ML20214R804

Proposes Meeting on 830309 to Discuss 10CFR50.72.Revised 10CFR50.72 Reflecting Course of Action Outlined in CRGR Meeting Encl

ML20214R804
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/04/1983
From:	Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:	Eisenhut D, Olmstead W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
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Download: ML20214R804 (36)

Text

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.TfMb MAR 0 41983 MEMORANDUM FOR: W. J. Olmstead, ELD D. G. Eisenhut, NRR FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

650.72, IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION Pursuant to the discussion of the recent CRGR meeting, I proposed that we meet to discuss $50.72 on March 9 at 9:00 a.m. in my office.

Please find enclosed a copy of the revised $50.72 reflecting the course of action that I outlined in the CRGR meeting.

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Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Encicsure: Revised 450.72 cc w/ enclosure:

F. Hebdon, AE00 J. T. Beard, NRR J. Cawley, ADM C. J. Heltemos, AEOD 0612080095 eM2M PDR c g3 hKA 29

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e NUCLEARREGULATORYC0blSSION 10 CFR Part 50 Immediate Notification Requirement .

For Operating Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission is amending its regulations which require imediate notification of significant events at licensed comercial

., nuclear power plants in light of experience with existing requirements and p'ublic coments on a proposed revision of the rule. The existing regulation uses reporting criteria that licensees have sometimes found vague and that the Comission has sometimes found to result in notifications of little value. The amended regulation will clarify the list of reportable events and provide the Commission with more meaningful reports regarding the safety of operating nuclear power plants.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555; Telephone (301)492-4973.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

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. I. BACKGROUND On December 21, 1981, the Commission published in the Federal Register a noticeofproposedrulemaking(46FR61894),andinvitedpubliccommentonthat rulemaking. The proposed rulemaking considered: (1) The incorporation of the immediate notification requirements of $50.72 into $50.54 as a condition of every operating license to implement the provisions of section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295),(2) certain clarifications and refinements of the reporting requirements contained in 150.72.

Licensees are now subject to certain notification requirements, both as to

, the contents of their applications for operating licenses and to actions authorized by the operating licenses. All applications foi licenses under sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act (Act) of 1954 as amended, 42 USC 2133, are now required by 650.54 to include emergency plans that contain the various elements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. These section 103 and 104b facilitites are the commercial nuclear power facilities that produce electricity for public consumption. Research and test reactors are not subject to these notification requirements as they are licensed under section 104a and 104c of the Atomic Energy Act. Section IV of Appendix E , requires the plans to include procedures for notifying local, state and Federal officials. Once an t

operating license under section 103 and 104b is granted, the licensee is required by 10 CFR 50,72 to actuate immediate notification procedures upon the occurrence ~

of any of the specific "significant events" described in 150.72, Since the enactment of section 201, the liRC has provided further guidance to operating licensees as to situations or events which require notificatien by t

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. emergency personnel. On August 19, 1980, the NRC published a final rule on emergency planning, effective on November 3,1980(45FR55402). This rule established a multifaceted emergency planning and preparedness program and, among other things, required procedures to be established for immediate notif.ication of the NRC and State, and local emergency response personnel in certain situations.

These situations were discussed in Revision 1 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants" (hereinafter Revision 1"), wh'ich was issued in November 1980, shortly after the Emergency P'1anning rule became effective.1 Revision 1 specified four classes of Emergency Action Levels involving notification actions--Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. Revision 1 also set forth examples of initiating conditions for each of these four Emergency Classes.

The rationale for the notification of Unusual Event is to provide early and v prompt notification (minof events which could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more I

Copies of NUREG documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C. 20555. Copies may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555.

Attention: Publications Sales Manager

[7590-01)

A serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. The Alert emergency class

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7;- & w reflects events which involve an actual [ & * &r potentiaT,' substantia the level of the safety of the plant. The Site Area Emergency c! ass reflects conditions where some significant releases are likely or are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based on current information. In this situation full mobilization of emergency personnel in the near-stte environs is indicated as well as dispatch of monitoring teams and associated communications.

The General Emergency class involves actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment.

As discussed in the proposed rule, the criteria set forth in Revision 1 and the examples of events triggering the respective Emergency Classes (with attendant notification actions) provide additional guidance for every operating licensee in the preparation, approval, and ultimately, the implementation of their emergency preparedness plans which must be submitted to NRC for evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47.

The revision of $50.72 promulgated by this rulemaking reflects a continuing effort to achieve consistent terminology, phrasing, and thresholds in the reporting criteria of various portions of the Ccmmission's regulations.

Nevertheless,thisrevisionof650.72capturesashon-EmergencyEventsjsom ko- events falling within the " Unusual Event" category of the Emergency Classes defined in CFR Part 50, Appendix E.

This was done with the purpose of preparing the foundation of a new reporting scheme that would ultimately eliminate

" Unusual Event" as an Emergency Class. However, since the tubject of this rulemaking is not emergency planning another rulemaking will be required to delete " Unusual Event" from Emergency Classes. Proposed Rulemaking regarding emergency planning is in preparation and will be forthcoming soon.

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, The' NRC considers that incorporation of the immediate notification requirements of $50.72 into $50.54 as a condition in every operating license granted under sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act will implement the Congressional mandate in section 201 of the Authorization Act. Section 201, however, also provides that immediate notification of the NRC be made fo accident which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits of normal operation established by the NRC."

The provision would be implemented by the changes proposed to 650.72 als contained in this notice.

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Besides ammending 550.54 and $50.72, the subjects of the rulemaking, the NRC is developing a new 150.73 " Licensee Event Report Syetem" (47 FR 1954 The reporting requirement of $50.72 are being coordinated with those of $50.73 in order to use similar phrasing and reporting thresholds in the two regulations, 11 ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS Twenty letters of comment were received in response to the Federal Register Notice published on December 21, 1981 (46 FR 61894)2 This Federal Register notice described the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72 "Not'ification of Significant Events" and 10 CFR 50.54 " Conditions of Licensees." A discussion of the more significant comments follows:

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j-General:

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A few general comments said that the " Commission already has the to enforce its regulations and does not need to incorporate the items as now proposed into conditions of license."

The Commission has decided to promulgated the proposed revision of $50

" License Condition" in order to satisfy the intent of Congress as expressed Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Public Law 96-295). This Act and its relationship to 150.54 are discussed in detail in the Federal Register notice for the proposed rule (46 FR61894).

. Coordinate with other Reportino Recuirements Seven commenters said that the NRC should coordinate the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 with other rules, NUREG-0654 and Reg. Guide 1.16. Many of these letters identified overlap, duplication and inconsistency among NRC rep requirements.

The Commission is making a concerted effort to ensure consistent and coordinated reporting requirements.

The requirements contained in the revision of 10 CFR 50.72 are being coordinated with revision of $50.73, 650.55(e),

Part 50 Appendix E, $20.402, 673.71 and Part 21. The rule change also replaces ,

Reg. Guide 1.16.

Building Evacuation 5 Ten commenters said that the proposed 50.72(b)(6)(ii1) regarding ,

"any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled release resulting in evacuation of a building" was unclear and counter-productive in that it could cause reluctance to evacuate a building.

Many of s Jse commenters stated that the reporting.of i

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q;. 3 ,, DS9,0-01) in-plant releases of radioactivity that require evacuation of individual rooms was inconsistent with the general thrust of the rule to require reporting of significant events. They noted that minor spills, small gaseous waste releases, or the disturbance of contaminated particulate matter (e.g., dust) may all .

require the temporary evacuation of individual rooms until the airborne concen-trations decrease or until respiratory protection devices are utilized. They noted that these events are fairly common and should not be reportable unless the required evacuation affects the entire facility or a major portion thereof.

In response to these comments the wording of this criterion has been changed to significantly narrow the scope of the criterion to include only

,. those events which significantly hamper the ability of. site personnel to

. perform safety-related activities.

The NRC has also revised this reporting requirement to eliminate reference to. building evacuation and instead rely on specific radiological release rate criteria.

Plant Operatino and Emercency Procedures Several commenters said that the reporting criteria should not make reference to plant operating and emergency procedures because:

a. It would take operators too long to decide whether a plant condition was covered by the procedures,

b. The procedures cover events that are not of concern to the NRC, and .

c. The procedures vary from plant to plant.

The Commission thinks that the plant's operating personnel should be faniliar with their procedures. However, the wording of the reporting criteria i

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a has been modified (650.72(b)(1)(ii) in the final rule) to narrow the events captured to those that significantly compromise plant safety. Notwithstanding

,. the fact the procedures do vary from plant-to-plant, the Comission has found this criteria results in notification indicative of serious events. ,

Reactor Scrams Several commenters said reactor scrams, particularly those scrams below power operation, should not require notification of the the NRC within 1-hour.

In response to these coments, the Comission has changed the reporting deadline to four hours. However, the Comission does not regard reactor scrams as

, "non-events" as stated in some letters of coments. Information related to reactor scrams has been useful in identifying safety related problems. The Commission agrees that four hours is an appropriate deadline for this reporting i

requirement because such events are not as important to immediate safety as are some other events.

Radioactive Release-Threshold i

Several comments said that the threshold of 25% of allowable limits for radioactive releases was too low a threshold for 1-hour reporting,

, Based upon this coment and our experience, the Comission has changed the threshold of reporting to 2 times allowable limits. This will eliminate reports that have proved to be of little value.

I Citing 10 CFR 50.72 as Basis for Notification A few commenters objected to citing 150.72 as a basis when making a telephone I

notification. The letters of comment questioned the purpose, legal effect and burden on the licensee.  !

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3 The~ Comission does not believe that it is an unnecessary burden for a licensee to know and identify the basis for a telephone notification required by $50.72.

There have been many occasions when a licensee could.not tell the NRC whether the telephone notification was being made in accordance with technical specifications,10 CFR 50.72, some other requirement, or just a courtesy call. Unless the licensee can identify the nature of the report, it is difficult for the NRC to know what significance the licensee attaches to the report and it .becomes more difficult for the NRC to respond quickly and properly to the event.

Personnel Radioactive Contamination Several commenters objected to the use of vague terms such as " extensive o'nsite contamination" and "readily removed" in one of the reporting criterion of the proposed rule.

Based on this comment new criteria have been prepared that do not use these terms.

Notification Timino The commenters generally had two points to rake regarding the timing of reports to the NRC. First, the comments supported notification of the NRC after appropriate state or local agencies. Second, two comments requested that there be a new four to six-hour report category for events not warranting a report with one hour.

Based on these comments and its experience, the NRC has estLblished a "four-hourreport"categorytitledhon-Emergene fIoti on" as was suggested.

Jmmediate Shutdown Several commenters objected to the use of the term "immediate shutdown" saying that technical specifications do not use such a term.

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Since the term is used in some but not all Technical Specifications, the Commission has revised the reporting criterion in question. The final rule-requires a report upon the initiation of any nuclear power plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. ,

Explicit Threats A few commenters said that the intent of the term " explicitly threatens" was unclear. Those commenting wondered what level of threat was being r urred to. The term " explicitly threaten" has been deleted from the final rule.

Instead, the wording of final rule refers to "any event that threatened the i

safety ot the nuclear power plant" (50.72(b)(1)(vi)) and gives examples so that it is clear the Commission is interested in real or actual threats.

III. SPECIFIC FINDINGS Overview of the immediate Notification System When this final rule becomes effective, the immediate notification reporting ,

requirement will provide the NRC with timely reports of emergencies and other safety significant events. This amendment of $50.72, " Notification of Signifi-cant Events" will result in basically three types of improvements.

One improvement is that the NRC will receive notification of safety significant events that were not previously covered under the existing provisions of 150.72. For example, the final rule requires reporting of any " major loss of er:ergency assessment or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indicator or Emergency Notification Systen)." This and other t

changes in reporting criteria will provide the NRC with a more complete immediate Notification System.

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A second improvement is that certain events that were previously reported, "l despite having little safety significance, will no longer be reported. For

', example, 650.72 currently requires the reporting of any fatality or injury occurring on the site and requiring transport to an offsite medical facility.

This has resulted in a large number of worker injury reports. The new rule requires reporting " transport of a radioactively contaminated person to offsite individual facility for treatment" or if " news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been made." These changes and others are expected to greatly reduce the number of inconsequential reports.

t The third and perhaps most important improvement is that the revision of this rule has been closely coordinated with other sections of Part 50, Part 20, a'nd Part 21. Many of the reporting criteria in the new rule are similar in

, wording and intent to reporting in the'new $50.73 " Licensee Event Report System."

This should aid ease of interpretation, and generally improve coordination in the generation, receipt and use of reports.

Several substantive revisions of other sections of the Comission's regulations are underway that will like-wise use similar wording in their reporting requirements (e.g.,50.55(e)and10CFRPart21). In addition, a Proposed Rulemakin is being prepared outlining the Connission's intent to revise emergency planning criteria in 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, and 10 CFR 50.47 to eliminate " Unusual Event" as an emergency class.

1 Paraoraph-By-Paraoraoh Explanation of The Rule Paragraph 50.72 (a) states:

" General Requirements. (1) Each licensee of a nuclear power reactor licensed under 150.21(b) or 150.22 shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System of: (1) The declaration of any of Emergency Classes specified

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.. in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan; or (ii) Those non-Emergency events specified in paragraph (b) of this section. (2) If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the the licensee shall make the required notifications via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone system or any other method which will ansure a report being made as soon as possible to the NRC Operations Center."

(3) loe licensee shall notify the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate ! tate or local agencies and within one hour of the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes."

(4) The licensee shall identify: (i) the Emergency Class declared, or

. (ii) either paragraph (b)(1) "One-Hour Reports" or paragraph (b)(2) "Four-Hour Reports" as the paragraph of this section requiring a Non-Emergency Events Notification.

(b) Non-Emergency Events. (1) 1 a-Hour Reports. If not reported as a declaration of an Emergency Class und paragraph (a) of the section, the licensee shall notify the.NRC as sect, as possible and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any of the following:"

This introductory paragraph reflects some consolidation of language that was repeated in various subparagraphs of the proposed rule. In general, the intent and scope of this paragraph do not reflect any change from the proposed rule.

Several titles were added to this and subsequent sections. For example, paragraph 50.72(b) is titled "Non-Emergency Events" and this has two subpara-graphs (b)(1) titled "One-Hour Reports" and (b)(2) "Four-Hour Reports." The justification for a one-hour deadline is based upon the potential for these events to escalate to Emergency Class. The justification for a.four-hour deadline is explained in the analysis of that paragraph.

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,g.iC The terms "immediate" and "immediately" used in this and suceeding

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' h*Q ., paragraphs refer to notifications that should be made as soon as possible.

$,-@ However, the Commission recognizes that some events have more safety signifi-cance than others and the various duties and exigencies associated with operating a nuclear power plant may mitigate against an iiiraediate notification for.less safety-significant events. Depending on the type of event, different absolute deadlines are associated with each immediate notification. As stated in later paragraphs "non-Emergency events" may be reported within either one hour or four hours depending on their significance, and all declarations of an

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Emergency Class must be reported within I hour.

Paragraph 50.72 (b)(1)(1) requires reporting of: "The initation of any n'uclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications." While the intent and scope has not changed, the change in wording between the proposed and final rule is intended to clarify that prompt notification is required once a shutdown is initiated.

In response to public comment, the term "immediate shutdowr" that was used in the proposed rule is not used in the final rule. The term was vague and unfamiliar to those licensees that did not have Technical Specifications using the term.

This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events for which Technical Specifications require the initiation of reactor shutdown. This will provide the NRC with early warning of safety significant conditions serious enough to warrant shutdown of the plant.

Paragraph 50,72(b)(1)(ii) [ encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events and some events captured by proposed 50.72(b)(1)] requires reporting of:

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W i.l,5 "Any event or condition sluring operation that resulted in the condition of

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the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously M

y.. , degraded; or resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety; in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant; or in a condition not governe~d by the plant's operating and emergency procedures." This paragraph was added to provide for consistent, coordinated reporting requirements between this rule'and 10 CFR 50.73 which has a similar provision. Public comment suggested that there be similarity of termino-logy, phrasing and reporting thresholds on both 650.72 and 550.73. The intent of this paragraph is to capture those events where the plant, including its.

principal safety barriers, was seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition.

. For example, small voids in systems designed to remove heat from the reactor core which have been previously shown through analysis not to be safety significant

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.' need not be reported. However, the accumulation of voids that could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under natural circulation conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and would be reportable. In addition, voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the operator to misunderstand the true condition of the plant is also an unanalyzed condition and should be reported.

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The Commission recognizes that the licensee may use engineering judgment and experience to determine whether an unanalyzed condition existed. It is not intended that this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters, or to problems concerning single pieces of equipment. For example, any time, one or more safety-related components may be out of service due to testing, mainte-nance, or a fault that has not yet been repaired. Any trivial single failure or minor error in performing surveillance tests could produce a situation in which

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}. two or more often unrelated, safety-grade components are out-of-service. Techni-

'i cally, this is an unanalyzed condition. However, these events should be reported "k

only if they involve functionally related components or if they.significantly compromise plant safety.

Finally, this paragraph also includes material (e.g., metallurgical, chemical) problems that cause abnormal degradation of the principal safety barriers (1.e., the fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the containment). Examples of this type of situation include:

(a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor, or in the storage pool, that exceed expected values, that are unique or widespread, or that are caused by

.. unexpecte'd factors, and would involve a release of significant quantities of fission products.

(b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestressed concrete) or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc.).

(c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system.

(d) Serious temperature or pressure transients.

(e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during operation.

(f) Loss of containment function or integrity including:

(i) containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits (ii) loss of containment isolation valve function during tests or operation, or (iii) loss of main steam isolation valve function during test or operation (iv) loss of containment cooling capability Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(iii) [ encompassing a portion of proposed 50.72(b)(2)]

l requires reporting of:

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. :.s "Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampers site n

j personnel in the. performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant."

This paragraph was reworded to correspond to a.similar provision of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii). By making the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 similar in language, when possible, the Commission hopes to increase the coordination between these rules.

The paragraph has also been reworded to make it clear that it applies only L

to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes) and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank car explosion). References to acts of sabotage have been removed, since these are covered by 573.71. .In addition, threats to personnel from internal hazards (e.g., radioactivity releases) are now covered by paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(vi).

This paragraph is intended to capture those events where there is an actual threat to the plant from an external condition or natural phenomenon, and where the threat or damage challenges the ability of the plant to continue tc operate-in a safe manner (including the orderly shutdown and maintenance of shutdown

. conditions). The licensee should decide if a phenomenon or condition actually threatened the plant. For example, a minor brush fire in a remote area of the site that was quickly controlled by fire fighting' personnel and, as a result, L

did not present a threat to the plant should not be reported. However, a major forest fire, large-scale flood, or major earthquake that presents a clear threat to the plant should be reported. As another example, an in'dustrial or transportion accident which occurs near the site creating a plant safety concern should be reported.

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One commenter was concerned that events occurring on land owned by the

" utility adjacent to the utility's plant, might be reportable. This is not the intent of this reporting requirement. The NRC is concerned with the safety of plant' and personnel on the utility's site and not with non-nuclear activities on land adjacent to the plant.

. Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(iv) [ encompassing events previously classified as

" Unusual Events"] requires the reporting of:

"Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge to the vessel as a result of a valid signal."

This paragraph is intended to capture those events that result in either automatic' or manual actuation of the ECCS or would have resulted in activation of the ECCS if some component had not failed or an operator action had not been

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taken.

One example of such an event would be if a valid ECCS signal were generated by plant conditions, and the operator put all ECCS pumps in pull-to-lock. Even though no ECCS discharge occurred, the event would be reportable.

A " valid signal" refers to the actual plant conditions or parameters

-satisfying the requirements for ECCS initiation. Excluded from this' reporting requirement would be those instances where instrument drift, spurious signals, human error, or other invalid signals caused ECCS. However, such events may be

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reportable under other of sections of the Commission's regulations based upon other details of the event. In particular, paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) would j require a report within four-hours if an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) were actuated.

Experience with notifications made pursuant to 550.72 has shown that events involving ECCS discharge to the vessel are generally more serious than ESF

[7590-01] ,

~,a;; actuations without discharge to the vessel. -Based on this experience, the "v} Commission has made this reporting criterion a "One-Hour Report."

Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(v) [ encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events] requires reporting of:

"Any event which results in major loss of emergency assessment or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System"). '

This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that would impair a licensee's ability to deal with an accident or emergency. Notifying the NRC of these events may permit the NRC to take some compensating measures and to more completely assess the consequences of such a loss should it occur during an accident or emergency.

Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi) [ encompassing some portions of the proposed '

5650.72(b)(2), (6) and (8)] requires the reporting of:

"Any event that threatened the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear plant including fires, toxic gases or radioac-tive releases." Adding the phrase " including toxic gases or radioactive releases" to paragraph 50.72(b)(il)(vi) of the final rule covers paragraph 50.7"Ib)(8) of the proposed rule and the " evacuation" portion of paragraph 50.72(b)(6)(iii)of the proposed rule. Since public comment was critical of this " evacuation" reporting criterion in the proposed rule, the staff made this change in wording for the final rule.

While paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(iii) of the final rule primarily captures acts of nature, paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi) captures other events, particularly acts by pe rsonnel . The Commission believes this arrangement of the reporting crite,ria

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in the final rule lends itself to more precise interpretation and is consistent with.those public comments that requested closer coordination between the reporting requirements in this rule and other portions of the Comi.ssion's regulations.

This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events, particularly ,

those caused by acts of personnel which endanger the safety of the plant or interface with personnel in performance of duties necessary for safe plant operations.

Nevertheless, the licensee must exercise some judgment in reporting under this section.

For example, a small fire on site that did not endanger any plant equipment, that did not and could not reasonably be expected to endanger the plant is not reportable.

Paragraph 50.72(b)(2) requires that:

"If not reported under paragraph (a) on (b)(1) of this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as possible and in all cases, within four hours of the occurrence of any of the following:"

Although the reporting criteria contained in the subparagraphs that follow were in the proposed rule, public comment prompted the Commission to establish this "Non-Emergency" category for those events with slightly less urgency and less safety significance that may be reported within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

The rationale for not permitting, reporting later than four hours is that the Commission wants to obtain such reports from personnel who were on shift at the time of the event when this is possible, because the personnel on shift at the time of the event will have a better knowledge of the circumstances associated with the event.

_ ~_-

[7590-01] ,

~

_20 _

Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(i) [ encompassing some events captured by proposed 50.72(b)(1)] requires reporting of:

"Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety".

Based upon public comments that requested close ' coordination be established .

between 550.72 and other rules, this reporting requirement is similar to a requirement in 550.73. Except for referring to a shutdown reactor, this

-reporting requirement is similar to an "One-Hour Report" in $50.72(b)(1)(ii).

Because this refers to a shut down reactor, events captured by this requirement 1

have less urgency and can be reported within four hours as a "Non-Emergency."

Paragraph 50.72(b)(1) of the proposed rule was split into 50.72(b)(1)(ii) and 50.72(b)(2)(i) in the final rule in order to permit some type of reports to be

~

made within four hours instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, because these reports have less safety sicnificance. In terms of their combined effect', the overall intent and scope of these paragraphs has not changed from that in the proposed rule. Since the types of events intended to be captured by this reporting requirement are similar to 550.72(b)(1)(ii) except that the reactor is shutdown, the reader should refer to the explanation of $50.72(b)(1)(ii) for more details on intent.

Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii)[ proposed 50.72(b)(5)]requiresreportingof:

l "Any event or condition resulting.in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

Hewever, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of-the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

D

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[ ,, In response to public comments, this reporting requirement has been made a

'"Non-Emergency" because the Commission agrees with the commenters that events 2

captured by this requirement generally have slightly less urgency. and safety significance than those events included in the "One-Hour Reports" paragraphs.

The intent and scope of this reporting requirement have not changed from that in the proposed rule.

This paragraph is intended to capture events during which an ESF actuates, either manually or automatically, or fails to actuate. It is based on the premise that the ESFs are provided to mitigate the consequences of the event;~

'therefore, (1) _they should work properly when called upon and (2) they should

. . not be challenged unnecessarily. The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences of the event (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF operated unnecessarily.

" Actuation" of multichannel ESF Actuation Systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic. Therefore, single channel actuations, whether caused by failures or otherwise, are not reportable if they do not complete the minimum actuation logic.

Operation of an ESF as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported. However, if during the test or evolution the ESF actuates in a way that is not part of the planned procedure, that actuation shoul'd be reported. For example, if the normal reactor shutdown procedure requires that the control rods be inserted by a manual reactor trip, the reactor trip need not be reported. However, if conditions develop during the shutdown that require an automatic reactor trip, such a reactor trip should be reported. The fact that the safety analysis assumes that an ESF will actuate automatically

[7590-01] ,

during an event does not eliminate the need to report that actuation. Actuations

..A ~

that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event (e.g., at the discretion of the licensee as part of a planned procedure).

Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and (iv) [ proposed 50.72(b)(4)] requires reporting of:

"Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of.

the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:

(i) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, (ii) Remove residual heat, (iii) Control the release of radioactive material, or (iv) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Events covered in 150.72(b)(2)(iii) of this part may include one or more personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, indivi-dual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and avialble to perform the required safety function."

In response to public comments, the words "any instance of personal error, equipment failure, or discovery of design or procedural inadecuacies" that appeared in the proposed rule have been replaced by the words " event or condition".

This simplification in language is intended to clarify what was a confusing ~

phrase to many of those who commented on the proposed rule. Also in response to public comment, this reporting requirement is a "Non-Emergency" to be reported within.four hours instead of within one hour.

~~

f

.g 3 ,,{7590-01]

1 ,

e, This reporting requirement is similar to one contained in l50.72, thus reflecting public coment identifying the need for closer coordination of

, reporting requirements between 650.72 and $50.73.

In sumary, the wording of this paragraph has been changed to make it easier to understand, while the intent and scope of the paragraph have not been changed. This paragraph is based on the assumption that safety-related systems and structures are intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident. While paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) applies to actual demands for actuation of an ESF, paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(iii) covers an event where a safety system could have faile,d to perform its intended function because of one or more personnel errors, including procedure violations; equipment failures; or design, analysis, fabrication, construction, or procedural deficiencies. The event should be reported regardless of the situation or condition that caused the structure or system to be unavailable.

The applicability of paragraph includes those safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (e.g., containment isolation, emergency filtration). Hence, minor operational events such as valve packing leaks, which

-could be considered a lack of control of radioactive material, should not be reported under this paragraph. System leaks or other similar events may, however, be reportable under other paragraphs.

This paragraph does not include those cases where a system or component is removed from service as part of a planned evolution, in accordance with an approved procedure, and in accordance with the plant's Technical Specifications.

for example, if the licensee removes part of a system frem service to perform maintenance, and the Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration,

[7590-01) .

.[f. and the system or component i,s returned to service within the time limit speci-fied in the Technical Specifications, the action need not be reported under this a paragraph. However, if, while the component is out of service, the licensee e

identifies a condition that could have prevented the system from performing its intended function (e.g., the licensee finds a set of relays that is wired incorrectly), that condition must be reported.

It should be noted that there are a limited number of single-train systems that perform safety functions (e.g., the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in BWRs). For such systems, loss of the single train would prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of that system and, therefore, must be reported even though the plant Technical Specifications may allow such a condition to exist for a specified length of time.

It should also be noted that, if a potentially serious human error is made that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, but recovery factors resulted in the error being corrected, the error is still reportable.

The Commission recognizes that the application of this and other paragraphs of this section involves the use of engineering judgment on the part of licensees. In this case, a technical judgment must be made whether a failure or operator action that disabled one -train of a safety system and could have, but did not, affect a redundant train. If so, this would constitute an event that "could have prevented" the fulfillment of a safety function, and, accordingly, must be reported.

If a component fails by an apparently random mechanism it may or may not 4

be reportable if the functionally redundant component could fail by the same mechanism. To be reportable, it is necessary that the failure constitute a condition where there is reasonable doubt that the functionally redundant

.- 1 e

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3

• M 3,3 373

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gg train or channel would remain operational until it completed its safety function or is repaired. For example, if a pump fails because of imprcper h.[ s.

lubrication, and engineering judgment indicates that there is a reasonable R<.

expectation that the functionally redundant pump, which was also improperly lubricated, would have also failed before it completed its safety function, then -the failure is reportable and the potential failure of the functionally

- redundant pump must be discussed in the LER.

Interaction between system, particularly a safety system and a non-safety system, is also included in this criterion. For example, the Commission is increasingly concerned about the effect of a loss or degradation of what had been assumed to be non-essential inputs to safety systems. Therefore, this paragraph also includes those cases where a service (e.g., heating, ventilation,

,' and cooling) or input (e.g., compressed air) which is necessary for reliable or long-term operation of a safety system is lost or degraded. Such loss or degradation is reportable if the proper fulfillment of the . safety function is not or can not be assured. Failures that affect inputs or services to systems that have no safety function need not be reported.

> Finally the Commission recognizes that the licensee may also us'e engineering i

judgment to decide when personnel actions could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. For example, when an individual improperly operates or maintains a component, he might conceivably have made the same error'for all of the functionally redundant components (e.g., if he incorrectly calibrates one bistable amplifier in the Reactor Protection System, he could conceivably incorrectly calibrate all bistable amplifiers). However, for an event to be l

reportable it is necessary that the actions actually affect or involve components i

i-in more than one train or channel of a safety system, and the result of the

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j..,j actions must be undesirable from the perspective of protecting the health and safety of the public. The components can be functionally redundant (e.g., two

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pumps in different trains) or not functionally redundant (e.g., the operator correctly stops a pump in Train "A" and, instead of shutting the pump discharge valve in Train "A," he mistakenly shuts the pump discharge valve in Train "B").

Parhgraphs 50.72(b)(2)(v) and (vi) [ proposed 50.72(b)(6)] require reporting:

"(i) Any airborne radioactive release that exceeded'2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of one hour.

(ii) Any liquid effluent release that exceeded 2 times the limiting combined

, Maximum Permissible Concentration MPC (see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part 20)

-l of this chapter at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e.,

.C' unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gates.

when averaged over a time period of one hour."

Immediate notifications must be made to the Commission in accordance with 550.72(b)(2)(v). These immediate notifications also meet the requirements of

$20.403(a)(2) of Part 20 of this chapter."

These paragraphs.have been changed to clarify the requirements to report releases of radioactive material. The first of these two paragraphs is similar to $20.403 but places a lower threshold for reporting events at commercial power reactors. The lower threshold is based on the significance of the breakdown of the licensee's program necessary to have a release of this size, rather than on the significance of the impact of the actual release.

Based upon public ccmment, the reporting threshold has been changed from "25%" in the proposed rule to "2 times" in the final rule. Also, based on t

public comment, this has been made as a "Non-Emergency" to be reported wi. thin 4-hours instead of.within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

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, d 'f. Also based on public comment, this reporting requirement fias been changed

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. 'M to make a more uniform requirement by referring to specific release criteria qe

.j; instead of referring only to Technical Specifications.

' This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that constitute unplanned or uncontrolled releases of a significant amount of radioac-tive material to offsite areas. Unplanned releases should occur infrequently.

however, when they occur, at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational contrcl established to avoid their occurrence and, therefore, such events should be reported.

Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(vii) [ proposed rule 50.72(b)(7)] requires the reporting

. of:

"Any event requiring transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment."

Three changes have been made to this reporting requirement. One is to eliminate the phrase " occurring onsite" because it is implied by the scope of the rule. The second change is to replace " injury involving radiation" with

" radioactively contaminated person." This change was made because of the difficulty in defining injury due to radiation and more importantly because 10

~

CFR Part 20 captures events involving radiation exposure.

The third change, in response to public comment, was to make this reporting requirement a four-hour notification, instead of one-hour notification.

Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(viii.) [not in proposed rule] requires reporting of:

"Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel or protection of the environment and for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.

[7590-01]-

~,"

• Such event may include an onsite fatality or release of radioactively contami-nated materials." Besides covering some situation such as radioactive releases y

that warrent NRC attention, this criterion covers those events or situations that would not otherwise warrant NRC attention except for the interest of the news media, other government agencies, or the public. In terms of its effect on licensees; this is not a new reporting requirement because the threshold for .

reporting injuries and radioactive releases was much'iower under the proposed rule. This criterion will capture those events previously reported under other criteria when such events require the NRC to respond because of media or public attention.

o Paragraph 50.72(c) [ proposed 50.72(c)] concerning:

" Followup Notification. With respect to the telephone notifications made under pa agraphs (a) and (b) of this section, each licensee, in addition t'o making the required notification, shall during the course of the event:

(1) Immediately report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions including those that require, or initiation of any of the Emergency Classes if such initiation has not been previously declared, or the change from one Emergency Class to another or a termination of the Emergency Class.

(2) Immediately report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information related to plant behavior tnat is not understood.

(3) Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the fiRC Operations Center upon request by the fiRC."

This paragraph has remained essentially unchanged from the proposed rule, except for addition of the title " Followup Notification" and some renumbering.

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i .

. This paragraph is intended to provide the NRC with timely notification

. when an event becomes more serious and additional information or new analyses-cl.arify an event.

This' paragraph also permits the NRC to maintain a continuous communications channel-because of the need for continuing follow-up informstion or because of telecommunication problems.

IV REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The I analysis examines the costs and benefits of the Rule as considered by the

, Commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and

'c'opying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW., Washington, 3

D. C. Single copies of the analysis ma be obtained from Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555, Telephone (301)492-4973.

V PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT-The information requirements contained in the regulation have b'een approved l

by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L.96-511(clearance number 3150-0011).

VI REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605 (b), the Commission hereby certifies that this. regulation will not have a signi-ficant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This regulation affects electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas

[7590-01].

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J and that own and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under Sections 10 4/f and 1040 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The amendments clarify

. ~::

.c and modify presently existing notification requirements. Accordingly, there is no

L -

new, significant economic impact on these licensees, nor do the affected full licensees fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regolatory Flexibility Act or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.

VII LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50

, Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevent, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors. Penalty, Radiation Protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting requirements.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 20, 50, and 73 are published as a document subject to codification.

PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C 2133,2134,2201,2232,2233,2236,2239,2282); secs.201,202,206,88 Stat.

1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4S41, 5842, 5846), unless etterwise noted.

- - , _ , _ _ - . - . - - - - _ . - - - __y ._ ,

[7590-01]

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 4

(42 U.S.C. 5851).

U.S.C.2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68-Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),

5550.10(a),(b),and(c), 50.44,50.46,50.48,50.54,and50.80(a)areissued i

l under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); il50.10(a) and I (c)and50.54areissuedundersec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2201(1));and-ll50.55(e),50.59(b),50.70,50.71,-50.72,and50.78areissued ,

. . under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

2. A new paragraph (w) is added to $50.54 to read as follows:

1 650.54 Conditio.ns of licenses.

(w) In the case of every utilization facility licensed pursuant to Section

. 103 or 104 b of the Act, the licensee shall immediately notify the NRC Operations Center of the occurrence of the events specified in 650.72 of this part.

1

3. Section, 50.72 is revised to read as follows:

1 - 950.72 Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors.

(a) General Requirements.I (1) Each licensee of nuclear power reactor licensed under $50.21(b) or 150.22 shall notify the NRC Operations Center via ,

~

the Emergency Notification System of: (i) The declaration of any of Emergency i

I 1

0ther requirements for immediate notification of the NRC by licensed operating i nuclear power reactors are contained elsewhere in this chapter, in particular,

$20.403, 950.36, and 673.71, i

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. 7590-01) -

the Classes specified in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan;2 or(ii)of those non-Emergency evea+.s specified in paragraph (b) of this section. 2) If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required notifications via commerical telephone service, other dedicated telephone 9

g u n. or any other metnod which will ensure a report being made as soon as lc a io' system A ...s to the 'NRC Operations Center.3 _ ,) y e g' l .

(3) The licensee shal notify he NRC inre % a 4 cation of the es A e, WH r A GC <p y ~' M appropriate State or local agencies and r ithibne1Ir,i o the time the licensee

declares one of the Emergency Classe,s.h, **-

xA. 9 (4) The licensee shall identifyj (i) the Emergencv Class declared, or (ii) /

s wGiu q e4+har n=-2 7: P (b)(1)f"One-Hour Report" or ps ere? (b)(p)^"Four-Hour \ R VQ

-:r +he p r: p:05 cf +hde e-+4c n g;'riz e b r:ma,pi,j E , ii n w iir; w Li m i, j.] ( f' h m r ( uf' (b) Non-EmergenjEvents. (1)h-HourReports)Ifnotreportedasa declaration of an Emergency Class under paragraph (a) of this section thes b t 44 % M =0Jt, n,tD' licensee shall notify the NRC a - =e

cidble, rd 'r

P xx;g one ___.

hour of the occurrence of any of the following: p -t 4 .cicdj &#, -ps (i) The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdownggi :d by Technical 1h Specifications.

(ii) Any event or condition during operation that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or resulted in the nuclear power plant being:

2 These Emergency Classes are addressed in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 entitled

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Erergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" Rev. 1, November 1980.

Ccpies of NUREG dccuments are available at the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C. 20555. Copies nay be purchased frcm the Government Printing Office. Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.

Attention: Publications Sales Manager Cen ercial telephone numbet- cf the NRC Operations Center is (202) 951-0550

7590-01]

(A) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety; (B) In an condition that was outside the design basis of the plant; or (C) In a condition not governed by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.

(iii) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual , ,.

threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampers site per-a 's t' a.~4 L-M-g sonnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operatidn of the $ antj n.e .

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(iv) Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core A A w m. w r d -

h Cooling System (ECCS) di:Mp; te,the vessel @s a result $f a valid s p .

(v) Any event which results in a major loss of emergency assessment or

. communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Errergency Notification System).

(vi) Any event that threatened the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant including fires, and toxic gas or radioactive releases, k j [ ,,

(2) our-Hour If not reported under paragraph (a) or (b)(1) of -

cpc.ap n a a this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as perrib h :nd i. cil-

,itti-fourhoursoftheoccurrence[ofanyofthefollowing:

(i) Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear' power plant, including its principal s.afety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.

(ii) Any event or condition that resulted in manual or autcmatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ES cluding th b actor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and

[7590-01] .

, was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not ,

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be reported, y

_g (iii) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the f

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rt # th: ::f:t; function o{ structures org;':t:9 tha(%ngeded to:

(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition,

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O y., (B) Remove residual heat,

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g,{ly g (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or

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• Y ' (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

p4 O \ 4 (Au iv) su (v covered Events  ;;) % .ro.n (i<. cw 9ofzthis in %50.72(b)(2)(iii) r)..ce 3 f.ny part may J).one or include

'I

1. nore personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable.and available to perform the required safety function. C/-

(v) (A) Any airborne radioactive release that exceeded 2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of one hour. (B) Any liquid effluent release that exceeds 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) (see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part 20, of this chapter) at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e.,

unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour.

(vi) Immediate notifications must be made to the Commis ion in accordance A- . ik 9?

with ?50.72(b)(2)(v). These irrediate notifications also the requirerents of (20.403(a)(2) of Part 20 of this chapter.

(vii) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite redical facility for treatment.

)

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.- '.7590-01) e (viii) Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel or protection of the environment and for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.

Such events may include an onsite fatality on inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.

(c) Followup Notification. With respect to the telephone notifications made under paragraphs nd (b) of this section, each licensee, in addition to making the required 3 notification, shall during the course of the event:

(1) Immediately report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions including those that require, or initiation of any of the Emergency Classes if such initiation has not been previously declared .or the change from one Emergency Class to another or a termination of the Emergency Class.

(2) Immediately report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information related to plant behavior that is not understood.

-(3) Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC.

Dated at Washington, D.C., this day of 198 .

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Ccemission

.