ML20211C210

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Re Issue of Manpower Mobilization & Adequacy of Communication Sys to Be Used in Event of Emergency.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20211C210
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	10/17/1986
From:	Love A GRATERFORD INMATES, MONTGOMERY COUNTY LEGAL AID SERVICE
To:
References
CON-#486-1134 OL, NUDOCS 8610210299
Download: ML20211C210 (22)

Text

//3/-/

DOCHETED USN!!C i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ll NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COMMISSION '86 0CT 17 Pl2 :35 f

i Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board _

0 0 C t" ' ' . ..e 3 jl Bf:/ Hy gINTHEMKITEROF  :

U PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  :

li(Limerick Generating Station

, Units 1 and 2)  : Nos. 50-352 and 50-353 CC d

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF GRATERFORD INMATES 1

1 h.

'I. INTRODUCTION

(

Pursuant to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Decision docketed d

fas ALAB-845, a remand hearing was held on September 22, 1986 regarding the issue 0

of manpower mobilization. Consistent witn the Appeal Board's ruling, the Z

jhearing was held regarding the issue of "the adequacy of the communication Isystem to be used in the event of an emergency". ( ALAB-845, p. 8.) The Appeal Board further noted that the adequacy of such a system must comply with 10 CFR

[50.47(b) 5 requiring establishment of procedures "for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations". (See also NUREG 0654, Criterion E 2 at 43.)

jThe Appeal Board further noted that implicit in this issue is a finding that the

[ proposed system will serve its intended purpose, i.e. eventual mobilization of

!necessary emergency workers. (See ALAB-845, p. 9.) Pursuant to the Licensing i

yll

[ Board's directive at the close of said hearings, the inmates hereby subnit their I

fproposedFindingsofFactandConclusionsofLaw.

I I

K G

l l

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. "As a part of the S.C.I. - Graterford Emergency Plan for any type of emergency, there is a call up system in place. This system is available' to notify additional manpower if they were needed during a radiological emergency.

The plan uses management individuals to call the staff. Each individual has less than ten other persons to call. Furthermore, the callers are of sufficient rank to give the orders to the persons receiving the call to report to work. ..

The Department of Corrections maintains a complement of approximately 700 employees at the State Correctional Institute at Graterford.. .If, for some reason, further manpower was required, officers from the other department resources or the Pennsylvania State Police would be utilized. As a last resort, the Pennsylvania National Guard could be used." (See Response of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to Requests for Information Raised at the February 27, 1985 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Conference, Theodore G. Ctto, III, p. 4.)

2. ...There is a system in place which does provide in our emergency I

I lplansforacallupsystemofmanpowerasneeded." (See Jeffes Tr. 20,534.)

} 3. " ...If wa have a major emergency, we are going to have to call up hvery.one, we are going to have to call up everyone that we can get our hands an." (See Jeffes Tr. 20,535.)

4. "There is no way in which you are going to have enough people on any bne shift to do this, you are going to have to call in everyone from outside

hat's on the other shifts and perhaps from other institutions as well." (See Case Tr. 20,533.)

2-

5. "Not all personnel need be called, only the number indicated in the plan." (See Zimmerman Pretrial Testimony for July 15, 1985 hearing, p. 5.)

6. Graterford Exhibit No. 1, which is attached as Exhibit A, is "a graphic description or presentation of the pyramid calling system." (See Zimmerman Tr.

21,423.)

! 7. "We have a kind of a pyramid structure, and there is a list of personnel that are called by the shif t commander or whoever is designated to i

l ll from the facility itself. They in turn call X number of other people and Ilca i it is almost like a chain letter and eventually everyone is contacted. .. ."

(See Zimmerman Tr. 20,809.)

8. The pyramiding call up system contemplates telephone calls being made from outside the prison. (See Zimmerman Tr. 21,469.)

9. The maximum number to be called is 300. (See Zimerman Tr. 20,842.)

10. Telephone service is engineered "... based on basically the number of customers we expect to be able to serve from that particular central office and the known load that those customers would place on ta? switching system." (See

'Buell Tr. 21,389.)

I

! 11. Certain situations can overburden telephone lines, "it's usually ll henever customers are trying to use their telephone more than the average qw expected loads would be. An example would be a snow storm at, say, 3:00 o' clock in the af ternoon, when everyone is trying to make arrangements to travel; or weather related disasters; or any other cases where people try to use the telephone all at the same time." (See Buell Tr. 21,395.)

12. Periods of peak service are not engineered into telephone servicing.

(See Buell Tc. 21,424.)

i 13. An overload of the telephone circuits will cause the following to o

l' happen. "The first thing that happens is some people start to experience delays in getting dial tones within three seconds. Then it happens that once you've I

gotten a dial tone, you could experience delays in completing the call to whatever trunk you are going to." (See Buell Tr. 21,442.)

t

14. Peak service times, such as Mother's Day, are not factored into the engineering equation. (See Brown Tr. 21,512.)

1

15. Switching systems run by AT&T and Bell are the same because they are j

Imanufactured by AT&T. (See Brown Tr. 21,512.)

16. The FCC regulates telephonc service so that only a certain percentage of rate of return of capital investment can be permitted. (See Brown Tr.

]21,311.)

17. Emergencies, such as natural or man-made disasters, are not factored into the engineering of the phone company. (See Brown Tr. 21,512.)

18. "All our offices are detailed ... to provide good service on a normal, busy hour. In other words, no dial tone delays, 97% within three seconds."

(See Miller Tr. 21,539.)

19. If events occur beyond the normal business hour, then the system j

j"...couldrunintoproblems." (See Miller Tr. 21,540.)

il y 20. Telephone service is not engineered to handle man-made or naturally I

floccurring disasters. (See Miller Tr. 21,540.)

[ 21. In the past, man-nude and natural disasters have created problems for llphoneservice.

(See Brown Tr. 21,518.)

22. "The one that sticks out in my mind mostly 'is the Hurricane Agnes and the floods that were related to that in 1972, the Kennedy assacsination, severe l

weather storms, and the recent sale of Bruce Springsteen concert tickets." (See Brown Tr. 21,518.)

23. These problems "... caused congestion of the switching facilities and of the machines themselves." (See Brown Tr. 21,518.)

l

, 24. "In Hurricane Agnes, there were dial tone delays of up to one-half an hour in the Pottstown area. I was working there at the time, so I am familiar with the type of delays that occurred." (See Brown Tr. 21,518.)

25. "I an a comunications technician employed by AT&T Comunications. One of my several responsibilities is the maintainance of electronic switching system. It is a number 1 four wire ESS machine." (See Brown Tr. 21,510.)

26. "He (Brown) would be familiar with the operation of that machine."

(See Buell Tr. 21,446.)

27. Currently, the Collegeville office of Bell Systems is served by a number 2 ESS (electronic switching system). (See Buell Tr. 21,388.)

28. A number 5 ESS (electronic switching system) is the current state of the art. (See Buell 21,406.)

29. The Graterford system "...is basically the same type of switching. We manufacture them." (See Brown Tr. 21,516.)

30. "There are ten lines presently working in the Huntingdon group that serve the PBX from Collegeville." (See Buell Tr. 21,390.)

31. Graterford has ten network lines in its institutional phone system which are also called foreign exchange lines that go to a Philadelphia exchange operated by the Cmmonwealth of Pennsylvania. (See Comonwealth Exhibit No.1.)

. _ - - - ---- J

i

32. . Essential service lines or prioritized lines would give the individual

"...a little priority on enabling us to get a dial tone ahead of someone who wasn't on the essential service list." (See Brown Tr. 21,528.)

33. Methods exist which can improve one's chances of getting a dial tone during an overload situation. ...We have what we call emergency service lines l or class A lines that can be assigned to a customer if there is a severe enough

! overload." (See Buell Tr. 21,393.)

i

! 34. SCIG does not have priority class A lines or essential service lines.

(See Zimmerman Tr. 21,458.)

1

-35. "The foreign exchange lines would have to use the same switchers that those people at home call if they're in the EPZ. So the fact that calls going into Philadelphia may come right back to the same area that is affected (by a nuclear emergency) would have significant impact on the completion of that call." (See Brown Tr. 21,529.)

36. During the Three Mile Island accident of 1979, "there were dial tone delays in the Middletown central office for an extended period of time, and we experienced certain congestion on the AT&T long distance circuits at that time.

I believe it (the congestion) was a several day period... . The longest (delay) was thirty minutes... ." (See Brown Tr. 21,529-21,534.)

37. A nuclear accident at the Limerick facility may cause an overload of the surrounding telephone stations. (See Buell Tr. 21,413.)

38. Foreign lines would not have any priority when calls were being made

'into a congested area. "...That's one of the places that you would have l

r congestion. And once it gets to that point, we wouldn't have any priority. It 0

lwould then be trying to terminate all of the calls coming in. There wouldn't be any priority over which location it was coming from at that point." (See Buell hTr.21,423.)

l

j 39. "Once it (foreign service lines) got into the office, all the calls l then would have the same chance of terminating, no matter where it was coming qfrom."

p (See Buell Tr. 21,423.)

J ll 40. Prioritizing phone lines only goes to dial tone and doesn't guarantee i

jcompletion. (See Buell Tr. 21,428.)

r

!' 41. Commonwealth's witness Buell is not familiar with the Graterford manpower mobilization plan and offered no opinion as to whether or not said plan could work. (See Buell Tr. 21, 429.)

42. Commercial telephone lines may not be adequate to get the manpower mobilized. (See Deposition of Robert Morris, p. 80 re July 15, 1985 hearings.)

h

43. When congestion occurs and the phone system becomes overloaded "usually i

lthen work would slow down. Calls would not be handled as promptly as we n

,,normally expect them to be handled." (See Buell Tr. 21,329.)

ll y 44. Superintendent Charles Zinmerman estimates that it will take between q

one to two hours in order to mobilize the manpower necessary to conduct an l

evacuation of Graterford. (See Zimmerman Tr. 20,808.)

l

45. There has never been an emergency situation at SCIG requiring use of the call up system that also involved an emergency for the public. (See Zinmerman Tr. 20,809.)

46. There has never been a test of the call up system during an emergency that also affected the general public. (See Zinnerman Tr. 20,809.)

47. If local relephone switching systems in and around the EPZ are h'ioverloaded and if the call up system depends upon use of home phones in this

!! area, "the system is still working . . . but there are other cases where there will be delay, and that's what you normally would expect. Some people would experience a delay in completing the calls." (See Buell Tr. 21,431.)

ll l 48. An undocumented alteration of the Radiological E'mergency Response Plan for the State Correctional Institute at Graterford has been undertaken without notice to any parties to this proceeding. (See Zimmerman Tr. 21,473.)

49. Said alteration is not documented on the page of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan covering revisions of said plan. (See Zimmerman Tr.

21,474.)

50. "Any time there is a revision or change in the plan, that change should 1

be acknowledged and subnitted to FEMA for review. At this point in time, we have not received any change in that plan. (See Asher Tr. 21,561.)

ii il 51. Superintendent Zimmerman, in preparation for this hearing, reviewed and 0

ll revised the number of staff needed to evacuate the institution. (See Zimerman lTr. 21,451.)

i l 52. This revision indicates that only 15% of' all off-duty staff will have to be called in in the event of an emergency. Previous testimony indicated that number to be 300. (See Zimerman Tr. 21,451.)

k

53. Said revision also redefines the original concept of the evacuation in that removal of medical records, criminal files and equignent is no longer the responsibility of the SCIG manpower mobilization component. (See Zimmerman Tr.

21,499-21,500.)

54. The total staff at Graterford is now 628. (See Zimerman Tr. 21,496.)

55. 230 persons employed by the SCIG live in the Skippack, Royersford, Pottstown, and Collegeville areas which fall within the 10 mile EPZ. 137 additional employees of SCIG live in the Norristown, Boyertown, West Chester, and Lansdale areas. All of the above mentioned areas are within 20 miles of the Limerick Generating Station. Thus, 367 out of 628 employees of SCIG live within 20 miles of the LGS. 72 employees live in the Central Pennsylvania area, Northeastern Pennsylvania area, and Western Pennsylvania area; all requiring a driving time of from 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in order to arrive at said institution.

56. The pyramiding call up system is " partially used at least up to the level of lieutenant. When we get into sergeant and below, we're getting into non-management staff. And that's where, if we go to that system, we go directly from the institution level who tends to make the calls. It's a pyramid system, as has been established that all institutions have in the Department of Corr'ections. Because of our geographic location with people who live in different calling areas, and because of the fact that, from the sergeant level down, it involves non-management staff, as a practical matter we have been l

making the calls from the institution because these men would be making long distance calls from their homes." (See Zimerman Tr. 21,473.)

_9_

57. This system, as previously described in the above finding "has always been a part of our plan". Thus, indicating more than one plan exists for the evacuation of Graterford. (See Zimerman Tr. 21,474.)

58. The back-up system involves the direct line to the state police, Montgomery County Emergency Radio System, our (SCIG) system, ten lines to Harrisburg, C.O.'s from other institutions, and the C.L.E. A.N. machine. (See Zinmerman Tr. 21,460-462.)

59. If the public was aware of the nuclear emergency, the placement of 199 long distance phone calls needed as part of the SCIG call up system would cexperience delays. (See Brown Tr. 21,526.)

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW l 1. The Comonwealth has failed to provide a reasonable assurance that the manpower mobilization system will achieve its intended purpose, i.e.

jmobilization of sufficient manpower to conduct an evacuation of the State l Correctional Institute at Graterford.

l

2. There is no reasonable assurance that the call up system, as previously described by Superintendent Zimmerman and Comissioner Jeffes, will mobilize the imanpower necessary to conduct an evacuation of SCIG.

3. There is no reasonable assurance that the unauthorized ex parte revision of the mechanics of the call up system will mobilize sufficient manpower in order to conduct an evacuation of SCIG.

1

4. There is no reasonable assurance that the unauthorized reduction of manpower needed to be called in in the event of an emergency will be sufficient to conduct an evacuation of SCIG.

5. There is no reasonable assurance that the revised call up system and duty assignment changes will conduct an effective evacuation of SCIG due to the fact that they will no longer be involved in the transporting of medical records, criminal files, and other such equipment, which had previously been described as being included in the evacuation according to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Graterford.

6. There is no reasonable assurance that the 10 foreign phone lines to the Philadelphia Conmonwealth of Pennsylvania exchange or the availability of a back up system at the Department of Corrections central office in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania will enhance the ability of the institution to contact their staff when the large majority of said staff live in close proximity to the Linerick Generating Station. Commercial telephone lines owned and operated by Bell Systems in and around the area of Graterford and the Limerick Generating Gtation are not engineered to handle man-made or naturally occurring disasters.

7. Such disasters hr.ve resulted in considerable delays in telephone servicing in the past. Examples of such are the 1972 Hurricane Agnes floods, the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the 1985 Bruce Springsteen concert ticket sales, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, and severe winter i

storms.

8. The manpower mobilization component of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan depends on the use of home telephones of its employees.

9. There is no guarantee that given an emergency situation, calls can be completed to said home telephones.

10. Prioritizing certain telephone lines, i.e. essential service lists, can increase one's chances of obtaining a dial tone, however, cannot guarantee that said call will be completed.

1 U

11. All back up systems designed in the event that the call up system fails, also rely upon the use of home phones and thus are equally unreliable. i IV. DISCUSSION Reasonable assurances must be provided that offsite emergency plans are capable of implementation. (See 10 CFR 50.47(a)l.) Part of offsite emergency planning involves a communications network "for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations". (See 10 CFR 50.47(b)5. See also NUPEG 0654 Citerion E 2 at p. 43.) With respect to the above-captioned matter, the Appeal r

Board has stated that it is " implicit in this issue ... that the proposed system 1

will serve its intended purpose, i.e. eventual mobilization of necessary emergency workers. (See ALAB-845 p. 9.) Thus, the issue before this Board involves whether or not the manpower mobilization system, which has been described as a call up procedure, will effectively mobilize the personnel necessary to conduct the evacuation as contemplated by the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Graterford.

Initially, the Department of Corrections and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania presented a plan in which management personnel would be utilized to call staff, the system referred to as a call up system. Superintendent Zinnerman testified that it would be based upon a " pyramid structure". The i

shif t commander at the institution would place one call to a list of personnel who would then in turn call a number of other people similar to a chain letter.

The maximum number of persons to be called was to be 300. These individuals would also be assigned duties regarding transportation of criminal files, medical records and other equipment, which has been deemed to be of vital importance at the relocation site. This system has been tested but never during

an emergency that also affected the general public surrounding the institution.

Superintendent Zimmerman has testified that he believes the system could be implemented-successfully within one to two hours.

At the recently held hearings regarding the remand dictated by the Appeal l

Board, the Commonwealth changed significant portions of its manpower mobilization component. Instead of a chain-letter-like pyramid call up system, they now rely upon a two-tiered call up system. The initial tier involving nonagement personnel works in a similar fashion to the original description. The lsecond tier involves the rank and file members who will be called individually

!fromtheinstitution. The alleged reason for said change is the economic burden g

that said rank and file personnel will undergo if ordered to complete long distance telephone calls. Superintendent Zinmerman indicated that this system is the one that has in fact been used in the past and is included in some plan other than the Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which he refers to as "our" I

plan. Further modifications of the initial plan include the number of persoanel l

used to evacuate the institution. Initially, Superintendent Zimmerman stated that a maximum number of 300 persons would be called to effect the evacuation.

I pt the recent hearings, he has revised this figure and now states that only 15%

I l'of the total off-duty staff will be called via the call up system. The total staff at Graterford is 628 individuals. From this number, one would subtract the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time, and take 95% of that total. Although the exact number of persons on duty at any one time is not s available, the number of persons to be called in can roughly be estimated as less than 100 individuals. The third aspact of the plan that has been changed involves the functions to be carried out by the mobilized manpower. Initially, 1

the plan called for the removal of not only the inmates, but all vital records and equipnent necessary to maintain custody and control of said individuals at the relocation site. Superintendent Zimerman testified that the individuals to be mobilized will no longer be carrying out said duties and will only be concerned with the' evacuation of the inmate population.

The above-mentioned changes were made without authorization or notice to any of the parties to this proceeding. Superintendent Zimmerman admitted trat the changes have not been noted in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Graterford on the revision page. James Asher further testified that said changes should have been reported to PEMA, who in turn should report them to FEMA in order to determine whether they were satisfactory. None of this was done until Judge Hoyt ordered such a review at the conclusion of the hearing on September 22, 1986. Discovery requests by the inmates prior to said hearing failed to note these changes. Thus, the inmates contend that ad hoc planning was incorporated in preparation to the remand hearing of September 22, 1986.

Such ad hoc planning was designed to circumvent prior testimony regarding the unreliability of the commercial telephone lines. Said testimony was given by Rick Brown and Robert Morris. Their testimony indicated the telephone service is not designed to withstand the pressures placed upon it by natural or man-made disasters. Such disasters will cause delays in obtaining dial tone and will further cause delays in completion of said calls.

The Comonwealth contends that the use of ten foreign phone lines to a Corrmonwealth exchange in Philadelphia, the use of ten local telephone lines, the back up services of the Department of Corrections in Camp Hill, and other back up such as the Pennsylvania State Police, provide an assurance that the call up 1

system will in fact operate. Inmates presented testimony, through Rick Brown, that said foreign lines will be subject to the same congestion as the local lines when they attempt to reenter the EPZ area and complete their calls. Thus, foreign phone lines may enhance the ability to obtain a dial tone, however, do not significantly increase the probability that said call will be completed if l

Iit is into a congested area such as the EPZ. Comonwealth witness Richard Buell suggested the possibility of prioritizing certain lines so that a greater l

l ability to obtain a dial tone can be achieved. While the inmates welcome Mr.

l Buell's suggestion and encourage the institution to employ such prioritized or essential service lines, they also do not guarantee that said phone calls will be completed within a reasonable length of time. Testimony from Richard Buell, Rick Brown, and Bill Miller suggest that significant delays can be expected in the event of a nuclear disaster at the Limerick Generating Station.

l Superintendent Zimerman has gone on record as saying that his call up system will achieve its designated purpose within one to two hours. The inmates contend that further testimony indicates that said time frame ha, no basis in fact, f Thus, the inmates contend that the use of commercial phone lines is an

i. unreliable method of achieving notification of emergency personnel. As previously mentioned, the inmates call this Board's attention to the matter of Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (William H. Zimer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1) Docket No. 50-358, 17 NRC 760 (1983) which states, "The Board reasoned and the Applicant concedes that during an emergency, the comercial telephone circuits, including those serving the schools, likely would become overloaded as a result of heavy public usage and thus be unavailable for public use", at 1570. Similar testimonies were provided to this Board with regard to the remand issue. The task of mobilizing the manpower necessary to conduct an evacuation at Graterford is of crucial importance to the overall success of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Given the fact that telephone service is engineered for day to day service and not peak loads such as natural or man-made disasters, further indicates that such reliance is unsound. Attempts to bolster j the plan through the use of essential service lines and foreign lines may help reduce the delays, but will not affect the ability to complete telephone calls in a congested area. An accident at the Limerick Generating Station would I result in significant local telephone usage just as it did during the flood of 1972, the Three Mile Island accident of 1979, the Bruce Springsteen ticket sales of 1985, and other similar situations. Therefore, it is unwise to rely upon a call up syste.n that utilizes the contnercial telephone lines and the home phones of the SCIG personnel.

The testimony of James Asher, a representative of FEMA, indicated that he believed the manpower mobilization system would work because the public would j,not be aware of the accident at the time of its implementation. He noted that I

the plan calls for the mobilization at the alert stage. As the public would not be informed at that stage, he sees no problem regarding the reliability of the coninercial phone lines in order to implement the manpower mobilization component of the plan. But as the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board decision recently indicated, this assertion is based upon speculation and does not take into account a fast developing accident scenario. (See ALAB-845, Note 12, pp.

11-12.) The Appeal Board also indicated that this position is inconsistent with l .

l 1

PECO's previous argument that off-duty personnel would be notified later, rather than earlier, in an emergency. (See supra, Note 12, pp.11-12, and Note 7, p.

8.) Indeed, one need only go back to the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island for further evidence as to the unreliability of commercial telephone lines. That accident, which occurred within the Comonwealth of Pennsylvania and within the servicing area of Bell of Pennsylvania, resulted in significant delays to

telephone service. Said delays occurred over a period of days and resulted in l bial tone delays of up to 30 minutes. Thus, Mr. Asher's contention that the

public would be unaware of an accident during the manpower mobilization is based 4

!uponspeculationandnotexperience.

Despite Superintendent Zimmerman's ad hoc planning with regard to unauthorized revisions of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the inmates

contend that the Comonwealth has failed to provide a reasonable assurance that such a plan will in fact operate. Superintendent Zimmerman's revisions were unauthorized, undocumented and tailored to suit the imediate needs of this forum. His previous testimony that upwards of 300 individuals would be needed to carry out such an evacuation appears to be more credible when contrasted to

' Commissioner Jeffes' and Major Case's observations. Major Case, the inmates' expert in this matter, who was a prison warden for fifteen years and served twenty-one years in the United States Marine Corps, indicated that all SCIG personnel would be mobilized at the very least in order to conduct a safe evacuation. Commissioner Jeffes also stressed the need for mobilizing all personnel under the employ of the State Correctional Institute at Graterford.

1 1

l bnce the inmates indicated that previous testimony in this and other cases raised the issue of the reliability of the commercial phone lines, Superintendent Zimmerman drastically altered his plans. He reduced the

' assignments necessary for his personnel to carry out, he cut by over one-third the number of persons necessary to conduct the evacuation, and now insists that only additional personnel will be needed during the night shif t. He further indicated that all calls would be coming from the institution and the system

,w ould no longer rely upon individuals' home phones. He provided additional ll l assurances that foreign phone lines and the possible prioritization of phones I

could increase the workability of the manpower mobilization component. The inmates presented testimony that phone servicing is not reliable in the event of hemergency. Both the Comonwealth's witness and the inmates' witness agreed il

'that the phone service is not engineered to handle either man-made or naturally occurring disasters. Peak loads are not factored into the engineering process.

i bhese witnesses, along with Bill Miller, wire chief of the Pottstown Bell lof fice, indicated that considerable delays have occurred during previous instances requiring heavy telephone usage. These instances included the Three Mile Island accident of 1979, the Hurricane Agnes floods of 1972, Bruce Springsteen 1985 concert ticket sales, the Kennedy assassination, and severe winter storms. Regardless of where calls originate or whether dial tones are available, the majority of SCIG personnel live within a 20 mile radius of the Limerick Generating Station. In all probability, these phone lines will suffer

,from heavy usage resulting in considerable delays in obtaining dial tones and in completion of said calls. In light of this testimony, the inmates contend that

. 1 1

the manpower mcbilization system fails to provide a reasonable assurance that it will in fact mobilize the manpower necessary to conduct the evacuation as contemplated by the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the St' ate Correctional Institute at Graterford.

Respectfully submitted r,

'M /AA ANGUS R. , ESQdINE

Montgomer ounty Legal Aid Attorney Inmates, SCIG l

l l

l l

l l

..=, .

st** * * ? , p ' *y.g e e . . .

.,/ [W = M4Nk6 b sf t t..an==.asmaa*=c , . . . . . ....._^r . *-ma**@ N ' * * ~ I^

2.

..,..z.

"Mh .-%q

t. M e

I

~

.U

- ~

l I v:

o .

.-i u, -

.nu,,,,. p r'

l i

. v. -

- -. c .

= n t-  :

-i

. .s >

t I . .-

t g

) i i l r

I I

I.

i i i I n I

u. k.

t q .g

_ 4

• w m, v-.

o

.H i (% .

l .

7 EXHIBIT "A"

.I .a w

'I s

. . "y%

.* ' * *.85 ma. . .

m....e.

GOL ME TE (

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'86 0CT 17 Pl2 35 i

l GFFILL . . n 1 In the Matter of  : 00chE7pm .: E,. . . ,d l UR; e 1 l PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  :

!l Limerick Generating Station, h (Units 1 and 2) f

Docket Nos. 50-352, 50-353 I

! CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l

'i I, Angus R. Love, Esquire, attorney for the Inmates at I

the State Correctional Institute at Graterford, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF GRATERFORD INMATES, was sent via first class, postage prepaid mail to the Service List, and the original and two copies via Federal lExpresstotheDocket&ServiceStation,onOctober 16, 1986.

Administrative Judge Helen F. Hoyt Robert W. Sugarman, Esquire

! Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Sugarman, Denworth & Hellegers U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission 16th F1., Center Plaza Washington, D.C. 20555 101 N. Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 Administrative Judge Jerry Harbour Atcmic Safety & Licensing Board Docket & Service Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 (3 copies)

Ann P. Hodgdon, Esquire Counsel for NRC Staff Mr. Isobert L. Anthony Office of Executive Legal Director 103 Vernon. Lane, Box 186 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Moylan, PA 19065 Washington, D.C. 20555 David Wersan, Esquire Martha W. Bush, Esquire Asst. Consumer Advocate Municipal Services Bldg. Office of Consumer Advocate 15th & JFK Blvd. 1425 Strawberry Square Philadelphia, PA19107 Harrisburg', PA 17120 Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnm.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

Frank Ecmano Jay M. Gutierrez, Esquire 61 Forest Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Anbler, PA 19002 Region 1 il 631 Park Avenue 1 Zori G. Ferkin, Esquire King of Prussia, PA 19406 p Governor's Energy Council 1 P.O. Box 8010 Phyllis Zitzer 1625 N. Front Street Limerick Ecology Action i Harrisburg, PA 17105 P.O. Box 1761 1

762 Queen Street 9 Mr. Thcmas Gerusky, Director Pottstown, PA 19464 j Bureau of Radiation Protection Dept. of Environmental Resources Charles W. Elliott, Esquire i Fulton Bank Bldg, 5th F1. Counsel for Limerick Ecology

] Third & Incust Sts. Action

!! Harrisburg, PA 17120 325 N. 10th. Street

'! Easton, PA 18042 lSpenceW. Perry, Esquire

! Associate General Counsel Eugene J. Bradley, Esquire

!! FEMA Room 840 counsel for Philadelphia Electric.

h 500 CT St. , SW 2301 Market Street U Washington, D.C. 20472 Philadelphia, PA 19101 James Wiggins Edward G. Bauer, Jr.

Sr. Resident Inspector V.P. and General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conm. Philadelphia Electric Company

[ P.O. Box 47 2301 Market Street Sanatoga, PA 19464 Philadelphia, PA 19101 Timothy R.S. Campbell, Director Steven P. Hershey, Esquire

,, Dept. of Emergency Services Conmunity Legal Services L 14 East Biddle Street 5219 Chestnut Street J West Chester, PA 19380 Philadelphia, PA 19139 L Director.

Penna. Emergency Management Agency h,

Basement, Transportation Bldg.

q Harrisburg, PA 17120 o .

1 Arthur E. Gowran h U.S. Dept. of Justice

[ji 10th Appellate Section and Penna. Ave. NWLand Division WEashignton, D.C. 20530 j n

j' Theodore G. Otto, III, Esq. f/ /

Dept. of Corrections Office of Chief Counsel

/v % Las

/ AN ANGUS R.- E, ESpl P.O. Box 598 CounselfrInmates/ IRE'V

, SCIG Camp Hill, PA 17011 Montgome unty Legal Aid 107 E. Street Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. Norristown, PA 19401 Conner & Wettehahn (215) 275-5400 1747 Penna. Av, NW Suite 1050 Washington,D.C.20006