ML20134N765

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Amend 180 to License DPR-40,revises TS to Add Limiting Condition for Operation & Surveillance Test for Safety Related Inverters & Deletes Nonsafety Related Instrument Buses
ML20134N765
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 02/13/1997
From: Wharton L
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134N760 List:
References
NUDOCS 9702240433
Download: ML20134N765 (8)


Text

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p t UNITED STATES

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2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. soseMoot

. . . . . ,o OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT DOCKET NO. 50-Z H FORT CALHOUN STATION. UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE i

Amendment No.180 License No. DPR-40

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

l A. The application for amendment by the Omaha Public Power District i (the licensee) dated November 16, 1995, as supplemented by letter i

dated August 8, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
8. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C. There is reasonable assurance: (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. '

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9702240433 970213 PDR ADOCK 05000285 P PDR i

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2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No.

. DPR-40 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1 B. Technical Soecificatiqni The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 180, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

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3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be l l implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

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FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

. Raynard Wharton, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 l Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV I Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l I

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical i Specifications 1 Date of Issuance: February 13, 1997 i

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i j ATIACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 180 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO, DPR-40 ,

l DOCKET NO. 50-285 3

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i Revise Appendix "A" Technical Specifications as indicated below. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. ,

REMOVE INSERT 2-32 2-32 2-35 2-35 ,

2-36 2-36 2-36a 2-36a l 3-60 3-60 i

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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

.. 2.7 Electrical Systems Anolicability a

j Appl:es to the availability of electrical power for the operation of plant components.

Obiective To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to provide for safe l reactor operation and the continuing availability of engineered safety features.

{ Specifications

] (1) Mmimum Requirements The reactor shall not be heated up or maintained at temperatures above 300'F unless the following electrical systems are operable:

a. Unit auxiliary power transformers TIA-1 or -2 (4,160 V).
b. House service transformers TIA-3 and 4 (4,160 V).
c. 4,160 V engineered safety feature buses I A3 and 1 A4.
d. 4,160 V/480 V Transformers TIB-3A, TIB-3B, TIB-3C, TIB-4A, TIB-4B, TIB-4C.
e. 480 V distribution buses IB3A,1B3A-4A, IB4A, IB3B,1B3B-4B, IB4B, IB3C, IB3C4C,1B4C.
f. MCC No. 3A1, 3B1, 3A2, 3C1, 3C2, 4 A1, 4A2, 4C1 and 4C2.
g. 125 V d-c buses No.1 and 2 (Panels EE-8F and EE-8G).
h. 125 V d-c distribution panels AI-41A and AI-41B.
i. 120V a-c instrument buses A, B, C, and D (Panels AI 40-A, B, C and D).
j. Inverters A, B, C, and D. l
k. Station batteries No. I and 2 (EE 8A and EE-8B) including one battery charger on each 125V d-c bus No. I and 2 (EE-8F and EE-8G).
1. Two emergency diesel generators (DG-1 and DG 2).
m. One diesel fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 16,000 gallons of diesel fuel in FO-1, and an additional 8,000 gallons of diesel fuel in FO-10.

2-32 Amendment No. 117,162,180

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FORDPERATIQN

.' 2.7 Electrical Systems (cantimad)

.. 1. Island buses IB3A-4A, IB3B 4B, and IB3C-4C may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> provided there are no inoperable required safeguards components which are raan=taar to components on the inoperable bus (es).

m. Eicher one of the 125V d-c buses No. I or 2 (Panels EE-8F or EE-8G) may be inoperable for up to 8 houn.
a. Either one of the 125V d<: distribution panels AI-41A or AI-41B may be

! inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

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) o. One invener (A, B, C, or D) may be inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> i provided the sancte* protective and engineered safeguards systems instnanent channels supplied by the remaining three inveners are all

. operable and the 120V a c instranent bus associated with the inoperable j invener is powered from ks bypass source.

j hait lhe electrical system equipment is arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough engineered safeguards tojeopardize the plant safety. The 480 V safeguards are arranged on nine bus sections. The 4.16 kV safeguards are supplied from two buses.

The normal source of piriliary power with the plant at power for the safeguards buses is Aom the house service power transformers being fed from the 161 Kv Wit line with on-site emergency power from either one of two diesel generators and off-site

, standby power via the unit anviliary transformers.m The loss of the 161kV incoming line senders the house service transformers (TIA-3 and TIA4) inoperable in that the .

transfonners cannot supply power to the 4.16kV safeguards buses IA3 and 1A4. '

Inoperability of the house service transformer (s) or loss of the 161kV incoming line is not reponable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 crheria; however, the NRC will be promptly ,

notined of these events via the NRC Operations Center. t i

The two emergency diesel generators on site do not require outside power for start up or operation.

Upon loss of normal and standby power sources, the 4.16 Ky buses IA3 and iA4 are energized froen the diesel generators. Bus load shedding, transfer to the diesel generator and pickup of critical loads are carried out antamatically.m ,

L When the anbine generator is out of service for an extended period, the generator can be isolated by opening motor operated diacanaaet switch DS-T1 in the bus between the genssator and the main transfonner, aBowing the main transfonner a~.J the unit anviliary power aansfonners (TIA-1 and TI A-2) to be returned to service." The piriliary power transfonners are not considered inoperable during these normal plant startup/ shutdown sealignments.

2-35 Amendment No. ?5, e?, 5^, 52,180

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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION i . 2.7 Electrical Systems (Contimmi)

] 'Ibe time allowed to repair an inoperable invener is based upon engineering judgement, i ,.

taking into consideration the time required to repair an invener and the additional risk l to which the unit is exposed because of the invener inoperability. In the event of j

invester failure, the load on the invener is automatiemlly transferred to its safety related l bypass source. The associated 120 V a-c instrument bus is considered OPERABLE when it is being p,U fnun its bypass source and during the shon time it takes to mammally or amamatically transfer between sources.

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! Equipment served by 4.16 kV and 480 V auxiliary buses and MCC's is arranged so that I

loss of an entire 4.16 kV bus does not compromise safety of the plant during DBA '

! mndirians. For example, if 4.16 kV bus IA3 is lost, two raw water pumps, one low i

pressure safety insection pump, two high pressure safety insection pumps, one auxiliary

! feedwater pump, two component cooling water pumps, one enmainment spray pump and j two anntainment air fans are lost. ' Ibis leaves two raw water pumps, one low pressure j safety injection pump, one high pressure safety 'Me pump, one component cooling water pump, two ennrainment spray pumps and two cantainment air fans which is more f

than sufficient to control containment pressure below the design value during the DBA.

Each diesel generator has sufficient capacity to start and run at design load required by engineered safety features equipment. The safety features operated from one diesel generator can adequately cool the core for any loss of coolant accident and also maintain the enntainment pressure within the design value. The engine base tank capacity of 550 gallons on each diesel provides 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> running time (worst case loading) before transfer of fuel oil from the 18,000 gallon capacity emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank FO-1 is mandarary. Two fhel oil transfer pumps per diesel, with each being powered from the associated diesel, are available for transferring fuel oil from FO-1 to the day tanks. The minimum diesel fuel oil inventory available to the diesel generators from the emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank FO-1 is maintained to assure she operation of either: 1) one diesel generator at full rated design capacity for at least 3.6 dsys, or 2) one diesel generator at post accident load conditions for a minimum of 4.5 days.

A minimum of 8,000 gallons of diesel fuel oil is reserved in the auxiliary boiler fuel oil storage tank FO-10 for transfer to the emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank in the event of an emergency to extend the fbel supply for diesel generator operation to 7 days. Methods of transfer of the fuel oil fann this tank to FO-1 have been established and procedures have been developed so that the transfer can be made in a timely manner without adversely impacting diesel generator operation. Therefore, a minimum diesel fuel oil in _ny available to the diesel generators from the total on-site diesel fuel oil storage capacity is maintainad to assure the operation of one diesel generator at the seguired post accident loads for 7 days. The fhel inventory is allowed below the 7 day supply, but above a 6 day supply, for a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. This restriction allows suf5cient time fbr obtaining the sacriisite :=pt- volume and performing the analyses required prior to addition of fhel oil to the tank. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required level prior to initiating a 2-36 A==iment No. 444,M2,180

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued) 1 plant shutdown as required by Specification 2.7(2). This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (more than 6 days), the fact that procedures are in place to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event durmg this brief period.

Additional supplies of diesel fuel oil are available in the Omaha area and from nearby terminals. Ample facilities exist to assure deliveries to the site within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

One battery charger on each battery shall be operating so that the batteries will always be at full charge; this ensures that adequate <!-c power will be available for all emergency uses. Each battery has one battery charger permanently connected with a third charger capable of being cs=M to either battery bus. 'the chargers are each rated for 400 amperes at 130 volts. Following a DBA the batteries and the chargers will handle all required loads. Each of the reactor protective channels instrumentation channels is supplied by one of the a-c instrument buses. The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the 2-of-4 logic may be manually changed to a 2-of-3 logic without compromising safety.

The engineered safeguards instrument channels use a-c instrument buses (one redundant bus for each channel) and d-c buses (one redundant bus for each logic circuit). The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the two of four logic automatically becomes a two of three logic.

Required engineered safeguards components, as described in Specirmation 2.7(2), refers to components required to be operable by other Limiting Conditions for Operation within these Technical Specifications. If no other ILO requires a particular ESF component to be operable, then its redundant component is also not required to be operable due to this specification. As an example, Specification 2.3 requires that safety injection pumps be operable prior to the reactor being made critical, and Specification 2.7 applies when ,

the RCS is above 300'F. If the RCS is above 300*F but the reactor is not critical, then l l

no safety injection pumps are required to be operable.

References (1) USAR, Section 8.3.1.2 (2) USAR, Section 8.4.1 (3) USAR, Section 8.2.2 2-36a Amendment No.1C,:52,180

)' 3.0 MJRVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l

3.7 F=-,way Power System Perindic Tests (Continued) l l

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d. During refueling shutdowns the correct function of all D.C. emergency i transfer switches shall be demonstrated by manual transfer of normal D.C.
supply breakers at the 125 volt D.C. distribution panels.

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-(3) Emergency lighting

'Ibe correct functioning of the emergency lighting system required for plant safe
shutdown shall be verifwd at least once each year.

(4) 13.8 Ky Transmission line l

< 'Ibe 13.8 Ky transmission line will 1:e energized and loaded to minimum shutdown requirements at each refueling outage following installation.

(5) Inveners A. B. C. and D 1

. 'Ibe conect inverter output (voltage, frequency, and alignment to required

120 V a-c instrument buses) shall be verifwd weekly.

Baili f

The emergency power system provides power requirements for the engineered safety features in the event of a DBA. Each of the two diesel generators is capable of i supplying minimum required safety feature equipment from iadapadant buses. This d redundancy is a factor in establishing testing intervals. The monthly tests specified will i demonstrate operability and load capacity of each diesel generator. These tests are
conducted to meet the objectives of NRC Generic letter 84-15 regarding the issue of reductions in cold fast starts. For this reason, the test verifying a 10 second start will j be conducted from ambient conditions once per 184 days for each diesel. Other monthly tests will allow for mamifacturer's recommended warm-up to reduce the mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engines. The fuel supply and various controls are continuously monitored and alarmed for off-normal conditions. Automatic starting on loss of off-site power and automatic load shedding, diesel connection, and loading will be verified on a refueling frequency. At the same intervals, capability will be verified for manual emergency control of these functions from the diesel and switch-gear rooms.

Considering system redundancy, the specifud testing intervals for the station batteries should be adequate to detect and correct any malfunction before it can result in system malfunction. Batteries will deteriorate with time, but precipitous failure is extremely unlikely. The surveillance specified is that which has been demonstrated over the years to provide an indication of a cell becoming unserviceable long before it fails.

References (1) USAR, Section 7.3.4.2 (2) USAR, Section 8.4.1 (3) USAR, Section 8.3.4 (4) USAR, Section 8.4.2 3-60 Amendment No. 24,111,157,180

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