ML20198S461

Amend 188 to License DPR-40,revising TS 2.12, Control Room Sys, to Delete Limiting Condition for Operation & Surveillance for Control Room Temp

ML20198S461
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/31/1998
From:	Wharton L NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198S447	List: ML20198S445 ML20198S461 ML20198S483
References
NUDOCS 9901110334
Download: ML20198S461 (47)

Text

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, e tero p '4 UNITED STATES g {

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006 4 001 i

\...../ l OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT  ;

DOCKET NO. 50-285 J

FORT CALHOUN STATION. UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.188 License No. DPR-40

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by the Omaha Public Power District (the licensee) dated April 17,1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic j Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i

B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, j and the rules and regulations of the Commission;  ;

C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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9901110334 981231

}- PDR ADOCK 05000295 P__ PDR .,

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2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is amended by char.ges to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is hereby amended to read as follows: .  !

B. Technical Suecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 188, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days from the date of its issuance. Implementation of the amendment includes the relocation of certain technical specification requirements to the appropriate documents, as described in the licensee's application dated April 17,1997, and evaluated in the staffs Safety Evaluation attached to this amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 14 L. Raynard Wharton, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 i Division of Reactor Projects ill/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 31, 1998 l

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.188 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-40 1

DOCKET NO. 50-285 '

Revise Appendix "A" Technical Specifications as indicated below. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... I 1.0 SAFETY. LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 1-1 1.1 Safety Limits - Reactor Core .. .. ... . ........ ....... .. ...... ..'.... 1-1 1.2 Safety Limit, Reactor Coolant System Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1.3 Limiting Safety System Settings, Reactor Protective System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPI: RATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 2-0 2.0.1 General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-0 2.1 Reactor Coolant System . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. 2-1 2.1.1 Operable Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 2-1 2.1.2 Heatup and Cooldown Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 2-3 2.1.3 Reactor Coolant Radioactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 2-8 2.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 2-11 2.1.5 Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen and Halogens Concentrations . . . . . . . . 2-13 2.1.6 Pressurizer and Main Steam Safety Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 2.1.7 Pressurizer Operability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16a 2.1.8 Reactor Coolant System Vents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16b 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20 2.4 Containment Cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24 2.5 Steam and Feedwater System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-28 2.6 Containment System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-30 2.7 Electrical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-32 2.8 Refueling ................................................2-37 l 2.9 Radioactive Waste Disposal System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-40 2.10 Reactor Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 8 2.10.1 Minimum Conditions for Criticality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-48 2.10.2 Reactivity Control Systems and Core Physics Parameter Limi ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . 2-50 2.10.3 DELETED 2.10A Power Distribution Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 6 2.11 DELETED i Amendment No. !!,15,27,22,38,52.5',

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. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - FIGURES TABLE OF CONTENTS l

PAGE WHICH FIGURE DESCRIPTION FIGURE FOLLOWS i

11 T,MLP Safety Limits 4 Pump Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....13 n l 2.l A RCS Pressure-Temperature Limits for Heatup . . . . . . ... ...... ... ....... 2-6 2 IB RCS Pressure-Temperature Limits for Cooldown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .2-6

)

1 23 - Predicted Radiation Induced NDTT Shift . . . . . . . . . . .... ......... .... 2-6  !

I 2-11 MIN BAST level vs Stored BAST Concentration . . . . . . ..... ......... 2-19h i

2-12 Boric Acid Solubility in Water ..... ....................... .... 2-19h 2 10 Spent Fuel Pool Region 2 Storage Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ..... . . 2-39e l 2-8 Flux Peaking Augmentation Factors . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-53 I

i viii Amendment No. !!5,125,131.!,'f!,170,172,188 h

• DEMNIIlONS REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS (Continued)

Cold Shutdown Condition (Operating Mode 4)

The reactor coolant To is less than 210'F and the reactor coolant is 2 SHUTDOWN BORON CONCENTRATION but < REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION.

Refueling Shutdown Condition (Operating Mode 5) .

The reactor coolant Ta is less than 210'F and the reactor coolant is 2 REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION.

Refueline Operation Any operation involving the shuffling, removal, or replacement of irradiated fuel outside of the reactor pressure vessel. The suspension of any REFUELING OPERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

The Refueline Boron Concentration A reactor coolant boron concentration of at least that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT which corresponds to a shutdown margin of not less than 5% with all CEA's withdrawn.

Shutdown Boron Concentration The boron concentration required to make the reactor suberitical by the amount defined in Section 2.10.

Refueling Outane or Refueline Shutdown A plant outage or shutdown to perform refueling operations upon reaching the planned fuel depletion for a specific core.

Plant Operating Cycle The time period from a REFUELING SHUTDOWN to the next REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

2 Amendment No. 24,32,41,43,103,133,141,188

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' DEFINITIONS MISCELLANEOUS DEFINITIONS l

Operable - Operability 1

1 1 i A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY I

when it is capable of performing its specified function (s). Implicit in this definition shall be the ,

assumption that all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency I electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s). l l

In Operatiqa l

A system or component is IN OPERhTION if it is OPERABLE and is performing its design function.

CEA's All full length shutdown and regulating control rods. '

Non-trionable (NT) CEA's CEA's which are non-trippable.

Containment Intenrity Containment integrity is defined to exist when all of the following are met:

(1) All nonautomatic containment isolation valves which are not required to be open during l accident conditions and blind flanges, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 2.6(1)a, are closed.

(2) The equipment hatch is properly closed and scaled.

'(3) ' The personnel air lock satisfies Specification 2.6(1)b.

(4) All automatic containment isolation valves are operable, locked closed, or deactivated and secured in their closed position (or isolated by locked closed valves or blind flanges ,

as permitted by a limiting condition for operation).

(5) The uncontrolled containment leakage satisfies Specification 3.5, and

, '(6) ' The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings) j is operable.

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5 Amendment No. 52,10^,151,188

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DEFINITIONS Core Alteration The movement or manipulation of fuel, sources, reactivity control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed acd fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

l Eauivalent Full Power Day (EFPD) -

l The time interval during power operation when the heat generated by the reactor is equivalent i to reactor operation at 100% of rated power for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Shutdown Marnin

- Shutdown Margin shall be the amount of reactivity by which:

(1) the reactor is suberitical; or (2) the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor would be subcritical from its present condition assuming:

a. All known trippable full length control element assemblies (shutdown and regulating) are fully insened except for the single assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn, and

b. No change in non-trippable control element assembly position.

Axial Shane Index The external AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (Ys) is the power level detected by the lower excore l nuclear instrument detectors (L) less the power level detected by the upper excore nuclear instrument detectors (U) divided by the sum of these power levels. The internal AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (Y) i used for the trip and pre-trip signals in the reactor protection system is the above value (Ys) modified by the shape annealing factor, SAF, and a constant, B, to determine the true l

core axial power distribution for that channel.

' Ys = L-U Yi = SAF x Ys + B L+U l 6 Amendment No. 19,32,10^,188 9

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION I 2.1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued) 2.1.1 Operable Components (Continued)

(c) If fewer than the above required reactor coolant loops are OPERABLE, I the required loops shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

(3) 210*F 1 Ta 1300*F or Ta < 210*F with fuel in the reactor and all reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. .

l (a) At least two (2) of the decay heat removal loops listed below shall be OPERABLE: l l l

(i) Reactor coolant loop 1 and its associated steam generator and at )

least one associated reactor coolant pump.

(ii) Reactor coolant loop 2 and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump.

(iii) One shutdown cooling pump, one shutdown cooling heat exchanger, and associated shutdown cooling piping.

(iv) One shutdown cooling pump, in addition to that in (iii) above, one shutdown cooling heat exchanger, in addition to that in (iii) above, and associated shutdown cooling piping. i (b) At least one (1) of the decay heat removal loops listed above shall be IN OPERATION. l (c) With no coolant loop IN OPERATION, suspend all operations involving l a reduction in >>oron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

(d) For the purposes of items a(iii) and a(iv) above, the containment spray pumps can be considered as available shutdown cooling pumps only if both of the following conditions are met:

(i) Reactor Coolant System temperature is less than 120*F.

(ii) The Reactor Coolant System is vented with a vent area greater than or equal to 47 in2, (4) DELETED 2-2 Amendment No. 39,56,136,188 a

• 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION I 2.1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued) 2.1.1 Operable Components (Continued)

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(5) DELETED l (6) Both steam generators shall be filled above the low st'eam generator water level trip set point and available to remove decay heat whenever the average temperature of the reactor coolant is above 300*F. Each steam generator shall be demonstrated operable by performance of the inservice inspection program specified in Section 3.17 prior to exceeding a reactor coolant temperature of 300*F.

(7) Maximum reactor coolant system hydrostatic test pressure shall be 3125 psia. A maximum of 10 cycles of 3125 psia hydrostatic tests are allowed.

(8) R.eactor coolant system leak and hydrostatic test shall be conducted within the limitations of Figures 2-1A and 2-1B.

(9) Maximum secondary hydrostatic test pressure shall not exceed 1250 psia. A minimum measured temperature of 73*F is required. Only 10 cycles are permitted.

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(10) Maximum steam generator steam side leak test pressure shall not exceed 1000 psia. A minimum measured temperature of 73*F is required.

(11) If no reactor coolant pumps are operating, a non-operating reactor coolant pump shall not be started while T, is below 385'F unless at least one of the following conditions is met:

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1 2-2a Amendment No. 39,56,66,71,119,136, M1,188

• 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued) 2.1.1 Operable Comnonents (Continued)

(a) A pressurizer steam space of 53% by volume or greater (50.6% or less actual level) exists, or (b) The steam generator secondary side temperature is less than 30*F above that of the reactor coolant system cold leg.

(12)- Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves  ;

(a) The integrity of all pressure isolation valves listed in Table 2.9 shall be >

demonstrated, except as specified in (b). Valve leakage shall not exceed ,

the amounts indicated.

(b) In the event that the integrity of any pressure isolation Hve specified in I Table 2-9 cannot be demonstrated, reactor operation may continue, i provided that at least two valves in each high pressure line having a j nonfunctional valve are in and remain in the mode corresponding to the  !

isolated condition. Manual valves shall be locked in the closed position; motor operated valves shall be placed in the closed position and power  ;

l supply deenergized.

(c) If Specifications (a) and (b) above cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Balia The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation and maintain DNBR above 1.18 during all normal operations and anticipated transients.

When Specification 2.1.1(2) is applicable, the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) are used to provide forced circulation heat removal during heatup and cooldown. Under these conditions, decay heat removal requirements are low enough that a single reactor coolant system (RCS) loop with one RCP is sufficient to remove core decay heat. However, two RCS loops are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant paths for decay heat removal. Only one RCP needs to be OPERABLE to declare the associated RCS loop OPERABLE. Reactor coolant natural circulation is not normally used but is sufficient for core cooling. However, natural circulation does not provide turbulent flow conditions. Therefore, boron reduction in natural circulation is prohibited because mixing to obtain a homogeneous concentration in all portions of the RCS cannot be assured.

2-2b Amendment No. %79 577192i161,188

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION i 2.1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued) ,

2.1.1 Operable Components (Continued)  !

i When Specification 2.1.l(3) is applicable, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown I l cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat, but )

single failure considerations require that at least two loops be operable. Thus, if the l

reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two shutdown cooling pumps to be OPERABLE. l One of the conditions for which Specification 2.1.l(3) is applicable is when the RCS l

, temperature (T ) is less than 210*F, fuel is in the reactor and all reactor vessel closure l

bolts are fully tensioned. .As soon as a reactor vessel head closure bolt is loosened, ,

Specification 2.1.l(3) no longer applies, and Specification 2.8 is applicable. I l Specification 2.8 also requires two shutdown cooling loops to be operable if there is less  !

than 23 feet of water above the top of the core. I I

The restrictions on availability of the containment spray pumps for shutdown cooling service ensure that the SI/CS pumps' suction header piping is not subjected to an i l

unanalyzed condition in this mode. Analysis has determined that the minimum required RCS vent area is 47 in2 This requirement may be met by removal of the pressurizer manway which has a cross-sectional area greater than 47 in2, When reactor coolant boron concentration is being changed, the process must be uniform throughout the reactor coolant system volume to prevent stratification of reactor coolant at lower boron concentration which could result in a reactivity insertion. Sufficient mixing of the reactor cooiant is assured if one low pressure safety injection pump or one l reactor coolant pump is in operation. The low pressure safety injection pump will  !

circulate the reactor coolant system volume in less than 35 minutes when operated at  !

rated capacity. The pressurizer volume is relatively inactive; therefore, it will tend to have a boron concentration higher than the rest of the reactor coolant system during a dilution operation. Administrative procedures will provide for use of pressurizer sprays to maintain a nominal spread between the boron concentration in the pressurizer and the reactor coolant system during the addition of boron.m Both steam generators are required to be filled above the low steam generator water level trip set point whenever the temperature of the reactor coolant is greater than the design temperature of the shutdown cooling system to assure a redundant heat removal system for the reactor.

The LTOP enable temperature has been established at T, = 385*F. The pressurc

! transient analyses demonstrate that a single PORV is capable of mitigating overpressure events. Additional uncertainties have been applied to the Pressure-Temperature (P-T) limits to account for the case where a PORV is not available (T,> 385 F) which is the j reason for the discontinuity in the P-T Figures. The curves nave been conservatively smoothed for operations use.

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2-2c Amendment No.56 37131363161,188

l 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued) 2.1.1 Operable Components (Continued)

The design cyclic transients for the reactor system are given in USAR Section 4.2.2. In addition, the steam generators are designed for additional conditions listed in USAR Section 4.3.4. Flooded and pressurized conditions on the steam side assure minimum tube sheet temperature differential during leak testing. The minimum temperature for pressurizing the steam generator steam side is 70*F; in measuring this temperature, the instrument accuracy must be added to the 70*F; limit to determine the actual. measured limit. The measured temperature limit will be 73*F based upon use of an instrument with a maximum inaccuracy ofi 2*F and an additional 1*F safety margin.

Formation of a 53% steam space ensures that the resulting pressure increase would not result in any overpressurization should the first reactor coolant pump be started when the steam generator secondary side temperature is greater than that of the RCS cold leg. The steam space requirement is not applicable to the start of a reactor coolant pump if one or more pumps are in operation.

For the case in which the pressurizer steam space is less than 53%, limitation of the steam generator secondary side /RCS cold leg AT to 30*F ensures that a single low setpoint PORV would prevent an overpressurization due to actuation of the first reactor coolant pump. This requirement is not applicable to the start of a reactor coolant pump if one or more pumps are operating.

I References (1) USAR Section 4.3.7 l

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2-2d Amendment No.56 3713 1263 161,188

• i' 2.0 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

~ 2.6 Containment System (Continued) i

c. DELETED

d. DELETED  !

e. The containment purge isolation valves will be locked closed unless the reactor is in a cold or refueling shutdown condition.

-(2) . Internal PressMIA -

I The internal pressure shall not exceed 3 psig (except for containment leak rate tests).

(3). Hydronen Purne System

a. Minimum Reauirements i The reactor shall not be made critical unless all of the following ,

requirements are met: i

1. The containment isolation valves VA-280 and VA-289 shall be l locked closed.' Opening of these valves intermittently under 1 administrative control is not allowed.  !

2. VA-80A and VA-80B with associated valves and piping to include VA-82 filters, are operable.

b. Modifistion of Minimum Reauiremente ]

' After the reactor has been made critical, the minimum requirements may be modified to allow either or both of the following statements (i,ii) to be applicable at any one time. If the operability of the component (s) is not i restored to meet the minimum requirements within the time specified l below, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within six  !

hours.

(i) One of the hydrogen purge fans, VA-80A or VA-80B, with l associated valves and piping, may be inoperable provided the fan

[ is restored to operable status within 30 days.

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(ii) The hydrogen purge filter system, VA-82, may be inoperable provided the system is restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

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( 2-31 Amendment No. 58,138,151,188 i

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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIbNS IbR b OPERATibN 2.6- Containment System (Continued)  !

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Basil The reactor coolant system conditions of cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and, hence, there would be no pressure buildup in the containment if the reactor -

coolant system ruptures. The shutdown margins are selected based on the type of i activities that are being carried out. l Regarding internal pressure limitations, the containment design pressure of 60 psig would not be exceeded if the internal pressure before a major loss-of-coolant accident were as much as 3 psig.m The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the l control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. Operation of the purge isolation valves is prevented during normal operations due to the size of the valves (42 inches) and a concern about their ability to close against the differential pressure that could result from a LOCA or MSLB. j Specification 2.6(1)a applies when both doors of the PAL are declared inoperable, or the l entire air lock assembly leakage exceeds the requirements of Specification 5.19. l l Specification 2.6(1)b(ii) applies when mechanisms other than a door, such as the inner door equalizing valve, are declared inoperable.

The Hydrogen Purge System is required to be operable in order to control the quantity of combustible gases in containment in a post-LOCA condition.* The containment l integrity will be protected by ensuring the penetration valves VA-280 and VA-289 are

" locked closed" while HCV-881 and HCV-882 are normally closed during power l operation. The applicable surveillance testing requirements of Table 3-5 will ensure that l

the system is capable of performing its design function. The blowers (VA-80A and VA-80B), associated valves, and piping are single failure proof, have been designed as a Seismic Class I System, and are redundant to the VA-82 filter header. VA-80A or VA-80B is capable of providing sufficient hydrogen removal capabilities as required by the USAR to prevent the hydrogen concentration inside of containment from exceeding the 4% flammability limit.* Electrical Equipment qualification was not required as the i radiation doses in the area of the Hydrogen Purge System equipment were below the minimum requirements.*

l VA-80A or VA-80B with the associated valves and piping may be inoperable for 30 u days. The redundancy of the blowers allows one blower with associated valves and l piping to be removed from operation while the other train has the capability to provide l 100% hydrogen control.

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References (1) USAR, Section 14.16; Figure 14.16-2

(2) Regulatory Guide 1.7 (1971)

(3) USAR, Section 14.17 (4) Engineering Study 86-10, Calculation 53 2-31a Amendment No. 138,151,188 l

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION ,

2.8 Refueling

• l 2.8.1 Refueline Shutdown l l

2.8.l(1) - Boron Concentration Anolicability Applies to Reactor Coolant System boron concentration when fuel is in the reactor and one or more reactor vessel head closure bolts are less than fully tensieued.

Obiective ,

The limit on the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System ensures that the reactor remains subcritical when the plant is in REFUELING SHUTDOWN (MODE 5).

Specificatig

- Boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System shall be greater than or equal to REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION.

Reauired Actions (1) With the boron concentration not within limit, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS immediately, and (2) Suspend positive reactivity additions immediately, and (3) Initiate actions to restore boron concentration to within limits immediately.

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2-37 Amendment No. 25,56,132,152,188 l

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' 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling 2.8.1 Refuelina Shutdown i i

2.8.1(2) Nuclear Instrumentat:on .

Apolicability Applies to the source range neutron mon tors in MODE 5 with fuel in the reactor and with one or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

Obiective l To mordtor the core reactivity condition and to alert the operator to unexpected changes in core reactivity when the plant is in REFUELING SHUTDOWN (MODE 5). l Specification Two source range neutron monitors shall be OPERABLE. l l

Reauired Actions i (1) With only one source range neutron monitor OPERABLE, suspend CORE i ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions immediately. ,

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(2) With no r.ource range neutron monitors OPERABLE, suspend CORE i ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions immediately, and initiate actions l to restore one source range neutron mocimr to OPERABLE status iir s...'ately, and verify RCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to PEl JEIING BORON CONCENTRATION within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> theres lter.

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2-38 Amendment No. 5,24,25,43,75,133, M2155,169,174,188 7

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2.0 . LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling l 2.8.1 Refueline Shutdown i

i 2.8.1(3) Shutdown Cooline System - High Water Level i

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Apolicability

- Applies to shutdown cooling requirements in MODE 5 with fuel in the reactor and with one or ntore reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned, and the refueling cavity water level 2

23 ft. above the top of the core. -

Obiective To minimize the possibility of a loss of shutdown cooling accident occurring inside containment that could affect public health and safety.

Specification One OPERABLE Shutdown Cooling loop shall be IN OPERATION except as noted below: ,

1. The required Shutdown Cooling loop may be removed from operation for s; one hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are p rmitted that would cause dilution of the RCS boron concentration.

2. The required Shutdown Cooling loy may be inoperable for up to eight hours provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the RCS boron concentration, (2) no CORE ALTERATIONS or REFUELING OPERATIONS are taking place, (3) all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere are closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and (4) at least one loop is available under administrative controls.

Reauired Actions (1) With no Shutdown Cooling loop IN OPERATION (except as allowed by notes 1 or 2 above),

a. Suspend operations involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration immediately, and

b. Suspend loading of irradiated fuel assemblies into the reactor core l immediately, and  !

c. Initiate actions to restore system to operation immediately, and

d. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

2-39 Amendment No. 21,75,103,117,133, ,

111,155,159,174,188 l

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling  ;

2.8.I Refuelina Shutdown 2.8.1(4) Shpidown Cooline System - Low Water Level Anolicability Applies to shutdown cooling requirements in MODE 5 with fuel in the reactor and with one or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned, and the refueling cavity water level < 23 ft. above the top of the core.

l Obiective To minimize the possibility of a loss of shutdown cooling accident occurring inside of containment that could affect public health and safety.

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! Soecification l

Two Shutdown Cooling loops shall be OPERABLE, and one Shutdown Cooling loop shall be IN OPERATION.

Reauired Actions (1) With one Shutdown Cooling loop inoperable either, l a. Restore the inoperable Shutdown Cooling loop to OPERABLE status l immediately, or

b. Initiate actions to establish at least 23 ft, of water above the top of the core immediately.

(2) With both Shutdown Ccoling loops inoperable or one Shutdown Cooling loop not IN OPERATION, a.. Suspend operations involving a reduction in RCS boron concentration immediately, and

b. Initiate actions to restore at least one Shutdown Cooling loop to operation immediately, and

c. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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2-39a Amendment No.188 n -e~--

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling ,

2.8.2 Refueling Ooerations - Containment I

t 2.8.2(1) _ Containment Penetrations l l

Anolicability i

, Applies to containment penetrations in MODE 5 during CORE ALTERATIONS and i l

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REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment. l I

Obiective l

To minimize the consequences of an accident occurring during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment that could affect public health and safety.

I Soecification i The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by at least four bolts;

b. At least one door in the Personnel Air Lock closed; and I

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or .

equivalent, or

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal.

Reauired Actions (1) With one or more containment penetrations not in required status, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS within containment immediately.

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2-39b Amendment No.188

, 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l 2.8 Refueline 2.8.2 Refuelinn Operations - Containment 2.8.2(2) Refueline Water Level Applicability Applies to the refueling water level during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during REFUELING OPERATIONS inside of containment Obiective To minimize the consequences of a fuel handling accident during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside of the containment that could affect public health and safety.

Specification The refueling water level shall be :2: 23 ft. above the top of the reactor vessel flange.

Reauired Actions (1) With the refueling water level not within limits, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS immediately, and (2) Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS inside of containment inunediately, and (3) Initiate actions to restore refueling water level to within limits immedb.tely.

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!. 2-39c Amendment No.188 l f

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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling l

2.8.2 Refuelina Operations - Conainngat 2.8.2(3) Ventilation Isolation Actrition Signal (VIAS)

Anolicability Applies to operation of the Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment. ,

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Obiective To minimize the consequences of an accident occurring during CORE ALTERATIONS or REFUELING OPERATIONS that could affect public health and safety.

Specification  !

VIAS including manual actiuntion capability shall be OPERABLE with two gaseous radiation monitors OPERABLE and supplied by independent power supplies.

1 Reauired Actions l

(1) With less than two radiation monitors OPERABLE, or VIAS manual actuation l capability inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and .

REFUELING OPERATIONS. i l >

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l 2-39d Amendment No.188

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling 2.8.3 Egfueline Operations - Soent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(1) Soent Fuel Assembly Storage foolicability Applies to storage of spent fuel assemblies whenever any irradiated fuel assembly is stored in Region 2 (including peripheral cells) of the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 Br Limiting Conditions for Operation are not applicable.

Obiective To minimize the possibility of an accident occurring during REFUELING OPERATIONS that could affect public health and safety.

Soecification The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region 2 (including peripheral cells) of the spent fuel pool shall be within the acceptable burnup domain of Figure 2-10.

Required Actions (1) With the requirements of the LCO not met, initiate action to move the noncomplying fuel assembly immediately.

2-39c Amendment No.188 6

' 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION i 2.8 Refueling 2.8.3 Refueline Ooerations - Soent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(2) Soent Fuel Pool Water Level Aeolicability l

. Applies to the water level of the spent fuel pool during REFUELING OPERATIONS in i the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for l Operation are not applicable. l l

Obiective j l

To minimize the consequences of a fuel handling accident < luring REFUELING j

! OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool that could affect public health and safety. l 1

Soecification I

The spent fuel pool water level shall be 2: 23 ft. above the top of irradiated fuel j assemblies seated in the storage racks.

l Reauired Actions (1) With the spent fuel pool water level not within limits, suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS in the . spent fuel pool immuliately.

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2-39f Amendment No.188

l 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

, 2.8 Refueling l -

2.8.3 Refuelino Ooerations - Soent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(3) Soent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration Aeolicability Applies to the boron concentration of the spent fuel pool when unirradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. .

]

Obiectiv3 i

To minimize the possibility of an accident that could affect public health and safety from i occurring when unirradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool.

Specification I

The spent fuel pool boron concentration shall be 2 500 ppm.  !

Reauired Actions 1 (1) With the spent fuel pool boron concentration < 500 ppm, suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool immediately, and (2). Restore spent fuel pool boron concentration to 2 500 ppm immediately.

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2-39g Amendment No.188

. o 2.0' LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l 2.8 Refueling  !

2.8.3 Refueline Operations - Soent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(4) Soent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation Anolicability Applies to operation of the ventilation system in the spent fuel pool area during REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification i 2.0.1 for Limiting Condition for Operations are not applicable. -

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Obiective To minimize the consequences of an accident occurring during REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool that could affect public health and safety.

Soecification The spent fuel pool area ventilation system shall be IN OPERATION.

Reauired Actions I

(1) With the spent fuel pool area ventilation system not IN OPERATION, suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool immediately.

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l 2-39h Amendment No.188 l

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' 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueline 2.8.3 Refueling Operations - Soent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(5) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Sinnal (VIAS)

Aeolicability l

Applies to operation of the Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) during REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool, l 4

Obiective To minimize the consequences of an accident occurring during REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool that could affect public health and safety.

Soecification I

VIAS including manual actuation capability shall be OPERABLE with two gaseous  ;

radiation monitors on the auxiliary building exhaust etack OPERABLE, and supplied by independent power supplies.

Reauired Actions (1) With less than two gaseous radiation monitors on the auxiliary building exhaust stack OPERABLE or VIAS manual actuation capability inoperable, immediately suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS.

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l 2-39i Amendment No.188

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' 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueline Bases I

2.8.1 Refueline Shutdown 2.8.l(1) Boron Concentration The boron concentration of the water filling the reactor refueling cavity (cf at least the REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION) is sufficient to maintain the reactor subcritical by more than 5 %, including allowance for uncertainties, in the cold condition with all rods withdrawn. The REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION is specified in the COLR. Periodic checks of the refueling water boron concentration ensure the proper shutdown margin.

When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued j without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

2.8.l(2) Nuclear Instrumentation Two OPERABLE source (wide) range neutron monitors are required to provide a signal to ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in core reactivity. With only one source range neutron monitor OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.

With no source range neutron monitor OPERABLE, there is no means of detecting changes in cota reactivity. However, since CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity addhions are not being made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the monitors are returned to OPERABLE status. This stabilized condition is determined by verifying that the required boron concentration exists. The completion time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is sufficient to obtain and analyze a reactor coolant sample for boron concentration.

The freouency of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that unplanned changes in boron concentration would be identified. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> frequency is reasonable, considering the low probability of a change in core reactivity during this period. )

i 2-39j Amendment No.188

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l l 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l l 2.8 Refueling ,

Bases (Continued) 1 Shutdown Coolina System - High Water Level 2.8.1(3)

The purposes of the SDC system in MODE 5 with fuel in the reactor and with one or l

more reactor vessel head closure bolt less than fully tensioned, are to remove decay heat l and sensible heat from the RCS, provide mixing of borated coolant, to provide sufficient i coolant circulation to minimize the effects of a boron dilution accident, and to prevent boron .,tratification.

Inadequate cooling of the reactor coolant could result in boiling of the reactor coolant which could lead to a reduction in boron concentration in the coolant due to the boron plating out on components near the areas of boiling activity, and because of the possible I l addition of water to the reactor vessel with a lower boron concentration than is required to keep the reactor subcritical. The loss of reactor coolant and the reduction of boron concentration in the reactor coolant would eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier.

, An OPERABLE SDC loop consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flowpath and to determine the low end temperature. The flowpath starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. The containment spray pumps can be considered as available shutdown

cooling pumps only if the RCS temperature is less than 120*F and the PCS is vented with a vent area greater than or equal to 47 in2 . This restrictions ensure that the SI/CS

pumps' suction header piping is not subjected to an unanalyzed condition in this mode.

Analysis has determined that the minimum required RCS vent area is 47 in . This 2 requirement may be met by removal of the pressurizer manway which has a cross-sectional area greater than 47 in2, Specification 2.8.1(3) is modified by an exception that allows the required operating SDC loop to be removed from service for up to I hour in each 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration.

This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles, and RCS to SDC isolation valve testing. During this I hour l period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling cavity. Boron concentration reduction is prohibited because uniform concentration distribution cannot be assured without forced circulation.

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2-39k Amendment No.188 l

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refuelinn Bases (Continued) 2.8.1(3) Shutdown Cooling System - High Water Level (Continued)

Specification 2.8.1(3) is modified by an exception to allow both trains of SDC out of service for up to eight hours provided, in part, that at least one SDC train is available under adininistrative controls. This allows evolutions such as Engineered Safety Feature testing to be completed when the SDC system is not fully OPERABLE but is considered available since only minor operator actions are required to restore the SDC system to OPERABLE status and place it IN OPERATION. A SDC loop is considered available under administrative controls if there are: (1) approved procedures, (2) a dedicated operator stationed at the controls if they are outside of the control room, and (3) direct conununication between the dedicated operator and the control room. Similarly, the SDC system is considered available under administrative controls when an operator is not at the locatien of the controls provided: (1) procedural guidance is consulted prior to removing SDC from servi e to determine the time-to-boil, and (2) there is sufficient time for the operator to travel to the local controls and perform the required actions.

With the water level 2 23 feet above the top of the core, only one SDC loop is required for decay heat removal. Only one is required because the volume of water above the top of the core provides backup decay heat removal capability. The 23 ft level was selected because it ensures that adequate time is available to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core. For example, assuming the amount of decay heat generated one day after shutdown with an initial reactor coolant temperature of 200*F, this level provides approximately 25 minutes before the reactor coolant would boil. More time is available under conditions more representative of when this specification applies (i.e., when the reactor vessel closure head is removed). For example, five days after shutdown with the initial reactor coolant temperature of 130*F provides more than four hours before the reactor coolant would boil.

If the SDC loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations. Therefore, actions that reduce boron concentration are required to be suspended immediately. Additionally, suspending any operation that would increase the decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly, is a prudent action under this condition. Closing the containment penetrations that provide direct access to the outside environment prevents fission products, if released from a loss of decay heat removal event, from escaping the containment. A completion time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable because most SDC problems can be repaired within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and because there is a low probability of the cooling boiling in that time.

When "inunediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.

2-3 91 Amendment No.188

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refuelinn Bases (Continued)

^2.8.1(4) Shutdown Cooline System - Low Water Level With the water level < 23 feet above the top of the core, two OPERABLE SDC loops are required since the volume of water above the top of the core will not provide sufficient backup decay heat removal capability.

With one SDC loop inoperable, actions shall be immediately initiated and continued until the SDC loop is restored to OPERABLE status, or until 2 23 feet of water is established i above the top of the core. With the water level 2 23 feet above the top of the core, this Specification is no longer applicable, and Specification 2.8.l(3) is applicable. l An OPERABLE SDC loop consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flowpath and to determine the low end temperature. The flowpath starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. The containment spray pumps can be considered as available shutdown cooling pumps only if the RCS temperature is less than 120*F and the RCS is vented with a vent area greater than or equal to 47 in2, With both SDC loops inoperabk, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boroa concentrations. Therefore, actions that reduce boron concentration are required to be suspended immediately. Closing the containment penetrations that provide direct access to the outside environment prevents fission l

products, if released from a loss of decay heat removal event, from escaping the .

containment. A completion time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable because most SDC problems can be repaired within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and because there is a low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

When "immediately" is used in a completion time, the required action should be pursued j without delay and in a controlled manner.

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i 2-39m Amendment No.188 l \

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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIQN_

2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.2(1) Containment Penetrations During CORE ALTERATIONS or REFUELING Ol'ERATIONS inside of containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within the containment will be restricted from escaping *to the environment when the LCO requirements are met. In MODE 5, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the ouside atmosphere are less stringent than when the reactor is at power. The LCO does not require CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization as a result of a fuel handling accident, the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means of moving large equipment and components into and out of containment. During CORE ALTERATIONS or REFUELING OPERATIONS inside of containment, the equipment hatch must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be approximately equally spaced.

The Personnel Air Lock (PAL), which is also part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for personnel access into containment. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneously opening when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required. During periods of shutdown when containment closure is not required, the interlock may be disabled and both PAL doors allowed to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. During CORE ALTERATIONS or REFUELING OPERATIONS inside of containment, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required, therefore the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one PAL door must always remain closed.

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. The specification )

is met when one of the two automatic isolation valves per penetration is OPERABLE,  ;

or by closure of a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent i isolation methods must be approved (through 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation process) and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during fuel movements.

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2-39n Amendment No.188 l

• s e 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

( 2.8 Refueline Bases (Continued) 2.8.2(1) Containment Penetrations (Continued) l For automatic isolation valves with direct access to the outside atmosphere to be l OPERABLE requires that the Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) is l OPERABLE in order to close the valves. This action prevents release of significant radionuclides from the containment to atmosphere. During CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS, the OPERABILITY of VIAS is addressed by Specification 2.8.2(3).

! l When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued I without delay and in a controlled manner.

l 2.8.2(2) Refuelina Water Level Prior to REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment, the reactor refueling cavity is filled with approximately 250,000 gallons of borated water. The minimum refueling water level meets the assumption of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident. When the water level is lower than the required level, CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside of containment shall be suspended immediately. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from l occurring. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and CORE ALTERNATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position. In addition to suspending REFUELING ,

OPERATIONS and CORE ALTERATIONS, action to restore the refueling water level '

must be initiated immediately.

Movement of irradiated fuel from the reactor core is not initiated before the reactor core has been subcritical for a minimum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if the reactor has been operated at power levels in excess of 2% rated power. The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the power has been removed from the core takes advantage of the decay of the short half-life fission products and allows for any failed fuel to purge itself of fission gases, thus reducing the consequences of a fuel handling accident.

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I 2-300 Amendment No.188 y -v-

o o 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueline 1

l Bases (Continued) l

'2.8.2(3) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Sianni (VIAS) i A Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) is initiated by a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) or a Contaimtient Radiation High Signal (CRHS). During CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS only the CRHS is required to respond to a fuel handling or reactivity accident. At least two of the following three radiation monitors I

(Containment Monitor (RM-051), Containment / Auxiliary Building Stack Swing Monitor l (RM-052), Auxiliary Building Stack Radiation Monitor (RM-M2) must be OPERABLE, l powered from independent 480-VAC buses, and capable of actuating both the A and B trains of VIAS, to fulfill the requirements of this specification. The independent 480-VAC buses may be supplied by a single 4160-VAC power source. In addition, one l manual actuation channel is required to be OPERABLE. (Note, the Offsite Dose  ;

Calculation Manual may have additional requirements / restrictions concerning operation i l of these monitors.)

l l In the event that only one of the above radiation monitors is OPERABLE or VIAS I

manual actuation capability is inoperable, CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING i OPERATIONS must be suspended thus precluding the possibility of a fuel l handling / reactivity accident.

l For the fuel handling accident in containment, the very conservative assumption that all the rods in a single assembly fail with no credit taken for containment isolation or atmosphere filtration yields doses at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) and low population zone (LPZ) that remain well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.

VIAS initiates closure of the containment pressure relief, air sample, and purge system valves, if open. This action prevents release of significant radionuclides from the .

containment to the environment. The containment penetrations providing direct access

to the environment are required to be closed, or capable of being closed by an l OPERABLE VIAS in accordance with Specification 2.8.2(1). VIAS also initiates other actions, such as opening of the air supply and exhaust dampers in the safety injection pump rooms in preparation for safety injection pump operation. These other functions are not required to mitiate the consequences of a fuel handling accident, and therefore are not required to be OPERABLE.  ;

When' VIAS is inoperable, CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS in containment are immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

l 2-39p Amendment No.188

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.. o 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refuelina Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(1) Soent Fuel Assembly Storane The spent fuel pool is designed for noncriticality by use of neutron absorbing material.

The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool, according to Figure 2-10, and the accompanying LCO, ensures that the k, of the spent fuel pool always remains < 0.95 assuming the pool to be flooded with unborated water.

A spent fuel assembly may be transferred directly from the reactor core to the spent fuel J pool Region 2 provided an independent verification of assembly burnups has been completed and the assembly burnup meets the acceptance criteria identified in Figure 2-

10. When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 (including the peripheral cells) is not in accordance with Figure 2-10, immediate action must be taken to make the necessary fuel assembly movement (s) to bring the configuration into compliance with Figure 2-10. Acceptable fuel assembly burnup is not a prerequisite for Region 1 storage because Region 1 will maintain any type of fuel assembly that the plant j is licensed for in a safe, coolable, suberitical geometry.

The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not i applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not l i

specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner, j 2.8.3(2) Soent Fuel Pool Water Level l l

The minimum water level in the spent fuel pool meets the assumption of iodine  !

decontamination factors followir.g a fuel handling accident. When the water level is I lower than the required level, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool is immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fue; '.tandling accident i from occurring in the spent fuel pool. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement  ;

is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.

2-39q Amendment No.188

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueline Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(3) Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration The basis for the 500 ppm boron concentration requirement with Boral poisoned storage racks is to maintain the k, below 0.95 in the event a misloaded unirradiated fuel assembly is located next to a spent fuel assembly. A misloaded unirradiated fuel assembly at maximum enrichment condition, in the absence of soluble poison, may result in exceeding the design effective multiplication factor. Soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water, for which credit is permitted under these conditions, would assure that the effective multiplication factor is maintained substantially less than the design condition.

This LCO applies whenever unirradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool.

The boron concentration is periodically sampled in accordance with Specification 3.2.

Sampling is performed prior to movement of unirradiated fuel to the spent fuel pcol and periodically when unirradiated fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool.

The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1,2, or 3, the fuel movement j is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of refueling operations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

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2.8.3(4) Soent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation The spent fuel pool area ventilation system contains a charcoal filter to prevent release of significant radionuclides to the outside atmosphere. The system does not automatically realign and therefore must be IN OPERATION prior to REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool. When the spent fuel pool area ventilation system is not IN OPERATION, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool is immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring in the spent fuel pool. When "inunediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position, i

l 2-39r Amendment No.188

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refuelinn ,

, l Bases (Continued) i 2.8.3(4) Soent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation (Continued)

The provisions of Specification 2.0.) for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not l specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1,2, or 3, the fuel movement j is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel ,

assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. '

2.8.3(5) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Sinnal (VIAS)

A Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) is initiated by a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) or a Containment Radiation High Signal (CRHS). During REFUELING OPERATIONS, only the CRHS is required to respond to a fuel handling or reactivity accident. The requirements of this specification are met when the Containment / Auxiliary Building Stack Swing Monitor (RM-052) and the Auxiliary Building Stack Radiation Monitor (RM-062) are OPERABLE, monitoring the Auxiliary Building exhaust stack, powered from independent 480-VAC buses and capable of actuating both the A and B trains of VIAS.

When the RCS is below 300'F, the 480-VAC buses may be supplied by a single 4160-VAC power source. Above 300*F, Specification 2.7 requires both 4160-VAC buses to be operable. In addition, one manual actuation channel is required to be OPERABLE.

(Note, the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual may have additional requirements / restrictions i concerning operation of these monitors.) l In the event that one of the above radiation monitors becomes inoperable, or both are OPERABLE but RM-052 is not monitoring the exhaust stack, or VIAS manual actuation  ;

capability is inoperable, REFUELING OPERATIONS must be suspended thus precluding the possibility of a fuel handling accident. The doses calculated at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) and low population zone (LPZ) for a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool are well within 10 CFR 100 limits using conservative assumptions i.e., all rods in a single assembly fail with no credit taken for iodine filtration by VA-66.

VIAS aligns.the control room air filtration system to the filtered air makeup mode, which prevents significant radionuclides from entering the control room. VIAS also initiates other actions, such as opening of the air supply and exhaust dampers in the safety injection pump rooms in preparation for safety injection pump operation. These other functions are not required to mitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident, and therefore are not required to be OPERABLE.

2-39s Amendment No.188

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueline Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(5) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Sinnal (VIAS) (continued)

When conducting REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool during MODES 1 and 2, LCO 2.15 is also applicable to VIAS. The allowable bypass condition for inoperable CRIIS during MODES I and 2 is to close the containment pressure relief, air sample, and purge system valves. This is justified because a SIAS or CSAS will still initiate a VIAS. Since SIAS and CSAS would not initiate in response to a fuel handling l accident, both the actions of this specification and 2.15 must be followed when the CRHS is inoperable in MODES 1 or 2 and REFUELING OPERATIONS are being conducted in the spent fuel pool.

When VIAS is inoperable REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool are immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

References (1) USAR Section 9.5 (2) USAR Section 14.18 2-39t Amendment No.188

4  ;

, 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Systems 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operatine Apolicability Applies to the operational status of the control room air filtration system when the

- reactor coolant temperature T 2: 210*F.

Obiective To assure operability of equipment required to filter control room air following a

- Design Basis Accident.

'Soecification Two control room air filtration trains shall be OPERABLE.

Reauired Actions (1) With one control room air filtration train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

(2) With the required actions of(1) not met, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

(3) With two control room air filtration trains inoperable, enter LCO 2.0.1 immediately.

2-59 Amendment No. 15,128,130,188

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, 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Systems 2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditionine System l Anolicability l

Applies to the operational status of the control room air conditioning system when the reactor coolant temperature Ta :t 210*F. I Obiective l To assure operability of equipment required to maintain air temperature within the control room following a Design Basis Accident.

Specification Two control room air conditioning trains shall be OPERABLE.

Reauired Actions (1) With one control room air conditioning train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

(2) With the required actions of (1) not met, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 ,

hours, and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

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(3) With two control room air conditioning trains inoperable, enter LCO 2.0.1 immediately.

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2-59a Amendment No.188 4

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Systems Bases i 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Ooerating The control room air filtration system is designed to maintain radiation doses to control room personnel within the limits of General Design Criterion (GDC) 19.

When the control room ventilation system is placed in the filtered air mak'eup mode either manually or after receiving a VIAS, the unfiltered outside air duct is isolated to prevent significant radionuclides from entering the control room.

A control room air filtration train is OPERABLE when the associated train level components and the system level components are OPERABLE and the train can provide filtered outside air and recirculation air to the control room. Train level components consist of the outside air filter unit isolation dampers (PCV-6680A-1, PCV-6680B-1), the outside air filter unit fan (VA-63A, VA-63B), the outside air filter unit (VA-64A, VA-64B), and the outside air filter unit isolation damper (PCV-6680A-2, PCV-6680B-2) and associated ductwork.

System level components consist of the unfiltered cutside air duct isolation dampers l (PCV-6681A and PCV-6681B), the recirculation duct isolation damper (PCV-6682) l l and associated ductwork. IF either or both unfiltered outside air duct isolation l l dampers (PCV-6881A, PCV-6681B) are inoperable, the control room air filtration '

system is considered OPERABLE if the unfiltered outside air duct is isolated. If only a single unfiltered outside air duct isolation damper is OPERABLE and the unfiltered outside air duct is not isolated, then the 7 day LCO applies. If both unfiltered outside ,

air duct isolation dampers are inoperable concurrently with an unisolated flowpath I through the unfiltered outside air ductwork to the control room, then both trams are inoperable and LCO 2.0.1 applies. i The recirculation duct does not require redundant dampers to meet single failure proof critdria. Damper PCV-6682 meets the acceptance criteria for the damper repair option described in Standard Review Plan 6.4, Appendix A. A radioactivity release requires PCV-6682 to open, should PCV-6682 fail to open, it can be repaired or i

repositioned open before control room doses exceed the allowable limits of GDC 19.

With the reactor coolant temperature T 2 210*F, two trains of the control room air. filtration system are required to be OPERABLE. If one train is inoperable it shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition the remaining train is adequate to perform the control room radiation protection function. The 7 day I completion time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring during this I time period, and the aliility of the remaining train to provide the required function.

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l 2-59b Amendment No.188

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. 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Systems Bases (Continuedi l 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operatine (Continued)

If the inoperable train cannot be restored to OPERABLE within the allowed l completion time, the plant must be placed in a MODE where the specifica. tion is no longer applicable. With two trains inoperable, the control room air filtration system may not be capable of performing its design function and the plant must be placed in a MODE where the specification is no longer applicable.

2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditionino System l

The control room air conditioning system is required to ensure the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements. The reactor l protective system panels and the engineered safety features panels were designed for, and the instrumentation was tested at,120*F. The temperature inside the control 4 cabinets is at most 15'F warmer than the temperature of the control room due to heat produced by the electronic circuitry. Therefore, the temperature of the control room will not affect OPERABILITY of the control cabinets as long as it doesn't exceed l 105'F.

During non-emergency operation, the control room temperature may be maintained by using Component Cooling Water (CCW). During design basis accident conditions, the CCW isolation valves to air conditioning units (VA-46A and VA-46B) are automatically closed on a VIAS. This prevents CCW that has been heated by components following a design basis accident from adding heat to the control room.

l When VIAS is in override, closing these valves maintains the OPERABILITY of the associated air conditioning unit.

With the reactor coolant temperature T, :e 210*F, two trains of the control room air conditioning system are required to be OPERABLE. If one train is inoperable it shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this condition the remaining train is adequate to maintain the control room temperature. With both trains inoperable, the control room air conditioning system may not be capable of performing its intended function and LCO 2.0.1 must be entered immediately, References I (1) USAR Section 9.10 l

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2-59c Amendment No.188

__- . ~ . . __. ___ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ _ . -__ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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TABLE 3-3 (Continued) -

MINIMUM FREOUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING '

OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency SurveiMance Method -

8. Dropped CEA Indication a. Test R a. Insert a negative rate of change power signal to all four Power Range Safety Channels to test alarm.

b. Test R b. Insert CEA's below lower electrical limit to test dropped CEA alarm.

9. Calorimetric Instrumen- r. Calibrate R a. CHANNEL CALIBRATION tation

10. Control Room Ventilation a. Test R a. Check damper operanon for DBA mode.

5. Test R b. Check control room for positive pressure.

I1. Containment Humidity a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Detector

12. Interlocks-Isolation Valves a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on Shutdown Cooling Line

13. Control Room Air Conditioning a. Test R a. Verify each train has the capability to System remove the assumed heat load through combination of testing and calculations.

3-15 Amendment No. 16,32,!23,!57,182, 188

. , , , y TABLE 3-4 (Continued)

MINIMUM FREOUENCIES FOR SAMPLING TESTS Type of Measurement Sample and Analysis and Analvsis Freauencies l 1. Reactor Coolant (Continued) .

(

l (c) Cold Shutdown (1) Chloride 1 per 3 days l (Operating Mode 4)

(d) Refueling Shutdown (1) Chloride 1 per 3 days *

(Operating Mode 5) - (2) Boron Concentration 1 per 3 days *

(c) Refueling Operation (1) Chloride 1 per 3 daysm (2) Boron Concentration 1 per 3 days

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' 2. SIRW Tank Boron Concentration M l

3. Concentrated Boric Boron Concentration W l Acid Tanks

j. 4. SI Tanks Boron Concentration M l

5. Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration See Footnote 4 below l

! 6. Steam Generator Blowdown isotopic Analysis for Dose WS l

. (Operating Modes 1 and 2) Equivalent I-131 l

(1) Until the radioactivity of the reactor coolant is restored to .5;,1 Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT l-131.

(2) Sample to be taken after a mmimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of power operation have elapsed since reactor was subcritical for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or longer.

(3) Boron and chloride sampling / analyses are not required when the core has been off-loaded. Reinitiate boron and chloride sampling / analyses prior to reloading fuel into the cavity to assure adequate shutdown margin and l

- allowable chloride levels are met.

(4) Prior to placing unirradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool and weekly when unirrdiated fuel assemblies I are stored in the spent fuel pool.

(5) When Steam Generator Dose Equivalent 1 131 exceeds 50 percent of the limits in Specification 2.20, the sa apling l and analysis frequency shall be increased to a mialmum of 5 times per week. W'2en Steam Gcnerator Dose Equivalent,1-131 exceeds 75 percent of this limit, the sampling and analysis frequeecy shall be increased to a l minimum of once per day.

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3 19 Amendment No. 28,",M,121,133,!52, 422,188 l

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TABLE 3-5 (Continued) -

Test PYeauency

17. Hydrogen Purge 1. Verify all manual valves are operable by R i System completing at least one cycle.

2. Cycle och automanc valve through at R

. le A m complete cycle of full travel frorn the control room. Verification of the valve cycihig may be determmed by the observation of position indicatmg lights.

3. Initiate flow through the VA-80A and VA-80B '

blowers, HEPA filter, and charcoal adsorbers -

and verify that the system operates for at least (a) 30 mmutes with suction from the a) M L

auxiliary budding (Room 59)

(b) 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with suction from the b) R containment

4. Verify the pressure drop across the R VA-82 HEPAs and charcoal filter to be less than 6 inches of water. Verify a system flow rate of greater than 80 scfm and less than 230 scfm dunng system operation when tested in accordance with 3b. above.

18. Shutdown Cooling 1 Verify required shutdown cooling loops are S (when shutdown cooling is requimi by TS 2.8).

OPERABLE and one shutdown cooling loop is IN OPERATION.

2. Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated W (when shutdown cooling is required by TS 2.8).

power is available to the requimi shutdown cooling pump that is not IN OPERATION.

3-20e Am-d-t No. 438r140,188

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d TABLE 3-5 (Continued) s Test Freauency

-19. Refueling Water level Verify refueling water level is 2 23 ft.' above Prior to commencing, and daily during CORE ALTERATIONS the tcp of the reactor vessel flange. and/or REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.

20. Spent Fuel Pool Ixvel Verify spent fuel pool water level is 2 23 ft. Prior to commencing, and weekly during REFUELING '

above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool.

in the storage racks

21. Containment Penetraons Verify each required contamment penetration is Prior to commencing, and weekly durmg CORE AL'ERATIONS in the required status, and/or REFUELING OPERATIONS in containment.

22. Spent Fuel Assembly Storage Verify by administrative means that initial Ptior to storing the fuel assembly in Region 2 (inch hg enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in p@sel cells).

accordance with Figure 2-10.

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I 3-20f Amerwiment No.188 6

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