ML20210T351
ML20210T351 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Satsop |
Issue date: | 10/02/1974 |
From: | Tedesco R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
References | |
CON-WNP-1808 NUDOCS 8605300079 | |
Download: ML20210T351 (9) | |
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Docket Nos. .'STN 50 2508 .., c
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.f;M.c MTLTm AED POWER CONVERSION. SYSTEMS'BRANCE, FIRST ROUED REQUEST . 3,.YJ S l
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I t Docket Numbers: STN 50-508; STN'50-509 G*[ .
( iQ" Besponsible Branch: LWR 1-3 '
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Project Manager: P. D. O'Reilly l i i q.
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. Requested Coupletion Date: September 27, 1974 -
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Please note that the item 02012, the question regarding.the
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protection of the' ultimate heat sink cooling ~ towers from 'the effects '
l of the external missiles, is a special concern on site-related matters-. ' '
teen 020.33 stating a position on the ==~m=q feedvater system will
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be forwarded to you shorti.v.
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020.0 AUXILIARY AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMS l
020.1 Figure. .2 of the PSAR indicates that the basement floor of the (3.4) reactor auxiliary building will be at elevation 330 feet MSL which is 60 feet below the plant grade. Discuss how the safety related equipment located inside the reactor auxiliary building below the plant grade will be protected from the effect of the maximum ground water table.
, '020.2 Provide a complete tabulation of all high and moderate energy (3.6) piping systems outside containment, as defined in Mr. J. O' Leary's letter dated July 12, 1973. For each system indicate the means by which protection is afforded, whether:
(1) The piping system is isolated by adequate physical .
separation and remotely located from safety systems and components, or
. (2) The piping system is enclosed within structures suitably designed to protect adjoining safety systems and components, or j ; (3) The piping system is provided with suitable restraints and protective measures such that the operability and integrity of structures, safety systems and components that are required to shutdown the reactor safely and
, 3 maintain the plant in ,a cold shutdown condition are not impaired.
If the piping system is described elsewhere in the PSAR, provide reference to such description in this tabulation, and if not described elsewhere, include a description.
020.3 Provide layout drawings of the safety related areas outside (3.6) containment showing the above systems and the protection affo'rded
, to safety related equipment.
020.4 Provide the results of an analysis which demonstrates that failures (9. 0,I of any non-category I auxiliary system or component will not have detrimental effect (such as flood, spray, Icaks) on safety related systems that would prevent safe shutdown of the plant.
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- . '020.5 In regard to potential failures or malfunctions occurring due
]- (9.0) to freezing, icing and other adverse environmental conditions
. for those components not housed within temperature controlled t
areas and which are essential in attaining and maintaining a
- , safe shdtdown, identify and discuss the protective measures
[ taken to assure their operation.
. 020.6 Provide additional information that demonstrates that the _ _ _ _ . . .
(9.1.2) . spent fuel storage facility meets Position 3 and 5 of Regulatory Guide 1.13 " Fuel Storage Design Basis".
020.7 (RSP) Discuss the interfaces between the shutdown heat exchangers and (9.1. 3) the spent fuel pool cooling system. It is staff's position that the shutdown cooling system shall not be initiated to back up the spent fuel pool cooling system unless the reactor is in a .
cold shutdown condition and in the refueling mode. Further, means of ensuring isolation between. the shutdown cooling system -
and the spent fuel pool cooling system are required to prevent the initiation of the shutdown cooling system for spent fuel pool cooling purposes except under the above stated operating.
conditions. Provide a description of the system and any modifi-cations required to reflect the above staff position. ..
020.8 Describe and discuss the means provided to prevent a possible (9.1.4) dropping and tipping of the spent fuel cask into the spent fuel pool. Discuss the provisions made to limit the maximum raised
- . elevation of the spent fuel cask to a position higher than the necessary elevation for proper cask handling.
020.9 , The component cooling water system (CCWS) description indicates j .(9.2.2)' that the fuel pool heat'exchangers and the letdown heat exchanger will be served by the non-essential headers of CCWS and the non-essential headers will be automatically isolated from the essential headers on a safety injection actuation signal. Describe and discuss the provision that will be made to manually reinstate the cooling water supply to the fuel pool heat exchangers and the letdown heat exchanger at a latter stage of the incident as the operation of these heat exchangers may be required for long-term cooling.
020.10 (RSP) Figure 9.2-1 of the.FSAR shows that the reactor coolant pump oil (9.2.2) coolers are served _by the part of non-essential component cooling water supply headers which will be designed to non-nuclear safety class. It is our position that the reactor coolant pump bearing cooling system be designed to seismic Category I requirements to
, assure cooling to the pumps.
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! 020.11 Discuss the consequences in the event of an accident that causes
- j. -(9.2.2) actuation of the containment isolation and shuts off 'he t component j ,
cooling, water to the reactor coolant pump cooling systems.
020.12 Discuss the measures taken to protect dry and wet cooling towers (9.2. 2) used as the ultimate heat sink from the effects of the external missiles.
020.13 Provide the content of Section 9.2.3.3 through Section 9.2.4.1 (9. 2. 3 & which are missing in the PSAR.
9.2.4) .
020.14 In order to permit en assessment of the ultimate heat sink, (9. 2.5) provide the results of an analysis of the thirty-day period following a design basis accident that determines the total heat rejected, the sensible heat rejected, the station auxiliary system heat rejected, and the decay heat release from the reactor.
" In submitting the results of the analysis requested, include the following information in both tabular and graphical presentations:
4 (1) The total integrated decay heat.
(2) The heat rejection rate and. integrated heat rejected by .
the station auxiliary systems, including all operating pumps, ventilation equipment, diesels and other heat sources. *
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. N (3) The heat rejection rate and integrated heat rejected due tio sensible heat removed from containment and the primary
, system.
(4) The total integrated heat rejected due to the above.
(5) The maximum allowable inlet water temperature taking into account the rate at which the heat energy must be removed.
cooling water flow rate, and the capabilities of the respec-i tive heat exchangers.
I l The above analysis, including pertinent backup information, is to demonstrate the capability of the cooling towers to provide ade-quate water inventory and provide sufficient heat dissipation to
" limit essential cooling water operating temperatures within the
, -- I design ranges of system components.
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020-4
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Use the methods set forth in Enclosure Number 1, " Residual -
Decay Energy for Light Water Reactors for Long Term Cooling",
to establish the input due to fission product decay and heavy elementedecay. Assume an initial cooling water temperature based on the most adverse conditions for normal operation.
Assume the meteorological conditions set forth in Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.27 " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 1, dated IIarch 1974.
020.15 It is indicated that the makeup water to the expansion tank of (9.2.9) the essentici services chilled water system will be taken from the service water system which is a non-seismic Category I designed water supply. Provide additional information to demonstrate that the water inventary in the expansion tank is
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sufficient to compensate system leakage for long-term operation after a design basis accident.
-020.16 Since the compressed air systems wili not be designed to seismic (9. 3.1) Category I requirements and individual air accumulators will serve as a reliable source of compressed air for operation of essential equipment, provide additional drawings to show typical-arrangement of the air accumulators and the point in the system that changes the seismic Category classification. - -
020.17 -
Provide more inforamtion on the auxiliary building lower elevation (9. 3. 3) drainage system sumps and sump pumps as to their capability to collect and discharge excess liquid due to emergency flood 1 conditions. State the assumptions used.
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(NOTE:
- The above is a repeat of our acceptance review question, '
.. which was not answered).
020.18 Discuss how the. single failure criterion will be met since a (9. 4.1) single air supply and return duct for main control room is used ,
, as indicated in Figure 9.4-2 of the PSAR.
020.19 Describe the operation mode of the control room HVAC systems in-(9.4.1) the event of control room fire.
020.20 Provide the physical separation and missile protection criteria (9.4.1) for the control room HVAC outside air intakes and exhausts.
020.21 Provide the physical separation and missile protection criteria o
(9.4.2) for the diesel room HVAC outside air intakes and exhausts, the diesel combustion air intakes and exhausts and the diesel fuel oil storage area ventilation system, i .
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, 020-5 020.21 Provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that (9. 4. 2) the function of the diesel engine combustion air intake system
. will not, under any meteorological and accident condition, be degraded to an extent which prevents the engine from developing - -
full rated power.
020.23 Show the plan end elevation locations for each diesel inlet _,..__ ___
(9.4.2) and exhaust location on a building layout drawing. - --
020.24 Provide an analysis that demonstrates that control room personnel (9. 5.1) will not be adversely affected by the toxic fumes of the extinguish-ing agents and the products of combustion. List the agents that will be used.
020.25 Describe and provide the design criteria and bases for the makeup-(9 '. 5. 5) water source to the expansion tank of the diesel generator cooling water systems. Include P & I drawings of the diesel generator ,
cooling water system.
.l 020.26 (RSP) It is our position that the diesel generator air starting systems (9. 5. 6) must be designed to have two separate air starting systems fo.r... .._
each diesel engine and the quantity of air provided for each subsystem or an air starting system be capable of providing _
sufficient compressed air to enable its engine to perform five normal cold start cycles without recharging the air receivers.
020.27 Identify the quality group classification and seismic design (9. 5. 6) classification change of specification of the diesel generator air starting piping systems in the Figure 9.5-3 of the PSAR.
020.28 Expand- the discussion of the turbine overspeed protection system (10.2) to demonstrate that the turbine will be protected from excess overspeed. Provide the results of a failure mode analysis for the turbine overspeed protection system, With rei: tion to the operation of the required values and their operatina or pressure dumping system.
020.29 Expand the evaluation regarding the effects of posrible circu-(10.4.5) lating water system f ailure inside the turbine building. Include the following:
(1) The maximum flow rate through a completely failed expansion joint.
(2) The potential for and the means provided to detect a failure in the circulating water transport system barrier such as the rubber expansion joints. Include the design and operating 4
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pressures of the various portions of the transport system, barrier and their relation to the pressures which could exist during malfunctions and failures in the system (rapid valve closure).
- y i (3) The time required to stop the circulating water flow (time j '^
sero being the instant of failure) including all inherent "t' delays such as operator reaction time, drop out times of - - - - -
l- the control circuitry and coastdown time.
(4) For each postulated failure in the circulating water transport system barrier give the rate of rise of water
, in the associated spaces and total height of the water when the circulating water flow has been stopped or overflows to site grade.
J (5) For each flooded space provide a discussion, with the aid of drawings, of the protective barrier provided for all essential systems that could become affected as a result of flooding.
4 Include a discussion of the consideration given to passageways, pipe chases and/or the cableways joining the flooded space to the spaces containing safety related system components. Dis -
cuss the effect of the flood water on all submerged essential electrical systems and components.
~ 020. 30 ' Figure 10.4-7 of the PSAR indicates that the auxiliary feedwater
. (10.4. 7) pumps will be supplied water from a condensate storage tank through a common pipeline with a gate valve in the line. Discuss 4 i this sys' tem design in view of the single failure criterion.
020.31 Provide the results of an analysis to demonstrate that a single (10.4.7) water supply source (a condensate storage tank) for the auxiliary
.f.eedwater system is sufficient and the ensured water storage in the condensate storage tank will provide sufficient water to perforn the auxiliary feedwater system design function, i.e. , to maintain the reactor at hot standby condition for a specified time period and cooldown the reactor to.the conditions that the shutdown cool-
- ing water system can start its operation. The analysis should be-::r
. based on the assumption that the auxiliary feedwater system will be operated from outside'the control room.
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. .. i 020.32 Provide a tabulation of all valvas in the reactor pressure .
1 (NONE) boundary and in other seismic Category I systems (per Regulatory Guide 1.29) e.g. , safety valvea, relief valves , stop valves ,
s stop-check valves, plant shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a transient or accident. The tabulation should identify the i system in which it is instr,11ed, the type and size of valves,
'{ the actuation type (s), and the environmer.tal design criteria to which the valves are qualified as stated in the design specifica .
tion.
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OCT 2 1974 .
s Enreld R. Doston, Assistaat Director for Site Safety, L j
TERus BrianE. Grimes, Chief.AceidentAnalysisBranah,Lh -
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TRIP BEFORT - SITE TISIT TO WFFSS 3 & 5
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~onSeptember18and17/1974,' I toured the WFPss 3 & 5 alte and '-
. environs as part of the staff site safety visit. The WFPSS 3 -
and 5 site is loested near the town of Satsep, Washington, about '
f 30 adles from the Pacifia enest and 75 =41== SW of Seattle. The alte le ehesastariand by heavily forested hills which rise in
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_ several terrases from the chehalis River valley. The peak - - ' .
elevation ensite is about 500 ft and the site will be excavated l ,
so that the plant structures will be at an elevation of 390 ft. ;
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{ In the company of representatives of WPPSS a'ad Khasco, I drove and walked over the areas of the site that were accessible. 6 A leasing operation was observed in progrees onsite (the .
.appliaast states that lessing will be permitted during plant
- . operatten). The trees had been failed previously and the logs l 'were b6ing loaded en a trusk. The logging erow consisted of i
a trusk driver, a lift operator, and a bu11 dose operator.
, . I oboarved the single treek railroad line which if as about one f mile north of the site. .The railroad is in the valley below i the site and the elevation of the site above the railroad line and the d==== tree growth which presently exists between the
" site and the railroad were noted. .
After some difficulty, the Elma " International" Airport was 1 seated abeet 2 miles NE of the site. The airport consists of a slagle grase strip about 2000 ft long oriented in an east-
' west directise. Be airplanse were visible at the airport '"
. (there were esveral waan oevered hangers which were elosed),
and no ens was presuat in the small operations building. -
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. Esen espansion la Naaned for the airport la the future. s After the sits terer a asettag was held to discuss tho' draft first ,
somed qwsstions. It was emphasised to the appliesat that the unsettled status of the ownership of the site exclusion area presented a petsatial problem which neuld affect the licensing ',
h =1=. At yresent the majority of the site is. owned by three hh=e eenpanian, an irdividual, and the state of Washington. ,
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- te. > . . . . .. t e o i R. R. Denton lP l f UFFSS does not intend to purehase all of the property within the asalueism area but rather to obtain ensements from the ownere s.
' and negotiatione are presently *1, to obtain these ensammets .
l 4==1mding the nimeral ridte. It une agreed that the guestion
. - X of site owmarabip and- the authority to sentrol estivittee in the '
- , ;i {. partiam of the site not emned by the app 11 east le largely a lesel Jc.,y.gsetter and would have to be addressed by the WrFSS and Esgulatory ?"
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l Buring the site visit I had the opportamity to esatset several <
l officiale of Greye Barber County. These imeladed representatives (G i
.,foi the Engineere Office, the Asemesore Offies, the County Flemming +
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- c===d==4==. la Montemano. Unehingtes, and the Regional Flammine ' ^
i f' Cosmuission in Aberdeen. * =hington. Several maps, serial photos,
! and reports were obtained during disemmaiens with these officials.
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