ML20209H175

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Discusses 860514 Deliberate Interruption of Power from 3 of 4 Power Lines.Circumstances Suggest Attack Coordinated. Licensed Units Were Not Operating.Diesels Operational. Related Documents Encl
ML20209H175
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/1986
From: Burnett R
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To: Jennifer Davis
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
Shared Package
ML20209H160 List:
References
FOIA-86-774 NUDOCS 8702050544
Download: ML20209H175 (12)
v • d • e


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May 16' 1986 SG R/F N

ETenEyck RErickson WBrown C MEMORANDUM FOR: John G. Davis, Director '

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards FROM: Robert F. Burnett, Director Division of Safeguards, HMSS -.

SUBJECT:

INCIDENT AT PA1.0 VERDE -

During the evening of May 14, 1986, power from three of four transmission lines to the' Palo Verde site was interrupted by deliberate acts by -

unknown persons. The FBI has the' matter under active investigation. ,

Power was inter [upted'at three separate locations. Circumstances suggest ~

that this was a..cooTdinated attacki Neither of the 'l two licensed units were operating at the time of the incident. The g operational.

d ,ies'els w.ere chekked and were found to be Attached is a copy of a message generated by the FBI, Phoenix Field Office.

Although the first part of the FBI message is somewhat garbled, it does '

reflect the essential facts as we.know them. The message was transmitted a . to 12 other FBI field offices whichfwere asked to provide.any information .

tha.t might be related to this matter. We are keeping in close contact with thelFBI concerning developments.

'Al'so' attached is a copy of a brief summary we have furnished to Public Affairs for use in the event of any inquiry.

. A a' Robert F. Burnett, Director Division of Safeguards, NMSS

Enclosures:

1. FBI Message
2. Prepared Statement for PA's Use .

8702050544 870202 A PDR FOIA ' <

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DURING THE EVENING OF MAY 14, 1986 POWER FROM THREE OF THE FOUR TRANSMISSION LINES TO THE PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION WAS INTERRUPTED BY WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DELIBERATE ACTS BY UNKNOWN PERSONS. THIS INCIDENT IS BEING ACTIVELY INVESTIGATED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

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AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT THE TWO REACTORS THAT HAD BEEN LICENSED WERE _

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SHUT-DOWN. HOWEVER, EVEN IF THE PLANT HAD BEEN OPERATING AND ALL 0FF-SITE  :

POWER SOURCES HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED THE PLANT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN  ::

SAFE OPERATION USING REQUIRED SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO ASSURE CONTROL IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. .

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k I (WIZONA PUBLIC TELEPHONF CALL FROM APPARENT SABOTAGE;- OF F'R11Es . A FN IS PL I Nt.,

1 dERViCE COMPANY fiF:. ! Dr.N ? TNSPECTCH AT APf'ROX IMATELY '3: 4 0 4"M MST ON MAY 14. 1985. THE PHEVeV<iDi iHS 1M AND

! PVNGS til. 2 $< 3 AT APPROX. 8:00 AM SITE FXPERIENCED 1HE SEOUENTIAL LOSS OF 3 UF THE 4 UPNS LENTI.R HAvc ITfN

!DM50-528 Foi ON 'fi/15/86 SOURCES OF OFFS 11 E POWE R. PRELIMINARY fMVEdTIGAfinN NOTIFIFD, l 50-529 REVEALED THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE l.INLb HAY HAVE blF N FULLO! M i EF( M ..cd b 4

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Reportab1e Event Nurrb er 04650 Fati1ity : PALO VERDE Date Notified : 05/15/P - ~

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1 ;' &3 T i rne Notified : 14:la Region : .3 Date of Event : 05/15.'96 Vendor : E, -- E ' C C-*C-E ime of Event : 13:35 Operationn Officor : Chauncey Gauld Cl r35 i f i c a t i en : P hys . Sec . / Sa f oc= u ar d

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Cornpanen t : Category 4 :

SECURITY EVENT. NOTIFIED REG 5, IE JORDAN /ECHWARTZ, IAT NOTIFIED

Reportable Event Nurber 04651 Faci 1ity : PA!_O VERDE Date Notified : 05/15/86 Unit : 1 Time Notified : 15:05 Region : 5 Date of Event : 05/14/86 Vendor : C-E,C-E.C-E Time of Everit : 18:EP Operatians Officer : Chauncny Gould C1assification : Phys. Sec. /Sa f eguar d NRC Natified By : CHERNICK Categery 1 : Security Rad R e l e a 'f e : No Categor Cause : SECURITY EVENT Category 3 :

Compon ran t : Category 4 -

SECURITY EVENT. COMPENSATGHY MEMURES TAKEN. NOTIFIED REG 5 MCOUEEN l

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Peportab1e Event Number 04650 Faci 1ity : PALO VERDE Date Natified : 05/15/86 Unit : 1 Time Notified : 18:52 Region : 5 Date cf Event : 05/15/86 Vendor : C-E,C-E,C-E Time of Event : 14:01 Opera t i on t- Officer : Chauncey Gould C1ansification : Phys.Sec./ Safeguard NRC Notified E' y : CHERNICK Category 1 : Security Rad Release : No Category 2 :

Cause : EECURITY EVENT Category 3 :

Component : Category 4 :

SECURITY EVENT. COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN. NOTIFIED RDO PATE I

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(603)i850=1277i LINES SU6PECTED TO'BE DELIBERATELY DAMAGED three transminaism linestiendian in and out of the Pale verda nuclear, plant L35 miles ivest of Pho'esis:are surren'ely out that sabotage was of speration :and of fiatala stressly suspect involved.

The zhree linesi ere :300 kv > transmission 11 mas which earry electricity throughout the state and to :Califersia.' A foufth lina is unaffected. The isoisent ham. had no ef f ect sa the AP$ r elaatrical system.

Two nef the111aes are aparatse by the Salt liver. Project and one is by Arisena Public $arvies.

last might 434

' APS, discovered its demased.line at 6184 p.n.

i this morning. located a rope er strap thrown iever the Pale ;Yorde North Gila Line southwestaof the! nuclear p1,nt. a This line Power to this carries 4 power to.the Yussiand aan Diego areas.

area was also not affested.i Thetother two lines were discovered damassi by 817'st 9:01 p.m. and 9:23 p.m..-

According to officials at ANPP', MRC regulations reguire-that two separate outside sources of, power be available befors Unit 2 at ithe Palo : Verde nuclear plant :is a11ewed to start.

The company is:surrently investisating the incident and thei appropriste(law enforeassat assucias have base notified.

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  • P.O. Box 52034
  • 85072 May 27, 1986 ANPP COMMUNICATIONS 250-1530 For Release:

Contact:

ANPP STATUS.ORIEF is designed toitMS responsive to the information needs of the news media by providing information Aongreat the Arizona Nuclear Power Project as it becomes available.Thus, some deal of the information information in it is preliminary in nature.

which initia]1y appears signiticant may.later prove to be of less importance,.while other material, which at first neems insignifi-cant, may subsequently prove to be significant.

Unit 1 -- Scheduled work on the inspection and PROJECT STATUS mai'ntenance outage was completed on May 14, 1986, with the successful conclusion of the Integrated Safeguards test and completion of l minor modifications to the Balance-of-Plant l Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (BOPESPAS).. In Mode-5 (Cold Shutdown) since.

March 7, 1986, the unit entered Mode 4 (Hot shutdown) at 5: 12 a.m. on May 18, 1986, as operators preparcd to return it to service.

Mode 3 (Hot Standby) operation was achieved the same. day at 7:01 p.at., ,when the temperature of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) exceeded 350 degrees F. At 1:59 p.m. on tlay 23, 1986, Unit 1 went into Mode 2 (Startup) and into Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 4:49 p.m. that afternoon.

Unit,2 -- At 4: 42 p.m. on April 30, 1986, the unit.was placed in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to conserve fuel while surveillance testing on the Post-Accidenc Sampling:Syntem-(PASS) and minor ntdifications to the Balance-of-Plant Engi-neered Safety Features 4 Actuation System (DOPESPAS)~were. completed. At 3:33 a.m. on May 14, 1986, Unit 2 entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), followed byiMode 3 (Hot Standby)

At operation at 1:26 p.m.'that.Same that day. major evening, approximately 9:00 p.m.

vandalism to three 500 Kilovolt transmission linen leading to PVNGS caused plans to'rentart i

' Unit 2 to be placed on hold. Following repair of the'danaged lines and their return to

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May 27, 1986 Page 2 service, the unit entered Mode 2 (Startup) at 6:25 p.m. on May 16,71986, and Mode 1 (Power' Operation) at.9:57 p.m. on May 18,11986. After warming and rolling the turbine-generator, Unit 2 was syn- chronized,to the grid and produced op its first electricity, 65 Megawatts, at 5:41 p.m.:on May 20, 19861 Unit 3 -- Prerequisite andipreoperational testing of the various systems and'aubsystems turned;over4 to ANPP Startup4 and Operations continues, asiconstruction is 99.6 percent complete.

NRC INSPECTIONS 1 Reported April 25, 1986. NRC inspection of PVNGS l' nits 1, 2 andt3 from6 March 24 through-March 28, 1986, and April 7 through 11, 1986.

Routine, unannounced inspection by. regionally based inspector of licensee < action on previous-ly identified

  • construction deficiencies and on other inspector-identified items. No viola-tions of NRC requirements were identified within the scope of this ins pec t-lon .

Reported May 6, 1986. NRC proposed imposition of a civil penalty of $100,000 based on the resulta of a routine, unannounced security inspection from February 11, 1986 through March 13, 1986. ANPP has thirty days from the date of theinotico.to respond.

MISCBLLANEOUS On May.19, 1986, ANPP announced that it is offering a reward of.$25,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person or persons responsible.for vandalizing three of four 500 kilovolt transmission lines tied to PVNGSton May 14, 1986. The three damaged lines experienced separate faults within a period.of 25 minutesibeginning at approximately 9:00 p.m., at pointn ranging from 10 to 32 miles from the plant. Repair crews from Arizona Public Service and Salt River Project restored the lines to service the following afternoon. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is investigating the case. The reward will be paid by:ANPP participants in proportion to their share of ownernhip. Anyone with information concerning the incident is asked to' call the Phoenix office of the F.B.I.

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-NUCtEAR-REGtitATORTCOMMISSl_ON REGION V 1450 MARIA LANE. SUITE 210 e,,, h h (( WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNI A 94596

> . AUG 211986 .

Docket Nos. 50-528 and 50-529 Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Attention: Mr. E.E. Van Brunt, Jr. -

Executive Vice President Gentlemen:

Subject:

NRC Security Inspection, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 This letter refers to the routine Safeguards inspection of your activity at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1 and 2 authorized under NRC License Nos. NPF-41 and NPF-51, respectively. The inspection was conducted by Mr. D. Schaefer of this office on July 28 through August 1,1986.

It also refers to the discussion of our inspection findings held by the inspector with Mr. E. Van Brunt Jr., Executive Vice President of the Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP), and members of his staff on August 1, 1986.

Further, this letter refers to a telephone discussion between Messrs. J.

Pollard, ANPP and D. Schaefpr of this office on August 13, 1986.

Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with facility and contract personnel and observations by the inspectors.

Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were observed.

In accordance with Section 2.790(d) of NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, documentation of the findings of your safeguards and security procedures are exempt from public disclosure; therefore, the enclosed inspection report will not be placed in the Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution.

We have determined that the enclosure to this letter contains Safeguards Information and must be protected against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21. 4 q(

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ABCLOSURB-00NTAIT SAFEGUARDS-NFOIOfATION+- "- - ~ ' '

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UPON SEPARATI0:0THIS- -

PAGE IS DECONTROLLED. -- v3MUMTM II MiT' i f h- ~

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AUG 211986 Sh'ould you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

' Sincerely,

%[.

U James L. Montgomery, Chief

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Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch

Enclosure:

Inspection Report Nos. 50-528/86-26 50-529/86-25 (IE-V-764) cc w/ enclosure:

J. Bynum, ANPP W. F. Quinn, ANPP T. D. Shriver, ANPP W. E. Ide, ANPP C. N. Russo, ANPP i

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T.7. 277sj (Closed) Follow-up Item (05-14-86). Suspected sabotage of off-site equipment. The licensee reported that on May 14, 1986, between 8:58 p.m.

and 9:23 p.m., May 14, 1986, three of the four licensee offsite high voltage transmission lines tripped off-line. The licensee did not

? identify any problems in their switchyard, nor at their towers within the owner controlled area. Throughout the evening of May 14/15, 1986 all attempts to try and locate the cause of the power outage met with negative results. On May 15,1986, cable slings were discovered tied to towers of the high voltage transmission lines, each located between 25-35 miles from the site. On May 15, 1986, the FBI arrived at the site of the' first transmission line and assumed charge of the investigation. The FBI is continuing their investigative efforts with assistance from NRC Office of Investigation (01). All relevant information, as it becomes available, is being forwarded to the FBI. Due to 0I's direct involvement in this case, this event is administratively closed in this inspection report. No inspection efforts are required in support of this event.

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change notices and will be included in the next revision. Item (b) is covered in procedure 41A0-1ZZ10 " Functional Recovery Procedure" Revision 1. This item is closed.

I. (Closed) Followup Item 50-528/85-06-07: " Minimum Shift Crew for Fire Brigade."

The licensee committed to revise 40AC-9ZZ02, " Control of Shift Operations", to specify the minimum shift crew complement required to implement 41AO-1ZZ44 " Shutdown Outside the Control Room" while simultaneously manning the fire brigade.

The inspector reviewed procedure 40AC-92Z02 which was modified by a procedure change notice (PCN) to increase minimum shift manning by two auxiliary operators. In addition, to the above, in November 1985, a full time professional fire department was established. This department replaced the fire brigade requirements of the operating staff. This item is closed.

Unit 2 (Closed) Followup Item 529/86-04-02: " Review of Procedures Dealing With Preventing Operation With Dry Reference Legs."

This item related to the operational checks which should assure the reference legs associated with the pressurizer, steam generators and safety injection tanks level instrumentation were filled.

A review of operating procedures and the Control Room daily data log sheet revealed that the procedures had been modified to include instructions and cautions to confirm that there was a proper correlation between the multiple level instrumentation associated with these components. These changes included both Units 1 and 2.

This item is closed.

3. Review of Plant Activities l A. Unit 1 l

During the report period Unit I remained in a scheduled maintenance outage until May 23, 1986. The outage was extended i

beyond the scheduled duration when problems were identified l during testing of the "A" Diesel Generator (D/G). Water and fuel oil leaks prevented the D/G from completing a required 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operational test for the integrated safeguard surveillance test. Following repair to the D/G, identification of a broken wire in the balance of plant emergency safety features l actuation system (BOP ESFAS) in Unit 2 led to the discovery l that module connectors in the B0P ESFAS in all three units were not mating correctly. The connectors were subsequently modified in the BOP ESFAS cabinets to provide adequate mating

' (see paragraph 11). On May 14, 1986, at approximately 8:59 PM the offsite power line from the North Gila substation tripped, at 9:02 PM, the Kyrene line tripped, and at 9:23 PM, the 99

Westwing line tripped. Licensee investigation the following morning revealed that all three lines had been intentionally grounded by unknown persons. The locations of the groundings were all 30-40 miles from the plant site. The grounds were cleared and the lines were returned to service. The licensee performed surveillance testing of the D/Gs at Units I and 2 and performed walkdowns of onsite electrical distribution equipment, as well as portions of selected mechanical, safety related systems. No discrepancies were identified during the check of the above equipment. In addition, the licensee increased security surveillance both onsite and offsite of the transmission network.

On May 16, plant heat up was started and Mode 4 was entered.

Mode 3 was attained May 17, and on May 23 the reactor was taken critical. Power was raised to 100% on May 26 and remained at 100% through the remainder of the report period.

B. Unit 2 Unit 2 initial criticality was achieved on April 18. This was followed by the performance of low power physics testing which was completed on April 21. A short period of operation followed at approximately 3% of rated power until April 22, for the purpose of performing nuclear instrumentation calibrations, core protection calculator and core operating limit supervisory system tests.

The plant was then taken to Mode 3 on April 22 in order system.

to complete testing of the post accident sampling The full power license was issued on April 24.

On April 23, Unit 2 experienced an inadvertent main steam isolation actuation due to a personnel error during the conduct of a surveillance test on the system. The plant was in Mode 3 at the time.

On April 28, during the inspection of wire connections in the train "A" balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system (BOP ESFAS) cabinet a loss of power signal was actuated when wires were moved to facilitate the inspection. The plant was in Mode 3 at the time. Following the determination that the actuation was caused because the B0P ESFAS connectors had limited engagement (paragraph 11) the plant was taken to Mode 5 on April 30. Both trains of engineered safety features were i

declared inoperable at the time.

Following replacement of the connectors, the plant was again made critical on May 6, and 20% power was reached on May 21.

On May 25, 1986, while reducing power from 20% to 12% for a turbine over speed trip test, operator error in controlling feedwater flow caused a reactor trip due to a low steam generator level condition. After the reactor trip, excessive auxiliary steam loads and overfeeding the steam generators caused main steam isolation, containment isolation and safety injection actuations. All required systems functioned

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