ML20211D719

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in Form of Suppl to Fourth Partial Initial Decision on Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions Re Graterford.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20211D719
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	10/17/1986
From:	Conner T CONNER & WETTERHAHN, PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
References
CON-#486-1170 OL, NUDOCS 8610220254
Download: ML20211D719 (28)

Text

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• C 00CKETED USNPC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~86 0CT 20 P1 :03 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing B ard In the Matter of )

)

Philadelphia Electric Company ) Docket Nos. 50-352-OL

) 50-353-OL (Limerick Generating Station, )

Units 1 and 2) )

LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

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OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A " SUPPLEMENT TO FOURTH.

PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION (ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING TO GP.ATERFORD)"

In accordance with the provisions of 10 C.F.R. $2.754 and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's order at hearing (Tr. 21569), Licensee Philadelphia Electric Company hereby cubmit: its Proposed Findings and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a " Supplement to Fourth Partial Initial Decision (On

-Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to Graterford) . "

Also enclosed are Licensee's proposed transcript corrections.

Respectfully submitted, CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C.

Troy B.. Conner, Jr.

Robert M. Rader Nils N. Nichols October 17, 1986 I

8610320254 861017 PDR ADOCK 05000352

- O PDR pJo3

4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD t BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES:

{ Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson Dr. Richard F. Cole l

l Dr. Jerry Harbour

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a )

! In the Matter of )

! )

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-352-OL

) 50-353-OL (Limerick Generating Station, )

Units 1 and 2) )

)

ll SUPPLEMENT TO FOURTH PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION (ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING TO GRATERFORD)

APPEARANCES l Robert M. Rader, Esq. and Nils N. Nichoin, Esq., of Conner &

l Wetterhahn, P.C., Washington, D.C. for Philadelphia .

Electric' Company.

1 Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq. and Joseph Rutherg, Esq., Office of

the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory j Commission, Washington, D.C. for the NRC Staff.

i l Michael Hirsch, Esq., Office of the Gene'ral Counsel, Federal l Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. for FEMA.

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! Theodore G. Otto, III, Esq., Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania for

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, l

! Angus Love, Esq., Montgomery County Legal Aid Service, l,

Norristown, Pennsylvania, for the Graterford Inmates.

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r I. INTRODUCTION  ;

This is a supplement to the Fourth Partial Initial Decision ("PID"), which was issued by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board" or " Board") at an earlier stage in the operating license proceeding for the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 (" Limerick").1! The Fourth PID disposed of two contentions raised by the intervenor inmates of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford ("Graterford") as to the adequacy of emergency planning and preparedness for G rater ford . 2_/ These contentions were decided in favor of applicant Philadelphia Electric Company (now Licensee) . This supplemental decision pertains to another issue raised by the inmates, which is the last contested matter before this Board. It is also resolved in Licensee's favor.

After the Fourth PID was decided in favor of Licensee, the Atomic Safety Licensing and Appeal Board (" Appeal Board") affirmed the decision as to the two litigated

-1/ See Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-25, 22 NPC 101 (1985).

2/ In a recent decision, we explained the history of this

'i proceeding, including the status of contested issues and hearings up to and after this Board's authorization i for the issuance of full power operating licenses for Limerick. See Limerick, supra, " Supplement to Third Partial Initial Decision (On Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions) " (September 5, 1986).

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contentions, but remanded for further hearings on this Board's denial of one of several other contentions pleaded by the Graterford inmates.b In essence, the inmates alleged in the remanded issue that telephone circuits in the Limerick area might be overloaded in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick, such that Graterford authorities would be unable to notify and mobilize a sufficient number of off-duty correctional officers to implement the Graterford emergency plan. In particular, the plan includes a possible evacuation of the institution. The Appeal Board also directed this Board to determine what effect, if any, the resolution of the notification and mobilization issue has upon evacuation time estimates prepared by the Graterford authorities.O Inasmuch as this narrow issue constituted the only remaining question fut dispouillon in this operating license proceeding, the Board desired to convene a hearing as promptly as possible. Following a conference call on September 3, 1986, at which time the Board stated its 3/ Limerick, supra, ALAB-845, 24 NRC (August 28, 1986). At this time, the Commission has not yet acted upon the petition by the Graterford inmates to review ALAB-845.

4/ Id. (slip op. at 41). In its earlier decision, the TTeensing Board approved, and the Appeal Board affirmed, the evacuation time estimates for Graterford.

See Limerick, supra, LBP-85-25, 22 NRC at 108-116, aff'd, ALAB-845, 24 NRC (August 28, 1986) (slip op. at 35-46).

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4-intention to schedule a hearing promptly, I a hearing on the

) remand issue was held on September 22, 1986 in Philadelphia,

{ Pennsylvania.

i i At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties t

recommended and the Board agreed to the submission of a

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by October

17, 1986. Proposed findings were filed by the Licensee, NRC

) Staff, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Graterford inmates.

I Based upon the Board's specific findings and conclusions 1

l which follow, we have determined that reasonable assurance i

exists that an adequate number of off-daty correctional officers can and will be notified ind mobilized for duty in  !

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y the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick.

Accordingly, we find in favor of Licensee.

I II. FINDINGS OF FACT 2

4 A. Manpower Nceds To Effcetuate An Evacuation Of Graterford.

I 1. Charles A. Zimmerman is the Superintendent of the i

State Correctional Institution at Graterford. Zimmerman, I.

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5/ As we noted at that time, the schedules of the Board's

membero for other hearings would not permit a hearing for this remand issue until next year, unless it were heard promptly. The Board has attempted to be solicitous of the parties' needs in preparing for the hearing and therefore eliminated the requirement for submitting prepared testimony. The Board promptly issued subpoenas requested by the Graterford inmates for their two witnesses. Therefore, the Board believes that the interests of fairness and acting expeditiously i have been well served by avoiding unnecessary delay in convening the hearing, without prejudice to any party.

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Tr. 21450. Mr. Zimmerman previously testified in this pro-ceeding on two other contested issues concerning emergency planning and preparedness for the inmates at Graterford.

Zimmerman, Tr. 20760-20853.

2. As Superintendent, Mr. Zimmerman is familiar with the radiological emergency response plan for Graterford, the manpower needs to implement that plan and the number of staf f .on duty during the available shifts at Graterford.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21450.

3. Graterford utilizes several manpower shifts.

Three correctional officer shifts run from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.; and 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

Between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., other staff shifts commence. The Culinary Department runs on other shifts.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21450-51.

4. Superintendent Zimmerman compared the number of assigned staff on duty at Graterford during these shifts to the manpower needed to evacuate the institution under its emergency plan. During the two correctional officer shifts from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., no additional of f-duty staf f would be required. On-duty staff would be sufficient to evacuate the inmates. Zimmerman, Tr. 21451, 21469, 21495.

5. During the two 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. shifts, there is far greater inmate activity than during the third shift. More correctional officers and support staff are present, such as industry shop supervisors, maintenance I

crews, counsellors, assessment center staff, medical staff, i

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education staff, culinary staff, and administrative personnel from the business, accounting and personnel offices. All these staff are trained in inmate custody, care and control. Zimmerman, Tr. 21452-53.

6. If it were necessary to lock down. the Graterford inmates to initiate an evacuation, routine prison operations would cease. This would free enough staff during the two 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. shifts to complete the evacuation according to the emergency plan. Zimmerman, Tr. 21452.

7. During the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift, the inmates are locked down in their cells. Even during this period of minimum staffing, only fifteen percent of the of f-duty staf f would be required to supplement the on-duty complement to implement the institution's emergency plan.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21451-21454. Fifteen percent of the total Graterford staff would be less than 100 individuals.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21496-97; see Commonwealth Exh. 1 at 3.

8. If an evacuation were necessary, correctional officers on duty would not be assigned any other respon-sibilities. Securing the institution would be accomplished by a skeleton crew once evacuation had been completed.

i Zimmerman, Tr. 21469-70.

9. The Pennsylvania State Police are notified at the time of any emergency situation at Graterford. They could be used, as in other situations, for perimeter assignments.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21491.

B. Procedures And Capabilities For Notifying Off-Duty Correctional Officers.

10. As reflected in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's plan, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency ("PEMA")

will notify the Department of Corrections if an alert is declared at Limerick. See Commonwealth Exh. E-1 at pp.

E-7-E-1 (initial notification procedures) and E-17 (listing the Department of Corrections as among responsible State agencies receiving notification).

11. Upon notification by PEMA at the alert stage, the Department of Corrections would request off-duty correctional officers to report to Graterford. At that time, the general public will not have knowledge of any radiological emergency. Therefore, telephone lines should not be overly burdened when correctional officers are summoned. Even in a rapidly developing scenario which proceeds immediately to a sounding of the sirens at the general emergency stage, off-duty personnel would understand that they are required to report. The entire Graterford staff has been trained to report or inquire as to the need to report for any number of emergencies. Zimmerman, Tr.

21506; Asher, Tr. 20560.

12. All off-duty officers would be called as required by means of a call-up system which is utilized for notifying Graterford staff whenever they are needed for any emergency situation. Zimmerman, Tr. 21454.

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13. Although the capacity exists to utilize a

" pyramid" system of notification by which off-duty staff notify each other in turn over their residential phones, i

C.caterford authorities have found it more practical and efficient to notify their staff directly from a centralized control center within the institution. Zimmerman, Tr.

21454, 21473.

14. Under the Graterford call-up system, all manage-I ment officers have telephone lists of their staff. A caeckoff list is utilized. Zimmerman, Tr. 21471.

l 15. At Graterford, there are a total of 66 telephone lines available to notify off-duty correctional officers.

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Zimmerman, Tr. 21456; Commonwealth Exh. 1 at 1.

l 16. Five of these are direct lines, one of which is a j dedicated line to the Pennsylvania State Police. Zimmerman, Commonwealth Exh. 1; Tr. 21457; 1 at Buell, Tr. 21435.

i There are also ten lines which are part of the Commonwealth

telephone network, a system which is utilized by departments and agencies of the Commonwealth for official business.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21457-58; Buell, Tr. 21390-92, 21403-04, j 21440-41.

l 17. Additionally, Graterford has a combined law i enforcement assistance network, or " CLEAN" machine, which j could be used to notify the Department of Corrections office l

in !!arrisburg to make telephone calls to notify support personnel. Zimmerman, Tr. 21462. By use of the CLEAN l l system, Graterford has the capacity to notify the central i

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office, other law enforcement agencies and all other institutions simultaneously. Zimmerman, Tr. 21470.

18. Fifteen key supervisory staff at Graterford carry personal pager, which would be used in an emergency.

I Zimmerman, Tr. 21459; Commonwealth Exh. 1 at 1-2.

l 19. The call-up system at Graterford is tested regu-larly. It is also routinely implemented because of incidents at the institution requiring off-duty staff to report. During such incidents, more than enough support

staff have reported. Zimmerman, Tr. 21462-63.

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20. The "in house" lines of the Graterford phone system are dependent .upon the institution's own power supply. During power failures, backup generators supply power to those lines. Thus, power outages at Graterford only affect "in house" phones not the five phones in the institution's Administration Building which would be used for notifying off-duty correctional officers. Zimmerman,

! Tr. 21475, 21485-90.

j C. Design And Capacity Of The Commercial Phone Network.

21. Telephone calls over the commercial telephone network are handled by local switching systems located at a Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania (" Bell") switching station, i also called a central of fico. The central office for the i

l State Correctional Institution at Graterford is located in i

Collegeville, Pennsylvania. Buell, Tr. 21388.

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22. The Collegeville central office presently utilizes i

- a No. 2 Electronic Switching System ("ESS"). This system is scheduled to be upgraded in February 1987 to a No. 5 ESS.

' . l The No. 5 ESS ' is the state-of-the-art Buell, Tr. 21388.

j system utilized by Bell at this time. Buell, Tr. 21406.  !

j Four other central offices contiguous to the Collegeville I central office utilize or will be upgraded in the near future to utilize the'No. 5 ESS. Buell, Tr. 21406-07. l

23. Each . central office is engineered to provide a i '

grade of service estimated to meet demand for a projected service period of about two to three years. This projection is based on the number of customers expected to be served l from a particular office and the known . load that those l customers will place on the switching system. Buell, Tr.

l 21389.

i 1 24. Business customers normally generate a heavier calling demand during the business day than residential customers for the same period of times. This is a factor in l engineering the demand capacity of the switching system.

I i Buell, Tr. 21390. i

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1 25. Telephone service is designud for the busy hour of l the busy season, which is normally the winter. Buell, Tr.

1 j 21424: Miller, Tr. 21539. Bell's engineered objective is to i

j provide a dial tone during the " busy hour" to 97% of its f i

customers within three seconds. Buell, Tr. 21393.

26. Bell is able to measure the number of calls that i

! are placed on each trunk line to each central office and the  ;

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duration of each call on each trunk route during the busy hour. Buell, Tr. 21402-03. From this subscriber use data, Bell derives the number of calls during the busy season which are normally placed between one central office and another. Bell provides the switching capacity and the number of trunks between each central office necessary to l'

handle the expected load during that busy hour. Buell, Tr.

21399, 21432-34.

27. AT&T long-distance phone service, like Bell's local service, is engineered to handle the busy hour of the busy day, which typically occurs during the winter months.

Brown, Tr. 21511. Once a call goes beyond a certain area 1

served by local switching equipment, usually between area codes, a long-distance line is necessary. Brown, Tr. 21527.

28. Emergency service lines, or Class A lines, can be assigned to a customer. Bell assigns Class A lines to no

more than approximately ten percent of its subscribers, but has never been requested to assign that many. This affords a customer priority service in obtaining a dial tone if ,

i there is a severe overload. This service is necessary only under the gravest of conditions and is very seldom invoked.

2 Buell, Tr. 21393, 21410.

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29. Class A lines are made available by computerized i

scanning of all lines available for service to provide l priority for the C1' ass A line. This information is stored in the operating instructions of the computer which operates the ESS. Buell, Tr. 21437-38.

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30. During an emergency where there were competing requests for service between Class A and regular lines, the priority afforded Class A subscribers would enhance their i

chances of completing their calls first. Buell, Tr. 21439, i

21448; Brown, Tr. 21528.

l 31. Class A service gives a priority in obtaining a j dial tone, but not in completing a call through a central office. Buell, Tr. 21393-94. The design of any switching system is such, however, that it attempts to complete a call prior to attempting to originate a new call. Buell, Tr.

l 21394-95, 21410; Miller, Tr. 21550,

32. If one central office's circuits are overloaded, other offices in the locale would not be affected. Buell, 4

Tr. 21397. Bell has no way, however, to estimate the exact number of calls that can be handled at one time by any particular central office. Buell, Tr. 21411.

) 33. As noted in Board Finding 116, there are ten lines l which run out of the Graterford switchboard to Philadelphia that are part of the Commonwealth's telephone network.

These ten liner, pass through the Collegeville central office, but are switched at Philadelphia. Buell, Tr.

21391-92, 21398. The Commonwealth's network is comprised of five major switching centers in the State which utilize state of the art equipment comparable to the No. 5 ESS.

j Buell, Tr. 21440.

34. Once calls over the Commonwealth network lines i

from Graterford are switched in Philadelphia, they could be i

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routed over the Commonwealth network or directed to a line off the network and terminated at any other central office.

In other words, Graterford could use Commonwealth network

lines to call the Department of Corrections in Harrisburg or Graterford staff at their private residences. Buell, Tr.

l l 21404.

D. Reliability of Commercial Telephone

! Network For Notifying Off-Duty i Graterford Staff.

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35. Normal phone usage within the hours of 10

00 p.m.

to 6:00 a.m. in a typical service area is so " minimal" as to be incomparable to other times. Brown, Tr. 21532; Buell, Tr. 21409-10; Miller, Tr. 21550-51 i

36. At the Pottstown office, for example, where there are about 20,000 lines, calls during 10:00 p.m. through 6:00 a.m. are so few in number that they could be counted by the office operator listening to the mechanical equipment.

Miller, Tr. 21548.

37. Because Graterford's ten Commonwealth network  !

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[ lines are switched at Philadelphia, outgoing calls over those lines would not be affected by overloaded circuits at

! the Collegeville central office unloos they were routed back to that office. Duell, Tr. 21391-92. Of the 628 Graterford

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staff, it appears that 110 officers reside in areas served ,

by the Collegoville central office. Commonwealth Exh. 1 at 3.

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38'. The dedicated line connecting Graterford with the l

i Pennsylvania State Police would not be affected by overloaded telephone circuits. Buell, Tr. 21391.

39. If there is an overload at one particular switch-I ing system, calls would not be handled as quickly as they I

would during normal conditions. Buell, Tr. 21392. But this

{ ,

does not mean that the telephone system is inoperative.

Even if all local central offices in and around the Limerick area experienced overloaded circuits, the systems are still

! working. Calls are generated and completed within the  :

i capability of the system. Some callers would experience a l

delay in completing their calls, but others would get l

through. Eventually, all callers would be served. Buell, Tr. 21430-31. .

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40. There are approximately 6300 telephone subscribers l l

who utilize the collegeville central office. Buell, Tr.

l l 21403. Approximately 630 lines switched at the Collegeville central office could be predesignated for emergency use by Class A subscribers. Buell, Tr. 21405.

41. Although Superintendent Zimmerman stated that j Graterford had never experienced a need for priority tele-l phone service, he stated his intention to obtain such l service. Zimmerman, Tr. 21458, 21464. >

42. If Graterford experienced delays in telephone  !

j nervice, other means are available to notify off-duty I

correctional officers. Desides the dedicated line to the I i  !

State Police, Graterford could utilize its radio system to j i

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contact Montgomery County emergency officials and other Y

agencies. These agencies could notify the news media or

! other radio systems (including the Emergency Broadcast i

System) to make a public announcement for off-duty t correctional officers to report. Zimmerman, Tr. 21461.

! Graterford could also request the Department of Corrections l

office in Harrisburg to notify correctional officers by i

{ telephone. Zimmerman, Tr. 21461.

43. If necessary, the Pennsylvania State Police telephone network could be utilized to initiate off-duty staff notification by the central office in Harrisburg.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21461.

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' 44. It would also be possible to utilize correctional l officers at other state institutions who could arrive on the i

! buses supplied for evacuation of the inmates at the time of a

y an actual emergency. Those arriving staff could provide all or most of the additional staf f necessary to implement an i

j evacuation. These officers routinely carry out assignments of loading and unloading inmates on buses because inmates

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) are routinely transferred from one institution to another l for various reasons. Zimmerman, Tr. 21461-62, 21467, i

j 45. Of the 628 total Graterford staff, only 257 reside 3

within areas which may be inside the emergency planning zone

{

plume exposure pathway ("EPZ") for Limerick, i.e., Skippack l l [

1 Township /Graterford areat Boyertown Townships the Borough of i

P.toenixville/Royorsford Township; Borough of Pottstown; and i

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Borough of Collegeville. Zimmerman, Tr. 21459; commonwealth l

Exh. I at 3.

i j 46. The Board takes official notice that of the 2

remaining jurisdictions, only Norristown (two miles from the j

.EPZ), Lansdale (six miles) and West Chester (eight miles) are less than ten miles from the Limerick EPZ. - Some staff from outlying areas seem to have high response times (i.e.,  !

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{ greater than two hours) for reporting to Graterford.

l Discounting even those staff as not immediately available, far more than the maximum number of o f f-duty Graterford staff who might be needed in an emergency would nonetheless be available. Commonwealth Exh. 1 at 3. '

! 47. It is the Board's view that the residential areas 1

l under consideration outside the Limerick EPZ are I

,i sufficiently dispersed from the plant and each other that i telephone circuit overloading in an emergency at Limerick

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j would not delay notification of such personnel, if at all, i

l for any unacceptable duration. Commonwealth Exhibit 1 at 3.

In all, the number of staf f residing outside the Limerick EPZ who would be unaffected by congested telephone cervice l

at the time of an emergency and have reasonable response l times far exceeds the maximum of fifteen percent of all l l

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The Board notified the parties of its intent to take this official notice as required by 10 C.P.R.

S2.74 3 (i) . ,

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. off-duty guards necessary for an evacuation. Zimmerman, Tr.

21467.

E. Events In Northeastern Pennsylvania

l Involving overloaded Telephone Circuits.

i l 48. Two Bell witnesses were asked to testify about instances, such as severe snow storms, during which j

, telephone circuits had been overloaded. The witnesses .

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testified that such occurrences were infrequent. They were  ;

i i unable to provide specific information as to the severity,

duration or geographical extent of delay in telephone service during those events. Buell, Tr. 21426-28, 11442, i

j 21444; Miller, Tr. 21540-41.

49. An AT&T employee testified that there were dial j tone delays of up to half an hour in the Pottstown area i

j during Hurricane Agnes in 1972. (Brown, Tr. 21518). The  ;

4 witness acknowledged, however, that down telephone lines and equipment problems may have contributed to these delays.

l Brown, Tr. 21530; Buell, Tr. 21405-06. Also, flooding in f

i certain areas resulted in lines shorting out. To the phone user in the area, the dead line from down or shorted lines would have been indistinguishable from a delay in receiving a dial tone. Brown, Tr. 21531. Thus, the witness could not j state the degree to which dial tone delays in the Pottstown area during Iturricane Agnes were attributable to overloaded

! circuits or shorted or down lines. Brown, Tr. 21535.

l l 50. During Iturricane Agnes, many central offices i

.! utilized older, less officient types of switching system ,

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equipment than in place today. Buell, Tr. 21395-96. The switching system most commonly in use throughout most of southeastern Pennsylvania was either the " step-by-step" or No. 5 Crossbar system. The step-by-step switching machine is antiquated equipment, which was replaced by the No. 5 Crossbar and in turn replaced by the ESS equipment. Brown, Tr. 21514. The No'. 5 Crossbar is an electromechanical system, as opposed to the No. 5 ESS, which is a computer digital system. Buell, Tr. 21396, 21409, Brown; Tr. 21532.

51. At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, there were dial tone delays in the Middletown central office.

for an . extended period of time. That office, however, was using antiquated " step-by-step" equipment. . Brown, Tr.

21529, 21533. Also, the witness providing this testimony was unable to state even roughly what number or proportion of all subscribers experienced a dial tone delay. He stated ~

his belief that, during the overall period of dial tone delay, the longest delay to an individual subscriber was up to 30 minutes. Brown, Tr. 21534. As- with the other testimony noted, the Board is unable to translate this

limited information into' specific projections of the r

l severity, duration or geographical extent of any circuit l

overloading that might result from an emergency at Limerick.

52. The possibility of a radiological emergency at Limerick which would require an evacuation of Graterford is distinguishable from other emergencies, such as the Agnes Hurricane. During the hurricane, only small portions of the i

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populace were evacuated from those areas which experienced telephone circuit congestion. Brown, Tr. 21530-31. An evacuation ' of Graterford, however, would necessarily mean that the entire Limerick EPZ would have been evacuated. The previously approved evacuation time estimates for Limerick demonstrate that practically the entire populace would commence to evacuate within two hours of public notification-of an emergency at Limerick. See Exh. E-67 at Fig. 5.1. As 4 an evacuation of the public is in progress, any circuit congestion would gradually diminish. More lines would become available and calls competing for service will be completed more quickly. See Board Finding 139.

F. Corroborating FEMA Testimony

53. While FEMA did not observe the use of the Graterford call-up system during the exercise of its emergency plan (Asher, Tr. 21552-53), the FEMA witness was present to hear the testimony of Superintendent Zimmerman as to plans for notifying off-duty correctional officers at Graterford. Based upon that testimony and his knowledge of Graterford planning, he agreed that there is reasonable assurance that off-duty correctional officers needed to implement the plan can.and will be notified in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick. Asher, Tr. 21554-55.

54. Further, the Board has had extensive testimony on this narrow issue and therefore has an adequate record upon which to base its e'videntiary conclusions. We reiterate the views expressed in our earlier decision that FEMA's l

evaluation of offsite emergency planning exercises and its testimony during hearings provides only part of the evidence comprising the record. Limerick, supra, LPB-85-14, 21 NRC at 1229. Aside from FEMA's corroborative testimony, the evidence adduced at hearing is sufficient to establish that the Commission's regulatory requirements and guidance criteria have been met for notification and mobilization of off-duty correctional officers at Graterford.

55. The Bosrd agrees with FEMA that changes in any emergency plan should be acknowledged and incorporated in the plan. Asher, Tr. 21561. Accorcingly, the Board has ordered the Department of Corrections to incorporate within its emergency plan the call-up system for notifying off-duty correctional officers which is actually in use now and would be used in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick. Hoyt, Tr. 21564-66. By letter dated October 1, 1986, counsel for the Department of Corrections confirmed that this action has been taken.

G. Effect Of Notification And Mobilization Procedures Upon Evacuation Time Estimates.

56. One component of the overall evacuation time-estimates for Graterford previously approved by this Board was the 1-to-2 hour (normal conditions) and 2-to-3 hour (adverse conditions) estimate for off-duty personnel to report. Limerick, supra, LBP-85-25, 22 NRC at 111. In considering the effectiveness of the call-up system for

.Graterford and the various options available for notifying

off-duty correctional officers, Superintendent Zimmerman determined that these previous estimates remain accurate.

Zimmerman, Tr. 21468.

H. Comparability Of Telephone Systems Used To Notify Graterford Staff And Other Emergency Response Organizations.

57. James R. Asher is an Emergency Management Program Specialist in the Natural and Technological Hazards Divi-sion, Region III, FEMA, and Chief of the Technological Hazards Branch. Mr. Asher is also FEMA's representative to the Regional Assistance Committee ("RAC") and Chairman of that Committee. Asher, ff. Tr. 20150 (Professional Quali-fications). Mr. Asher previously testified, along with another FEMA representative, at other hearings on off-site emergency planning and preparedness for Limerick. .See Asher, Tr. 20131-20332, 21278-21289.

58. Mr. Asher is familiar with emergency response plans for other nuclear power plants throughout the country, including organizational chains of command and the means of notifying off-duty emergency workers. From his experience, he testified that other plans utilize commercial telephone lines in the same manner they are utilized for Graterford.

In fact, Mr. Asher is unaware of any nuclear power plant which does not utilize commercial lines to notify of f-duty I emergency workers. Asher, Tr. 21554.

59. The Ossining Correctional Institution (formerly l

known as Sing Sing Prison) in New York lies within the EPZ for the Indian Point plant. At that institution, there are

no plans for an evacuation of inmates and under no circumstances will those prisoners be evacuated. Therefore, no. plans exist for calling in off-duty guards in the event of a radiological emergency. Instead, plans call for issuance of KI and sheltering as the only protective action.

Asher, Tr. 21555.

60. Since its inception, FEMA has utilized group commercial phone lines to notify its emergency response teams. Its call-down system is very similar to that in use at Graterford. Asher, Tr. 21556. To Mr. Asher's knowledge, there has never been an instance in which FEMA has been unable to notify its off-duty emergency response teams by means of commercial telephone lines. Asher, Tr. 21557.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In reaching this decision on the remanded issue of off-duty Graterford staff notification and mobilization, the Board has considered all the evidence of the parties and the entire record of this proceeding, including all proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the l

l parties. Based upon a review of that record and the foregoing Findings of Fact, which are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, the Board, with respect to the issue in controversy before us, reaches the following i conclusion pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.760a:

Arrangements in place at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford for the notification and mobilizgtion of off-duty correctional officers in the event

of a radiological emergency at the Limerick Generating Station meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. S50.47, and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, as well.as the criteria.of NUREG-0654, and provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures for the Graterford inmates can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

IV. ORDER WHEREFORE, in accordance with the Atomic Energy.Act of 1954, as amended, and the Rules of Practice of the Commission, and based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS ORDERED that:

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.760(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, this Supplement to the Fourth Partial Initial Decision will constitute the final decision of the Commission forty-five (45) days from the date of issuance, unless an appeal is taken in accordance with 10 C.F.R.

52.762 or the Commission directs otherwise. See also 10 C.F.R. SS2.764, 2.785 and 2.786.

I Any party may take an appeal from this Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within ten (10) days after service i of this Decision. Each appellant must file a brief supporting its position ' on appeal within thirty (30) days after filing its Notice of Appeal (forty (40) days if the Staff is the appellant) . Within thirty (30) days after the period has expired for the filing and service of the briefs of all appellants (forty (40) days in the case of -the f Staf f) , a party who is not an appellant may file a brief.in i

9 support of or in opposition to the appeal of any other party. A responding party shall file a single, responsive brief regardless of the number of appellant briefs filed.

See 10 C.F.R. 52.762(c).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Richard F. Cole ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Jerry Harbour ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated'at Bethesda, Maryland this day of , 1986.

k ut ops.ea.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 86 0CT 20 P1 :04 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3DY-ML" '

In the Matter of )

)

Philadelphia Electric Company ) Docket Nos. 50-352

) 50-353 (Limerick Generating Station, )

Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a ,

" Supplement to Fourth Partial Initial Decision (On Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to Graterford)" and

" Licensee's Proposed Transcript Corrections" both -dated October 17, 1986 in the captioned matter have been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail this 17th day of October, 1986:

• Helen F. Hoyt, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing.

Chairperson Appeal Panel Atomic Safety and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board ~ Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section

• Dr. Richard F. Cole U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Commission Licensing Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Counsel for NRC Staff Office of the General

• Dr. Jerry Harbour Counsel Atomic Safety and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l

• Hand Delivery 1

_ , - - - . . _ __ - -_ 1

1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Angus Love, Esq.

Board Panel 107 East Main Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Norristown, PA 19401 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.

Sugarman, Denworth &

Philadelphia Electric Company Hellegers ATTN: Edward G. Bauer, Jr. 16th Floor, Center Plaza Vice President & 101 North Broad Street General Counsel Philadelphia, PA 19107 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 John L. Patten, Director Pennsylvania Emergency Mr. Frank R. Romano Management Agency 61 Forest Avenue Room B-151 Ambler, Pennsylvania 19002 Transportation and Safety Building Mr. Robert L. Anthony Harrisburg, PA 17120 Friends of the Earth in ~

the Delaware Valley Kathryn S. Lewis, Esq.

106 Vernon Lane, Box 186 City of Philadelphia Moylan, PA 19065 Municipal Services Bldg.

15th and JFK Blvd.

Charles W. Elliott, Esq. Philadelphia, PA 19107 325 N. 10th Street Easton, PA 18064 Spence W. Perry, Esq.

General Counsel Maureen Mulligan Federal Emergency Limerick Ecology Action Management Agency P.O. Box 761 500 C Street, S.W.

762 Queen Street Room 840 Pottstown, PA 19464 Washington, DC 20472 Mark L. Goodwin, Esq. Thomas Gerusky, Director Pennsylvania Emergency Bureau of Radiation Management Agency Protection P. O. Box 3321 Department of Environmental Harrisburg, PA 17105-3321 Resources 5th Floor Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq. Fulton Bank Bldg.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Third and Locust Streets Commission' Harrisburg, PA 17120 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

a

)

Gene Kelly William A. Welliver, Ed.D.

Senior Resident Inspector Superintendent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Spring-Ford Area School Commission District P.O. Box 47 199 Bechtel Road Sanatoga, PA 19464 Collegeville, PA 19426 Ralph Hippert Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency B151 - Transportation and Safety Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Theodore G. Otto, Esq.

Department of Corrections Office of Chief Counsel P.O. Box 598 Lisburn Road ,

Camp Hill, PA 17011 Timothy R.S. Campbell, Esq.

Director Department of Emergency Services 14 East Biddle Street West Chester, PA 19380 A. Lindley Bigelow Coordinator of Emergency Preparedness Montgomery County 50 Eagleville Road Eagleville, PA- 19403 Roy C. Claypool, Ed.D.

District Superintendent Owen J. Roberts School District Administration Building R.D. 1 Pottstown, PA 19464 Nils N. Nichols