ML20207T098

Amend 103 to License DPR-40,revising Tech Specs to Modify Refueling Boron Concentration from at Least 1,700 Parts Per Million (Ppm) to at Least 1,800 Ppm

ML20207T098
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	03/09/1987
From:	Thadani A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T092	List: ML20207T091 ML20207T098 ML20207T104
References
TAC-64371, NUDOCS 8703230189
Download: ML20207T098 (10)

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,/  %, UNITED STATES g g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

7. j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655

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OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT DOCKET NO. 50-285 FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENOMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 103 License No. DPR-40

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by the Omaha Public Power District (the licensee) dated January 8, 1987 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the

, Commission; h

C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized l by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health

! and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be

! conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

l 8703230189 870309 PDR ADOCK 05000285 P PDR i

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2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No.

OPR-40 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.103, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This Itcense amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION guadw Ashok C. Thadani, Director PWR P oject Directorate #8 Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 9,1987

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3 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.103 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-40 DOCKET NO. 50-285 Revise Appendix "A" Technical Specifications as indicated below. The revised pages are identified by amend.ent number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages 2 2 2-18 2-18 2-20 2-20 2-22 2-22 2-39 2-39 2-62 2-62 4-4 4-4 l

p DEFINITIONS ,

REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS (Continued) goldShutdownCondition(OperatingMode4)

The reactor coolant T cold is less than 210*F.and the reactor coolant is at shutdown boron concentration.

i:

Refueling Shutdown Condition (Operating Mode 5)

The reactor coolant is at refueling boron concentration and Tcold is less i

than 210*F.

l' Refueling Operation Any operation involving the shuffling, removal, or replacement of nuclear

, fuel, CEA's, or startup sources.

l The Refueling Boron Concentration A reactor coolant boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm, which corre- l sponds to a shutdown margin of not less than 5% with all CEA's withdrawn.

i

! Shutdown Boron Concentration i

j The boron concentration required to make the reactor subcritical by the amount defined in paragraph 2.10.

( Refueling Outage or Refueling Shutdown l

l A' plant outage or shutdown to perform refueling operations upon reaching the planned fuel depletion for a specific core.

Plant Operating Cycle The time period from a Refueling Shutdown to the next Refueling Shutdown, i

i Amendment No. 24,32,4J,#3,103 2 L.

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued)

a. One of the operable charging pumps may be removed from service provided two charging pumps are operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b. Both boric acid pumps may be out of service for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

c. One concentrated boric acid tank may be out of service provided a minimum of 68 inches of 6-1/4 percent to 12 percent by weight boric acid solution at a temperature of at least 20*F above saturation temperature is contained in the operable tank and provided that the tank is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,

d. Only one flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks to the reactor coolant system may be operable provided that either the other flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks to the reactor coolant system or the flow path from the SIRW tank to the charging pumps is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

e. One channel of heat tracing may be out of service provided it is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

f. One level instrument on each concentrated boric acid tank may be out of service for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

e Basis The chemical coolant system and volume boron control 11 inventory. (system provides This is nomallycontrol of the reactor accomplished by using any one of the three charging pumps in series with one of the two boric acid pumps. An alternate method of boration will be to use the charging pumps directly from the SIRW storage tank. A third method will be to depressurize and use the safety injection pumps. There are two sources of borated water available for injection through three different paths.

'(1) The boric acid pumps can deliver the concentrated boric acid tank

! contents (6-1/4 - 12 weight percent concentration of boric acid) j to the charging pumps. The tanks are located above the charging pumps so that the boric acid will flow by gravity without being pumped.

(2) The safety injection pumps can take suction from the SIRW tank

(at least 1800 ppm boron solution). I l

l Amendment No. #,103 2-18 I

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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION '

2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System Applicability Applies to the operating status of the emergency core cooling system.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to remove decay heat from the core.

Specifications (1) Minimum Requirements The reactor shall not be made critical unless all of the following conditions are met:

a. The SIRW tank contains not less than 283,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm at a temperature l not less than 40*F.

b. One means of temperature indicati.on (local) of the SIRW tank is operable.

c. All four safety injection tanks are operable and pressurized to at least 240 psig with a tank liquid of at least 116.2 inches (67%) and a maximum level of 128.1 inches (74%) with refueling boron concentration.

d. One level and one pressure instrument is operable on each safety injection tank.

e. One low-pressure safety injection pump is operable on each bus.

f. One high-pressure safety injection pump is operable on each bus.

g. Both shutdown heat exchangers and three or four component cooling heat exchangers are operable.

h. Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow paths from the SIRW tank to the reactor coolant system.

i. All valves, piping and interlocks associated with the above components and required to function during accident conditions are operable. HCV-2914, 2934, 2974, and 2954 shall have power removed from the motor operators by locking open the circuit breakers in the power supply lines to the valve motor operators.

FCV-326 shall be locked open.

Amendment No.17.32,M.103 2-20

2. 0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)

(3) Protection Against Low Temperature Overpressurization The following limiting conditions shall be applied during scheduled heatups and cooldowns. Disabling of the HPSI pumps need not be required if the reactor vessel head, a pressurizer safety valve, or a PORV is removed.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 320*F, at least one (1) HPSI pump shall be disabled.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 312*F at least two (2) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 271 F, all three (3) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.

In the event that no charging pumps are operable, a single HPSI pump may be made operable and utilized for boric acid injection to the core.

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is to first heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature by running the reactor coolant pumps.

The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing CEA's and diluting boron in the reactor coolant. With this mode of start-up, the energy stored in the reactor coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and therefore all engineered safety features and auxiliary cooling systems are required to be fully operable.

During low power physics tests at low temperatures, there is a negligible amount of stored energy in the reactor coolant; therefore, an accident comparable in severity to the design basis accident is not possible and the engineered safeguards systems are not required.

The SIRW tank contains a minigum of 283,000 gallons of usable water contain-ing at least 1800 ppm boronill. This is sufficient boron concentration to l provide a shutdown margin of 5%, including allowances for uncertainties, with all control rods withdrawn and a new core at a temperature of 60*F.(2)

The limits for the safety injection tank pressure and volume assure the required amount of water injection during an accident and are based on values used for the accident analyses. The minimum 116.2 inch level corresponds to a volume of 825 ft3 and the maximum 128.1 inch level corresponds to a volume of 895.5 ft 3.

Prior to the time the reactor is brought critical, the valving of the safety injection system must be checked for correct alignment and appropriate valves locked. Since the system is used for shutdown cooling, the valving will be changed and must be properly aligned prior to start-up of the reactor.

2-22 Amendment No. J7 )$,f),f/,54,74,77,JS0,103

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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Operations (Continued) incident could occur during the refue]ing operations that would resalt in a hazard to public health and safety tl 1 Whenever changes are not being made in core geometry one flux monitor is sufficient. This permits maintenance of the instrumentation. Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condi-tion. The shutdown cooling pump is used to maintain a unifonn boron concentration.

The shutdown margin as indicated will keep the core subcritical even if all CEA's were withdrawn from the core. During refueling operations, the reactor refueling cavity is filled with approximately 250,000 gallons of burated water. The boron concentration of this water (at least 1800 ppm l boron) is sufficient to maintain the reactor subcritical by more than 5%,

including g withdrawn.lgowanceforuncertainties,inthecoldconditionwithallrods Periodic checks of refueling water boron concentration ensure the proper shutdown margin. Communication requirements allow the control room operator to inform the refueling machine operator of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement.

In addition to the above engineered safety, features, interlocks are utilized during refueling operations to ensure safe handling. An excess weight interlock is provided on the lifting hoist to prevent movement of more than one fuel assembly at a time. In addition, interlocks on the auxiliary building crane will prevent the trolley from being moved over storage racks containing irradiated fuel, except as necessary for the handling of fuel. The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the power has been removed from the core takes advantage of the decay of the short half-life fission products and allows for any failed fuel to purge itself of fission gases, thus reducing the consequences of fuel handling accident.

The ventilation air for both the containment and the spent fuel pool area flows through absolute particulate filters and radiation monitors before discharge at the ventilation discharge duct. In the event the stack discharge should indicate a release in excess of the limits in the technical specifications, the containment ventilation flow paths will be closed automatically and the auxiliary building ventilation flow paths will be closed manually. In addition, the exhaust ventilation ductwork from the spent fuel storage area is equipped with a charcoal filter which will be wgually put into operation whenever irradiated fuel is being handled.LiJ References

1) FSAR, Section 9.5

2) FSAR, Section 6.5.1.2 2-39 Amendment No. 24.75,103

k 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.14 Enaineered Safety Features S_vstem Initiation Instrumentation Settings (Continued)

(3) Containment High Radiation (Air Monitoring) (Continued) t i

The setpoints for the isolation function will be calculated in accordance with the ODCM.

Each channel is supplied from a separate instrument A.C. bus and each auxiliary relay requires power to operate. On failure of a single A.C. supply, the A and B matrices will assume a one-out-of-two logic.

(4) Low Steam Generator Pressure A signal is provided upon sensing a low pressure in a steam generator to close the main steam isolation valves in order to minimize the temperature reduction in the reactor coolant system with resultant loss of water level and possible addition of reactivity. The setting of 500 psia includes a +22 psi uncertaintyandwasthesettingusedinthesafetylinalysis.(3)

As part of the AFW actuation logic, a separate signal is provided to tenninate flow to a steam generator upon sensing a

. 10w pressure in that steam generator if the other steam generator pressure is greater than the pressure setting. This is done to minimize the temperature reduction in the reactor coolant system in the event of a main steamline break. The setting of 466.7 psia includes a +31.7 psi uncertainty; therefore, a setting of 435 psia was used in the safety analysis.

(5) SIRW Tank Low Level Level switches are provided on the SIRW tank to actuate the valves in the safety injection pump suction lines in such a manner so as to switch the water supply from the SIRW tank to the containment sump for a recirculation mode of operation after a period of approximately 24 minutes following a safety injection signal. The switchover point of 16 inches above tank bottom is set to prevent the pumps from running dry during the 10 seconds required to stroke the valves and to hold in I

reserve approximately borated water. The FSAR28,000 lossgallons of ataccident of coolant least 1800 ppm (4) analysis assumed the recirculation started when the minimum usable volume of 283,000 gallons had been pumped from the tank.

(6) Low Steam Generator Water Level As part of the AFW actuation logic, a signal is provided to initiate AFW flow to one or two steam generators upon sensing a low water level in the steam generator (s) if the 2-62 Amendment No. 5,32,# ,65,86.103

4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.4 Fuel Storage 4.4.1 New Fuel Storage The new unirradiated fuel bundles will normally be stored in the dry new fuel storage rack with an effective multiplication factor of less than 0.9. The open grating floor below the rack and the covers above the racks, along with generous provision for drainage, precludes flooding of the new fuel storage rack.

New fuel may also'be stored in shipping containers or in the spent fuel pool racks which have a maximum effective multiplication factor of 0.95 with Fort Calhoun Type C fuel and unborated water.

The new fuel storage racks are designed as a Class I structure.

4.4.2 Spent Fuel Storage Irradiated fuel bundles will be stored prior to off-site shipment in the stainless steel lined spent fuel pool. The spent fuel pool is nonnally filled with borated water with a concentration of at least 1800 ppm. l The spent fuel racks are designed as a Class I structure.

Normally the spent fuel pool cooling system will maintain the bulk water temperature of the pool below 120*F. Under other conditions of fuel discharge, the fuel pool water temperature is maintained below 140*F.

The spent fuel racks are designed and will be maintained such that the calculated effective multiplication factor is no greater than 0.95 (including all known uncertainties) assuming the pool is flooded with unborated water. The racks are divided into 2 regions. Region 1 racks are surrounded by Boraflex; Region 2 racks have no poison. Acceptance criteria for fuel storage in Regions 1 and 2 are delineated in Section 2.8 of these Technical Specifications.

4-4 Amendment No. J),AJ,75,103

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