ML20214R914
| ML20214R914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/24/1983 |
| From: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Ottinger R, Simpson A, Synar M, Udall M HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REP., GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213E720 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-729 NUDOCS 8612080136 | |
| Download: ML20214R914 (39) | |
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AUG 2 4 1983 The Honorable Alan Simpson, Chairman Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulations g Committee on Environment and Public Work United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Enclosed for your information is a copy of a notice of rul aking to be published in the Federal Register.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is publishing a rule that amends its regulations which require timely and accurate information from licensees following significant events at licensed commercial nuclear power plants. The amended regulation (10 CFR 50.72) will clarify the list of reportable events and provide the Commission with more useful reports regarding the safety of operating nuclear power plants.
As part of this ~rulemaking, the Commission is also promulgating an amendment to 10 CFR 50.54, " Conditions of Licenses," in order to satisfy the intent of Congress as expressed in Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295.) This amendment would make the notification requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 a condition of each license for operating commercial nuclear power plants.
Sincerely,
' Original Signed B7 R. C. DeYoung" Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Notice of Rulemaking S "
IDENTICAL LETTER SENT T0:
e The Honorable Richard L. Ottinger DEPER File The Honorable Mike Synar EAB File RCDeYoung The Honorable Morris K. Udall JHSniezek ELJordan SASchwartz GFlanik EWeiss OCA /gy
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FE'DERAL ^ REGISTER NOTICE O
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NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIbN.
Immediate Notification Requirements of Significant Events At Operating Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations which require timely and accurate information from licensees following significant events at commercial nuclear power plants. Experience with existing requirements and public comments on a proposed revision of the rule indicate that the exist- -
ing regulation should be amended to clarify reporting criteria and to require
- early reports only on those matters of value to the exercise of the Commission's respo,nsibilities. The amended regulation will clarify the list of reportable events and provide the Commission with more useful reports regarding the safety p.-
of operating nuclear power plants.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1,1984 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555; Telephone (301) 492-4973.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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4 I. BACKGROUND
. On February 29, 1980, the Commission amended its regulations without prior notice and comment to require timely and accurate licensee reporting of information following significant events at cperating rutlear power reactors (45 FR 13434). The purpose of the rule was to provide the Ccb.ission with imediate reporting of twelve types of significant events where immediate Commission action to protect t'he pubiic health and safety may be required or; where the Commis,sion needs accurate and timely information to respond to height-ened public concern. Although the rule was made immediately effective, coments were solicited. Many commenters believed the rule was in some respects 'either vague and ambiguous or overly broad. .
After obtaining experience with notifications required by the rule, the #
Comission published in the Federal Register a not,1ce of proposed rulemaking on" December 21,1981 (46 FR 61894) and invited publi' ccomment. The proposal was made to meet two objectives: change 10 CFR 50.54 to implement Section 201 of the NRC's 19'80 Fiscal Year Authorization Act and change 1C CFR 50.72 to more clearly specify the significant events requiring licensees ,tb imediately notify NRC.
The problems and issues which this rulemaking addresses and the solutions that it provides can be sumarized in five broad areas:
- 1. Authorization Act for FY80 Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295) provides:
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"(a) Section 103 of the Atomic Ene'rgy Act of 1954 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
Each license issued for a utilization facility under this "f.
section or section 104b. shall require as a condition thereof that in case of any accident which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable .
limits.for normal operation established by the Comission, the licensee shall immediately so notify the Connission. Violation -
of the condi. tion prescribed by this subsection may, .in the Co=ission's discretion, constitute grounds for license revoca- '
tion. In accordance with section 187 of this Act, the Commis-sion shall promptly amend each license for a utilization facility . issued under this section or section 104b. which is
, in effect on the date of enactment of this subsection to include the provisions required under this subsection."
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- s Accordingly, this rulemaking includes an amendment to 10 CFR 50.54 that would add an appropriate notification requirement as a condition in the ,
operating license of each nuc1' ear utilization facility licensed under section -
103 or 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 552133,
. 2134b. These facilities generally are the comercial nuclear power facilitics
. which produce electricity for public consumption. Research and test reactors
, are no,t subject to the license condition as they are licensed under section 104a.
. .- or 104c. of the Act. Under trie amendment to 10 CFR 50.54, licensees falling under sections 103 or 104b. would be required, as a condition of their respective operating licenses, to notify the NRC immediately of events specified in 10 CFR 50.72. *
- 2. Unnecessary Reports Several categories of reports required by 550.72 are not useful to the NRC.
/cong these categories are reports of: worker injury, small radioactive releases, I
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._.- , l and minor security problems. For example, reports- are presently required if a. ;
worker onsite experiences chest pains or another illness not related to radiation and is sent to a hospital for evaluation; or if the vent stack monitor moves upward a few percent.yet radiation levels remain 100,'000 times below technical specification limits; or. if the security computer malfunctions for a few minutes.
This rulemaking eliminates such reporting requirements from !50.72 and in l general cladfies and narrows' the scope of reporting. However, revision of Part 73 of the Commission's. regulations is necessary to resolve all. problems with security reports.
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- 3. Terminology, Phrasing, and Reporting Thresholds .
The various sections of 10 CFR 50 have different phrasing, terminology, and thresholds'in the reporting criteria. Even when no different meaning is interided
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a change in wording can cause confusion.
This rulemaking has been carefully written to use terminology, phrasing, and reporting thresholds that are~ either identical to or similar to those in' l_50.73,'henever w possible. Other conforming amendments to Par'ts 20, 21, 73, and j . ,
in !50.55 and Appendix E of Part 50 are under development. ,
As a parallel activity to the preparation of $50.72, on July 26, 1983~, the Commis'sion has published a Licensee Event Report (LER) Rule (550.73) which requires lic'ensees for operating nuclear power plants to prepare detailed
- ~ written reports for certain events (48 FR 33850).
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- 4. Coordination with Licensee's Emergency Plan .
The current scheme for licensees' emergency plans includes four Emergency Classes. When the licensee declares on'e of the four Emergency Classes, it must report this to the Comiss' ion as required by 550.72. The lowest of the four ,
Emergency Classes, Notification of Unusual Event, has resulted in unnecessary emergency declarations. Events that fall within the Unusual Event class have
' been neither emergencies in themselves nor precursors of more serious events that are emergencies. ,
Although changes to.the definition of the Emergency Classes are not being made in, this rulemaking, a new reporting scheme that would ultimately eliminate
" Unusual Event" as an Emergency Class requiring notification can be adopted -
consistent with this rule. A proposed rulemaking which would redefine the ,
Emergency Classes in 550.47 is in preparation and may soon be published for public comment. This final rulemaking makes possible the elimination of " Unusual Event", as an emergency class without further amendment of 550.72 by including in the category of non-Emergencies the subcategory of "one-hour reports."
- 5. ' Vague or Ambiguous _ Reporting Criteria _
The reporting criteria in 550.72 have been revised in order to clarify their scope and intent. The criteria were revised for the proposed rule and in response to public comment. The " Analysis of Comments" portion of this Federal Register no', ice describes in more detail specific examples of changes in wording intended to eliminate vagueness or ambiguity.
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II. ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS ,
Twenty letters of comment were received in response to the Federal Register notice published on December 21[ 1981 (46 FR 61894)1 . Of the twenty letters of comment received, the vast majority (15 of 20) were from utilities owning or operatinc nuclear power plants. This Federal Register notice described the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72, " Notification of Significant Events," and 10 CFR 50.54, " Conditions of Licenses." A discussion of the more significant comments follows:
Conditions of Licenses (650.54)
A few commenters said that the " Commission already has the ability to
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enforce its regulations and does not need to incorporate the items as now proposed into conditions of license." ,
- The Commission has decided to promulgate the proposed revision of 550.54, .'
" Conditions of Licenses," in order to satisfy the intent of Congress as expressed in Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal 1 -
! Year 198'0. This Act and its relationship to 550.54 are discussed in detail in th? Federal Register notice for the proposed rule (46 FR 61894).
Coordination with other Reportino Reouirenents (Final Rule 950.72)
Seven commenters said that the NRC should coordinate the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 with other rules, with NUREG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and l
1 Copies of these documents are available for public inspection and copying for a fee the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N. W. , Washington, D. C. 20555
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. .J Evaluation of Radiological Emergency ' Response Plans and Preparedness in~ Support of Nuclear Plants," and with Regulatory Guide 1.16, " Reporting of Operating Information..." Many of these letters identified overlap, duplication, and
' inconsistency among NRC's reporting requirements.
The Commission is making a concerted effort to ensure consistent and ,
coordinated reporting requireJaents. The requirements contained in the revision of 10 CFR 50.72 are being coordinated with revision of 650.73,150.55(e),
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Appendix E of Part 50, 920.402, 573.71, and Part 21.
Citino 10 CFR 50.72'as a Basis for Notification (Final Rule 550.72(a)(4))
A ,few comenters objected to citing 550.72 as a basis when making a telephone notification. The letters of coment questioned the purpose, legal effect, and -
burden on the licensee.
- The Comission does not believe that it is an unnecessary burderi for a licensee to know and identify the basis for a telephone notification required by !50 72. There have been many occasions when a licensee could not tell the NRC whether the telephone notification was being made in accordance with Technical Specifications,10_CFR 50.72, some other requirement, or was just a courtesy call. Unless the licensee can identify the nature of the report, it is difficult for~the NRC to know what significance the licensee attaches to the
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report, and it becomes more difficult for the NRC to respond quickly and properly to the event.
Irrediate Shutdown (Final Rule 550.72(b)(1)(i))
Several correnters objected to the use of the term, "imediate shutdoOn,"
saying that Technical Specifications do not use such a term.
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The term is used in some but not all Technical Specifications. Consequently, the. Commission has revised the reporting criterion in question.
The final rule requires a report upon the initiation of any nuclear power plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. ,
plant Doeratino and Emeraency Procedures (Final P.ule %50.72(b)(1)(ii))
Several commenters said that the reporting criteria should not make reference to plant operati,ng and emergency procedures because:
- a. It would take operators too long to decide whether a plant -
condition was covered by the procedures,
- b. The procedures cover events that are not of concern to the NRC, and
- c. The procedures vary from plent to plant. 4 While the plant operating peysonnel should be familiar with plant proce-dures, it is true that procedures vary from plant to plant and cover events other than those which compromise plant safety. However, the wording of the' reporting criteria has been modified (650.72(b)(1)(ii) in the final rule) to narrow. the reportable events to those that significantly compromise plant safety.
Notwithstanding the fact that the procedures vary from plant to plant, the- ,
Commission has found that this criterion resu,lts in notifications indicative of serious events. The narrower, more specific wording will make it possible for
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plant operating personnel to identify reportable events under their specific .
operating procedures.
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Building Evacuation (Final Rule 650.72(b)(1)('iii))
Ten commenters said that the proposed 550.72(b)(6)(iii) regarding "any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled release resulting in evacuation of a
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- building" was unclear and ' counterproductive in that it could cause reluctance
~to evacuate a building. Nany of these conmenters stated that he reporting of ,
in-plant releases of radioactivity that require evacuation of individual rooms was inconsistent with the general thrust of the rule to require reporting of significant events. They noted that minor spills, small gaseous waste releases, or the disturbance of contaminated particulate natter (e.g., dust) may all require the temporary evacuation of individ'ual rooms until the airborne concen-tration,s decrease or until respiratory protection devices are utilized. They noted that these events are fairly common and should not be reportable unless -
the required evacuation affects the entire facility or a major part of it.
4 The Connission agrees. The wording of this criterion has been changed to include only those events which significantly hamper the ability of site person.nel in performance of duties necessary for safe operation.
. One commenter was concerned that' events occurring on land owned by the utility adjacent to its plant might be reportable. This is not the intent of this' reporting requirement. The NRC is concerned with the safety of plant and personnel on the' utility's site and not with non-nuclear activities on land acjacent to the plant.
Exslicit Threats (Final Rule ?50.72 (b)(1)(vi))
A few ccmmenters said that the intent of the term, " explicitly threatens,"
was unclear. Those commenting wondered what level of threat was involved. ' The
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tem, " explicitly threatens," has been deleted from the final rule. Instead, the. final rule refers to "any event that poses an actual. threat to the safety
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of the nuc1 ear power plant" [650.72(b)(1)(vi)] and gives examples so that it is clear the Commission is interested in real or actual threats as opposed to threats without credi,bility.
Notification Timing (Final Rule 650.72(b)(2))
The comment,ers generally had two points to make regarding the timing of reports to the NRC. First, the comments supported notification of the NRC after appropriate State or local agencies have been notified. Second,'two commenters-requested a new four-to six-ho.r report category for events not warranting a ,
report with one hour. ,
Allcwing more time for reporting some non-Emergency events would lessen the. impact of reporting on the individuals responsible for maintaining .the pl. ant in a safe condition. 1.imitiNg the extension of the deadline to four hours ensures that the report is made when the information is fresh in the minds of those involved and that it is more likely to be made by those ' involved rather than by ot.hers on a later shift.
Other, more significant.non-Emergency events and all declarations of an Emergency must continue to be reported within, one hour. The one-hour deadline is necessary if the Commission is to fulfill its responsibilities during and following the most serious events occurring at operating nuclear power plants.
A deadline shorter than one hour was not adopted because the Commission does not want to interfere with the operatorI s ability to deal with an accident or transient in the first few critical minutes.
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Therefore, based on these comments and its experience, the NRC has'
' establ.ished a "four-hour report," as was suggested. .
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' ReactoE Scrams (Final Rule 650.72(b)(2)(ii))
Several. commenters sa'id that reactor scrams, particularly.,those scrams below power operation, should not require notification of the NRC within one hour.
In response to these coments, the Comission has changed the reporting deadline to four hours. However, the Commission does not regard reactor scrams as "non-events," as stated in some letters of comment. Information related to reactor scrams has been useful in identifying safety-related problems. The
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Commission agrees that four hours is an appropriate deadline for this reporting -
requirement because these events are not as important to immediate safety as are some other events.
Radioactive Release Threshold. (Final Rule 650.72(b)(2)(iv))
Several commenters said that the threshold of 25% of allowable limits for radioactive releases was too low for one-hour reporting.
Based upon these coments and its experience, the Comission has changed the threshold of' reporting to those releases exceeding tw'o times Part 20 concen-
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trations when averaged over a period of one hour. This will eliminate reports of releases that represent negligible risk to the public.
The Commission has found that low level radioactive releases below two times Part 20 concentrations do not, in themselves, warrant imediate radiolo-gical response.
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[7590-01) 8 This paragraph requires the reporting of those events that cause an ,
unplanned or uncontrolled release of a significant amount of radioactive material ~
to offsite areas. Unplanned releases should occur infrequently; however, when they occur, at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational control established to avoid their occurrence and, therefore, these events should be reported.
Personnel Radioactive Contamination (Final Rule 650.72(b)(2)(v))
Several commenters objected to the use of vague terms such as " extensive onsite contamination" and "readily removed" in one of the reporting criteria of-the proposed rule. ,
Based on this comment, new criteria have been prepared that use more -
specific terms. For example, one new criterion requires reporting of "Any evsnt
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requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment." Experience with telephone notificati6ns made to the NRC Operations Center suggests that this new criterion will be easily-understo'od.
III. PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH EXPLANATION OF THE RULE Paraaraph 50.72(a) reflects some consoli,dation of language that was repeated in various subparagraphs of the proposed rule. In general, the intent and scope of this paragraph do not reflect any change from the proposed rule.
Several titles were added to this and subsequent sections. For example, paragraph 50.72(b) is titled "Non-Emergency Events" and it has two subpara-graphs: (b)(1), titled, "One-Hour Reports" and (b)(2), "Four-Hour Reports."
The events which have a one-hour deadline are those having the potential to escalate to an Emt-gency Class. The four-hour deadline is explained in the
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- analysis af parbgeoph(b)_(2).
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Paragraph 50.72 (b)(1)(1)(A) requires. reporting of "The initiation'of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications." Although- the intent and scope have not changed, the change in wording between the proposed and final rule is intended .to clarify that prompt notification is required once a shutdown is initiated. ,,
In response to public comment, the term "immediate shutdown" that was used in the proposed rule is not used in the final' rule. The term was vague and
, unfamiliar to those licensees who did not have Technical Specifications using the term. .
This reporting ~ requirement is intended'to capture those events for which.
Technical Specifications require the initiation of reactor shutdown. This will provide the NRC with early warning of safety significant conditions serious -
enough to warrant shutdown of the plant.
- Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(i)(B) was added to be consistent with existing. require-ments in 550.54(x) and the existing 550.72(c) as published in the Federal Register
. on Apr,il 1, 1983 (48 FR 13966) which require the licensee to notify the NRC Operations Center by telephone when the licensee departs from a license condition or technical specification.
Paragraph' 50.72(b)(1)(ii), encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events a6d some events. captured by proposed 550.72(b)(1) was added to
- provide for consistent, coordinated reporting requirements between this rule and 10 CFR 50.73 which has a similar provision. Public coment suggested that there
- should be similarity of terminology, phrasing, and reporting thresholds between (50.72 and $50.73. The intent of this paragraph is to capture those events where the plant, including its principal safety barriers, was seriously degraded ~or in
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an unanalyzed condition. For example, small voids in systems designed to remove heat from the reactor core which have been previously shown through analysis not to be safety significant need not be reported. However, the accumulation of voids that.could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly uryder natural circulation conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and would be reportable. In addition, voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indicatiori causing the operator to misunder-stand the true c,ondition of th'e' plant is also an unanaly7ed condition and should be reported.
The Coninission recognizes that the licensee may use engineering judgment -
and experience to determine whether an unanalyzed condition existed. It is no,t intended that this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters, -
or-to problems concerning single pieces of equipment. For example, at any tir6e, one or more safety-related components may be out of service due to testing, maintenance, or a fault that has not yet been repaired. Any trivial single failure or minor error in performing surveillance tests could produce a situa-tion in'which two or more often unrelated, safety-grade components are out-6f-service. Technically, this is an unanalyzed condition. However, these events should be reported only if they involve functionally relatad components or if they significantly compromise plant safety. When apply ng engineering i judgement, and there is a doubt regarding whether to report or not, the Commission's policy is that licensees should make the report.
Finally, this paragraph also includes material (e.g., metallurgical or chemical) problems that cause abnormal degradation of the principal safety barriers (i.e., the fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the c'ontainment). Examples of this type of situation include:
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, (a) Fuel cladding , failures in the reactor, or in the storage pool, that exceed expected values, or that are unique or widespread, or that are caused by unexpected factors, and would involve a release of significant quantities of
' fission products. ,
f (b) Cracks and break's in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestresse ,
concrete) or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc.).
, , (c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system. ,
(d) Serious temperature or pressure transients.
(e),
Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during operation. ,
. (f) Loss of containment ' function or integrity including: -
(i) containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits (ii) loss of containment isolation valve function during tests or operation,
. , (iii) loss of main steam isolation valve function during test or operation, or (iv) loss of containment cooling capability.
' Paraaraoh' 50.72(b)(1)(iii), encompassing a portion of proposed 50.72(b)(2),
was reworded to correspond to a similar provision of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii).
Making the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 similar in language increases the clarity of these rules and minimizes confusion The paragraph has also been reworded to make it clear that it applies only to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes) and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank carexplosion). References to acts of sabotage have been removed, since these G
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are covered by 673.71. In addition, threats to personnel from internal hazards ,
(e.g., radioactivity releases) that hamper personnel in the performance of 6
necessary duties are now covered by paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi). This paragraph covers those events involving an actual threat. to the plant from an external condition or natural, phenomenon, and where the threat or damace challenges the ability of the plant to continue to operate in a safe manner (including the crderly shutdown and maintenance of shutdown conditions). The licensee should decide if a phen,omenon or condition actually threatens the plant. For example, a minor brush fire in a remote area of the site that is quickly controlled by fire fighting personnel and, as a result, did not present a threat to the plant-
. should not be reported. However, a major forest fire, large-scale flood, or ,
major earthquake that presents a clear threat to the plant should be reported. -
As another example, an industrial or transportation accident which occurs near.
the site, creating a plant safety concern, should be reported.
Paraaraph 50.72(b)(1)(iv), encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events, reguires the reporting of those events that result in either i .
l autcmatic or manual actuation of the ECCS or would have resulted in activation of the. ECCS if some component had not failed or an operator action had not been taken.
For example, if a valid ECCS signal were, generated by plant conditions, and the operator were to put all ECCS pumps in pull-to-lock, though no ECCS
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discharge occurred, the event would be reportable.
i A " valid signal" refers to the actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ECCS initiation. Excluded from this reporting l
requirement would be those instances where instrument drift, spurious signals,
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human error, or other invalid signals caused actuation of the ECCS. However, such events may be reportable under other sections of the Commission's regulations based upon other details; in particular, paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii)
' requires a report within four hours if an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) is actuated. -
Experience with notifications made pursuant to 550.72 has shown that events involving ECCS discharge to the vessel are generally more serious than ESF actuations without discharge to the vessel. Based on this experience, the Comission has made this r.eporting criterion a "One-Hour Report."
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(v), encompassing' events previously classified as Unusual Events, covers those events that would impair a licensee's ability to deal with an accident or emergency. Notifying the NRC of these events may -
permit the NRC to take some compensating measures and to more completely assess the consequences of such a loss should it occur during an accident or emergency.
Examples of events that this criterion is intended to cover are those
, in whi,ch any of the following are not available:
- 2. Emergency Response Facilities (ERF's).
- 3. Emergency comunications facilities and equipment including the.
Emergency Notification system (ENS).
- 4. Public prompt Notification System including sirens.
- 5. Plant monitors necessary for accident assessment.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi), encompassing some portions of the proposed
!!50.72(b)(2) and (6), has been revised to add the phrase, " including fires,
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toxic gas releases, or radioactive releases." This addition covers the
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"e'vacuation" portion of paragraph 50.72(b)(6)(iii) of the proposed rule. This ,
! change in wording for the final rule was made in response to public coments I discussed above.
While paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(iii) of the final rule primarily captures acts of nature, paragraph.50.72(b)(1)(vi) captures other events, particularly acts by personnel . The Comission believes this arrangement of the reporting criteria in the final rule lends itself to more precise interpretation and is consistent with those ;bli,c comments that requested closer coordination between the reporting requirements in this rule and other portions of the Comission's regulations.
This provision requires reporting of events, particularly those caused by, acts of personnel, which endanger the safety of the p. ant or interfere with -
personnel i.i perfomance of duties necessary for safe plant operations.
- The. licensee must exercise some judgment in reporting under this section. ~
For example, a small fire on site that did not endanger any plant equipment and that did not and could not reasonably be expected to endanger the plant, is not reportable.
' Paracraph 50.72(b)(1) of the proposed rule was split into %50.72(b)(1)(ii) and 650.72(b)(2)(i) in the final rule in order to permit some type of reports to be made witnin four hours instead of one hour because these reports have less safety significance. In terms of their combined effect, the overall intent and scope of these paragraphs have not changed from those in the proposed rule. Since l the types of events intended to be captured by this reporting requirement are similar to $50.72(b)(1)(ii), except that the reactor is shut down, the reader should refer to the explanation of 650.72(b)(1)(ii) for more details on intent.
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Paragraph 50.72(b)(2) .
Although the reporting criteria contained in the subpa agraphs of
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s50.72(b)(2) were in the proposed rule, in response to public coment the
' .Comission established this "Non-Emergency" category for those events with slightly less urgency and'less safety significance that may be. reported within ,
four hours instead of one hour.
The Comission wants to obtain such reports from personnel who were on
, . ' shift at the time of the event, when this is possible, because these personnel will have a better knowledge of the circumstances associated with the event.
Reports made within'four hours of the event'should make this possible while not imposing.the more rigid more one hour requirements.
The reporting requirement' in paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(i) is similar to a -
requirement in 550.73. Moreover, except for referring to a shutdown reactor, this reporting requirement is also similar to the "One-Hour Report" in ESO.72(b)(1)(ii).
However this- paragraph applies to a reactor in shutdown condition. Events within, this requirement have less urgency and can be reported within four hours as a "Non-Emergency."
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) (proposed 50.72(b)(5)) is made a "Non-Emergency" in response to public comment, because the Commission agrees that the covered events generally ~have slightly.less urgency and safety significance than those events included in the "One-Hour Reports."
The intent and scope of this reporting requirement have not changed from the proposed rule. This paragraph is intended to capture events during which an ESF actuates, either manually or automatically, or fails to actuate. ESFs are provided to mitigate the consequences of the event; therefore, (1) they
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should work properly when called upon and (2) they should not be challenged ,
unnecessarily. The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was
~
needed to mitigate the consequences of. the event (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF operated unnecessarily.
" Actuation" of multichannel ESF Actuation Systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic. Therefore, single channel actuations, whether caused by failures or otherwise, are not reportable if they do not complete the minimum actuation logic.
Operation of an ESF as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported. However, if during the test or evolution the ESF ' actuates in a way that is not part of the planned procedure, that actuation should be ,
reported. For example, if the normal reactor shutdown procedure requires that -
the, control rods be inserted by a manual reactor trip, the reactor trip need -
not be reported. However, if conditions develop during the shutdown that require an automatic reactor trip, such a reactor trip should be reported. The fact that the safety analysis assumes that an ESF will actuate automatically' during a'n event does not eliminate the need to report that actuation. Actuations that'need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event-(e.g., at the discretion of the licensee as part
- of a planned procedure). .
Paracraph 50.72(b)(2)(iii) (proposed 50.72(b)(4)) has been revised and simplified. - -
The words "any instance of personal error, equipment failure, or discovery of design or procedural. inadequacies" that appeared in the proposed rule have been replaced by the words " event or condition." This simplification in language
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i:i intended to clarify what was a confusing phrase to many of those who
' conrnented on' the proposed rule. Also in response to public comment, this reporting requirement is a "Non-Emergency" to be reported within four hours
~
' instead of within one hour.
This paragraph is bas'ed on the assumption that safety-related systems ,
and. structures are intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident. While paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) applies to ' actual demands for actuation of an ESF,
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. paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(iii) covers an event where a safety system could have failed to perfonn its intended function because of one or more personnel errors, including procedure" violations; equipment failures; or design, analysis, fabrica, tion, construction, or procedural deficiencies. The event should be ,
reported regardless of the situation or condition that caused the structure or -
system to be unavailable. , ,
This reporting requirement is similar to one contained in 550.73, thus
. reflecting public comment identifying the need for closer coordination of
. report.ing requirements between 550.72 and $50.73.
This paragraph includes those safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (e.g., containment isolation, emergency filtration).
Hence, minor operational events such as valve packing leaks, which could be considered a lack of control of radioactive material, should not be reported under this paragraph. System leaks or other similar events may, however, be reportable under other paragraphs.
This paragraph does not include those cases where a system or component is removed from service as part of a planned evolution, in accordance with an approved procedure, and in accordance with the plant's Technical Specifications.
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Fo'r example, if the licensee removes part of a system from service to perform maintenance, and the Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration, and the system or component is returned to service within the time limit speci-fied in the Technical Specifications, the action need not be reported under this pa ra graph. However,,if, while the component is out cf service, the licensee identifies' a condition that could have prevented the system from perfoming its intended function (e.g., the licensee finds a set of relays that is wired incorrectly), th,at condition must be reported.
It should be noted that there are a limited number of single-train systems that perform safety functions (e.g., the High Pressure Coolant Injection System-inBWRs). For such systems, loss of the single train would prevent the fulfill-ment of the safety function of that system and, therefore, must be reported even -
though the plant Technical Specifications may allow such a condition to exist'
. for. a specified length of time. Also, if a potentially serious human error is ~
made that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, but ricovery factors resulted in the error being corrected, the error is still reportable.
The' Comission recognizes that the application of this and other paragraphs of this section involves a technical judgment by licensees. In this case, a technical judgment must be made whether a failure or operator action that -
disabled one train of a safety system could tave, i but did not, affect a redundant train. If so, this would constitute an event that "could have prevented" the fulfillment of a safety function, and, accordingly, must be. reported.
If a component fails by an apparently random mechanism, it may or may not be reportable if the functionally redundant component could fail by the same mechanism. To be reportable, it is necessary that the failure constitute a 9
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condition where there is reasonable doubt that the functionally redundant train .or channel would remain operational until it completed its safety function or is repaired.. For example, if a pump fails because of improper V .
' lubrication, there is a reasonable expectation that the functionally redundant pump, which was-also improperly lubricated, would have also failed before it .
completed its safety function, then the failure is reportable and the potential failure of the functionally redundant pump mus+. be reported.
Interaction between systems, particu.arly a safety system and a non-safety system, is also included in this criterion. For example, the Commission is increasingly concerned about the effect of 'a loss or degradation of what had been assumed to be nonessential inputs to safety systems.
Therefore, this
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paragraph also includes those cases where a service (e.g., heating, ventilation, -
and cooling) or input (e.g., compressed air) which is necessary for reliable or long-tenn operation of a safety system is lost or degraded. Such loss or. ,
degradation is reportable, if the proper fulfillment of the safety function is
. not or,can not be assured. Failures that affect inputs or services to systems l that have no safety function need not be reported.
I Finally, the Comission recognizes that the licensee have to decide when personnel actions could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. For example, when an individual improperly operates or maintains a component, that person might conceivably have made the same error for all of the functionally redundant components,(e.g., if an individual incorrectly calibrates one bistable f
l amplifier in the Reactor Protection System, that person could conceivably inccrrectly calibrate all bistable amplifiers). However, for an event to be reportable it is necessary that the actions actually affect or involve components
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[7590-01]
in'more than one train or channel of a safety system, and the result of the .
actions must be undersirable from the perspective of protecting the health and safety of the public. The components can be functionally redundant (e.g., two pumps in different trains) or not functionally. redundant (e.g., the operator correctly stops a pump in Train "A" and, instead of shutting the pump discharge valve in Train "A," he mistakenly shuts the pump discharge valve in Train "B").
- Paraaraohs 50.72(b)(2)(iv) (proposed 50.72(b)(6)) has been changed to clarify the requ,irement to report releases of radioactive material. The paragraph is similar to 620.403 but places a lower threshold for reporting events at commercial power reactors. The lower th.eshold is based on the significance of the breakdown of the licensee's program necessary to have a release of this size, rather than on the significance of the impact of the -
actual release. The existing licensee radioactive material effluent release -
monitoring programs and their associated assessment capabilities are sufficient
- to satisfy the intent of 50.72(b)(2)(iv).
Based upon public comment and a reevaluation by the Coninission staff, the
,' reportin'g threshold has been changed from "25"." in the proposed rule to "2 times" in the. final rule and has been reclassified as a "Non-Emergency" to be reported within four hours instead of within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Also this reporting requirement has been, changed to make a more uniform requirement by referring to specific release criteria instead of referring only to Technical Specifications that may vary somewhat among facilities.
! This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that may lead to an accident situation where significant amounts of radioactive material 1
[7590-01]
could be released from the facility. Unplanned releases should occur infre-quently; however, if they occur at the levels specified, at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational control established to avo d their occurrence and, therefor'e, such events should be reported.
Normal operating limits for radioactive effluent releases are based on ,
the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 which establishes maximum annual average concen-trations in unrestricted areas. This reporting requirement addresses concen-trations averaged over a one hour period and represents less than 0.1% of the annual quantities of radioactive materials permitted to be released by 10 CFR Part 20.
Paraaraph 50.72(b)(2)(v) (proposed rule 50.72(b)(7)) has three changes. ,
The first eliminates the phras'e " occurring onsite" because it is implied by the -
scope of the rule. The second replaces " injury involving radiation" with,
" radioactively contaminated person." This change was made because of the diffi-culty in defining injury due to radiation, and more importantly, because 10 CFR Pa.rt 20 captures events involving radiation exposure.
The third change, in response to public comment, was to make this reporting requirement a four-hour notification, instead of one-hour notification.
This~ change was made because these events have slightly less safety significance than those required to be reported within one hour.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(vi) (not in proposed rule) besides covering some events such as release of radioactively contaminatsd tools or equipment to the public that may warrent NRC attention, also covers those events that would not otherwise warrant NRC attention except for the interest of the news media, other government agencies, or the public. In terms of its effect on licensees, t .
[7590-01]
. .\
th'is is not a new reporting requirement because'the threshold for reporting injuries and radioactive releases was much lower under the proposed rule. This criterion will capture those events previously reported under other criteria when such events require the NRC to respon'd because of media or public attention.
Paracraoh 50.72(c) (proposed 50.72(c)) has remained essentially unchanged from the proposed rule, except for addition of the title " Followup Notification" and some renumbering.
This paragraph is intended to provide the NRC with timely notification when an event becomes more serious or add'itional information or new analyses clarify an event.
. This paragraph also permits the NRC to maintain a continuous communications channel because of the need for continuing follow-up infomation or because of. -
telecomunications problems. .
IV. REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The analysis' examines the costs and benefits of the Rule as considered by the Commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis .is available for inspection and l
copying for a fee at the NRC.Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. Single copies of the analysis may be obt,ained from Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C..
20555, Telephone (301) 492-4973. . .
V .. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The information collection requirements contained in this final rule have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub, L.96-511 (clearance number 3150-0011).
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VI. ,
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605
-(b), the Comission hereby certifies that this regulation will not have a
' significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule affects electric utilities that are dominant in theJr respective ,
service areas and that own'and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under sections 103 and 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The
.' amendments clarify and modify presently existing notification requirements.
Accordingly, there is no new, significant economic impact on these licensees, nor do the affected' licensees fall within the scope of the definition of "small entitie,s'.' set forth in the' Regulatory Flexibility Act or within the Small ,
Business Size Standards set forth in regulations issued by the Small Business -
Administration at 13 CFR Part 121. ,
VII. LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 A,ntitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors.
Penalty, Radiation Protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting requirements.
~ Pursuant 'to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as anended, the Energy Reorgani-zation Act of 1974, as amended, and section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50,are published as a document s0bject to codification.
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PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF ,
PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
.1. The author,ity citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189,15;8 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); sets. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat.
1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.
Section 50.1 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec.10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.58, 50.91 and 50.92 also issued under Pub.
L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued un' der -
sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued .
under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C 2236). ,
for the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42.U.S.C. 2273),
5650.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44,50.46,50.48,50.54,and50.80(a)are' issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); {550.10(b) and (c)and'50.54areissuedundersec. 1611,, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.
220111)); and 5650.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, and 50.78 are issued
( under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)). -
- 2. A new paragraph (z) is added to 550.54 to read as follows:
950.54 Conditions of licenses.
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. (z) Each licensee with a utilization facility licensed pursuant to sections
' 103 or 104b. of the Act sh'all imediate'ly notify the NRC Operations Center of the occurrence of any . event specified in !50.72 of this part. -
- 3. Section 50.72 is revised to read as follows:
{50.72 Imediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power
. reactors.
(a) General Reouirements.1 (1) Each nuclear power reactor licensee licensed under 550.21(b) or ,
550.22 of this part shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System of:
(i) The declaration of any of, the Emergency Classes specified in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan;2 or (ii) Of those non-Emergency events specified in paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required notifications via commercial telephone service, other dedicated tel.ephone system, or any other method which will ensure that a report is made as soon as practical to the NRC Operations Center.3 1
Other requirements for immediate notification of the NRC by licensed operating nuclear power reactors are contained elsewhere in this chapter, in particular,
!20.205, 520.403, s50.36, and 573.71. -
2 These Emergency Classes are addressed in Appendix E of this Part.
3 Comercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center ic (202) 951-0550.
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l (3) The licensee shi.ll notify the NRC imediately:af ter notification of the
. appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes. -
(4) When making a report under paragraph {a)(3) of this section', the license ~e shall identify':
.t (i) The Emergency Class declared; or -
(ii) Either paragraph (b)(1) "One-Hour Report," or paragraph (b)(2)',
"Four . Hour Report, as the paragraph of this section requiring notification of the Non-Emergency Event.
4 (b) Non-Emergency Events _.
(1) One-Hour Reports. If not' reported as a declaration of an Emugency Class under paragraph (a) of this section, the. iicenss shall notify. -
the NRC as soon as practical and in'all cases withir eone hour of ths occurrence of any of the following:
(i) (A) The initiction of any nuc h ar plant shutdoAn required bi the i plant's Technical Specifications.-
(B) Any deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications authorized pursuant to $50.54(x) of this part.
, (ii) Any event or condition during operation that.results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its pri.ncipal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or results in the nuclear power plant being:
(A) In an unanalyzed condit$on that significantly compromises plant safety; (B) In a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant; or (C) Inaconditionnotcoveredbytheplant'soperatingandemergency procedures.
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,(iii) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that poses an actual threat' to the safety of the nuclear power plant or signifi-cantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary
'~
for the safe operation of the plant.
(iv) Any event that results or should have resulted in Emergency Core ,
Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal.
(v) dny event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offs.ite response capability, or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system). , ,
(vi) Any event that poses an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear -
power plant or significantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power. plant including fires, toxic gas releases, or radioactive releases.
(.2 ) Four-Hour Reports. If not reported under paragraphs (a) or (b)(1) of this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as prac-tical and in all ca.ses, within four hours of the occurrence of any of the'following:
(i) Any ev5nt, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety ba-riers, being seriously degraded or being in an unanalyzed cundition that significantly compromises plant safety.
(ii) Any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection i
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[7590-01]
j _
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I c System (F.PS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that results from and is part of the preplanned sequence during testing or-reactor operation n.eed not be reported.
(iii) Any event or' condition that alone could have prevented the fulfill-ment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Contro,1 the release of radioactive material, or
'(D)~ Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
(iv) (A) Any airborne radioactive release that exceeds 2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B, .
Table II of Part 20 of this ch.Lpter in unrestricted areas, when -
averaged over a time period of one hour.
. . (B) Any liquid effluent release that exceeds 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) (see Note l'of Appendix,B to Part 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry in.to the' receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for a11 radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour. (Immediate notifications made under this paragraph also satisfy the requirements of pa,ragraphs (a)(2) and (b)(2) of 520.403 of Part 20 of this chapter.)
(v) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated ,
person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.
(vi)' Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protect. ion of the environment, for which a news release'is planned or notification to other government agencies has beer: or will be made. Su:h an event may include an onsite fatal.ity
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3 or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.
(c) Followup Notification. With respect to the telephone notifications
. 'made under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, in addition to
~ ~
making the required initial notification, each licensee, shall during the course of th'e event: ,
,(1) Imediately report: (i) any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions, including those that require the declaration of. any of the Emergency Classes, if such a declaration has not been previously made,.or (ii) any change from one Emergency' Class to another, or (i'ii) a termination of the Emergency Class. ,
(2) Imediately report: (i) the results of ensuing evaluations or -
assessments of plant conditions, (ii) the effectiveness nf response or ,
protective measures .taken, and (iii) information related to plant behavior that is not understood.
(3) Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC.
Dated at Washington, D.C., this day of ,198 .
~
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Samuel J. Cnilk, Secretary of the Comission.
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P'U B L I C ANNOUNCIMINT
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NRC ADOPTS CHANGES TO I}NEDIATE REPORTING REQUIRE!!ENTS FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AT NUCLEAR' POWER' PLANTS .
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. Th'e Nuclear Regulatory Commission is changing its ,, ,
regulations to provide further guidance to operators of . . .
nucleltr power plants on significant events that must be '
. . ~ :
reported i==pdiately -by telephone to the NRC Operations -
Center in 3ethesda, Maryland.
On December 21, 1981, the Commission published a pro-posed rule to revise and clarify its notification require-cents-issued on Februar'y 29, 1980. Experience with the exis. ting. requirements and public comments on the changes proposed in 1981 indicate that the regulations should bs -
amended to clarify reporting criteria and require early reports only on matters of value to the exercise of the
~
Commission's responsibilities. .
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Several categories of events required to be reported E-ithin one hour have been found to be not useful on an inmediate basis. Examples include worker injury not related 1
t uo radiatign," small releases of radioactive material below the limits permitted by the license and minor security problems such as a short malfunction of the security computer.
O I
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Under the new regulations, a . licensee cust notify 'the
' ~
NRC Operations Center within one hour after it declares an e'nergency pr takes actions that deviate'from license conditions
, .. or' technical specifications but are in=tiiately needed to protect the public health and safety during an energency. ~
The licensee also must notify the Operations Center within ene hour -after one cf the fc11owing nen-energency ccnditiens occurs: .
. '(1) The initiation of any nuclear -power plant shutdown required by the plant's operating license; (2) Any event or condition during cperaticn that results .
in the condition of the plant.being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety, a condition outside the-design basis of the plant or a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency pro'cedures; (3) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that poses an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear*
pcwer plant or significantly hampers site perscnnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant; O
e
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(4) Any event that results cq should have resulted in an emergency core cooling system discharge into the rea,ctor j
coolant system as a result of a valid signal;!
/
'(5) Any event that results in a major loss of emer,gency assessment,off-site response or connunications capability; -
(6) Any event that threatens the safety of the plant or significantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary- for the safe operation of the plant, including fires, toxic gas releases or radioactiv'e releases. .
~ ~
In addition, the licensee must notify the NRC within four hours of certain other events, such as an occurrence requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated
~
person to an offsite medical fa'cility for treatment. .
Further details on the revised requirements, which are contained in Part 50 of the Commission's regulations, are provided in a Federal Register notice published on l
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- %g UNITED STATES P I 3 -
- % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 3- g WASHINGTON, D. C. 205S5
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9-7 NOV 151983 < .'
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Greger, Section Chief N' '
Emergency Preparedness & Radiological Safety Branch Region III FROM: LeMoine J. Cunningham, Section Chief Section 2, Operating Reactor Programs Branch Division of Quality Assurance, Safeguards, and Inspection Programs, IE
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION GUIDANCE - 50.72 On October 20, 1983, Paul Lovendale requested clarification of several aspects of the new 50.72 notification requirements. The questions related to the requirement that lictnsees call in notification of radioactive releases that exceed the specified concentrations. Specifically, the questions were: 1) what meteorological data should be used in determining offsite concentrations? (e.g.,
annual average, real time or worse case?) and 2) what location should be used?
(e.g., unrestricted area as defined by Part 20 or the expanded definition as specified in NUREG-0133?).
In addition, you noted that the revised 50.72 was incorporated into the 10 CFR by Supplement No.12 issued September 20, 1983, although the rule change is not effective until January 1,1984. You note that a currently effective
- version is not in the 10 CFR.
l Inspection guidance for operating nuclear power reactors concerning 50.72 is
! as follows:
- 1. Annual average meteorological data should be used for determining offsite airborne concentrations of radioactivity. This is to maintain consistency with the tech specs.
- 2. The expanded definition of an unrestricted area as specified in NUREG-0133 should be used. This is to maintain consistency with the tech specs.
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Robert Greger NOV 151983
- 3. - The lack-of a currently effective version of 50.72 in the 10 CFR loose-leaf version is an administrative problem only. Licensees and inspectors should keep the old pages for reference until January 1,1984. The old version is
~
still the effective rule until January and deviation from those require-ments in favor of the new requirements would be a technical violation.
However, in such a case, notation in the inspection report without further enforcement action would be the appropriate approach.
Appropriate NRR, Admin, ELD and IE representative were consulted ring the formulation of this guidance. .
L,M . nninghamv ection Chief S ion 2, Operating eactor Programs Branch Division of Quality Assurance, Safeguards, and Inspection Programs, IE cc: J. Partlow, IE -
E. Jordan, IE W. Fisher, IE E. Flack, IE F. Congel, NRR R. Bellamy, RI A. Gibson, RII C. Paperiello, RIII R. Hall, RIV F. Wenslawski, RV P. F. McKee, IE 4
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E' UNITED STATES (ig$.,".fj g.7 f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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/ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 up //e 3 J o .- E~.wsL Fnn .- E_ g4 Fe < =, <~Jsh /
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