of equipment.For example, sabotage have been removed because required by i 50.73(a)(2)(1) an'd i 20.405.
at cny time, one,c, r more safety related they are covered by i 73.71. In addition. Section 50.73(a)(2)(viii) and (ix) components may be out of service due threats to personnel from internal (proposed i 50.73(a)l9)) require reporting to 1: sting. maintenance, or a fault that hazards (e.g., radioactivity releases) are of. , has not yet been repaired. Any trivial now covered by a separate paragraph . . . . . single failure or minor error'.a (i 50.73(a)(2)(x))' (viii)(A) Any altborrle radioactivity release l performing surveillance tests could This paragraph requires those events that exceeded 2 times the applicable produce a situation in which two or - to be reported where there is an actual concentrations of the lur.its speci5ed in Table more often unrelated, safery-related threat to the plant from an external D of Appendix B to Part 2o of this chapterin components are out.cf. service. condition or natural ph'enomenon, and unrestricted areas, when aversted over a Technically, this is an unantlyzed where the threat or camage challenges time period of one hour. condition. However, these events should the ability of the plant to continue to (B) Any liquid enluent release that exceeded 2 times the limiting cornbined b2 reported only if they involve operate in a safe manner (including the Co 't t n( functionally related components or if orderly shutdor end maintenance of axig
, Permis
,g p b BtoP ,
th:y significantly compromise plant shutdown conditions . chapter) at the point of entry sto the safety. The licensee is to ecide if a receiving water (i.e unrestneted arealfer all
. Finally, this paragraph also includes phenomenon or condition actually radionuclides except tnoum and dissolved ma t eri:1 (e.g m etallurgical, ch emical) threatened the plant. For example, a noble sens, when aversted over a time problems that cause abnorrnal minor brush fire in a remote area of the period of one hour.
I degradation of the principal safety site that was quickly controlled by fire (ixl R eports submitted to the Commission fighting personnel and, as a result, did in accvdance Mth paragraph (a)(2)(viiil of I barriers (i.e., the fuel cladding. reactor
'c3 lant system pressure boundary, or not present a threat to the plant need this syruon ayo meet the effluent nieau l the containment). not be reported. However, a major forest NP g y *'j g ' g Ph, , ,
- Additional examples of situations fire,large scale flood, or major , , , g, ,
included in this paragraph are: - earthquake that presents a clear threat
' v! Adding failures in the to the plant must be reported. industrial Paragraph (viii) has been changed to m the storage pool, that or transportation accidents that clarify the' requirements to report
{ releases of radioactive matenal.The N , +.wpected values. that are unique occurred near the site and created a Jr widespre.nl. or that resulted from plant safety doncern rnust also be paragraph is similar to i 20.405 but unexpec.ed factors. rgported. places a lower threshold for reporting (b) Reactor coolant radioactivity Section 50.73(a)(2)(x) (proposed events at commercial power reactors. levsls that exceeded Technical i 5033(a)(7)) requires reporting of: "Any The lower threshold is based on the Specification limits for lodine spikes or, event that posed an actual threat to the significance of the breakdown of the
- _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _, ,m - _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ - _ - .
Fed:r:1 R: sister / Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday. July 26, 1983 / Rules cnd Regul'ations 33857 licensee's program necessary to have a ' in a condition not analyzed in the Safety "Special Reports" of the Technical
- release of this size.rather than on the Analysis Report) under reasonable and Specifications are still required.
significance of the impact of the actual cmdible alternative conditions, such ae
, V. Regulatory Analysis release. . power level or operstmg mpde. For Reports of events covered by
- example.*1f an event occurt'edMhile dye The Commission has prepared a 150.n(s)(2)(viii) are to be made in lieu plant was at15% power and the same regulatory analysis for this final rule. -
- of reporting noble gas releases that event could have w gd. while the The analysis examines the costs and exceed to times the instantaneous _ plant was at 2005 power, and, as a benefits of the alternatives consid. red release rete, without averaging *over a ' result, the consequences would have
- by the Commission. A copy of the
- time period. as implied by the been considerably more serious, the regulatory analysis is available for r'equtrement of I 20.405(a)(5). licensee must assess and report those inspection and copying for a fee at the Paragraph 50.n(b) describes the - cons 6guencas. . NRC Public Document Room.In7 H format and content of the IE.R. It Paragraph 50.n(b)(4) requires that the Street. N.W., Washington. D.C. Single' requires that the licensee prepare the licensee describe in the IE.R any copies of the analysis may be obtained I.ER in sufficient depth so that corrective actions planned as a result of from Frederick J. Hebon. Chief. Program knowledgeable readers conversant wjth the event that are known at the time the Technology Branch. Office for Analysis i the design of commercial nuclear power I.ER is submitted, including actions to and Evaluation of Operational Data,
! plants, but not familiar with the details reduce the probability of sinilar events U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
of a particular plant, can understand the occuiring in the future. After the initial Washington. D.C. 20555 Telephone (301)
- . complete event i.e., the cause of the I.ERis submitted only substantial 492-4440.
' Tr'dle*" e%('e",'f J"'*e"2%e gre'as'"s:;g : e!.""'" vi. - neduedn aciS--i The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Paragraph 50.n(c) authorizes the NRC
**Paragra
'Y'"'I'ph 50.n(b)(1) requires that the staff to require the licenses to submit has submitted this rule to the OfSce of
. licensee provide a brief abstract speciSc supplementalinformation Management and Budget for such
+ describing the major occurrences during beyond that required by I 50.n(b). Such review as may be appropriate under the the event. including all actual . Information may be re utred if the staff paperwork Reduction Act. Pub. L 96 . component or a stem failums.that finds that supplementa materialis 511.The date on which the reporting contributed to e event, all relevant ' necessary for complete understanding of requimments of this rule become 1 operator errors or violations of an unusually complex or significant effective reflects inclusion of the 60. day- ! , procedures, and any significant event. Such requests for supplemental period which the Act allows for such i _. corrective action taken or planned as a informationmust be made in writing, review.
. msult of the event.This paragraph is and the Ucensee must submit the "needed to give !.ER data base users a VII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
]eyd pp e
! . # brief desenption of the eventin order to d N's nd in accordance with the Regulatory identify events of intmst. mutually agmed upon by the NRC staff Flexibility Act of 1980. 5 U.S.C. 605(b). Paragraph 50.n(b)(2) requires that the the Commission hereby certines that and th licens n s a ar ers n th e i gr a case e g 9,
- details of a particular plant can exmptions to the reporting dominant in their respective service understand the event. The licensee , requirements contained in the 1.ER system.Th!: exemption could be used to areas and that own and operate nuclear i should empbasize how systems' limit the collection of certain data in
- utiliza n aci tie e s d
! components, and operating personnel , those cases where full participation i performed. Specific hardwan problems- Energy Act of1954. as amended.The would be unduly difficult because of a should not be covered in excessive . amendments clarify and modify detail. Characteristids of a plant that are plant's unique design or circumstances. presently existing notification
' . unique and that influenc'ed the event Paragraph 50.n(s) states that the ' .
MPontng requirements ~ contained in mquimments. ~ ,,
+
Accordingly, th'ere is no new , (favorabl[The describe narrative must alsoorI unfavorably)
. 50.n replace themus't be '
reporting signincant economicimpact on these describe the event from the perspective - mquirement: in all nuclear power plant licensees. nor do these licensees fall Technical Specifications that are tion of of the operator (e.3, what the o[erster th th e pe o e l saw, did. perceived, understoc or typically associated with Repo table ,,, , Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small are h .~n(b)(3) mquires that the superseded repo s'rhirements , Business Size Standards set out in 1.ERinclude a summary assessment of by I 50.n are those regulations issued by the Small Business the actual and potential safety contained in the Technical Specification Administration at 13 CFR part 121. consequences andimplications of the sections that are usually titled " Prompt event This assessment may be based on Notification with Written Followup *' , 1.lst of Subjects the conditions existing at the time of the (Section 6.9.1.8) and " Thirty Day Written- Jo CER Port 20 event.The evaluation must be carried Reports" (Section 6.9.1.9). The reporting
% le the extent necessary to fully requirements that have been superseded 1.icensed material. Nuclear power
! ars: the safety consequences and are also described in Regulatory Guide plants and reactors. penalty. Reporting Wety margms associated with the 1.16. Revision 4. " Reporting of Operating and reccedkeeping requirements.
event. An assessment of the event under Information-Appendix A Technical . , alternative conditions must be included Specincation." paragraph 2. " Reportable .10 CTR PARTS 50 if the incident would have been more Occurrences." The special report incorporation by reference. Antitrust, severe (e.g. the plant would have been typically described in Section 6.9.2 Classified information. Fire protection.
--n---e.pnm,*w-e-ne-----,w--w_
d 3858 Feder-l R:gistir / Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday. July 26. 1983 f Rules and Regulations stergovernrnental relations. Nuclear (C) Any deviation from the plant's (D) Mitigate the consequences of an cwor sla=ts and reactors, penalty. Technical Specifications authorized accident.
.a(' protection. Reporting and pursuant to i 50.54(x) of this part. (viii)(A) Any airborne radioactivity .
~
ec. . ping requirements.- * (11) Any event or condition that release that exceeded 2 times the Und r the authority of the Atomic resulted in the condition of the nuclear applicable concentrations of the limits ! I .'nergy:Act of 1954, as amended, the power plant. including its principal specified in Appendix B. Table 11 of Part l
'nergy Reorganization Act of1974. as
. safety barrim, being miously 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas. '
- mended, and 5 U.S.C. 352 and 553, the degraded, or that resulted in the nuclear when averaged over a time period of i
511: wing amendrnents to 10 CFR Parts ... Power plant being: . one hour. , O and 50 are published as a document IA)In an unanalyzed condition that - (B) Anyliquid effluent release that 4
' ubject to codification. ' significantly compromised plant safety; exceeded 2 times the limiting combined .
(B) In a condition that was outside the ' Maximum Permissible Concentration .
' ART 50-00MESTIC LICENSING Op design basis of the plant: or (MPC)(see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part j ' REDUCTION AND UTILIZATION ' . (C) In a condition not covered by the 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry.. .
'ACILTTIES plant's operating and emergency into the receiving water (Le., . .
- ' ' .. procedures. . unrestricted area) for all radionuclides 1.The authority citation for Part 50 (iii) Any natural phenomenon or other except tritium and dissolved noble . . ~
tatinues to read as follows: ,, external condition that posed an actual . gases, when averaged over a time period. l Authirity; Sees.103.104.151.18L 183.138. threat to the safety of the nuclear power of one hour. . .. i se. 88 Stat. 938. 937. eet, ela, es4. e&& est, as plant or significantly hampered site - (ix) Reports submitted to tha .:t :
' mended. sec. 2a4. as stat.1244. as amended personnelin the performance of duties t'a==Imalan in accordance with . .W -
1 42 U.S.C 21:3. 2134. 2201. 21st 22:3. 2 36, necessary for the safe operation of the paragraph (a)(2)(viillof this section also. . ass. 22a2): seca. sol. 202. 20s. as stat.1342. nuclear power plant. meet the effluent release reporting - t.
; 244.124e. as amended (42 USC seat. ses2 (iv) Any event or cond'ition that requirements of paragraph 20.405(a)(5) 4 444). unless otherwise noted. resulted in manual or automatic of Part 20 of this chapter. ..
! Sec2a scJ also leeued under Pub. L. es- actuation of any Engineired Safety (x) Any event that posed an actual . ~ j 01. e c.10. e2 5 tat. ass 1 (42 UAC sast). Feature (ESF). including the Reactor ' threat to the safety of the nuclear power ! Protection System (RPS). However~ plant or signi$cantly hampered site e S s't. 2 (2sec, 3.C actuation of an ESF. including the RPS. personnelin the performance of duties 4
' ase)r Pub L.97-4 s.
. Section s0Je eleo issued under that resulted from and was part of the necessary for the safe operation of the i 22. es stat. eas (42 USC 21:2). Sections 1 a.as-so.al alee lessed under sec.144, es stat. preplanned sequence dun'ng testing c'r nuclear power plant including Ares. .
- 34.
- taded (42 U.S.C 2234). Sectione reactor operation need not be reported, toxic gas releases, or radioactive 0.1 tot also lasued under sec.136 es (v) Any event or condition that alone releases.
- i tat. . .2U.S.C2236). could have prevented the fulfillment of (b) Contents. The 1.icensee Event i
. Fir the purposes of sec. 223. te Stat, ess, as the safety function of structures or Report shall contain: ! mended (42 USC 22r3). Il 30.10 (a). (b). systerns that are needed to: . (1) A brief abstract describing the . l nd (c) 30.44. 30.46. 50.48. 50.54, and 50.a0(a) me lot occurrences during the event. (A) Shut down the reactor and
- main a n n a sa e a u own nc u ng a component w system .
de (4 .
) Il 50.1 and condition; failures that contributed to the event i :) a:d 30.34 are leeued under sec. telt, es l tat. see, se amended (42 USC 2201(1)): and (B) Remove residual heat; and significant corrective action taken
- I 504S(e). 80.Seib). 50J0. 5031. 30.72, and (C) Control the release of radioactive or planned to prevent recurrence. !
! 3Je are leaved under sec.181o. es Stat eso, material: or (2)(i) A clear, specific. narrative j s emelded (42 U.S.C 2201(o)). , (D) Mitigate the consequences of an description of what occurred so that accident. knowledgeable readers conversant with j 2. A new I 50.73 is added to read as (vi) Events covered in paragraph the design of commercial nuclear power ! ! 3 **8' . (a)(2)(v) of this section may include one plents, but not familiar with the details l ' 50.72, Licensee event report system. or more procedural errors, equipment of a particular plant, can understand the ' failures, and/or discovery of design.
- complete event.
(a) /ttp;rtch/e events. (1) The holder analysis, fabrication, construction. and/ [11)The narrative description must l f an operating license for a nuclear ' or procedural inadequacies'. However, include the following specific . twer plant (licensee) shall submit a individual component failures need not information as appropriate for the . j Jcenste Event Report (1.ER) for any be reported pursuant to this paragraphif particular event: ' ads be nt s redundant equipment in the same (A) Plant operating conditions before {ntgr,p af ye , system was operable and avauable to the event. . locovery of the event.Unless otherwise perform the required safety function. (B) Status of structures. componenta. .. pecified in this section, the licensee (vil) Any event where a single cause' 'or systems that were inoperable at the j hall report an event regardless,of the or condition caused atleast one start of the event and that contributed to , tant mIde or power level, and independent train or channel to become the event. . rgardless of the signi!!cance of the inoperable in multiple systems or two (C) Dates and approximate times of .
- tructure, system. or component that independent trains or channels to occurrencas.
l 11tleted the event. become inoperable in a single system (D)The cause of each component or . . W % me shall report: designe(to: system fauure or personnel error. if I td 4 n..mpletion of any nuclear (A) Shut dow'n the reactor and known.
!at .. ildown required by the plant's mairftain itin a safe shutdown . (E)The fauure mode. mechanism and echnical Specifiestions: or condition: .
effect of each faued co=ponent. if (B) Any operation or condition ' (9) Rernove residual best: known. r2hibit:d by the plant's Technical (C) Control the release of radio. active (F) The Energy ladustry Identification i pecif) cations: or . material: or System component funcoon identifier
Fcdiral R:gister / Vol. 48. No.144 / Tuesday. July 26. 1983 / Rules and Regulations 3385h
~ . and system name of each component or components that could have performed PART 20-STANDARDS FOR system referred to in the !.ER. the same function as the components PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION (J)The Ene gy Industry Identification and systems that failed during the event.
I System is defined in:IEEE Std 803-1983 3-(4) A description of any corrective the m.In (20.402, (May 16.1983) Recommended Practices actions planned as a result'of tlie event, troductory text paragraph of paragraph(a)is (b)isrevi for Unique Identification Plants and revi8'd; 8nd a new paragraph (e) 18 ' 6ep bab a[dfns itles-Principles and g. fg*1 ,8 ,[ 6 , d g, t e ict *dd'd t #**d tl *** - (5) Reference to any previous similar l20.ao2 Reports of theft or lose of (2)IEEE Std 803-1983 has been . . uoensed matertal approved for incorporation by reference . events at the same plant that are known by the Director of the Federal Register. to the licensee. - (a)(1) Each licensee shall report to the , A notice of any changes made to the (6)The name and telephone number of Commission, by telephone, immediately materialincorporated by reference will a person within the licensee's after it determines that a loss or theft of be published in the Federal Register. organization who is knowledgeable licensed material has occurred in such Copies may be obtained from the about the event and can provide . quantities and under such circumstances Institute of Electrical and Electroni:s additional informatidn concerning the that it appears to the licensee that a Engineers. 345 East 47th Street. New event and the plant's characteristics. substantial hazard may result to persons York. NY 10017. A copy is ayallable for "" * "" (c)Supplemento/information.The (2) Reports must be made as follows: inspecnon and copying for a fee at the Commission may require the licensee to Commission s Public Document Rcom. . (il1Jeansees haung an installed stibmit specific a dditiona1 informat2on Emergency Notification System shau 1717 H Street. NW., Washington. D.C. and at the Offic' of the Federal Register, beyond that required by patagraph (b) e of W neden d 6e Comnu,ssion Ends make the reports to the NRC Operations 1100 L St. NW Washington. D.C. Center in accordance with !$0.72 of this (C) For failures of components with that supplemental material is necessary chapter. multiple functions, include a list of for complete understanding of an (ii) Allotherlicensees shallmake systems or secondary functions that unusually complex or significant event, reports to the Administrator of the were also affected. These requests for supplemental appropriate NRC Regional Office list.ed. [Hj For failure that rendered a train of infor=ation wiD be made in writing and in Appendix D of this pstt. a safety system inoperable. an estimate . the licensee shall submit the requested (b) Each licensee who makes a report of the elapsed time from the discovery information as a supplement.to the under paragraph (a) of this section shall. of the failure until the train was returned initial 1.ER. withing 30 days afterlearning of the loss to service. . (d) Submission of repdres. l.icensee or theft. make a report in writing to the
, 5 (I)The method of discovery of each Event Reports must be prepared on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
t :omponent or system failure or Form NRC 366 and submitted within 30 Document Control Desk. Washington, procedural error. - days of discovery of a reportable event D.C. 20555, with a copy to the U)/JJ Operator actions that affected or situation to the U.S. Nuclear appropriate NRC Regional Of5ce listed
. the course of the event. including in Appendix D of this part.The report Regulatory Commission. Document operator errors. procedural deficiencies. shall include the following informstion:
Control Desk. Washington D.C. 20555. or both. that contributed to the event. gg gg g g . . . . . additional copy to the appropriate NRC (e) For bolders of an operating license Uce ee [ ball is for e nuclear power plant, the events (if Whether the error was a cognitive Regional Of! ice listed in Appendix A to error (e.g fauure to recognize the actual Part 73 of this chapter. included la paragraph (b) of this section i plant condition. failure to realize which (e) /teport legibility. The reports and must be reported in accordance with the I
, systems should be functioning. failun to copies that licensees are required to procedures described in 150.73 (b). (c).
recognize the true nature of the event) or submit to the Commission under the
~
(d). (e), and (g) of this chapter and must
. include the information required in a procedural error: . provisions of this section must be of -
(ii)Whether the error was contrary to '.. auf5cient quality to permit legible paragr h (b) of this section. Events { an a proved procedure, was a direct P a o an reproduction and micrographic ,.n "g,og'E tb po by res t of as errorin an approved processing procedure or was associated with an
' 'h f (f) E.xemptions. Upon written request do activity or t sk the was not covered by from a licensee including adequate [l 20.403. the introductory text of (fif)$ y unu alcYaracteristics of the jus cad a or at 6e initf adon of 6e. paragraphs (a) and (b) is revised. end NRC staH. 6e NRC Encutive Director paragraph (d)is revised to read as l . work location (e.g heat. noise) that directly contributed to the erron and f r Operations may, by a letter (o the , followe:
ndo"12'r;'efs'"2'Jfuiv.'"' E" M *lS"n'ds E. *
===*"""-"-
i licensed operator, utility nonucensed section. -
, (a)Immedicte notificction. Esch licensee shallimmediately report any operator, other utility personnel). (S)liePortob/e occurrences. The (K) Automatically and manually requirements contained in this section events involving byproduct. source. or Irntiated safety system responses. replace all existing requirements for special nuclear material possessed by
' ' The manufacturer and model licensees to report " Reportable the licensee that may have caused or Occurrences" as defined in indjvidual threatens to cause:
I . .sr (or other identification) of each * * * *
- mrr.nonent that failed during the event. plant Technical Specifications.
p) An assessment of the safety The following additional amendments (b) Twenty.four hour hotificction. consequences and implications of the are also made to parts 20 and 50 of the Each beensee shall within 24 hours of event.This assessment must include the regulations in this chapter. discovery of the event, report any event availability of other systems or involving licensed material possessed _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ . . - _ , . _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ . _. . _ _ . _ - - _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ . , - - - . . _ - _ - - - .
~
33660 Federal Register / Vol. 48.'No.*144 / "$iesday ju}y 26, 1983 / Rules and ReN!ations by the licenses that may have caused or (iv) Corrective steps taken or planned (i) Licensees that have an installed 1:ee.ns to cause: to prevent a recurrence. Ernergency Notification System shall .
- make the initial notification t'o the NRC (c)(1) In addition to any notification Operations Center in accordance with
, p:rts made bylicensees in . (50.72 of this part.
resp nse to the requirements of this required by i 20.403 of this part each secti:n must be made as follows: licensee shall make a report in writing of (ii) All other licensees shall make the levels of radiation or releases of initial notification by telephone to the (1) Licensees that have aninstalled Administrator of the appropriate NRC Emerge,ey Notification System shall . radioactive materialin excess oflimits
- Regional Office !!sted in Appendix D.
mak3 the reports required by paragraphs. spe'cified by 40 CFR Part'190.
**Environrnental Radiation Protection Part 20. of this chapter. .
(a) and (b) of this section to the NRC (7) Written reports. Holders of an Operations Center in accordance with . Standards forNuclear Power Operati'ons." orin excess oflicense opera ting license'for a nuclear power-i 50.72 d this chapter. .. conditions related to compliance with 40 plant shall submit a written report to the - ( (2) All ether licensees shall make the CFR Part 190. Commission concerning the incidents ' l repcrts required by paragraphs (a) and (2) Each report submitted under included in paragraphs (c) (1) and (2) of t (b) of this section by telephone and by this section in accordance with the telegram, mallgram, or facalmile to the paragraph (c)(1) of this section must describe:. .- . procedures described in i 50.73 (b). (c)., - Administrator of the appropriate NRC . (d). (e), and (3) of this part. Incidenta e - (i) The extent of exposur,e of Regi:nal 05ce listed in Appendix D of Individuals to radi,ation or to radioactive reported in accordance with 150.73 of this part. .
- 5. In i 20.405, para 8Iraph's (a) and (c) . "d*N ' f * *
.this part need not also be reported under ii I paragraphs (c)(1) or(2) of this section.* -
are revis:d. and new paragraphs (d) andtrations co(nc)en.evels of radioactiveofmaterial radiation and . Dated at Washington.D.C. this 20th day '* of (c) are added to read as follows: involved: , July 1983. l 2o.aC5 14eports of overeuposures and (iii)The cause of the exposure. levels. For the Nuclear Regulatory Comodes' ion. eneseelve levela and conoontrations. or concentrations; and - - (iv) Corrective steps taken or planned hW.CMIL g g j ,, ", - (a)(1)In addition to any notification g required by i 20.403 of this part. each to assure against a recurrence including the schedule for achieving conformance in o m n esru m - u eu .. _ licensee shall make a report in writing *********'*" , concerning any one of the following with 40 CFR Part190 and with types of incidents within 30 days of its associated license conditions. (d) For holders of an operating license . - occurrence:. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY for a nuclear powSr plant the incidents f 't exposure of an individual to included in paragraphs (a) or (c) of this rat :in excess of the applicable Customs Service section must be reported in accordance , limits in il 20.101 or 20.104(a) of this with the procedures described in part. or the license: 19 CFR Part 134 paragraphs 50.73 (b). (c),(d). (e) and (g) - (ii) Each exposure of an individu'ai to of this chapter and must also include the radicactive materialin excess of the information required by paragraphs [a) U.D. sW . applicable limits in ii 20.103(a)(1), and (c) of this section. Incidents Customa Regulations Amendments
' 20.103(s)(2). or 20.104(b) of this part, or reported in accordance with 150.73 of M M iicense, Relating to Country of Origin Marking this chapter need not be reported by a
; ,g duplicate report under paragraphs (a) or AGENCY 1 Customs Service. Treasury.
( conc ntr tiens o osc ve materialin sec n. Acm Final rule. I a restricted area in excess of anY other (e) All otherlicensees who make ' applicable limit in the license: reports under paragraphs (a) or (c) of
SUMMARY
- Thjs document amends the (iv) Any incident for which this section shall, within 30 days after Customs Regulations to establish nouficatien is required by 120.403 of learning of the overexposure or certification requirements for importers
, &!s part: or ' excessive level or concentration. make a with respect to the country of cripin j (v) Levels of radiation or report in writing to the U.S. Nuclear marking of certain articles, repacked in e:ncentrations of radioactive mate-f al Regulatory Commission. Document the United States after rolesse from l Customs custody. This change requires (whether or not invohing excessive Control Desk. Wa shington. D.C. 20555. exposure of anyindividual)in an with a copy to the appropriate NRC importers to certify to the district unrestricted area in excees of ten times Rehnal Office listed in Appendix D of director having custody of the articles any applicable limit set forth in this part this part, that:(allf the importer does the or in the license. repacking the new container must be . (2) Each report required unde'r PART 50-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF marked in accordance with applicable stragraph (t)(1) of this sectJon must . PRODUCTION AND UTit.lZATION '
- law and regulations: or (b)if the article d: scribe the extent of exposure of . FACILITIES is sold or transferred. the importer must individuals to rad!ation or to radioactive notify the subsequent purchaser or
- 6. In i 50.36. new paragraphs (c)(6) - repacker. 6 w% st 6e tim of sale I
meterial, including: . and (7) are addad to read as follows: or transfer, that any repacking of the * (O Fstimates of each individual's article must conform to the marking required by paragraph (b) Iso.3s Yechnicei sp.emoetions.
/
I .. .t: . . . . . requirements.The purpose of this change is to ensure that an ultimate i , . treb of radiation and (c)* % . # .; . purchaser in the Uniteo States is aware
- encentrations of radioactive matenal (6)Initio/ Notification.' Reports made to the Commission bylicensees in of the country of origin of the imported mvilv:d: article.
' response to the requirements of this (iii)The cause of the exposu:e. levels sr concentrations: and section must be made as follows: anactive oara: October 24.1983.
. Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. Ifla / Monday. August 29.19fl3 / Rules and Regulations 39039 rt 20 of this chapter.The licensee F 150.20 Recognition of Agreement State Commission. Washin'gton, D C. 2fG5:
( '"ses. Telephone (301) 432,373.
,all send a copy of the report to et 'h s' repriate State agency that has .. surm.auaNTARY INFORMATION:
a onty over the particular well. Notwithstand,mg any provistor o dr ing operation. The report mus the ntrary in any specific licenae 1. Background co sin the following informatio issue by on Agreement State to On February 29.1080. the Commiumn ( Date of occurrence. . perso ngsging in activities in a on.
, amended its regulations withmit pnor (2, A desenption of the irretti able Agreem nt State orin offshore aters notice and comment to require timely well oggmg source involved. in uding under th encrallicenses pro ded in and accurate licensee reporting of radio uclide, quantity. and che ical this secti , . the generallicen s information following significant events and p sical form. provided i is section are blect to at operatirig nuclear pawn reactors (45 (3) rface location and ide ification the provisio ' of Il 30.7 (a hrough (e). FR 13434).The purpose of the rule was of well 30.14(d) and 30.34. 30.4 and 30.51 to to provide the Commission with (4) R ults of efforts to i bilize 30.63 inclusiv of Part 3 of this immediate reporting of twelve types of and ses the source in place. chapter: I 40.7 thro (e) and Il 40.41, 40.51. 61. 4 .63. inclusive, significant events where immediate ,
(5) De4h of source. Commission action to protect the public (6) Dep of the top of the ement 40.71 and 40.81 of ar 40 of this chapter: health and safety may be required or plug. and i 70.7 (a) thro (e) and il 70.32. where the Commission needs accurate (7) Dept of the well. 70.42. 70.51 to 70.58 clusive. 70.60.
, .71 of Part 70 of and timely information to respond to (8) Any herinformati (e.g.. 70.82. Inclusivela heightened public concern. Although the warning at ement) conta ed on the this chapter: an th rovisions of rule was made immediately effective.
permanenti entification aque. Parts 19,20. an 1 and ubpart B of Part 34 of this apter. In ddition any comments were solicited. Many (9) Notific ions made State Person engas g in activit s in non. commenters believed the rule was in agencies. some respects either vague and - (10) A brief escriptic of the Agreement ates orin offn are waters under the erallicenses p vided in ambiguous or overly broad. attempted rec ery eff ts.
- After obtaining experience with (d) Anylice ce or a plicant for a this secti
. . . . . notifications required by the rule. the license may ap y to t Commission for Commission published in the Federal approval of pro sed racedures to Dated Behesda. Maryland, thi 2th day of Aug' 1983.' Register a notice of proposed
, %~ abandon an irre av le well. logging rulemaking on December 21.1981 (46 FR For e Nuclear Regulatory Commis on.
/ ~ ' source in a mann r n t otherwise 61894) and invited public comment.The
, authorized in para r' h (a) of this Jack . Roe. . proposal was made to meet two section. Ac g Executive Directorfor 0perottons objectives: change to CFR 50.54 to r em ruenm o .,ii, PART 150--EXEM ONS AND coae ,, . ,
implement Section 201 of the NRC's 1960 CONTINUED REG TORY Fiscal Year Authorization Act and l AUTHORITY IN A EMENT STATES change la CFR 50.72 to more clearly l
- l AND IN OFFSHO ATERS UNDER to CFR Part 50 specify the sigmficant events requiring j SECTION 274 licensees to immediately notify NRC.
Immediate Notification Requirements The problems and issues which this l 7 The authart cita .on for Part 150 is of Significant Events At Operatin9 rulemaking addresses and the solutions rov se to read . fo!! s: Nuclear Power Reactors that it provides can be summanzed m Authoetty: Sec 2n 161. Stat.948.as five broad areas: A0aNCY: Nuclear Regulatory amended. sec. .. 73 Stat. (42U.S.C. . 22o1. 20211: sec. .88 Stat 242.es Commtssion. f. Authomotion ActforFYSO amended (42 U .C. 3841). AcTiow: Final rule. Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Sections 150 150.15 150.1 150.31 150.32 also tesued un r secs.11e(2, 1. 68 Stat. 923. SUMesAny:The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for 935. as amend seca a3.84.' Stat.3033. Commission is amending its regulations Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. ( 96-295) l 3039 (42 U.S. 2014e(2).2111. 13.2114), which require timely and accurate provides: Section 150.1 also leeued und sec.53,68 information from licensees following (a) Section 103 of the Atomic Enerev Act of Stat. 930. as l ended (42 U.S.C 'o73). significant events at commercial nuclear 1954 is amended by adding at the end therruf a power plants. Experience with' existing the followms new subsectione: f. Each hcenne at 9 9( S 2 52 Sec to 50 s requirements and public comments on a issued for a unhunun facility under the issued und. see. 234. as Stat. 42 U.S.C- section or section 104h. shall require as a proposed revision of the rule indicate t2s21 condinun thereof that m case of any no.ident For the urposes of sec. 223. es at 9*,a. me that the existing regulation should be amended 2 U.S.C 2273): il 150.' l(2H4) amended to clanfy reporting critens and which could result m un unpfanned relem ni quannues of fiss.on products m esceas of i and 150. are issued under sec. to , se sist, to require early reports only on those aHowable limite for normal operanon ) 944,ase ended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)). 150.14 matters of value to the exerc!se of the estabbshed by the Commission. the hcensee I is taeuer under sec.1611. 68 Stat. 949 s Commission's responsibilities. The * """"'"' l amend (42 U.S.C. 2201(11): aod il 1 16 amended regulation will clanfy the list Violanon of the condshon presenbed by t'us 150.19 d 150.20(b)(1) are issued un sec. { reportable events and provide the subsection may. In die Commusion's ( '81o.
. Stat. 950. as amended (42 U", Commission with more useful reports 2 gig discrenon. constitute steunds for heense regarding the safety of operating nuclear rewc.inen. In accordance wen secuen ter of power plants, tPJs Act. the Commission sseil prr,mptly i il 15 .3.150.1a,150.15.150.154,150. amend each hcense for 1 util.2;.non facihty 150J , N32 (Amomfedi gypgcTTVE DATE:lanuary 1.1984, l
9 in i 150 20. the introductory tex f pon punTwen tweenesAflose coorTAcT: $$",",d',' ,t ) "$,",',$,",f
,,, n m nt of pa graph (b)is revised to read as Eric W. Weiss. Office of Inspection and th s su3section to mrtude m cimmns j
h **- Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory reudi**d under .his sooe./ "i. 1
e. 39040 reditral Register Vol. 48. *.. ICA / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules c.d Ren.iottom Accordmn. this rulemak.nr includes pr .ure cetailed wntten reports for Condmou of Licemr* n ;c 6 - nencnynt to to CFR 50 54 that ( "" "
.ctrtain events (48 FR 338501 A few commenters said in : the requiremen a e ndi i n in !p' 4. Co rdmotion with I./censee's " Commission already has in ..beliiv tu (perating heense of each nuc! car EmqencyMon enforce its regulations and m n m.
utilization facility licensed uncer section The current scheme for licensees. need to me.orporate tre steins as nim 103 cr 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of emergency plans includes four proposed mto conditions of I.u nsel
~ 1954, as amended. 42 U.S.C. 2133,2134b. Emergency Classes. When the licensee The Commission has decided to These facilities generally are the declares one of the four Emergency promulgate the proposed revision of commercial nuclear power facil.ities Classes,it must report this to the i 50.54. " Conditions of 1.icenses." in which produce electricity for public Commission as mquired by I 50.72.The order to sansfy the intent of Congress as consumption. Research and test reactors lowest of the four Emergency Classes. expressed in Section 201 of the Nuclear are not subject to the license condition Notification of Unusual Event. has Regulatory Commission Authonzation s they are licensed under section 104a. resulted in unnecessary emergency Act for Fiscal Year 1980. This Act and at 104c.of the Act. Under the declarations. Events that fall within the its relationship to I 50.54 are discussed amendment to 10 CFR 50.54. licensees Unusual Event class have been neither in detailin the Federal Resister notice falling under sections 103 or 104b. would emergenciesin themselves nor be required. as a condition of their for the proposed rule (46 FR 61894).
precursors of more serious events that respective operating licenses. to notily are emergencies. Coordination With OtherReportmg the NRC immediately of events specified Although changes to the definition of Requirements (Fino/ Rule!5ar2/ in to CFR 50.72. the Emergen Classes are not being
- Seven commenters said that the NRC
- 2. UnnecessoryReports ,", port a sche e should coordinate the requirements of to ould u timately Several categories of reports required CFR 5472 with other rules, with eliminate " Unusual Event" as an by I 50.72 are not useful to the NRC. Emergency Class requiring notification NUREG-0634. ,, Criteria for Preparation .
Am:ng these categories are reports of: can be adopte'd consistent with this rule. and Evaluation of Radiological worker injury, small radioactive A proposed rulemaking which would Emergency Response Plans and rel:sses. and rninor security problems. redefine the Emergency Classes in Preparedness in Support of Nuclear For example, reports are presently I 50.47 is in preparation and may soon Plants." and with Regulatory Guide 1.16. required if a worker onsite experience be published for public comment. This " Reporting of Operating information He pains or another illness not related final rulemaking makes possible the . . ." Many of these letters identified Jiation and is sent to a hospitsi for elimination of " Unusual Event" as an overlap. duplication, and inconsistency
,ation: orif th8 vent stack monitor emergency class without further among NRC's reporting requiremer ts.
thuves upward a few percent yet amendment gf i 50.72 by including in The Commission is making a radiition levels remain 100.000 timas the category of non. Emergencies the concerted effort to ensure consistent bel:w technical speciDcation limits: or if subcategory of "one-hout reports." " and coordinated reporting requirements. th2 security computer malfunctions for a
- 5. Vogue or Ambijuous Reporfiry The requirements contained in the few minutes.
This rulemaking eliminates such Cnterio revision of to CFR 50.72 are being reporting requirements from I 50.72 and The reporting criteria in 5 50.72 beve coordinated with revision of i 50.73. in general clarifies and narrows the 150.55(e). Appendix E of Part 50. , been revised in order to clarify their sc:pe of reporting. However, revision of scope and intent.The criteria were i 20.402. I 73.71. and Part 21. Part 73 of the Commission's regulations revised for the proposed rule and in Citmg 10 CFR 50.c as a Bosis for is n:cessary to resolve all problems with response to public comment.The . Notihcotion (Fmol1sule f Sa72/o#411 s:cunty reports. " Analysis of Comments" portion of this Federal Register notice describes in A few commenters objected to citing J. Tctnunology, phiusing, and Reportin# more detail specific examples of i 50.72 as a basis when making a Thresholds telephone notification. The letters of changes in wording intended to . The various sections of10 CFR 50 eliminate vagueness or ambiguity. comment questioned the purpose legal h:v3 different phrasing, terminology. II. Analysis of Comments 9 and thresholds in the reporting critena. The Commission does not believe that Esen when no different meaning ts Twenty letters of comment were it is an unnecessary burden for a miended a change in wording can cause received in response to the Federal licensee to know and identify the busin c:nfusion. Register notice published on December for a telephone notificution required by This rulemaking has been carefully 21.1981 )46 FR 61894).' Of the twenty I 50.72. There have been many wntten to use terminology phrasing. letters o comment rewived, the vast occasions when a licensee could not tell und reporting thresholds that are either mal rity (15 of 20) were frorn utilities the NRC whether the telephone ide tical to or similar to those m i 50.73. owrung or operating nuclear power notification was being rnade in when:ver possible. Other mnforming plants. This Federal Register notice accordance with Technical amendments to Parts 20,21. 73 and in described the proposed revision of to Specifications.10 CFR 50.72. some other i Sn.55 and Appendix E of Part 50 are CFR 50.72. " Notification of Significant requirement or was just a courtesy call.
/ development. Esents." and to CFR 50.54. " Conditions Unless the licensee can identify the I l . parallel activity to the of Licenses. A discussion of the more nature of the report. it is difficult for the l p =,aration of I 50.72 on July 28.1983, significant comments follows:
NRC to know what significance the the C:mmission has published a licensee attaches to the report and it Licensee Event Report (IIR) Rule ' cop.e. of she doewnente ere e.ed.t,le to' (l 50.73) which requires licensees for becomes more difficult for the NRC to
$7n*$'n" E,d,,7@'ds'teei5"[ '
respond quickly and properly to the operstmg nuclest power plants to w .ninston.nc sosas event.
I Federal Register / Vol. 48. No.168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations 39041 l
/mmediate Shutdown (Final Rule airborne concentrations decrense or occurnnu at operating nue: lent pow. r ! f M72/b//f///// until respiratory protection devices are pinnis. A deaillms. shorter thari one hmir Several commenters objected to the . ut lized.They noted that these events was not mtoptiit in onnsi. the-are fairly commun and should not be Commission dues not wimi to mtritete use of the term."immediate shutdown.
saying that Technical Specifications do up rtable unless the required with the operator's ability to ifral wdh not use such a term. evacuation affects the entire facility or a an accident or transient m the first few maior part of it. entical mmutes. The term is used in some but not all The Commission agrees. The wording Therefore, based on these cumments Technical Specifications. Consequently
- of this. criterion has been changed to and its experience, the NRC has the Commission has revised the include only those events which established a "four. hour report." as was reporting criterion in question. The f!nal rule requires a report upon the initiation sign c4 y amp" a ty ?f site suggested.
per nna o of any nuclear power plant shutdown $",', g"o, ,. pe okdunes Re ctorScrams(FinalRule required by Technical Specifications. fMn/b//2//li// One commenter was concerned that Plant Operating andEmergency events occurnns on land owned by the Several commenters said that reactur Procedures (Fincl Rule f M72(b/(1/(ii// utility adjacent to its plant might be scrams, particularly those scrams below reportable.This is not the intent of this power operation, should not require Several commenters said that the rep tting requirement. The NRC is reporting enteria should not make notification of the NRC within one hour. c neerned with the safely of plant and in response to these comments, the reference to plant operating and pers nnel en the utility s site and not emergency procedures because: Commission had changed the reporting
- a. It would take operators too long to
'" **' achvnies on land deadline to four hours. However the
*[jac"en"t to t e p; ant.
a Commission does not regard reactor decide whether a plant condition was covered by the procedures. Erp// cit Threats (Fina/ Rule scrams as "non. events." as stated m
- b. The procedures cover events that yJan/b//f/(vil/ some letters of comment. Information ,
are not of concern to the NRC. and A few commenters said that the intent related to reactor scrams has been c.The procedures vary from plant to
- of the term. " explicitly threatens." was useful m identifying safety.related plant. unclear. Those commenting wondered pmblems.The Commission agrees that While the plant operating personnel what level of threat was involved. The four huurs is an appropriate deadline for should be familiar with plant term. " explicitly threatens. " has been thie reporting requirement because theso procedures,it is true that procedures deleted frnm the final rule. Instead. the events are not as important to
/ - vary from plant to plant and cover final rule refers to "any event that poses. immediate safety as are some other i events other than those which an actual threat to the safety of the events.
compromise plant safety. However, the nuclear power plant * [l 50.72(b)(1)(vi)] wording of the reporting criteria has Radioactive Re/ case Threshold (fina/ and gives examples so that it is clear the Rule f San /b//2//iv// been modified (i 50.n(b)(1)(li) in the Commission is interested in realor final rule) to narrow the reportable ' actual threats as opposed to threats Several commenters said that the events to those that significantly without credibility. threshold of 25% of allowable limits for compromise plant safety. . radioactive releases was too low for Notwithstanding the fact that the Notification Te. ming (fino/Ru/e one.hout reporting. procedures vary from plant to plant, the fJan/b/(21/ Based upon these comments and its Commission has found that this criterion The commenters generally had two experience, the Commission has results in notifications indicative of points to make regarding the timing of changed the threshold of reporting to serious events.The narrower, more reports to the NRC. First, the comments those releases exceeding two times part spectiic wording will make it possible supported notification of the NRC after 20 concentrations when averaged over a for plant operstmg personnel to identify appropriate State or local agencies have period of one hour. This will ehminate reportable events under their specific been notified. Second. two commentera reports of releases that represent operating procedures. requested a new four.to six. hour report negligible risk to the public. Building Evoeuotion(FinalRule category for events n t warranting a The Commission has found that low report with one hour, level radioactive releases below two fSa72(b/(f/(li/// Allowing more time for seporting tirnea Part 20 concentrations do not m Ten commenters geld that the some non. Emergency events would themselves, warrant immediate proposed I 50.72(b)(6)(ill) regarding lessen the impact of reporting on the radiological response. l "any accidental. unplanned or individuals responsible for maintaining This paragraph requires the reporting uncontrolled release resulting in the plant m a safe condition. l.irniting of those events that cause an unplanned evacuation of a building" was unclear the extension of the deadline to four or uncontrolled release of a significant and counterproductive in that it could hours ensures that the report is made amount of radioactive material to offsite t cause reluctance to evacuate a building. when the information is fresh in the areas. Unplanned releases should occur Many of these commenters stated that minds of those involved and that it is infrequently: however, when they occur. the reporting of in. plant releases of more likely to be made by those at least moderate defects have occurred radioactivity that require evacuation of involved rather than by others on a later in the safety design or operational Individual rooms was inconsistent with shift. control established to avoid their ( he general thrust of the rule to require Other, more significant non- occurrence end. therefore, these events reporting of significant events. They Emergency events and all decications should be repoded. noted that minor eptlls, small gaseous of an Emergency must conttaue to be waste releases, or the disturbance of reported within one hour. The ene hour Personeel Radioactive Contammation contaminated particulate matter (e g., deadline is necessary if the C.v7. mission (fino/ Ru/c y Samb/(2)(v// dust) may all require the temporary is to fulfillits responntr' litttes curme ard Several co-tmenters objected to the esacuation of individual rooms until the following the most ser.m eu r.:s me of vyue terms such as " extensive I
, 390c Federal Reninter / Vol. 48. No.1G8 / Mnnriav. Anquet 29.19TI / Pules and Regulatirms te contamination" and "readily from a license cundition er technical the containmentl. Examples of Im :yn I sved"in one of the reporting cnteria specification. of situation include:
.. .ne proposed rule. Pamgmph 50.72(b//J//iil. (a) Fuel cladding failures in the Based on this comment. new criteria encompassing events previously reactor, or in the storage pool. tL.
have been prepared that use more classifisc as Unusual Events and some exceed expected values.or that are specific terms. For example, one new events enptured by proposed unique or widespread. or that are criterion requires reporting of"Any , ! 50.72(b)(1) was added to provide for caused by unexpected factors. and event requiring the transport of a consistent, coordinated reporting would involve a release of significant radioactively contaminated person to an requirements between this rule and to quantities of fission products. effsite medical facility for treatment." CFR 50.73 which has a similar provision. (b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or Experience with telephone notifications Public comment suggested that there reactor vessel (steel or prestressed made to the NRC Operations Center should be similarity of terminology, concrete) or major components in the suggests that this new criterion will be Phrasing, and reporting thresholds primary coolant circuit that have safety e:sily understood. Detween i 50.72 and i 50.73. The intent relevance (steam generators, reactor ' of this paragraph is to capture those coolant pumps. valves, etc.). III. Paragraph by. Paragraph Explanation events where the plant. including its (c) Significant weldmg or material of the Rule principal safety barriers, was seriously defects in the primary coolant system. Pampmph 50.72/a/ reflects some degraded or in an unanalyzed condition. (d) Serious temperature or pressure condidation oflanguage that was For example, small voids in systems transients. repeated in various subparagraphs of- designed to remove heat from the (e)I oss of relief and/or safety valve the proposed rule. In general. the intent reactor core which have been previously functions during operation. and scepe of th's paragraph do not shown through analysis not to be safety significant need not be reported. (f) Loss of containment function or reflect any change from the proposed integrity including: rul. However, the accumulation of voids that (i) Containment leakage rates Several titles were adaed to this and could inhibit the ability to adequately exceeding the authorized limits.
~
subsequent sections. For example. remove heat from the reactor core. particularly under natural circulation (ii) Loss of containment isolation paragraph 50.7:(b)is titled "Non. valve function during tests or operation. Emergency Events" and it has two conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and would be (iii) Loss of main steam isolatiotf subparagraphs:(b)(1). titled. "One Hour valve function during test or operation. R: ports" and (b)(2). "Four Hour reportsble. In addition, voiding in ,, ( 'its." The events which have a one, deadline are those having the instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the (iv) Loss of containment cooling capsihty i' ,..<ntial to escalate to an Emergency operator to misunde' rstand the true c ndition of the plant is also an Pa graph 50.72/b//J/(siil. Cl:ss. The four. hour deadline is encompassing a postion of proposed explained in the analysis of paragraph unanalyzed condition and should be 50.72(b)(2). was reworded to correspond he Commission recognizes that the to a similar provision of10 CFR Pamgraph 30.72/b//f/////AJ requires 50.73(alf2)(iii). Making the requirements reporting of 'The initiation of any licensee may use engineering judgment and expenence to determine whether an of to CFR 50.72 and 50.73 similar in nucl:ar plant shutdown required by language increases the clarity of these Technical Specifications. Although the unanalyzed condition existed. It is not intended that this paragraph apply to rules and minimizes confusion. int:nt and scope have not changed, the The paragraph has also been ch:nge in wording between the minor variations in individual parameters. or to problems concerning reworded to make it clear that it applies pr: posed and final rule is intended to s ngle pieces of equipment. For example. only to acts of nature (e.g., tomadoes) clanfy that prompt notification is and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank required once a shutdown is initiated. at any time one or more safety-related components may be out of service due car explosion). References to acts of in response to public comment. the sabotage have been removed. since to testing, maintenance, or a fault that term "immediate shutdown' that was has not yet been repaired. Any trivial these are covered by i 73.71. In addition, used in the proposed rule is not used in single failure or minor error in threats to personnel from internal the final rule. The term was vague and performing surveillance tests could hazards (e g.. radioactivity releases) that unfimiliar to those licensees who did produce a situation in which two or hamper personnel in the performance of n:t have Tei.hnical Specifications using more often unrelated. safety. grade necessary duties are now covered by the term. components are out.of service. paragruph 50.72(bl(1)(vi). This paragraph This reporting requirement is mtended Technically, this is an unanulyzed covers those events mvulving an actual to capture those events for which condition. However. these events should threat to the plant from an external l Technical Specifications require the be reported only if they involve cundition or natural phenomenon, and l initiation of resclor shutdown.This will functionally related components or if where the threat or damage challengen pr: vide the NRC with early waming of they significantly compromise plant the ability of the plant to continue to silety significant conditions serious safety. When applying engineenng operate in a safe manner (including the en ugh to warrant shutdown of the judgement. and there is a doubt orderly shutdown and maintenance of plant. regarding whether to report or not, the shutdown conditions). The licensee aagraph 50.72/b/(1/////Bf was added Commission's policy is that licensees should decide if a phenomenon or ( consistent with existing should make the report. condition actually threatens the plant.
. .irements in i 50.54(x) and the Finally, this paragraph also includes For example, a minor brush fire in a existing I 50.72(c) as published in the matenal(e.g. metallurgical or chemical) remote area of the site thatis quickly Federal Register on April 1.1983 (48 FR problems that cause abnormal controlled by fire fighting personnel and.
13966) which require the licensee to degradation of the principal safety as a result. did not present a threat to n:tify the NRC Operations Center by barriers (i.e. the fuel cladding. reactor the plant should not be reported. tel: phone when the licensee departs coolant system pressure boundary. or However, a major forest fire,large scale
l
- Federal Register / Vol. 48. No.168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and' Regulations 39043 1 I Good. or major earthquake that presents 5. Plant monitors necessary for is possible, because these personnel will a clest threat to the plant should be have a better knowledge of the accident aseemment.
i reported. As another example, an Artcyroph W.72(b/(2)(vi). circumstances associated 6th the vent. industrial or transportation accident enconapassing some portions of the R, ports made within four hours of the which occurs near the site, creating a proposed il 50.72(bl(2) and (6). has event ihould make this possible while plant safety concern, should be ban revised to add the phrase, cot imposing *.he more ngid one hour
- reported. " including fires, toxic gas rolestes, or reqmroments.
1%ragmph M72(bl{!Mivl. radioactive releases." This aMition , The re sortins requirement in i encompassing events pseviously covera he " evacuation" port.rmbi porogmph 277(b)(2)(if le similar to a , classified me Unusual Evente, requires paragraph 80.72(b)(gl(l'il of the proposed require:wat in i 50.73. Moreover, escapt l the reporting of those events that result rule. This change i.: anding f or the final for refontag to a shstdown reactor, this ' in either automatic or manual actuation rule was asade in response to pablic reporting requirmnent is also similar to -
~
of the BCCS or would have resulted in comments discussed above. ' the **One-Hour Report" in activation of the ECCS if some While paragroph 50L72(b)(1){illl of the i 10.72(b)(1)(ill. However this peregraph camponent had not failed or an operator final rule primarily captures scie of applies to a resctor in shutdown action had not been taken. nature paragraph 50.n(b)(1)M condition. Events within this For example,if a valid ECCS signal captures other events, particularly acts requir-ment have less urgency and can were generated by plant condialoos. and by peesonnel The Commission belJeves be rer'orted within four hours se a "Non- , the operator were to put all ECCS this arrangement of the reporting criteria Emerge." pumps in pull-to. lock, though no ECCS in the Anas reie lends itself to more 15fuyEph M72(b/(2)(li/ (proposed discherpo occurred, the event would be precise interpretion and is consistent 50 74 bits))is made a "Non-Emergency" 4 reportable. with those pubic comenents that in response to public comment, because A " valid signal" refers to the actual requested closer coordination between the Commission agrees that the covered . plant conditions or parameters j the reporting requirements in this rule events generally have slightly less satisfying the requirements for ECCS and other portions of the Co.netission's urgency and safety significance than
- initiation. Excluded from this reporting , resula, tions. those events included in the "One. Hour requirement would be those instances 'Thas proes.s ion requires reperdng of '
rts "
- where instrument datft, spurious signals. evenes, particiderly those caused by acts Reye ihent and scope of this re
.. human error, or other invalid signals of personnelwhich endanger the safety requirmnt have not changed from the
' caused actuation of the ECCS. Ilowever. of the plant erinterfere with personnel proposed rule.This parayaph is such events may be reportable under reance of duties necessary fer
, in intended to capture events during which other sections of the Commission s se e plant operations. an ESP sctuates. either manually or restulations based upon other detalla:in The licenese must exercise some automaticaHy. or ga to actuate. ESFs i particular, paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) judgment in reporting under thin section.
i requires a report within four hours if an Fer example, a small fire on site that did are provide i to mitigate the consequences of the event; therefore. (1) i Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)is not endanger any plant equip. nest and that did not and could not reasonably be they shou;d work properly when called actuated. Emperience with notifications made enpocted to endanger the plant.'is not upon and (2) they should not be purnuant to l 50.72 has shown that reportable. challenged unoecessarily.The events involving ECCS discharge to the Peregraph 272(b#ff of t4 peuposed Commission is interested both in events vessel are generally more serious than rule was split into f M7W6#f#ii/ and where an ESF was needed to mitigate ESF actuations without discharge to the the consequences of the event (whether f 50.746#2Xi/ in the final cule in order or not the equipment performed sessel. Based on this experience, the to pennit some type of reparts t > be
! Commission has made this reporting made within four hours irstead of one Properly) and events where an ESF criterion a "One Hour Report." hour because these reports have less Operated unnecessanly.
/brugraph so.72(bNJ/(v/. safety essm8cance,in terese of their " Actuation" of multichannel ESF encompensing events previously combined effect, the overalllatent and Actuation Systems is defined as l classified as Unusual Events, covers actuation of enagh channels to scope of these paragraphs have not j those events that would impair a changed flrom those in the proposed rule. complete the minimum actuation logic.
, licensee's ability to deel with an Since the types of events intended to be Therefore, single channel actuations. 1 accident or emergency. Notifying the capaused by this reporting reqdirement whether caused by failures or otherwise. NRC of these events may permit the are sinaler to I 88.72(b)(1)(li), esc tpt are not reportable if they do not NRC to take some compensating that the reactor is shut down, the evader complete the minimum actuation logic. measures and to more completely assess should rc'se to the explanation of Operation of an ESF se part r,f n the consequences of such a loss should i 50.72(bg t)(ii) for more details on planned test or operational it occur during an accident or latent. evnledan need not be reported. cmergency. Forcyraph 30.72tb#2/ Althoush the flowever,if during the test or Examples of events that this criterion reporting anteria contained in the evolution the ESF metuates in a way that
, is intended to cover are those in which subparmymphs of 4 50.72(b)(2) were in is not part of the planned procedure.
any of the following are not available: the proposed rule. In resposes to public that actuation should be reported. For
- t. Safety parameter display system comment the Commission seeablished example,if the normNi retClor shutoown l
I iSP1)St. this "Non Emergency'* category for procedure requires that the control rods
- 2. Emergency Response Facilities those events with slightly less ar;.ency be inserted by a manual reactor inp. the IENFn). and less safety significance that may be reactor trip need not be reported.
3 Emergency communications reported within four t.ours instead of liowever, il conoitione deve'op during fanlities and equipment including the one hour. the shutdown tt et require un autoer.atic l'merwency Notification system lentil. Die Commiseen wants to obtain such reactor trip, such a reactne trip should
- 4. Pubhc prompt Notificntion Hystem reports frove persor.nel who were on be reported. ne fett that the safety mrlmimm sirens. shiR at the time of the event, when this j _ _ . _ _ _ ___ __ ___ _._ _ _ _ ___ . _ _ _
__ __ -- _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - __ _ ._ __ ___ __. 1 30034 Federal Register / Vol. 48. No.168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations service to perform meihtenance, and the criterion. For examplo. the Corrmininn l l ' sis soeumes that an ESF will is increastnaly concerned about the Ate automatically during an event Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration, and the system effect of a lose or deyadation of what does not eliminate the need to report or component is returned to service had been assumed to be nonessential that actuation. Actuations that need not inputs to safety systems.Therefore this be reported are those initiated for within the time limit specined in the reasons other then to mitigate the Technical Speci8 cations, the action paragraph also includes those cases need not be reported under this where a service (e.g., heeting. , consequences of an event (e.g., at the - discretion of the licensee as part of a paragraph. However,if, while the ventilation, and cooling) or input (e.g I planned procedure). component is out of service, the licensee compressed air) which is necessary for . identifies a condition that could have reliable or lonq-term operetion of a 3 Pier 43rWPh ga72(6g2#M)(proposed prevented the system from perfornung safety system is foot or depeded. Such
- its intended function (e.g.. the licensee loss or degradetica is reportable, if the i 50.72(b)(4)) has been revised and
; simplined. finds a set of relays thatis wired pre.per fulallment of the safety function The words "any instance of personal incorrectly), that condition must be is not or can not be assured. Failures i that affect inputs or services to systems error, equipment failure, or discovery of reported.
design or procedural inadequacies" that it should be noted that there are a that have no safety function need not be j sppeared in the proposed rule have been, limited number of single trein systems reported. repl:ced by the words " event or that perform safety functions (e.g., the Finally, the Commission recognius l j condition." Die simpli8 cation in High Pressure Coolant Inloction System that the licensee has to decide when language is intended to clarify what was in BWRs). For such systems. loss of the personnel actions could have prevented ]; a confusms phrase to many of those single train would prevent the fulfillment of a safety function. For 4 who commented on the posed rule. fulnilment of the safety function of that example, when en individual improperly Alsoin response to c comment, this system and, therefore, must be reported operates or maintains a component, that ' reporting requirement is a "Non- even though the plant Technical person might conceivably have made i Imergency" to be reported within four Speci8 cations may allow such a the same error for all of the functionally . houre instead of within one hour. condition to exist for a specified length redundant components (e.g.,if an l of time. Also,if a potentially serious individual incorrectly calibrates one Tais paragraph is based on the assumption that safety-related systems human erroris made that could have bistable amplifierin the Reactor cod structures are intended to mitigate prevented fulfillment of a safety Protection System, that person could the consequences of an accident. While function, but recovery factors resulted in conceivably incorrectly calibrate all 1
'Faph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) applies to the errcr being corrected, the error is histable amplifiers). However, for en d demands for actuation of an ESF. still reportable. event to be reportable it is necessary
( , agra 50.72(b)(2)(lii) covers an , no Commission recognites that the that the actions actually affect or event a safety system could have application of this and other paragraphs involve components in more than one
- failed to perform its intended function of this sectioninvolves a technical train or channel of a safety system, and because of one or more personnel errors, judgment b ifcensees. In this case, a the result of the actions must be i ..tchding procedure violations
- technical j ont must be made bl 'f e whether a fa or operator action that "",de",Q P , de f *alth
'h' and p'"p{c s, t of th j f pment failures; or design, anal sie,disabled one train of a safety system i
cation, constraction, or Public.The components can w l donciencies.The event shoube could utal . have, but did not. affect a redundant train. lf so, this would functionally redundant (e.g., two pumps reported regardless of the situation or in different t sine) or not functionally condition that caused the structm or constitute an event that "could have redundant (e 3.. the opere, tor correctly system to be unavailable. prevented" the fulfillment of a safety 8 top 8 e pump in Train ,A, and instead his reporting requirement is similar function, anu. accordingly, must be f shuttmg the pump discharge valve in 13 (no contained in i 50.73, thus orted. Train "A," he mistakenly shuts the reflecting public comment identifying 1f a component fails by an apparently pump discharge valve in Train ,,B ). the need for closer coordination of random mechanism,it may or may not Pbrugraphs 30.72(b)(2)(iv)(proposed reporting requirements between i 50.72 be reportable if the functionally 50.72(b)(6)) has been changed to clanfy and i 30.73.
- redundant component could fall by the the requirement to report releases of This paragraph includes those safety same mechanism. To be reportable. It is ' radioactive material.The paragraph is systeme designed to mitigate the necessary'that the failure constitute a similar to i 20.403 but places a lower consequences of en acchient (e.g.. condition where there is reasonable threshold for reporting events at containment teolaeon, emergency doubt that the functionally redundant commercial power reactors. The lower filtration). Hence, minor operational trein or channelwould remain threshold is based on the significance of events such as valve packing leaks. operational untilit completed its safety the breakdown of the licensee *s program which could be considered a lack of function or is repaired. For example,if a necessary to have a release of this size, control of radioactive material. should pump fails because ofimproper rather than on the significance of the not he reported under this paragraph. lubrication, there is a reasonable expectation that the functionally impact of the actual release.The System leaks or other similar events existing Ilcensee radioactive material ,
map however. be reportable under other redundant pump, which was also effluent release monitoring programs - paragraphs. improperly lubrtcated. would have also This paragraph does not include those failed before it completed its safety and their sesociated assessment s where a system or componentis function then the failure is reportable espabilities are sufficient to satisfy the { aved from service as part of a and the potential failure of the intent of 50.72(b)(2)(lv). functionally redundant pump must be Based upon public commerit and a pdaned evolution, in accordance with reported. reevaluation by the Corr. mission staff. en opptoved procedure, and in accordance with the plant's Technical lateraction between systems, the reporting threshold has been Spectfloations. For example,if the particularly a safety system and a non- changed from "25%" in the pesposed rule licensee removes part of a system from safety system is also included in this to "2 times"in the final rule and has
Federal Register'/ Vol. 48. No.168 / Monday. August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 39045 been reclassified as ar"Non. Emergency" respond because of media or public IJet of Subjects in 10 CFR Put 50 to be reported within four hours instead attention. Antitrust. Classified information. Fire
}} preventi n. Incorporation by reference.
1 this r phrtin requirement has he re n a enti i nc n d been changed to make a more uniformfrom the proposed rule, except for intergownmental Mahou. Nuclear requirement by referring to specific addition of the t'itle " Followup p wer plants and reactors. Penalty, release criteria instead of referring only Notification" and some renumbering. Radiation protection. Reactor siting to Technical Specifications that may criteria.Reporung and recordkeep,mg This paragraph is intended to provide very somewhat among facilities. the NRC with timely notification when requimmento Dis reporting requirement is intended an event becomes more serious or Pursuunt to the Atomic Energy Act uf to capture those events that may lead to additional information or new analyses 1954, as emended the Energy an accident situation where significant clarify an event. Reorganization Act of1974, as amended, amounts of radioactive material could his paragraph also permits the NRC and section 552 and $53 of Title 5 of the be released from the facility. Unplanned to maintain a continuous United States Code, the folloiving releases should occur infrequently; communications channel because of the amendments to Title *10. Chapter 1. Code however if they occur at he levels need for continuing follow up of Federal Regulations. Par: 50 are specified, at least moderate defects have information or because of ' published as a document subject to telecommunications problems. codification. pe a analcon rol sta ed to avoid their occurrence end. therefore, such IV. Regulatory Analysis events should be reported. PART 5t-DOMESTIC UCENSING OF Normal operating limita for reg at ry nel is on i e u a ion. NUCMN ANMWAN I radioactive effluent releases are based The analysis examines the costs and FACit.! TIES , on the limits of to CFR Part 20 which benefits of the Rule as considered by the estabilshes maximum annual average ' 1.The authority citation for Part 50 co ote sto c ntinues to read as follows: concentration in unrestricted areas.This reportmg requirement addresses o]{ssio
, , g, , (9 und Authority: Secs. 103.134.161.182.183.1 %
oncentrations averaged over s one copying for a fee at the NRC Public 189. 68 Stat. 936. 937,948. 953. 9R 955. 956 as our od and represents less t an Document Room.1717 H Street. NW amended, sec. 234. a3 Stat 1244, as amended 0.1% o e annus quantities Washington. D.C. Single copies of the analysis maybe obtained from Eric W. (42 0.S.C 2133, 2134. 2act. 2232. 2233. 223e. rm ioac i e ma i permitted to be 2230,2282): secs. 201. 202. 208. as Stat.1242. Weiss. Office ofInspection and 12 % 1248. as amended (42 U.S.C sa41,5842. Po gmph .?2(b/t2/(v)(proposed Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Saee se d rule 50.72(b)(7)) has three changes. The Corr.r seion. Washington. D.C. 20555. n as otje first eliminates the phrase " occurring Telep one (*,01) 492-4973. 601. sec.10,92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C 5851). onsite" because it is implied by the V. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Sectiuns so.sa. 50.91 and so.92 =lso issued scope of the rule.The second replaces under Pub. L 97-415. 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C
" injury involving radiation" with h information collection 2239 . Sunon so.7s also issued under sec.
" radioactively contaminated person." requirements contained in this final rule have been approved by the Office of 22. en Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C 2152). Sections "lliis change was made because of the 50.ao 50.at also iseued under sec.184. ee Stat.
difficulty in defining injury due to Management and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act. Pub. L 96-511 954 as amended (42 U.S.C. 22341. Sections rudiation. and more importantly. 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec.1an. ne because 10 CFR Part 20 captures events (clearance number 3150-0011). StoS5 H2 U.S.C 22'W. mvolving radiation exposure. VL Regulatory Flexibility Certification For the purposes of sec. 223. et Stat. 958. as The third change. In response to amended (42 U.S.C 2273). Il 50.10 (a). (bl. in accordance with the Regulutory public comment, was to make this and (c). 50.n 50.48. 50.44. 50.54. and 50 ao(al reporting requirement a four. hour Flexibility Act of 1980. 5 U.S.C. 805(b). are issued under sec. 1810. 08 Stat. 948, as notification,instead of one-hour the Commission hereby certifies that amended (42 U.S C 2201(bil. Il 50.10 lb) and notification. This change was made this reguletion will not have a (cl and 50.54 are issued under sec. toti. sa because these events have slightly less significant economic impact on a . Stat. 949. as amended (42 U.S.C 2201(ill: and safety significance than those required substantial number of small entities. Il So.55(el. so.59(bl. 50.70. 50.71. 50.72. a nd to be reported within one hour. This final rule affecn electric utilities so.7a are issued under sec.161o. 68 Stut. 950. Ibmgmph 50.72(b/(2//vil(not in that are dominant in their respective
, as amended (42 U.S C 2201(oll.
proposed rule) besides covering some service areas and that own and operate events such as release of radioactively nuclear utilization facilities licensed 2. A new paragaph (z)is added to contaminated tools or equipment to the under sections 103 und 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. us amended. i 50.54 to read as follows: public that may warrent NRC attention. I also covers those events that would, not The amendments clarify and modify 5 50.54 conistsons of scenses. otherwise warrant NRC attention except presently existing notification . . . . . for the interest of the news media, other requirements. Accordingly, there is no government agencies. or the public. In new. significant economic irrpact on (z) Each licensee with a utilization ( terms of its effect on licensecs, this is these licensees, nor do the affected facility licensed pursuant to sections 103 not u new reportir g requirement licensees fall within the scope of the or 104h. of the Act shallimmediately becats the threshold for reportmg definition of "small entities" set forth in nonfy the NRC Operations Center of the iniurio .c.nu radioactive release was the Regulatory Flexibility Act or within occurrimcc of any event specified in much lower Awr the proposed rule. the Small Busmesa Size Standards set i 50 72 of this purt. This entert.nwth capture thnne events forth in regulations issued by the Smnll previously reported under other criteria Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 3. Section 50.72 is revised tu read us when such events require the NRC to 121 follows:
3904s Federal Register / Vol. 48. No.168 / Monday. August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
* ' 72 Immediese noemessen $1n a condition not covered by the when averaged over a time period of emones for operosing nussear power plant's operating and emergency 4
l ' one hour. procedures. (a) Genem/ Anguimments.8 (1) Each
.sstB) Any liquid effluent release that glii) Any natural phenomenon or other exceeds 2 times the limiting combined nuclear power reactor under i 80.21(b) external condition that poses an actual or i 50.22 of this part shall motify the threat to the safety of the nuclear Maximum Permissible Concentration NRC Operosions Center via the (MpC)(see Note 1 of A ndix B to part power. plant or significantly hampers Emergency Notdication System of: . site personnelin the performance of 20 of this chePter) at the Point of entry (1)The declaration of any of tim '
Emergency Classes specified in the dutiu necessary for the safe operation of the plant -
",d ) r 1 e ionuclides licenese's approved Emergencyp lan:sor (iv Any event that results or should except tritium and dissolved noble l (ii) Of those non-Emergency events have)resultedin Emergency Core gases. when avenged over a time period l specified in paragraph tb) of the section. Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into of one hour. (Immediate notifications l (2)If the Emergency NotiAcation the reactor coolant systern as a result of made under this paragraph also satisfy System 1- inoperative, the licensee shall a valid signal. the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2)
(v) Any event that results in a and (b)(2) of I 20.403 of part 20 of this m:ke the required notincations via or commerical telephone service, other loss of emergency assessme:it chapter.) dedicated telephone system or any capability, otreite response capability, o (v) Any event requiring the transport cther method which will ensure that a communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room of a radioactively contaminated person repor:Is made as soon as practical to to an offsite medical facility for the NRC Operations Center.8 s +dication. Emergency Notification tnatment. (3)Thelicensee shallnotify the NRC tm. w dfsik nouBcadon syste). immediately after notification d &e } Any event that poses an a L_. - (vi) Any event or situation. related to t to the safety of the nuclear the health and safety of the public or
$ er t a o ebe e e pow 5 plant a signincantly hampers site onsite personnel, or protection of the peonneHn se pufennance ddodes envimnant. fu which a news release -
licensee declares one of the Emergency r 1.. necessary for the safe operation of the is planned or notification to other (4) When:nak a report under nulteer powerplant including Ares, toxic government agencies has been or will be ges releases, or radioactive releases. ph W eis d b (2) Four.Nour Aaporte. If not made. Such an event may include an eshalli stify: d onsite fatality or it. advertent release of ame Em - Cl-+-* w "d'-"'dr -"'-"" ad -'""' - l Eithw paragraph (b)(1) "One He"' NRC "." cst'."e'"2s!:'s"a@'.e" as soon se practical andin all (c) Followup Notification. With it." or paragraph (b)(2). "Four.How cases, within four hours of the respect to the telephone notifications hport." as the paragraph of this section occurrence of any of the following: made under paragraphs (a) and (b) of mquiring nodficaden of he Non- (1) Any event. found while the reactor this section,in addition to making the Emergency Event. is shutdown. that, had it been found required initial notification, each (b) Non Emeryency Events. (1) One- ~ while the reactor was in operation, licensee, shall during the course of the HourReports. lf not reported as a event: would have resulted in the nuclear decitretion of an' . g Clase powerplant. including its principal under para ph (e) of this section, the (1) Immediately report:(i) any further licensee sh 11 notify the NRC as soon as safety barriere, being seriously degraded degradation in the level of safety of the and in allcases within one or betag in an unanalysed cos.dition that plant or other worsening plant significantly compromises plant safety. conditions, including those that require l rur cf the occurrence of any of the g(ii) Any event or condition that results f'IINi"8: the declaration of any of the Emergency - m manual or automatic actuation of an (t)(A)The initiation of any nuclear Cl**** If *uch
- deelti n h** " t plant shutdown required by the plant's Engineered including the Reactor protection Safety Feature (ESF)' been System previously made. or (11) any change 1
Technical Specifications. ' (RpS). However. ectuation of an ESF. fran one Entergen@ ass 2 ander, w (B) Any deviatina flrom the plant's including the RpS. that results from and (Hi} a unninadon d ee Emrgeng Technical Specifications authorized is part of the preplanned sequence Class. - pursuant to i 50.54(x) of this part. during testing or reactor opwation need (2) Immediately sporte (i) the usults (11) Any event or condition during not be reported. of ensuing evaluations or assessments of , cperation that results in the condition of asp (iii) Any even't or condition that stone plant conditions, (ii) the effectiveness of the nuclear powerplant. Including its could have prevented the fulfillment of response or protective measures taken. principal safety barriers, being seriously the safety function of structures or and (iii) information related to plant degraded: or results in the nuclear systems that are needed to: behavior that is not understood. powerplant being: (A) Shut down the reactor and (3) Maintain an open. continuous
@)In a umanalysed condition that maintain it in a safe shutdown communication che'nnel with the NRC significantly compromises plant safety; condition. Operations Center upon request by the WWr!n a condition that is outside the -
(B) Remove residual heat. NRC. disign basis of the plant; or ) trolthe release of radioactive Deted: at W..hington. D.C. this 23d d.y of '
' w reem . ser n e.w noon a.n et (D)Mitiente the consequences of an August. t esa.
ny tw.en d .s r.uns nues e power accident. For the Nuclear itegulatory Commission. ( k IIENa* an * " "N" ' Ir$ ' Napphcable h concentrationsesof the " 2 se same.i1. chilt M ac "7, k'.*"'."her t m. tee
. i.e.,s specifled in Appendix B. Table 11 of Part limits 8*"Y 'M' C#""'"88i'*-
I" D'* **"" "**" al Operses eC nter (ana)est-esen 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, same coes tems.ews
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TITLE: UNPLANNED GASEOUS RELEASE * ( While transferring gas from the waste gas overhead surge tank to the waste gas decay tank, a pressure relief valve lifted. An estimated 120 cubic fiet of fission product gas, primarily Xenon, was released to the. atmosphere through the process vent stack. The durati'n o of the release was approximately five ainutes. The licensee calculated that a total of 46.4 curies of noble gas were released. The licensee reported that the release was 2.58 times the plant Technical Specification limit for an instantaneous release, but less than 1 percent of the quarterly Technical Specification limit. Comments: The event would be reportable if the release exceeded 2 times the applicable ~ concentrations specified in Appendix B, Table 2 of 10 CFR Part 20 averaged over a time period of one hour [50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)]. (5 . e ( _ _ ._ C-3A -__ ---- -
i e g TLE: UNPLANNED RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE GASES IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING While draining the reactor coolant system to the reactor coolant drain tank, to perform maintenance on the HPI nozzles, a release of noble gases, princi-pally Xe-133, occurred.' The gas and,a small quantity of liquid (approximately one gallon) escaped from a vacuum br'eaker in the nitrogen cover gas line located in the Auxiliary Building east decay heat cooler room. The release was initially identified by the room air monitor. The auxiliary building stack gas monitor increased to 1,000 counts per minute. Using the public address system, the licensee evacuated the minus 20-foot and minus 47-foot levels of the auxiliary building. The licensee estimates that the release rate was approximately 0.53 percent of the Technical Specification instan-taneous release rate limit. The licensee stopped draining the Reactor Coolant System and plans to correct the fault with the vacuum breaker before ~ continuing draining the system,
# mment:
(. l$ The event is not reportable if the release did not exceed the limits in Appendix B, Table II of 10 CFR Part 20 [50.73(a)(2)(viii)).
- 2. The event would be reportable if the release significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant [50.73(a)(2)(x)].
l
,_ma
f TITLE: RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECI The controlled radioactive gaseous release rate limit was exceeded fo 30 seconds during sakpling of the waste gas stripper surge drum at t l sample sink. An estimated 3.2 curies of mostly Xenon-133 was released, t e the controlled release rate listed in plant Technical Specifications by abo The licensee 60 percent. No particulate or Iodine radioactivity we.s released. estimated that the dose rate at the site boundary for a short period of An individual standing at the site boundary would l was 0.07 millirem per hour. l have received an estimated whole body dose of 0.001 millfrem. l l
! Comment:
i , 1. The event is reportable because a Technical Specification limit was l l violated (50.73('a)(2)(1)(B)].
;7< - ~ ~ ,
2. The event is not reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(viii) if the release did no j
.- exceed two times the applicable limit of Appendix B, Table II, of Pa when averaged over one hour.
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