ML20213F021
| ML20213F021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Fort Saint Vrain, Trojan |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1984 |
| From: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | James Keppler, Murley T, James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213E720 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-729 NUDOCS 8410180055 | |
| Download: ML20213F021 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES 3x d.
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s NT 1194 MEMORANDUM FOR: ThomasE.Murle[.RegionalAdministrator,RegionI James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator, Region II James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region IV John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V
.FROM:
Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
NEED FOR IMPROVED IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS TO THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER We have had two recent cases where a licensee has reported a significant event to the NRC Operations Center and not given the Headquarters Operations Officer
'a complete story.
The first event occurred at Fort St. Vrain on June 23, 1984, when the plant scrammed from 23% power.
It was 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after the initial notification before s~
the licensee told the Headquarters Operations Officer about a serious problem, namely, 6 of 37 control rods failed to insert.
The second event occurred on September 20, 1984, when the Trojan Nuclear Plant had a reactor trip and safety injection.
Despite a series of questions from the Headquarters Operations Officer, the licensee did not mention all the plant's problems, including (1) flow oscillations in the only operating safety-grade auxiliary feedwater pump and (2) a diesel generator that did not automatically start and would not manually start.
The licensee did not tell the Headquarters Operations Officer about a non-safety-grade auxiliary feedwater pump that was started.
I recommend that you consider enforcement' action for these two cases and any other similar instances. We cannot tolerate a licensee who knows, or should t
know, of safety problems and, for whatever reason, fails to notify the Head-
-quarters Operations Officer.
Without a complete story, a serious safety problem could get out of hand without responsible officials in headquarters knowing of the situation.
CONTACT:
Eric Weiss, IE 492-2973
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o Regional Administrators nNK18SDQ' I wish to add one more point regarding calls to the Headquarters Operations Officer.
From the licensee's perspective, the presence of the resident i
inspector in the control room may seem to eliminate the need for telling the Headquarters Operatio'ns Officer a complete story.
The licensee may think that because the resident inspector knows about an event, "The NRC knows"; so, there seems little point in telling the Headquarters Operations Officer. This is not the case.
I urge you to caution your resident inspectors and licensees that the presence of a resident inspector does not change the requirement for ensuring that the Headquarters Operations Officer is given complete information l
on plant problems following a reportable event.
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- 0'riginal Siened By l
R. C. Dc7oung" l
Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement i
I cc:
H. Denton, NRR l
J. Axelrad, IE G. Holahan, NRR
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