ML20093K961

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Limerick Ecology Action Contentions DES-1,-2,-3 & -4 Re Severe Accident Risk.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20093K961
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Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	07/26/1984
From:	LIMERICK ECOLOGY ACTION, INC.
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Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on LEA Contentions DES--1,,3,3, and 4 General Introduction

1. LEA's contentions challenge the adequacy of the NFC Staff's Environ-mental Impact Statement (EIS or FES) under the National Environmental Policy Acto of 1969 (hereafter, NEPA), with respect to the risk of severe accidents at the Limerick facility.1!

2. We conclude below that the EIS does not cmply with the mandates of NEPA, largely due to numerous material non-disclosures of environmental impacts, including health effects. We also conclude that, contrary to Applicant's assertions in its Proposed Findings of Fact, No. 6, those disclosure defects in the FES cannot be cured by the discussion of those defects in this decision, notwithstanding 10 C.F.R. 5 51.102(c) . The publication of this decision is simply no substitute for the full circulation and conment requirements of NEPA and 40 C.F.R. Parts 1502 and 1503.

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Applicant would have us observe that LEA and the City did not conment on the draft supplement to the Environnental Statement and thus did not "put the Staff on notice as to the specific areas which they felt should be modified or im-proved. The litigation could have been simplified and shortened had this been done." (Applicant's Proposed Findings, fn. 5.) This position is utterly un-tenable. LEA's and City's litigation contentions were admitted long L7 fore the issuance of the FES and put the Staff on adequate notice. Indcod, Staff's testimony was generally responsive to the contentions. But the Staff mi.de no changes to the DES responsive to any of the contentions. The opportunity for informal and formal discovery in the litigation provided the Staff with even greater opportunity to determine areas of concern than that afforded by public conments. The Staff did not avail itself of its opportunity to include in the FES the information it provided in testimony, even thouqh the infonnation was apparently availablo, and the contentions were long krwn to it.

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.D' 3.

Applicant has suggested that various tables, diagrams and figures referenced in the decision "should be considered a part of it for all pur-poses". - (Proposed Findings of Fact, Fn 6) . Similarly, Staff's witness sug-gested at hearing that the materials referenced by the FES should scmehow be deemed " included" within the FES. (IIulman, Tr.11,295) . Wo reject such sug-

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gestions.

While incorporation of sonn materials by reference may-be appropriate under scme circumstances (See 40 C.F.R. 51502.21), we conclude that specific risk calculations for the non-disclosed impacts for the Limerick site were not publicly available for inpection; and that these and the other matters not disclosed could have been easily set forth in the FES without unnecessary length.

See also, Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., et.al. v. Natural Ibsourcca Defenso Council, Inc. US (1983) slip. yo . pp.11-12, fn.12. (criticism of ex-cessivo reliance on inforuution outside of the FES) .

Risk of ibtal Facility Operational Lifo 4.

Throughout the FES' discussion of the environtrental impact of sovere accidents, the discussion of risk is limited to " annualized" values, i.e. , the risk prcsonted by onc year of operation of a single reactor. Ilowever, tin; severe accident probabilities at one unit must be approximately multiplied by the number of years of plant operation to obtain the total probability of a severe accident from operation of one unit of the Limerick facility. (Acharya, Hulman, Tr. 11,298-299).

Because Applicant's operating license application is for both units of'a tm -unit facility, the risk posed by the entire facility must be roughly multiplied by two,' assuming a low probability of interaction between the two units. (Acharya, Tr. 11,195-6).

5.

We find that the FES does not adequately disclose the impacts of total facility _ operation over its operating life in the context of al/, of the avattac:.

embraced by LEA's. DES 4, because in each case the risk is presented either in terms of a "per reactor-year" risk value or by the presentation of a CCDP cuev which similarly is limited to annual probabilities. We cannot conclude that a lay reader would discern, without instructions in the FES, that the total risk over the operating life of the entire facility could be obtained by the multiplication process described above. Indeed, one Staff expert witness, Mr. Hubnan, consistently 2 ajected this approach until he was finally corrected by another witness. (Hulman, Tr. 11,194-5).

DES .L

6. LEA's Contention DES-1 staces:

The DES' severe accident consequence nodeling assumes the relocation of the publio from contaminated areas beyond the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ (DES, Supp. 1, pp. 5.21 to 5.22). Such an assumption in Limerick's case is implausible and without foundation in fact.

7. While Staff's witness Mr. Hulman testified that "some discussions" of a generic naturo have taken place between thu Nr<C and the Federal Emergency Management Agency concerning relocation of populations beyond the 10 mile plume exposure pathway (Hubnan, Tr. 11,544; 11,550), the witness admitted that no such planning for Lamorick is in place (Hulman, Tr. 11,544),

and while the witness spoke in terms of " planning", he denied that " planning" even contemplates the presence or existence of a plan. (Hulman, Tr. 11,500).

8. Indccd, not oven any formal planning document has been issued by the appropriate agencies, and the Staff witness refused to speculate on when such a document might ever be issued. (Huhnan, Tr.11,567) . We therefore place no credence in suggestions of such " relocation planning".

9. The Staff perfornud no analysis of the consequences of a severe acci-dent at Lamerick in which relocation of the population outside of the lo mile plume exposure emargency planning zone does not take place. (Acharya , ' Tr . 11, 545).

10. However, if no relocation is assumed, early fatalities would occur at distances farther from the plant than those calculated in the Staff's Final Environmental Statement analyses. (Acharya, Tr. 11,547-8).

ll." Indeed, the Staff's own analysis performed in the context of another IEA contention showed that at a probability level of 1.18 x 10 / reactor year, 5,000 persons are expected to be located in an area in which those persons, unless relocated, would receive in seven days a bone marrow dose of 200 res,II the dose threshold for early fatalities assuming no medical treatment.

(IIulman, et.al. ff. Tr.11,555; Table 1; Id. ff. Tr.11,543, pp. 4-5) . Thus, it is apparent that the " relocation" assumption eliminated fran the Staff's analysis many hundreds if not thousands of "early fatalities", on the basis of an assumption of relocation which was supported only by a thin evidentiary thread.

12. With respect to the possibility of such relocation, we note that the.

NIC Staff written testimony on this point was limited to the plausibility of radiological monitoring for the identification of such areas, and the founu-lation of " advisories". (IIulman, et.al. , ff. Tr. 11,543, p. 3-4) . There is an understandable, but conspicuout absence of any testimony whatsoever on how such relocations beyond the planning zones would be carried out for Limerick.

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Indcod, while the probability drops to very low levels, the nunber of such persons rises t.o as many as 500,000, all of t.hich represent potential early fatalities if no relocation takes place. (IIulman, et.al. , ff. Tr.11, 555, Table 1).

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13. Applicant and the Staff also attemnted to rely upon various references in NUIEG-0'6 54, FE2%-IEP-1 to support their conceptions of an "ad hoc" relocation beyond the 10 mile plume exposure EP3. (th11 man, et.al. , ff.

'Tr._11,543 pp. 3-4; Daebler, et.al., ff. 11,114, p. 11). We find this reliance to be misplaced.

14. Both the Staff's and the Applicant's consequences analyses assuned that persons between 10 and 25 miles frcm Limerick would be " rapidly re-located", i.e., would be physically r e oved frcm contaminated areas so quickly as to virtually cease dose accumulation 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after plume passage. (Dacbler, et.al. ,ff. Tr.11,114, p. 12-13; FES p. 5-80) . Ob-viously, the radiological nonitoring and identification of contaminated areas relied upon by Staff (Firiling of Fact No.12 ) could not occur until after plume passage. Thus, to support the Applicant's ad hoc " relocation" assumption, we would have to conclude that the process of (l')cmpleting field measurements of ground radioactivity over an area large than the areas actually contaminated by pluno passage fall out, (2) identifying those specific areas meeting the relocation criterion of 200 re s to the bone marrow in a 7-day period; (3)fornulating advisories to such persons, (4)cennunicating thm to those persons (probably on a door to door basis) (5) preparation of the affected population for relocation, and (6)the physical renoval of such persons, would all occur with a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period, without any advance planning for such a disaster. On the basis of the record before us, we cannot so conclude.

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15. The contaminated land area over which the plume would pass, and which would thus require field nuasurmen'ts of ground radioactivity is reflected by Applicant's Tables 5 and 6, although the total area of plume passage would be even larger. (See Kaiser, Invine, Tr. 11,389-391).

Mose tables show land areas ranging from 300 square miles to 30,000 square miles, depending upon the probability and contamination level.

(Daebler, et.al., ff. Tr. 11,114, Tables 5 and 6). While the areas so highly contaminated as to require population relocation would doubtless be much smaller, these areas are indicative of the size of the area over which field measurements will be required, and thus of the resources and time necessary to perform such field measurements. In the absence of some explanation for i m this entire process could possibly be done in such a short time period, on an ad hoc basis simultaneously with and in_

addition to the entire process required to complete and support the evacuation of the entire plume exposure EPZ, such an assumption of a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> " relocation" strains credibility, and we reject it.

16. Therefore, we find Staff's and Applicant's assumption of ad hoc popu-lation " relocation" to be inappropriate, and a defect in the FES.

,. - .- - =. _, -- - -

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5 DES-2 ,

17. IENs Cbntention DES-2 states:' '

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'1he DES severo accident consequence modeling uses an asstmption of a unifom two-hour ovacuation delay thne l in~ its anorgency responso model. (DES, Supp. 1, pp.

5-21 to 5-22). This asstmption understates the likely.

l delay tine for a high population density sito such as Linerick. This understatment of delay tine results in an understatenent of Limerick's risk, because ac-cident consequence calculations are sensitive to l cvacuaticn time delay assumptions.

18. Out of 27 release categories analyzed by the Staff in the FES, only 6 have warning times for evacuation in excess of two hours. (FES p. 5-76, Table 5.ll(c); IIulman, Tr.11,552) .

l 19. Accidents with sMrt warning times are nest sensitive to evacuation r

delay times, and sme of the rolcaso categorica analyzcxl by the Staff aro l highly sensitive to ovacuation delay tines. (llulman, Tr.11,552) .

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20. The generic evacuation time study performed by Sandia National Lab-oratories, and which is used in Applicant's consequence modeling concluded ,

that the mean evacuation delay tine of the observed evacuations was 3  !

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hours. (Daebler, et.al. , ff. Tr.11,114 p. 21) . 30% of the population was nhaprVed to " delay" for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 40% was observed to " delay" for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, and 30% were nhaarved to delay for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. (Id., p. 22).

21. If the evacuation delay timo is increased to throo or more hours, O

x the calculation of early health offects would increase. (Ilulnnn, Tr..

11,554).

22. . '1ho Staff did not use the nuclear evacuation generic arxlel delay times of 1, 3, and 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> because it used a 2.5 mph evacuation speed l rather than the 10 nph evacuation speed of the gencric model.

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23. However, the delay time (including warning and preparation times) and evacuation speed (actual spood of persons noving away frm the react er) are largely independent in reality - the only "dopendenco" the Staff could l~ think of had nothing to do with tle actual speed of ovacuation away frm ,

i i the reactor arca: "What role will the travel speed play in determining

. the timo people will take to preparo after being notified to evacuato, l 3

i i whatever traffic might bo involved. It is not the traveling in the

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i evacuation routes....so the speed involved there is not the speed of  ;

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cvacuation which comes after the peepic have already prepared for evacua- i tion and when they got in their car and take those routes." (flulman, 4

Tr. 11,555).

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24. While for modeling considerations, use of a shorter delay timo can

{ be ccmpensated for by a slower speed, this "conpensation" is incmplete.

4 In fact, where the delay time is in excess of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (as would be the

. case for between 30-70% of the population, according to the Sandia generic model), CCDP risk curves are generally insensitivo to evacuation speeds l

l ranging fr m 5-40 mph. (Kaiser, Tr.11,556) . Wo therefore firn the 2-hour delay time to be an inewwiate understatment.

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. 1 DES-3

25. LEA contended that the Staff's analysis failed to account for the probability that a portion of the population will fail to take protective action despite planning and instructions, thus understating the actual t

consequences of a severe accident at Limerick.

26. Indeed, the base case for the Staff's consequences analysis assumed that 100% of the population within the 10 mile EPZ would be evacuated after an average delay time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

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27. The CRAC code can be modified to determine the effect of a non-parti-l l cipating percentage of the population in mergency response, and indeed Applicant smewhat modified its analysis to consider this possiblity; however, even its modified analysis is defective and not fully responsive to LEA's issue, for reasons we discuss hereafter.

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28. Applicant's testimony states that while a non-participating fraction

! of the population up to 50% is an inappropriate value (Dacbler, et.al. ff.

Tr. 11,114 at p. 26), the Sandia generic evacuation model, which was specific-ally developed for nuclear power plant stixlies and was used in SARA, states l that civil defense personnel observed 5 percent as the fraction of non-participating people in actual evacuations, and the llans and Soll study 1/

I/- Hans, J.M. Jr. and T.C. Sell, 1974. Evacuation Risks - Air Evaluation, EPA-520/6-74-002, U.S. EPA

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f. =.

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( upon which the Sandia generic model was based, considered 6 percent to be 1

0 an appropriate value. Indeed, Applicant provided an analysis asstning a

! 6% "non-participating" fraction, although its analysis, as we have said, is i'

l defective and not fully responsiva to LEA's issue. (Daebler, et.al., ff.

I f Tr. 11,114, at pp. 26-27).

29. Applicant's alternative analysis assumed that "6% of the population l-i out to 25 mtles does not take the protective actions which the remainder of -

i lL l the affected pnedation is asstned to take, i.e., evacuation within 10 miles of IGS or normal activities for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after plume passage with subsequent relocation for people between 10 and 25 miles from the plant. 'Ihe individuals who did not participate were as=M to remain outdoors for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the declaration of a general emergency and then to rapidly relocate. 'Ihis is the equivalent of exposures that would be am= Mated in over two days of normal activities following plume passage." Under this variation, the public risk of early fatalities increases by 49%. (Daebler, et.al. ff. Tr. 11,114 ,

at pp. 27-28) .

30. Applicant testified that this variation had a small offect on the results, well within the estimated uncertainties, and that the incorporation of this omission in the analysis does not change the overall conclusions. (Daebler, l

et.al., id at p. 24).

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!. 31. However, this opinion was entirely based upon the A[plicant's sensitivity  !

l analysis with the asstaption as described in our. finding of fact No #7 .

(Kaiser, Tr.11,502) .

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i__________ 2

32. Based upon the testimony, we find Applicant's characterization of its variation assumption of 6% of the population as a "non-participating" frac-tion to be manifestly false, because the model still assumes cooperation in evacuation, albeit delayed for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />sjand assumes cessation of radiation dose accumulation after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. (Kaiser, Tr. 11,504). Persons who in fact do not participate in evacuation or relocation as IEA contended would continue to receive radiation doses after the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> timeline at which Applicant's model assumes dose accumulation ends. (Kaiser, Tr.11,504) .

33. Applicant admits that the net affect of Applicant's modeling assump-tions is that the "non-participating" fraction of the population in fact take protective action after 2-3 days. (Kaiser, Tr.11,505) .

34. This assumption eliminates the contribution to early fatalities of any persons whose doses would exceed the lethal dose threshold after 2-3 days.

For example so a persons would accumulate a lethal dose in a period up to 7 days. (Kaiser, Tr. 11,506).

35. The Staff's " alternative" analysis is emn nore seriously defective.

The Staff relied upon its "Early it. loc" nodel of uncryency response to re-sporrl to IEA's contention that it had failed to account for the non-partici-pating fraction of the population. (!!ulman, Acharya, ff. Tr.11,148, at p. 4) .

36. In this "Early Reloc" model of emergency response, all persons outside P  !

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of the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ are assumed not to receive a dose I

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l. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after passage of the plume. Within 10 miles of the plant, l- . persons are assumed to be relocated frm contaminated areas 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the passage of the plume, (Acharya', Tr. 11,511) .

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37. Thus, Staff's " alternative" analysis, which Staff offered to demon-l' strate the inpact on consequences of a non-participating percentage of the i

l population, assumes cooperative participation of 100% of the population l

[ with energency measures and their cmplete removal frun contaminated areas l . .

l 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after plune passage. We fail to understand how this assunption l

models "non-participating" persons.

38. Nor can we conclude that this is merely a " minor variation". Both Applicant and' Staff " alternative" models almost completely eliminate frm consideration the dose to a non-participating fraction of the population re-l sulting fr m ground exposure. Other testinony of the Staff calculated areas of contamination requiring land interdiction for periods up to, and exceeding, 30 years, the population within those areas and, the population located in highly contaminated areas beyond the 10 mile EPZ in which persons would receive l a 200 rem bone marrow dose over a 7 day period. This dose is believed to be

[ the threshold for early fatalities, absent medical treatment. (llulman, Acharya, ff. Tr. 11,555 and Table 1). For exanple, even beyond the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ, where doses are anticipated to be lower than within the 10 mile plune exposure EPZ due to plume depletion and decay, at a probability level of i

-6 1 x 10 / reactor year, 5,000 or more persons would receive a 200 rem bone marrow dose unless removed from the contaminated areas within 7 days. A 5% non-participating fraction of the population only within thoso small

" hot spot" areas beyond the EP4 identified to trigger the 200 rem 7 day bone marrow doso threshold, is suggestivo of an additional 250 fatalitics that Staff's analysis ignores. Within the 10 mile EPZ, significantly more persons can be expected to receivo such projected 7 day doses duo to the higher levels of contamination expected closer to the plant. L'ven if we conservatively assume the same number c.! persons (5,000) again within the EPZ projected to receive such a 7 day Jose, a 5% non-participating fraction would nean an additional 250 carly fatalitics, for a total of 500 adoitional early fatalities at that probability level. The FES p. 5-87, Figuro 5.4 (c) shows that at a probability lovel of 10~0/rcactor year, como 1,000 carly fatalities are expected. The addition of 500 nero fatalitics, to 1500, represents a 50% increaso ignorcxl by the Staff, for only the population in the small " hot spots" calculated by CPAC.

39. While Arplicant's witness testified that other uncertaintios woro more significant than a 49% increase in early fatalities, and that such an in-crease is "small" for calculations of this typo (Dachlor, et.nl,. ff. Tr. 1.1,114 at p. 28), we find such a conclusion irrelevant for two reasons. Ono, it is clear that the proper inclusion of a non-participating Iraction of the popu-lation would increase early fatalities by more than 50%, inasmuch as such inclusion causcs that much of an increase in early fatalitics for the " hot i l

spot" population alone. Second, NEPA is not bound b;' the risk assessment connunity's notion of what a "small" increase is, and NEPA's disclosure pur-poses are ill-served by omissions of human deaths in environmental assessments.

'the omission is particularly inappropriato in view of the fact that state-of-the-art accident consequence ccuputer modeling could easily acconniodate the disclosuro.

DES-4 (A) (1)

40. LEA's Contention DES-4 (A) (1) states:

The DES Supplenent fails to adequately disclose or consider:

(1) Total latent health effects due to both initial and chronic radiation exposure, other than those result-ing in fatalities, including genetic effects, non-fatal cancers, spon-taneous abortions, and sterility (See eg. , BEIR I-III) .

Genetic Effects

41. hhile the Staff admits that various types of genetic offects arc among the health risks posed by severe reactor accidents, the main nontion of the risk of genetic effects caused by severo accidents at Limerick in the FES consists of two sentences at p. 5-67:

In addition, approximately 220 genetic changes por million person-rems would be projected over succeeding generations by models suggested in the BEIR III report. This also caripares well with the value of about 260 per million person-rems used by the NIC staff, which was computed as the sum of the risk of specific genetic de-fccts and the risk of defects with complex etiology.

42. The Staff's testimony proved to be considerably more informative than the FES. The Staff witnesses testified that it calculated an estimated risk of 2.6 x 10-1 cases of genetic effects per reactor year, and that a CCDF for genetic effects could be obtained by multiplying the consequences magnitudo on the X-axis of FES Figure 5.4 (c) for t.otal person-rom by a

)

i factor of 2.6 x 10-4. (Hulman, et. al., ff. Tr..ll,148, p. 5-6).

43. On a per reactor-year basis, the risk of genetic effects is higher than any other health effect analyzed in the EES (Acharya, Tr. 11,211-212).

)

i l 44. However, the Staff neither created nor presented any CCDP curve for i

the risk of genetic effects, as it did for.other 1cwar risk health effects, and the per reactor year risk value appeared nowhere in the FES (Id.). The Staff instead relied upon the reader to perform his own calculations to arrive at a risk value, (Id.) but even failed to provide any instructions on how to do so. (Acharya, Tr.11,215) .

45. The Staff's risk estimato for genetic effects may be low by a factor of 4 to 5 (FES p. 5-43) . If raised by a factor of 4-5, the risk estimate would still be consistent with the range of values used by the Staff as a basis for its own estimato. (Icharya, Tr. 11,213) .

l 46.

Even if one constructed a CCDP curve in accordance with the instructions l

l given by the Staff in its testimony, (which, we repeat, were not available to a reader of the FES, who did not have the Staff's testimony), such a l _ construction would not tell you that the curve may be 4 to 5 times too low.

(Hulman, Tr.11,215 ; Ievine, Tr.11,315) .

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47. Although it is custcmary for CCDFs to reflect the uncertainty of the estimates upon which the CCDP was constructed by showing an upper bound and a lower bound curve (Acharya, Tr.11,216), constructing a single curve E

according to the infornntion in the testimony and the FES would obviously not reflect the uncertainty.

48. The FES estinntes for genetic effects were those integrated over all succeeding generations, which Staff witness Branagan testified were limited to five generations. (Branagan, Tr. 11,246).

49. Ilowever, Dr. Branagan also testified that for genetic effects that are nore irregularly inherited than those caused by dominant mutations, the mean persistence would be 10 generations. (Branagan, Tr. 11,244-11,247).

50. While Staff relied upon FES Table K.1 as the basis for asserting that the FES pennits a reader to determine the health effects cssociatcd with a particular release category, Table K.1 fails to incltxle genetic effects.

(Hulman, Tr. 11,284-5; 11,296-7).1!

51. For all the above reasons, wo find that the FES did not adequately disclose even the bare numbers associated with the risk of genetic effects of severe accidents at Limerick. We also find tlut the FES's baro reference to genetic " changes" does not adequately convey the impact of this risk.

Nowhero is a genetic "chango" cxplaincd, defined, or doccribtxl in the IES.

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Indeed, Table k.1 cmits all the other health offects alleged in LEA's Contention DES 4(A), including non-fatal cancers, spontaneous abortions, and sterility.

The word " change" is apparently a carefully chosen, neutral term which does not suggest the true naturo of the health risks involved. Indcod, in this context, the word "chango" is essentially meaningless.

52. This is so particularly in view of the Staff's testimony concerning the catastrophic naturo of sme of the physical expressions in livebirths of theso genetic " changes":

By genetic offects estimates that woro included in the value of 260 potential genetic defects por million person-rom, that included all dis-orders that could causo saro serious handicap during the lifetino of an indivjdual. Examples of genetic effects that are included in the risk estimator are diseases and abnormalitics l caused by a dominant mutation. For exanplo, j

cxtra fingers, ex xa toos. Diccasos caused l by recessivo mutations. Por examplo, sicKlo cell anemia. Abnormalitics caused by chttrno-smal aberration. For examplo, Downs syndrmo, congenital anomalics, anemia, diabotos, and schizophrenia.

The o aru exanpleu ut the typvu of udnyu that are included. (Branagan, Tr. 11,255).

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53. We find that the FES's failuro to describo the physical nanifestation of theso " genetic changes" in terms of the disordern and discaues which tiny cause is inconsistent with NEPA's mandato of full disclosdro.

l Non-Fatal Cincorn

54. With respect to non-fatal cancers, the Staff testimny stated that according to the WASil-1400 health effects model, 10% of cancerous thyroid nodules my be fatal, and 90% non-fatal. (!!ulmn, et. al. , f f. Tr.11, 148, p. 7).

55. Thus the number of non-fatal thyroid nodules can bo derived by sealing the consequences axes of the thyroid cancer fatality CCDP in Figuro 5.4(d) by a factor of nino. (Id.).

56, flowever, a reader of the FES could not no this without oither reading the Staff's testimony or relying upon information sources outsido of the j FES. While responding directly to this point, Staff witness !!ulmn stated that a reador could derive this estimato of non-fatal thyroid nodules by using tho FES, p. 5-73, first paragraph, last sentence, (Ilulman, Tr. 11,248),

the witneuu' toutimny lu plainly incorrect on itu face, l

57. FES p. 5-73, first paragraph, last sentenco, states in full:

The health risk to an individual rco2ivinct a thyroid exposuro (of 300 roms) is the potential appearance of benign or malignant thyroid nodulos in about 1 out of 10 casos, and the develormant of a fatal cancer in about 4 out of 100 casos.

58. Yet it is plain that this contenco may provido inforTnation to tho l

I

reader of the relative health risk of a given radiation doso to the thyroid, it does not provide the reador with the 9-1 ratio of non-tatal cancerous thyroid nodules to fatal cancerous nodules. It states only that for a given exposuro, one out of 10 persons receiving such an exposuro will suf-for either an benign or malignant thyroid nodule, and out of 1000 parsons rocciving such a doso 4 will receive a fatal cancer. Indeed, it is impos-sible to derive the ratio mthematically fran the informtion given because the information fails to provido a crucial factor - how many malignant, or cancerous (as opposed to benion) thyroid nodulos are expected in the exposed population.

59. We find that a reader's inability to determino from the information in the FES the total number of cancers without a fatal outcono is a signifi-cant defect, because (1) non-fatal cancern are serious human health offects which must be fully disclosod;1/ and (2) expresaed in terms of a por reactor year risk, the risk poned by the I,hnerick facility of non-fatal c.ux eru in greator than any other health offect analyzed by the Staff in the FES.

(llulman, Tr. 11,240).

60. We conclude also that the risk of benion thyroid nodules arxl hypothy-roidism are sufficiently serious to warrant their full disclosure. Such 1/

Wo do not find that fatality is a nocessary outcono of health offects to requiro their full disclosuro in an environmental statoment. Indeed, Staff itself et least partially disclosed radiation injuries and genetic effocts in the FES.

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c cases. require 3edial;treatnent(in-de fom of hormone adminictraticp, and "for n$ny individuals, Ehe thyroid gland could be Acemoved - the persons will havd under'g one _the re'xivAl of the thyroid gland." '(Acharya, Tr. 11, 1 .

m 262). - Tne Staff testimony states that the risk of ben {gn thyroid nodules would be htouO 15 tiknes hidher than that of thyNoid cancer fatality, and -

that the riak of hyp5 thyroidism would'be about the same order o5 magnitude as the risk of thyr,old. nodules. (Hulman, et al. , ff. Tr. 11,148, p. 12) .

Expressed in. terms of a'per-reactor. year-risk basis, both these risks would be higher than the other; health effects risks analyzed in the FES. (Cf.

Hulman, Tr.?ll,248 and Tr. 11,261-62).

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61. The risk of Lenign thyroid 'ncdules tax 1 hypothyroidism was rowhere dis-closed in thd FES. (Acharya, Hulman, Tr. 11,250).

62. While the FES a,ssumes that with respect to radiation induced cancer in children after fstal or embryonic irradiation the risk period ends at age 10 (Acharya, Tr! 11,252), other cancer induction sources place the risk period as the eritire lifetime or 30. years, depergling on the cancer. (Richter, Tr. 11,250).

Spontaneous Abortions

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63. While the Staff agreed that spontaneous aboctions in women in the population [ exposed"to radiation is a riskTof severe accidents at Limerick, no such risk was disclosed in the FES. (flulman, Acharya, Tr. 11,252).

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64. . We Staff's testimony attempts to mitigate the effect of this emmission by' asserting that the societal impact is difficult to assess because the

.majcd.ty of such spontaneous abortions would be in the first trimester, and of those, they would "likely" occur so early as to be undetectible.

4

.(Hulman, et. al., ff. Tr. 11,148 at 9).

65. However, the Staff witness indicated that the " majority" could be any-thing over 50% - thus as many as 49% of such abortions may not.be'within.

the.first trimester. Indeed, not all-spontaneous abortions occurring-within the first trimester would be undetectible ("likely to occur- so

, early in pregnancies as to be undetectible").

66. For those pregnancies which are detected, the women either abort or carry a dead fetus. (Hulman, Tr. 11,256-7). The risk of spontaneous abortion is higher than any health effect risk the FES considered,with the sole exception ~of genetic effects (Acharya, Tr. 11,258). 'The NRC Staff has quite obviously ignored the impact of the risk of spontaneous abortion.

4 Sterility

67. Se same analysis is also appropriate with respect to sterility. While Staff admits that sterility is a health risk of severe accidents at Limerick, i

the FES makes no disclosure of such an impact. According to BEIR III, de-pending on the dose, the sterility in males can last up to a year. (Brana-gan, Tr. 11,259 - 11,261).

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68. While Staff's testimony deprecates the significance of this sterility by asserting that "because most individuals only conceive children inter-mittently . . . the vast majority of these cases would not be aware of.

their temporary sterility" we find such a consideration to be utterly ir-relevant in terms of NEPA's requirement of full disclosure of health impacts.

69. The Staff estimated the societal risk of such sterility to be 1.6 x.

10-1 per reactor year and 3 x 10-2 per reactor year for males _and females, respectively (Hulman, et. al., ff. Tr. 11,148, p. 11). This societal risk, like that of non-fatal cancers, thyroid nodules, and spontaneous abortions, which were also cmnitted by the Staff's FES, is larger than any health risk disclosed by the FES, except .for genetic effects which we have already found to be incompletely disclosed. (Acharya, Tr. 11,248, 11,261).

70. Finally, one further health impact of radiation exposures caused by a severe accident at Limerick was impairment of developnent of children due to in-utero exposure of embryos and fetuses, including microcephaly, mental retardation, growth retardation, blindness, cleft palate, and spira bifida.

Goldman, Tr. 11,317).

(Tr.11,264-S; Acharya, Tr.11,267 ; Those health impacts were not cyplicit-ly considered by the Staff or disclosed in the FES. (Acharya, Tr. 11,267-8).

71. Indeed, while Staff attempted to show that the FES' estimates of casos of early "rnaintion injury" provides an " envelope, the bounding type of l

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e estimates", (Acharya, Tr.11,267) w3 find the FES~ estimates of early radiation injury to be irrelevant to IEA's concern about developmental defects in children.

72. The NASH-1400 consequences mdel for estimates of early radiation injury was based upon radiation doses to three principal " organs - the whole body, the lungs, and the GI tract." The dose threshold for the whole body was 55 rems, the " injury" being eMeminal vaniting. The dose threshold for occurrence of that effect in 100% of the population receiving the dose is 400 rems. (Acharya, Tr. 11,268-9).

73. The Staff testified that the FES consequence mdel was a modification of the NASH-1400 model ard substituted a " conservative" dose whole body threshold of 200 rems to the total bone marrow, for a 100% occurrence rate in the population so exposed. (Acharya, Tr. 11,269).

74. However, Staff witness Branagan admitted that the developmental defects in children to which LEA had reference are associated with doses as low as 10 rems to the fetus and embryo. (Branagan, Tr.11,269) .

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75. The Staff testified that the risk to this age group might be a "sncll fraction" of the risk of in,iwnt that was reported for all age groups (Acharya, Tr.11,271), ard that the relationship between the number of infants so injured cnd the rest of the population would be similar to the comparison of fatalities due to enbryonic in utero exposure and fatalities estimated for all persons (5-10% of the fatalities) (Acharya, Tr.11,270) .

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76. The Staff witness stated he did not know, and'did not calculate, the impact on the population of infants receiving radiation doses (Acharya,

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.Tr.11,272); it is' plain, however, that if the number of infants so in-i jured'can approach 5-10% of the total number of persons injured, a large-t portion of the infants born after a severe accident at Limerick muld be l

developnentally impaired.

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77. We find that the modification of the consequence nodel in reducing the " radiation injury" dose threshold to 200 rems (whole body) simply does not encmpass the child developmental defects with which LEA is concerned.

This is so particularly in view of the qualitativo difference between the additional cases of radiation induced "abdminal vmiting" which the nodi-f

-fication includes,a quite temporary phenomenon, and tle mental retardation, microcephaly, blindness, spina bifida which were LEA's concern.

78. The FES nowhere discloses the existence of the risk of those types l of health effects in children, and we find this omission to be inconsistent l

with NEPA.

The Staff's Rationale for Non-Disclosure of Ilealth Effects l

79. While the FES clearly omitted any discussion of many of the health

-effects mentioned by LEA, the Staff atts pted to justify these omissions by stating that " Staff went-through all the literature and decided to w

select a representative sample of the nore unportant effects. The FES reflects that judgmant. (Hulman, Tr.11,273) .

80. Mr. Hulman attempted to clarify the "representativeness" of the effects disclosed by stating that the health effects were representative of the types of health impacts and other impacts. (Hulman, Tr. 11,296),

but finally admitted that the health effects disclosed by the Es are not in any way representative of the health effects not disclosed, such as sterility, spontaneous abortions, or in utero injuries. (Hulman, Tr.

11,296).

81. The Staff witnesses also testified that the Staff " considered" (in some t.nspecified way) the health offects mentioned by IEA in its contention, but "did not report" them, and that the Staff distinguished (in some unspecified my) between "considering" the health effects and

" reporting" them. (11ulman, Tr. 11,282) .

82. Thus, the Staff's fundanental rationale is that it considered itself under no obligation to disclose in the ES any health effects except those it deened to be "a representative sample of the nore important effects".

(Hulman,.Tr. 11,273). l

83. But Staff admitted that the health effects it disclosed were not representative of the health effects it did not disclose. The lack of l

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s "inportance" of the non-disclosed health effects is utterly belied by

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(1) the factLthat the per reactor-year risk of each of the-'non-disclosed -

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' health ~ effects is higher than all.the health effects disclosed" except-

"ing genetic effects, and (2) the Staff's own testimony:

It's not that we didn't think that all of

the health inpacts that could be associat-ed with reactor accidents were not'inportant.

My' God, they were very important. [Bnphasis supplied]..-(Hulman, Tr. 11,274).

84. We conclude that the Staff had no raa=ved basis for excluding from the FES the health effects it disclosed in its testimony, and that tEPA requires the disclosure of all of these admittedly "very important" health 2mpacts.

DES 4-A(2), (3), (8)

85. IEA's contentions DES 4-A(2), (3), (8) read:

'Ihe DES Supplement fails to adequately disclose or considcy:

(2) the total land area in which crops will be interdicted; (3) the total land area in which milk will be interdicted; (8) the p=1= tion within the land areas to be interdicted.

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With the possible exception of child developnental impairment, which Staff did not separately calculate.

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Milk and Crgo Interdiction

86. In the event of a severe accident at Limerick, there is a probability

.that land will be so contaminated with radioactivity that crops growing on the land and milk frm dairies with pasture land in the contaminated area, will be

" interdicted", i.e., either destroyed or impounded until radioactive decay reduces the contamination to " acceptable" levels. (Acharya, et.al., Tr. 11, 376-394; Huhnan, et.al. ff. Tr.11,148, pp.12-14) .

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87. The FES cnitted any discussion of the extent of such interdiction - it considered such interdiction solely in econcmic terms by including the value of contaminated and condemned crops and milk in its calculation of offsite mitigation measures " costs" of severe accidents at Limerick. (FES, pp. 5-93, Table 5.11(h) (pp. 5-99) ; Acharya, Tr. 11,386) .

88. The FES does not disclose the land area over which either crops or milk will be interdicted (Acharya, Tr.11,386), although the Cl?AC codes used by Applicant and Staff provides calculations of these areas and their associated probabilities.

89. Because the contamination threshold requiring milk interdiction is rela-tively low, the per reactor year risk of 1,000 square maters of land requiring interdiction of milk (7.6-5) is approximately equal to the per reactor year risk of 700 million square meters (or [ or 2,962 square miles) requiring such interdiction. (7.74-5) . (!!ulman, et.al., ff. Tr. 11,148, Table 2; Acharya, Tr. 11,387).

90. Similarly, the probabilities that 1,000 square meters of 10 million square noters of land will require crop interdiction are approximately equal.

(7.6-5 and 5.42-5) . (Hulman, Tr. 11,387).

91. If one nultiplies these per reactor year risk estimates by 30 years of plant operation, and by 2 (number of units) to arrive at a conservative esti-mate of the total risk of milk and crop interdiction posed by the 2 unit facil-ity over its operating life, we reach the following conclusions:

(1) For interdiction of 700,000,000 square motors (2,692 square miles) of milk interdiction, the probability is 7.74-5 x 30 x 2, or .0000774 x 30 x 2, or .004644. 'n11s is approxinutely 4 chances in a thousand, or one chance in 250.

(2) Similarly, with respect to the total probability of contamination of land requiring milk and crop interdiction, the probability of 10 million square meters of land requiring such interdiction is 5.42-5 x 30 x 2, or

.0000542 x 30 x 2 or .003252, or about 3 chances in 1,000 or about 1 chance in 333.

92. We find' these estimates and the impact of milk and crop interdiction land areas to be sufficiently significant to warrant their disclosure as impacts.

Such disclosure is not made by nerely calculating the economic value of the milk and crops and " burying" these numbers in the total offsite mitigation measures cost. Ilow much it will cost to mitigate the consequences of such contamination does not adequately express the socio-economic and environnental inpact of such widespread contamination.

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. Population .Cnt rdicted 93.

Radioactive contamination of land by a severe accident at Limerick would also requiro interdiction of land areas by denial of human access to those areas. (Kaiser, Tr. 11,349).

94.

The CPAC code identifies two areas for the denial of such acces arca from which people would be relocated for a period of time in excess of 30 yec: s, and an area frcm which people would be relocated for varying pe of time, less than 30 years) calculates the populations within each, and the respectivo probabilities of such relocation magnitudos.

(flulman, c,t,.al. ,

ff. Tr. 11,148, p. 14).

95.

For causes of accidents other than severe earthquakes, at an annual probability lovel of 3.19-6 i

, as many as 10,000 persons wou.1d be relocated for varying periods less than 30 years.

At an annual probability level of 1.83~3, as many as 1,000 persons would be relocated for varying periods loss than 30 years (Hulman, et.al. , ff. Tr.11,148, Table 5) .

96.

As Staff testified, Ne may obtain the risk posed by facility operation over its entiro oporating life, by multiplying the por reactor yeue risk lay '!O (approximately the expected operating life of the plant) and then multiplying this figure by 2 (to account for both units).

97.

As a result, the probability that 1,000 persons would be relocated for periods up to 30 years as a result of severe accidents at the Lirrerick is therefore more than one chance in 10 (1.83 -3 x 30 x 2).

98.

Neither the probability of such relocation or the population which would be affected were disclosed in the FES.

99. The same analysis is true with respect to persons to be denied access for periods in excess of 30 years. The " annual probability' of up to 7,000 persons being denied such access is 1.19-5(Ilulman, Acharya, ff. Tr.11,148 at Table 5) .

-5 Thus, if we perform the same exercise the total probability is 1.19 x 30 x 2 or,

.0000119 x 30 x2 = .000714, or roughly 7 chances out of 1,000 or about one chance in 142.

100. The Staff ignored both these probabilities and the affected populations in the FES, which we find to be a significant defect.

DES-4 (A) (6) -

101. LEA contended that the FES improperly failed to " adequately disclose or consider the quantification of the cost of medical treatment of health effects" as a result of severe accidents at Limerick.

102. The only FES reference concerning such costs is found at p. 5-102, at which the Staff states that:

The Staff has also considered the health care costs resulting from hypo-theticaL accidents in a generic model developed by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (Nieves,1982) . Based upon this generic model, the Staff con-cludes that such costs may be a fraction of the offsite costs evaluated here, but that the model is not sufficiently constituted for application to a specific reactor sito.

103. The Staff testimony indicated that such costs m re quantifiable, that the risk of incurring such costs were ascertainable on a per reactor-year risk basis, and in its testimony the Staff in fact provided such calculations and risk esti-mates. It admitted that the absolute costs are large (Richter, ff. Tr.11,148,

p. 5) but attempts to mitigate the relative significance of these large absolute costs by noting the low probability of the more severe radiation releases. (Id.)

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104. We readily agree that the absolute costs are large - the total health costs for the various release categories initiated by causes other than moderate to severe' earthquakes analyzed-by the Staff range from a low of

$1,037,550 to a high of $1,356,834,304. (3_d.

d , Table 1) . Ebr release cata-gories initiated by severe earthquakes, the costs range from $1,519,146 to S2,381,'202,176. @ ., Table 2).

105. The testimony presenMd in Tables 1-2 of Mr. Richter's testimony denon-strates that it was possible for the Staff to present in the FES a range of values of health costs and their associated probabilities.

106. However, despite this ability, Staff did not disclose such infonnation.

The basis for this total cmnission was that "the data gave us an estimate of the likely magnitude of the cost rather than precise estimates of the cost for the Limerick area. Direct and indirect cost factors are based on national data and are not specific to the area surrounding Limerick". (Richter, ff.

Tr. 11,148, p. 4).

107. However, Mr. Richter testified on cross-examination that the estimates in the testimony are the best available data, that the cat estimates are based on Iamerick-specific accident probabilities, and that only the " cost factors" were not Limerick-specific. He also stated that in his opinion, Limerick area specific cost factors are not likely to be signficantly dif-ferent than the national data (Richter, Tr. 11,400-401).

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108. We are at a loss, therefore, to understand the basis for this omission.

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1We also note that the cost. estimates which were provided in the staff's

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teutinony unitted - calculation of the health costs  : genetic effects des--

pite the Staff's use of a generic nodel which acconmodated such calculations.

(Richter, Tr. 11,408). We find this emission to be a defect, because the Staff's testimony indicates that the per reactor year risk of genetic offects.

is higher than any other health offect considered by the Staff in the FES. *

(See our Finding of Fact No. 43 ). The health treatment cost of this highest risk was totally omitted.

109.

We cannot accord material weight to Staff's explanation for those onis-sions because the testimony tends to contradict the as'sertions that the data was not " Limerick-specific" and because any relative imprecision does not justify such a total lack of disclosuro under NEPA. (Sco our Conclusions of Law, No. 1-3 ).

DES-4(B) 110. IEA's contention DES-4 (B) states:

By treating same environmental costs in a CCDP format and treating'other quantifiablo costs in a non-quantitutivo manner, the DES format obscures the total impact of severo accidonts at Lhnorick.

111.

While LEA indicatod it would not specifically cross-exasnino on DBS-4 (11) as a separate entity (Tr.11,400) it has proposed findings of fact thereon,

-based upon t$ ontiro record of tha proceedire.

112.

We incorporate herein the.following findings of fact relevant to this contention also: 4, 5, 43-47, 50-52, 70-78, 101-109

1

- *113. . As we indicated above, the FES' discussion of risk is limitut to a "[ct -

reactor year" risk valt.c. Tho "CCl# founat" portrays this riuk by plotting u n Lvalues for the probability of a consequence and the values of the magnitude of

.tinu uansequence on X-Y axes.

114. This CCDP portrayal disguises two significant matter:.: (1) tho I.nt-coautor year risk is only approximately 1/60 of the total risk posed for each consequencu type portrayed, and (2) the risk may bo 40 titics higher than that due to thu uncertainty estimated by the Staff.

115. We find that the use of " average" values also disguises theso uignificant matters 'as they cannot possibly cover this additional information, 116. We also find that the CCDP curve and " average value" portray 1s disguise-the total impact of severo accidents because their very nature is to present only the bare numbers associated with the impacts. Tho witnesses admitted that they did not analyze the full socio-economic inpact of reactor accident ris!w at Limerick. (Levine, Tr. 11,397-8). These "barc numbers" do not convey the full socio-economic risk, including social upheaval, caused by a severo acci-dont at Limerick.

117. The FFS fails to ccmiply with NEPA for these reasons as well. !

Conclup,i.ons,,o,f,Jpw

1. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) placou upon un agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action, and requirca an EIS of disclose the significant health, soc.i.o-cconomic and cumulativo consequences of the envirotwental impact ut a propuuut action. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. et. e1. v. Natural Ibcources Defence Council, US , (1983) slip. op. p. 9,19.

1/ Curiously, neither Applicant or Staff pro-filed testitiony addresue.<! thin aspect of the contention, although Lim specifically pointed it out in its respon6o to Applicant's "First Set of Interrogatoriou and itupiout for Par-Guction of Docuncnts to hinocick Ecology Action on ik:veru h:cident cont ent.i .nn",

Interrogatory No. 21.

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2. Environmental Impact Ctatements shall include r reasoned consi-deration of the environmental risks (impacts) attributable to accidents at the particular facility... within the scope of each such statement. In the analysis

_and discussion of such risks, approximately equal attention shall be given to the probability of occurrance of releases and to the' probability of occurrance of the environmental consequences of those releases.

The environmental consequences of releases whose probability of occurrenco 1

has been estimated shall also be discussed in probabilistic terms. Such conse-l quences shall be characterized in terms of potential radiological exposures to i individuals, to population groups, and where applicable, to biota. Ilealth asi l safety risks that may be associated with exposures to people shall be discussed in a manner that fairly reflects the current stato of knowledge regarding such l risks. Statenent of Interim Policy on Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations under the National Environmental Policy Act. 45 Fed.11cg. 40101 (June 13,1980) .

l

3. The Staff's EIS fails to canply with these mandates in:

(a) its failure to cdequately disclose certain health effects which may bo caused by a severe accident at Limerick and their ascociated probabilitics, including genetic effects, non-fatal cancers, child developnental impair-ment caused by in-utero radiation exposure, spontaneous abortions, steri-lity, benign thyroid nodules, and hypothyroidism; (b) its failure to adequatoly consider and disclose the total land area in which crops and milk will be interdicted and the probabilities associuted with such interdiction;

! (c) its failure to adequately consider and disclose the population in the areas to be interdicted, and the probabilities associated with such population interdiction duo to severo accidents at Limerick; (d) its failure to adequately consider and disclose the economic cost of medi-cal treatment of all health effects of severe accidents at Limerick, and i the probabilitics associated with such costs; (e) its use of an inappropriate assumption of population relocation beyond the plune exposure EPZ in the calculation of* health effects; (f) its use of an inappropriate evacuation delay time in the cmargency re-sponse model for calculating health effects; (g) its failure to adequately account for the probability that a portion of the population will fail to take protectivo action, thus understating the risk of health effects of severo accidents.

(h) its failure to disclose the total risk of a two-unit facility over 30 years of operation.

o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR EDGUIRIORY CDMISSION BEFORE THE A'IO1IC SAFETY AND LICLEING BOARD In the lhtter of )

)

PIIILADEI.Pl!IA ELECTRIC MiPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-352

) 50-353 (Lincrick Generating Station, }

Units 1 and 2) I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copics of " LEA'S PIOPOSED FINDECS OF FICf AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON LEA CINTENTIONS D2.S-1,2,3, AND 4" in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indicate' by a double asterisk by hand-delivery, this 26th day of July 1984:

Inwrence Brenner, Esq. , Chairnan (2) Mr. Edward G. Bauer, Jr.

Administrativo Judge Vice President & General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Philadelphia Electric Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission 2301 Market Strcot Washington, D.C. 20555** Philadelphia, PA 19101 Dr. Richard P. Colo Troy B. Conner, Jr., Eal.

Administrative Judge Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.

Atanic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (bnner and Wetterhahn U.S. Nuclear Bcqulatory Comnission 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555** Washington, D.C. 20006**

Dr. Potor A. Morris Mr. Marvin I. Icvis Administrativo Judge 6504 Bradford Terrace .

Atanic Safety and Licensing Daard Panel Philadelphia, PA 19149 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccumission Washington, D.C. 20555** Joseph H. White, III 15 Ardmore Avenuo Mr. Frank R. Ibnano Ardmore, PA 19003 Air and Water Pollution Patrol G1 Forest Avenue Martha W. Bush, Esq.

Ambler, PA 19002 Kathryn S. Icwis, Eng.

1500 Municipal Services Bldg.

Ms. Maureen Mulligan 15th and JFK Blvd.

Limerick Ecology Action Philadelphia, PA 19107 762 Queen Strcot Pottstown, PA 19464 l

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r __

o Thmas Gerusky, Director Zori G. Ferkin Bureau of Radiation Protection Governor's Energy Council Dept. of Envirorrnental Pesources P.O. Box 8010 Sth Floor, Fulton Bank Building 1625 N. Front Street Third and Iocust Streets llarrisburg, PA 17105 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Spence W. Perry, Esq.

Director Associate General Counsel Pennsylvania Emergency Management Federal Etnergency Managcsnont Agency Agency Room 840 Basement, Transportation & Safety 500 C Street, S.W.

Building Washington, D.C. 20472 IIarrisburg, PA 17120 Robert J. Sugannan, Esq.

Robert L. Anthony Sugarman, Denworth & IIellegers Friends of the Earth of the 16th Floor Center Plaza Delaware Valley 101 North Broad Street 103 Vernon Lano, Box 186 Philadelphia, PA 19107 Moylan, PA 19065 James Wiggins Angus R. Iovo, Esq. Senior Resident Inspector Montganery County Iogal Aid U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Canmission 107 East Main Street P.O. Box 47 Norristown, PA 19401 Sanatoga, PA 19464 David Wersan Atcmic Safety and Licensing Consumer Advocate Doard Panol Office of Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comtission 1425 Strawberry Squarc Washington, D.C. 20555 liarrisburg, PA 17120 Atcmic Safety and Licending Appeal Jay Gutierroz Doard Panol Regional Counsel U.S. Nuclear Ibgulatory Ccmnission USNRC, Region I Washington, D.C. 205S5 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Docketing and Servica Scction Office of the Secretary Steven P. licrshey, Esq. U.S. Nuc1 car IOgulatory Ccumission Cbnmunity Iogal Services, Inc. Washington, D.C. 20555 5219 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19139 Gregory Minor MilB Technical Associates Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq. 1723 Hamilton Avenue Counsol for NRC Staff San Jose, CA 95125 U.S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D.C. 20555 ** Timothy R.S. Campbell, Director Depart 2nent of Emergency Services 14 East Biddle Street West Chester, PA 19380

,[ h .phW' Charles W. Elliott, Esq.

Counsol tor Limerick Ecology Action, Inc.

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