ML20212G202
| ML20212G202 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1987 |
| From: | OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212G186 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-64371, NUDOCS 8701120324 | |
| Download: ML20212G202 (10) | |
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p-8 ATTACHMENT A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Pace Nos.
2 2-18 2-20 2-22 2-39 4
2-62 4-4 4
8701120324 870108 DR ADOCK 05000285 PDR,_
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DEFINITIONS REACTOR OPERATI::G CC::DITIONS (Continued)
Cold Shutdown Condition (Operating Mode k)
The_ reactor coolant Teold is less than 2100F and the reactor coolant is at shutdown boron concentration.
Refueling Shutdown condition (Operating Mode 5)
The reactor coolant is at refueling boron concentration and Teold is less than 2100F.
Refueling Oneration Any operation involving the shuffling, removal, or replacement of nuclear fuel, CEA's, or startup sources.
The Refuelin: Boron Ccncentration y
C 1800 A reactor coolant boren concentration of at least 1-700 ppm, which corres-
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ponds to a shutdown margin of not less than 5% vith all CFA's withdrawn.
)
(
Shutdown Boren Ccncentration The boron concentration required to make the reactor suberitical by the amount defined in paragraph 2.10.
Refueline Outace or Refueline Shutdown A plant outage or shutdown to perform refueling operations upon reaching the planned fuel depletion for a specific core.
Plant Oueratinc Cvele The time period from a Refueling Shutdown to the next Refueling Shutdown.
Amendment.io.[,/,%,43 2
2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) a.
One of the operable charging pumps may be removed from service provided two charging pu=ps are oper-able within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b.
Both boric acid pu=ps may be out of service for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c.
One concentrated boric acid tank may be out of ser-vice provided a minimum of 68 inches of 6-1/h per-cent to 12 percent by weight boric acid solution at a te=perature of at least 20oF above saturation temperature is contained in the operable tank and provided that the tank is restored to operable status within 2h hours.
d.
Only one flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks to the reactor coolant system may be operable provided that either the other flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks to the reactor coolant system or the flow path from the SIEW tank to the charging pu=ps is restored to operable status within 2h hours, f'
One channel of heat tracing may be out of service e.
provided it is restored to operable status within 2h hours.
f.
One level instrument on each concentrated boric acid tant tay be out of service for 2h hours.
Basis The chemical and volume control system orovides centrol of the re-actor coolant system baron inventory.k1) This is normally accom-plished by using any one of the three charging pumps in series with one of the two boric acid pu=ps, An alternate method of boration vill be to use the charging pu=ps directly from the SIRW storage tank.
A third method vill be to depressurize and use the safety injection pu=ps.
There are two sources of borated water available for injection through three different paths.
(1)
The boric acid pu=ps can deliver the concentrated boric acid tank contents (6-1/h - 12 weight percent concentration of boric acid) to the charging pumps. The tanks are located above the charging pumps so that t' ? boric acid vill flow by gravity without being pumped.
(2)
The safety injection pumps can take suction from the SIRW
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(j, i tank (at least 1700 ppm boron solution).
'l' Ieoo Amendment No. h3 2-18
2.0 LIMITIriG Cor:DITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System Applicability Applies to the operating status of the emergency core cooling system.
Objective To assure operability of equipment required to remove decay heat from the core.*
Specifications (1)
Minimum Recuirements The reactor.shall not be made critical unless M1 of the fol-loving conditions are met:
a.
The SIRW tank contains not less than 283,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of at least 1-700 ppm f
at a te=perature not less than h00F.
100 0 b.
One means of temperature indication (local) of the SIRW tank is operable.
I c.
All four safety injection tanks are operable and pres-surized to at least 2h0 psig with a tank liquid of at least 116.2 inches (675) and a maximum level of 128.1 inches (7k%) with refueling boron concentration.
d.
One level and one pressure instrument is operable on each safety injection tank.
e.
One low-pressure safety injection pump is operable on each bus.
f.
One high-pressure safety injection pump is operable on each bus.
g.
Both shutdown heat exchangers and three of four compo-nent cooling heat exchangers are operable.
h.
Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow paths from the SIRW tank to the reactor coolant system.
i.
All valves, piping and interlocks associated with the above components and required to function during acci-dent conditions are operable. HCV-2914, 2934, 2974, and 2954 shall have power removed from their motor (f
operators by locking open the circuit breakers in the
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power supply lines to the valve motor operators.
FCV-326 shall be locked open.
Amendment No.
g, h3 2-20
S 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continued)
C-
_ (3) Protection Against Low Temperature Overpressurization The following limiting conditions shall be applied during scheduled heatups and cooldowns. Disabling of the HPSI pumps need not be
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required if the reactor vessel head, a pressurizer safety valve, or a PORV is removed.
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Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below T
320*F, at least one (1) HPSI pump shall be disabled.
Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 312*F, at least two (2) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.
4-
. - - - -.Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below i
- 271*F, all three (3) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.
In the event that no charging pumps are operable, a single HPSI 4
pump may be made operable and utilized for boric acid injection to the core.
Basis i
The nomal procedure for starting the reactor is to first heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature by running the reactor coolant pumps.
1 The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing CEA's and diluting boron in the reactor coolant. With this mode of start-up, the energy stored in
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the reactor coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially j
equal to that during power operation and therefore all engineered safety i
features and auxiliary cooling systems are required to be fully operable.
During low power physics tests at low temperatures, there is a negligible amount of stored energy in the reactor coolant; therefore, an accident 4
comparable in severity to the design basis accident is not possible and 1
the engineered safeguards systems are not required.
The SIRW tank contains a minigum of 283,000 gallons of usable water contain-I eco _
ing at least 1700 ppm borontli. This is~ sufficient boron concentration to provTde a shutdown margin of 5%, including allowances for uncertainties, with all control rods withdrawn and a new core at a temperature of 60*F.(2) s 4
The limits for the safety injection tank pressure and volume assure the required amount of water injection during an accident and are based on values used for the accident analyses. The minimum 116.2 inch level corresponds to a volume of 825 ft3 and the maximum 128.1 inch level i
3 corresponds to a volume of 895.5 ft.
Prior to the time the reactor is brought critical, 'the valving of the safety i
injection system must be checked for correct alignment and appropriate valves locked. Since the system is used for shutdown cooling, the valving i
will be changed and must be properly aligned prior to start-up of the reactor.
2-22 Amendment No. 17,39,43, A7,64,74,77,100 n,
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2.)
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Petuelina Operations (.;o n t inued )
inc ide n t could oc ;ur during the refueling operations that would result in i hazard to publi: health and safety.(1)
When-ever changes are not being made in core geometry one flux moni-tor is suf ficient.
This permits.na intenance of the instrument-ation.
Continuoas monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate ind ica t ion' of an unsafe condition.
The shutdown cooling pump is used to maintain a uniform boron concentration.
The shutdown margin as indicated will keep the core subcriti-cal even if all CEns aere withdrawn fron the core.
During refueling operations, the reactor re f ueling cavity is filled with approximately 250,000 gallons of borated water.
The 1600 boron concentration of this water (at least 17&O ppm boron) is sufficient to :na intain the reactor subcritical by more than 53, including allowance for uncertainties, in the cold condi-tion with all rods withdrawn.(2)
Periodic checks of refueling water boron concentration ensure the proper shutdown margin.
Communication requirements allow the control room operator to inform the ref ueling machine operator of any impending unsafe condition deteeted from the main control board indicators during f uel novement.
In addition to the above engineered safety features, inter-locks are utilized during refueling operations to ensure safe handling.
An excess. weigh t interlock is provided on the lift-ing hoist to prevent movement of more than one fuel assembly at a time.
In addition, interlocks on the auxiliary building crane will prevent the trolley from being moved over storage racks containing irradiated fuel, except as necessary for the handling of fuel.
The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the power has been re-moved from the core takes advantage of the decay of the short half-life fission products and allows any failed fuel to purge itself of fiscion gases, thus reducing the consequences of fuel handling accident.
The ventilation air for both the contain:nent and the spent fuel pool area flows through absolute particulate filters and radiation nonitors oe fore discharge at the ventilation dis-charge duct.
In the event the stack discharge should indicate a release in excess of the limits in the technical s pe c i f i-cations, the containment ventilation flow paths will be closed auto na tically and the auxiliary building ventilation flow paths will be closed manually.
In addition, the exhaust venti-latian ductwork fron the spent fuel storage area is equipped wita a charcoal filter which will be aanually put into oper-ation whene,ver ttradiate1 fuel is being handled.(l)
References
( 1)
F3AR, Section 9.5
( 2)
F3AR, Section 9.5.1.2
'nendment No. 24, 75 2-39
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2.0_ ~ LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.14 Engineered Safety Features System Initiation Instrumentation '
' Settings (Continued)
-(3) Containment High Radiation ( Air Monitoring)
(Continued)
The setpoints for the isolation function will be calculated in accordance with the ODCM.
(
(
- Each channel is supplied from a separate instrument A.C. bus and each auxiliary relay requires power to operate. On failure of a single A.C. supply, the A and B matrices will assume a one-out-of-two logic.
(k) Low Steam Generator Pressure A signal is provided upon sensing a low pressure in a steam generator to close the main steam isolation valves in order to minimize the temperature reduction in the reactor coolant system with resultant loss of water level and possible addition of reactivity. The setting of 500 psia includes a 22 psi uncertainty and was the setting used in the safety analysis.(3)
As part of the AFW actuation logic, a separate signal is provided to terminate flew to a steam generator upon sensing a low pressure in that steam generator if the other steam generator pressure is greater.than the pressure setting. This is done to minimize the temperature reduction in the reactor coolant system in the event of a main steamline break. The setting of h66.7 psia includes a +31.7 psi uncertainty; therefore, a setting of 435 psia was used in the safety analysis.
(5)
SIRW Tank Low Level Level switches are provided on the SIRW tank to actuate the valves in the safety injection pump suction lines in such a manner so as to switch the water supply from the SIRW tank to the containment sump for a recirculation mode of operation after a period of approximately 2h minutes following a safety injection signal. The switchover point of 16 inches above tank bottom is set to prevent the pumps from running dry during the 10 seconds required to stroke the valves and to hold in reserve approximately 28,000 gallons of at least [knalysis(h) g ppm borated water. The FSAR loss of coolant accident assumed the recirculation started when the minimum usable volume of 283,000 gallons had been pumped from the tank.
(6)
Low Steam Generator Water Level As part of the AFW actuation logic, a signal is provided to initiate AFW flow to one or two steam generators upon sensing a low water level in the steam generator (s) if the 2-62 Amendment No. $, 32, #3, 65, 86
E.
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4.0 DESIGN FEATURES
'C'4.4.1 4.4 Fuel Storace New Fuel Storage-The new unieradiated fuel bundles will normally be stored in the dry new fuel. storage rack with an effective multi-plication factor of less than 0.9 The open grating floor below the rack and the covers above the racks, along with.jenerous provision for drainage, precludes flooding.of the new fuel storage rack.
New fuel'may also be stored in shipping containers or in.
the spent fuel pool racks which have a maximum af fective
.nultiplication factor of 0.95 with Fort Calhoun Type C fuel and unborated water.
The new fuel storage racks are designed as a Class I structure.
4.4.2 Spent Fuel Storage Irradiated fuel hundles will be stored prior to of f-site snipment in the stainless steel lined spent f uel pool.
The spent fuel pool is normally filled with borated water with a concentration of at least 1700 ppm.
l900 The spent fuel racks are designed as a Class I structure.
Normally the spent fuel pool cooling system will maintain the bulk water temperature of the pool below 1200F.
Under other conditions of fuel discharge, the f uel pool water temperature is maintained below 1400F.
The spent f uel racks -are designed and will be maintained
(
such that the calculated ef fective multiplication factor
)
is no greater than 0.95 (including all known uncertain-
)
ties) assuming the pool is flooded with unborated water. '
(
The racks are divided into 2 regions.
Region 1 racks are 2
surrounded by Boraflex; Region 2 racks have no poison.
[(
Acceptance criteria for fuel storage in Regions 1 and 2 are delineated in Section 2.3 of these Technical Speci-s fications.
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ATTACHMENT B Justification, Discussion No Significant Hazards Considerations The requirements of the refueling boron concentration are to provide:
1) a dilution time to critical not less than 30 minutes, and 1
2) a shutdown margin of not less than 5#A# assuming a freshly loaded core with all CEA's withdrawn, in accordance with the Technical Specifica-tion definition of refueling baron concentration.
For Cycle 11, the current Technical Specification refueling boron concentration of 1700-ppm meets neither of the above criteria. A revised refueling boron concentration of 1800 ppm has been shown to be adequate to fulfill both of the above requirements. The attached table summarizes the results of the boron dilution analyses for Cycles 10 and 11 for the Refueling Mode (Mode 5).
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS This Technical Specification amendment will not increase the probability of occurrences or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the revised refueling boron concentration ensures the existence of both a 5%
delta rho shutdown margin with all CEA's withdrawn from the core and a dilution time to critical greater than or equal to 30 minutes. Thus, the probability of occurrence and the consequences of any accident or malfunction will remain within the bounds of the current safety analysis.
The probability of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report will not be created because this application only revises the minimum refueling RCS boron concentration.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications will not be reduced because the minimum refueling shutdown margin is maintained above the minimum required margin and dilution time to critical time is in excess of the minimum acceptance criterion for operator response.
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TABLE 1 REFUELING MODE INPUTS AND RESULTS OF THE BORON DILUTION EVENT Parameter Cycle 10 Cycle 11 Critical Boron Concentrations, All 1330 1400 a
Rods Out, Zero Xenon (ppm)
Inverse Boron Worth Assumed in
-55
-55 Dilution to Critical Calculation (ppm /% delta rho)
Time to Loose Prescribed Shutdown 31.2 31.9 Margin (min.)
Refueling Boron Concentration (ppm) 1700 1800 Actual Shutdown Margin (%)
5.0 5.2 i
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l 1
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