ML20205M117
ML20205M117 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
Issue date: | 03/30/1987 |
From: | Daverio C, Donaldson D, Lieberman E, Lindell M, Linnemann R, Mileti D, Watts R COLORADO STATE UNIV., FORT COLLINS, CO, Neely Research Reactor, ATLANTA, GA, HYDRO NUCLEAR SERVICES, INC. (SUBS. OF WESTINGHOUSE, KLD ASSOCIATES, INC., LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
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ML20205M082 | List: |
References | |
OL-3, NUDOCS 8704020276 | |
Download: ML20205M117 (462) | |
Text
F LILCO March 30,1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing floard in the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuc! car Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
1 WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. DAVERIO, l DALE E. DONALDSON, EDWARD U. LIE 11ERMAN ROGER E. LINNEMANN, i MICIIAEL K. LINDELL DENNIS S. MILETI. AND RICIIARD J. WATTS
- ON Tile SUITAlllLITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS i
i l CON _ TENTS 1
E3K0 l !. Ide n t i t y o f Wi t n esses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
!!. P la n n i n g 11 asis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 l
l !!!. Number of Peoplo Expected to Arrivo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 IV. " Shadow Phenomenon" and Opinion Polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 V. Dis t anco f rom Shorcha m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 VI. Panic..................................................25 VII. Tra f f ic Conges tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Vllt. M o n i t o ri n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 IX. Additional Resources !!cyond the Planning flasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 X. Decon t a mina tlon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 XI. Contamina ted Washwa ter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 0704020276 070330 PDH ADOCK 0D000322 0 PUH i
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l Attachments A- Resume of Charles A. Daverlo
- B- Resume of Dale E. Donaldson i i C- Resume of Edward B. Lieberman '
1 D- Resume of Michael K. Lindell l E- Resume of Roger E. Linnemann j F- Resume of Dennis S. Mileti -
{ G- Resume of Richard J. Watts j H- Map showing locations of reception centers i ! -
Maps of vicinities of reception centers (3 pages) i J- Plans of reception center sites K- List of distances to reception centers for other plants i L- Guidance memorandum of December 24,1985 t
{ by Richard W. Krimm, with attachments l M- KLD TR-192 N- New York State letters about washwater ,
l 0- Layout of decontamination trailer !
! P- Proposed changes to Plan and procedures relating j to the reception centers j
Q- OPIP 4.2.3 i. Revision 8)
R- OPIP 3.9.2 (Revision 8) 5- KLD TR-201 ,
i j !. IDENTITY OF WITNESSE$
- 1. Q. Will the witnesses please identify themselves?
1 A. (Daverlo) My name is Charles A. Daverlo. I am Assistant Department l Manager of the Nuclear Operations Support Department for LILCO. My l
professional qualifications, and those of the other witnesses, are Attach-ments A-G to this testimony. My famillarity with the reception centers 1.
j stems from work in developing and implementing the Local Offsite Ra-
! diological Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham.
(Donaldson] My name is Dale E. Donaldson. I work for Hydro Nuclear Ser- '
vlees in Moorestown, New Jersey. I have been retained as a consultant by LILCO to testify in this proceeding. When I worked for thJ NRC,I was one ,
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! of the three principal draf ters of a precursor document to NUREG 0654.
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! (Lieberman] My name is Edward B. Lieberman. I am Vice President of l
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KLD Associates, Incorporated. My familiarity with the reception centers is based on work I have performed for LILCO on traffic flow to the three re-ception centers. !
, [Lindell] My name is Dr. Michael K. Lindell. I am a Visiting Associate i i
, Professor of Psychology at the Georgia Institute of Technology. I am a con- [
r f sultant to LILCO on human behavior in emergencies.
i j [Linnemann] My name is Dr. Roger E. Linnemann. I am a consultant to f LILCO on the medical aspects of exposure to lonizing radiation. i
, (Mileti] My name is Dr. Dennis S. Milett. I am a Professor of Sociology at i i '
- Colorado State University. I am a consultant to LILCO on human behavior !
In emergencies.
(Watts) My name is Richard J. Watts. My famillarity with the reception centers results from working as a consultant to LILCO in developing the LILCO plan for monitoring and, if necessary, decontaminating members of l the public.
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a II. PLANNING BA515
{ 2. Q. What is your planning basis for reception centers?
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{ A. (Daverlo] The planning basis for the general population reception centers
) is as follows: -
I j Monhoring. In accordance with the FEMA guidance memorandum of l 1
i Richard W. Krlmm dated December 24, 1988, emergency preparedness 1
l plans should include provisions at relocation center (s) for trained personnel i and equipment to monitor a minimum of 20 percent of the estimated
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population to be evacuated. For highly improbable radiological releases in which it might be necessary to monitor more than 20 percent of the popu-lation, it would be expected that ad hoc measures would be developed, sup-piemented, if necessary, by federal and private sector resources.
LERO compiles with this guidance by providing 61 monitoring sta-tions. Since it requires approximately 100 seconds for each vehicle to cycle through a monitoring station, over 20 percent of the estimated 58,000 EPZ vehicles (summer population) could be monitored at the reception con-ters within approximately six hours. At this monitoring rate, incoming evacuees could be processed as fast as they arrived, with little or no waiting.
Should it be determined that a greater number of evacuees than ,
about 30 percent of the EPZ required monitoring, LERO would request that additional trained monitors with equipment be provided by the Institute of !
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the Department of Energy: these monitors would man additional monitoring stations established at the three reception centers. It despite these efforts monitoring would still take more than about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, the reception center personnel would be directed to I monitor only the vehicle and driver of the car if all the passengers had come from the same place. ;
(Daverlo, Watts] Decontamination. Neither NUREG-0654 nor any FEMA L guidance memorandum provides any indication how many evacuees may need decontamination. NUREG-0396 recommends, however, that "Jalg i
speelal local decontamination provisions for the general public (g&, blan- i kats, changes of clothing, food, special showers)" (emphasis in original) and no special decontamination equipment for property and equipment need be
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prc'eided. It contamination is found on evacuees, it is likett to be et!!y re- -
s movable due to the dustilke nat1re of tPctartteulates, and decontamh 4 dun should be simply a matter of, removing outer layers of cloNag and/or -
washing exposed skin surfaces.[li is expected that less th6 ten percent of the contaminated evacuees would requten full showering.
(Daverlo) LERO has provided at..the reception ca:.to a total of four e s ., ,
decont,9mication traMers conuining a total of 36 sinks at:J 80 si:ower". Ad- !
ditledal:: Inks are available in nearby LILCO buildings if recded. The Ahow-er cyatnty at the LERO decontamination trailert, assunJng 15 mir.utes to allow for decontamina tion of an evacuee by shov'$ ring, is suff'etont to pro- -
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cess more than the 3206 (ten percent of the 32,000) evacuees requiring full showers who inight be proceed!q to t W cuggregste, nre cente:.
Jn the highly unlikely event of a radiologic.d releba ca.using contam- -
! nation of sv:.cuc<w, LLRO would first rely upon its owd Mcontamination -
equity. Should this not det adequatl to ret. pop:Y to the situation, Lrlio weild attempt to enlist the support of governmen? .ind ['avate redeces that dicht be made available and to p ovide the neergary interface to use these. >'ourecs and ferJittlos effectively,11. (Wpire Lost etforts, additfon-al fa#:llistas did not adequately meet the need, LERO would recommend that thoco evie:uees not regilring con?rmgate car:i prined directly to their c
evacuation destY.itions. nnd taksi shcivers and c9nho it,to clean clothing. j The recopilon centers would remain open in vW# to monitor noncor.gre' !i gate t' ire ovacut c:t who had already sheworod anti sished to res/sure them-selver that r.o cobt,1mination was still present. )
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% L F 3. Q. What regulatory guidance have the NRC and FEMA provided about reloca-tion centers?
! A. [Daverio] Section 50.47(b)(10) of 10 C.F.R. provides as follows:
(10) A range of protective actions have been de-
!' veloped for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emer-
, gency workers and the public. Guidelines for the j choice of protective actions during an emergency, con-i sistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in j' place, and protective actions for the ingestion expo-sure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been
- f. , developed.
i In addition, NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion J.12, which is only guidance, i : . says as follows:
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- 12. Each organization shall describe the means
] for registering and monitoring of evacuees at reloca-
) tion centers in host areas. The personnel and equip-
"] ment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.
Also, Criterion J.10.h; a FEMA guidance memorandum of December 24, 1985; and a draf t EPA manual are discussed below.
! 4. Q. Please describe the reception centers that LILCO has designated in its I offsite emergency plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
+ A. (Daverio] The three reception centers are LILCO's Operations Centers in i
j Hicksville, Bellmore, and Roslyn, New York. Their Iccations are shown in h- Attachment H to this testimony. Maps of the vicinity of each center, l' showing local roads, are in Attachment I. A plan of each site, showing how evacuees will move through the facilities, is in Attachment J.
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IIL NUMBER OF PEOPLE EXPECTED TO ARRNE
- 5. Q. What federal guidance is there as to the capacity of relocation centers?
A. [Daverio] As noted above, NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion J.12 pro-vides that personnel and equipment should be " capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers."
- 6. Q. When,does the 12-hour period in Criterion J.12 begin to run?
I A. [Daverio, Watts] Our opinion is that it begins to run when the first evacuee arrives. We take this to mean two hours after the public is first 3
advised to evacuate. Also, the Criterion says "about" 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; this means that somewhat longer than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to monitor 20 percent of the EPZ pop-ulation would be acceptable.
- 7. Q. What is the basis for your estimate that members of the public will start arriving approximately two hours af ter the evacuation recommendation?
A. [Lieberman] The estimate of evacuation travel time from the western boundary of the Shoreham EPZ to the three reception centers is calculated as follows:
- 1. Assume that all highways will be congested.
- 2. Estimate mean speed along the long-haul routes as follows:
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- a. Estimate mean density as 100 vpml, reflecting LOS F.
operations.
- b. Estimate capacity as 1800 vphl. '
- c. Apply equation of state: V = Q/k.
Thus, V - 1800/100 = 18 mph.
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- 3. Distance from western boundary of EPZ to reception centers !
is approximately 30 miles. i i- 4. Travel time is 30/18 = 1.67 hours7.75463e-4 days <br />0.0186 hours <br />1.107804e-4 weeks <br />2.54935e-5 months <br />, l
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- 5. Elapsed time from the order to evacuate to the time that the first evacuees reach the western boundary of the EPZ in significant volume is about 20-30 minutes.
, 6. Total elapsed time from the order to evacuate until the ar-rival of evacuees at the reception centers is the total of items 4 plus 5, or about two hours.
- 8. Q. Mr. Donaldson, what was your role in draf ting NUREG-0654?
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A. [Donaldson] When I worked at the NRC I was part of a three-man team that draf ted a document that was the precursor of NUREG-0654. Our draf t~
was used by a FEMA /NRC Steering Committee, the members of which are listed in the front of NUREG-0654, as a basis for NUREG-0654.
- 9. Q. Did you originate the language of Criterion J.12?
A. [Donaldson] No. That came from the Steering Committee.
- 10. Q. Did your draf t - what you call a " precursor" - incorporate the idea that emergency planning should include monitoring for members of the general public?
A. [Donaldson] Yes. Although I no longer have a copy of that precursor doc-ument, I recall that our intention was that offsite emergency plans should include some capability for monitoring the general public. This idea, how-ever, was not in a single clause like J.12 but rather was implicit in a num-ber of provisions throughout our draf t - for example, provisions that called for monitoring equipment to be available both onsite and offsite.
- 11. Q. How many people did you think would have to be monitored in a ra-diological emergency?
A. [Donaldson] When we wrote the precursor document, we did not have a specific number in mind. We believed, however, that only a small percent-age of the EPZ would require monitoring.
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- 12. Q. What insights, if any, does your experience as an NRC inspector give you into the appropriate planning basis for reception centers?
A. (Donaldson] It has been my experience from having observed many drills and exercises, as well as from having responded to and investigated the TMI accident, that monitoring of people can be effectively and efficiently im-plemented as long as the basic response framework, which will guide the implementation, is in existence. I am specifically referring to the preplanning as it relates to organization, procedures, facilities, and equip-ment. I say " basic" in the sense that extreme detail is far less important than clear precoordination of the responsibilities.
[Donaldson, Watts] In addition, the nature of the plume Q.e2 , its dispersion and content) is such that it is unliksly that all people within the plume ex-posure EPZ would be affected by it. From a planning standpoint, a plume is generally considered by emergency planners to impact a downwind sector (for example, a 221/2-degree sector flanked by another 221/2-degree sec-tor on each side, Nr e total of 671/2 degrees). It is highly improbable that a plume would har disperse over the entire plume EPZ.
- 13. Q. Are you aware of any other guidance regarding the capacity of relocation centers?
A. [Daverio, Donaldson] Yes. A. December 24, 1985 guidance memorandum from Richard W. Krimm of FEMA (Attachment L to this testimony) pro-vides that plans should include trained personnel and equipment to monitor a minimum of 20 percent of the estimated population to be evacuated. In rare cases that require more than 20 percent to be monitored, "ad hoc" mea ures are to be used.
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- 14. Q. From an emergency planning standpoint, is the FEMA guidance of 20 per-cent a reasonable number?
A. [Daverlo, Donaldson, Watts] Yes, for the following reasons:
First, as page 15 of NUREG-0654 provides:
. . . [T]he potential for releases to the environment decreases dramatically in this order: (a) gaseous mate-rials; (b) volatile solids, and (c) non-volatile solids. For this reason, guidance for source terms representing hy-pothetical fission product activity within a nuclear power plant containment structure emphasizes the de-velopment of plans relating to the release of. noble gases and/or volatiles such as iodine. Consideration of particulate materials, however, should not be com-pletely neglected. For example, capability to deter-mine the presence or absence of-key particulate ra-dionuclides will be needed to identify requirements for additional resources.
The guidance, then, addresses itself primarily to noble gases and lodine re-leases. These releases, due to their gaseous nature and to various removal mechanisms for iodine that exist within the plant itself, would not general-ly cause contamination to be deposited to any great extent downwind.
Thus, while people in the EPZ might have received a radiological dose from exposure to the plume, they would not necessarily have any contamination af ter the plume passed.
Contamination occurs only when there has been a release of particulate materials. This may occur if there has been damage to the fuel elements in the reactor core. These dustlike particulates are carried by the release plume until they settle out of the plume and are deposited on the f
ground. This particulate material would be the primary source of contami-
- nation, but, as discussed in the NUREG-0654 passage set out above, devel-oping a response to this very unlikely event need not be emphasized. Field monitoring personnel from Shoreham and DOE's Brookhaven Area Office l are capable of determining if particulate material is present and if additional emergency response measures need be taken.
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Second, any protective action recommendation takes into account the nature and timing of the release. In the situation in which the release was delayed several hours, the evacuating public would have lef t prior to the arrival of the plume, regardless of whether it contained particulate contamination. In the situation in which the release occurred rapidly, the population might be requested to shelter until the plume had passed ~and .
then, if necessary, to relocate af terwards. In this case,'even if there were particulate contamination in the plume, it would be deposited on the houses and ground and not for the most part on the people. When people relocated they might pick up small amounts of contamination (eg, on the soles of their shoes), but this would not present a health-threatening situation that required immediate monitoring or decontamination.
There is, in short, very little potential for a release of particulates that would cause contamination, and the likelihood is that, even if a particulate release ever did occur, the protective action recommendation l would limit the exposure to the particulate material.' Thus, the planning basis need not emphasize detailed emergency response planning for con-taminated evacuees. In the most probable case (IA, where there was no contamination or where it had been greatly limited by implementation of protective actions), only those people requiring congregate care (less than 20 percent of the population ) would be expected at the reception centers, and therefore 20 percent is an appropriate planning base.
- 15. Q. Isn't it possible that more than 20 percent could arrive at reception cen-ters?
A. [Daverio] Yes. But radiological emergency response planning, as outlined in NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654, is based on a capability to respond to a
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" spectrum" of accidents. This means that there is a range of accidents that could occur. To identify one particular accident or type of accident as the j basis for emergency planning is inappropriate. Instead, one should develop local emergency response capabilities to cope with a portion of the range.
These capabilities must be capable of being augmented if required by the i demands of an actual emergency.
- 16. Q. What are the monitoring capacities (in terms of percent of EPZ population) of relocation centers for some nuclear plants other than Shoreham?
A. [Daverio] Based on contacts made by my staff with county and utility personnel at several sites, the following table was developed:
EPZ Percent of Population County Utility Population Monitored in 12 Hours
- 1. Westchester NYPA/ Con Ed 125,000 58%
- 2. Rockland NYPA/ Con Ed 80,000 4%
- 3. Orange NYPA/ Con Ed 20,000 100 %
- 4. Monroe RG&E 30,000 100 %
- 5. Wayne RG&E 23,000 50%
- 6. Oswego NYPA/ Niagara 43,000 8%
Mohawk Af ter this information was gathered, my staff reviewed State and county i
plans and FEMA assessment reports to see if additional data were available.
This review indicated that these publicly available documents do not pro-vide enough information to determine monitoring capabilities.
4 IV. " SHADOW PHENOMENON" AND OPINION POLLS
- 17. Q. Dr. Mileti, is there a difference between " evacuation shadow" and "moni-toring shadow"?
A. (Mileti] Yes, there is. As I discussed in my written testimony in the -05 proceeding, these are two different phenomena. There, shadow evacuation is defined as " voluntary evacuation of persons not advised to evacuate" and monitoring shadow is defined as " voluntary reporting of persons to the 1
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reception centers for monitoring by members of the public not advised to report for such monitoring." Both these phenomena are discussed in that testimony.
- 18. Q. It is alleged, based on opinion surveys, that a million people or more would attempt to come to the LILCO reception centers. What is your opinion of this claim?
A. [Mileti] The estimate of over a million people seems to be based primarily on a poll administered by Dr. Stephen Cole in December 1986. I disagree with Dr. Cole's conclusions.
In the first place, the poll is designed to create a mindset of nuclear power as " dangerous" at the outset. The poll was conducted by first telling the respondents that it was a survey on some " current social problems,"
hence defining nuclear oower as a " problem." The first question on the poll is "how dangerous do you think it would be to live near" certain facilities, namely an airport, a mental hospital, a coal fired power plant, and a nucle-ar power plant. The suggested answers were "very dangerous," " dangerous,"
and "not dangerous at all." Even if a respondent did not think of nuclear power as dangerous before he heard the question, he would tend to think of it as a danger af ter hearing the question.
In the second place, the particular question about monitoring is seri-ously flawed. That question is as follows:
- 16. If at 1:45 p.m. you heard on the radio a LILCO representative say that certain people living within ten miles of Shoreham may have been exposed to radiation during their trip out of the evacuation zone and should go to a specific location in Nassau County to be monitored for possible radioactive contamination, would you:
1= go to the specific location in Nassau to see if you have been contaminated with radiation, or
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l 2= go somewhere else to have your radiation level checked,or 3= would not bother to have your radiation level checked The question gives respondents three choices, all of which suggest that the respondent had radiation exposure. It is astonishing that 20 percent of the respondents said they would not bother to have their radiation level checked af ter being asked to presume (given the answers to the question) that they had been exposed.
[Lindell] Dr. Cole's conclusion of a million people is extremely improba-ble. It assumes that anyone who expresses an intention to be monitored i would, in fact, go in for monitoring., Neither Dr. Cole, nor anyone else that I know of, has data to back up that assumption. In the absence of such data, it seems inappropriate to attempt to predict future emergency public behavior from pre-emergency surveys.
- 19. Q. Do you have any other reasons why you believe Dr. Cole's theory is incor-rect?
A. [Mileti) Yes. First, it is hard for people to personalize risk. Thus people, particularly those not asked to go in for monitoring, will not automatically assume that they are at risk and need to be monitored. This is why EBS messages are so important to encourage those advised to be monitored to do so. Second, the research record provides repeated evidence about how
" victims" in emergencies help themselves. People who have not been told
, to go for monitoring will take the necessary steps to protect themselves if they think they have been contaminated. Rather than drive to a reception l center to take a shower, they will take their own shower wherever they
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, 20. Q. How many people were there in the various " zones" that might be drawn about the Three Mile Island reactor?
A. (Mileti) About 35,000 people lived ..Ithin five miles; 127,000 people with- 4 in five tJ ten miles; and 209,000 within 10-15 miles (C.B. Flynn and J.A.
Chalmers,1980, The Social and Economic Effects of the Accident at Three Mile Island, NUREG/CR-12, Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission p. 22). These are the areas from which came the estimated 144,000 TMI evacuees.
- 21. Q. Was monitoring offered af ter the Three Mile Island accident?
A. [Linnemann] Starting about. two weeks af ter the TMI accident, whole i
body counts and thyroid counts were offered to the public. Over the next several months approximately 736 whole body counts and about 200 thyroid j counts were done. These were offered at the Hershey Medical Center in l
Hershey, Pennsylvania; at the Harrisburg Hospital in Harrisburg, Pennsyl-vania; and at the Poly Clinic in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
- 22. Q. So far, we have only talked about Dr. Cole's survey in terms of monitoring shadow. Does Dr. Cole also use his survey to predict evacuation behavior?
A. [Mileti) Yes. I have already testified on evacuation shadow, both in this j proceeding in 1983-84 and in LILCO's written testimony in the -05 proceed-ing. As I stated there, it is not possible to predict future emergency behav-for from polls.
- 23. Q. Dr. Lindell, do you agree with Dr. Cole's conclusion that there would be a substantial shadow evacuation based upon people's response to his survey? )
l A. [Lindell] No. Dr. Cole's survey contained bias that would inflate the esti- ;
mated number of people who say they would evacuate. The actual number 1
of evacuees would be much smaller for the following reasons. First, l I
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disaster researchers have concluded that a protective action decision in-i volves the resolution of three competing goals-the continuation of normal activities, the protection of property, and the protection of personal safe-4 ty. Evacuation achieves the protection of personal safety by disrupting normal activities. Since Dr. Cole's telephone survey made the protection of personal safety salient, it had the effect of blasing the responses toward l intentions to evacuate. This is particularly true since time and effort (which would be required to actually evacuate) do not have to be expended j in responding to Dr. Cole's hypothetical EBS message.
l Second, the tendency for the design of the study to lead respondents toward an evacuation intention was compounded by listing only three alter-
) native actions in response to the EBS message "go about your normal busi-ness," " stay inside your home," and " leave your home and go further away from the plant" (see survey question no.12). Only the last of these three alternatives describes an active response to the hazard. By contrast,'
Perry, Lindell, and Greene in Evacuation Planning in Emergency Manage-i ment (1981) (p. 48) found that the response to the first warning of a flood elicited the following five categories of responses " normal routine,""tried 4
to confirm," " family oriented," " protective action," and " prepared to evacu-ate." Four of these alternatives involve an active response to the threat that does not necessarily result in evacuation. Comparison of the Perry e_t al warning response alternatives with those in Dr. Cole's survey suggests ,
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that anyone who was inclined to make an active response to an EBS mes-sage would be induced in responding to the survey to choose the evacuation option as being the only alternative that was consistent with his or her be-liefs about the need to take some type of action in response to the potential threat.
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- 24. Q. Are there any other reasons why you think Dr. Cole's survey inadequately '
addresses the number of people who would evacuate? ,
i A. [Lindell] Yes. The factors that I have just mentioned are related not only.
to the question of whether or not local residents would evacuate; they are also related to when they would evacuate if they decided to do so. Dr.
Cole's conclusion implicitly assumes that all people deciding to evacuate would do so simultaneously, or at least so close together in time that their numbers alone would create problems for LERO. This also is not likely to be the case. Disaster researchers have found very large individual differ-ences in the timing of response to a warning message. This timing factor is not addressed by the procedure used in the telephone survey.
- 25. Q. But, Dr. Lindell, you've used surveys to study behavioral intentions in your work, haven't you?
A. (Lindell] Yes, I have. But there is a significant difference between the aims of my work and those of Dr. Cole's. I did not collect behavioralinten-tions data in order to estimate the number of persons who would evacuate in a real emergency. Rather, I collected such data in order to identify characteristics that the public might use to assess the degree of threat from a hazard. That is why I have always asked respondents to judge the likelihood that they would evacuate, rather than to state a specific action that they would take. Moreover, I believe it is extremely difficult to inter-pret behavioral intentions data, or perceived risk characteristics data for '
that matter, without having a point of comparison. That is why I, unlike Dr. Cole, have always followed the procedure of having respondents rate two or more technologies or hazards on the same set of criteria.
= . ._. - _.
- 26. Q. Dr. Lindell, what studies have you done recently of people's perception of risks?
A. [Lindell) I have conducted two studies recently. The first concerned per-ceptions and intended response to two technological emergencies: a re-lease of radioactive materials from a nuclear power plant and a release of dioxin from a herbicide factory. In a follow-up study, comparisons were made between an eruption of Mt. St. Helens, a release of chlorine from a railroad tank car derailment, and a release of radioactive materials from a nuclear power plant accident. (One of the two samples in this study was composed of residents of a community close to a nuclear power plant, Mt.
St. Helens, and the site of a hazardous materials accident.)
Superficial examination of these data (not all of the data have been analyzed) might lead to the conclusion that respondents would, according to Dr. Cole's theories, be inclined to evacuate because of their fears of hazard exposure. Such was not the case, however, during the May 18,1980 erup-tion of Mt. St. Helens or following the chlorine tank car derailment at Mississauga, Ontario. Both cases indicate that direct extrapolation from l
risk perception data substantially overstate the amount of evacuation that l i
would actually occur. This, in turn, suggests that attempts to estimate evacuation " shadow" in a radiological emergency from behavior intents would be equally inappropriate.
- 27. Q. Then are you saying that your studies show that there would be no "evacua-tion shadow"?
4 A. [Lindell] No. What my studies show is that people's beliefs about the characteristics of a radiological emergency are in the direction of making the hazard seem to be more frightening than reactor accident consequenc-1 es analyses indicate is warranted. These are, however, beliefs that exist l l
l - . - _ .
prior to the onset of an actual radiological emergency. In an actual ra-diological emergency, local residents would be very attentive to informa-tion disseminated by sources such as the utility and governmental agencies.
Moreover, ~they would be more inclined to seek out additional information ,
to clarify any ambiguities that they felt existed. I expect the information obtained during an emergency to significantly outweigh prior beliefs.
4 4
- 28. Q. Dr. Cole has also conducted several focus group interviews, which he says l show that people on Long Island have a deep fear of exposure to radiation, which in turn would cause substantial shadow evacuation. What is your j opinion of the focus groups?
A. [Lindell, Mileti] No one needs to conduct a focus group interview to real-Ize that people in general, not just Long Islanders, fear radiation. People should have a healthy respect for rddiation. But to accurately predict how i
people will respond to an actual emergency at a nuclear power plant, based i
on group discussions where EBS messages are read in what is otherwise an informational vacuum, is just not possible. First, as we have said repeat-edly, there is no scientific basis for predicting emergency behavior from pre-emergency measures of behavior intentions or speculations, regardless I
of the method used, be it focus groups, questionnaires, or something else.
l Second, as we have previously stated, people are affected by the sit-I uation they are experiencing. This is not only true in emergencies, but also l
i in focus groups. Thus, it is impossible to know whether what people said in these focus groups was more a result of what they really believed or what i.
l was going on in the group. For example, as stated by one of Dr. Cole's re-
! spondents: l l' Before listening to everybody's opinion, I would proba-bly have waited for two more broadcasts and if we were still on alert, I would leave. But af ter what you l said [another subject], I think the first alarm would be i enough so I would go. I i
! -~.--.,,,-c.-,,
- , - . . -- --. - . . . ~ . . . - _ . ~ _ . - - _ _ , _ _ _ _ - _ , . . -,.
(Focus Group Transcript #1, p. 6.) This response illustrates the dynamic processes that can operate in a focus group to determine what people say.
The bottom line is that the gap still prevails between what people think, or say, in a non-emergency context and their actual behavior in an actual fu-ture emergency.
- 29. Q. What does the history of real-life experience with radiation tell us about people's propensity to flee?
J A. (Mileti] There are a number of real-life accidents and situations that, taken together, tend to cast doubt on the Intervenors' theories.
I have collected data on tourist activities (for example, hotel occu-a pancy) in Las Vegas during atomic bomb tests in Nevada. There is no evi-dence that people avoided, or fled from, Las Vegas during or af ter the bomb tests.
I There are also data on property values in the Three Mile Island area.
l In the months after the accident the rate of increase in property values 3 slowed somewhat, but this appears to have been a temporary effect. If l people were as afraid of radiation as the Intervenors argue, and if their fears were as readily translated into behavior, one would expect emigration from the area and a decline in property values.
There was apparently a fire and a small release of radiation south of Sydney, Australia on March 18, 1987. The newspaper accounts I have seen (which are sketchy) suggest that " residents would seek assurances that au-thorities took adequate precautions following detection of the leak," but they do not report any voluntary evacuation. l
]
i !
I i
l
, l
[Daverio] There is no evidence of either population decline or decline in property values in the 10-mile EPZ around Shoreham.
! [ Watts] I was present during the Ginna accident on January 25, 1982. ,
) There was no evidence offsite of the public evacuating. Some plant staff were directed to evacuate the main onsite buildings. Calm prevailed both onsite and offsite.
[Linnemann] In 1966 four nuclear bombs were accidently lost over i
Palomares, Spain. The casings cracked, and several square miles were con-
, taminated with plutonium. Some 3000 U.S. soldiers and airmen partici-pated in the clean-up, and most of the people who lived in the area were aware of the contamination. I was sent to Palomares af ter the accident, and I saw no evidence of either U.S. personnel or Spanish residents fleeing :
the area.
[Miletil None of these accidents or situations is, by itself, conclusive. For l example, in some of the accidents the releases were small, or people may not have known there was a release. But together they suggest the follow- '
ing conclusion. If people were as afraid of radiation as the Intervenors say, f and (more to the point) if that fear were as readily translated into behavior as they say, then one would expect a great deal more avoidance behavior than has actually been observed. This is particularly the case because newspapers are eager to report stories of evacuation. The fact that there is so little evidence (or even rumors) of fleeing suggests that the Interve-i nors' theories of fear of radiation are wrong.
D
... - -,, , , . , , - - , , - . - , . _ , . _ . - .n- , - - , _ _ . . , , - - - . . - , _ _ . _ , - - , . , . - . _ - - - - - -
i
- 30. Q. Does the accident at Chernobyl support the Intervenors' theory about the j shadow phenomenon?
I A. [Linnemann] I was at the meeting in Vienna on August 24-28,1986 at which the USSR State Committee on Atomic Energy presented the causes and consequences of Chernobyl to a group of 500 scientists from around the i
world. The Russian delegation was asked whether there was voluntary evacuation from Pripyat and the area 30 miles around the reactor. Profes-sor Ilyn, head of radiation protection in the Soviet Union, said no. In fact, he explained that they had a problem persuading some people to leave, par-
! ticularly those in small towns and farms.
, 31. Q. It is reported that some people in Kiev, who were not officially ordered to l evacuate, lef t the city anyway. , Does this support the Intervenors'
) theories?
A. [Mileti] No. It is not at all surprising that people in Kiev may have evac-uated based on their situational perceptions of risk. Undoubtedly many people in Kiev perceived they were at risk, since they were apparently ad-
! vised to take protective actions such as keeping windows closed and washing fruits and vegetables.
i
[Linnemann, Mileti] In any event, the Soviets did not have site-specific emergency planning around nuclear plants as we know it in the western r
world, and information given to the public about the emergency at the time j was apparently poor.
A l
l [Mileti] In short, although it is risky to generalize from one culture to an-l 1 1
- other, it is likely that many of the same factors that resulted in a " shadow" l at TMI were also present in Kiev.
- 32. Q. It is alleged that the reception centers themselves, because radioactive wastes are handled there, will be viewed as a " local unwanted land use" and that as a result people living around the centers will themselves evacuate and contribute to the traffic congestion. What do you think of this theory?
A. [Lindell, Mileti] We don't agree with it for several reasons. The evidence is overwhelming that sites involving some form of radiological activity have not contributed to people's fleeing. For example, places where pluto-nium is produced or where a nuclear plant has had an accident (Three Mlle Island) have not experienced an outflux of people moving away. Further-i more, without some type of public information about how hazardous or con-taminated the area is, people are not going to flee just because of their al-leged fear of radiation. Only af ter the risk has been clearly defined by an authoritive source will you see people leaving as they did at Love Canal and Times Beach. If this weren't true, we would see people migrating from the q areas around Three Mile Island, train derailments involving toxic chemi-cals, etc. Given the available evidence, it is just as plausible to argue that the people around the reception centers will perceive the centers as a "so-lution" rather than a problem.
5 V. DISTANCE FROM SHOREHAM
- 33. Q. What FEMA /NRC guidance is provided as to the location of reception cen-l ters?
i A. (Daverio] NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion J.10.h states that the emer-i gency plan should include "[r]elocation centers in host areas which are at least 5 miles, and preferably 10 miles, beyond the boundaries of the plume I
exposure emergency planning zone; . . ." (emphasis in original).
I 4
h 4
l
- 34. Q. Does each of the three reception centers meet Criterion J.10.h?
A. (Daverio] Yes. Each is at least five miles beyond the boundaries of the plume exposure emergency planning zone. The distance of each center from Shoreham is as follows:
Miles Miles from Plume Reception Center from Shoreham EPZ Boundary Hicksville 37 27 Roslyn 42 32 Bellmore 41 31
- 35. Q. Are these distances unprecedented?
A. [Daverio] No. According to information from FEMA (Attachment K to this testimony), a number of other nuclear plants have had relocation cen-ters just as far away or even farther ~.
- 36. Q. Why did you choose the Hicksville, Bellmore, and Roslyn facilities?
A. [Daverio] Because of Suffolk County's and New York State's political op-position to Shoreham, it is unlikely that any public building in Suffolk Coun-ty will be made available for the Shoreham emergency plan until the plant is licensed to operate above five percent power. Likewise, the Nassau County Board of Supervisors has attempted to make public buildings in Nassau County unavailable. Accordingly, LILCO has turned to properties it owns. The three facilities LILCO has designated are the closest available; LILCO does not own suitable facilities significantly closer to the plant.
- 37. Q. How far is the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum from the Shoreham plant?
A. (Daverio] Approximately 40 miles, and in the same same general direc-tion from the plant as the three LILCO-owned reception centers.
(
, . . - _ . -. ,c. . _, _
- 38. Q. Dr. Johnson has argued that because the reception centers are approxi-mately 40 miles from the Shoreham plant, the public will think that the zone of risk extends out to the reception centers and, therefore, that peo-ple within this 40-mile area will evacuate. What is your opinion on his the-ory?
A. (Mileti] I do not believe Dr. Johnson's theory is correct. First of all, risk zones are defined by emergency information. Thus, the " shadow" is deter-mined by the information the public hears, not by the positioning of the re-ception centers or shelters. Second, reception centers are likely to be per-f ceived by the public as solutions to the problem, not the problem itself.
Clear and accurate information supports the public in such a belief. Third, shadow areas do not have distinct boundaries. The degree of shadow evacu-ation from areas outside the stated area of risk falls off dramatically as dis- l tance increases.
- l Furthermore, data from Three Mile Island do not support the thesis that the location of a reception or relocation center would define the evac-l uation shadow area. The main relocation center at Three Mile Island was approximately ten miles from the reactor. The center was little used.
Such centers are little used in any evacuation. When one considers that the evacuation at TMI occurred on a Friday, which was the start of the first sunny weekend in weeks, it is understandable that people did not go to the reception center when they could (and obviously did) go to other places.
VI. PANIC
- 39. Q. Would you expect members of the public coming to the LILCO reception centers in a radiological emergency to exhibit aberrant, irrational, anti- f social, or panic behavior?
A. [Lindell] No. I think that once residents leave the 10-mile EPZ, many if not most of them will feel that they have in fact lef t the area at risk. As a result they will not perceive that there is an immediate or severe danger to their safety.
.- . . - .. . - - - . .. - - . - _- . . - . - - -- ~ _- _. -
4
[Mileti] No. The idea that aberrant behavior would occur is based largely on the Intervenors' opinion surveys and on certain small group interviews conducted by Dr. Cole. Those surveys and interviews, in his view, show a high level of anxiety and fear about radiation among people on Long Island.
It does not surprise me that people on Long Island express fear of ra-r diation. Many public officials on Long Island, and the Governor as well, have been claiming that Shoreham is unsafe for several years now. These l
statements by public officials tend to create much of the fear on which the
- Intervenors now rely to prove their case. But, as we' have testified before, l expressions of anxiety or expressions of behavioral intention outside the context of an actual emergency cannot be used to accurately predict be-a havior in a true emergency. In an &ctual emergency at Shoreham, most of the public would behave in ways consistent with their situational percep-tions of risk, and these situational perceptions would be predominantly in-fluenced by the emergency information they received at the time rather than their pre-emergency generic fear (be it high, low, or in the middle).
People on Long Island will act the same way as other people in an emergen-cy.
Moreover, experience with actual emergencies in the past shows
{ uniformly that people do not react with panic in communitywide disasters, j as I testified in this proceeding in 1983-84.
j 40. Q. It is alleged that during the Chernobyl accident, there were "near-riot" i conditions at the Kiev train station. Does the Chernobyl nuclear accident i
tell us anything about panic or irrational behavior in emergencies?
j A. (Lindell, M11etil Because little is known about how people behaved at l
l Chernobyl, it is hard from a social science viewpoint to quantify what we f
have learned. We would hypothesize, however, from the little that we do
i
. 1 4
know and from our studies of emergency planning and response, that, de-
- spite the difference in cultures, (1) people at Chernobyl and in the sur-i rounding areas probably behaved in a way consistent with their situational perception of risk formed on the basis of emergency information received, (2) that there was no community panic, (3) that the real problem was getting people out, and (4) that the people in Kiev who did evacuate did so j because they perceived that evacuation was an appropriate response.
I
< 41. Q. It is alleged that some workers refused to participate in the emergency re-sponse to the Chernobyl accident because of their fear of radiation. What i
do you think about this?
A. [Mileti, Lindell] If these workers refused to participate in the emergency l
j responte not just because of a fear of radiation, but because of a fear of 1
losing their life (from the fire, for example), it is understandable that some
{ of them would not have performed that function. We would venture to say, i
j however, that the jobs did get done.
i j [Linnemann] From my discussions with various scientists and officials 1
from Russia at the Vienna conference on Chernobyl, it would seem that the i
. workers at Chernobyl did have a reason to fear for their lives, because a l
number of workers eventually did die from performing emergency functions in trying to contain the radiation and fire.
- 42. Q. What does people's behavior in fires tell us about this issue'?
A. [Mileti] There are some things we can learn from fires, depending upon what type of fires are being looked at. From a human behavior viewpoint, there are two different types of fires. The first type of fire is the kind that creates a communitywide mass emergency, for example, the frequently oc-l curring large fires in southern California or the 1906 San Francisco k
l l
1 i
conflagration. In these sorts of fires there is a threat to an entire commu-nity that constitutes a mass emergency comparable to an accident at a nu-i clear power plant. Fires, however, can also pose a non-mass emergency type of situation where entire communities are n_ot threatened by the fire. .
, Such fires would include those occurring in hotels, buildings, and train tun-nels.
These two different kinds of fires generally lead to different categories of human behavior. The first type is typically responded to in terms of what has been labeled " altruistic community" response, iA, peo- 1 i pie coming together and helping one another. People do not panic. The second type of fire is "in a class apart." Under such circumstances, the op-posite of altruism sometimes does occur and people may, but do not always, ,
panic.
1 l 43. Q. Why do people respond less altruistically in a fire in a confined space than
- in a communitywide fire?
j A. [Mileti] People respond differently to these two different ' types of fires because they perceive the risk to their lives differently. As early as 1954, the social sciences began compiling evidence of the unique social environ-4 ment that can on occasion lead to panic. The profile in general is as fol-i lows: (1) that people are in a confined place such as a hotel room or movie j theater, (2) that there is an escape route that is traversible to safety, (3) that the people are convinced that death is very likely unless one traverses the escape route, and (4) that it appears that there is insufficient time for i
everyone to flee to safety. Such conditions sometimes occur in the second
! type of fires (noncommunitywide fires in confined spaces) but do not fit the ;
i first type (communitywide fires). :
- t j i
- 44. Q. What does all this mean in context of response to a radiological accident?
4 A. [Mileti] The knowledge gained from how people respond to that subset of fires that can be characterized as communitywide emergencies where peo-ple respond altruistically tells us a great deal about how people will respond during other emergency responses such as to an accident at a nuclear l
f power plant. -
i The other subset of fires (noncommunitywide fires in confined ,
spaces), in which people sometimes panic, does not provide much insight here. However, if the conclusions drawn from research into people's re-sponses to such fires is reviewed, we find that even in these situations emergency information that is clear, consistent,and accurate helps people j respond to this type of fire. These donclusions are consistent with my posi-t tion that people in emergencies will respond appropriately if provided ade-quate emergency information. >
L I 45. Q. What is your opinion of the thesis that people in mass evacuations will be
! hostile and less able to perform necessary tasks?
t A. [Milet1] There is, on the average, a mass evacuation every day in this l country. No one, as far as I know, has documented an increase in traffic I
accidents or anti-social behavior in any of these emergencies. What is doc-l umented is that people rise to the occasion and help one another.
I
- 46. Q. What about radiological emergencies alone?
f: A. (Milet1] In none of the radiological accidents mentioned in response to Questions 29 and 30 above, including Chernobyl, has there been any reliable evidence of panic or irrational or antisocial behavior by the public.
l t
i I
_ _ . . _ . . - _ _ . _ - _ _ _ , _ . _ _ . _ _ __. _ . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ _ --_, ._._.~ ~_
___ _ ~ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ._. _ _ _
l l
i j VII. TRAFFIC CONGESTION l 47. Q. How have you analyzed the impact of traffic congestion on the ability to ,
j service evacuating traffic at the reception centers? '
A. [Lieberman] Two studies were undertaken. The first, documented in KLD TR-192, focused on determining the distribution and assignment of evacua-
$ tion trips from within the EPZ. The trip distribution identifies the recep-tion centers that will service the evacuees from each zone in the EPZ. The trip assignment identifies the routes to be taken from the boundary of the '
I
) EPZ to the reception centers.
i 1 In the course of this study it was necessary to conduct a somewhat
! limited capacity analysis at intersections along the routes connecting the J
main east-west highways to the reception centers. Since that time, addi-l.
] tional field data were gathered and a thorough capacity analysis was under-
.i taken. This analysis utilized sof tware developed for the Federal Highway j Administration that has recently become available. This later study is doc-umented in KLD TR-201.
i :
1
- 48. Q. In conducting this capacity analysis, what assumptions have you made?
} A. (Lieberman] KLD has performed several sensitivity studies to quantify :
the ability of the highway system to accommodate the projected demand, t These studies use as a basis the assumptions that 30 percent of the i evacuating public will seek to be monitored and that 100 percent of the ;
normal (" background") traffic volume will be on the highways at the same
- time. In addition, evacuating traffic will arrive at the reception centers '
over a six-hour period.
i l t I
1
. - . . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ ____ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _n________.__ _._ __.
1.
1
- 49. Q. How did you estimate the evacuating traffic demand along the approaches to the reception centers?
- A. [Lieberman] These estimates are the outcome of the previous analysis, I
documented in KLD TR-192 (Attachment M to this testimony), to distribute evacuating traffic from within the EPZ to the available reception centers.
I j The analysis also assigned this traffic to the major access-controlled east-west highways connecting the EPZ to these reception centers and onto the approach roads linking these major highways to the reception centers.
I 4 50. Q. What calculation procedures have you used to estimate highway capacities i on the approaches to the reception centers?
i i A. [Lieberman] The procedures incorporated the following steps:
l 3 1. Conduct a field survey to identify the geometrics of all approach roads identified in the previous trip assignment analysis. This field j
survey also noted the traffic signal phase sequences and lane chan-
) nelization at the major intersections along these roads and the pres-
- ence of any significant pedestrian traffic and parking activity.
/
! 2. Conduct an extensive traffic count program to acquire 24-hour l' counts on all approaches to these major intersections along the vari-ous paths to the reception centers. Augment these counts with rep-4
) resentative counts of turn movements.
- 3. Apply sof tware developed for the Federal Highway Administration
- that automates the procedures for the calculation of intersection ca-( pacity, as documented in the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual, also
) known as Special Report 209 of the Transportation Research Board. ,
i The inputs to this sof tware were the highway geometrics, the back- '
ground traffic volumes, the projected evacuation traffic volumes su-
- perimposed thereon, lane channelization, the observed traffic signal -
4 phasing, pedestrian movements, and representative traffic turn movements. This sof tware provides estimates of capacity for specified traffic signal phasing. This signal phasing must be calcu-lated by the analyst in a manner responsive to the traffic demand i j and then input to the program.
- 4. Analyze the results of this capacity analysis in conjunction with es- l timated monitoring rates at the reception centers, which were pro- '
vided by LILCO. The purpose of this analysis was to determine
! whether highway capacity was the limiting factor in the ability of, l evacuees to gain access to the reception centers or whether the j monitoring rates constituted the limiting factor.
I d
_ _ _ _ ___ . ~ - . . . _ . _ _ ___ _ _ _ -_ ___ _._ - _ _ __ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . . _ ._ _ _
l This analysis considered clear weather conditions. For each analysis, fur- i
, i ther sensitivity studies were conducted to determine the effects of evacua- -l l
tion traffic arriving in the neighborhoods of the reception centers over a nine-hour period, of inclement weather, and of a demand for service constituting only 20 percent of the EPZ population.
For inclement weather it was assumed that evacuation traffic would arrive in the neighborhoods of the reception centers over a nine-hour peri-l od. This longer time, relative to that for clear weather, reflects longer l evacuation times and longer travel times from the EPZ to the reception i
- centers.
I
- A subsequent analysis was done to determine the number of cars that
! would be queued on the approach rdads to the reception centers as a func-1 tion of time and to identify the lineal deployment of these queues.
These analyses were all based on the use of the primary (monitoring all passengers) monitoring method.
- 51. Q. What are the results of the study of the approaches to the reception cen-ters?
4 A. [Lieberman] Our analyses indicate that the controlling factors that limit I
the rates at which evacuees can enter the reception centers are the esti-mated rates at which vehicles and their passengers can be monitored for radioactive contamination within the reception centers. The primary sam-pling rates in vehicles per hour, provided by LILCO, are as follows:
i ReceDtion Center Entrance 1 Entrance 2 Hicksville 504 veh./hr. 648 veh./hr.
j <
Roslyn 360 216 Bellmore 360 180 i
._7, ., . . .
. . ; ? / '
< s r >
. \~ ,
?
- 52. Q. Under these conditions..how long would it take to mordtor evt.cuees at the three reception centets '
f A. ( Liebermdn] The }?mes, in hours and minutes, ere als follows:
~
Recept}og,Genter _Ctear Weather- Jj>@1ent Weather ,
Hicksville J 8:07 11:23 Roslyn 6:34 9:15 Bellmore ,$:43 9:43 1
- 53. Q. Have you nurr. fret tha effects of queuing assticiated with traffic conges- '
tion on ths 'spproach roads. to the reception centers on the ability of s
s evacoms to reach, thq meeption centers vdthin the above times?
A. [Lieberman] ras.' We have perform 4 a kueue analysis, as.!ndicated above. Thu tu p(ra of this ansiysis vai to do6 ermine if the c;gues would extend suiticiently ups: ,-ream of the resption cent ers to impedelhe flow of I
P evacuating traffic en the major highways or otherwisc interfere with ono
another. Speel11cally, we determined whether'such queues would form on- 'I
{; >_ ,a -
] the major high'qys and whether tht? quece formation wbuld restrict 1fie i access of evacuees t'o the' exit ramps that lead to the cot:1eedag routes to-
/
ward the reception centers. '
- 54. Q. What did yott find? , ' '
- 4 3
A. [Lieberman] Wo have determined that queues w!!! form on the major highways in :he vicmity of the '.toslyn and Bellmore cente.s but that theva
~
l 4 #
a queues will not extend uastward to the extent that haf would affect the '
flow of evacuating traffic' to Hlchwille.
Specifically, tra.etci c oving toward Hicksvi!!M w141 not ' encounter
~ '
. i l any queues formed at the entruc.ces to the Roslyn and Bellmore centars, l 4
Those evacuees ' traveling to Roslyn or Bellmcre will simply arrive at tt'e
! talls of these queues, join thern, and then movs toward t!,e secotion cen-1 tecs as members of a movit@'q'.: cue. 3 c ,
N .g 4
i Queues also form at the entrances to the Hicksville reception cen-ter. These queues, however, do not extend beyond the approach roads and thus will not affect traffic on the major highways.
i
- 55. Q. Have you examined the background traffic volumes on the major east-west o highways and determined whether this factor will impact the rate at which l i evacuees can reach the service roads to the reception centers?
A. [Lieberman] Yes. For this analysis it has been assumed that the major P
l east-west highways will be congested throughout the length of the evacua-tion trip and be operating continually at Level of Service F (forced flow).
Since the evacuees will gain entrance to the Long Island Expressway (LIE),
4 l Northern State Parkway, and Southern State Parkway at or near their east-p .
ern termini, respectively, the issue of their being able to gain access to
( .
^
these facilities is moot. The traffic that would be most severely affected by congestion on these controlled access highways is the traffic attempting to gain entry via ramps in the presence of congested conditions on the.
main lines. Such traffic can only gain entry by vehicles inserting them-
, selves (" forced merge") into gaps in the mainline traffic stream. Since j
4 traffic density is in the neighborhood of 100 vehicles per mile in each lane )
l under congested conditions, the number of gaps of acceptable length is lim- )
f ited. Therefore, one can expect significant delays to be experienced by I i
!.' . traffic attempting to gain entry to the highway. These delays would serve ;
to discourage people from outside the EPZ from entering the main evacua-1 tion routes.
i,
- It is true, of course, that some traffic outside the EPZ will enter at i
j' low rates onto these highways. This will have the effect of dispersing the )
1
- evacuating vehicles longitudinally. As a result, their arrival at the roads '
connecting these major highways to the reception centers will extend over I
e i .
~
4 ,
t a longer time than the time (roughly five hours) over which they entered these highways at their eastern termini. While this effect increases the evacuees' travel time, it also decreases the rate of evacuation traffic de-mand on these access roads, since a given number of cars will be seeking service on these roads over a longer time. In any case, it appears that,
- based on available data, average travel speed on the controlled access high-ways'at Level of Service F should not be significantly less than 18 miles per hour on average.
- 56. Q. Have you considered inclement weather?
A. [Licberman] Yes. The primary effect of inclement weather on traffic op-erations is to reduce highway capacity. This effect on capacity lengthens the evacuation travel time in the EPZ from around five hours to about six hours and 20 minutes (for an evacuation of the entire EPZ). The net effect of this factor is to further disperse the evacuating traffic over time, there-by reducing their arrival rates in the neighborhoods of the reception cen-ters. This dispersion lowers the arrival rates of evacuees onto the con-necting routes to the reception centers and serves to reduce or even eliminate queues originating at the reception centers'. Another beneficial effect is that traffic demand representing discretionary trips is usually sig-nificantly reduced by severe inclement weather. This beneficial effect, however, was not incorporated into the analysis in the interest of conser- I
~
vatism.
Of course, the capacities of the approaches to intersections on the connecting roads to the reception centers will also be reduced by inclement weather; this effect runs, counter to the beneficial effects described'above.
1 The net effects of inclement weather have.been estimated to increase l l
l
-g
- , - - - . n-,-.. ,,. ,.w- -- , , . -
service time, due primarily to the dispersion of traffic arriving in the vi-cinity of the reception centers. See the table in the response to Question 52 above.
- 57. Q. What about buses?
A. [Lieberman] Buses from within the EPZ will be routed west on the LIE to South Oyster Bay Road. From there they will turn onto Woodbury Avenue, thence to Park Avenue and to the Hicksville reception center. This ap-proach route differs from those servicing evacuating private vehicles. Ca-pacity constraints are not limiting factors for bus traffic.
It must be emphasized that to the extent people travel in buses, these same people cannot be in cars. Thus, the presence of these buses on the LIE serves to displace evacuating passenger cars that would otherwise be used. For example, a family with children in school might be more in-clined to evacuate with two cars (if available)if the children were at home at the time of the order to evacuate, but would probably evacuate in one car if the children were being evacuated separately by bus. Also, the esti-mated number of cars was based on the entire EPZ population, and no al-lowance was made to reduce the number of vehicles to reflect the fact that those in special facilities would be evacuating by bus. It is therefore rea-l sonable to conclude that the use of high-capacity buses to evacuate persons in special facilities serves to slightly reduce the number of passenger-car-equivalents that would be evacuating from the EPZ.
- 58. Q. Were you able to use these results to estimate traffic operations under other conditions?
A. (Lieberman] Yes, with some limitations. Since the estimation of capacity and flow rates is a nonlinear process, it is only possible to examine
- ~ _ ,_ . _ _ . _ _. . , _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ - - . . _ . - _ . , .
~
conditions reasonably close to those that have been rigorously studied.
With that limitation understood, however, it is possible to examine what the effects could be for neighboring conditions.
- 59. Q. What other conditions have you examined?
A. [Lieberman] We have examined traffic operations under the scenario of 20 percent evacuation with 100 percent background traffic.
- 60. Q. What are your results for the 20/100 case?
A. [Lieberman] As noted above, the controlling factor for the 30/100 case was the monitoring rates in the reception centers. This remains the con-trolling factor for the 20/100 case. On that basis we were able to calculate estimates of the maximum queues'that could be expected and the total times required to service this evacuating traffic at the three reception centers. The results are as follows:
Reception Max. Queue Elapsed Time to l Center Length (veh.) Service Demand (hrs: min) i Hicksville 0 6:15 Roslyn 0 6:15 j Bellmore 114 6:35 As indicated above, the maximum time in queues for evacuees, assuming they arrive in the neighborhoods of the reception centers over a six-hour -
i period, is about 20 minutes at Bellmore.
I l
- 61. Q. What traffic control does the plan contemplate?
i A. (Daverio, Lieberman] LERO traffic guides will occupy stations, only on LILCO property, specified in OPIP 4.2.3. . The Nassau County police will be asked to provide traffic control off LILCO paperty at all signalized inter-sections along the paths defined in the KLD analyses (Attachments M and S 1
to this testimony). l I
i
.mv , , , . , , . , . - - - -n, v--+ e--- ---' -~ + **--------*m-~ " - - - - ' "~'* - -
- t
- 62. Q. On the basis of your studies, is it your opinion that reception centers and approach roads to them at Bellmore, Roslyn, and Hicksville can accommo-date the estimated traffic demand?
A. [Lieberman] Yes, given the assumption that up to 30 percent of the popu-lation in the EPZ will seek service at the reception centers.
- ~ 63. Q. What is the relationship between whole body dose and the amount of time until decontamination? -
A. [Linnemann, Watts] As a general matter, the dose received from the con-tamination on a person's body is small compared to the dose he received from having been in the plume in the first place, even if it is several hours before he or she gets decontaminated.
We can calculate the total body (bone marrow) dose a person might receive from radioactive particulatbs on his person, using standard formu-las that can be found in most health physics textbooks. For example, as-sume a person is outdoors five miles from the plant and receives a total body gamma exposure of about 60 mrem / hour from the plume. (This is based on the scenario used for the February 13, 1986 Exercise.) Assume he is in the plume three hours before he evacuates, which is about the midpoint of the evacuation time for the downwind area. His dose from the plume prior to evacuation would be approximately 180 mrem. If uniform contamination on this person remains at the same concentration (covered head to toe) from having been in the area and he is delayed 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> before
. decontamination, he will receive (conservatively) an additional nine mrem total body exposure, or about five percent of the dose he received before he evacuated.
. . _ _ _ _ _ , _ . ~ . , _
i 1
1
- 64. Q. What would be the effect of delayed decontamination on the dose contribu-tion to the thyroid gland from iodine isotopes on the body?
A. [Linnemann, Watts] The thyroid dose from delayed decontamination t
would vary from less than one percent to a few percent of the thyroid dose from having been in the area of the plume in the first place. For example, using the February 13,1986 Exercise scenario, at five miles from the plant a child's thyroid would receive 1200 mrem per hour from inhalation. As-i suming a three-hour exposure in the plume, the child's thyroid would re-ceive 3600 mrem.
i q Assuming a 20-hour delay in decontamination and a uniform skin i
contamination, the additional dose to the thyroid from gamma radiation j from the radiolodine on the skin and, from absorption of radiolodine through '
the skin would be approximately 140 mrem, or about four percent of the
] dose the thyroid gland received from having been in the area of the plume
- in the first place.
1
- 65. Q. What would be the biological effects of the additional dose to the whole body or thyroid gland from delayed decontamination?
A. [Linnemann] The additional doses discussed above would not result in any I acute, detectable effects on the whole body or the thyroid gland. As for long-term effects (cancer and genetic effects) these additional doses are '
well below where any of these above effects have ever been detected in human or animal populations. Furthermore, the incremental increase in dose to thyroid gland (140 mrem) or whole body (nine mrem) from delayed decontamination is but a small factor among the many greater uncer-tainties in the biological factors used in risk assessment at very low doses I
of radiation. The risk assessment of low dose radiation (below about 5000 mrem brief exposures and 10,000 mrem protracted exposures) is based on
d e
very conservative assumptions which to date have eluded satisfactory sci-entific proof. For example, our best estimate of the carcinogenic mortali-ty risk from nine mrem to the whole body lies somewhere between zero and about one chance in 1,000,000. The normal lifetime cancer death risk, without additional radiation exposure, is about one in seven.
t
, VIII. MONITORING i
I 66. Q. What monitoring method will you use at the reception centers?
A. (Daverio, Watts] The primary method will be as follows. Each monitoring
] station has two monitors and a traffic guide. A monitor will stand on each j side of the car and monitor the head, shoulders, hands, and feet of each 4
i passenger. Meanwhile the traffic guide will take a swipe of one quarter of the front hood and a wheel well, holding the swipe for one of the monitors
- to monitor. If no contamination is found, a " clean" tag will be placed under the windshield wiper and a clean tag given to each occupant of the vehicle.
].
3
- 67. Q. How do you monitor people arriving in buses?
A. [Daverio, Watts] A munitor boards the bus and monitors the seated pas-sengers in a manner similar to the way that passengers in cars are moni-tored.
i 1
- 68. Q. What will you do if you find any evidence of contamination by this method?
I A. (Daverio, Watts] If we find any evidence of contamination on either the ,
., vehicle or any occupant of it, everyone in the car will be directed to a '
1 decontamination trailer for additional monitoring and, if necessary, decon- l
- tamination. l l
i i
-.v. -- ,-- . . . ~ . .-----,,.-n,,-, -.~-.--+-,,--...,-----,,,n -.,,n.,-,--n.,-,,.-,,m,,,.n.- .,,.m- ..-e.., - - - -4 . - - ,mr.-.--+-.-,--
l l
- 69. Q. Is this procedure in the LILCO procedures now?
A. (Daverio] No. But LILCO will revise its procedures to reflect the moni-toring procedure described in this testimony, assuming no changes need to be made as a result of this litigation. A copy of the pages of the proposed revision (dated February 20,1987) that apply to the three reception centers is Attachment P to this testimony. (Note, however, that the February 20 f
draf t calls for only 58 monitoring stations, whereas LILCO now proposes to have 61.) The present (Revision 8) version of OPIP 3.9.2 and OPIP 4.2.3 are
, also attached (Attachments R and Q, respectively).
- 70. Q. Why are you proposing to change the procedure?
A. (Daverio] The proposed change is in response to RAC comments on Revi-sion 8 of the Plan.
l
- 71. Q. How fast do the LERO monitors move the monitoring probe?
T A. (Watts] They are trained to move it about 8-10 inches per second. This is comparable to methods under other plans. For example, the "S.O.P. For Personnel Monitoring Center and Decontamination Operation," published in July 1982 by the State of New York Division of Military & Naval Affairs Radiological Intelligence Section, recommends (in paragraph 5.5) moving
, the probe "at about 1 it./sec. around entire perimeter of person." Likewise, this document recommends paying "special attention to the head, shoulders, hands, feet including soles and any moist areas." The same instructions as to monitoring speed and technique are in at least two county plans that I l
am aware of.
2 a
- 72. Q. How long does it take to monitor a vehicle using the primary method?
A. [ Watts] We estimate 100 seconds.
- 73. Q. What is the basis for your time estimates?
A. [ Watts] Time trials were conducted on vehicles to demonstrate the details of the procedures. The primary (100-second) method was tested on several different vehicles to evaluate the time to monitor all the passengers in dif-ferent types of vehicles. The 35 seconds for the secondary (backup) method (discussed below) was based on two monitors, one doing a vehicle swipe and the other monitoring the driver.
- 74. Q. Must any time be added to account for the cars coming up to the moni-toring stations and leaving again? ,
A. (Daverio] No. When the time trials were done, the vehicles were required to drive up to the monitoring station, be monitored, and then drive off.
- 75. Q. How long would it take LERO to monitor 20 percent of the EPZ population using the primary method?
A. [Daverio, Watts] About 5-6 hours.
- 76. Q. How do you get that figure?
A. (Daverio, Lieberman, Watts) Assuming 2.8 people per car, the 160,000 people in the EPZ (summer population) would evacuate in about 58,000 ve-hicles. Twenty percent of 58,000 is 11,600 vehicles. There are 61 LERO monitoring stations and (at a rate of 100 seconds per vehicle) each station l
can monitor 36 vehicles per hour, or 2196 vehicles per hour for all 61 sta-i tions. ;
I i
i !
l l
l f
1 I
t 11.600 vehicles = 5.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 2196 vehicles / hour d'
This is about the same rate as evacuees would arrive at the centers.
- 77. Q. What monitoring equipment will LERO use?
A. [Daverio, Watts] The Eberline RM-14 count rate meter with either an HP-210, HP-260, or HP-270 probe.
i
- 78. Q. Why did you choose this equipment?
! A. [ Watts] We considered a variety of instruments. The performance char-acteristics of the RM-14 were reviewed, and we concluded that they are l well suited for the intended purpose. The RM-14 is comparable to the in-struments used by other emergency response organizations in New York State and elsewhere in the country. It is relatively simple to use and has been proven in the field (during the January 25, 1982 Ginna accident, for example). It is commonly used in the nuclear industry.
- 79. Q. Suppose it is raining or snowing. Can the RM-14 give accurate readings under these conditions?
1 l A. [ Watts] Yes. The RM-14 is usable under a wide range of temperature and humidity conditions. In an extremely heavy downpour, clear, thin plastic bags could be placed over the meter and probe. These bags will be avall-able on location.
- 80. Q. Is there any difference in readings in foul weather?
A. [ Watts] No.
I
- 81. Q. Does the LILCO Plan call for monitoring of the thyroid gland?
l A. [ Watts] I know of no other current plan that calls for direct thyroid moni-toring to check for accidental uptake of radioactive lodine. However, i
l
. _ _ _ _ _ ~ _. . . _ _ - - _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , - , . . . _ _ ._ _ _ _ _
i i LERO will perform such a check in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2 should de-tailed monitoring be warranted due to the detected presence of contamina-
! tion on a vehicle or any of its occupants.
- 82. Q. It has been alleged that the monitoring personnel might have trouble reading the meter, interpreting the needle fluctuations, etc. What is your
- response to this claim?
A. (Daverio, Watts] It is emphasized to the LERO monitors in training that if there is any doubt in their minds as to whether a person is contaminated, i they are to send the person to the decontamination trailer for more de-
! talled follow-up monitoring.
l
- 83. Q. How do you monitor people in the back of a car, particularly if the car is a
- two-door model? -
t A. [ Watts] The probe has an approximately eight-inch handle. In training i
sessions the monitors have had no trouble reaching passengers in the back seat. In one trial, passengers in a Ram Charger had to get out of the front i seat briefly while the monitors monitored the people in the back.
} 84. Q. Is it likely that you would miss contamination on a person because you mon-itored him while he was sitting in the car or because you monitored only his hands, feet, head, and shoulders?
{ A. (Watts] The monitoring locations are based on the most likely places for j contamination to be found. In addition, the monitor incidentally scans 1
other parts of the body as he moves the probe from the hands up to the head and shoulders and then down to the feet in a continuous motion.
l 85. Q. What if some of the monitoring equipment falls?
A. (Daverio, Watts] We will stock approximately ten percent more moni-toring devices than are needed.
- , , , ,,, ,--.--- ,, - - -. -,,-_. --- ---,-,,-n- n- -... ,- . - - . - - - - . - - , , - - - . - , .- ., ,, -
--e. - .. -
l
- 86. Q. Suppose, hypothetically, that background radiation levels at the reception ,
centers were above normal at the time of an accident. What would you do l about this?
l A. [Daverlo, Watts] It is not plausible that elevated background levels would be caused by the plume itself, due to the distance of the reception centers from the plant and the infrequency of the wind's blowing in that direction (approximately four percent of the time). Our procedures call for initial and periodic (every 15 minutes) monitoring of background. If allowable background is exceeded, we find and remove the source, or we move the monitoring station. ,
- 87. Q. Could nearby contamination interfere with monitoring people in their cars?
A. (Watts] It is not likely. The detection probe is especially efficient for beta emissions, and particularly so when measuring in close proximity to a person or a vehicle swipe. Thus the instrument reading relative to back-ground would tend to maximize. As stated above, if there should be an in-dication that background levels are exceeding allowable levels, we would take appropriate action.
- 88. Q. What if the instruments themselves get contaminated? How do you handle that?
A. (Watts] There is little possibility of the instruments becoming contami-nated, since they do not come in contact with the evacuees. However, if they should be contaminated, the probe need only be wiped off to remove the particulate contamination. Periodic background checks are performed, in part to watch for this, at least every 15 minutes.
i
. , - . - - , -.,--,r, -, - - . , .- . - , . - - - - - - - - ,-, - .-y-.~ , . -
7 +--. -. - - - -e----
- 89. QI What if the monitoring personnel become contaminated? How would you know about this and how would you handle it?
! A. [ Watts] The monitoring personnel are trained to frisk themselves when i taking background readings. They wear gloves in any case. They will be di-1 rected to put on protective clothing if contamination is found on or inside l
any incoming vehicle. This clothing is readily replaceable in the field if contamination is found on any monitoring personnel.
- 90. Q. What if the decontamination trailers get contaminated?
A. [ Watts] The monitoring areas of the trailers will be papered over during i
initial set-up. If radiatio levels are found to be above acceptable back-ground, the paper will be raised and replaced and the trailer floors wiped
~
down if need be.
b f 91. Q. Might contamination spread to personnel or equipment in the decontam-l Ination trailers?
) A. [ Watts] No, it isn't likely that the contamination would transfer to other <
j
{ surfaces without direct surface contact. Even then only a small portion would be transferred.
- 92. Q. What if a driver requested a whole body scan?
1 A. [Daverio] He would be directed to the decontamination area for detailed monitoring.
l 93. Q. Would contaminated objects in the trunk of a car cause a problem?
A A. [ Watts] If contamination was found on a passenger or vehicle, contents of 1
the trunk would be monitored also when the vehicle received detailed mon-itoring. It is unlikely that the articles in the trunk would be independently contaminated.
t I
- 94. Q. What sort of information will be disseminated at the reception centers?
A. (Daverio] As cars enter the facilities, passengers will be handed an infor-mation sheet that explains the basics of monitoring and decontamination.
\
If passengers have questions about the accident, traffic guides at the re--
ception centers are trained to advise them to tune to the EBS stations for the latest official information. Also, people who say that they need a place to stay will be given a map to a congregate care center.
t
- 95. Q. What type of registration of evacuees will be done?
A. (Daverio] The traffic guide at each monitoring station will write down the vehicle license plate number and the number of passengers in the car.
The names of evacuees arriving by b,us will be recorded.
- 96. Q. Is this sufficient?
. A. (Daverio] Yes. If it is necessary to contact these people, this should pro-vide sufficient information.
- 97. Q. Will much additional time be necessary for the monitors or traffic guides to j give people information?
A. (Daverio] No. The information sheets to be provided and details on the l
radio should give the evacuees adequate information. Questions about mon-
! itoring will be answered by the monitors during the monitoring process.
Anyone requesting additional information would be directed to the decon-tamination area to talk to a Decontamination Leader.
4
- 98. Q. It is alleged that members of the public would have urgent questions to ask
- and would barrage the monitors or traffic guides with those questions, thereby causing delay and perhaps hostility if the questions were l unanswered. Do you agree with this theory?
A. [Lindell, Mileti] People are going to have questions. That is why we put i
i
so much emphasis on EBS messages. As was said in this proceeding in 1983-84, it is all right if traffic guides don't know the answers to questions. They can refer evacuees to the EBS station for more information.
We seriously doubt that evacuees will block traffic on the road or at the monitoring stations. First, they themselves will want to move along.
Second, because of the altruistic behavior of people in mass emergencies,
! they will not want to block traffic for anyone else. We also seriously doubt that evacuees will get out of their cars and attack either the traffic guides or the monitors. To delay traffic just to pick a fight would be counter to 4
not only their own, but everyone's, health and safety.
Furthermore, since it is likely that most questions would be an-
- swered by the information sheets passed out to people as they arrive at the
- monitoring center, the number of questions should be reduced, and no sig-nificant delay should result.
t
- 99. Q. How many people does LILCO propose to have working initially at the mon-itoring stations at the reception centers?
A. [Daverio] One hundred twenty-two (122) monitors and 61 traffic guides t
will be manning these stations.
100. Q. How quickly can the monitoring personnel arrive at the reception centers?
j A. (Daverio] The reception center personnel are notified to report upon dec-j laration of a Site Area Emergency; an evacuation would not be recom-mended until a General Emergency, which in most cases would be declared i
after a Site Area Emergency. The selection of personnel for LERO is in '
part based on the nearness of their homes to their LERO reporting loca-
} tions. In general, the reception centers would be manned in approximately
- 60 to 90 minutes. As an indication of how this system works in practice,
4
- the Nassau Coliseum was fully manned in 90 minutes for the February 13, i
i 1986 Exercise.
j 101. Q. Would bringing in INPO monitoring teams be made difficult by traffic con-
! gestion?
- A. (Daverio, Watts] INPO teams would be directed te come first to the Roslyn reception center. Since they would come *! rom the west, they should have no trouble reaching the center. From Roslyn they can be taken or directed to the other two centers.
102. Q. What if the monitoring personnel get fatigued?
A. (Daverio] We call out 150 percent of the number of monitors we need, f The additional monitors are available to provide relief from fatigue or ex-j posure to the weather. In addition, monitors from INPO and DOE would be
- l able to relieve some LERO personnel when they arrived.
j 103. Q. How many security people will you have at each reception center?
A. (Daverio] The security contingent at the reception centers will be eight i
! at Hicksville and one each at Bellmore and Roslyn. The Nassau County po-1 l lice will be requested to assist in maintaining order if necessary.
! 104. Q. It is alleged that members of the public will not necessarily go to the re-
. ception centers to which they have been assigned by LILCO. Is this a prob- "
lem?
A. (Daverlo) - The emergency information brochure provided to each house-i' hold in the EPZ will contain specific directions only to the designated re-4 ception center for that household. There is no reason to believe that I
j evacuees would have some preference for a facility different from the one l designated. Even if some evacuees do choose a different facility, there is considerable surplus capacity at each facility for meeting the 12-hour i
t i
o 4
1 i guideline when 20 percent of the population are proceeding to the recep-tion center.
i 105. Q. How big are the reception centers?
t j A. (Daverio] The size of each property is as follows:
- Size of Percent of EPZ
. Reception Center Property Population Assigned
-l l Hicksville 77 acres 50%
l Roslyn 15 acres 20 %
! Bellmore 10 acres 30 %
106. Q. Are there any physical impediments that would restrict traffic flow as it is shown in Attachment J7 A. (Daverio] No, but the following physical changes still need to be made, j At Bellmore the space in the fence,off Sunrise Highway will be expanded, and the curb between the customer service window drive-in circle and parking lot will be removed. Also, some debris will be removed.
4
! 107. Q. Is there room enough to conduct the monitoring activities at the sites?
}
A. (Daverio) Yes. All lanes have been measured to ensure that sufficient
]
room is available for the activities described in the procedure.
l 108. Q. Will buses interfere with car traffic at Hicksville?
- A. (Daverio, Watts] No. There will be a separate lane for bus arrivals and a separate area for monitoring evacuees in buses at Hicksville.
109. Q. Is there space for more than one bus at the bus monitoring locations?
.l j A. (Daverio] Yes, as shown on Attachment J, there is considerable room for j the buses. The buses will leave the reception center to take the evacuees I
- to congregate care centers af ter the passengers have been monitored.
I t
I I
i
., .e-n.-.we v-.--n.-umw . . nnwn m a n , w w ,-,n,--. ,.nr.-..,--- - , me,,-- er,--,e,-- ,.,--.,..,,,--.r.,-- -- ,--.-. --mm,,
f 4 f
110. Q. The Hicksville facility is used as the LERO Family Relocation Center also.
Will this function interfere with the reception center activities for the public?
A. [Daverio] No Fewer than a hundred LERO families live in the EPZ and, l
therefore, only a few hundred family members would be expected. These
- could be adequately handled in any of the numerous buildings at the
) .
Hicksville f acility.
I 111. Q. Hicksville, Bellmore, and Roslyn are also designated as congregate care
) centers. Will this interfere with the monitoring and decontamination fune-j tions?
} A. (Daverio] No, because the interiors of the buildings are not used for moni-i j
j toring. The evacuees' personal vehicles could be parked on surrounding l
lawns and substation areas. ,
I 112. Q. Is there space to park evacuees' cars, if that should be necessary?
l A. (Daverio) Yes. At Bellmore there is an open space in the middle of the f
! site and a front lawn. Also, LILCO employees' cars could be moved out of j the east parking area to.make room for evacuee vehicles. Finally, there is j a LILCO substation with parking space a few hundred feet to the north.
! At Roslyn there is a LILCO employee parking area (again, LILCO
{ cars would need to be moved first), a lawn, and a substation behind the decontamination trailer.
At Hicksville there are ballfields, lawns, employee parking areas, a storage area in back, and two small LILCO parking lots across the street on Old Country Road.
i
.__,__..-..,__....__,_.___,.m_ - . , . . _ _ . - -- __.._m,-,-,._.,y_ , _ , _ , , _ _r--,... .- ,- .~. , . , . ,_,m,
' ^
IX. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES BEYOND THE PLANNING BASIS 113. Q. How many arriving people are you preparmi to monitor in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />?
A. [ Daverlo, Watts] Using only our own (lA, LERO's) resources, we can mon-itor 30 percent of the EPZ population in aoout 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
114. -Q. What if more than 30 percent had to be monitored?
i l A. [Daverlo, Watts] We have back-up measures. First, we could call on INPO (the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) and the Department of Energy.
115. Q. What resources can INPO provide?
A. [Daverlo, Watta) During the FEMA-graded Exercise on February 13,1986, the Manager of Local Response called INPO. As he has testifed in the -05 l
i proceeding (in LILCO's Testimony on Contentions EX 22.A and EX 49 (Mon-itoring at Nassau Coliseum), pp.11-12):
i Q. What role did INPO play during the February 13 Exercise?
{ A. [Weismantle] On the day of the Exercise, as the
- Manager of Local Response I requested at approx-imately 12
- 00 that the Emergency Planning Ad-visor in the EOF contact INPO and make arrange-ments for additional monitoring resources. At approximately 12:30 INPO called me; I told them of the potential need for assistance. At 1:00 p.m.
I called INPO and #as told that 88 people from I five utilities would be available in approximately
- 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. At 1
- 40 p. .., I called INPO and re- ,
j quested 200 more people. At 2:45 p.m., INPO )
i called and stated that additional people would be i available in approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. At 3:20
- p.m., I called INPO to confirm that the 2
- 45 p.m.
- information was accurate, and that the people
- were on their way.
! Q. Was this information valid?
l
- A. (Weismantle] Yes, During the January 30,1986 i practice exercise LERO requested monitoring as-sistance, through INPO, from other utilities.
] INPO actually contacted senior management I
i l
1 i
personnel that day at numerous utilities, and ob-tained details of the numbers of personnel actual-
~ ly available and their expected arrival times.
INPO used these data during the February 13 Ex-ercise because they did not feel it was appropri-ate to call utility personnel on a non-emergency basis again af ter only two weeks.
116. Q. Would these resources typically be available?
A. (Daverio, Watts] Yes. Minor variations might occur from day to day (for example, someone might be sick or on vacation), but staffing levels are fairly constant and can be counted on. l 117. Q. Could you get extra monitors from Brookhaven National Labs?
A. [Daverio] Brookhaven is a possible source of equipment and personnel.
118. Q. Is there space at the reception centers for INPO or Brookhaven monitors to set up?
A. (Daverio) Yes. The plan calls for 61 LERO-only monitoring stations.
There is enough space for 138 stations.
119. Q. What if LERO, INPO, and DOE together hadn't enough resources?
A. (Daverlo, Watts] We would use the secondary monitoring method set out in Revision 8 of the Plan. The driver's hands and feet would be monitored.
( Occupants of the car would be asked if they had come from a different place from the driver; anyone who had come from a different place would be monitored the same as the driver, as would anyone else who requested monitoring. The exterior of the vehicle would also be monitored, as with the primary method. As with the primary method, detection of contamina-tion on the vehicle or on the driver or any other occupant would warrant further detailed monitoring. We believe this is an acceptable method, par-ticularly when used as a back-up.
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120. Q. How long does it take to monitor people using the backup, driver-only method?
A. [ Watts] We estimate 35 seconds.
, 121. Q. Are other resources available?
i A. [Daverio, Watts] Yes. There are five operating nuclear plants in New York State. The county governments responsible for emergency planning for those plants have some monitoring capabilities, as does the New York State government. In a real emergency, the LERO Director of Local Re-t
, sponse could ask the State or other counties for help.
I j 122. Q. Dr. Linnemann, do you think as a general matter that resources would be
- made available in a large-scale radiological emergency?
j A. [Linnemann] Based on my experience at TMI, experts would volunteer and welcome the opportunity to help. There is in this country a very large pool ,
of radiological expertise, both private and governmr.atal, that could be l called upon and would willingly respond. <
- 123. Q. What " trigger" determines when LERO would call INPO and DOE for addi-tional monitors or switch to the backup monitoring method?
i A. (Daverio] Whenever the protective action recommendation directs more evacuees to a reception center than can be handled in approximately 12
- hours. This is determined by exceeding 30 percent of the total population i
directed to a particular reception center. This percentage may be greater if additional monitors become available.
124. Q. How long would people have to wait before being monitored?
> A. (Daverio] That would depend on the number of people requiring moni-
, toring. LERO's planning basis is that 20 percent of the EPZ population can l be monitored about as quickly as they arrive, R, over a six- to seven-hour i c
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period. Thus, evacuees would encounter little or no waiting to be moni-tored. However, if a significantly greater number were directed to go to the reception centers for monitoring, the wait could extend to five or six hours. In this event, LERO would call upon industry and governmental re-sources to assist by providing additional personnel, equipment, and/or facil-ities.
125. Q. Suppose that during an emergency the weather was bad. Where would peo-pie waiting to be decontaminated go to get out of the weather?
A. (Daverlo, Watts] The transportation buildings in Hicksville and Bellmore and the warehouse and operating office building in Roslyn can be used to shelter people. Each of these buildings is heated. There are also other buildings at the three reception centers that could be used for shelter.
126. Q. Suppose the weather at the reception centers was very cold or very rainy.
Would people who had to discard their clothes and put on paper clothing suffer from the weather?
A. (Daverio] First, it will be recommended in the public information bro-chure that people take a change of clothes with them, so most people will not need paper clothing. Also, LERO has included in its organization a 10-gistics support group that could call local suppliers of blankets and have them delivered to the reception centers.
127. Q. Suppose people had to wait for a time either before or af ter being decontaminated. Are there toilets for them to use?
A. (Daverio] Yes, there are restrooms in the LILCO buildings at the three reception centers if more toilets were needed, the LERO logistics support group could call local suppliers of portable toilets.
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X. DECONTAMINATION f l 128. Q. How do you plan to decontaminate people?
A. (Daverio, Watts] LILCO's plan for decontaminating people is to use !
]
j decontamination trailers equipped with showers and wash basins. A sketch }
i of a decontamination trailer layout is Attachment O to this testimony.
t 129. Q. Will the decontamination trailers be placed at the reception centers in ad- i j vance of a radiological emergency at Shoreham? l A. [Daverio] Yes.
2 i
j 130. Q. Would there be internal contamination from food or drink?
) A. [ Watts] It is unlikely that people would ingest contaminated food or drink i
on the way to the reception centers. '
131. Q. How long does it take to decontaminate people?
l A. (Daverio, Watts] The number of people who can be decontaminated 1
- depends on the level and nature of decontamination and on how long it l
j takes individual people to shower or wash the contaminated parts. We have h estimated 15 minutes for a complete shower. There is no NRC or FEMA
, t requirement that any minimum number of people be decontaminated in any r
- specified period of time.
I i
132. Q. Is it ditficult to remove skin contamination? !
A. (Linnemann) We have had approximately 60 cases of contaminated in- '
jured individuals treated by hospital personnel that my company has ;
trained. In no case was it difficult to remove the contamination.
l i I j (Watts] In my in-plant experience, skin contamination has been dealt I
with using standard washing techniques.
133. Q. How many people might need a shower to be decontaminated?
A. [ Watts] Based on general considerations, I judge that only about ten per-cent of people who might be contaminated would need a shower to remove the contamination. Those general considerations are the following. If con-tamination is found on evacuees, it is likely to be easily removable because of the dust!!ke nature of the particulates. Thus, decontamination would likely be simply a matter of removing outer layers of clothing and/or washing exposed skin surfaces.
This ten percent estimate is coasistent with my experiences of actu- '
al contamination. In the Ginna accident 11 nuclear power plant employees traveled through a radioactive plume and were contaminated. Only one
~
needed a shower.
[Linnemann] Based on my experience, I agree with the ten percent esti-mate. If anything, it seems too high. It is difficult to imagine, under the circumstances of a plume release of radioactive particles, that people would have contamination under their clothing. In the approximately 60 cases of contaminated injured or ill cases handled by hospitals that my company has trained, most of the contamination was removed with the clothing. Only localized decontamination of open skin or wounds was nec-essary. In only one case, which involved an explosion, did the patient re-quire a total bath. In all cases the contamination was90-100 percent re-moved with one washing.
134. Q. Where will contaminated clothing be stored?
A. (Daverlo, Watts] It will be bagged and set aside in a controlled area for transfer to the Shoreham site for cleaning or disposal. It is also possible l
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- e that contamination activity would drop below detectable levels in a reason-able amount of time due to radiological decay alone, without further need for treatment.
135. Q. How many LERO people will be in the trailers to do monitoring and decon-tamination?
A. (Daverio] There are eight to ten people in each decontamination trailer.
This number could be expanded using backup or initial monitoring personnel if necessary. In addition, buildings in the immediate vicinity can be used for preliminary monitoring or for people waiting to enter the decontam-ination trailer.
136. Q. How do you handle people who have surface contamination that cannot be removed?
A. (Daverio, Watts] They will be sent to hospitals. LERO will notify the hos-pital first that the contamination is nonremovable and offers little possibil-ity of spreading. The affected people will drive themselves to the hospital, if they have cars, if they do not, LERO will provide transportation.
137. Q. Do you plan to administer potassium lodide to members of the public with thyroid contamination?
A. (Linnemann, Watts) Consistent with New York State policy, we do not plan to provide potassium iodide for the public.
1 138. Q. How will people who are contaminated be kept separate from people who I aren't?
A. (Daverlo, Watts] We will use the standard. magenta / yellow ropes, stan- I chions, and signs to designate controlled areas. The spread of contamina-tion would require direct surface-to-surface contact, and our monitoring people are trained to keep contaminated and noncontaminated areas separate. l l
i L
139. Q. If an event like the accident scenario postulated during the FEMA Exercise occurred, what would LERO do?
A. (Daverlo, Watts] First, let us emphasize that in order to test fully the ca-pabilities of the LERO response, the February 13, 1986 Exercise postulated a very unrealistic accident. In the unlikely event that this situation should happen, LERO would attempt to handle the affected population at the three reception centers. This would be adequate if only a limited portion of the EPZ were contaminated.
(Daverio, Linnemann, Watts] If a large segment of the EPZ were affect-ed, though, LERO would recommend that people proceed to their evacua-tion destination, take showers, change into clean clothing, and bag the re-moved clothing. In this case, the' population requiring congregate care would still proceed to the reception centers, where adequate decontam-ination facilities exist. The reception centers would remain open for sev-eral days so that evacuees could return and be monitored to reassure them-selves that they were not contaminated.
140. Q. Is there any support for this approach in federal guidance documents?
A. (Daverio, Watts] There is a draf t, dated June 27, 1986, of Chapter 7 of the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency. This draf t manual says this on page 7-37:
- d. Establish monitoring and personnel decon-tamination (bathing) facilities at evacuation centers.
Encourage evacuated persons who did not go to an evacuation center but who were in specified areas at specified times (based on the location of the airborne plume) to bathe, change clothes, wash clothes, and wash other exposed surfaces such as cars and trucks and their contents and then report to these evacuation centers for monitoring. Table 7-7 provides recom-mended surface contamination limits for these centers.
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- XI. CONTAMINATED WASHWATER 141. Q. What will happen to the washwater af ter it is used to decontaminate peo-ple?
4 A. (Daverlo, Watts] The washwater will be collected in collapsible storage tanks and held until it can be monitored. Depending on the level of activi-ty, it will then be either released directly to the environment (af ter getting the approval, if necessary, of the responsible government officials), or it
{ will be processed either at the Shoreham Station or by a commercial pro-t f cessor of radioactive wastes.
142. Q. How much storage capacity are you providing for radioactive washwater?
A. (Daverio] The tanks will be large enough to contain the entire full flow of
! all showers in the decontamination ' trailers, assuming all showers were lett on full, for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The capacities will be as follows:
Total Number 24-Hour of 15,000 gallon Reception Center Full Flow Tanks 1
Hicksville 120,000 gal. 8 Roslyn 60,000 4 Bellmore 60,000 4 143. Q. What if you just released the water to storm drains or sewers?
A. (Daverio, Watts] Letters from the State of New York (Attachment N to this testimony) indicate this would not pose a health problem because the contaminated water would be greatly diluted.
i 144. Q. Is there federal guidance on this?
, A. (Daverlo, Watts] The draf t EPA manual mentioned above says this on page 7-36: !
i i .
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, For emergency situations, the following gener- .
i al guidance regarding surface contamination is recom-mended:
l ....
, b. Do not waste ofjorts trying to contain con- ,/
l , *, taminated wash water. =
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t 145. Q
.. Can you calculate how high the activity in the washwater might be?
A. (Watts] As an example we elleulated the potential wastewater concen- i tration cf lodine-131 that could rasult from showering 3800 evacuees, all of whom wore assumed to hivh. received contamination at thw very high levels
, 1 3 ,
assimed prosent downwind from Sho.'aham during the February 13, 1986 Exercise, it was assumed that I-131 con:t.n'aination was equally distributed over all normally exposed skin areas (i.e.. approximated 30 percent of the .'
body's surface area), and'that 011 contamination on each pers3n was re-moved during a 15-minute showoring pedad. This resulted in a calculated l
I-131 concentration that was 'appedelmately 150 time: the maximum per-
, . ~ ,
missibi^e concentration (MPC) for 1-131 in pubNe w. ster as stated in 10 L C.F.R. Part 20, Appendix B. Even without further dilution or processing, t
radiological decay alone would reouco this concentration down to permissi-ble drinking water levels during a hold-up perhxi of less than two months. .
u , Of course, if deemed necessary, this water codd be prock.*eed to remove the radioactivity using ccaventional treatment 'techriques.
6 "
146.
Q. If vehiclei; are contaminated by radinictive materials, how do yn't propwe i to decontaminate them? *
/ j A. ( Watt.1) LERO will decontaminate. vehicles byylping them with dim [os able paper wipes and a common-homehold close. The contaniinated ,
wipr.s wildbe collected in bass and removed to t!w shoreha(station for disposal.
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f 147. Q. Does the proposed use of the reception centers require authorization under State environmental law?
p A. (Daverio] First, no reception centers designated in any other radiological emergency plan in New York State (and this includes plans for Indian Point, f -
FitzPatrick, Ginna, and Nine Mlle Point) have been required to have SPDES permits for radioactive water or environmental impact statements. Based on this information, we conclude that no state approvalis required.
Second, there will not be any release of contaminated water, sinle we intend to collect it as described above.
i I
If some State or local approval were required before decontam-1 i y ination could be done, LILCO would use best efforts to secure that approv-i al. If approval could not be had in advance of an emergency, LILCO would j at the time of an accident seek emergency approval from the authorities before decontaminating anyone.
l j If there were a need for permits or manifests for transporting or dis- l
^'
posing of contaminated water or other materials.after decontaminating l people and vehicles, they could be applied for during the recovery phase, when the emergency was over.
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ATTACHMENTS 4
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Attachment A
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PROFESSIONAL QU ALIFICATIONS CHARLES A. DAVERIO Assistant Department Manager - Nuclear Operations Support Department LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY My name is Charles A. Daverio and my businiass address is Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, P.O. Box 628, North Country Road, Wading River, New York 11792. I have been employed by LILCO since February,1976.
I was awarded a Bachelor of Engineering degree in Mechanical Engineering in February 1972 from Manhattan College, located in Riverdale, New York. In 1974, I attended a special summer program on " Nuclear Power Reactor Safety" at the Mas-sachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston, Massachusetts. In February 1975 I earned my Master of Science degree in Industrial Engineering from New York University, lo-cated in New York City.
In 1972, I was employed by Cosentini Associates, located in New York, New York, where I was assigned to the Field Supervision Department. My primary functions included checking HVAC vendor equipment submittals against specifications.
From 1973 to 1974, I was employed by EDasco Services, Inc., located in New York, New York. I served Ebasco Services, Inc. as a Project Coordinator with responsi-bility for contract administration and coordination of Ebasco Engineering and Design efforts.
In 1974, I joined Stone & Webster f.ngineering Corporation (S&W), located in New York. New York, where I was assigned the position of Licensing Coordinator on the Jamesport Project. In May of 1974,I was assigned to LILCO's office to assist them in their licensing effort on the Jamesport Project. I remained in this position until 1976.
i CHARLES A. DAVERIO Page :
From February 1976 to January 1979,I was assigned as an Associate Engineer in the Licensing Section of LILCO's Nuclear Engineering Division. I was responsible, except for the legal authority involved, for Jamesport's licensing under NRC regula-E l tions and rules. In this regard, I testified before the ASLB concerning compliance of the Jamesport site with 10 CFR 100 site suitability requirements.
In January 1979, I was appointed Section Supervisor of the Licensing Section.
I remained in this position until November 1981. In this capacity, I was responsible for generic licensing issues as they might affect Shoreham, in January 1980, I was given the additional responsibility of Chairman of the Emergency Planning Task Force and I testified before the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on Shoreham's Emer- ;
! gency Plan. In January 1981, I assumed yet another role as Lead Licensing Engineer for the Shoreham Public Hearings. In this assignment, I was responsible for working with
< the licensing legal team in the particularization of contentions, discovery, and devel-
! oping testimony for the forthcoming hearings.
From November 1981 to April 1982, I served as the full-time Chairman of the Emergency Planning Task Force, reporting to the Vice President, Engineering. I i was responsible for the completion of the Shoreham Emergency Plan, including the de-
\
- tailed implementing procedures. Further, the Task Force was responsible for insuring proper training of all emergency personnel and for the overall coordination and review -
of state and local plans to insure they were prepared for the joint NRC/ FEMA exercise.
In April 1982, I was assigned to the Nuclear Operations Support Department, I
where I remained until January 1983. In addition to assuming responsibility for special projects in the regulatory area, in this capacity I provided consultation to the Emergen-cy Planning Task Force, particularly regarding the Company's coordination with
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C}IARLES A. DAVERIO Page ~3~
f federal, state, and local officials. I was furthermore responsible for hearing tion on Emergency Planning.
In January 1983, I assumed the position of Supervisor, Emergency Planning and Regulatory Services. In this capacity, I acted as the Company's primary co with industry groups; I was responsible for research and development programs f Nuclear the Office of Nuclear Operations. I provided support for the functioning o tne Furthermore, my responsibilities included the implementation of Review Board.
LILCO's Emergency Preparedness Program. This involved administering both the o and offsite preparedness program.
In March 1983, I received a special assignment, serving as Assistant Manager of the Local Emergency Response Implementing Organization. In this capacity, I pro-The vided supervision for thirty professional and four administrative staff personnel.
end product was the development and implementation of a Local Emergency Response Plan in.,which utility personnel performed ofisite emergency preparedness functions.
From July of 1984 to April of 1986,I was Manager of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Division. In this position. I was responsible for maintaining the Shoreham i onsite and offsite emergency preparedness programs. This included procedure develop-ment, training drills and exercises. Also, I was responsible for budget and schedule con-trol. I had an approved staff of eleven professionals and three administrative support personnel. In addition, approximately ten to fif teen consultants were used to support the program.
From April to November 1986 I was the Assistant to the Vice President of Nuclear Operations. I provided direct support and assistance to the Vice President for a seven hundred person organization covering quality assurance, engineering,
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CHARLES A. DAVERIO Page~4-operations and all support for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. This position re-quired a working knowledge of all facets of the nuclear program. I prepared special re-ports and studies as directed and advised the Vice President on matters requiring his personal attention. I maintained office continuity in the absence of the Vice President and represented the Vice President in both industry and in-company meetings. I man-aged many special project.c for the Vice President and interacted directly with senior corporate management. I also provided policy clarification and advice to the personnel within the Office of Nuclear Operations.
In November of 1986 I assumed the position of Assistant Department Manag-er, Nuclear Operations Support Department. This Department is comprised of the fol-lowing divisions: Security, Emergency Preparedness, Financial Services, Licensing and Contract Administration.
My training also includes the Westinghouse Electric Corporation's PWR Sys-tems Intfoduction Course and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Special Sum-mer Program on " Nuclear Power Reactor Safety."
- l Attachment B I
1 DALE E. DONALDSON Director, Radiological Services Division Hydro Nuclear Services EDUCATION B.S., Ohio State University
SUMMARY
OF EXPERIENCE Mr. Donaldson is an expert in the planning, scheduling, implementation ,
and evaluation of emergency preparedness and radiation protection pro-grams for nuclear facilities. Mr. Donaldson gained invaluable experience as a member of the NRC investigation team for the accident at Three Mile Island. He was also involved with nuclear incident assessment and control and radiation protection activities while working for the U.S. Army and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. His most recent work has involved the evaluation, planning, scheduling, and related management of the imple-mentation of the Health Physics Program at the Limerick Generating Station and Shoreham Station in preparation for licensing.
1985 - Present Director, Radiological Services Division, Hydro Nuclear Services. Provides overall Divisional executive management, direction and coordination for all professional consulting aspects of HNS operations. Responsible for all routine and special RSD projects, regulatory affairs, project planning and development , quality control of RSD operations and executive liaison functions both internally within HNS and with respect to client executive management.
1982 - 1985 Senior Radiological Engineer and Director of East Coast operation, Radiological Services Division, Hydro Nuclear Services. Provided senior level consulting services in the areas of Health Physics , Radioactive Waste Management, Reactor Chemistry, and Emergency Preparedness .
Performed program evaluation and provides management services to power reactors relative to the planning, scheduling, and implementation of these programs.
Senior Engineer, Engineering Services Division, TERA Corporation. Provided professional consulting services in all phases of Radiation Protection and Emergency Prepared-ness.
1975 - 1982 Health Physicist, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region i Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Was responsible for inspecting emergency planning, radiation protection and environmental monitoring programs at nuclear power reactors, nuclear fuel facilities and test and research reactors; developing and maintaining a 61014-RSD1
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DALE E. DONALDSON Page 2 Regional incident Response Plan; serving as co-chairman of three Federal Regional Advisory Committees and the Federal Field Assistance Cadre for assistance to states in radiological emergency response planning: member of the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement investigation Team for the accident at Three Mile Island; contributing author of NUREG-0654 and the NRC health physics and emergency preparedness appraisal programs; member of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission Health Physics Appraisa!
Team, and Team Leader of a Nuclear Regulatory Commis-slon Emergency Preparedness Appraisal Team.
1969 - 1975 Chemical, Biological and Radiological Officer, U.S. Army.
Various titles with Supervisory responsibility and in-structor duties involving: Radiation safety , nuclear accident / incident assessment and control; civil and military emergency preparedness; nuclear weapons ef fects:
project management for the research, development, test and evaluation of radiological items of equipment and radiological safety policies and procedures.
PUBLICATIONS NRC Health Physics Appraisal Prog ram, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission / May 1980.
Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and Enforcement , N U R EG-0600, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1979.
Crlteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plan ts , U.S. Nuclear Regula tory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, .lanuary 1980.
61014-RSD1 l
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Attachment C PROFESSIONAL QU ALIFICATIONS EDWARD B. LIEBERMAN Vice President KLD ASSOCIATES, INC.
My name is Edward B. Lieberman and my busin'ess address is KLD Associates, Inc.,300 Broadway, Huntington Stelion, New York 11746. I am presently Vice President of KLD Associates,Inc.
I received the Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in 1951 from Poly-technic Institute of Brooklyn. I was awarded the Master of Science degree in Civil En-gineering in 1954 from Columbia University and in Aem Engineering in 1967 from Poly-technic Institute of Brooklyn. I subsequently worked on a Doctorate degree in Transportation Planning at Polytechnic Institute of New York. I am a member of the Chi Epsilon Honorary Fraternity.
With almost 30 years of professional experience, I have managed a number of major projects. I pioneered the development and application of traffic simulation mod-els, making Dajor state-of-the-art innovations in the traffic engineering profession. I have also been responsible for many engineering studies involving data collection and analysis and design of traffic control systems to expedite traffic flow and relieve con-gestion.
I have developed simulation models to study traffic performance on urban net-works, freeways, and freeway corridors. I have recently completed a traffic simulation model for two-lane, two-way rural roads. These programs include consideration of pe-destrians, interaction with vehicular traffic, truck and bus operations, special turning
' lanes, and vehicle fuel consumption and emissions; both pretimed and actuated traffic signal controls are represented.
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Edward B. Lieberman
. Page 2 i
I was the Principal Investigator for the development of traffic signal control strategies for congested conditions in mid-Manhattan. These strategies were imple-mented and evaluated in the field. Car tests indicated substantial reductions in delay
- combined with increased vehicle throughput.
1 I was the Principal Investigator in the development of an interactive computer-graphics (ICG) sof tware system for displaying traffic simulation results generated by the Netsim model. I designed the overall structure of the sof tware for implementation on PC AT computers and, subsequently, on larger ICG work stations. This work was i
sponsored by FHWA.
I was responsible to a large extent for the theoretieni development of DYNEV, a Dynamic Network Evacuation model. The DYNEV model consists of two major compo-nents: an equilibrium traffic assignment model and a macroscopic dynamic traffic sim-ulation model designed for all types of roadway facilities (urban streets, freeways, rural
) roads).
1 j DYNEV is designed to be used as a tool to develop and organize evacuation plans l
l needed as part of general disaster preparedness planning. DYNEV was used to analyze an existing evacuation scenario at the Con Edison Indian Point Nuclear Power Station l
and is currently being used to develop an extensive evacuation plan for the LILCO Shoreham Nuclear Power Station on Long Island, New York.
In developing this evacuation plan for LILCO's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, my activities include definition of evacuation scenarios, definition of the evacuation network, development of traffic control treatments and of traffic routing patterns, analysis of trip tables, analysis of simulation results, optimization of evacuation strategies and the preparation of formal documentation.
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i Edward B. Lieberman .
Page 3 I was responsible for the development of the I-DYNEV model, an interactive ver-sion and enhancement of the DYNEV model, under contract with the Federal Emergen-cy Management Agency (FEMA). I-DYNEV, in turn, was integrated into the Integrated Emergency Management Information System (IEMIS), developed by FEMA. I applied I-DYNEV to estimate the evacuation times for the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) for
- eight nuclear power stations.
I developed course material and conducted training for emergency planning per-sonnel at the National Emergency Training Center (NETC) in Emmittsburgh, Maryland.
I was also responsible for the designs of the NETSIM microscopic urban traffic simulation model (formerly UTCS-1) and of the SCOT freeway traffic simulation model.
The NETSIM microscopic traffic simulation model developed for the Federal Highway l
Administration, enables agencies to evaluate traffic operations in urban environments.
The SCOT model was developed for the Transportation Systems Center of the Depart-ment of Transportation. This program includes a dynamic traffic assignment algorithm which routes traffic over a network in response to changing traffic flow characteristics i
- to satisfy a specified origin-destination table. In addition, I have developed advanced ,
traffic control policies for urban traffic for the FHWA-sponsored UTCS Project, as well
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as a bus preemption policy to enhance the performance of mass transit operations I l
within urban environs.
I designed and programmed the advanced " Third generation" area-wide, cycle-free control policies for moderate and congested traffic flow for computer-monitored real-time systems. I also developed a cycle-based, off-line computational procedure named SIGOP-II, to optimize traffic signal timing patterns to minimize system "disutility."
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Edward B. Lieberman Page 4 I led a group of traffic engineers and systems analysts in developing a system of macroscopic traffic simulation models designed to evaluate Transportation Systems Management (TSM) strategies. This sof tware system, named TRAFLO, also includes an equilibrium traffic assignment model. This model has been distributed to other agen-cles including FEMA.
I designed an " Integrated Traffic Simulation System," named TRAF, which will eventually incorporate all the best traffic simulation models available. Using struc-tured programming techniques, TRAF integrates: NETSIM, TRAFLO, and ROADSIM, a microscopic rural-road simulation model.
I served as PrincipalInvestigator on NCHRP Project 3-20 entitled," Traffic Sig-
)
nal Warrants." This project involved both field data collection and the application of the NETSIM model to study intersection delay as a function of traffic volume, a type of control and geometrics. In turn, I developed and documented new signal warrants, some of which will be incorporated in the next version of the Manual on Uniform Traf-fic Control Devices (MUTCD).
Under NHTSA sponsorship, I directed a research study to evaluate a Driver Vehl-cle Evaluation Model named DRIVEM. This model simulates the response of motorists to hazardous events. This effort included analysis of the model formulation and sof tware and sensitivity testing. A workshop was designed, organized, scheduled and conducted by myself and other KLD professionals; experts f rom all over the U.S. were invited to recommend specific NHTSA research activities for the further development l of the model. A recommended research program constituted the major output of the contract. .
l
Edward B. Lieberman Page5 Over the years I have been involved in a number of other studies to evaluate traffic operations on large-scale road networks, using one or more of the models de-scribed above.
Prior to 1960 I applied my skills to the areas of stress analysis, vibrations, fluid dynamics and numerical analysis of differential equations. These analyses were pro-grammed for the IBM 7090 and System 360, CDC 6600 and 7600, G.E. 625 and UNIVAC i
llOB digital computers in assembly language, FORTRAN and PLI. I also designed the logic and real-time programming for a sonar simulator built for the Department of Navy and monitored by a PDP-8 process-control digital computer.
I am a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers, the Institute of Transportation Engineers, the Association of Computing Machinery and the Trans-portaton Research Board (TRB). I am also a member of the Capacity Committee and of the Traffic Flow Theory and. Characteristics Committee of the TRB. I am a licensed Professional Engineer in New York, Maryland. and Florida.
The following list comprises selected publications of my studies and findings:
"DYNET - A Dynamic Network Simulation of Urban Traffic
- Flow," Proceedings, Third Annual Simulation Symposium, 1970.
" Simulation of Traffic Flow at Signalized Intersections: the SURF System," Proceedings,1970 Summer Computer Simula-tion Conference,1970.
" Dynamic Analysis of Freeway Corridor Traffic," ASME paper, Trans. 70-42.
" Simulation of Corridor Traffic: The SCOT Model,"
" Highway Research Record No. 409,1972.
" Logical Design and Demonstration of UTCS-1 Network Sim-ulation Model." Highway Research Record No. 409, 1972 with R. D. Worrall and J. M. Bruggerman).
l
Edward B. Lieberman Page 6
" Variable Cycle Signal Timing Program: Volumes 1-4," Final Report of Contract DOT-FH-11-7924, June,1974.
" Traffic Signal Warrants," KLD TR-51, Final Report on NCHRP Project 3-20/1,' December 1976 (with G. F. King and R. Goldblatt).
" Rapid Signal Transition Algorithm," TransDortation Research Record No. 509.1974 (with D. Wicks).
"Subnetwork Structuring and Interfacing for UTCS Project-Program of Simulation Studies," KLD TR-5, January, 1972.
" Development of a Bus Signal Preemption Policy and a Sys-tem Analysis of Bus Operations," KLD TR-11 April 1973.
"SIGOP-II - Program to Calculate Optimal,- Cycle-Based Traffic Signal Timing Patterns, Volumes 1 and 2," Final Re-port, Contract DOT-FH-11-7924, KLD _ TR-29 and TR-30, December 1974. Summary report in Transportation Research Record 596,1976 (with J. Woo).
" Developing a Predictor for Highly Responsive System-Based Control," Transportation Research Record 596,1976 (with W. McShane and R. Goldblatt).
"A New Approach for Specifying Delay-Based Traffic Signal Warrants," Transportation Research Special Report 153 -
Better Use of Existing Transportation Facilities,1976.
" Network Flow Simulation for Urban Traffic Control Sys-tems," Vols.1-5, PB230-760, PB230-761, PB230-762, PB230-763, PB230-764,1974 (with R. Worrall). Vols. 2-4 up-dated 1977, KLD TR-60, TR-6? , TR-62 (with D. Wicks and J.
Woo). l
" Extension of the UTCS-1 Traffic Simulation Program to In-corporate Computation of Vehicular Fuel Consumption and Emissions," KLD TR-63,1976 (with N. Rosenfield).
" Analysis and Comparison of the UTCS Second- and Third-Generation Predictor Models," KLD TR-35,1975.
" Urban Traffic Control System (UTCS) Third Generation Control (3-GC) Policy," Vol.1,1976 (with A. Liff).
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Edward B. Lieberman Page 7
" Design of TRAFIC Operating System (TOS), KLD TR-57, 1977.
" Revisions to the UTCS-1 Traffic Simulation Model to En-hance Operational Efficiency," KLD TR-59,1977 (with A.
Wu).
"The' Role of Capacity in Computer Traffic Control," in Research Directions in ComDuter Control of Urban Traffic Systems, ASCE,1979.
" Traffic Simulation: Past, Present and Potential," in Ham-burger, W.S. and Steinman, L., eds., Proceedings of the International Symposium of Traffic Control Systems. U ni-versity of California, Berkeley,1979.
"TR A FLO: A New Tool to Evaluate Transportation System Management Strategies," presented at the 59th Annual l Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,1980 (with B.
Andrews),
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" Determination of the Lateral Deployment of Traffic on an Approach to an Intersection," presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,1980.
I l
" Service Rates of Mixed Traffic on the Lef t-Most Lane of an Approach," presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,1980 (with W. R. McShane).
" Development of a TRANSYT-Based Traffic Simulation i Model," presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Trans- l portation Research Board,1980 (with M. Yedlin). l
" Hybrid Macroscopic-Microscopic Traffic Simulation Model,"
presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation ,
Research Board,1980 (with M. C. Davila).
"A Model for Calculating Safe Passing Distance on Two Lane Rural Road," presented at the 60th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,1981.
"The TRAF System - Anayltic Formulation and Logical De-sign of the Roadsim Model," KLD TR-129 June 1983.
"PREDYN User's Guide," KLD TR-131, June 1983.
"The TRAF System - Technical Report," KLD TR-136, August 1983 (with M. Yedlin, B. Andrew and K. Sheridan).
Edward B. Lieberman
- Page 8 I
4 l
" Application of the I-DYNEV System to Compute Estimates of Evacuation Travel Time at Nuclear Power Stations - l Four Demonstration Case Studies," KLD TR-142, December ;
1983.
" Users Manual for the Interactive Dynamic Network Evacua-tion Model: I-DYNEV." KLD TR-144, February 1984.
" Formulations of the DYNEV and I-DYNEV Traffic Simula-tion Models Used in EESF," KLD TR-154, March 1984.
"PREDYN/IDYNEV Training Guide," KLD TR-155, April 1984 (with R. Goldblatt).
" Specifications of Recommended Interactive Graphics Hard-ware Configuration and Graphics Support Sof tware for the Netsim Graphics Display Package," KLD TM-93, July 1985.
" Metering of High-Density Sectors Comparison of Traffic Operations Along Fif th Avenue in Mid-Manhattan: Metering Control vs. Existing Control," KLD TM-94, July 1985.
" Description of an Integrated Traffic Assignment and Distri-
- bution Model (TRAD) for the IDYNEV Systme," KLD TR-187, April 1986.
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! " Evacuation Plan Update (Robert G. Ginna Nuclear Power Station)," KLD TR-189 May 1986 (with R. Goldblatt).
" Evacuation Plan Update (Davis Besse)," KLD TR-190, July
, 1986 (with R. Goldblatt).
"Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Estimates and Traffic Management Plan Update," KLD TR-174, Aurest 1986.
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" Reducing Traffic Congestion at Herald Square," ITE Jour-nal, September 1986, pp. 27-31 (with A.K. Rathi).
- " Congestion Based Traffic Control Scheme for High Traffic Density Sectors," Transportation Research Record No.1057 TRB, National Research Council Washington, D.C.,1986, pp. 49-57 (with A.K. Rathi and G.F. King).
" Overview of the Evacuation Plan and of the Evacuation Time Estimates for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station,"
KLD TM-98. October,1986.
- . . . _ , . . _ . . .---._. - ,,, - . . , . , , _ _ . - - . . - _ . _ , - - _ . - - - . , _ . . - - . - , , , . - . . ~
Edward B. Lieberman Page 9
" Overview of the Evacuation Plan and of the Evacuation Time Estimates for the Ginna Nuclear Power Station," KLD TM-99, November 1986 (with R. Goldblatt).
" Overview of the Coastal Region within the Pilgrim Station Emergency Planning Zone," KLD TM-100, November 1986.
" Enhanced Freflo Program: Simulation of Congested Envi-ronments," paper submitted for presentation at Transporta-tion Research Board's 66th Annual Meeting, January 1987 (with A.K. Rathi and M. Yedlin).
"The Netsim Graphics System," paper submitted for presen-tation at Transportation Research Board's 66th Annual Meeting, January 1987 (with B. Andrews and A. Santiago),
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Attachment D 1 PROFESSION AL QUALIFICATIONS MICHAEL K. LINDELL Visiting Associate Professor of Psychology GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY My name is Michael K. Lindell and my business address is School of Psycholo-gy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 225 North Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30332. Iam presently a Visiting Associate Professor of Psychology at the Georgia Institute of Tech-nology specializing in those areas of study dealing with complex organizations, hazards, and industrial / organizational psychology.
I received the Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology in 1969 irom the Uni-versity of Colorado. I was awarded a doctorate of Social Psychology and Quantitative Psychology in 1975 from the University of Colorado, Boulder. I am a member of the American Statistical Association, the Human Factors Society (Technical Groups on in-dustrial Ergonomics, Organizational Design and Management), the Society for Risk Analysis and the Judgment /Decisionmaking Society.
Since receiving my doctorate, I have been engaged in teaching and as a re-search scientist. From 1974 to the present,I have been a Research Scientist at Battelle Memorial Institute, Human Affairs Research Centers. During my tenure at Battelle, I also have held various adjunct teaching positions. In 1981 I was a Visiting Lecturer in Educational Psychology at the University of Washington. From 1981 to the present I have been an Adjuact Assistant Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington.
On the undergraduate level, I have taught introductory Statistics, Psycholog-ical Testing, Industrial / Organizational Psychology and Social Psychology. On the gradu-ate level, I have taught Introduction to Research and Advanced Correlation / Regression Analysis.
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Michael K. Lindell Page 2 During my employment with the Battelle Memorial Institute, I have been principal investigator / project director for several projects, related to emergency pre-paredness, evaluation. of emergency organizations and the staffing of emergency orga-nizations including:
National Institute of Mental Health. Consequences of natural hazards for mental health.
Energy Research and Development Administration. Public perception and t
evaluation of risk associated with nuclear waste.
Private Corporation. Analysis of position evaluation system.
1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Technical assistance in implementing emergency preparedness requirements.
< Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of licensee emergency response f acility designs.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of emergency exercises at nu-clear power plants.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Analysis of emergency staffing.
Atomic Industrial Forum. Planning concepts and decision criteria for shel-tering and evacuation.
National Science Foundation. Behavioral response to technological hazards.
Westinghouse Corporation. Human f actors assistance for the Hanford Emer-gency Control Center.
s Private Corporation. Toxic chemical emergency response plan.
Department of Energy. Human factors assistance for the DOE headquarters emergency operations center.
, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of licensee emergency response facilities.
In addition to the projects just listed I have authored the following books or j chapters in books'.
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Michael K. Lindell .
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Perry, R. W., Lindell, M. K. and Greene, M. R. Evacuation Planning in Emerrency Man-
.arement. Lexington, M A: Heath Lexington Books,1981.
Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. Handbcok of Emergency Response Planning. Under con-tract to Hemisphere Publishing (a division of Harper & Row) to be published I in late 1987.
Stewart, T. R., Joyce, C. R. B. and Lindell, M. K. New analyses appilcation of judgment theory to physicians judgments of drug effects. In K. R. Hammond and C. R.
i B. Joyce (Eds.) Psychoactive drugs and social judgment: Theory and research New York: Wiley Interscience,1975.
i Earle, T. C. and Lindell, M. K. Public perception of industrial risks: a free response ap-proach. In R. A. Waller and V. T. Covello (Eds.) Low Probability High Conse-ouence Risk Analysis: Issues. Methods and Case Studies. New York: Plenum Press,1984. .
3 Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. Communicating threat information for volcano hazards.
In L. Walters (Ed.) Comunication in Disaster: Disseminating Bad News, in press.
]
The following is a list of journal articles I have written that relate to the is-sues about which I will testify:
i 4
l Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. Psychological consequences of' natural disaster. Mass
- Emergencies, 1978, 3, 105-115.
! Lindell, M. K. and Perry, R. W. Evaluation criteria for emergency response plans in ra-l dialogical transportation. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1980, 3, 335-348.
i Perry, R. W., Greene, M. R. and Lindell, M. K. Enhancing evacuation warning compli-j ance: suggestions for emergency planning. Disasters, 1980, 4, 433-449.
Greene, M. R., Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. The March 1980 eruptions of Mt. St.
I Helens: Citizen perceptions of volcano hazard. Disasters, 1981, 5, 49-66.
l l Drexler, J. A. Jr. and Lindell, M. K. Training / job fit and worker satisf action. Human
- Relations, 1981, 34, 907-915.
! Perry, R. W., Lindell, M. K. and Greene, M. R. Threat perception and public response to j volcano hazard. Journal of Social Psychology, 1982, 116, 199-204.
! Lindell, M. K., Perry, R. W. and Greene, M. R. Individual response to emergency pre-
- paredness planning near Mt. St. Helens. Disaster Management, 1983.3,5-11.
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, Michael K. Lindell j Page 4 Perry, R. W., Lindell, M. K. and Greene, M. R. Crisis communications ethnic differen-tials in interpreting and responding to disaster warnings. Social Behavior and Personality, 1982, 1_0,97-104.
Lindell, M. K. and Perry, R. W. Nuclear power plant emergency warning: how would the public respond? Nuclear News, 1983, 21, 49-53.
Lindell, M. K. and Earle, T. C. How close is close enough: public perceptions of the risks of industrial facilities. Risk Analysis 1983, 3, 245-253.
Houts, P. S.', Lindell, M. K., Hu, T. W., Cleary, P. D., Tokuhata, G. and Flynn, C. B. The protective action decision model applied to evacuation during the Three Mile Island crisis. International Journal of Mass Emerrencies and Disasters.
1984, 2, 27-39, i
Lindell, M. K. Review of Warning and Response to the Mt. St. Helens Eruption by Saarinen and Sell. Disasters, 1985, 9, 230-232.
Lindell, M. K. and Barnes, V. E. Protective response to technological emergency, risk perception and behavioralintention. Nuclear Safety, 1986, 27, 457-467.'
Kartez, J. D. and Lindell, M. K. Planning for uncertainty: the case of local disaster planning. Journal of the American Planning Association, in press.
I have written approximately forty technical reports for governmental and corporate sponsors. Those which are relevant to the issues in this litigation are:
j 1
i
- Nealey, S. M., Thornton, G. C., Maynard, W. S., and Lindell, M. K. Defining research needs to insure continued job motivation of air traffic controllers in future
- air traffic control systems. Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers,1975.
Maynard, W. S., Nealey, S. M., Hebert, J. A., and Lindell, M. K. Public values associated with nuclear waste disposal. BNWL-1997 UC-11. Battelle Pacific Northwest i
Laboratories,1976.
4 4 Lindell M. K., Earle, T. C., Hebert, J. A. and Perry, R. W. Radioactive wastes: Public attitudes toward disposalIacilities. B-HARC-411-004,1978.
Schilling, A., Harris, A., Lindell, M., Marcus, A., Perry, R., and Selvin, M. Emergency l
response in transportation of radioactive materials: An evaluation method-ology. BHARC-311-004,1979.
Earle, T. C. and Lindell, M. K. The role of the newsmedia in the gasoline crisis.
BH A RC/411-80-002.
i 1
1 Michael K. Lindell-Page 5 Lindell, M. K., Rankin, W. R. and Perry, R. W. Warning mechanisms in emergency re-sponse systems. BHARC-411/80/003.
Greene, M. R., Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. The March 1980 eruptions of Mt. St.
Helens: Citizen perceptions of volcano hazard. BHARC-400/80/021.
Lindell, M. K., Walsh, J. T., Drexler, J. A. Jr. and Lawler, E. E., III. Effects of technol-ogy on experienced job characteristics and job satisf action.
BHARC-422/80/019.
Urbanik, T., Desrosiers, A., Lindell, M. K., and Schuller, C. R. Analysis of techniques for estimating evacuation times for emergency planning zones.
BHARC-401/80-017. NUREG/CR-1745.
Bolton, P. A., Greene, M. R., and Lindell, M. K. Public information programs accompa-nying emergency plans at nuclear power plants: Issues for consideration.
BHARC-400/80/025.
Lindell, M. K., and Earle, T. C. Comparative analysis of risk characteristics of nuclear waste repositories and other disposal f acilities. BHARC-411/81/005.
Earle, T. C., Lindell, M. K., and Rankin, W. L. Risk perception, risk evaluation and i
human values: Cognitive bases of the acceptability of a radioactive waste repository. BHARC-411/81/007.
Lindell, M. K., Perry, R. W., and Greene, M. R. Public response to evacuation warnings:
Implications of natural hazards evacuations for nuclear emergencies.
BHARC-411/81/032.
Earle, T. C., Southwick, L. L., and Lindell, M. K. Newspaper coverage of Mt. St.
l Helens: Patterns of content and information sources. BHARC 411/81/035.
Desrosiers, A. E., Hickey, E. E., Lewis, J. R. and Lindell, M. K. Criteria for evaluation l of emergency response facilities,1981 (published as NUREG-0814).
Lindell, M. K., Wise, J. A., Desrosiers, A. E., Griffin, B. N. and Meltzler, W. D. Design i basis for the NRC Operations Center. BHARC-400/82-005.
Lindell, M. K. Analysis of emergency staffing for nuclear power plants.
BHA RC-400/83/032.
Lindell, M. K., Bolton, P. A., Perry, R. W. Stoetzel, G. A., Martin, J.B., and Flynn, C. B.
- Planning concepts and decision criteria for sheltering and evacuation in a nuclear power plant emergency. Atomic Industrial Forum / National Environ-mental Studies Project. AIF/NESP-031.
6 5
Michael K. Lindell ,
Page 6 s
Lindell, M. K. Communicating risk information to' the public: a review of research on natural hazards. BHARC-400/84/026.
Lindell, M. K., Martin, J.B. and Stoetzel, G. A. A protective action decision procedure using radiological release date and offsite response times.
l BHARC-400/85/007.
t Lindell, M. K. Functional analysis for the Hanford ECC. BHARC-400/85/009.
Lindell, M. K. Social and political aspects of nuclear power plant emergency planning.
BHARC/400/85/012.
Lindell, M. . K. Analysis of information flow within the Hanford Emergency Control Center. BHARC-400/85/018.
Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. Twentieth century volcanicity at Mt. St. Helens:
- Routinization of life near an active volcano. BHARC-400/86/003.
1 Lindell, M. K. and Barnes, V. E. Comparative perceptions of characteristics of natural and technological hazards. BHARC-400/86/007.
I I have also made presentations at various professonal meetings that relate to the issues in this litigation. To the extent that these presentations did not become the subject of journal articles or technical reports, they are listed below.
! Lindell, M. K.,1976. Assessment of social values in nuclear waste disposal. Western j Psychological Association.
Lindell, M. K. and Maynard, W. S.,1976. Interchange of technical information and Dub-lie beliefs in enerrv decisionmaking. Western Psychological Association.
Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K.,1979. Predisaster planning to promote comDllance with
' evacuation warnings. National Conference on Hurricanes and Coastal Storms.
Lindell, M. K., Perry, R. W. and Greene, M. R.,1980. Race and disaster warning re-sponse. Pacific Sociological Association.
Lindell, M. K., Perry, R. W. and Greene, M. R.,1980. Consistency of attitudes and be-havior related to nuclear power. Western Psychological Association.
Greene, M. R., Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K.,1981. Citizen perception of public ac-i tions. Western Political Science Association.
l Michael K. Lindell Page 7
, Lindell, M. K., Perry, R. W. and Greene, M. R.,1981, Individual response to emerrency preparedness planning. Western Social Science Association.
Lindell, M. K., Perry,' R. W. and Greene, M. R.,1981. Social and psychological factors affecting evacuation decisionmaking. American Psychological Association.
Perry, R. W., Greene, M. R. and Lindell, M. K.,1981. Evacuation behavior during the May 18th eruption of Mt. St. Helens. Pacific Sociological Association.
Bolton, P. A., Perry, R. W., Lindell, M. K. and Greene, M. R.,1981'. Hazard eXDerience i and warning response of older persons. Gerontological Society of America.
Lindell, M. K.,1982. Judgments, values and the management of conflict over nuclear ,
waste. First International Conference on Social Impact Assessment.
Lindell, M. K.,1982. Development of a design for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's i emergency operations center. Human Factors Society.
1 Lindell, M. K. and Southwick, L. L.,1982. An analysis of information integration usin_g free response data. American Psychological Association.
- Southwick, L. L., Lindell, M. K. and Earle, T. C.,1982. Attitude polarization in public i
issues the roles of cognitive complexity evaluative consistency and issue im-i portance. Washington State Psychological Association.
1
! . Hanswick, C. Archea, J., Hanson, H., Keating, J., Lindell, M. K. and Wise, J. A.,1983.
Designing for personal control in hazards and disasters. Environmental De-t sign Research Association.
- Lindell, M. K.,1983. Analysis of emerrency staffing for nuclear power plants. Human
. Factors Society.
! Lindell, M. K., Moeller, P. A. and Renner, M. S.,1984. Offsite response consideration for appropriate protective actions. American Nuclear Society. l
\ l Lindell, M. K. and Perry, R. W.,1984. Social psychological processes and personal risk I
- assessment. Society for Risk Analysis.
Lindell, M. K.,1984. Communicating risk information to the public: a review of re- l I
search on natural hazards. NSF/ EPA Workshop on Risk Communication.
Lindell, M. K.,1985. Decision criteria for sheltering or evacuating medical facilities in radiological and hazardous materials incidents. Association for the advance-j ment of MedicalInstrumentation.
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Michael K. Lindell Page 8 The following is a list of Scientific Journal ad hoc reviews I have been in-volved with: Academy of Management Review, Risk Analysis, Disasters, and Interna-tional Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters.
I have served as a member of the following Scientific Peer Review Panels:
National Science Foundation, Community Water Management Program National Science Foundation, Applied Science and .
Research Applications Directorate National Science Foundation, Earthquake Hazards Mitigation Program National Science Foundation, Decision and Management .
Science Program Brookhaven National Laboratory, Department of Nuclear Energy i University of Washington, Department of Family Medicine Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine,
~
Department of Behavioral Science University of Pittsburgh, University Center for Social i and Urban Research
- University of Southern California, Institute of Safety and Systems Management National Science Foundation, Geography and Regional Science Program Argonne National Laboratory, EES Division I have given expert testimony for the Public Forum on the Operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant sponsored by Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy and the Public Hearing on the Operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant sponsored by the Plymouth Board of Selectmen and the Boston Edison Company.
In addition, I have served on a professional committee for the American Na-tional Standards Institute /American Nuclear Society Standards Committee Criteria for establishing emergency response facilities and am currently Conference Chair of the l American Society of Civil Engineers Specialty Confe.rence on Planning for Hazardous i Facilities.
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Michael K. Lindell Page 9 Not only have I taught university students, but I have taught professionals in l the field of emergency preparedness. The following is a list of short courses I have taught and lectures I have given.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Perception of risk at nuclear waste disposal sites and power Diants.
Lecture for Pacific Lutheran University Center for the Study of Public Poll- ,
cy.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. Lecture to Uni-versity of Washington Department of Environmental Health and Nuclear En-gineering.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Design of emergency response facilities. Pacific Northwest Labo-ratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1983. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1984. Emergency staffine. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1984. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory
! Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Protective action decisionmaking. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Emergency public information. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Short Course in Emergency Planning.
Lindell, M.K.,1985. Social and political aspects of nuclear power plant emergency planning. Health Physics Society Short Course on Emergency Planning.
I Lindell, M.K.,1985. Social response to the Mt. St. Helens eruptions. University of Washington Short Course on Mt. St. Helens.
i
- Lindell, M.K., 1985. Emergency management: planning principles for larre-scale emergencies involving technological and natural hazards in developed and developing nations. Administrative Staff, College of India Workshop in Risk Analysis in Developing Countries.
Linde.ll, M.K.,1986. Concerns about offsite response in a nuclear power plant emergen-SLv. GPU Nuclear Annual Training Workshop for TMI Area Emergency Re-sponse Agencies.
I
Attachment E i
I
) CURRICULUM VITAE, ROGER E. LINNEMANN, M.D.
PRESIDENT RADIATION MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF CLINICAL RADIOLOGY .
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL OF MEDICINE J
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T %I CURRICULU'iVITA'b -
~ June 9,' 1986~
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ROGER *:. LI!(HF? FANN, M.D. -
Home Address: 517' S.' Providence" Rocd ,,
We?.lingford, PA 19086 Office Address: Radiation Management Consultants 4-.
5301 Tacony Street - Box DS Philadelphia, PA 19137(
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Date of Birth:
January 12, 1931 ,- '
Place of Bitth: , St. Cloud,'Minnesot3 Educatien: 1962 University of tjinnesota, MinneapStis,g MN, B.A. (Cum Laude) s ..
1966 University of Minnesota, Minneapo ust'( ,
MN, B.S.l.M.D. t h' g-1956 - lq57 Walter Reed Army Hospital, :: ./.77 ton, D.C.; INTERNSHIP /-
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- 1962 - lo oS Walter Reed Army Hcipital, Washington, D.C.t RESIDENCY (R".diology) 1963 - 1965 US' Department of Agriculture Graduate School (Evening), Washington, D.C.,
Russian Language
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Professional Experience: 1, l !<
1986 - present President, Radiation Msww. ment Consultants -
y 1982 - 1986 Vice Ct'tirman, RadLItion Management / ~
[ _ y Corporaticrt ,., if, b L .,
1969 - 1982 s,. Pr'esident/ Chief Executive ' Officer, Radiation V' Management Corporation '- i , i
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1974 - present Clinical Associate Professor of Radiology, University of Pennsylvania S ocol of" Medicine 9
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1977 - present Visiting Associate Professor, Clinica; Radiology, Northwestern University Medical. School i
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1,2 :s 1 '9 Professional Experience (Con't):
1969 - 1974 Assistant Professor, Clinical Radiology, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine 1968 - 1969 Nuclear Medicine Consultant, Philadelphia Electric Company Jan - August 1968 Assistant Professor, Radiology, University 9
of Minnesota School of Medicine (investigated 1
i use of radioisotopes in kidney function evaluation) 1957 - 1968 Medical officer in United States Army.....
j 1
i 1965 - 1968 Commanding Officer, Nuclear Medicine Research Detachment, Europe; Radiological Health Consultant, j
US Army-Europe (responsible for plans, I procedures and training of military hospitals l C' and personnel in the evaluation, evacuation and treatment of radiation casualties). In l
January, 1966 sent to Palomares, Spain for evaluation of medical and environmental aspects of the mid-air collision involving nuclear weapons)
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1961 - 1962 Research Associate, Departmentlof Radiobiology,
- ,, ' Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, j Washington, D.C. (investigated use of anti-radiation drugs in treatment.of cancer) ,
! 1957 - 1961 General Medical Office, Europe i Languages: German, Russian i
a Professional Appointments:
1982 American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs Subcommittee on the Management t of Radiation Accident Victims
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j 1979 - present Health Physics Society Standards Committee General Dynamics Electric Boat Division
{l978 - 1981 Radiological Health Consultant I
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- 'Ja978 - 1980 Edison Electric Institute Utility Radiation i
Standards Group i
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1973 - 1982 University of Pennsylvania Radiation Safety Committee
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'. 1970 The American Nuclear Society Subcommittee '
i for Writing Emergency Procedures Standards 1969 Atomic Energy Commission ad hoc Comunittee
';M . on Medical Aspects of Radiation Accidents 1966 - present American College of Radiology.....
1966 - present 'li Conunission on Radiological Units, Standards and Protection j x -
1969 - 1980 Committe on Radiation Exposure of Women j 1969 - 1983 crummittee on Radiological Aspects of
- Disaster Planning l
1967 - 1978 International Affairs Conunittee Specialty Certification:
l'964 Certified by American Board of Radiology ,
1972 Certified by American Board of Nuclear Medicine ~
i Licensure: ,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Illinois and Minnesota J
National Societies: 3 American College of Radiology );
Werican Public Health Association '
American Medical Association ' '
-1 Society of Nuclear Medicine "
Pennsylvania Medical Society '
3
> Radiological' Society of North America, Inc.
An'erican Institute.of Physicists /American- Associat. ion of ,'
. Physicists-in Medicine American College of Nuclear Physicians ",
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Awards & Honors:
Association of Medicine & Security, Madrid, Spain (1978)
University of Minnesota Radiological Research Scholar (National Research Council)
United States Army Legion of Merit Listed in Who's Who in Frontier Science and Technology Presentations:
1983 DWK (see 1978) Munich, Germany - appeared before as international expert 1983 DWK (see 1978) Hanover, Germany - Presented seminar
" Medical Significance of Radiation Exposure" at University of Regensburg for medical and chemistry grad students 1982 Health Pysics Society (Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada) - Presented keynote speech " Medical & Public Health Consequences of an Off-Site Release of Radiation from Nuclear Power Facility" 1980 Korea Women's Association (Seoul, Korea) -
Presented paper, " Energy: The Basis for Health in Developing and Developed Countries", at International Symposium on the Expulsion of Environmental Pollution 1980 Korean Association for Radiation Protection (Seoul, Korea) - Presented seminar on emergency management of radiation injuries 1980 Ministry of Health (Madrid, Spain) - Presented paper, " Definitive Treatment of Radiation Injuries",
at First Seminar on Assistance to Those. Wounded by Radioactive Elements and Ionizing Radiations ,
1979 Reinisch Westfalisches Elekrizitatswerk (Essen, Germany) - Presented paper, " Energy: The Basis for Health in Developing and Developed Countries", at The Seventh Energy Workshop 1978 The Swedish State Power Board (Vallingby, Sweden) -
Presented seminar, " Management and Treatment of Radiation Injuries", and conducted radiation emergency medical exercise at the Ringhauls Nuclear Power Plant l
1978 Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Wiedarauferbeltung (Hanover, Germany) - Appeared before the Prime Minister and Parliament of Lower Saxony as an International expert tc testify on the safety of a reprocessing plant at Gorleben, Germany 1978 International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna, Austria) -
Presentation at Symposium on Late Effects of Ionizing Radiation 1978 Associacion de Medicina v Seguridad en el Trabajo de Unesa para la Industria Electrica (Madrid, Spain) -
Presented one-day seminar entitled, " Primary Management of Radiation Injury" 1977 International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna, Austria) -
Presented paper, " Emergency Medical Assistance Programs for Nuclear Power Reactors", at Symposium on Handling of Radiation Accidents 1967 University of Freiburg Institute of Radiobiology (Freiburg, Germany) - Presented seminar on diaganosis and treatment of radiation injuries Publications:
- 1. Linnemann, Roger E. " Berlin: The Young Old City". Senior Citizen (September 1961).
- 2. Linnemann, Roger E. "This Way to Berlin". The American Benedictine Review: 14. No. 4 (December 1963).
- 3. Linnemann, Roger E. "The Acute Radihtion Syndrome and its Impact on the Chain of Evacuation". Medical Bulletin, U.S. Army Europe: 22, No. 12 (December 1965).
- 4. Linnemann, Roger E. and Robert T. Wangemann. " Medical Support of Nuclear Weapons Accidents". Medical Bulletin, U.S. Army Europe (November 1967).
- 5. Linnemann, Roger E. and O. Messerschmidt. "Erholungsvorgaenge bei Grosstieren nach Ganzkoerperbestrahlung", :dem 6, Jahrbuch von der vereinigung Duetscher Strahlenschutzaerzte (1968).
- 6. Linnemann, Roger E. " Command Radiation Guidance". Military Medicine: 33, pp. 771-716 (September 1968).
- 7. Loken, Merle K., Linnemann, Roger E. and George S. Kush. "Evalua-tion of Renal Function Using a Scintillation Camera and Computer".
Radiology: 93, No. 1, pp. 85-94 (July 1969).
- 8. Linnemann, Roger E., Loken, Merle K. and Colin Markland. "Com- ,'
puterized Compartmental Renograms to Study Kidney Function".
Journal of Urology: 103, pp. 533-537 (May 1970).
- 9. Linnemann, Roger E. and J. W. Thiessen. " Regional Approach to the Management of Radiation Accidents". Journal of the American Public Health Association: 61, No. 6, pp. 1229-1235 (June 1971).
- 10. Linnemann, Roger E. and Robert N. Holmes. " Nuclear Accidents and Their Management". Emergency Medical Care, pp. 281-292, Spitzer, Stanley and Wilbur W. Oaks (eds.) New York: Brune and Stratton, Inc. (1971).
- 11. Linnemann, Roger E., Rasmussen, N.C. and F.K. Pittman. Nuclear Energy: Issues and Answers. Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. in coop-eration with Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (April 1973).
- 12. Linnemann, Roger E. . " Accentuate the Positve" Trial: 10, No. 4, p.
13 (July / August 1974).
- 13. Linnemann, Roger E. " Accentuate the Positive". Congressional Record: 109, pp. 4964-4967. Washington, D.C. United States of America Proceedings and Debates of the 93rd Congress, Second Session (July 23, 1974).
- 14. Linnemann, Roger E. and J. W. Thiessen. Editorial, "In Defense of Radiation and Cells". The New York Times (May 23, 1974).
- 15. Linnemann, Roger E. Nuclear Radiation and Health. Springville, NY, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (September 23, 1974).
- 16. Linnemann, Roger E. Editorial, "In Defense of Nuclear Power Plants", The Philadelphia Inquirer, p. IlA (March 6, 1975).
- 17. Linnemann, Roger E. " Nuclear Power Plants Pose Minimal Health Risks", Perspective. News Bureau of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA (February 1975).
- 18. Linnemann, Roger E. " Medical Aspects of Power Generation",
- Impulse. Massachusetts
- Electrical Council of New England (June 1975).
- 19. Linnemann, Roger E. " Bugs in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle". Spectrum p.
59, Gadi Kaplan (ed.) Piscataway, NJ: The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. (September 1975).
o
- 20. Linnemann, Roger E. and Fred A. Mettler, Jr. "Emsigency Medical As-sistance Programs for Nuclear Power Reactors". International Atomic Energy Agency Symposium on the Handling of Radiation Accidents.
IAEA-SM-215/22, Vienna, Austria (1977).
- 21. Linnemann, Roger E. "Why ALARA?" Transactions of 1979 American Nu-clear Society Conference, Atlanta, GA (June 3-7, 1979), Vo. 32, TANS A0 32 1 832 ISSN 0003-018x (1979).
- 22. Linnemann, Roger E., Hackbarth, C.J.,and Ray Crandall. "The Contam-inated and Injured Patient". Proceedings of Twenty Fourth Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Philadelphia, PA (July 9-13, 1979),
- 23. Linnemann, Roger E. "The Three Mile Island Incident in 1979: The Utility Response". The Medical Basis for Radiation Accident Preparedness, K.F. Hubner and S.A. Fry (eds.),
Elsevior/ North-Holland, pp. 501-509 (1980).
- 24. Linnemann, Roger E. " Initial Management of Radiation Injuries".
Journal of Radiation Protection, 5, No. 1, pp. 11-25 (December 1980).
- 25. Linnemann, Roger E., Kim, Stephen M. and Frazier L. Bronson. "Three Mile Island: Medical and Public Health Aspects of a Radiation Acci-dent". Journal of Radiation Protection, 6, No. 1, pp. 45 52 (October 1981).
- 26. Saenger, E., Linnemann, Roger E., and Wald, N. " Facilities for Han-dling the Contaminated Patient". Radiation Accident Preparedness:
Medical and Managerial Aspects, Science-Thru-Media Company: New York (1982).
- 27. Linnemann, Roger E. "A Systems Approach to the Initial Management of Radiation Injuries". Systems Approach to Emergency Medical Care, Appleton-Century-Crofts: New York (1983).
- 28. Linnemann, Roger E. " Radiation Injuries" Current Emergency Therapy. Editors; Richard Edlich and Daniel Spyper; and Aspen Pub-lication by Aspen Systems Corporation, Rockville, MD (1985).
- 29. Linnemann, Roger E. " National Emergency Medical Assistance Program for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants". Presented at the September 1986 American Nuclear Society Topical Meeting on " Radiological Acci-dents: Perspectives and Emergency Preparedness".
- 30. Linnemann, Roger E. " Soviet Medical Response to Chernobyl." Sub-mitted for publication by the Journal of the American Medical Asso-ciation (JAMA), January, 1987. ,
4 PROFESSIONAL TESTIMONY 1984 Limerick Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Planning Hearings 1985 Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Emergency Planning Hearings 19f4 Long Island Lighting Company Emergency Planning Hearings for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 1983 Union Electric Company Emergency Planning / Licensing Hearings for Callaway Nuclear Power Plant 1983 Pennsylvania Power & Light Company Susquchanna Steam Electric Op-erating License Hearings 1982 Texas Utilities Generating Company Emergency Planning Hearings for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station 1981 Florida Power & Light Company Turkey Point Steam Generator Repair-Hearings l 1981 Southern California Edison Company Emergency Planning Hearings for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 1979 Gorleben Nuclear Fuels Reprocessing Plant hearings before the Prime Minister and Parliament of Lower Saxony, Hanover, Germany
- 1979 Florida Power & Light Company Turkey Point Nuclear Station Operating 1 License Hearings
- 1977-79 John Benek vs. Pennsylvania Power Company et al. #99 of 1977 Eminent Domain 1971 Long Island Lighting Company Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Op-erating License Hearings 1970 Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Operating License Hearings 1970 Northeast Utilities Service Company Millstone Nuclear Power Station Operating License Hearings i
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Attachment F PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS j DENNIS S. MILETI Professor Department of Sociology and Director -
Hazardous Aa:a== ment Laboratory COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY My name is Dennis S. Mileti and my business address is Department of Sociology,
, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523. I am presently a tenured Pro-fessor of Sociology at Colorado State University. From 1978 to 1985 I was a tenured As-sociate Professor specializing in those areas of study dealing with complex organiza-tions, hazards, policy and methods.
I also serve as Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University, which was organized in 1984. The laboratory is an interdisciplinary setting in which geological, climatological and technological hazards and emergencies are ad-
.; dressed in terms of risk or hazard mitigation and management, preparedness, and emer-gency response.
j Prior to these appointments from 1974 to 1978, I held the position of Assistant Professor. I was also an Instructor for one year in the Department of Sociology at the University of Colorado, Boulder, from 1971 to 1972. I have taught numerous undergrad-uate courses, including Introduction to Sociology, Complex Organizations, Sociology of Disasters, Research Methods, Demographic Processes, and Social Change. In addition, I have taught burses at the graduate level such as Advanced Quantitative Analysis, Re-search Methods I and II, Demography and Population and Complex Organizations.
1
I Dennis S. Mileti j Page 2 i i l
! I received my Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology in 1968 from the University i l
l of California, Los Angeles. In 1971 I was awarded a Master of Arts degree in Sociology from California State University, Los Angeles. I completed my doctorate degree in So-3 ciology in 1974 at the University of Colorado, Boulder.
! In 1975 I was appointed Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Southern California Graduate School of Public Administration. During this year I offered an In-tensive Seminar Program sponsored by the University. From 1978 to 1979 I was an In-1 vited Instructor for the Chautauqua Short Course Program sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In 1981 I was appointed Policy Analyst for the Seismic Safety Commission by the State of California. During the year I served on this appointment I was on leave from my university duties.
I am a member of the American Sociological Association; the International Sociological Association, the Pacific Sociological Association, the Midwes.t Sociological
- Society, the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the U.S. Civil Defense Council. In addition, I have been a member of several committees since 1976, including
l COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIPS l 1984-date National Academy of Science, National Research Council, i
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, Commit-
- tee on Natural Disasters.
i 1984-date National Academy of Sciences, National *Research Council, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathe. stics, and Re-sources, Board on Earth Sciences, Subcomma *ee on Earth-
! quake Research.
1985-1986 National Academy of Sciences, National Institute
- Medi-eine, Committee on the Effects of Nuclear War,
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Dennis S. Mileti Page 3 1984-date National Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service, Center for Mental Health Studies of Emergencies Advisory.
1983 year National Science Foundation, U.S. Delegate on Earthquake Prediction Research to Japan, International Scientific Ex-change Section.
1983-date Front Range Consortium on Natural Hazards Studies, Col-orado State University of Colorado, University of Denver.-
1983-date International Sociological Association, Research Committee on Disasters.
1982-1983 Pacific Sociological Association, Nominations Committee for
- the Standing Committees for 1983.
1 1982-date Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Chair, Commit-tee on Social Science Research, Berkeley.
- 1981-1983 U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Advisory Panel on the Earthquake Studies Program.
l J
- 1981-1982 Pacific Sociological Association, Program Committee for the i 1982 Annual Meetings in San Diego.
1981-1982 Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthquakes, Threat and Reconstruction Committees, State of California, Sacra-mento.
l 1980-1981 Governor's Science and Technology Advisory Council, Com-mittee on the Relocation of Uranium Mill Tallings, State of Colorado.
1979 year American Association for the Advancement of Science, Committee on Intergovernmental Research and Develop-J ment on Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness, Washington, D.C.
1976-1978 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Sociatechnical Systems, Committee on Earthquake Prediction, Washington, D.C.
i
) APPOINTMENTS 1974-date Faculty, Department of Sociology, Colorado State Universi-ty, Fort Collins (1985-date. Professor; 1978-1985, Associate j Professor: 1974-1978. Assistant Professor).
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i-Dennis S. Mileti Page 4 1
1984-date Director, Hazards Assessment, ' Colorado State University, Fort Collins, i
1981 year Policy Analyst, Seismic Safety Commission, State of California, Sacramento (on leave from university).
1978-1979 Invited Instructor, American Association for the. Advance-ment of Science, Chautauqua Short Course Program.
I 1975 year Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Southern California, Graduate School of Public Administration, Inten-sive Seminar Program.
1971-1972 Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, Boulder.
l AWARDS .
. 1983-1984 Alumni Honor Faculty Award, Colorado State . University Alumni Association for excellence in teaching, research and i service i
1981 year Cited in Outstanding Young Men of America i
1978-1977 Cited for excellence in teaching, research and service by j the Dean, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences i
MEMBERSHIPS American Sociological Association, International Sociological Association, Pacific Sociological Association, Midwest Sociological Society, American Associ-
, ation for the Advancement of Science. Earthquake Engineering Research Insti-tute, Western Social Science Association, National Coordinating . Council on Emergency Management, Sigma Xi.
RESEARCH GRANTS AND CONTRACTS 1985-1987 Co principal Investigator, " State of the Art Assessment:
i Public Warning Systems," Subcontract from Oak Ridge Na- ,
j tional Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management j Agency.
- 1984-1985 Principal Investigator, " Assessment of Human Stress Impacts
- from the Livingston Train Derailment and Chemical Emer-j gency," contract for Illinois Central Gulf Railroad.
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. Dennis S. Mileti Page 5 1984-date Associate Investigator, " State-of-the-Art Assessment: Evac-uation " subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
1984-date Associate Investigator, " International Study of Disaster Im-pact on Domestic Assets," subcontract from the University of Georgia for the National Science Foundation.
1983-1984 Principal Investigator, " Intended and Forgotten Audiences
! for Emergency Warnings," quick-response grant from the Natural Hazards Research Applications and Information Center.
3 1982-1983 Associate Investigator, " Organizational Interface for Nucle-ar Reactor Emergency Preparedness," subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratories for the Nuclear Regulatory.
Commission.
1981 year Principal Investigator, " Nuclear Hazard Warnings and Emer-
' gency Evacuation Preparedness," contract for Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
1980-1983 Principal Investigator, " Local Land Use Policy Decisions,"
Colorado State University Experiment Station.
l 1979-1982 Principal Investigator, " Behavioral Aspects of the Three 4 Mile Island Incident and Re-start " contract for General Pub-Ilc Utilities via Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge.
]
! 1977-1980 Principal Investigator, " Migration Impacts of Non-Metropolitan Areas in the West," Colorado State Uni-versity Experiment Station.
1977-1979 Principal Investigator, " Adoption and Organizational Imple-l mentation of Policy for Land Use Regulations," grant from the National Science Foundation.
1975-1977 Co principal Investigator, Socioeconomic, Organizational and Politican Consequences of Earthquake Prediction," grant from the National Science Foundation.
1974 Research Sociologist, " Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards," grant from the National Science Foundation.
PUBUCATIONS [1985 and 1986 Updates are appended to this listing]
Books and Monographs (refereed)
Dennis S. Mileti Page 6 f
Mileti, Dennis S.
The Order of Chaos in Disasters (in progress).
Mileti, Dennis S., John Schneider and D. Stanley Eitzen Graduate Research Methods in the Social Sciences (in progress)
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1979 Technostructures and Interorranizational Relations. Lexington, Mas-sachusetts: Lexington Books.
Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and Ronald Perry 1976 Orranizational Response to Changine Community Systems Kent Ohio: Kent State University Press.
Chapters (invited and refereed) j Mileti, Dennis S.
1986 "Rescarch methods and disaster research." In Russell T. Dynes and Carlo Pelanda (Eds.). Sociolory of Disasters: Contributions of Sociology to Disaster Research. Italy: Franco Angelo (forthcoming).
Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen i 1985 "Why people take precautions against natural hazards." In Neil Weinstein (Ed.). Encouraging Self-Behavior (forthcoming).
Sorensen, John H. and Dennis S. Mileti 1985 " Protective actions for natural hazards: a review of programs to stimulate i public adoption." In Neil Weinstein (Ed.). Encouraging Self-Protection Behavior
- (forthcoming).
1 Hartsough, Donald M., and Dennis S. Mileti 1985 "The Media in Disasters." Pp. 282-294 in J. Laube and S. Murphy (Eds.),
j Perspectives in Disaster Recovery. Norwalk, Connecticut:
j Appleton-Century-Crofts.
j Hutton, Janice, Dennis S. Mileti and John Sorensen 1984 " Factors affecting earthquake warning system effectiveness." Pp. 947-956 in K. Oshida (Ed.), Earthouake Prediction. Tokyo: Terra Scientific Publishers for UNESCO.
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen 1984 " Social factors affecting the response of groups to earthquake prediction."
Pp. 649-658 in K. Oshida (Ed.), Earthouake Prediction. Tokyo: Terra Scientific
! Publishers for UNESCO.
! Sorensen, John, Janice Hutton and Dennis S. Mileti
- 1984 " Institutional management of risk information following earthquake predic-i tions." Pp. 913-924 in K. Oshida (Ed.). Earthouake Prediction. Tokyo: Terra j Scientific Publishers for UNESCO.
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t Dennis S. Mileti Page 7 4 Hutton, Janice, John Sorensen and Dennis S. Mileti 1981 " Earthquake prediction and public reaction." Pp. 129-166 in T. Rikitake
] (Ed.). - Current Research in Earthouake Prediction. Boston: Reidel Publishing i Tokyo: Center for Academic Publications.
Mileti, Dennis S.
- 1981 " Planning initiatives for seismic hazard mitigation." Pp. 44-53 in J. Isenberg (Ed.). Social and Economic Imoact of Earthouakes on Utility Lifelines. New
i Monorraphs and Chapters (quasi-refereed) l Mileti, Dennis S., and Joanne Nigg i 1986 " Social science earthquake investigations." In Roger Scholl (Ed.). Lessons l Learned from Recent Earthouakes. Berkeley: Earthquake Engineering Reseach Institute.
i Review Panel of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Plan 1984 National Earth-
{ ouake Hazards Reduction Program: Five Year Prorram Plan. Washington, D.C.:
i Federal Emergency Management Agency.
i j Sorensen, J., E. Copenhaver, D. Mileti and M. Adler i 1984 Organizational Interface in Reactor Emergency Planning and Response.
I Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG No. CR-3524.
j Mileti, Dennis S.
i 1982 "A bibliography for graduate research methods. Pp. 249-255 in Russel j Schutt, Alan Orenstein and Theodore C. Wagenaar (Eds.). Research Methods i Courses: Syllabi. Assignments and Projects. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.
Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen 1981 Earthouake Prediction Response and Options for Public Policy. Boulder:
! Institute of Behavioral Science, Monograph 28.
4 Santopolo, Frank, and Dennis S. Mileti 1980 Impacts of Population Growth in Articultural Colorado Committees. Fort Collins: Colorado State University Experiment Station Bulletin.
j Committee on Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness i 1979 Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness. Washington, D.C.: American Asso-j clation for the Advancement of Science.
Committee on Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Prediction 1978 A Program of Studies on the Socioeconomic Effects of Earthouake Predic-j tion. Washington, D.C: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Coun-cil.
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Dennis S. Mileti Page 8 1
Mileti, Dennis, D., Thomas E. Drabek and J. Eugene Haas 1975 Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective. s Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, Monograph 21.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1975 Natural Hazard Warning Systems in the United States. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, Monograph 12. Portions reprinted in Joseph Perry and Meredith Pugh, Collective Behavior: Response to Stress,1978.
Erickson, Neil, John Sorensen and Dennis S. Mileti 1975 Landslide Hazards in the United States: A Research Assessment. Boulder:
Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1975 Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation in the United States. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Ayre, Robert. Dennis S. Mileti and Patricia Trainer 1975 Earthouake and Tsunami Hazards in the United States: A Research Assess-ment. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Journal Articles: DisciDilne Focus (refereed)
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1985 "The effects of legitimacy on goal change and formalization in organiza-tions," Journal of Contemporary Sociology 22 (1,2):33-53.
M11eti, Dennis S.
1985 "The human equation in earthquake prediction and warning," Policy Studies Review 4 (4):725-733.
Mileti, Dennis S., Donald Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick Hufnagel 1984 "The Three Mile Island incident: a study of behavioralindicators of human stress." Mass Emerrencies and Disasters 2(1):89-114.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1983 " Societal comparisons of organizational response to earthquake prediction:
Japan vs the United States." Mass Emerrencies and Disasters 1(3):399-414.
Gillespie, David F, and Dennis S. Mileti 1982 " Differentiation in organizations," Social Forces 60(4):1172-1175.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982 " Structure and process in the implementation of public policy," Political Science Review 21(1):1-34.
Dennis S. Mileti .
Page 9 M11eti, Dennis S.
1982 "A review of research on public policy adoption," Public Administration Re-view (accepted and forthcoming).
Mileti, Dennis S., Doug Timmer and David F. Gillespie 1982 " Intra and interorganizational determinants of decentralization," Pacific Sociolocical Review 25(2):163-183.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Stan Eitzen 1981 "The multidimensionality of organizational size," Sociology and Social Re-search 65(4):400-414.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1981 " Heterogeneous sartples in organizational research," Sociological Methods and Research 9(3):327-388.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1980 " Human adjustment to the risk of environmental extremes," Sociology and Social Research 64(3):327-347.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1980 "Deteratinants of planning in organizations," Administrative Science Re-view 10(3):21-32.
4 Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1980 " Organizational and technological interdependencies," Journal of Contem-porary Sociolorv 17(3-4):132-158.
Gillespie, David F., Ronald Perry and Dennis S. Mileti 1980 " Stress and transformation," Journal of Social Research 21(2):139-147.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Stan Eitzen 1979 " Structure and decision making in corporate organizations," Sociology and Social Research 63(4):723-744.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1979 " action and contingency postulates in organization-environment relations,"
Human Relations 32(3):261-271.
Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Elizabeth Morrissey 1978 " Technology and organizations: methodological deficiences and lucunae,"
Technology and Culture 19(1):83-92.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1978 " Organizational technology and environment adaptation-manipulation "
Scottish Journal of Sociology 2(2):205-219.
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1 Dennis S. Mileti Page 10 Mileti, Dennis S., David F Gillespie and J. Eugene Haas 1977 " Size and structure in complex organizations," Social Forces 56(1):208-217.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1977 " Technology and the study of organizations: an overview and appraisal,"
Academy of Management Review 2(1):6-19. Reprinted in Readings on How Man-agers Manage. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,1982.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1976 "An integrated formalization or organization-environment interdependencies," Human Relations 29(1):80-100.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1976 " Organizational adaptations to changing cultural contingencies,"
Sociological Inauiry 46(2):135-141.
Gillespie, David F., Roy Lotz, Dennis S. Mileti and Ronal Perry -
1976 " Historical and paradigmatic differences in the use of the goal concept,"
International Review of History and Political Science 8(30):1-14.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1976 "A refined model of differentiation in organizations," Sociology and Social Research 60(3):263-278.
Perry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie, Roy Lotz and Dennis S. M11eti 1976 " Attitudinal variables as estimates of behavior," European Journal of Social Psycholorv 6(1):74-90.
Mileti, Dennis S., Ronald Perry and David F. Gillespie 1975 "The analytical use of case study materials in the study of organizations,"
Sociological inautrv 45(4):72-50.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Elwood M. Beck 1975 " Explaining evacuation symbolically: communication in crisis,"
Communication Research 2(1):24-49.
Gillespie, David F., Ronald Perry, Dennis S. Mileti and Roy Lotz 1975 " Organizational tensions and decentralization: the interactive effeet on member commitment, International Journal of Group Tensions 5(2):26-37.
Perry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie and Dennis S. Mileti 1974 " Collective stress and community transformation," Human Relations 27(8):767-788. .
Mileti, Dennis S, ,
1974 " Change ratios in age-specific percent contradictions to fertility: a new method with applications to the United States," Pacific Sociological Review 17(a):3-26. First Prize, student paper competition, Pacific Sociological l Association,1974. i
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., Dennis S. Mileti
[ Page 11 ,
1 Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1974 "An integrative approach to the study of organizational technology, struc-ture and behavior," Current Sociolory 23(1):189-200.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti i
.l 1974 " System stress and the persistence of emergency organizations,"
j Sociolorical inauiry 44(2):111-119.
Mileti, Dennis S..'and Larry Barnett i 1972 "Nine demographic factors and their relationship toward abortion legaliza- l
- tion," Social Biolory 19(2):43-50. t i
j Journal Articles: ADDiled Focus (refereed) ,
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- Mileti, Dennis S.
4 1984 " Role conflict and abandonment in emergency workers," Emerrency Man-I asement Review 2(1):20-22.
Mileti, Dennis.
, 1984 " Earthquakes and human behavior," Earthauakes Spectra 1(1):89-106.
l Milett, Dennis S.
l 1983 "Public perceptions of seismic hazards and critical facilities " Bulletin of 1 the Seismotorical Society of America 72(6)13-18.
!- Mileti, Dennis S., and Patricia Harvey 1 1978 " Correcting for the human f actor in tornedo warnings," Disaster Presared-j _ngg 2(February):5-9.
i
} Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. M11eti j 1977 " Socioeconomic and political consequences of earthquake prediction," -
Journal of the Physical Earth 25(4);283-293.
Hass, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti '
1977 " Earthquake prediction and its consequences," California Geology 30 l (7):147-157, 1977. Revised and reprinted in San Francisco 20(4):60-68,1978. ,
I
! Hass, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti -
j 1976 " Earthquake prediction and other adjustments to earthquakes," Bulletin of ;
j the New Zealand Society for Earthauake Enrineerina 9(4):183-194. l t
j Book Reviews (invited and refereed) i l M11eti, Dennis S. l
! 1984 "A review of Social and Economic Aspects Earthquakes by Barclay G. Jones and Miha Tomazevic (Eds.). Ithaca: Program in Urban and Regional Studies, 1983." Mass Emerrencies and Disasters.
i i
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. Dennis S. Mileti Page 12 Mileti, Dennis S.
1982 "A review of Unequal Care: Interorganizational Relations in Health Care by M. Milner, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press,1980." Social Forces 60(3):943-944.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982 "A review of Whistle Blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation by.
Alan Westin (Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill,1981." Sociolory: A Review of New Books 7(2).
Mileti, Dennis S.
1980 "A review of Af termath: Communities After Natural Disasters by H. Paul Friesema et al. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,1979 and After the Clean-up:
Long Range Effects of Natural Disasters by James Wright and Peter Rossi et al.
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,1979." Journal of the American Plannint Asso-clation (October): 484-485.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1976 "A review of A Sociology of Organizations by J. Eldridge and A. Crombie.
New York: International Publications,1975." Contemporary Sociolory 5(6):784.
Technical Reports (not refereed)
Mileti, Dennis S.
1985 Stress Impacts of a Technological Emerrency: An Unobtrusive Indicators Study of Livingston Train Derailment. New Orleans: Lemle, Kelleher.
M11ett, Dennis S.
1983 Human Response Scenarios: Law Enforcement Apolications and Media Im-Dlications. Sacramento: California Division of Mines and Geology.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1982 Orranizational Behavior and Interorranizational Relations: Imolications for Nuclear Power Plant Emerrencies and Preparedness. Oak Ridge, Tennessee:
Oak Ridge National Laboratories.
Milett, Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough and Patti Madson 1982 The Three Mile Island incident: A Study of BehavioralIndicators of Human Stress. Washington, D.C.: Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Arthur Sevenson 1981 Earthouake Prediction-Warnint Response for Emerrency Orranizations to the Prediction Terminolory. Van Nuys: Southern California Earthquake Pre-paredness Project.
Hutton, Janice, and Dennis S. Mileti 1979 Analysis of Adoption and Implementation of Community Land Use Regula-tions for Floodplains. San Francisco: Woodward-Clyde.
Dennis S. Mileti Page 13 Hass, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti 1976 Socioeconomic Impact of Earthouake Prediction on Government. Business and Community. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, Dennis, S., and David F. Gillespie 1976 Interorranizational Relations and Community Service Delivery Systems.
, Boulder: Center for Action Research.
j Publications in Proceedings (not referred)
Mileti, Dennis S.
l 1980 " Human response to earthquake prediction." Pp. 35-36 in Walter Hays (Ed.).
! Proceedings of the Conferences on Earthouakes Prediction Information. Menlo Park: U.S. Geological Survey. Paper presented at the January 1980 Conference on Earthquake Prediction Information, Los Angeles.
- Mileti, Dennis S., and Janice Hutton j 1978 " Social aspects of earthquakes." Pp. 179-192 in Proceedings of the Second
! International Conference on Microzonation. San Francisco: National Science Foundation. Paper presented at the November,1978 Conference on the State Hazards Reduction, San Francisco.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1978 " Socioeconomic effects of earthquake prediction stage policy."
Proceedings of the National Conference on Earthauake Related Hazards.
Lexington, Kentucky: Council of State Governments. Speech presented at the
- November,1977 Conference on State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technolo-gy, Boulder.
Other Published Comments (invited or referred) i Mileti, Dennis S.
1984 "The character of traffic in an emergency," Bulletin 6(1):4-5.
Mileti, Dennis S.
j 1983 "Disasterous warnings," Omni (March):24,25,152.
! Mileti, Dennis S.
1982 " Hazards reduction work: the next era," National Hazards Observer 6(4):1-2. Reprinted in Earthauake Information Bulletin 14(2):60, 1982.
Mileti, Dennis S. 1982 " Sociological aspects of earthquake prediction," Earthouake in-
, formation Bulletin 11(3):102-105.
I Hass, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti j 1977 " Earthquake prediction response," Time (January 24):83.
1 i
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Dennis S. Mileti
!- Page 14 1 Mileti, Dennis S.
1977 " Earthquake prediction: is it better not to know?" Mosaic 8(2):8-14.
4 Mileti, Dennis S.
1977 " Social hazards of earthquakes prediction," Science News 111(2):20-21.
Haas, J. Eugene, Thomas Drabek and Dennis S. Mileti 1976 " Individual and organizational response to threat," Mass Emerrencies
- 1(4):247 4
, M11eti, Dennis S.
1976 " Social scientists and applied research," The American Sociolorist 11(4):220-221. .
Mileti, Dennis S.
1974 " Response to research and national needs," Footnotes 2(October):6.
I PROFESSIONAL PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS Conference Papers Mileti, Dennis S. and R. Gary Williams 1985 "A sociological perspective on the siting of hazardous waste f acilities."
l paper presented to the Social and Economic Effects of Public Perceptions Ses-
- ! sion of the Symposium on Waste Management, Tucson: March.
1 l Mileti, Dennis S., Rick Hufnagel and David Gillespie i 1984 " Regulation of the firm: toward a theory of consequences," paper pres-l ented to the Complex Organizations Session of the American Sociological Asso-J clation, San Antonio: August, i
j Mileti, Dennis S. ,
j 1984 " Stress from risk uncertainties," invited paper presented to the Social As-
- pects of Risk Uncertainties Session of the Society for Risk Analysis, Knoxville
i October.
- Mileti, Dennis S.
1984 " Social and political obstacles to the use nonstructural flood loss mitigation
! measures," paper presented to the American Society of Civil Engineers, San i Francisco: October.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1984 "Why people take precautions against natural hazards," paper presented to 4
. the Conference on Encouraging Self-Protection Behavior, Rutgers University:
July.
1 8
_ - - . . , _ . _ _ _ _ , _ . - _ ~ . - . _. ,- ... _ . _ _ .-.~ . , _ _ - , - . - , - - , . - _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ .- - _.
. . - - - . - . . . - . - -. - - . - = - . ---
l Dennis S. Mileti l Page 15 l-1
- I j Mileti, Dennis S.
- 1984 " Sociology in litigation
- applications of disaster research," paper presented i to the Sociology of Disasters Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle: April.
i Mileti, Dennis S.
! 1983 " Social impact and use of earthquake prediction-warnings," paper presented l to the US-Japan Seminar on Practical Approaches to Earthquake Prediction and -
- Warning, Tokyo
- November.
i i Frey, R. Scott, Thomas Dietz, Dennis S. Mileti, and Debra Cornelius l
1983 " Structural determinants of community adoption of the National Flood In- ,
surance Program," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Lexington:
} July.
1 l Mileti, Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick Hufnagel .
! 1983 "The Three Mile Island incident: a study of unobtrusive indicators of human
} stress," paper presented to the Disasters and Hazards Research Session of the j Midwest Sociological Society, Kansas City: April.
I j Hufnagel, Rick, and Dennis S. Mileti
- 1983 " Organizational and environmental catastrophe
- factors affecting organi-
} zational response to a predicted earthquake," paper presented to the Disasters i and Hazards Research Session of the Western . Social Science Association, ;
- Albuquerque
- April.
- Mileti, Dennis S.
1982 " Earthquake prediction response: cultural comparisons between Japan and !
the United States," paper presented to the Disaster Research Session of the In-ternational Sociological Association, Mexico City: August.
L l Mileti, Dennis S.
i 1982 " Influencing corporate decisions on the use of microzonation information,"
paper presented to the Third Internation1 Conference on Microzonation, Seattle:
- June.
i Mileti, Dennis S.
I 1982 " Earthquake prediction and warnings: the human equation," paper pres-
- ented to the Conference on Hazards Research, Policy Development, and Imple--
j mentation Incentives: Focus on Urban Earthquakes, Policy Research Center at j the University of Redlands, Redlands: June.
! Mileti, Dennis S.
i 1982 "Public perception of seismic hazards " paper presented to the Seismological Society cf America, Anaheim: April.
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Dennis S. Mileti
, Page 16
! Williams, Gary, Frank Santopolo and Dennis S. Mileti l 1980 " Perception of growth impacts in energy impacted communities," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Ithaca: August.
I Mlleti, Dennis S.
I 1980 " Planning initiatives for seismic hazard mitigation," paper presented to the Conference on Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquakes on Critical Lifelines of the American Society of Civil Engineers, San Francisco: May.
Timmer, Doug, and Dennis S. Mileti 1980 "Interorganizational and structural determinants of decision making," paper presented to the Session on Complex Organizations of the Midwest Sociological
- Society, Milwaukee.
1 Williams, Gary, Dennis S. M11eti 1980 " Community growth and impacts," paper presented to the Western Social
, Science Association Albuquerque: April.
i Mileti, Dennis S.
l 1980 " Human response to earthquake prediction," paper presented to the Status j of Knowledge Session of the Conference on Earthquake Prediction Information, i Los Angeles: January.
! Williams. Gary, and Dennis S. Mileti 1
1979 " Perceptions of growth impacts in non-metropolitan Colorado," paper pres-l ented to the Impacts Session of the Conference on Regional Migration Trends, l St. Louis: October.
l Mileti Dennis S., and Gary Williams l 1979 " Resident perceptions in growth impacted western argricultural communi-ties," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Vermont: August.
Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and Stan Eitzen i 1979 "The epihenominality of organizational size," paper presented to the Session j on Complex Organizations of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee:
l April.
l l M11eti, Dennis S., Janice R. Hutton and John Sorensen
! 1979 " Social factors and response to earthquake prediction," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris: April. ,
i Hutton, Janice R., Dennis S. Milett, and John Sorensen 1
- 1979 " Factors affecting earthquake warning system effectiveness," paper pres-l ented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris: ,
i April.
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Dennis S. Milett Page 17 Sorensen, John, Janice R. Hutton and Dennis S. Mileti 1979 " Institutional management of risk information following earthquake predic-tions," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Predic-tion, UNESCO, Paris: April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Janice Hutton 1978 " Social aspects of earthquakes," paper presented to the State of the Art Session of the Second International Conference on Microzonation, San Francisco:
November.
M11eti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1978 " Organizational size, complexity and decision making," paper presented to the Organizations Session of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco: September.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1978 " Corporate size as work," paper presented to the Organization of Work Ses-sion of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco: September.
! Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1978 " Action postulates in organization-environment relations," paper presented to the Organizations-Environment Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha: April.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1978 " Size and organizational differentiation," paper presented to the Formal e and Complex Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Spokane: April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Patricia Harvey 1977 " Correcting for the human factor in tornado warnings," paper presented to the Conference on Severe Local Storms of the American Meteorological Society, Omaha: October.
M11eti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1977 " Organization and environment adaptation-manipulation," paper presented to the Organizational Relations Session of the American Sociological Assocla-tion Chicago: September.
Hutton, Janice R., and Dennis S. Mileti 1977 "The uses and abuses of scenarios in policy research," paper presented to the Social Policy Session of the American Sociological Association, Chicago:
September.
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1977 " Organizational growth and managerial efficiency," paper presented to the Social Organization / Formal / Complex Session of the Pacific Sociological Associa-tion. Sacramento: April.
_~ _. - - - _. - _.
J Dennis S. Mileti Page 18 l
- Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1977 " Organizational manipulation and adaptation to complex environments,"
paper presented to the Complex Organizations Session of the Midwest l
Sociological Society, Minneapolis: April.
j Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and J. Eugene Haas t 1976 " Size and structure in complex organizations," paper presented to the Orga-i nizational Change Session of the American Sociological Association New York j City: August. -
.I Mileti, Dennis S.
4 1976 " Learning theory and disaster warning response," paper presented to the Is-suas in Environmental Analysis Session to the American Sociological Association, i New York City: August.
j Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. M11eti l
1976 " Consequences of earthquake prediction on other adjustments to earth- ,
quakes," paper presented to the Australian Academy of Science, Canberra: May.
- Mileti, Dennis S., and J. Eugene Haas i 1976 "A methodology for future collective events," paper presented to the Col-lective Behavior Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis
- April, e
Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1976 " Operations technology and organizational structure," paper precented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis:
April.
! Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti j 1976 " Assessing the consequences of earthquake prediction," paper presented to
- the Social Risk Session of the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-l ence, Boston: February.
! Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1975 " Technological uncertainty in organization environment relations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the American Sociological As-sociation, San Francisco: August. l f Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1975 "A resolution of inconsistencies between size, complexity and the adminis- ,
trative component in organizations," paper presented to the Formal Organiza-j, tions Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago: April.
M11eti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1975 " Technology and the study of organizations," paper presented to the Formal l Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Victoria: April.
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Dennis S. M11eti Page 19 Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 3
1975 "An interaction model for organization environment relations," paper pres-j ented to the Interorganizational Relations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha: April.
Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1974 "A formalization of organization-environment dependencies," paper pres-ented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Associa-
. tion, San Jose: March.
Farhar, Barbara, and Dennis S. M11eti 1974 "Value and role issues for the involved social scientist," paper presented to the Applied Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, San Jose: March.
Mileti, Dennis S. .
1973 "Drowing: a communications disease," paper presented to the Mass Com-j munications and Public Opinion Session of the American Sociological Associa-tion, New York City: August.
1' Mileti, Dennis S., and Sigmund Krane 1973 " Response to impending system stress," paper presented to the What Do We Know Session on Human Behavior in Disaster of the American Sociological Asso-ciation, New York City: August.
Mileti, Dennis S.
1973 "A paradigm and sociology of knowledge for theories of natural law," paper ,
presented to the Theory Session of the paper presented to the Theory Session of the Midwest Sociological Soclety, Milwaukee: April.
Mileti, Dennis S.
j 1972 " Response to hazards warnings," paper presented to the Organizational and
! Community Response to Disaster Seminar at the Disaster Research Center of the i'
Ohio State University, Columbus: July.
, SPEECHES AND GUEST LECTURERS i " Social aspects of risk," Risk Analysis Seminar, Department of Industrial Engineering, Stanford University: February,1985.
" Communicating engineering information to public officials," Social Applications Ses-sion, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Seattle: February,1985.
- " Social and political obstacles to the use of nonst uctural flood loss mitigation mea-
. sures," American Society for Civil Engineers. San Francisco: October,1984.
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Dennis S. Mileti Page 20
" Warnings: applying research in the private sector," Plenary Session on Hazards Re-search and Management: Assessments of a Field, Natural Hazards Research Ap-plications Workshop, Boulder: July,1984
" Human response to emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar for County Commissioners of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, GPU Nuclear Corporation, Harrisburg: March,1984.
"The uses of earthquake prediction-warnings," Colloqium on Earthquake Prediction Re-
' search in the US, Earthquake Research Institute, University of Tokyo:
November,1983.
" Human response in disasters," American Red Cross, Mile High Chapter, Boulder Re-
- gion, Boulder: July,1983.
" Integrated emergency management: challenges and opportunities," Plenary Session of the Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July,1983.
"Public response to flood disasters," Conference on the Need to Teamwork in Managing Flood Hazards, Association of State Floodplain Manager, Sacramento: April, 1983.
" Natural hazards, disasters and public policy " Environmental Management Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles: April,1982.
" Myths of disaster response," Earthquake Planning Conference for Business and Indus-try, Los Angeles: May,1982.
Communicating lessons learned from social science research on earthquakes," Workshop of Identifyng and Disseminating Lessons Learned from Recent Earthquakes,"
Earthquakes Engineering Research Institutes Los Altos: December,1982.
" Social causes of earthquake prediction-warning response: implications for the design of California's warning system and Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Pro]ect, Van Nuys: October,1981.
" Assessment of research on natural hazards: what have we learned and what problems demand further attention," Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop.
Boulder: July,1981.
" Disaster reconstruction: patterns to guide planning," Governor's Task Force for Earth-quake Emergency Preparedness. Committee on Long Range Reconstruction, Sacramento: May,1981.
"Socio-cultural dimensions of earthquake risk," Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthquakes, General Assembly, Sacramento: May,1981.
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Page 21 ; hI ,
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"Interorganizational relations and service deiwe:y systems " Healm Scie .c,as Center. .
University of Colorado, Denver: October,1980. (j s-P g ;
},-
~ jj y y, ,
" Social response to earthquake prediction:$lfcal policy "" :soudarnissdes,3 California ,
Emergency Services Association, Noncebellc: February.fl980/l' 3 y.
,z ; 9(
" Human response to weather-borne hazards warnings,'" DeparpMnt ,of Atmospheric
,, )T Sciences, Colorado State University: October,19790 -
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" Natural hazards, disasters and social research," Department of@ciology, UniversityMf Denver: December, 1980,1979. <' -
,/
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" Measuring implementation of public policy for floodplain INd use contmd," datural '
Hazards Research Applications Workshop. Boulder: August,1978.
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5., i.
"Socioecono:nic effects of earthquake prediction and state;.polley," Conference c State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technology, Boulder:^ November,1977 ,
J.f %
" Population, resources and policy for social change," College of Natural, Resources. ', '
Colorado State University: September,197?; February,1978; February' 1980c u ,
q X '
"The behavior of government and corporate organintions in an earthquake profetion,"
American Society for Public Administation, Colorado Chapter. Denver: April, 1976.
"The social and economic aspects of scientifically credible earthquake predictions,"s 's California State Seminar on Emergency Preparedness and Earthquake Prediction, 1 Palm Springs: .iune,1976. .
i
" Preparing to make use.of earthquake predictions," Emergency Pet 8eredaess Commis- h ,
sion for the County and Cities of Los Angees, MontebeWx Feirtary,1976. " '/ ' '
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"The social organization of hazard warning systems," Engineering Foundation Confer-ence on Decision Making for Natural Hazards. Pacific Grove: March, L976. ,
,? q. >
- , l
" Briefing on the likely social and economic trahacts of earthqt.ake prediction " Gover- / !
nor's Conference Room, Sacramento: Ma% 1975; Mayor's Conference Room Los ,
l Ar.geles: October,1975, s ),
s
" Social, economic and legal aspects of earthquake predfction," General Assembly of the ; y' ' ' l International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, Grenot.le: Septemt:er,1975.
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" Earthquake prediction and its implications for emergency [reparedTdW " Center for Community Studies. Tokyo: September,1975, l ,j
" Social impacu.of earthquake predictird: . implications for policy," \Califo'rnia Water ;
and Power Earthquake Engineering Femm, San r,y1cisco: April,1975. y
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- Dennis S. Mileti 1
Page 22 i
i i OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
- Orranizer and Presider
!? Session on nuclear power, Third International Congress on Emergencies, Washington, D.C.: May,1985; Session on Applied Sociology, Pacific Sociological Association,
- Seattle
- April,1984; Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Asso-
! elation, San Diego: April,1984 Session on Methodological Approaches in the Study of l Health Care Delivery Systems, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, j 1984; Session on Earthquake Hazard Reduction: Is the National Earthquake Hazard Re-
- duction Program Meeting its Congressional Mandate, Seventh Annual Workshop on Nat-ural Hazards Research Applications, Boulder: July,1982; Session on Disasters and Cat-aclysms: Can Sociology Help, Pacific Sociological Association, San Diego: April,1982; l
Session on Collective Behavior, American Sociological Association, New York: August,
!, 1980; Session on Complex Organization, Pactic Sociological Association, San Francisco:
- April,1980
- Session on Complex Organizations, Western Social Science Association, r
Tempe,1976.
]
i Disgupsant l
Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Association, San Diego:
i April,1984; Session on Societal Response to Hazards, American Sociological Associa-I tion, San Antonio! August,1984; Session on Public Response to Earth Science Informa-tion, Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July,1980; Session on l Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Hazards, Boulder: June,1976; Ses-
! sion on Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Hazards Boulder: July,1975; l Session on Disaster Relief and Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Haz-ards, Ectes Park: June,1973.
) .
i Participant
, Panel on Disaster Research its Funding and Future, American Sociological Association,
- San Antonio
- August,1984; Review Panel, Corresponding Member. Task Group on So-cial and Economic Aspects of Earthquakes, National Academy of Sciences, National Re-f search Council, Commission on Soclotechnical Systems, Washington, D.C.: 1982; Work-
, shop on Disseminating Lessons Learned from Recent Earthquakes, Earthquake l ?.0.gineering Research Institute, Los Altos: December,1982; Tennessee Valley Authority
\ Flood Plain Evaluation Panel, Boulder: November,1982; Earthquake Prediction Warning Task Force Workshop, Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, Asilomar:
December,1981; Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, Preparedness and Human Re-l sponse, San Fernando: June,1976; Seminar on Disaster Research, Colorado State Uni-versity, Fort Collins: February,1975; Symposium on Complex Organizations: Research i and Applications Western Social Science Association, El Paso: April,1974.
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Dennis S. Mileti Page 23
\
Editorships -
Corresponding Edktbr, Organizations and Occupations Newsletter of the American Sociological Association. Western Region,1984-present: Associate Editor for social sci-ence Earthquake Spectra, Journal of. the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 1984-1987: Corresponding Editor on Hazards and Disaster Environmental Sociology.
Newsletter of the Section on Environmental Sociology of the American Sociological As-sociation,1981-date: Guest editor, special issue on Environmental Stress, Threat and Social System Response, Mass Emergencies 1(4):247-346, 1976.
Testimony u
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham Nuclear Reactor, Suffolk: December.1983 through June,1984; Nuclee.r Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Wolf Creek generating station, Burlington, Kansas: January,1984: Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of 1
pre-emergency pubhc eciucation and information for emergency planning at the Wa-terford Three Nuclear Reactor, New Orleans February,1983: Suffolk County,Legisla-ture, State of New York,'in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham Nuclear Reactor, Suffolk: January,1983; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Reactor, San Luis Obisbo: January, 1982: Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space in the matter of the Na-tional Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act, Washington, D.C. April,1980; Nuclear Regu-latory Commission in the matter of the impact of floating nuclear plants on tourist be-havior, Bethesda: May,1977 and July,1978.
Legislative and Prorram Reviews Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program U.S. Congressional Panel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983-82; Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of the U.S. Geo-logical Survey,1982; Final Regulations for Floodplain Management and Protection of Wetlands, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Register 176(45):59520-59538, 1980: Applied Research Program Evaluation, National Science Foundation, 1978-79.
Proposal Reviews
.l Societal Response Program of Civil and Environmental Engineering, National Science Foundation, 1985-81: Division of Policy Research and Analysis, National Science Foun-dation, 1983: Sociology Program, National Science Foundation, 1982-81: Design Re-
- search Program, National Science Foundation,1982
- Division of Problem Focused Re-search, National Science Foundation,198t;i Division of International Programs, National Science Foundation,1978: Division of Advanced Environmental Research and Technolo-gy, National Science Foundation, 1978-76.
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Dennis S. Mileti Page 24 Article Reviews Human Relations, 1985-83, 1978-77; Sociological Perspectives (Pacific Sociological Re-view) 1984; Social Forces, 1980-79; Sociology and Social Research, 1983-81, 1979-78, 1976; The Social Science Journal, 1985, 1981-77; The Sociological Quarterly,1975; Journal of the American Planning Association,1985; Deviant Behavior,1983; Risk Analysis,1983; The Environmental Professional, 1983-82; Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America,1982; Sociological Focus,1980; Mass Emergencies, 1978, 1976-75; Policy Analysis, 1978; Current Research in Earthquake Prediction, 1984; Mass Emergencies and Disasters,1985.
Other Reviews L. Lave and D. Epple, " Future Scenarios " Chapter 21 in R. W. Kates (Ed.). Climate Impact Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Socim. Geneva, for the International Council of Scientific Union's Scientific Committee on Problems of the En-vironment,1982; Study on Earthouake Hazards Information Dissemination: Charleston, South Carolina. Reston for the U.S. Geological Survey,1982.
Department and University Service College Scholarship Committee, 1985-84; Department Executive Committee, 1984-82, 1980-77; Department Graduate Affairs Committee, 1985-84, 1977-74; Department Five-Year Review Committee,1982; Department Comprehensive Examination Commit-tee, 1984-75; Department ad hoc Committee on Research Space,1983; Department Evaluation of Independent Study Courses,1978; Department Faculty Search Committee, 1985-84; University Committee for Department Chair, 1985-84; University Committee on Ethnic Studies, 1976-74; University Committee on Latin Americah Studies, 1975-74.
TEACHING Courses Taucht (underrraduate)
Introduction to Sociology Complex Org3nizatons Demographic Processes and Social Change Historical Sociological Theory Research Methods Sociology of Hazards and Disasters Courses Taught (graduate)
Advanced Quantitative Analysis Multiple Regression and Path Analysis
Dennis S. M11eti '
Page 25 Research Methods I Research Methods II Demography and Population
' Complex Organizations Graduate Theses and Dissertations Chair, Ph.D. Dissertation Committee, 6 i Member, Ph.D. Committees,12 Chair, M.A. Thesis Committees, 4 Member, M.A. Committees,12 1
! Student Evaluations
! Ranked as excellent by most students in most courses; evaluation summaries are avail- ;
able upon request.
Teaching Awards Alumni Honor Faculty Award, Colorado State University, Alumni Association, for Aca-demic Year 1983-84; Cited for excellence by the Dean, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences for Academic Year 1977-1978.
VITA ADDITIONS (1985)
Sorensen, J., J. Mutton and D. M leti 1984 " Institutional management of risk informa-tion following earthquake predictions." Pp. 913-924 in F. Evison (Ed.)
Earthauake Prediction. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultur-al Organization.
Mileti, D., J. Sorensen and J. Mutton 1984 " Social factors affecting the response of groups to earthquake prediction: implications for public policy." Pp. 649-658 in
. F. Evison (Ed.) Earthouake Prediction. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scien-tific and Cultural Organization.
Mileti, Dennis S., D. Hartsough, P. Madson, R. Hufnagel 1984 "The Three Mile Island In-I cident: A Study of Behavioral Indicators of Human Stress" Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2 (1): 39-113.
Hutton, J., D. M11eti and J. Sorensen 1984 " Factors affecting the effectiveness of earth-quakes warning - dissemination systems." Pp. 913-924 in F. Evison (Ed.)
Earthouake Prediction. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultur-al Organization.
I l .. . _ . . _
Dennis S. Mileti Page 26 i
Harwell, Christine C. (Ed.) 1985 " Experiences and extrapolations from Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Pp. 427-467 in M.A. Harwell and T.C. Hutchinson (Eds.)
Environmental Consecuences of Nuclear War Volume II: Ecological and Articul-tural Effects. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Mileti, Dennis, J. Sorensen, W. Bogard 1985 Evacuation Decision Making Process and Uncertainty. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory; No.
TM-9692.
Federal Emergency Management Agency 1984 National Earthouake Hazards Reduction Program Five Years Plan. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Popkin, Roy, D. Mileti, B. Farhar - Pilgrim and J. Sheiner 1985 Unmet Needs of Disas-ter Victims in the United States. Fort Collins, Colorado: Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.
Mileti, Dennis 1985 " Emergency role performance in disaster response organizations,"
Environmental Sociology (42): 6-10.
Mileti, Dennis S., with D. Hartsough, J. Mutton, P. Madson S. Pratt, C. Simile 1985 Stress impacts of a Technological Emergency: An Unobtrusive Indicators Study of the Livingston Train Derailment. Fort Collins, Colorado: Hazards As-sessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.
Mileti, Dennis and Gary Williams 1985 "A sociological perspective on the siting of hazardous - waste facilities."
Paper presented at the Annual Conference on Waste Management, Session on So-cial and Economic Effects of Public Perception: Tucson: March.
Cochrare, Hal and Dennis Mileti 1985 " Vulnerabilities of medical / health care systems to the effect of nuclear war." Paper presented at the Symposium on the MedicalImplications of Nuclear War, National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Session on Medical Resource Needs and Availability. Washington, D.C.:~ September.
i Participant, Conference for Researchers on the Use of Crisis Response Conclusion Retrieval System, University of Pittsburg Center for Social and Urban Research.
Pittsburg: December,1985.
Appointed (by invitation) to Sigma XI: The Scientific Research Society,1985.
" Social aspects of risk," speech presented to Risk Analysis Seminar, Department of In-dustrial Engineering, Stanford University. Standford: February,1985.
" Human response to emergencies," speech presented to Emergency Preparedness Exec-utive Seminar, General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation. - Middletown, Pennsylvania: May,1985.
i
M Dennis S. Mileti Page 27
" Social aspects of the Parkfield, California earthquake prediction," speech presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Geophysical Union, Session on Parkfield Earthquake Studies. San Francisco: December,1985.
" Communicating engineering information to public officials," speech presented to the Annual Meeting of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Session on So-cial Application. Seattle: February,1985.
"How well do traditional warning system strategies deal with today's natural and tech-nological hazards?", speech presented to the plenary session of the Tenth Annual Invitational Workshop on Hazards Research and Application. Boulder: July,
, 1985.
" Social impacts and lessons from the Parkfield earthquake prediction," speech pres-ented to the Earthquake Prediction Warning and Response System Workshop, Governor's Office of Emergency Services. Asilomar, California: July.
Corresponding Editor, Orranizationals and Occupations newsletter for the Western Re-gion of the American Sociological Association.
Organizer and Presider, Sessions I, II and III on Nuclear Power, Emergency 85, Third In-ternational Conference Emergency Management. Washington, D.C.: May,1985.
Corresponding Editor, Column on Natural Hazards and Disasters, Environmental Sociol-ogy Newsletter of the Section on Environmental Sociology of the American Sociological Association, 41 (Spring, 1985); 10-18; 42 (Summer 1985): 5-8.
f ExDert Witness Testimony Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shearon-Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Raleigh: June and November,1985.
FWwusal Reviews National Science Foundation, Societal Response Program, January,1985.
National Science Foundation Division of Fundamental Research in Emerging and Criti-cal Engineering System April,1985.
Report Reviews Earthquakes Engineering Research Institute Committee Report on Research Opportunities from the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake, September,1985. l l
s l
, _ _ _ . ~ , _ _
Dennis S. Mileti .
Page 28 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, Report on Impressions of the Guerrero-Michoacan, Mexico Earthquake, October,1985.
Advisories Seminar presentation on emergency public information needs for chemical and hazard-ous materials accidents to Office of the Governor of Colorado, State Police, and Colorado Division of Emergency Services. Denver: July,1985.
Interviews Given Interviews given with reporters from The New York Times, National Public Radio, Newsday, Colorado State University media, Time, and for other local media.
VITA ADDITIONS (1986)
Article review for the International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disaster,1986.
Speech, " Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquake Predictions," Los Angeles City Earthquake Prediction Workshop, Asilomar, California: October 12, 1986.
Speech," Earthquake Prediction: A General Overview," Emergency Preparedness Com-mission for the Cities and County of Los Angeles, Carson, California: April 24, 1986.
Mileti, Dennis S., and James Goltz " Social Response to the Parkfield Prediction," paper presented to the Parkfield Prediction Experiment Session of the American Asso-clation for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, May,1986.
Proposal Review, Earthquake Systems Integration Division of Fundamental Research for Emerging and Critical Engineering Systems, National Science Foundation, 1986.
Speech, " November 1985 Colombia Nevada del Ruiz Volcanic Eruption: Emergency Pre-paredness and Mitigation Measures," Committee on Natural Disaster, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.: October 27,1986.
Mileti, Dennis S., Randal G. Updike, Patricia A. Bolton and Gabriel Fernandey. 1986.
Recommendations for Improving the Existing Warning System for Possible Nevado del Ruiz Volcanic Eruption. Colombia. South America. Washington, D.C.:
National Academy of Science,1986.
- ,- w
Dennis S. Mileti Page 29 Speech, " Industrial Crisis Response," Fluid Mechanics and Wind Engineering Program, College of Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins: November 5, 1986. ,
Member, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on En-gineering and Technical Systems, Committee on Natural Disasters.
Member, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Coucil, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Resources, Board on Earth Sciences, Sub-committee on Earthquake Research.
Cochrane, Hal, and Dennis Mileti. 1986. "The Consequences of Nuclear War: An Eco-nomic and Social Perspective." Pp. 381-409 In F. Solomn and R.Q. Martson (eds.)
The Medical Implication of Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.: National Acade-my Press.
Mileti, Dennis S. and John H. Sorensen, " Determinants of Organizational Effectiveness in Responding to Low Probability Catastrophic Events," paper presented to the Crisis Analysis Models Session, Internation1 Conference on Industrial Crisis Man-agement, New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York City: September 6,1986.
Organizer and Presider, Sessions on the Sociology of Disaster, Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City: August,1986.
Article review, Human Relations,1986.
Speech, "Armero, Columbia: What are the Lessons for Hazards Management in the United States," Plenary Session, Hazards Research and Applications Workshop, Boulder, Colorado: July,1986.
Speech, "Public Response Elements ior Flood Warning Emergency Preparedness," Plena-ry Session, Conference on What Have We Learned Since the Big Thompson Flood, Boulder, Colorado: July,1986.
Williams, Gary, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1986. " Inclusion of Social Variables in Models of Risk Assessment." Pp. 375-379 in Geotechnical and Geohydrological Aspects of Waste Management. Boston: Rotterdam.
Article review, Earthauake Spectra,1986.
I Speech, " Social Aspects of Risk Communication," Conference on Communications in 1 Emergencies, Wyoming Disaster and Civil Defense Division, Cheyenne: - April, 1 1986.
Proposal review, External Research Division, U.S. Geological Survey,1986.
. 1
Dennis S. Mileti Page 30 Speech "What We Know About Human Behavior ar.d Earthquakes," Annual Meeting of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, San Francisco: February,1986.
Elected Member, Sigma Xi the Scientific Research Society,1985-present.
Sorensen, John H. Dennis S. Mileti and Emily Copenhaver. 1985. " Inter and In-traorganizational Cohesion in Emergencies." Mass Emergencies and Disaster.
3(3): 27-52. .
Report Review, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council,1986.
Mileti, Dennis.1986. " Disaster Survival." Alumnus Quarterly 62 (1): 6-7, 20.
Article review, Journal of the American Planning Association,1986.
1 Attachment G PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS RICHARD J. WATTS Prswdrient 4
l RICHARD J. WATTS. INC.
My name is Richard James Watts and my business address is Richard J.
- Watts, Inc., 404 Bluhm Road, Fairport,-New York 14450. I am presently the President j- cf Richard J. Watts, Inc.
I received my Bachelor of Science degree in Environmental Sciences from
, Michigan State University in 1973. From Septe'mber 1973 to April 1975 I attended the University of Michigan, where I earned a Masters of Science degree in Radiological Health.
! My professional training began in 1974 when, from May through August of that year, I was a research assistant at the French Atomic Energy Commission's Nucle-ar Research Centers at Saclay and Cadarache, France. From December 9-12, 1975, I attended and participated in the Training Course in Radiological Monitoring in the En-vironment of Nuclear Power Facilities, sponsored by the Radiation Management Corpo-ration in Philadelphia, Pennsylva:tia. In 1978, from March 13-14 I participated in the Training Course in Quantitative Testing of Respiratory Protection Equipment offered by Frontier Enterprissis, Inc., and held in Alburquerque, New Mexico. Shortly thereaf-ter, on October 23, 1978, I attended a Seminar in Radioactive Waste Shipping and Packaging Regulations given by Nuclear Energy Waste Management Consultants, which was held in New York City, N.Y. In September,1980, I enrolled in a Radiological Emer-gency Response Coordinators Course, sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management
- Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In 1981 I i
completed a Mitigating Core Damage Course offered by the Westinghouse Corporation.
I i
RICHARD J. WATTS Page 2 In the fall of 1986 I attended three separate courses given by Radiation Management Consultants, Inc. on the handling of contaminated / injured individuals, directed at nucle-ar plant, ambulance and hospital medical personnel. I have taken additional ABHP con-tinuing education courses as well as courses in supervisory skills and client management 4 at the Nassau Community College.
Since March of 1986 I have been President of Richard J. Watts, Inc., which specializes in radiological consulting in the areas of Health Physics, Radioactive Waste j
Management and Emergency Planning. My power reactor health physics experience in-cludes: radiological effluent technical specifications, offsite dose calculating manual.
development, ALARA reviews, radiation protection program development and audits, training, shielding, environmental monitoring and computerized dose assessment pro-gram development.
My radioactive waste management experience includes: development of 10 CFR Part 61 compliance programs, coordination of Part 61 waste stream sampling analysis and data interpretation, dismantling and decontamination studies, and partici-pation in New York State radwaste disposal planning activities in conjunction with the New York State Low-Level Waste Group. I have also provided expert testimony in New York State low-level waste management hearings on interim waste storage technology and economics.
My emergency planning experience includes: emergency preparedness drill scenario development; emergency dose assessment training provided to state, county and utility personnel; development of emergency dose assessment procedures; and drill observer and controller participation. I have been retained as the Radiological Health Coordinator for LILCO's Local Emergency Response Organization. I have been an i
._.._y____ _., , , . . , _ . , _ - - - - ~--.-y.,, . . - - - - , . . - . . . . - - - , ,.
4 RICHARD J. WATTS '
Page 3 expert witness in Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearings on Emergency Planning Is-sues for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. I have conducted dose assessment orienta-tion on LILCO "ACCDOS" model for DOERAP Team personnel at Brookhaven National .
Laboratory. I have also conducted numerous dose assessment courses and tabletop ses-sions for LILCO and Rochester Gas & Electric personnel.
I was employed by IMPELL Corporation from May'1983 to March 1986. Prior to joining IMPELL Corporation, from June 1975 through April 1983, I was employed by Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, located in Rochester, New York.
I was the Supervising Engineer of the Radiological Services Section at IM-PELL and was responsible for coordinating the Section's project activities in Emergency Planning, Health Physics, and Radioactive Waste Management in much the same capac-ity that I am working now.
My emergency planning work responsibilities included emergency prepared-4 ness drill scenario development, emergency dose assessment training which is provided
- to state, county, and utility personnel, and drill observer and controller participation. I was also retained as Radiological Health Coordinator for LILCO's Local Emergency Re-sponse Organization.
My health physics responsibilities included offsite dose calculation manual development, ALARA reviews, radiation protection program development and audits, training, shielding evaluations, environmental monitoring assessments, computerized dose assessment program development, and coordinating health physics aspects of spent !
fuel rack modification work.
My radioactive waste management activities included development of 10 CFR Part 61 compliance programs, coordination of Part 61 waste stream sampling l
s 1
RICHARD J. WATTS Page 4 analysis and data interpretation, and participation in New York State radwaste disposal planning activities in conjunction with the New York State Low-Level Waste Group.
My previous professional experience has included over eight years of applied experience in Power Reactor Health Physics in support of station operations, licensing, and siting of a proposed unit.
As Corporate Health Physicist for Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, my responsibilities included licensing, environmental monitoring, operational health physics, shielding and dose assessment, and emergency preparedness and response. I also participated in industrial review groups, committees, and professional societies',
including the Health Physics Society, Edison Electric Institute, . Atomic Industrial Forum, and the New York State Low-Level Waste Group.
My emergency response experience included directing radiological dose as-sessment and environmental sampling during the January 25,1982 Ginna steam genera-tor tube rupture incident. I was also responsible for the post-incident dose assessment evaluation report, and other follow-up programs.
My emergency preparedness and post-TMI experience included: establishing the Dose Assessment Section for RG&E Emergency Operations Facility, training the
! Emergency Radiological Response Staff, establishing improved methods for obtaining post-accident primary coolant and containment atmosphere samples, performing sam-pling analyses within exposure guidelines, upgrading plant radiation shielding for post-accident vital access areas, designing system layout for emergency environmental radiation monitors, directing meteorological program upgrading, including incorpora-tion of computerized data acquisition system, and performing a Control Room hab-itability study to assess conditions resulting from postulated radiological and chemical releases.
l
3 RICHARD J. WATTS Page 5 As an operational Health Physicist, I supervised Health Physicist activities during station outages, assisted in the planning and execution of a spent fuel rack modi-fication project, established a quantitative respirator testing program, conducted dosimeter intercomparison reviews, coordinated a technician retraining program, and managed a neutron measurements and carbon-14 research program.
As part of my onsite support duties, I conducted periodic radiological safety inspection tours during routine operations and plant outages, provided independent re-views of plant procedures and practices, and provided recommendations to the Ginna Plant Operations Review Committee, and to the Ginna Plant ALARA Committee. I also developed the proposed Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (10 CFR, Appen-dix !), and the supporting Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
In support of the site and licensing, I was responsible for the preparation and review of ER and SAR documentation supporting Sterling Nuclear Unit No. I construc-tion, testimony preparation for State and Federal construction permit hearings, ra-diological safety evaluations, and dose assessments for licensing submittals to the NRC, including Appendix I analysis, spent fuel pool rack modification, and postulated fuel handling accident evaluation.
My environmental endeavors included coordination of a preliminary radiation and radioactivity monitoring program, a base-line stable element analysis program for 4
establishing transfer coefficients in food pathways, special sampling projects at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, and a research project for statistical analysis of ra-diological monitoring data. In addition, I have acted as Project Manager for Post-TMI meteorological and environmental monitoring program upgrades, Project Manager for a
- - - - - - . , , , -% ,e--.,-.-,. - -, - _~. . , - - - - _ _ _ , , - , - . , --
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RICHARD J. WATTS Page 6 study on radiological emissions resulting from fossil fuel plant operations to establish t
baseline data in anticipation of EPA emission standards, and Project Manager for a carbon-14 emission measurements program in conjunction with the New York State De-partment of Health.
My emergency response experience includes directing radiological dose as-sessment and environmental sampling during the January 25, 1982 Ginna incident. I was also responsible for the post-incident dose assessment evaluation report, and other follow-up programs.
My emergency preparedness and post-TMI experience includes: establishing the Dose Assessment Section for RG&E's Emergency Operations Facility and training the emergency radiological response staff. I also established improved methods for ob-taining primary coolant, containment atmosphere samples and performing sampling analyses within exposure guidelines. I upgraded plant radiation shielding for post-accident vital access areas and designed the system layout for emergency environ-mental radiation monitors. I directed meterological program upgracing, including the '
- incorporation of a computerized data acquisition system and performed a Control Room l habitability study to assess conditions resulting from postulated radiological and chemi-
- cal releases.
i I am certified by the American Ecard of Health Physics as a Health Physi-cist.
! My professional affiliations include membership in the Health Physics Soci-
! ety, the American Nuclear Society, former Vice Chairman of the New York State Low-Level Waste Group and the New York Academy of Sciences.
f i
l l
9 RICHARD J. WATTS 1
Page 7
! In July 1977 I was responsible, in conjunction with E. L. DeMeritt, for a pre-1 I
sentation at the Health Physics Society Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, entitled 1
" Health Physics Methods Used in Spent Fuel Pool Modification Work Involving Divers at a Commercial Nuclear Power Facility." On March 19,1982, I provided a formal presen-tation on the radiological consequences of the Ginna steam generator tube rupture inci-dent before a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. In July, 1982, I made a presentation at the Health Physics Society Annual Meeting, in Las Vegas, Nevada, entitled, " Radiological Aspects of the Ginna Steam Generator Tube Rupture In-cident." In March 1985 I was responsible, in conjunction with J. R. Jorgensen and Dr.
M. Ma, for a presentation at Waste Management '85 in Tucson, Arizona, entitled, "New York State Interim Waste Management Cost Evaluation."
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o Attachment K I Federal Emergency Management Agency
@ RegionII 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 February 12, 1985 Michael S. !! iller, Esq.
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 1900 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 In the Matter of iOtG ISLAND LIGIIING CCMPANY (Shore. nam Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (Bnergency P1mmi=J
Dear Mr. Miller:
This office is in receipt of your letter dated January 31, 1985 in which you requested the following information relating to the Shorehm Nuclear Power Station and the proposed utilization of the Nassau Coliseum:
- 1. All docunents and correspondence of any kind between or anong representatives of the FEMA and the NRC Staff and/or LULO concerning LHIO's proposed use of the Nassau Coliseun.
- 2. All de= ants relating to the use or proposed use by any licensee, including Luf0, of a relocation center (or other facility at which all evacuees would be monitored and, if necessary, decontainated in the event of a radiological accident) which is 40 or more miles frcan the licensee's nuclear power plant.
- 3. All docunents relating to the health effects to EPZ evacuees or to the population of Nassau County or other areas outside the EPZ that could result from LHIO's proposal to use the Nassau Coliseun as a relocation center.
Upon receipt of tne above referenced letter FhMA's Regional Counsel requested clarification of the request frcxn counsel for Suffolk County. It was agreed that the second question only required identification of enose sites where monitoring and/or decontamination functions were located more than (40) miles from a Nuclear Generating facility. In addition, it was agreed that the last question was directed to the identification of Shorehan site specific studies and was not an attempt to ascertain the existence of general literature in the field. l
2-In reference to the aoove inquiry, FEMA provides the following responses:
- 1. To the best of our knowledge and belief, all the documents ad correspondence concerning LIIID's proposed use of the Nassau Colissun that are in FEMA's possession were provided through the service list in the above captioned matter.
- 2. The accached charts contain the identification of those sites
- utilizing facilities which are thirty or more miles fra a nuclear power plant to nonitor, and if necessary, decontaminate evacuees in the event of a radiological accident. This material was cogiled at the directica of this office. The difference in form utilized in the accached charts is a result of having different individuals compile the material to insure a cinely response and has no other intended significace.
- 3. It is our belief that generic material does exist relating to the health effects on EFL evacuses around Nuclear Power Plants but this
! office is not aumre of any specific documents relating to LIIIX)'s pronosal to use the Nassau Coliseus as a relocation center.
l FEMA is aware of the Board's ruling of February 5,1985 and its voluntary response to the above questions is intended to facilitate the dissemination i of information in this proceeding without unduly hindering the ability of l FEMA to carry out its assigned responsibilities. This response is not a i waiver of any rights enat F1HA has to formally object to these requests or any possible future requests that may result directly or indirectly from these responses. l < 1 Very truly yours, i i fStewart>n M. Glass h Regional Comsel i cc: tbeton B. Margulies, Omirman Norman L. Greene, Esq. Frederick J. Shan W. Taylor Reveley III, Esq. Dr. Jerry R. Kline Stephen B. Iacham, Esq. Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq. Donna Duer, Esq. Houard L. Blau, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board Panel Mr. Brim McCaffrey hard M. Baract, Esq. Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. Marc W. Goldanith 11HB Technical Associates i j Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. Mr. Jay DLmkleberger Docketing and Service Section ^ Hon. Peter Cohalan
- John F. Shea, III, Esq. Sence Perry, Esq.
- Janes B. Doug ny , Esq. Imon Friedman, Esq.
Ms. Nora Bredes Ben Wiles. Esq.
- Gerald C. Crotty, Esq. Bernard M. Bordanick, Esq.
! Q1ris Nolin Donald Irwin, Esq. i Richard Zahnleuter i 1 4
Attschment 1 Plant Distance Name of Purpose of Name Tra Facility racility Plant
- 1. Arkansas Nuclear 30 nues Norrillton Reception Reception Center One Centero NorrL11 tono Nonitorim and Arkansas Decontamination
- 2. River Bend 30 Mues Riverside Centroplex *
- East Baton Rougeo LA
- 3. Grand Gulf 18 Mues Tertiday Reception * * "
Centero Terriday a LA
- 4. Waterford 50 MLies Riverside Centroplex *
- East Bacon Rouge, LA
- 5. Muistone 35 Miles City Hall /Parkim lot Nonitoring Weatherfieldo CT Decontamination Registration 35 Mues Yale Bowl
- New Haven, CT
- 6. Trojan 46 Miles
- Lewis County Registration o
*This mileage Assistance Center Monitorimo is in air Decontamination miles (straight vector) from plant locations actual road miles would be greater than 46.
- 7. Browns Terr) 32 Miles Norris School *
- Huntsville o AL l
j 32 Miles Westlawn Middle *
- 4 Schoolo Huntsvu1eo AL 32 Miles Milton Frank stadLua r " "
Huntsvule, AL 32 Miles Huntsville-Madison *
- County ALrporta Huntsvuleo AL I
l 1
l l Plant Distance Name of Purpose of Name Froe Facility racL1 Ley Plant
- 8. Catawba 30 Mues i.ockhart Schoolo Shelter - .
Lockharto SC Nonitoring/ Decontamination 39 Miles Union Sigh Schoolo i Uniano SC . 30 Miles Cherokee Vocational Schoolo Cherokee
! County, SC 34 Mues East Junior High
< Schoolo Cherokee Countyo SC 32 MUes Gaffney High Shelter = Schoolo Caffneyo Monitoring / SC Decontamination 34 Miles Luther Vaugh E1enentary Schoolo Cherokee Countyr SC 35 MUes B D. Lee Elementary Schoolo Cherokee Countyo SC 35 Miles West Schoolo Chetokee Countyo SC
- 9. Crystal River 41 Mues 3ronson High School Bronsono FL i 42 Miles Chiefland High Schoolo Chieflanda TL 41 Mu es Wuliston High Schoolo Wu listono TL 41 Mu es WLiliston Elementary Schoolo W111Latono FL 4L Mu es WUllston Intermediate Schoolo Wulistono FL 32 M Ues Cedar Key Schoolo
. Cedar Keyo TL 4 1
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l Plant Distance Name of , Purpose of Name Fica Facu Lty FacilLcy Plant
- 10. Gratui Cult 40 Mues Hazlehurst North Sheitst -
Campus Elementar) Monitori:sj/ l Schoolo Haziehursto Decontamination MS
) ; 40 MU es Hazlehurst South Campus "
Elementary Schoolo , Haziehursto MS f 37 Miles North flatchez Adame } High Schoolo Natchezo MS )
- 37 Mu es South Natchez Adame High Schoolo Natchezo NS i
U . Watts Bar 35 Miles Oliver Springs Shelter - Elementary Schoolo Monitoring / Oliver Springso TN Decontamination 35 !!Lles Oliver Springs " High School, i Oliver Springso TN .I
- 12. Palo Verde 35 MUes Tolleson High School These four centers 3ullesono AZ are backup /oved10w i telocatLon centers I 40 Miles Glendale High School only. The primary
> Glettialer AZ centerso all less than 30 mu es 50 Mues Trevor Browne High froe the planto School are designed to i' Trevor Browneo AZ accoandate all anticipated needs. i 50 Mues Quartzsite Comamunity Center Quartzsite, AZ } l
~ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
Attachment 2
- Peellities Located 30-40 Miles Free A Seelear Power Flaat i
j g,g, Festlity Nees and Locaties Pureose of Facility quad Cities rad esa desealreptlseng sa i Mt Carrell Unit District Seheels a E a a Mt Carrell, IL Sterling Bish Scheel a a a Sterling, IL a Cha11and Jr Righ seheel a a a~ Sterling, IL u Franklia Grade Seheel a E E E 3 Sterlias, IL i 5 Lincola Grade Scheel a z a a i Sterling, It - Wallace Grade Scheel a a a Sterling,'IL m Washington Grade Scheel a a a a Sterling, IL j Jefferesa crede Scheel a a a a Sterling IL 1 1
; Syrea Mt Carrell Unit District Scheele a a a l Mt Cartell, IL a l
Pew Paw tienestery Scheel a a Paw Pow, IL a a Paw Paw Righ Scheel a u a a Paw Pow, IL i Syeamore Righ Scheel a Syensere, IL a a a 3 Syeemore Jr Righ Scheel a a Sysasore, IL a x 1 Berth Steesatary Seheel a a Syeamore, IL a a 1 4 Seetheast Steenstery Sehest s Syeamore, IL a a a i I West Riensstery Seheel a Syeamere, IL a a a 4
.m-i I
i t 1
.---w,m -,,_ nn_._., _ . w,_v.mw___ , ,.__m,, , ,,_,,,__v,m.-y_,,.,,w--g
lion Aldes-Rebres Righ Scheel (f19) 3 x a m Eebres, IL Aldes-Esbres Elementary Scheel x x x x Eebres. IL usedeteck Righ Scheel a a u a Usedeteck, IL , Berthwood Jr Eigh Scheel a x x a i Woodstock, IL i Westweed Scheel s s x x Usedeteck, IL Olsen Scheel a a a a Weedsteak, IL Northwood Elemmatary School x s a a i Weedstock. IL Greenwood Scheel a a a x 4 Weedsteek. IL l Desa Street Scheel x x x x Woodeteck, IL Clay Street Scheel a z a z 1 Weedstock IL Marios Central Catholic ES x x x x ! Woodeteck, IL - St Marye Grade Scheel a u a x
- usedateek, IL 1111acio Estional Guard Armory z x x x Usedateck, IL Sedes Seheel a a a a Voodsteek It I McBeary Comunity College - a a x x Crystal Lake, IL Crystal Lake Central Righ Scheel s a a x Crystal Lake Il Crystal lake Eigh Scheel South a a a a Crystal Lake, IL
! Berth Jr Eigh Seheel a a a a 1 Crystal Lake, It i 1 i e e
. -.. .,--.-.--....----,,--,.,--.-.--.-----e.- ---.3- ..,-. ..-- - . , , - , - - . - - - - . - . - - - , _ - . _ . . . . , - - . . - . . . . - - . , . - . . , , - -
11em (east) Lendahl Jr Eigh Scheel a a a a Crystal Lake IL Prairie Grove Scheel a a x x j Crystal Lake, IL Worth Elementary Seheel a a a a Crystal Lake, IL Usat Elementary Scheel a a a a crystal Lake, IL , i South Elaeostery Seheel a a a a Crystal Lake, IL Central Elementary Seheel a a a a Crystal Lake. IL Coventry Seheel a a a a Crystal Lake, IL Canterbury 31eenstery Scheel a a a a Crystal Lake, IL f Eneasel Luthores Scheel 3 m a m .I , Crystal Lake,IL l St Themse the Apeetle School x a a u Crystal Lake, IL t i, R.D.Jasebe High Scheel s a a a Algeequia, IL t ' Algonquin Middle Scheel a a a u Algesquia, IL Eseneth E. Neubert Else Scheel a a a a , Algeequia. IL t Eastview Slementary Seheel a a a u
- Algeequia, IL
! Conant Righ Scheel a a a a i Eeffesa Estates, It i Boffama Estates Righ Scheel s a a a Reffaes Betates, IL Seheueburg Bigh seheel a a a a Schaumburg, IL Maine 1try Eigh School East u a a a Park Ridge, IL 3
~
l ties (cent) Maine hrp Righ Scheel South Park ~ Ridge, IL a x x a Maine Uset Nigh Scheel Des Fisines, IL a a a a Algongela Jr Righ Scheel a a a a t Des Plaises. IL Chippewa Jr Eigh Scheel a f Des Plaines, IL a a a Iroquete Jr Righ Seheel a Des Plaines, IL a a a Cumberland Scheel a a a a Das Plaises. IL Centrol Righ School Des Plaines, IL z a a a Ferrest Scheel a Dee Plaines, IL a a a North Scheel Dee Pleines, It a a a i Orchard Place Scheel a a i Des Plaines IL a x 1 4 i Plainfis1d deheel a a Des Plaines, IL a a South Scheel Des Platase, IL a z a a I Terrace Scheel z Dee Plaines, IL a a a
- Elk Grove Righ Scheel a u x x Elk Grove Village. IL Liberty Jr Eigh School a B1k Grove, IL ' u a a
+ j Margaret Mead Jr Eigh Scheel a Elk Grove, IL a a a i, Orove Jr Ri 1 Elk Grove gh IL School a a a a 1 Admiral Byrd 11eenstery Seheel a 31k Grove IL a a a l 4 i
Eton (cent) Cleareset Elementary Scheel Elk Grove, IL a u a a Salt Creek Elementary Scheel a a a i Elk Grove IL a Supley Eleneatary Scheel a a Rik Grove IL a a Adlai Steveneen SCJtCOL 3 E E Elk Grove IL E Ade1Ph Link SCNMb u a a a Elk Grove, IL Elk Grove Twp Comessity Day a a Care Center a a Elk Grove IL Great Wood Seafor Center a a x Elk Grove, IL x - Elk Grove Public Library a u x Elk Grove IL a Liese Park Ceemanity Center x Elk Grove, IL x x x i Queen Of. Rosary h 81- x x a Elk Grove, IL a Streenwood Eigh Scheel s a a a Streamwood. IL Canton Middle Seboel z a a Streaurood, IL a
- Taf t Jr Eigh Scheel x Streampoed IL x x a I
- Glenbrook Elementary Scheel E a Streassoed, IL E E i
Eeritage Bleasatary Seheel a E Streampood IL a a Gek till Elementary Scheel a a Streassood, IL a a Ridge Circle Eleenstery Scheel a Streamwood, IL a a a Sumaydale.SC400L. x Streampoed, IL a a m ' I l
J i \ Eton (eent) Elgia Eigh Scheel a a a a Elgia IL Larkia Eigh Seheel a a a a I1gia. IL
- Abbott Middle Seheel a z a a Elgia. IL Ellie Middle Scheel a a a a Elgia, IL Einball Jr Eigh Scheel a a a a Elgia. IL Larsen Middle Scheel a a a a Elgin IL Century Oaks Seheel a a a a R1313 IL Chaastag Elementary Scheel a a a a Elgia. IL 4
Celesea Elementary School a a a a Ilgia. IL Gifford Elementary Scheel a a a a Elgia. IL Eighised Elementary Scheel a z a a 1 Elgia. IL ' Billarset Seheel s a a a Elgia IL Ruff Eleenstory Scheel a a a a Elgia, IL 1111 asia Park Scheel a E a a j Elgin, IL Lords Park Eleenstary Scheel a a a a Elgia IL Sheridas Ileasatary Seheel a a a Elgia, IL a Willard Greamer Sebeel a a a a Elgia. IL Elgia Ceumunity College a a a Elgin, IL a 6 i ! i 1 1
i Ites (east) Elgia Nestal Realth Center a a Elgia, IL a x Illisoie Natieaal Guard Armory a a a z Elgia. IL Desdee Ceamanity Righ Scheel a a Carpenteroville IL a a Dendee Middle Scheel a z a Dundee, IL a Perry Middle Seheel a a x x Carpentersville, IL Dundee Righlande Elementary Scheel a a a Dundee, IL a Lakewood Middle Scheel a a a i Carpentersville, IL a Golfview Eleenstery Scheel a a Carpentersville, IL a m i Irving Crova High Scheel a z Carpentersville, IL a u Kinge need Eleasatary Scheel a a Carpentersville, IL a 4 i Parkview Eleanstary Seheel u a Carpenterev111e, IL a a Needewdale Eleanstary Scheel a a l Carpentersville, IL a a 1 CaryMirove Righ Scheel u
- Cary IL a a x Cary Jr Eigh Scheel s Cary IL a a a 1
3 Sriargate Sleasatary Seheel a a j Cary, IL a a Oak Emell tieaantary Seheel E Cary, IL a a i Maplewood Eleasetary Seheel a i knen a a a Sainte Cary, IL Peter and Paul M a a a a .l 7
----------.~~~,a, .. - . -..,,.,n.__. ...,--n,,.,,__,,-.,-,_, ,,,_-n--.,, , , ,_ n..,,---,,,,,_ ., -..-.,
-, ... . - - - - _= - _ . . _ . . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ ..
4 4
- Etes (east) East Troy Jr Righ Scheel East Troy Village WI a a a a i
- se Petere Bleenstary Scheel 1
Best Troy Village, W1 a a a l, a Best Troy Righ Seheel \ East Troy Village, WI a a a 4 m t East Troy Eleesotary Seheet 1 East Troy Village, WK a a a a i Stees Elementary Seheel Emes Trey v111 age. VI a a a a i St Edwards 31eenstery Scheel
\
East Troy Village. W1 a a a a i Gateway Technical testitute s Elkhorn City W1 a a a ! a i i St Patricks Grade Seheel Elkhora City, VI a a a a Lakeland Scheel Elkhora City. WI a a a a Rikhora Middle Scheel a Elkhorn City, W1 a a a i Elkhora Righ Scheel i Rikhorn City, WI a a a a lieetelde Primary Seheel 31khora City, W1 a a a ! a j Festaan Elementary Seheet Festaan. VI a a a a i Denisse Jr Ri Lake Geneva,WIgh $shmol a a a a 4 4 Walworth Elementary teheel Malworth, W1 a a a a i j Sig Feet Eigh Scheel Walworth, WI a a a a i North univerth seheel a Welwerth, W1 a a a Williams Rey Eigh Beheel
#1111ame Rey, V1 a a a a
8 l l
t
'sien (east) Geerge Williams College a a a Willises Bay, W1 a Reek Scheel a a a i
Lies Township, VI a Traver Eleenstery School a a a Lina Tewaakiy, W1 a i N.W. Military Academy a a a a Lisa Township, WI
~
Pretria Island Univ of Wisseesta - Stout a a Menesinee, WI ' a a State St Paul,Fair let Grounds (id- N N a a a a Meeticelle State St Paul,Fair Ms Grounde( h -N M ) a a a a Perry Southeast 11eenstory Scheel Ceaseaut, 05 R a a a a Ceessaut Bagh School 32. a a Coeneout, OE a a cheetant Scheel SL a a a Coeneaut, OE a Lakeview Scheel 3L a a a a ceaseaut. On West Male Seheel 51 a a a Cenaseut OE a 9
Facilities Located Over 40 Itiles Free A Declear Power Plaat Site fastlity Wees and 14eaties Purpose of Facility rad esa;deseajrePtleses sa Prairie faland Olmsted County Fair Grenada a a koehester,ISI a a ties St Andrews Seheel a a a a Belavaa. VI Delaven Christian Scheel a a a a Delaves, W1 Wilemen Seheel a a a a Delavaa. VI Delavan Phoosis a a a Delavaa, WI a Park Scheel a a x x Delaves. VI Delavaa-Derica Righ Scheel a a a a Delavaa. VI Leera/ Play Bureery Scheel a a Delavaa, W1 a a Franklin Seheel s a a Whitewater, W1 a hiteweter Righ Seheel s x Witeweter, W1 x x Washington Eleenstery Seheel a a a hiteweter, W1 a Christian Educaties Building a a a a hiteweter, W1 Liaseln Sleenstary Scheel a a a hitsweter, WI a Univ Of Wisseesta - hitewater a a a a hiteweter, WI 10
Attachment 3 Region III - Philadelphia Plant flame / location Distance from Plant fAmber of Facilities Purpose" Surry oetween 30 & 40 miles 1 (Virginia)
'DiI between 30 & 40 miles 37 (Pennsylvania) o wr 40 miles 146 (One cotmty lists all mass care cancers - 90) will depend an need I.imerick between 30 & 40 miles 2 (Pennsylvania)
Peach Bottom between 30 & 40 miles 2 (Pemsylvania) 4 t: . Beaver Valley between 30 & 40 miles 4 4 (Pemsylvania)
- Susquehana between 30 & 40 miles 24 (Pennsylvania). owr 40 miles 4 Salem between 30 & 40 miles 2 (thew Jersey)
All mass care facilities will potentially serw as public renitoring and l deconta ination centers. ) l 1 t t 1 1 e O
- - . . - , . . , - - - . . . . , . . . . , . - . . - - - - , , , , -- ,.n, - - - , .-, .- --, . . - , -, . . . - ~ - - - - - . . , - - - . - - - - - . , -
I Name & tocation cf Facility for timitoring and/or Purpose
; Nuc!zer Pbwer decontamination l- Plant Distance 30-40 miles >40 miles j from plant from plant
- from plant H and/or D s'e
- Sites selected j Callaway 30 Heames Mult-Purpose H and D based on these
; Bldg. 2 criteria only. ; Coltsebla, to Facilities (30 ; miles not included, unless they were j , very close to 30.
i ls Cooper NW Hissourt State Univ. H and D l 1 g a) te ~ 50 . Maryville, le lith & 3rd Corse . H and D j < b) NE 35 & 21st & 4th " perfonned at i Nebraska City,NE roadblocks also i l thane Arnold 58 Harshall town,IA H and D i 30 Iowa City, IA H and D 4 75 Daveport, IA H and D i 68 Dubuque, IA H and D 28 Independence, IA H and D Ft Calhoun -- l a) NE 43 First Baptist H and D j Church, Bellevue, NC 4
- b) IA 50 Deniston, IA Registration & H I) Zion lutheran Church Plan does not '
2)Carlyle Memorial explicitly detail
- 3)Sr. Citizens Center HbD 4)Dension Jr. High H-State Patrol ,
5)Dension Comum. High D-Selected Central . locations __ ] Quad Cities All within 20 miles from plant All in Kansas l i u)lf Creeek 32 Ottmas H.S. j 28 Garnett H.S. 28 Buporia State Univ.
, 29 Lyon Co. Fairgrounds bd i
t 1
. IDCATIONS CF MDNIT! RING /DECONrAMINATION FACILITIES ~
FEBRUARY 1985 -
.n ----
u a FURTHEST FACILITY FRDM THE PLANr FACILITY IDCATED 40 MILES
}o o
SITE NAME OF MONITORINC DECONTAMINATION FACILITIES OR MORE FROM THE F1 ANT Oyster Creek, N.J. None Approminately 25 miles
, _ Carl Coets School fat.resson Road
__. - m e , ' Jackson, New Jersey c
' Sales, NJ Classboro College __ None __ - Approximately 28 miles ,~ ~' 3 Route 322-' ' 'h -a ~ .Cla ss boro, J,~s Jersey Approximately 31. 5 m11 esc.s Indian Fotnt M.T. Dutchess Mall None '
Flohk111, Nc., Jersey . . < -;- f , m,
, p -r ; -
Cinna,' h.T. Sperry Sr. High School , None Approx 1suitely 20 miles 1799 Lehigh Station Road - h
^
- Nin:t Mile Potat Jef ferson Comunanity College Appreuimately 40 miles --- --
120 Coffeen Street $" 7 yatertown, New Jersey d n f a* pv
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Aetachment L
.1/03 10:30 P02 x WINCD _iCPP 637 526-3499 Federal Emergency Management Agency " Weehlagton, D.C. 20472 DEC 241935 * '-
f, .
. - 3 nueswimsi rom, m'o! vision oilere " .. ..c :s - st- t e. ,at. a r tor Ib state and tacal Progens and support sum 3Ects .
thidance on MUMG4634/rptA-at>1 avaluation Criterion J.12
'this protective amorende prwides criterion reopense evaluation interpretative J.12: guidance on NURIO4454/ PIMA-Ra>
and senitorirg of evacuses at relocation centers in h arses. The personnel ard equipient available should be capable of monitoring within about a 124mur period all g, roeidente aruf transients in the arriving at relocation contare. phne esposure SPI -
; i; t ably be eupseted to arrive at a relocation conter(s).'the reason Frw itNo experience , ques ',>4 mergencies le rot conclusive. gathered on evacuation sweponses to a "- vari i twsaled that any*ere from 2 to 20 percent of the relecetion centers or shelters. ve at evaeuse,s arri dResearc For radiol
i sonable to asases that additional evacuees,ogical mergencies, it is see-
- r.
fear wer radiation, will go to relocation contero eether or not theyto alle ' ese to 20% range. for radiological meergenelse may be closer to the - . > 'the congregote aero toevo is reviewed as a part of all Atamic safety and '. Licenetrg such a heerisqsoard hearings, although it has never been foemally litte t d # - nuclear power p. lanta ee at is usually ci1he congregata care fact 11ty onpacity in the vicinity *
. " ./(' . of. .
the eettmated raster et eveeuses. ted as belte between 5 and 15 percent of Ifith these percentages in mind, it 14 **s. apparent rom ding thisthat lacus.there is atenificant diversity in the frees -of reference sur * ' h,.'d'
,7 . ;, l .n e ' *'*d.f;. :
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- ?.. 4
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~. . -. . . - _ _ - _ . __ . -.
f
,11/03 10:30 P03 *WINCO ICPP R77 t 526-3499 .~ , .l# \
13 2 . . s the guiderse provided bolme ia bened on the folicartrqr factores (1 poet experience with evecustions regardlese et the nature of the energen)cy energercies and (3) persontage of(2) incluelen aofo fear ogicalard smoortainty factar a facilitiae cited in ASIA hearirqpe. potential evacuees *for congrepete care Gddense .
- the state and local resintegieel aserverry properede :
persont of _:he estimated population to be avecuated.of ; tr e Icele str radiation encippeasirg a relatively large area I. may be emcessary to monitor a gisator vaanber et areouses, it boyarl 10 percent of the pagutatice. ' In euch a situation, State and foesi generreents woul6 he expected to develop and iglement ad hoc reigcnee maneures, sum Dy Federal ord private sector resourose.lenented, if needed, Any questions tt:Hatt et 446-2857. or concerns'about this guidance should e. Bill - be directed to at i I d t
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s 1 r 4.t . ep . .
,9, g t
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.1/C3 10:30 PO4 *WINCD fEPP B37 1 .
526-3499
' k Federal Emergency Management A'gency f wa.hinces, D.c. noen 2
OCT 22 ses , MDOWCLM PCft: Marshall E. Oilef, Pol velppuent Dr , FIDt Cra W
#J Se Otief, Field Ope ions trendi SLE75:Ts policy Determination Concerning MupeO-0454 Elenant of 12
- We attached October 4,1985 letter from Joe Aeller, of the Idaho Hetional Engineering taboratory (Dit:.1, to Stewart Class, Regicosal Counsel of FEMA Region 1953. II, tres received in this office and in Region II on October 14r Altimugh Mr. seller asks his trastione in comection trith the shortham plan rvview, the issue is also appliamble to other plans. ft. Class has twquested that since this really involves prograri policy tions, the remporse be coordinated at Meadparters in this ofrice.
please anseer Mr. Ra11er's questions? We have attached a copy of the16 you
** C.wober 8,1985, FEMA finding on Revision 5 of the LIICD Transition Plan " ,
fer Shornham. hat firding is referenced in Mr. 3411er's letter. ile would aggreciate it if you could address this issue soon so that the FEMA witness Reviolonpanel eculd have an anewr before they have to testify on the 5 firding. Ho hearing date has been set ces this poterialInst it is probable that the panel (Fo,leski - FDE, McIntire - FDu, Neller = INEZ. and 1414 tin - Argonne National laboratocy) will have to give tastimqt. Attadvient ' As Stated e e
.[
9 e
l
;1/03 10:30 P05 =WINCO ICPP 637 526-3499 \ g Westinghouse Idaho 1 Nuclear Company. Inc.
Son 4000 Idaho Fads. ldase 83433 JM 57-85 October 4.1945 Stewart M. Glass. Est. aeglenal Counsel Federal!!toergency Management Agency Aegten 25 Federal Pleas how York, how York 102?8
Dear Mr. Slass:
S'ubject: Clariflestion of ksREG 0654 Elseent J.12 b I believe element J.12. that clarification is reautred as to t'io meaning of hutEG 0654
$ lace it is very likely that the FEM witness eenel will
- agstr have to aopear before tee ASL8 en the Shorenas emergency ereparedness questions: issues ! would like to see the answers to the fellowing *
- 1. .
arrive at a recepcion conter(s) for monitoring and if sela ,- - wnet 5 of the EPZ soeulatten should be used in the planning process? .' 8
- 2. ' ,
More tepertently, what is the Fim posttten en the same cuestionsi j i
! raise tnis issue for two reasons.
nearings I recall a WRC Conmissten Aultng whichgroups you supelled as backFirst, eu material, which stated tnat 100% of unen astlying the 12 hour time frene of element J.12. the EPZ pseulation red must to conside not recall ifesintens the indivteval tnis statement speensed was to thein the body of the Auling er in one ofUnfortunately I Ruling. statement wouls have considereele nearing on the issue.The 1ecetten of the . Second, while the AAC has founa the LILC0 plan inadequate with respect to element J 12
. thearrivine reason for the inadequacy is not the insat11ty to mentter . ,a evacuees within 12 hours. The ASL8. en page 10 of the Concluding #artial Initial Decision en Emergency Planning has found the LILCO plan to be , ~'
safective because of the failure to adequately elen for the monitoring ana contor. b registratten of members of the general outlic errtving at ! - I apparently acceptable but the A5L4 points out that the number seeking -
,l i
senttering is not necessarily the same as snat seeking shelter. - t ' i
'. k .[
l . . i
I 1/03 10:30 POS xW!NCD ICPP.63.7 578-9490 . _ , _ . I . . Stewart M. 81 ass, Esq. Page 2 b JME-57-45 Octeter 4, 1945 While the 1spediate' concern is for the resulroments to be weed in the review of the LILC0 elen. this issue effects the review of all elans. Therefers the FEMA peeltlen, and to a eteewhat lesser degree the NRC posttten, should be known and clearly defined. I thank you for you'r help in obtaining a definitive positten en this issue. Stacerely, hW-J. H. Keller. Staff Scientist 5pecial Programs cc: M. Lawless - FEMA P. Rowleskt - FD% f 0# e . f .
- J .
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l l Attachment M KLD TR-192 Capacity Analysis of Highways in the Vicinity of Reception Centers for Evacuees from within the Shoreham Station Emergency Planning Zone Prepared by KLD Associates, Inc. 300 Broadway Huntington Station, NY 11746 September 26, 1986 l i - -
KLD TR-192 Capacity Analysis of Highways in the Vicinity of Reception Centers for Evacuees from within the Shoreham Station Emergency Planning Zone Prepared by KLD Associates, Inc. 300 Broadway Huntington Station, NY 11746 September 26, 1986
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Titd,g Eggt
- 1. INTRODUCTION 1
- 2. RECEPTION CENTER SITES 3
- 3. DATA COILECTION PROGRAM 7
- 4. ESTIMATED TRAFFIC VOLUMES 9
- 5. CAPACITY ANALYSIS 16
- 6.
SUMMARY
28 Appendix A: Data Collection Locations A-1 Appendix B: Representative Traffic Recorder Output B-1 Appendix C: Traffic Control Tactics C-1 f i
i LIST OF FIGUDFR Enz Title EAEA 2-1 Highway Map in the Vicinity of the Reception Centers 4 l 2-2 Evacuation Routes to Hicksville, l Bellaore and Roslyn Reception Centers 6 l 5-1 Pattern of Traffic Movements Entering, Within and Leaving the Reception Centers 19 LIST OF TAnr.wm hex Title EAgA 3-1 Data Collection Specifications 8 4-1 Distribution of Evacuating Traffic to Reception Centers and Path Assignments 11 4-2 Distribution of Traffic fr~om Zones within the EPZ to Reception Centers 12 4-3 Total Traffic Serviced on Each Path 13 4-4 Evacuating Vehicles Serviced by Key Intersections and Paths on Approaches to the Reception Centers 14 4-5 Procedure for Computing Capacity at Each Location 15 5-1 Sample Calculatien 17 l 5-2 Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 1 20 5-3 Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 2 22 5-4 Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 3 24 5-5 Maximum Number of Vehicles that can be Accommodated at the Reception Centers under Extreme Assumptions 26 11
- 1. INTRODUCTION A study was undertaken to distribute vehicles evacuating from
' within the Energency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), to three LILCO facilities which.will serve as reception centers. This study also assigned these vehicles to paths (outside the EPZ) toward these centers. With the distribution and assignment of evacuating vehicles determined, it was then possible to compute the highway capacities of roads in the vicinities of these centers. These reception canter facilitie's are:
e Hicksville Reception Center, located eff Old Country Road, east of Broadway (Route 107) and west of New South Road. e Bellmore Reception Center, located off Sunrise Highway, west of Newbridge Road. e Roslyn Reception Center, located off the Long Island Expressway (LIE) South Service Road, east of Willis Avenue. This study encompassed the following activities:
- 1. A field survey of the areas in the vicinities of these centers to identify the access roads to be used by
' evacuating vehicles and the turn movements of these vehicles as they travel toward the reception centers.
2. Based on this survey, a data collection program was developed to quantify the background traffic volumes en the access roads servicing these reception centers. This program was designed using Automatic Traffic to collect data 24 hours each day Recorders (ATR the following Monday, on all major acce)s,s roads.from Thursday to Furthermore, the data were stratified by those movements which would be taken by evacuees destined to the Reception Centers. -
- 3. The firm of American Traffic Information, Inc. (ATI) was retained to install the ATR and to furnish KLD with the traffic counts, broken down by 15-minute periods.
- 4. These data were reduced by KLD in a format amenable.to subsequent capacity analysis. ,
1 i I 5. A second survey was undertaken to collect geometric data ' and signal timing data, which are needed for calculating capacity. Additional manual counts of traffic were taken to establish turn percentages and lane usage. 4 l l l
6. The procedures of the 1985 Highway capacity Manual (HCM) were applied to compute the highway capacities of the access roads to, and from, the reception centers. This effort employed the information obtained in earlier steps. 7. The capacity available to accommodate the combined evacuating and background traffic was computed. 8. These results were analyzed to determine whether better utilization of available capacity could be achieved by changing the distribution of evacuating traffic to reception centers and/or by changing the routing of evacuating traffic. 9. As necessary, steps 6 through 8 were repeated to ensure efficient utilization of each reception center. e O t I 2
- 2. RECEPTION CENTER SITES Figure 2-1 is a highway map showing the locations of the three reception centers and all major access roads:
e The Hicksville-(H) center is serviced directly by Old Country Road and by a cross street, New South Road. Access highways to this site include: Long Island Expressway (LIE, I-495) Exit 48 onto Round Swamp Road (which joins with Old Country Road) approximately 4 miles to the east of the center. Seaford-Oyster Bay Expressway (Route 135) which has an interchange at Old Country Road about 1.7 miles to the east of the center. This expressway can be accessed directly from the LIE and from the Northern State Parkway (NSP) via the LIE and from Southern State Parkway (SSP). South Oyster Bay Road which intersects Old Country Road about 0.5 mile to the east of the center. South Oyster Bay Road is accessible from the LIE and NSP. Broadway-Hicksville Road (Route 107) which intersects Old Country Road about 0.2 mile west of the center. Broadway is accessible from the LIE, NSP, SSP and the Seaford-Oyster Bay Expressway. e The Bellmore (B) center is serviced directly by Sunrise Highway and by Newbridge Road. Access highways to this site include: Seaford-Oyster Bay Expressway onto Sunrise Highway approximately 2.5 miles to the east. Wantagh State Parkway onto Sunrise Highway approximately 1.3 miles to the east. Meadowbrook State Parkway onto Sunrise Highway !' approximately 1.3 miles to the west.
- i All of these access roads connect with the SSP (which !
is 2 miles to the north of the center) and with NSP l (which is 7.3 miles to the north). e The Roslyn (R) center is serviced directly from Willis Avenue, and from the LIE South Service Rcad which services one-way eastbound traffic. Access highways to this site include: Northat. State Parkway onto Willis Avenue, 0.2 mile to I 1 the south. ! l
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Long Island Expressway onto Willis Avenue immediately to the northwest. These access highways were surveyed to identify the paths of travel center. which would be followed by evacuees en route to each These caths which are assigned to evacuees, according to their zone within the SNPS EPZ are indicated in Figure 2-2, and discussed below: 1. There are many paths leading to the Hicksville center, which has the largest capacity of the three: 1A. LIE 9 Exit 48 onto westbound Old Country Road via Round Swamp Road. 13 LIE 9 Exit 44 onto southbound Seaford-Oyster Bay Expressway, than onto westbound Old Country Road. 1G. LIE 9 Exit 41S onto southbound Broadway (Route 107), than onto eastbound Old Country Road. 1D. NSP 0 Exit 36 onto southbound South Oyster Bay Road, then onto vestbound Old Country Road. 13 NSP 0 Exit 35 onto southbound Broadway (Route 107), then onto eastbound Old Country Road. lE. SSP 0 Exit 28A onto northbound Seaford-Oyster Bay Expressway, then onto westbound Old Country Road. 12 SSP 9 Exit 29 onto northbound Broadway-Hicksville Road, then onto eastbound Old Country Road.
- 2. Two paths lead to the Bellmore center:
1&. SSP 9 Exit 27 onto southbound Wantagh State Parkway to Exit WS, then onto westbound Sunrise Highway. 13 SSP 0 Exit 22 onto southbound Meadowbrook State Parkway to Exit M8, then onto eastbound Sunrise Highway.
- 3. Two paths lead to the Roslyn center:
2A. LIE 9 Exit 37 onto southbound Willis Avenue, then onto eastbound LIE South Service Road. 23 NSP 9 Exit 28 to northbound Willis Avenue. The field survey identified several intersections along these paths whose capacities could limit access to these centers. These locations, common to one or more of the paths enumerated above, limit the number of vehicles which can be serviced at a 1 center. 5 I
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- 3. l DATA Cor.7rCTION PROGRAM 1 Appendix A contains schematics of the locations where data were collected. Table 3-1 lists the data collection specifications. Appendix B lists the traffic counts obtained at a representative location.
l These data were reviewed to identify that 24-hour period 1 which exhibited the highest traffic volumes. The recorded l l traffic volumes during this peak 24-hour period (7:00 AM Thursday ! to 7:00 AM Friday) were then used as inputs to the capacity ' calculations, and are denoted as " background" traffic. The weekend traffic volumes were found to be substantially lower than the weekday volumes. o i 7
P-Table 3-1. Data Collection Specifications
- 1. All traffic counts aggregated by 15-minute periods, with time of day and day of week clearly defined.
- 2. Data collection to be continuous throughout the specified period.
- 3. The period of data collection to extend from early on Thursday (prior to the A.M. peak period) to late morning on the following Monday (after the and of the A.M. peak period).
This period was selected because: a) Thursday traffic is generally representative of mid-week traffic patterns and volumes. b) Friday evening and Monday morning traffic may reflect weekend travel and could well depart from midweek 1 patterns. c) Weekend traffic activity g5nerally differs from midweek traffic. d) Data were taken during the summer since this time frame corresponds to peak population within the SNPS EPZ. 8 9
- 4. ESTIMATED TRAFFIC VOLUMES The 1985 Highway capacity Manual (HCM) procedures were applied to calculate the capacities of the approaches at the key intersections, using the results of the data collection program.
Since these procedures require, as input, estimates of traffic demand volumes, it was necessary to estimate the evacuation traffic demand on the approaches to the key intersections. These estimates were developed as follows:
- 1. Identify the volume of evacuating traffic along each of the paths defined in Section 2:
e Table 4-1 lists the maximum number of vehicles that could evacuate from each zone within the EPZ during the summer, their major westbound routes from the EPZ, their reception centers and the paths assigned to them in the vicinity of the center. e Table 4-2 identifies the major initial routes taken by traffic evacuating from each EPZ zone and their respective reception centers. Note that while traffic from a zone may leave tha EFZ on several routes, all traffic originating withi~n a zone is assigned to the same reception center. e Table 4-3 lists the traffic volume along each path in the vicinity of the reception centers. These figures are obtained directly from Table 4-1 by summation. 2. Identify the paths associated with each key intersection: e Table 4-4 lists mapping of paths into the key intersections at which data were obtained, and presents the evacuating traffic volumes there. See Tables A-1, A-2 and A-3 for descriptions of these locations.
- 3. Develop a computational procedure:
e Table 4-5 lists the various steps involved in the procedure based on those documented in the 1985 HCM. Several comments are in order: e The presence of actuated signal controller equipment is beneficial since the assignment of GREEN time will be responsive to the traffic volumes approaching each intersection. e Since we are only interested in determining the total number of vehicles which can be serviced at these key 9 i l l 1
intersections, rather than the hourly fluctuations, we need to determine the average hourly volumes over each < 12-hour period.
)
i e Selecting three 12-hour periods provides a range of I estimates which indicates the effects of time-of-day I on the number of vehicles that can be serviced on the highway system in the vicinity of the reception centers. e
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l Table 4-1. Distribution of Evacuating Traffic to 4 Reception Canters and Path Assignments j Routes used to Reception fdgng Vehicles Leave EPZ Center M A 1999 LIE R 3A B 1953 LIE R 3B C 1708 LIE D R 3A 196 LIE R 3A E 1579 LIE R 3A F1 1135 LIE H F2 1A 1086 LIE H , lA F2 1086 Sunrise Hwy F3 H 1F 1789 Route 347 H 1D F4 1754 Route 347 F5 H 1E 1258 Route 347 H F5 lE 1258 Route 25A H lE G 2200 LIE G H 1B 677 Sunrise Hwy H H 1G 2500 LIE H 1C l H 903 Sunrise Hwy H 1F I 1840 LIE H 1B J 2106 LIE K1 R 3A 2824 LIE B K1 2823 2B K2 Route 25 B 2B 2628 Route 25 B K3 2885 2A K4 Route 347 B 2A 891 Route 25 B K5 1092 2B L Route 3.7 B 2B 1165 LIE H L 1165 1A H Sunrise Hwy H 1G 449 LIE H H 2000 1A N Sunrise Hwy H 1G 3726 Sunrise Hwy B O 2B 1624 Sunrise Hwy H P 1200 1F LIE H 1A P 825 Sunrise Hwy H 1G Q 1280 Route 25A R 3B Q 1279 Route 347 R R 3B 1227 LIE H R 1A 1000 Sunrise Hwy H 1G S 1293 Sunrise NWy H 1F TOTAL: 58,403 Evacuees in some zones of the EPZ are assigned multiple routes out of the EPZ. These multiple assignments are reflected by separate entries for each route in the above table. i 11
I ~ l Table 4-2. Distribution of Traffic from Zones within the EPZ to Reception Centers Leave EPZ via Linkana between Zones and Recention Centers Hicksville Roslyn Bellmore
~
LIE F1,F2,G,H, A,B,C,D, K1 I,L,M,P,R E,J Sunrise Highway G,H,L,M,P, N R,F2,0,S Route 347 F3,F4,F5 Q K3,K5 Route 25A F5 Q - R. ate 25 K1,K2,K4 G e e 12
Table 4-3. Total Traffic Serviced on Each Path Eggh Total volume 1A 6262 1B 4040 1C 2500 1D 1789 1E 4270 1F 4906 1G 5667 2A 5513 . 2B 11356 3A 7588 3B 4512 TOTAL: 58403 Reception Center Hicksville 29434 Bellmore 16869 , Roslyn 12100 e i 13
- e Table 4-4. Evacuating Vehicles Serviced by Key Intersections and Paths on Approaches to the Reception Centers Intersection Patha Servicad Total vehicles M1 1C H2 2500 1G 5667 H3 1C,lE,1G (eastbound)
H4 12437 Exiting traffic - H5 1D H6 1789 1A,lB,lF 15208 M7 1B H8 4040 LA 6262 B1 2B B2 11356 2B 11356 33 Exiting traffic - B4 2A 5513 R1 3A R2
. 7588 i
3A 7588 R3 3B R4 4512 Exiting traffic - R5 3A,3B R6 12100-3B 4512 i See Appendix A for the locations and descriptions of all intersections. s J 14 i l
Table 4-5. Procedure for Computing Capacity at Each Location Three cases were analyzed: a) Assume that 40 percent of all evacuating vehicles travel to the reception centers and that 100 percent of - background traffic also travels in the vicinity of these centers (i.e. X = 40, Y = 100 in step 3, below). b) Assume a 50 percent reduction in background traffic volumes in the vicinity of the reception centers reflecting the response of the general public to EBS messages and to traffic congestion, And that 80 percent of evacuees will travel to the reception centers (i.e. X = 8 0, Y = 50, in step 3 below) . , c) Assume a 50 percent reduction in background travel volumes and that 100 percent of all evaeuman travel to reception centers And that traffic control is exercised at key locations (i.e. X = 100, Y = 50 in step 3, below). See Appendix C for the traffic control tactics. The procedural steps are as follows:
- 1. Select a 12-hour period.
e 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM e- 12:00 PM to 12:00 AM e 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM
- 2. Calculate the maAn hourly background volume on the approaches to each key intersection over the selected period, based on the data obtained in the field.
- 3. Calculate 324D hourly evacuation volumes assuming X i
percent of evacuating traffic travels to centers, and that Y percent of the normal background traffic is also travelling in the vicinity of the reception centers during the selected 12-hour period. I
- 4. Add the results of steps 2 and 3 to get total anticipated volumes at each intersection over the selected period.
- 5. Use the procedure in HCM Figure 9-14(b) to obtain that signal timing which maximizes capacity, under the expectation that the actuated control will respond properly to the demand patterns. Impose reasonable constraints on minimum and maximum phase durations.
Compare the estimated values of traffic demand and 1 capacity over the selected period. l l
- 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for all three 12-hour periods.
! 15
1
- 5. CAPACITY AMALYSIS Table 5-1 is a sample capacity calculation. This calculation {
utilizes service flow rates which are computed using the 1985 HCM y procedures. l As indicated in Table 5-1, the background and evacuation i volumes, stratified by movement, are summed to yield the total estimated traffic volume over an average hour. These movement-specific traffic volumes are then related to existing traffic signal phase sequences. The phase durations, expressed as the ratio of green time: cycle time (G/C) ratio, are then calculated on the basis that the actuated controllers will allocate green time in response to the traffic demand. For the case of "No control", reasonable estimates of minimum phase duration are imposed; these constraints could reduce the effectiveness of the traffic control in servicing vehicular traffic demand. For the case of " control", where traffic guidas can over-ride the actuated signal controllers, (see Appendix C),
' these constraints are relaxed, thereby representing more efficient manual control and increased capacity responsive to i traffic demand.
The signal cycle lengths employed are those which were observed in the field. The " effective" cycle length is equal to the actual cycle length minus the " lost time" associated with changing signal phases over the course of a signal cycle. The calculation of capacity for each class of movements is simply the product of saturation flev rate for each movement, G/C ratio and the ratio of effective to actual cycle duration. (It is sometimes necessary to iterate whenever a permissive and protective movement is serviced by different phases.) - The ratio of demand volume to capacity (V/C) is an indication of the intersection's ability to service the traffic demand. A ratio of unity or less indicates that traffic demand can be
' serviced; a ratio exceeding unity indicates an oversaturation I
condition. In the latter case, the need for some adjustment in demand and/or control is indicated. For example, traffic exiting j' from the Bellmore facility onto Newbridge Road could avoid the queue on the northbound approach to Sunrise Highway by turning south to Merrick Road or by proceeding east on Clinton Street, then turning north or south onto an intersecting local street to gain assess to either sunrise Highway or Merrick Road, respectively. This response to congestion would reduce demand at the intersection of Sunrise Highway and Newbridge Road, thus lowering the v/C ratios, there, accordingly, similar responses are possible elsewhere, whenever the V/C ratio approaches or j exceeds unity in the short term. l l 16 l O
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Table 5-1. Sample Calculation (Not all details are shown) l Assume: Entire EPZ is evacuated and 100 percent of evacuees traval to reception centers. Background traffic reduced to half of normal traffic. Traffic control applied, but no further allowance for reducing background traffic. Mean Hourly Traffic Volumes h Aporoach 7AM - 7PM 12PM - 12AM 7PM - 7AM Phase Lgig Other Lait Other Laf& Other Total Total Total EB South Service Rd. (Back. ) 394 364 l'44 C SB Willis Ave. (Back.) 125 381 95 310 35 91 A+B SB Willis Ave. (Evac.) 632 0 632 0 632 0 A+B SB Willis Ave. (Total) 757 381 727 310 667 95 A+B NB Willis Ave. (Back.) 484 398 143 B Critical Phase Demand gZg gZg gzg A SB Willis Ave. , (LT) 0.62 0.64 0.81 B NB Willis Ave. 0.21 0.19 0.09 C ES S. Service Rd. 0.17 0.17 0.10 Phase calculation gg _vZg gg yj_q gg y2g CAP = (SF) x (G/C) xEe A 1693x(G/C)x0.87 910 0.79 939 0.74 1188 0.53 B 3300x(G/C) x0. 87 600 0.81 543 0.73 257 0.56 C 3300x (G/C) x0. 87 486 0.81 486 0.75 286 0.50 Notes: E e is the " efficiency" of the signal control = C,gg/C, where C e g, is the effective (i.e. usable) green time over one signal cycle of duration, C. Specifically C
- L, where L is the total lost time over one cy,cl gg e. =For C this 3-phase signal, L is estimated as 3 x 4 sec/ phase =
12 seconds, over the (observed] 90-second cycle. SF is the saturation flow rate for the approaches, as calculated using the 1985 HCM. 1 i 17
e Throughout this analysis, it is assumed that the monitoring procedures within the centers can always keep pace with the . average rate of vehicles entering the facilities. Figure 5-1 I indicates the patterns of traffic flow within each center. Our study activities. does not include consideration of the monitoring Note that within each reception center, the traffic occupants are along often moves parallel paths while the vehicles and their being monitored in these sketches. this level of detail is not shown analyses. Tables 5-2 through 5-4 are summaries of the capacity From these results, it is possible to estimate the maximum reception center number of vehicles under that could the following be accommodated extreme assumptions: at each. Current Assumntions Extreme Aamuuntions Q113 Backaround Evacuation Control Backaround Evacuation control 1 100% 404 No 100% 100% 2 50% 80% No No 50% > 100% No Table 5-5 presents the results associated with the application of the " extreme" assumptions. Note the sensitivity of these results (i.e. access to the reception centers over 12 hours)the to number of vehicles which can the background traffic volumes. traffic translates into improved access for evacuating vehiclesA reduction to the reception centers.. ' reduced, Whennot access control only by is provided, a public res the background traffic is desire to avoid a congested area,ponse to media messages and a the control tactics (see Appendix C).but also Sinceas all a consequence evacuating of traffic 5-5 Table can for be Case serviced 2), when No Access Control is applied (see Control will provide even better service.it follows that the application of Access Again, it must be emphasized that the figures given in Table 5-5 represent the following conditions, all acting concurrently: e A rapidly escalating accident at SNPS e The entire EPZ ordered to evacuate at once e one hundredtopercent responding of the occupants within the EPZ this order e One hundred percent of all evacuees travel to the reception centers, as advised. 18 G
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Table 5-2. Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 1 4 Summary of Capacity Estimation Background Traffic: 1001 Evacuation Traffic: 40% Analysis Time Framing Center Location Dir. 7:00AM-7:00PM 12:00PM-12:00AM 7:00PM-7:00AM Cap. V/C Cap. V/C Cap. V/C
, Hicksville Broadway (Route S/B 191 .99 207 .81 183 .43 107)/Old Country LT Road Broadway (Route N/B 574 .99 553 .81 630 .43 g 107)/Old Country RT Road Broadway (Route W/B 960 .99 966 .81 833 .43 107)/Old Country Road
) Old Country Rd./ N/B 424 .64 424 .64 696 .39
- Park Avenue g(B 1333 .66 1333 .63 1181 .39
! . Old Country Rd./ E/B 1504 .88 1565 .78 1208 .39 New South Road N/B 814 .88 785 . 78 970 .39 New South Road / S/B 458 .56 458 .63 458 .51 Hicksville Road South Oyster Bay W/B 1278 .95 1192 .90 1282 .60 Road /Old Country S/B 563 .95 587 .88 422 .35 Road RT
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Table 5- 2. Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 1 (conc.) n-Summary of Capacity Estimation
, Background Traffic 100% ,s.,
Evacuation ~ Traffic: 40 %
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Analysis Time Framing 3" ' Center Location Dir. 7:00AM-7:00PM 12:00PM-12:00AM 7:00PM-7:00AM CitP . V/C -Cap. V/C Cap. V/C - - Hicksvil'le: :NY 135 S/B 428 , .62 453
/ Old Country Rd. .56 412 .35 7' N/B 580 .62 624 . 56. 670 s -;s-;rn . LT .36
?' ' LIE Exit 48 W/E 1347 .57 1347
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.45 1347 .26 .-t Roslyn Willis Ave./ LIE W/B 888 H .99 880 .80 '1039 .40 North Service Road , .Willis Ave./ LIE S/B 53 .82 ~
578 .66 760 .34 South Service :- LT Road , Northern State E/B -447 .50 "454 .41 754 .22
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Bellmore Newbridge Road W/B ,271 .87 292'
.81' 372 .46 Sunrise liighway - Left ~~
1866 J" .- E/B .87 20CO. .81 1317, .46-N/B 217 .87; 152 s.- .81 224 .46 Newbridge Road # ._ S/B 630 .81 630 82 630
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I 1 Table 5-3. Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 2 Summary of Capacity Estimation Background Traffic: 50% Evacuation Traffic: 80% Center Analysis Time Framing . Location Dir. 7:00AM-7:00PM 12:00PM-12:00AM 7:00PM-7:00AM Cap. y[C Cap. y[C Cap. V/C
. Hicksville Broadway (Route S/B 22'4 .85 237 .76 240 .57 107)/Old Country left Road Broadway (Route N/B 726 .85 730 107)/Old Country .76 826 .56 R.T.
Road i Broadway (Route W/B 715 .85 684 .76 525 .57 107)/Old Country Road Old Country Rd./ N/B 758 .72 775 .70 925 .59 Park Avenue E/B 1196 .71 1186 .70 1102 .58 Old Country Rd./ E/B 932 .85 894 .84 514 .72 New South Road N/B 891 .85 906 .$8 4 1054 .72 New South Road / S/B 458 86 458 .89 458 .83 Hicksville Road South Oyster Bay W/B 1532 .85 1502 .82 1614 .65 Road /Old Country S/B 418 .85 424 .82 314 .65 Road
Table 5-3 . Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 2 (conc.) Summary of Capacity Estimation Background Traffic: 50 % Evacuation Traffic: 80 % Analysis Time Framing Center Location Dir. 7:00AM-7:00PM 12:00PM-12:00AM
' 7:00PM-7:00AM Cap. V/C Cap. V/C Cap. V/C Hicksville NY 135 S/B 402 .58 415 Old' Country Rd. .55 389 .44 N/B 704 .60 732 .57 772 .47 ,
LIE Exit 48 W/B 1347 .52 1347 .46 1347 .36 Round Swamp Rd. Roslyn Willis Ave./ LIE W/B 1067 .77 1987 [j .67 1240 .47 North Service Road Willis Ave./ LIE S/B 965 .65 '994 .60 1140 .47 South Service LT Road i Northern State E/B 862 .39 911 .35 1192 .26 Exit 28/Willis .N/B 1235 .39 1133 .35 556 Avenue .26 LIE South W/B 1876 '69 1876 Service Road
. 64 1876 .51 Bellmore Newbridge Road W/B 444 .83 461 .80 537 .63 Sunrise Highway _ Le f t E/B 1310 .83 1358 .81 1000 .63 N/B .224 .83 212 .81- 230 .63 Newbridge Road S/B 630 .85 630 86 630 .72 Merrick Ave.
Table 5- 4 Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 3 Summary of Capacity Estimation l Background Traffic: 50s Evacuation Traffic: 100t Analysis Time Framing Center Location Dir. 7:00AM-7:00PM 12:00PM-12:00AM 7:00PM-7:00AM Cap. V/C Cap. V[C Cap. V/C Hicksville Broadway (Route S/B 222 .98 234 .90 249 .71 107)/Old Country Left Road l Broadway (Route N/B 720 .98 722 ,. 9 0 786 .71
% 107)/Old Country RT Road I Broadway (Route W/B 637 .38 616 .89 513 .71 107)/Old Country 235 229 192 Road Old Country Rd / N/B 779 .82 805 .79 1144 .56 Park Avenue E/B 748 .82 719 .79 339 .56 Old Country Rd./ E/B 1375 .91 1327 .91 1067 .77 New South Road N/B 718 .91 736 ,. 91 838 .77 New South Road / S/B 570 .98 612 .91 624 .80 Hicksville Road South Oyster Bay W/B 1823 .85 1823 .83 1958 .71 Road /Old Country S/B 397 .85 398 .83 307 .71 Road
Table 5-4. Results of Capacity Analysis for Case 3 (cone.) Summary of Capacity Estimation Background Traffic: 50 g Evacuation Traffic: 100% Analysis Time Framing Center Location Dir. 7:00AM-7:00PM 12:00PM-12:00AM 7:00PM-7:00AM Cag. V/C Cap. V/C Cap. V/C Hicksville NY 135 S/B 406 .66 417 .63 392 .52 Old Country Rd. N/B 570 .53 593 .50 601 .40 G LIE Exit 48 W/B 1347 .59 1347 Round Swamp Rd. .53 1347 .44 Roslyn Willis Ave./ LIE W/B 1246 .76 1278 .67 1453 M North Service .49 Road Willis Ave./ LIE S/B 910 .79 '939 .74 1188 .53 South Service LT Road Northern State E/B 986 .42 1033 .38 1282 .30 Exit 28/Willis N/B 906 .42 810 .38 300 Avenue .30 LIE South W/B 1076 .69 1876 . 64 1876 .51 Service Road Bellmore Newbridge Road W/B 469 1.00 486 .97 559 .79 Sunrise liighway Le f t ' E/B 1407 1.01 1462 .97 1'04 .79 N/B 535 1.01 504 .97 518 .79 Newbridge Road S/B 630 1.00 630 1.01 548 .87 i Merrick Ave.
4 Table 5-5. Maximum Number of Vehicles that can be Accommodated at the Reception Centers under Extreme Assumptions l Case 1: Background Traffic: 100%; Evacuation Traffic: 100%; No Access control Traffic Volume that can be Accommodated Within Time Frame ! Center 7:00AM - 7:00PM 12:00PM - 12:00AM 7:00PM - 7:00AM y3]l.a. ! FqL. Y.ab, h ygb. Pct. Hicksville 12,068 41 21,192 72 29,434 Bellmore 10,121 100 61 11,908 70 16,869 100 Roslyn 7,744 64 10,285 85 12,100 100 Overall 29,933 51 43,285 74 58,403 100 Case 2: Background Traffic: 50%; Evacuation Traffic: 100%; No Access Control Center 7:00AM - 7:00PM 12:00PM - 12:00AM 7:00PM - 7:00AM Y.flls 29Iu. 79.llA 2.GIr i. Y9.llA 293.x Hicksville 29,434 100 29,434 100 Bellmore 29,434 100 16,869 100 16,869 100 Roslyn 16,869 100 12,100 100 12,100 100 12,100 100 overall 58,403 100 58,403 100 58,403 100 26
If a portion of the EPZ were ordered to evacuate, then the traffic demand at the reception centers would be reduced accordingly. Even if the entire EPZ were ordered to evacuate, it i is likely that this scenario would consist of a sequence of such 1 orders (e.g. the east quadrant followed by the west quadrant several hours later) reflecting changing wind conditions. In , this event, the time frame of 12 hours used in this analysis would prove to be too small, since the evacuation process could l extend over a longer time frame, thus lowering the (rate of] demand for access to the reception centers. It has been argued by some that, based on survey results, only 80 percent of the people within the EPZ would choose to evacuate. (We disagree with this argument, and believe that virtually all EPZ occupants would evacuate if ordered to do so.) If fewer than 100 percent of those within the EPZ evacuate toward the west, then the demand would decline accordingly! In the absence of an order asking evacuees to report to reception centers for monitoring, it is unlikely that any figure approaching 100 percent of the evacuees will choose to travel to the reception centers if there are more appealing viable alternatives studies have (homes shown that of relatives fewer than or.20friends percent orofhotels). evacuees travel Past to reception centers. Thus, the extreme assumption of 100 percent is not supported by available data, but was applied to indicate the effects of a hypothetical extreme. 1 s 1 l 27 L
. - , , . - , -w- .. ,., -, - , _ . - - . - - - - . - . -,-,.e, . - . -, - - - , _ . - ,,,.,,,_,.-.--,,,-,_-w--.,-,,-..-.- .-.n-
l l l i
)
- 6. SUKKARY An analysis was undertaken to calculate the number of evacuating-vehicles which could be accommodated by the three LERO reception centers over a 12-hour period. This analysis was based on data obtained from a field survey of current traffic conditions in the vicinities of the reception centers, and on the procedures of the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual. l The.results obtained indicate that in the presence of extreme conditions, all occurring over the same time and in the absence of any traffic control, the approaches to the reception centers can accommodate about half of all evacuating vehicles within a 12-hour period. Specifically, these conditions call for a rapidly escalating accident at SNPS leading to the evacuation of the entire EPZ, with all evacuees choosing to travel to the reception centers, with no reduction in background traffic in the vicinity of the reception centers.
Under more realistic conditions, however, all evacuating traffic seeking access to the reception centers can be accommodated within 12 hours. Expected response by the Nassau i
' County Police Department in providing traffic control, and/or a reduction in background (i.e. local, non-evacuating) traffic in response to media requests to avoid the area, or a lower demand
[ rate) of evacuating vehicles for a variety of reasons, would. enable all evacuating vehicles to be serviced. I i l I I t 28
't Appendix A: Data Collection Locations Hicksville Recention Center Table A-1 lists the deployment of sensors across the highway,
, at each data-collection location. Figures A-1 through A-6 are sketches showing each location and the placsment of detectors at these locations. Bellmore Raceetion Center Table A-2 lists the deployment of sensors across the highway at each data-collection location. Figures A-7 and A-8 are sketches showing each location and the placement of detectors at these locations. Roslyn Recection Center Table.A-3 lists the deployment of sensors across the highway at each data-collection location. Figures A-9 through A-11 are sketches showing each location and the placement of detectors at these locations. a i 2 1 4 l A-1 l l
Table A-1. Data Collection Locations Along Access Roads to Hicksville Reception Center Detectors Location Descrintion 1 1 H1 Southbound Broadway Left turn All lanes at Old Country Rd. bay H2 Northbound Broadway Right turn All lanes at Old Country Rd. lane -(lane 1) H3 Old Country Rd. at All eastbound All west-Park Ave. lanes bound lanes a H4 New South Rd. at All southbound - hicksville Rd. lanes H5 South Oyster Bay Rd. Right turn All. south-at Plainview/Old Country lane (lane 1) bound lanes
'l H6 Old Country Rd. east of Lane 1 Lane 2 South Oyster Bay Rd. Westbound Westbound H7 Southbound NY135 Service Right turn All lanes Rd. at Old Country Rd. (lane 1)
H8 Westbound LIE Service Rd. Left turn All lanes at Round Swamp Rd. lanes (exit 48) e A-2 i .
_= _ - AN N I l I l l Broadway l ,\ (Rodte 107) e
~ e i H _ q l l 1 L i I fIf 1
o e Old Country Road l l H l 2 I I i 1 I I I l I I i . I Figure A-1. Detector Locations at the Intersection of Broadway (Route 107) and Old Country Road i A-3 .l l i l l
~ . _ _ - . . _ . , . . _ . . . --
I i i l i A\ N , Park Avenue H 3 11 1 C C i
=
C Old Country Road 4 Hicksville
- Reception Center-Figure A-2. Detector Location at the Intersection of Old Country Road and Park Avenue A-4
-_._ _ . - _ _ . , . . , _ _ . . - - _ _ _ . - . - . , - - _ . ---,,w.- _:- .
New South N Road - 4 s N s. s N s s Hicksville-Broadway w (Route 107) ' s N N' i I Figure A-3. Detector Location at the Intersection of Hicksville-Broadway and New South Road A-5
l l JL l l N l l South Oyster Shopping l Center l i i H I H 5-Plainview Road i l E I f = - _ . _ _ _ _ . l. _
\s s _W /
Old Country Road
' s l~ l , l - - I - l l - 9.o a6 l unt" l l old co 1
1 I I I ) Figure A-4. Detector Locations at the Intersection of Old Country Road and South Oyster Bay Road A-6
}\
b\ To LIE N H_ y /p y'! _ - - - -
- - ~2 ____
1 Old Country / N Road i i 4 1 Seaford Oyster Bay Expressway l NY 135 Figure A-5. Detector Location at the Interchange of Old Country Road and the Seaford Oyster Bay Expressway (NY 135) A-7 _ , - - , . . y mn-, -, u.- ,- + . . - _.. - - - = , -,s .--y, -.,,.y.- . n,.
~ . . _ .- - -. _ .
i 1 i i 1 1 AN a N ) 1 Round Swamp-Road / Old Country Road N i N ! N '
- H I 8 JL L _
t i f'lE
\ / , ~\__
- westbound Long Island Expressway (I-495)
- Exit 48
/ \
I i
- r l
i S J Figure A-6. Detector Location at the Interchange of the Long Island Expressway (I-495) and Round Swamp /old , Country Road 4 4 i A-8 i i
, - . - . . _ - . - . y-- . - ,-- . %-.,w.-,_ %.--, - - , - , _ ,.,, -- . --,-.,r,,.-. .y..--,c.--~ - - , - - - , - . . , , y -,-- , --,v- , , , . -
Table A-2. Data Collection Locations Along Access Roads to Bellmore Reception Center Detectors Location Descrietion 1 1 B1 Ramp from southbound Ramp lanes All lanes Meadowbrook Pkwy. on Sunrise (exit MB) to eastbound Highway Sunrise Highway B2 Eastbound Sunrise Highway Right hand All lanes at Newbridge Rd. lane B3 Newbridge Rd. south of Northbound Southbound Sunrise Highway lanes lanes B4 Westbound Sunrise Highway Left turn All west-at Newbridge Rd. bay bound lanes 9 A-9
Y\ N Meadowbrook Parkway 't j[ Exit M8 3 N /
! Sunrise Highway (Route 27) ]f i
f5l ////// / //
=
j eastbound r W/ / ! a 1 (// / .\ 4 i ', Figure A-7. Detector Location at the Interchange of Sunrise Highway (Route 27) and the Meadowbrook State Parkway A-10
,_7 .
_v.. . , _ -,- _,,. __ -_. - _ m __ -, __.._.__y - . _ - , . . , _ . . _ _ - _ . , _ . - ,___.r, - _ - _ _ . . _ . , _ ,
l f l bN N i Newbridge Road i - Sunrise Hichway (Route 27) 1 C _M f~;~~j 2 f ( B _ 4_ __ II } l 5 Rl - l ' B . Bellmore Reception Center "" B 3 1 f 2 l l . 1 i_ _ _ __ __ __ ( i i I i i Merrick Road i l. 1 i Figure A-8. Detector Locations at the Intersection of Sunrise Highway (Route 27) and Newbridge Road i I 5 j A-11 1 I i
Table A-3. Data Collection Locations Along Access Roads to Roslyn Reception Center Detectors Location gascrietion 1 1 R1 Westaound LIE Service Rd. Left turn All lanes at Willis Ave. (exit 37) lanes R2 Southbound Willis Ave. at Left turn All lanes eastbound LIE Service Rd. bay R3 Northbound Willis Ave. at Right turn All lanes eastbound LIE Service Rd. lane (lane 1) R4 Eastbound LIE Service Rd.' All lanes (2) - east of Willis Ave. (exit 37) R5 Eastbound LIE Service Rd. All lanes.(3) - east of Willis Ave. i R6 Ramp from westbound All lanes (1) - i Northern State (exit 28) . l to northbound Willis Ave. 3 J l A-12
bN N R LIE North
.g 1 Service Road f
E s l
- westbound l
Long Island Expressway (I-495)
. s i
l I Exit 37 i Willis Avenue [ l k i l . a ' 2 "4 I l h LIE South Service Road ifIf
- ; 31 A l
l 5 R 3 I l Roslyn l Reception l Center
; l I
l l i I
. i
- Figure A-9. Detector Locations at the Interchange of the Long Islard Expressway and Willis Avenue i
A-13 J
,. - -. - --- -- , , . , , , ..e ,- - , - , -.,,m.c ~.,-,--,,-,,,--.-.n,,,
4 4 d
] \
N i Long Island Expressway (I-495) l l
/ % . - - - - - - _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _=_ = _
IE r 4 Il LIE South Service Road R. n Willis Roslyn Reception Avenue Center i e Figure A-10. Detector Locations on the LIE South Service Road, i East of Willis Avenue l 3 A-14
, .-y . .-m - . - - - r- - - - - - . - - - -- - -9 .,y--.- ---r-. :-.-3-.- - , - ,- ,
. . .~. . _ _ __ . . _ . _ }\
I l j l i l To I. LIE-
; l t l N I
9 I ' .i i R 6 Willis Avenue ! / 4 l 4 i I I I ! I I . l l
\ / +-- wes tbound l Northern State Parkway - Exit 28 ,
r 4 1 a h 1 l t l Figure A-ll.
- ( Detector Location on the Northern State Parkway '
Exit Ramp at Willis Avenue i
- A-15 i
i I :
Appendix B: Representative Traffic Recorder output This appendix presents the results of the traffic survey at i Location R3: Northbound Willis Avenue at Eastbound LIE South Service Road. l i I i i 1 I 1 1 } B-l' i i e w,, -
, , - - , n - -. , --,.,----.c - - , , - . , , , _ _ , . , - - . - , , , , . . - _ - , .
h i. j i i l 4T
. .....I _Ame_r__i
__ e__an ________ Te ai f i e___I ___ __n f or_ma _t _i_ o_n _ .. _ _AUT_OM_AT__! _ _ __ C_T_R_AF_F_! _ ... C__RE_CO_RDER__C_OUN __ . _ 1
' Te" al Number: 30 I l .
! Lecetions R3, N8 WILLIS AVE AT EB LIE SERVICE RD i
;ws: I
- RO? LYN I :ounty: NAS?AU Stktet NY 4 3 Date: 7/4/Se f i i i Direction 1: RIGHT LANE I Direction 2: LEFT L-NE !
.I :00 15 30 45 I 300 :15 30 45 .
- 8 ' Hour i to to to to Hour I to to t o- to Hour '
4 i :!! :30 345 00 Total I :15 30 845 00 T: >! j - ____________.__________________...._____.___._______..__________ .________... 1
. .:. . M . I I t 2:00 _ 1:00 __ __ __ __ .. g __ __ __ __ __
i
. 1:00 - 2:001 -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- -- t r
- co - 3: cot __ ._ __ __ __ g __ __ __ __
3:00 - 4:00: -- 1 -- -- - 4: 00 - 5:co __ __ .. __ __ i __ __ __ __ __
$300 _ 3:00g __ __ __ __ __ g __ __ __ __ __
3: 00 7:00, __ __ __ __ __ i __ _. __ __ __ . 4 7:00 - 3:00: -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- -- 6 t.
- 3:00 - 9: 00: .. _. __ __ .. i _ _ . ._ __. __ __
o n co - 10:00 __ __ .. __ .. i i - 10:00 1g:00 __ .- -. __ .. l __ .. .. __ .. ; 11:00 -~12:001 -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- -- 1 1 F.M. I I '
- g2:00 - groot __ __ __ __ .. l __ __ .. .. __ -
1 i ! 00 - 2:001 -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- -- k 2:00 - 3:001 -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- - -
- 3
- 00 a oo __ __ .. __ __ i .. __ __ __ __
i . 4:00 - 5:00: .- -- -- 153 -- I -- -- -- 105 --
- !:00 - +:00: 145 161 177 149 632 1 110 123 152 124 508 '
1 3:00 - 7: 00 157 143 155 123 578 1 12o 114 113 103 4e
- I 7:00 - 6:001 123 114 102 91 432 1 90 93 49 33 335 i :
1 3:00
- 8:001 74 90 74 31 324 I e5 72 57 47 235 .
I
- 00 - 10:001 ?! 63 43 40 251 1 57 45 43 55 22 : !
- i 10
- 00 - 11: 001 55 56 41 32 134 1 41 51 40 3S 1 70 i j 11:00 - 12:001 It 43 33 40 too l 35 3 "' .s 22 130 ;
j i
,____.______..______________________________,_________...____'__.____..__.i '
i Dhr Total 1 --
. ~
1
-- = MACHINE NOT ;NSTALLED -
l ++ = MACHINE NALFUNCTION r 4
. . B-2 .
] . . j j . I
l l 4 1 e i 1 4 T I-American Traffic Inf
.____ _____________________orma t i on AUTCMATI C TRAFF I C RECORDER COUNT DETA I L3 I serial Number 31 _____________________________________________________.
i Location: R3, N8 WILLIS AVE AT EE LIE 3EP/ ICE RD - e Tcun: R03 LYN 1 I
; CA'4,r4 p : tg' g )h6 5 tate: NY I 1 I Direction 1: RIGHT LANE I Direction 2: LEFT LANE I 300- :15 :30 :45 ! 300 15 30 :45 t i Hcur 1 to to to to Hour i to to to to Hour i
- :15 330 45 :00 Total I :15 45 ::4 'ote:
...____________.______...______________________._____.___:_30 ____________________-. .f'. !
I I
! 12:00 -
1:001 34 22 19 14 39 1 22 27
- t 1:00 - 2:001 11 oi !'
11 to ? 11 41 1 10 5 1' 12 de 1 2600 - 3:001 0 2 5 3 1* I 3 4 5 t 3:00 - 4:00i 4 3 20 l - 1 2 2 ? l 2 4* 5 i 4:00 - 5:001 4 30 t 7 1 3 15 1 6 o
- I 5:00 - 6:001 $ 12 :
5 10 11 20 do i S 19 s:00 - 7:001 13 ~3 25 ! I 28 31 54 72 135 I 37 34 50 i 7: 00 - 3:001 75 45 1:3 t 92 150 136 453 i 56 77 130 1 3:00 - 9:001 123 142 104 3e7 1 157 to5 5S9 1 103 123 123 144 ao3 I I S00 - 10:001 157 152 140 113 562 1 127 139
', 10:00 - 11:001 99 123 105 112 439 I 94 132 113 511 1 91 95 107 337 I I !!:00 - 12:001 107 109 123 120 459 1 100 103 i P.M. I 111 101 420 i t i i 12:00 - 1:001 119 110 110 136 475 1 07 i 1:00 - 2:001 120 130 SS 113 10- 405 i 127 126 503 1 113 'S 115 1*1 1 2:00 - 3:001 127 115 432 f 132 127 501 1 109 30 117' 102 403 t 3:00 - 4:001 142 130 133 151 5e1 1 107 104 4:00 - 5:001 103 112 431 i 145 153 152 157 o0' i 122 123 111 i 5:00 - e:001 165 158 120 47: I tot 150 134 1 129 125 127 12e 507 i I 4:00 - 7:001 149 136 141 124 550 113 117 i 7:00 - 3:001 106 116 110 .03 453 I 106 106 434 I 79 90 I ? 00 - 1:001 '3 30 Ts 74 314 'l CS 105 376 : 31 31 35 32 i *:00 - 10:001 76 61 33 53' 223 I 56 64 41 4) 32: i I 10:00 - 11: 001 72 52 53 43 225 t 54 47 46 2 0 .'
I 11:00 - 12:001 45 32 25 175 4e 37 160 a 33
- 54
.______..._____._______________________________.____?? 24 143 -
I D ar Total I 3 e
>________. __._... ,___________________ _____1eo ___,_______________________..______.
6 00 t
-- = IfACHitlE NOT INSTALLED- - * ** = MACHINE MALFUNCTION - . B-3 . -~ ~ - - . .
I
t p3 s as
%_h % , t v F ( 4 - r. % ,1a $
t- (. is ' 7 m
.y, A ,
9 T ,' e.C p
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y ,f - gd , \ j, - fi k +
'* , >A < <g r #, \ j , r.
L t'- j
!-Amer i ean Te mH i e Inf orma t i on AUTOMATIC TRAFFIC RECORDER potJ4T DETAILS ; ...-__-______..._----__----__.....-___...-_-____-____-__e....__-__._____..
eeat Number: 32 If I *
- I,A '
I ocation: F 2, ilS WILLIS c.UE AT fB L12 SEP.' ICE FD I own: FOSLYN
, , a :
County: tMS?AU States NY y i Okte 7/11, .r
- s I
.______._-___+-_____'S4 ..._____ _.-_. _---_ -_-_+_____ __ _--.._______-.___-____.
I Direction 1: RIGHT LANE I Dir+ctiong2: LEFT LANE (,
- 00 st! ': 30 :45 1 :00 15 t'30 - #45 ?
He u .- ! is ts te to Hcur I tc t to / to , to Hcur i l I :15 30 - 45 :00 Total' 30 145 300 sth To t)t
.-__.-________,_-____-_--___.__..--___---3.+-___.----__.-_.....____--__-.. i m.M. I
- 1 d5 }
I 12:00 - 1:008 26 27 13 19 35 1 31 19 13 ?? i:00 - 2:00: 12 o 12 ? 21' 9 ! 39 i ' t- 10 $6 52 2:00 - 3:001 3 6 to 4 23 t- 2 3 14 '3 22 i 4 3:00 - 4: 00! 4:00 '- 5:001 4 7 5
'3 9 $ 3x.3 14 1 29 i 2
5, 3 7 10 4 : 7 9 31 6
! " 00 - 6:001 5 S 15 20D 48
- 163 t.it I .'23 7 7 3C 5? i 6:00 - 7:001 32 25 53 as ' l' k.B 5 40 44 133 I i 7:00 - S:001 -
71 10" 129 146 3:00 - 3:001 127 141 146 145 451;I: 579'i e0\ /f3 124 jj 133 ,/ 147 114 147 141 401
!a; i
9:00 - 10:001 126 115 121 116 473 1 127 $ 100 \ 115 104 448 1 ' I 10:00 - 11:001 113 til 108 119 451 1 113 104 90 107 414 t t 11:00 - 12:001 110 .!!6 127 116 44? I 25 33 '105 97 333 t 2 P.M. I 2 1 , 12:0C - 1:001 127 !!6 135 1 30 503 1 !!5 42 117 113 442 ' 1:00 - 2:001 127 132 135 142. 546 1 126 119 10e 115 4ee i 2:00 - 3:001 103 120 146 133 ' 532 4 105 113 105 106 429 ! 3:00 - 4: 001 135 147 170 153 405 1 120 120 103 114 460 4:00 - 5:001 144 153 153 156 ett I - 10e its 123 134 478 5:00 - 4:00t 140 140 154 160 43o i 120 !!3 145 113 426 e:00 - 7:001 131 143 129 120 "29 I 97 08 U $7 99 39; t 7:00 - $3001 120 til 113 105 44* ! 71 ?? 95 32' 335 1:00 - 9:00I $4 $5 94 79 342 ' 74' 74 or 73 2o0
. *:00 - 10:001 42 52 3e 57 259 1 62 45 44 56 -212
- 10:00 - 11:001 23 40 7? 45 241.I 52 43 71 4' 213
!!:00 - 12:001 3c 49 64 40 138 i -35 44 40 35 154 On< Tc >1 ! $279 I c . . .__4-_____ ,___-_____....... ____ -_ __..__....:-______ .:':.......-__.4?o . . . . -- = tuCHitlE NOT It4STALLEt- ++ = t%CHjNE MALFUNCT!Ctl . 3-4 - s . +- . .
4 t L t T I-Amer i e an' Tr aH i e In+ormation AUTOMAT!C TRAFFIC RECOPDER COUNT DETAILS
, .----___----_------------------------------------------------------------------+ / ierial Numb +r 33 1 Location: R3, NB WILLI 3 AVE AT EB LIE SERVICE RD I Town: ROSLYN i l County: NASSAU State NY I i Date 7/12/S6 i 1 .--------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
-l 1 Dir+ction 1: RIGHT LANE I Direction 2: LEFT LANE I
?
I :00 :15 30 :45 1 300 :15 20 245 i Hour i to to to to Hour-l to to to i:o Hour I ! 4 i :15 330 :45 :00 Total I :15 30 :45 :00 Total 1 3---__---------+------------------------------_+-------------------------------+ ' ' (\ s , A.M. 12:00 - 1:001 I 45 44 24 23 141 1 I 22 31 19 30 102 i
! i :00 - 2:001 24 14 S 15 61 1 21 22 9 24 Ti I 2:00 - 3:001 S T 13 o 38 1 10 10 12 7 30 1 3:00 - 4:001 e f. S 0 29 1 o 3 12 5 31 :
4:00 - 5:001 7 10
- 9 35 l 10 4 10 3 32 I 5:00 - 3: 001 5 7 8 :1 31 1 11 5 12 '
35 : c:00 - 7:001 18 25 19 26 SS I 14 13 23 27 S2 :
':00 - 3:001 25 44 34 50 153 1 23 20 2S 51 122 ! ?:00 - 9:001 43 43 62 61 214 1 43 46 62 32 ISS i 1:00 - 10:001 55 74 59 61 249 i 40 41 .
19 ? 10:00 - 11:001 70 32 ST S2 321 1 66 73 74 69 232 1
!:00 - 12:001 102 90 99 103 304 I 72 67 74 34 297 i , P.M. I I I s !2:00 - : :60: 91 107 v7 11e -
m t?? I i 1:00 - 2:001 102 116 120 !!! 440 i So :6 c: :4 375 i i 2:00 - 3:001 102 37 115 103 412 1 7' S2 37 40 336 ' 3:00 - 4:001 11e 108 97 til 432 1 97 S IOC 74 Sc3 !
+
4:00 - 5:001 101 99 SS 100 338 I 81 77 30 25 233 I t 5:00 - o:00! 114 100 o! 103 408 I 84 92 30 76 332
- l e:00 - 7:00i i' $ 104 93 $2 332 1 65 74 c: 73- 221 :
; 7:00 - 8:001 85 93 72 of 201 1 73 e4 60 55 257
- 3:00 - 9:001 62 66 60 5o 247 i e2 59 :. 7 49 237 l 5: 00 - 10:00: 59 53 46 40 220 1 44 56 45 54 201 i i
10:00 - 11:001 50 4' So 55 208 1 50 30 43 55 17S I 11:00 - 12:001 46 45 43 45 184 1 44 4? 4C 26 155 i
..----- -------+--------------------- ---_-_---+-------------------------------,
Daf Toept i
.---,---------+-------------------------------+-_-
5fod , 43~2 i
~ -- = NACH!llE fl0T !NSTALLED .
f ++ = Me< CHINE t!ALFUNCTIOt1
.B- 5
- s
, ,~ , n a . , . - , - , . . , - - , . , - . ~ ,- .- - , - - - - - - ~ --- , - - - -- -
7 _ , 3
- t- ,
L f+ t .
.O o '
s
.f, 4 .
t i A- & - 4 1-f L h 3 1 I A T I-Amer i can TeaH ic !nformsii on AUTOMATIC TRAFF!C RECORCER C0fET DETAILS
+ --_-------------_--_-_-___--_..----_---_-_----------------_-------__---_-__---. '
I Ser i al ' fiumber : 34 I d oc a t i ce. : ' :3, rJe tJILLIS VE AT EB LIE SEP> ICE RD
! Twn : -
ROSLYtl Countp,: t:A35AU States fly Dat+: . 7/t3/3s
! ! D i r ec t i on, la RIGHT LAtJE I Direction 2: LEFT LiflE / I :00 15 30 45 i :00 :15 :30 :45 'l " cur i to to ,/ t o to Wour I to to to to Hour I I :15 330 45 :00 T'o t s : L :15 130 :45 :00 T tal
- A .t! . :
- 12:00 - ::00' 20 37 4: 33 '40. 51 ?6 24 27 ;33 l 1:00 - 2:0Cl 30 33 14 12 54 t 22 26 15 10 ~3 1- 2:00 - 3:001 23 7 5 10 45 I i 19 15 17
- 5?
17 3:^0 - 4:001 12 5 7 6 30 i N15 6 4 o 3; I - 4: 00 - 5:00: o 7 7 o 22 i < s 13 7 II. .x J.1 5:00 - 6:001 5 6 7 2Y I- 4 4 5 3 li
' .! 4: M- '300! 7 .11 9 17 44 '
to 11 11 12 !0 I ' 00 - 3:00!- 13 11 25 22 76 1 19 23 22 22 " i 9:00.- *:0Gi 25 17 26 34 102 1 17 26 29 24 *o I 9:00 - 10:001 29 , 32 44 54 159 I 34 41 41 43 :Y9 1 10:00 - 11:001 46 46 51 67 210 I ao 32 37 55 170 1 11:00 - 12:001 o3 59 70 37 27' f 46 63 5? Io 234 i P .ti . ! I i 12:00.- ::001 66 N 88 83 320 1 53 74 'O -3 225 1 1:00 - 2:001 33 32 33 ?S 351 1 34 69 31 1 30 5 1 2:00 - 3:00: 92 100 9e ?4 372 I
*3 61 'o 'T Oc~
- .-: ..3 3 _ a ....,.o i 2. 4 .0 o. .' ~. ~ ...
, ..': .- 4 _2 _' _: .
4 : :r 0 - 5:001 69 65 81 95 310 : ~3 35 To ~? 32: i !:30 - - : 0 0 '. So ?? 3? 31 35! . 79 32 s 57 '243 i e s vv ., - - - : .s .v01
.s o ., <a e, 20 . . .
206 .. si o,. ,'6 ..
-. _. ,. .?
- ~ : :. C, - 3:001 72 71 58 55 25o i 56 6' 49 23 ~33 3:00 - ' :001 65 46 4o 55 2:2 '
50 47 40 40 125 2:30 - 10:001 45 43 54 32 *74 I
. 35 46 41 40- 162 10:C0 - 11:00: 44 37 40 35 ;5o i 41 34 32 34 141 11:00 - 12:00' 40 3: 31 24 12s
- 32 23 20 25 !00 36 T. 11 : 445 3 '.
-- = r%Ci ! tie ':0T IrlST-LLED + + = t ic-4.'H : r !E. ' .:. LEU JCTI Qt: . ^ . . \ ,. ..!, t.
Q {'I l 6 - . - l . _ . .
.W . gy.
l I i
A T I _-Ame
+____ _____ r i _c _a_n ____Tr a_H__i ____
_c __I n f or m__a_t __ _i _on _A_UT__0t_%_T_I _ _ __ _ _ C_TRA__FF_I __ _ __ _C_F _E_C 0F_D_EF I I 3erial Number: 35 . i Location: F?, NB WILLIS AVE AT EB LIE SERVICE RD i i Town: ROSL'sN . I County: NAS3AU State: NY i Date: 7/14/96
.______________+_______________________________+________________ _______________
l Directlen 1: RIGHT LANE I Dir+ctico 2: LEFT _ANE I :00 115 230 45 i 00 :5 :20 8 45 Hour i to to to to Hour i to to to ,t3 Hour
! :15 2 30 45 200 Tot al i :15 30 :45 :00 Totpl +______________+____ __________________________+___________ ___________________. .M. I I
- 12:00 - 1:001 17 20 to 5 -58 I tc 15 :: 5 21 1:00 - 2:001 7 e 2 11 26 I *
, : : 14 25
- 2:00 - 3:001 4 5 4 2 15 I i : : II i 3:00 - 4:00! 2 2 4 5 13 1 1 2 ? ? 21 4 4:00 - 5:001 3 4 1 to 1S I 4 5 4 12 2!
5:00 - 6:001 3
- 10 18 40 1 3 14 17 24 el
~ ; c:00 - 7:001 24 34 53 63 179 I 41 34 51 5: 1!!
l ~:00 - 3:001 70 00 125 132 426 1 55 24 112 124 3:25 1 3:00 - ?:001 135 126 151 126 533 1 124 1:e 155 117 512 I 9:00 - 10:001 148 102 99 113 Jo2 i 130 ::
- 24 22 ale
- o i 10:00 - 11:001 tot 111 98 94 404 .I 95 it 74 352 t 11:00 - 12:001 110 to 119 111 439 I 35 TE '1 :5 237 P.M. I I i 12:00 - 1:001 122 117 1 ~. 2 -- l 100 24 24 -- --
, 1:go _ 2:00l __ __ __ __- __ i __ __ __ __ __
- 2:00 - 3:001 -- -- -- --
-- I -- -- -- -- -- ; ; co - 4:00; __ __ __ __ __
i __ __ __ __ __
- 00 - 5:001 -- -- -- -- --
1 -- -- -- -- --
. 5:00 - o 001 -- -- -- -- --
I -- -- -- -- --
;;;o - 7:00: __ __ __ __ __
i __ __ __ __ __
~
t :00 - 3:001 *
-- -- -- -- -- t __ -- _- -- --
5:00 - 9:001 -- -- -- -- -- , -- -- -- -- -- l 2:00 - 10:001 -- -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1 :30 _ ig:oci __ __ __ __ __ 4 1 11:00 - 12:001 -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- --
+--__-__-_____:.+________= ._______________,_____,______ ___'______:.______________
Da.,- Total 1
-- 1 -_ , +______________+_______________________________,_______________________________ = MACH!tlE NOT*!NSTALLED ' . ++ = MACHINE NALFUNCTICN
- g_7- . .
Appendix C: Traffic Control Tactics This appendix presents sketches depicting the' Access control (AC) tactics recommended at the indicated locations. f k e l C-1
4
. Access Control Post: H-AC-01 See accompanying sketch.
DISCUSSION Jerusalem Avenue and Old Country Road
- 1. Facilitate non-evacuating traffic along Jerusalem Avenue l
to turn west onto Old Country Road. Facilitate evacuating traffic along southbound Jerusalem Avenue to turn east onto Old Country Road.
- 2. Facilitate right-turning movements from Old Country Road onto Jerusalem Avenue.'
- 3. Discourage through movements on all approaches.
Broadway and Old Country Road
- 4. Facilit' ate left-turn movement for non-evacuating traffic from northbound Broadway onto westbound Old Country Road and right-turn movement for evacuating traffic onto eastbound Old Country Road.
- 5. Facilitate left-turn movement for evacuating traffic from southbound Broadway onto eastbound Old Country Road and non-evacuating traffic through on southbound Broadway.
- 6. Facilitate right-turn movement for traffic from westbound Old Country Road onto northbound Broadway.
- 7. Facilitate right-turn movement for non-evacuating traffic from eastbound Old Country Road onto southbound Broadway and through movement for evacuating traffic onto eastbound Old Country Road.
- 8. Discourage all other movements.
t C-2
Access Control Post No. H'AC-01 LOCATION: Jerusalem Avenue & Old Country Rd. CENTER: Hicksville Broadway (Route 107) & Old Country Road
\ \
g Broadway (Route 107) s N \
\ \
I Avenu - I - o N Hicksville Q' ' o i , - , s Receptien i
- - \ S oo Center ,.,a $
/ - s 79 2
' I I
I E*Z: O Movement facilitated
=l Movement discouraged . Traffic guide O Traffi: cone DESCRIPTION:
MANPOWER / EQUIPMENT 4 traffic guides 31 traffic cones C-3
Access Control Post No. H-AC-02 LOCATION: Broadway (Route 107) & New South CENTER: Hicksville Road
\
s s
// N \ \ \ \ New South Broadway Road (Route 107) s \ \\ Oo 0 f% 0 A
N \ O O \s O \ \
\
O
\
Keyt
=- Movement facilitated Ol Movement discouragad @ Traffic guide O Traffic cone DESCRIPTION: 1. Facilitate all southbound movements along New South Road and all northbound movements along Broadway.
- 2. Discourage northbound movements onto New South Road.
MANPOWER / EQUIPMENT 1 traffic guide l 10 traffic cones C-4 a
)
l Access Control Post No. H-AC-03 LOCATION: Old Country Road at South Oyster CENTER: Hicksville Bay Road bN u South Oyster Bay Road
, Old. Country Road I f - - - - - - -
- o, o n} /
_ _ _ _ _ _ _- h T T O O E.*X.S
- Movement facilitated L; Movement discouraged O Traffic guide O Traffic cone DESCRIPTION: 1. Facilitate westbound through movement along Old Country Road and right turn movement from southbound South Oyster Bay Road onto westbound Old Country Road.
- 2. Discourage left turn movement from eastbound Old MANPOWER / EQUIPMENT Country Road and from northbound South Oyster 1 traffic guidgay Road.
9 traffic cones C-5
Access Control Post No. H-AC-04 LOCATION: Broadway (Route 107) at Newbridge CENTER: Hicksville Road AN l I l i sign l N Broadway I
/ j / '
i
/ // / ,/
I l
'/ /// / JL,JL Newbridge / ,/ l/ ;
Road ,h / /
- '/ I / / ' - , i I ~ / '
f' ' ll/ ~ EVACUATION ALL
$8 RECEPTION OTHER CENTER TRAFFIC = Movement facilitated a a j = ; Movement discouraged / @ Traffic guide O Traffic cone DESCRIPTION: 1. Install sign north of junction of Broadway and Newbridge Road facing southbound traffic along Broadway.
MANPOWER / EQUIPMENT 1 sign, as shown above. C-6
Access Control Post No. B-AC-01 LOCATION: Sunrise' Highway & Newbridge Road CENTER: Bellmore AN N Newbridge Road
\\
o O
- a j o Sunrise Highway k
_ _ _g f ( _ _ _r __ _ _ _ _ _ h
'o l os I
of e Bellmore g 0I Reception o Center 8, Key: 'o I
%' I =- Movement facilitated r Move. ment discouraged 0 Traffic guide O Traffic cone DESCRIPTION: 1. Facilitate left turns from westbound Sunrise Highway onto southbound Newbridge Road.
- 2. Facilitate right turns onto Sunrise Highway from Newbridge Road.
- 3. Discourage through and left-turn movements from MANPOWER / EQUIPMENT Newbridge Road.
2 traffic guides 12 traffic cones C-7
Access Control Post: R-AC-01 See accompanying sketch. DISCUSSION Lone Island Excressway and Service Roads at Willis Avenue
- 1. Facilitate turn movements from Willis Avenue: right i turns from northbound approach onto LIE South Service
- Road and from southbound approach onto LIE North Service l Road; left turns from southbound approach onto LIE South Service Road.
- 2. Facilitate right turn movement from the LIE South Service Road onto southbound Willis Avenue and left turn movement from the LIE North Service Road onto southbound Willis Avenue. Permit through and right turn movements from LIE North Service Road approach to Willis Avenue.
- 3. Discourage all other movements.
Lone Islan'd Exeressway South Service Road between Willis Avenue and Rosivn Road
- 4. Facilitate traffic movement entering the reception center.
- 5. Discourage through movement along LIE South Service Road.
Lone Island Exeressway North Service Road at Roslyn Road
- 6. Discourage turn movements from Roslyn Road onto LIE North Service Road and through movement along LIE North Service Road.
- 7. Facilitate all other movements.
! C-8 l l . , . . .. --. , , . - . - . - .-
1 l l Access Control Post No. R-AC-01 LOCATION: CENTER: Roslyn i I i a i I i { I IO l l'
, i North (westbound) LIE Service Rd. l 1 N .. e - - - - ---- -
_.hy g'~__ .- j
=
1 l "l \ N I I 1 ( ( Long Island Expressway I T
\ !( ,g. --- ---
j[ , J/
- - - N*. \ *. =
- 7. .- 7) - _T _ ,*_ - . w-s
_ _/ I.\ lY l yI i i g i South (eastbound) LIE Service Rd. { l I l I oslyn f I Willis Avenue Roslyn Road !
, , Reception Center l l U; = Movement facilitated ; Movement discouraged O Traffic guide O Traffic cone I
l DESCRIPTION: MANPOWER / EQUIPMENT 5 traffic guides 38 traffic cones 1 C-9
Access Control Post No. R-AC-02 I l l LOCATION: Northern State Parkway at Willis CENTER: Roslyn i Avenue U o
/l
- i Y*I N j* l y,* O .
I g Willis Avenue i I I ~
\ \ //h _ _
s i / Northern State Parkway i j s j ,/
./ /
l $I *c o o f ,s' h i *i // O Key: "k I
= Movement facilitated l l r: Movement discouraged , @ Traffic guide O Traffic cone DESCRIPTION: 1. Facilitate left-turning traffic from the westbound Northern State Parkway of f-ramp onto northbound Willis Avenue.
- 2. Discourage all through movements along Willis Avenue.
MANPOWER / EQUIPMENT 2 traffic guides 16 traffic cones C-10
. ... ..c.s - r. = r.<. i we Attachment N \
STATE bF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ' Towsm SulLDING e THE 30VgmMOR N ELSeN A. ReCNEFEkgan tuotag sv A73 PLAT A o Ab 8 AN Y. N.Y.12237 l 9
..,.....J,.......
- c-. . .
3. . . August 29, 1983 '
. _ _ _ _ )
D @ I I m SEP 1 G83 " OmttOf15t1818C7PREPAW RIE Mr.,Goodge Brower gl Director - y Disaster / Emergency Preparedness , 200 North Second Street l Fulton, NY 13069 ,
- f. .
Dear Mr. Brower:
Referrin7 to your question today on "the decontamidation of vehicles leaving the 10 mile EPZ as to what problems may arise from water us'ad to wash off a. vehicle that may become contaminated, we believe that this is not a problem that creates , any major concern. ,
- a. .
g It is believed that tho'small amount of contamination 4,
'that may settle on a car will be diluted to a great extent by washing and that this water can either seep into the ground or enter the sewer systas. Care should be taken to see that the wash water does not enter the area where people gather.
The major concern with contamination is still with human beings first and equipment second. I hope this information gives * ' you enough: guidance'to answer your questions. l sincerely you , , , p MWf nald D. Davidoff/ Director Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group cc: Mr. Rowieski, FEMA l
)
h b i s% ' STATE}OF NEW YORK . DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH , , CCRNfMS 70Wim e TME GQvtRNGR NSL50N A. ReCNEFELLER gastatRt STAf t PLAIA e AL S AN Y, N.Y.13237" - , h aavio aaat.M. u.a.' , e m .. *, , s _ ,s 1 1 Y. . ..
- November 16, 1983 , . t . . . .
c : e l 1 l t'u}&lbj\'.j;ffl-l!. .:q ' ' NOV1 1983' i N C# WMWT FP.:.";.:,::, ,4 f Mr. George Brower - Direc r t..
' Disas /Er.orgency Preparedness 't**
200 N Second' Street '- .
* {T'I .:t ,,
Fulto NY 13069 ' t.
Dear . Brewer:
. r The question of what to do with waste shower water s ttfat a become contaminated due to the cleansing of a contaainated individual has been asked.
( In consultation with Dr. Karim Rimawi, Director, Buread, of Environmental Radiation Protection, it has been , deter ined that auch waste water should be allowed to flow I direc; Ly into .the nominal. sewer system since it would be ,.4 g great y diluted by the volume of water in the system and f e#4 ~ . d thersh, or8 Pese no health problems. .
; , .. .y -
h , sincerely yours, [,, .j s.
, e, w (pu nald . Dav d -[ '
4 .* irector
*E g 3 ', '.
adiological Emergency Preparedness Group 8 *
, L
Attachment O OPIP 4.2.3 Page 29 of 29 At tachc:en t 8 Page 1 of 1 DECONTAMINATION TRAILER LAYOUT e f 4 o '- c'
, -zc $* w in- r.Os s'. er he , 9tss4 ,esw , w e'w- , res W- ,
J V 4
-a ANOWEt$ UNDE 5 -es- tags-m& ==*
CWll k' x . V V V- N EXIT EXIT FOR CLEAN ENTIUWCE EXIT OR EASILY DE- . CONTAMINATED PEOPLE 9 I l Rev. 8
Attachment P / 4.2 Receotion Center The LILCO Operation Centers in Bellmore, Hicksville, and Rosyln are the designated general population reception centers. These facilities are located approximately 40 miles from Shoreham as detailed on Figure 4.2.1. Traffic guides will assist with traffic flow on the facility grounds. Monitoring stations will be set up in the facility parking lots to monitor evacuees arriving from the EPZ. Trailers, equinped with showers and sinks, will be used for decontamination of evacuees found to be contaminated. These trailers will also be used for equipment storage. OPIP 4.2.3 details the. activation, layout and operation of the reception centers. All waste water from the. decontamination trailers will be collected and contained in collapsible storage tanks. These tanks are sized to enable full-flow operations of the trailers for a period of 24 hours. Upon termination of the emergency the Recovery Action Committee will make arrangements for transportation of all potentially contaminated liquid and-solid wastes to Shoreham. 4.2-1 DRAFT 2/20/87
RECEPTION CENTERS It is anticipated that a majority of the people asked to evacuate their homes will seek temporary lodging with friends or relatives, or stay at hotels and motels for the duration of an incident, particularly since a large percentage of Suf folk County residents migrated from the New York metropolitan area and have relatives who still reside there. However, for those individuals with no such housing alternatives available, reception centers have been established. Evacuees requiring assistance will be directed to the LILCO Hicksville, Bellmore or Roslyn Operations Centers. Figure 27.2 in Section IV shows evacuation routes from the EPZ to these three Reception Centers. Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show traffic flow in the, immediate vicinity of each of these facilities. OPIP 4.2.3 details access control and vehicle and evacuee flow on the reception center's grounds. At these facilities, evacuees will be monitored by LERO and assigned to Congregate Care Centers by LERO or the American Red Cross. l In establishing these reception centers, it became more advantageous to use several large facilities as opposed to numerous small locations such as local schools. In minimizing the number of locations, it became easier to maintain control over evacuation routes and to provide supportive services (monitoring and congregate care assignment) for evacuees. The selection criteria used in choosing appropriate reception centers were as follows: o Adequate distance from the EPZ boun'dary o Reasonable highway access o On-site security i III-37 DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 3'.6.1-
- Page 2 of 44 3.0 PRECAUTIONS 1
3.1 The dose-saving effectiveness of protective actions can be influenced by many-variable factors such as expected duration of releases, involved population, weather . conditions, projected evacuation times, and plant conditions. Whenever possible, these factors should all be considered ,; prior to the recommendation of protective actions. L 3.2 Sheltering is the preferred protective action if
- sufficient-protection is offered by sheltering, or if no additional benefit is gained by evacuation. The
! evacuation of hospitals and nursing facilities should be sought as a last means since sheltering is the.least disruptive to the patients. 3.3
~
The evacuation time estimates used in this procedure, Attachment 2, account for variations in road conditions, seasonal population and mobilization of traffic guides, j The uncertainty in these values is i 1/2 hour. In 4 addition, the evacuation time estimates are sensitive to evacuee compliance with recommended routes, traffic-shadow beyond ten miles and road accidents. The_effect of these factors on the time estimates is detailed.in Attachment 7, Evacuation Time Estimate Sensitivity Study. This study should be reviewed by the Radiation Health Coordinator and Evacuation Coordinator. 3.4 If there.has been a release of radioactive material, with the potential to contaminate evacuees, have evacuees from downwind zones report to their designated reception center for monitoring. Have the Coordinator of Public l
'Information convey this information to the public via EBS messages.
I 3.5 If decontamination of general public evacuees is required implement the following steps: a) Utilize decontamination facilities at the trailers. i b) When Federal / State / County resources.become available provide necessary interface to utilize these additional facilities and resources. c) If it becomes apparent that additional facilities are i needed but unavailable' direct evacuees not needing , Congregate Care to' proceed to their evacuation
; destination. .They should put their clothes in-plastic bags and take a shower using-luke warm water and mild soap. They~should then put on clean clothes. Evacuees going to congregate care centers should continue to the reception centers for monitoring and decontamination.
4
OPIP 3.6.1 Page 2a of 44 d) Keep the reception centers open so that evacuees who took showers at their evacuation destination can have themselves and their bagged clothing checked. Have the Coordinator of Public Information convey the appropriate advisories to the public. 4.0 PREREQUISITES 4.1 The Shoreham Nuclear Power Station has declared an emergency. [ i 4 4 B DRAFT - 2/20/87 t
. - - . - ' .wy .-, .- -- .3 . -- -
OPIP 3.6.5 Page 9 of 60 o Start with the zones closest to Shoreham and work outward. o Provide for the Homebound before the Health Care Facilities. o If hospitals or Suf folk Infirmary are to be evacuated , provide for them last. 5.6.3 Contact Peconic Ambulance Service and talk to the Dosimetry Record Keeper.
- a. Find out how many vehicles are available and their capacities.
- b. Using Attachments 1.and 2, assign pickups and reception facility to the vehicles available.
Have the Dosimetry Record Keeper complete the Dispatch Form, Attachment 13, and dispatch the vehicle.
- c. Direct the Dosimetry Record Keeper to return to the Riverhead Staging Area when all the vehicles have been dispatched.'
5.6.4 Have the Emergency Medical /Public Service Commu-nicators or other available personnel proceed downstairs to dispatch the ambulances /ambulettes from the EWDF in the following manner:
- a. Obtain the Ambulance /Ambulette Packets from the EOC Equipment Store Room.
- b. Identify an available room, near the EWDF that can be used for briefing and dispatch, and have the Ambulance /Ambulette Drivers proceed there.
- c. Ensure that all ambulance /ambulette drivers have been issued dosimetry,
- d. The packets are in boxes marked by zone and vehicle type. Issue a packet and the number of Dispatch Forms, Attachment 13, equivalent to the capacity of the vebicle. Have the driver fill out the remaining'information on the Dispatch Form and return Part II of the three part form to you.
i
- e. Remind them that their procedure is in their i packet. When they return to Brentwood for ;
monitoring, combine evacuees on a single I vehicle as appropriate prior to their leaving i for the special population relocation centers. ' DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 1 of 49 OPIP 3.9.2 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION OF EHERGENCY WORKERS AND EVACUEES 1.0 PURPOSE ' To provida instructions for monitoring and decontamination of personnel, vehicles and personal belongings / equipment at offsite decontamination facilities.- 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 Decontamination Coordinator directs the efforts of the Decontamination Facilities. 2.2 Decontamination Leaders provide direction and coordination of the radiological Monitoring and Decontamination personnel at the facilities. 2.3 Monitoring / Decontamination personnel are responsible for implementing this procedure. 2.4 Responsibility for implementing portions of this procedure are as follows: Section Title 5.1 Decontamination Coordinator 5.2 Reception Center Supervisor or Decontamination Coordinatot 5.3 Dosimetry Record Keepers 5.4 Monitoring Incoming Emergency Workers 5.5 Initial Monitoring at Evacuee Reception Centers 5.6 Monitoring Bus Evacuees and Special Population Evacuees 5.7 Expedited Monitoring at Evacuee Reception Centers 5.8 Decontamination of Evacuees 5.9 Vehicle Monitoring at EWDF 5.10 Vehicle Decontamination 5.11 Monitoring Equipment / Persona 1 Articles 5.12 Decontamination of Equipment / Personal Articles DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 3.9.2 Page-9 of'49 5.4.13 Send a copy of the-Expos ~ure Report Form withLthe individual to the medical facility. 5.4.14. If monitoring'showed the individual to be free of both external"and internal contamination',. issue. ' the individual a tag signifying that he is clean (see Attachment 6). Direct the individual ~to the Dosimetry Record Keepers,to record his name, address, and telephone number on a Clean Emergency Worker Monitoring RecordLForm, see --
. Attachment 4.
5.4.15 .The EWDF monitoring personnel will-have ,. LER0/LILCO family members bring their vehicle to the Vehicle Decontamination Area for monitoring prior to going through personnel monitoring. 5.4.16 Emergency Workers will.either remain at the Decontamination Facility waiting for reassignment or they-will be released from duty._ 5.5 Initial Monitoring Personnel Assigned to Evacuee Reception Centers 5.5.1 Assist in set up of the Reception Center as detailed in OPIP 4.2.3. 5.5.2 Obtain-your dosimetry and fill our record. forms in accordance with OPIP-3.9.1. 5.5.3 Perform pre-operational checks-of RM-14 in accordance with Attachment 1. 5.5.4 Determine background radiation levels in accordance with Attachment'2. 5.5.5 When monitoring for external contamination using the RM-14 with the HP-210 or HP-260. probe, ensure: l
- a. range selector is on X1 position
- b. response time is fast
- c. volume switch is at maximum position.
- d. alarm is set at 360 cpm above background.
5.5.6 Each monitoring team will set.up at the stations detailed in OPIP 4.2.3. I DRAFT - 2/20/87-t
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 9a of 49 5.5.7 Three people will man each monitoring station. Each team will consist of two monitoring personnel and one traffic guide. 5.5.8 The two monitoring personnel will:
- a. Position themselves on both sides of the monitoring lanes.
- b. Approach the vehicle when it comes to a full stop.
- c. Explain to the passengers in the vehicle that you are monitoring for possible contamination and ask for their cooperation.
- d. Each monitor equippped'with an RM-14 and HP-210 or HP-260 prob'e , will scan the hands, feet, head and shoulders of each passenger in the vehicle.
- e. If no contamination above acceptable levels is found on the passengers issue clean tags (marked " person") to the driver for each passenger.
- f. The first monitor to complete monitoring
, vehicle passengers, will check the vehicle swipe for contamination.
- g. If no contamination above acceptable levels is found on the vehicle swipe, place a clean tag (' marked vehicle') under the vehicle windshield wiper.
5.5.9 Monitoring of each vehicle and its passengers should take no longer than 100 seconds. 5 . 5. l o The Traf fic Guide will complete the Reception Center Record Form (OPIP 4.2.3 Act. 6), and direct the vehicle driver to the exit or decontamination area. 5.6 Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to Monitor Incoming Bus (Hicksville Only) - Special Facility Evacuees (Brentwood Only) 5.6.1 Assist in the set up of the Emergency llorker l Decontamination Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1. DRAFT - 2/20/87
'OPIP.3.9.2 Page 9b of 49 5.6.2 Obtain your dosimetry and fill.out record forms I in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1.
I
- 5. 6.' 3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in ,
accordance with Attachment 1. 5.6.4 Determine background radiation levels in I accordance with Attachment 2. 5.6.5 Wear protective clothing in controlled area at all times in accordance with Attachment 7. 5.6.6 When monitoring for external contamination using the RM-14 with the HP-210 or HP-260 probe, ensure:
- a. range selector is on X1 position
- b. response time is fast
- c. volume switch is at maximum position
- d. alarm is set at 360 cpm.above background. l 5.6.7 Monitor each arriving. bus /special facility I evacuees as follows:
- a. Have the' individual remain in the vehicle.
- b. Hold the HP-210 or HP-260 probe'about a 1/2 l inch away from body.
- c. Scan ~each individual slowly. This should take about 90 seconds.
- d. Pay particular attention to:
o Hands o Feet o Head o Shoulders '
- e. While scanning individual, if the meter reading is fluctuating widely and is difficult to read, switch response time to slow and monitor the'particular area for-30 l s econd.s .
DRAFT - 2/20/87 i
.1
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 9c of 49 j i
- f. If reading exceeds 360 cpm above background, I the individual ~is considered contaminated.
5.6.8 If individual is not: externally contaminated, I proceed to section 5.4.10. < 5.6.9 If individual is contaminated, direct the contaminated individual to the Decontamination Area and inform the Decontamination Leader or his
~
designee that a contaminated person has arrived and the zone from which he/she evacuated. , 5.6.10 If the individual is contaminated and non-ambulatory, notify the Decontamination Leader to arrange placement of the individual in a medical facility. capable of handling a contaminated person. Attempt removal of
. contaminated clothing cr other activity that will reduce the contamination.
5.7 If directed by the Decontamination Leader assighed to
-initial _ monitoring to expedite the processing of vehicles, each monitoring team will scan incoming cars and drivers a's follows:
- a. One monitor will take a swipe of approximately one quarter of the hood and wheel well of the vehicle, and monitor the cloth with an RM-14 with HP-210 or HP-260 probe. (The cloth may be reused until contaminated.)
- b. The second monitor-will scan the hands, feet, head and shoulde'rs of the driver with an RM-14 with HP-210 or HP-260 probe.
- c. If no contamination found, place a clean tag (marked " vehicle") under the windshield wiper, and issue clean taps (marked " person")
to the driver for all passengers
- d. If contamination above acceptable limits is found on either the vehicle or the driver, explain to the vehicle driver and passengers -
that detailed monitoring is necessary.
- e. The Traffic Guide will complete the Reception Center Record Form (OPIP 4.2.3, Att. 6) and direct the vehicle to the exit or decontamination area, as necessary.
DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 20 of 49 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 4 RM-14 COUNT RATE METER (continued) 5.1.2 The radiation count rate (cpm) is' read on the front panel meter (0-500 cpm full scale)., Switch selected ranges of X1, X10 and X100 are provided. The response time of the meter can be selected by a " Fast / Slow" response switch. 5.1.3 The HP-210, HP-260, and HP-270 probes.are used- l with the RM-14 for personnel monitoring at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility and the Reception Center Decontamination Facilities. l 5.1.4 Topics covered in the procedure: 5.2 Operational Set-up 5.3 Battery Check 5.4 Range Selection 5.2 Operational Set-Up 5.2.1 Place selector switch in "0FF" position. 5.2.2 Connect either the HP-210, HP-260, or HP-270 l detector to the instrument as appropriate. 5.2.3 (Optional) Connect the power cable to the instrument and plug into 115 VAC power supply. 5.2.4 Set the meter alarm knob, located on the back of the instrument, to the desired alarm point. 5.2.5 Turn volume knob to maximum position. 5.3 Battery Check 5.3.1 Turn the selector switch to the "BATT" position; the meter should read in the BATT OK range. NOTE: The instrument does not function properly even when plugged into 115 VAC, unless the batteries check O.K. DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 21 of 49 Attachment 1 Page 3 of 4 RM-14 COUNT RATE METER (continued) 5.3.2 If the batteries check l'ow, notify the l Decontamination Leader for further instructions. 5.4 Range Selection 5.4.1 When monitoring with this instrument, it may be necessary to change ranges using the switch on the fa'ce of the instrument to bring the indicat-ing needle "on-scale". NOTE: If the alarm circuit is actuated, press the reset button. 5.5 Radiation Response Functional Test 5.5.1 Perform an upscale response test with the radioactive check source. Follow instructions , available with the check source c'ontainer.
6.0 REFERENCES
None 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Figure 1, Eberline Model RM-14 and HP-210, HP-260, and l HP-270 Probes
'I DRAFT - 2/20/87
l 1 OPIP 3.9.2 ! Fage Attachment 1 22 of 49 l ! Page 4 of 4 OPERATION OF EBERLINE MODEL RM-14 (continued) FIGURE 1 EBERLINE MODEL RM-14 AFD PROBES IN ;. - sw g~.' : ,*-. 4. m.__r.s e?ny,w =
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- 7.6 0 \ RECORDER OUTPUT '
SCALER OUTPUT TILT STAND mn L/:L.c./67
t, OPIP 3.9.2 Page 23 of 49 Attachment 2 , Page 1 of-1 DETERMINATION OF BACKGROUND RADIATION LEVEL
- 1. Set the RM-14 to the 'X1' scale.
- 2. Set the response time to ' slow.'
- 3. Readout will fluctuate slightly; use approximate average of upper bound measurements.
o 4. Use the following table. i~ l 1 l TYPE OF l SHIELD- l MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE 9tCp;TORING PROBE l POSITION BACKGROUND l .:.-- Externpi l HP-270 Open 50 CPM , e Thyroid-Adult l HP-270 Closed 50 CPM' I i l l l HP-210 Attach Plastic l . l Thyroid-Child Shield i 150 CPM
\ l \ l l Reception Center' l l and EWDF Initial HP-210 and
- None 1 150 CPM Scan HP-260 l l 1 l
Vehicle-Interior HP-270 Open 50 CPM l and Decon.
- 5. Ensure background radiation level with HP-270 probe is performed for both shield open and closed.
- 6. Determine background level every 15 minutes.
- 7. If maximum allowable background is exceeded, attempt to find and remove source of radiation. Otherwise move monitoring location.
. 1 l
1 DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 27a of 49 Attachment 3 Page 4a of 4 FIGURE 4 EVACUEE RECEPTION CENTER ' INITIAL MONITORING FLOW DIAGRAM ENTER
\/
STOP AT INITIAL MONITORING STATION 4 3 SMEAR SWIPE MONITOR HANDS'. IE E T, ri U O OF HOOD AND ~ r iv o 4, ;:~{QRIVERJNDTFEET :ncatau,h dF] WHEEL WELL
+ + 6; VOoJ L t.
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I OBTAIN PROCEED TO DECON. CLEAN TAG j TRAILER FOR-
, x DETAILED MONITORING.
OBTAIN MAP TO CONGREGATE CARE CENIER IF NEEDED s/ PROCEED TO FACILITY EXIT l l C)M9T
/ ac, /6'7
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 49a of 49 Attachment 8 Page 1 of 1 DETERMINATION OF CONTAMINATION LIMITS ! l Contamination is indicated by- the following: ; INSTRUMENT MINIMUM READING FOR l TARGET RM-14 SURVEY CONTAMINATION METER WITH: 1 (Above Background) i I Initial HP-210 Probe ori 360 CPM (Evacuee) l Monitoring HP-260 Probe 360 CPM (Vehicle Swipe) Shield Off I l Person - skin *HP-270 Probe 150 CPM l or clothing Shield Open i l 1 l Adult Thyroid l *HP-270 Probe 150 CPM-I Shield Closed Child Thyroid *HP-210 Probe Anything above background (Under 12) Shield'On l . l , Swipe from Vehicle *HP-210 Probe 360 CPM (warra'nts full Shield Off survey with HP-270) l Equipment or *HP-270 Probe l 360 CPM Vehicles positive Shield Open l l l on Swipes l l d
- Nominal sensitivity HP-270 probe @ 1,200 CPM = 1 mR/hr.
Nominal sensitivity W'-210 probe @ 3,600 CPM = 1 mR/hr. Nominal sensitivity HP-260 probe @ 3,600 CPM = 1 mR/hr. l NOTE: Background readings must be taken with the same type probe and same shielding configuration as used to measure contamination. DRAFT - 2/20/87
S
- OPIP 4.2.3-Page 3 of 29 5.1.4 Ensure proper. manning is maintained at the reception centers. Additional personnel may be.
requested from INPO by the Director _of Local' Response.
~
5.1.5 If more'than 30% of the evacuees identified ~in Attachment'i are directed to a reception: center
.- take the following actions:
a) ' Attempt to dispatch excess personnel and i personnel from underutilized facilities co the over utilized facility. b) When INPO personnel become available-direct them to the facilities as'needed. . c) If despite best ef forts it appears that
- monitoring will take more than 12 hours-then direct. receptions centers to use the backup method described in step 5.4.7.
. 5.2 Decontamination Coordinator 5.2.1 Upon declaration of a Site Area or General' j Emergency contact the facility managers'at ! Bellmore, Hicksville and.Roslyn. (Their' phone numbers are in the LERO phone directory.) Inform them of the Shoreham emergency and-thet LERO~
personnel will be arriving to set up the facility as a reception center. . Note: The Reception Center Supervisors have keys to each of the facilities ~. 5.2.2 When the Reception Center Supervisors call in, obtain a manning _ status'and find out if any
- problems exist with facility activation.
5.2.3 Maintain contact with the American Red Cross
- Coordinator in the EOC. If the Red Cross Coordinator has not arrived, contact the Red e Cross in Mineola at 747-3500. Keep the' Red Cross informed of tiie emergency status.
5.2.4 When an evacuation is recommended, use 20% of the population in the evacuated zones shown in
- ' Attachment 2 to estimate the number of evacuees needing congregate care.- Provide this number to.
the Red Cross. DRAFT 2/20/87
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 4 of 29 5.2.5 Obtain from the Red Cross Coordinator'a list of Congregate Care Centers and in what order they will be activated if an evacuation is recommended. Based upon proximity and capacity , , determine to which Congregate Care Center each reccption center is to send those evacuees requiring shelter assistance. 5.2.6 Contact each of the reception centers and inform them of the evacuation recommendation, and when they should begin to arrive. -(Approximately 2 Hours after the evacuation recommendation).
-Inform each reception center to which Congregate Care Centers they should send evacuees requiring shelter assistance.
5.2.7 Contact the reception centers on a regular basis and request the status of the following 4 information: o Manning o Facility Set Up o Are evacuees backing up onto'the public roads o Number of evacuees going to congregate care centers and status of map distribution o Number of evacuees requiring decontamination and the zones from which they came o Any additional support required including
. additional monitors provided through INPO o Obtain status of LERO bus arrivals-(Hicksville reception center only) .
Keep the Health Services Coordinator informea of the reception center status. 5.2.8 Uhen contacted by a reception center Decontamination Leader with a request to assign an evacuee with contamination to a hospital do the following:
- a. Contact the Hospital Coordinator and have him contact hospitals near the reception center and request the placement of contaminated evacuees. Ensure the hospital understands that the arriving evacuee has fixed contamination and does not'present a serious concern of spreading contamination.
DRAFT - 2/20/87
m . _. . _ __ - _ _ . T OPIP 4.2.3 Page 5 of 29
- b. When the receiving hospital has been identi-fied, contact the Decontamination Leader with the name and location of the hospital.
5.3 Reception Center Supervisors. - 5.3.1 Upon . arrival at the reception center contact either security or the facility manager and inform him (her) of the Shoreham emergency. 5.3.2 Drive around the facility and see if there are any' impediments to the reception center set up , such as a LILC0' truck or automobile parked.out of . J place. If necessary have the impediment moved. l' 5.3.3 Direct all arriving' LERO personnel to the. . decontamination trailer. area or a nearby enclosed-area to await initial sign in:and dosimetry distribution. i 5.3.4 Have Dosimetry Record. Keepers set up for , registration and distribution of dosimetry in the decontamination trailer. When ready have.the~ 4 LERO personnel go through the trailer to. sign in i and pick up identification and dosimetry.- 5.3.5 Using Attachment 2, Reception Center Personnel-
, and Zone Assignment, assign personnel to the various reception center positions.. Assign a Dosimetry Record Keeperito act as u communicator ! on the phone in the Decontamination Trailer.
- 5.3.6 'Have the Decontamination Leaders' set up their areas of the facility as shown in Attachments 3,
- 4 and 5.
i 5.3.7 Contact the Decontamination ~ Coordinator regul'arly ' and provide him with the information detailed in Section 5.2. 1
- 5.3.8 Provide offsite intersection diagrams and traf fic control equipment to Nassau County Police if they
) arrive. 5.3.9 Redistribute personnel and equipment among the reception center areas as necessary in order to
- meet evacuee monitoring demands.
- 5.3.10 During inclement weather, rotate people out of
. exposed areas.
DRAFT - 2/20/87 i
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 6 of 29 j l 5.3.11 If evacuees need transportation to a Congregate Care Center, arrange for a bus from Hicksville to ! provide transportation. l 5.3.12 Establish additional monitoring stations, at 9 secondary monitoring stations detailed in the facility diagrams, as INPO monitors arrive. 5.3.13 Upon termination of the emergency, deactivate the i reception center in accordance with Section 5.9. 5.4 Decontamination Leader Assigned to Initial. Monitoring 5.4.1 Have personnel obtain equipment and set up the facility as shown in Attachment 3, 4 and 5. 5.4.2 A traf fic guide will hand an information sheet to every entering vehicle. 5.4.3 Three people will man each monitoring station. I Each team will consist of two monitoring personnel and one traf fic guide. The vehicle and passengers will be monitored within approximately 100 seconds. 5.4.4 The two monitors will: a) Monitor the passengers in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2. b) When the traf fic guide presents a suipe check it for contamination. c) If no contamination is found, one monitor will put a clean tag (marked ' vehicle') under the windshield wiper; the other monitor will issue to the driver a clean tag (marked
' person') for each passenger.
5.4.5 The traffic guide assigned to the monitorin~g station will:
- a. Using one cloth, take a swipe of approximately one quarter of the front hood and one wheel well. Have the suipe checked by either montior for contamination. The swipe may be reused until either dirty or contaminated.
- b. Write down the license plate number of the car and the number of passengers on Attachment 6 Reception Center Record Form.
Check off on the form whether or not clean i tags were issued. DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 7 of 29
- c. If clean tags were not issued, then direc t the vehicle toward the decontamination area.
- d. If clean tags were issued then ask the driver if (s)he needs directions to a Red Cross Congregate Care Center. If yes, hand the . -
driver a map. Direct the car toward an exit.
- e. If you begin to run low on maps, request more from the Dosimetry Record Keepers.
5.4.6 Ensure the traffic guides in your area understand
. 'their assignments and-are handling traffic flow ';or rec tly . Vehicles with more than six passengers or limited access shoyld be directed to the monitoring stations identified.on the facility diagrams.
5.4.7 If directed by the Reception Center Supervisor, 1 expedite the processing of vehicles as follows:
- a. Have one monitor check only the driver for contaminati'on.
- b. Have second monitor swipe vehicle exterior and issue clean tags if no contamination'is found on either vehicle or driver.
- c. Traffic Guide will record license number and issue map to congregate car-center if required.
- d. If passengers did not travel together, monitor passengers from other locations.
5.5 Decontamination Leaders asaigned to Decontamination 1 5.5.1 When directed by the Reception Center Supervisor initiate set up of the vehicle decon area and the dect,ntamination trailer. Activation instructions for the trailers and waste water storage system are kept inside the trailer. The layout of the decontamination traildr is shown in Attachment
- 8. One side of the trailer will be designated for women the other side for men. Ensure a female monitor is assigned to the female side of the trailer.
5.5.2 When evacuees requiring decontamination arrive direct them to the vehicle decontamination area. Have the vehicle park in a designated spot. 5.5.3 Have the passengers leave the vehicle and proceed into the decontamination trailer. DRAFT 2/20/87
l OPIP 4.2.3 I Page 8 of 29 5.5.4 While the passengers are in the trailer, monitor and decontaminate the vehicle in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2. If.the vehicle cannot be decon-taminated place a contaminated vehicle tag under the windshield wiper. When the driver returns have a LERO worker in a paper suit drive the vehicle to a contaminated vehicle parking area. Use regular LILCO parking spaces for contaminated vehicle parking. If additional space is necessary park vehicles on the lawns. 5.5.5 Evacuees entering decontamination trailers will be monitored and decontaminated in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2. Issue clean tags to all evacuees with contamination below-acceptable limits. 5.5.6 If there are a large number of evacuees awaiting access to the decontamination trailer, use the transportation building in Hicksville and Bellmore and the warehouse in Roslyn either as a holding area or for detailed monitoring and decontamination by removal of outer clothing. Establish a controlled entrance and exit and designate a clean area as necessary. 5.5.7 If evacuees cannot be decontaminated below i acceptable-limits contact the Decontamination Coordinator in the EOC. Request that a hospital be identified to accept a contaminated evacuee. When a hospital has been identified have the contaminated svacuee(s) drive themselves (if their vehicle is clean) to the hospital. Ensure that the evacuee. bas a copy of the Evacuee Exposure Record Form to take to the hospital. Tell the evacuee to enter the hospital via the emergency room entrance. 5.5.8 Ask the driver of cars issued clean tags if they l need a map to a Red Cross Congregate Care Center. If so, issue a map. 5.5.9 Have evacuees who do not have transportation to l use the LILCO district operations of fice as a temporary shelter until transportation to a Congregate Care Center can be arranged. Ensure , the Reception Center Supervisor is aware of evacuees awaiting transportation. DRAFT - 2/20/87
m OPIP 4.2.3 Page 9 of 29 5.6 Decontamination Leader assigned to monitoring evacuees arriving by bus at Hicksville. 5.6.1 Arriving buses will transport evacuees to the Hicksville Operation Center, northeast employee - parking area, at the gate just north of the transportation building. 5.6.2 Evacuees will' remain on the bus. Personnel at this~ location will perform radiation monitoring l checks and issue clean tags in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2. 5.6.3 If decontamination is necessary escort evacuee (s) to the decontamination trailers. 5.6.4 A dosimetry record keeper will have all bus evacuees sign out on the Clean Evacuee Log Out Form, OPIP 3.9.2, Attachment 4. 5.6.5 If Hicksville Operations Center has been designated as a Congregate Care Center then direct evacuees with clean tags to the check in area. 5.6.6 If Hicksville has not been designated as a Congregate Care Center, direct clean evacuees -- onto a bus that has been monitored. Give the bus driver directions to an activated Congregate Care Center. 5.7 Dosimetry Record Keepers 5.7.1 Uhen directed by the Reception Center Supervisor log in LERO personnel and distribute LERO identification badges. The LERO reception center roster is kept in the Decontamination Trailer.. Set up a table in the Decontamination Trailer and route the LERO workers through.
- a. Request LILCO identification.
- b. Have LERO personnel sign and record the time of entry into the facility next to their name which is located under their LERO job title on the LERO Reception Center Roster. If their name does not appear under their job title, have them fill in the required information in the space provided under their LERO job title on the Reception Center Roster.
DRAFT - 2/20/87
r, - - 10 PIP 4.2.3 Page 10 of 29
.c. Issue green LERO badges to all the LERO Reception Center personnel. Instruct them that the. badge-is to be worn at all times-in a visible place.
- 5. 7. 2- Issue dosimetry and Emergency Worker Dose Record Forms'to all Reception Center Supervisors, Decontamination Leaders, Monitoring /Decontamina-tion and. Traffic Guide-personnel-in accordance with Attachment 7, OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure Control.
- 5. 7. 3 ' A Dosimetry Record Keeper will'act.as a communicator with the EOC and' man the tel,ephone in the Decontamination Trailer ~ .
~5.7.4 .The Dosimetry Record Keepers'(DRK) will handle dispatch.to Congregate Care Centers as follows:
- a. The DRK communicator will receive, via phone, from-the Decontamination Coordinator, a list of Congregate Care Centers activated by the Red Cross.
- b. The DRK's will obtain maps, stored in the trailer, for the identified Congregate Care Center and distribute them to the- Traf fic- .l Guide at each monitoring station and the Decontamination Leader at the'decon trailer.
Note: The number of maps provided-is proportional to the capacity of the Congregate. Care Center. -When all the maps to a facili.ty'have been distributed by the Recorders, the Congregate. Care Center is-full.
- c. Regularly check with monitoring station Traffic Guides to ensure they are~not running l low on maps. Contact'the Decontamination Coordinator if~it is necessary to activate additional' Congregate Care Centers.
- d. If directing a bus full of evacuees to a Congregate Care Center give a map to the driver. Remove and discard 15 maps from your package to account'for the extra' people.
DRAFT - 2/20/87 6
)
i OPIP 4.2.3 Page 11 of 29
- e. If Hicksville is to be used as a Congregate Care Center have evacuees park on the front lawn and rear ball fields if additional space is needed.
- 5. 7. 5 Uhen the emergency is terminated, collect all of the Clean Evacuee Log Out Forms and Reception Center Record Forms for transfer to.the EOC Dosimetry Record Keeper.
5.7.6 At the completion of the emergency, b' ring the copies of all the completed Emergency Worker
, Forms and TLDs to the EOC Dosimetry Record Keeper.
5.8 Traffic G'uides 5.8.1 Traffic Guides will be assigned to the posts designated in Attachment 3, 4 and 5 to facilitate the flow of traffic through the reception center. 5.8.2 Follow the instructions in your Reception Center Traffic Guide Procedure Attachment 7. 5.8.3
~
Traffic Guides at the Reception Center entrances will hand out information sheets. 5.8.4 Traffic Guides assigned to monitoring stations l will implement Step 5.4.5. 5.9 Termination of Emergency and Deactivation of the Reception Center 5.9.1 If the emergency is terminated without an evacuation recommendation, inventory and repack all the emergency equipment. Notify the Decontamination Coordinator at the EOC and LILCO facility management that you are leaving. 5.9.2 If an evacuation has been recommended, contact the Decontamination Coordinator, inform ~him that the evacuees are no longer arriving at the Reception Center and that you are ceasinb monitoring and decontamination operations. Request that the Recovery Action Committee make arrangements for transportation of potentially contaminated water from liquid storage waste system and solid waste to Shoreham for disposal. DRAFT - 2/20/87
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 15 of 29 Attachment'2 , Page 1 of 1 RECEPTION CENTER PERSONNEL AND ZONE ASSIGNMENTS FACILITY I l I- l Positions l Bellmore Hicksville i Roslyn
- Reception Ctr. Spyr, 1 1 1 l
Area A Area Bj
'Decon Ldr. Init. Mon. 1 1 1 . 1 l Init. Mon. Pers. l 28 l 2 P, 3A I 26 l Traffic. Guides 14 1+ 16 14 'Decon. Ldr. Decon. L 1 l l- l 1 l Vehicle Mon /Decon 3 6 2 Evac. Mon /Decon 10 20 8 l l l Decon Ldr. - Bus -- 1 l --
Init. Mon. Pers. -- 12 l -- Traffic Guide l 2 l l1 l l
. Dos. Recd. Keepers 2 ! 4 l 2 I I I I l Traffic Guide Onsite 1 10 18 7.
TOTAL 70 .l 1 57 l l 'tA l l l I l i I I l l l l Zones Assigned to l K-40,600 F - 29,000 ' A - 5,400 Each Reception Center N-11,500 G- 8,300 B - 3,800 and Total Population , H- 2,100 l C - 5,300 l of Each Zone I- 1,600 D- 600 i l L- 7,200 E - 4,900 l Note: l l M- 7,600 J - 4,600 i Number of evacuees 0- 5,000 Q - 7,900 requiring congregate P- 5,500 l care is approximately i R- 6,900 20%~of zones S- 1,700 evacuated. i l i l l I I
- I ! l I. 1 DRAFT - 2/20/87
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OPIP 4.2.3 Page 23 of 29 Attachment 4 Page 4 of 4 HICKSVILLE RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC FLOW AND ACTIVATION DIAGRAM (continued) RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC CCNTROL FOSTS (continued) Traffic Number of Control Traffic Post Location Guides Strategy HG-9 Vehicle Decentamin- 1 Direct vehicles to decon-ation Area camination area and coordinate parking. HG-10 LILCO Property 1 Assist right hand turn of Access Road vehicles coming from Old Country Road and merge two lanes into one. Merge two lanes coming from New South Road into one lane and direct through gate.
'HC-11 LILCO Property Access 1 Assist exiting traffic.
Road HG-12,13 Hicksville Office Bldg. 2 Direct buses to monitoring Northeast Employee area of gate just north of Parking Lot tcansportation building. HG-14,15 LILC0 Storage Areas 2 Direct incoming vehicles toward available monitoring stations. Maintain separation of traffic heading toward decon area. HG-16 LILCO Employee 1 Direct incoming vehicles Parking Area toward available monitoring stations. Maintain separation with exiting vehicles. HG-17,18 L.ILCO Storage Area 2 Direct vehicles without clean tags toward decon area. Direct vehicles , with clean tags toward exit. DRAFT - 2/20/87 l
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Hand Probe Model HP-210
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Model HP 210, Hand Probe GENERAL DESCRIPTION The Model HP 210 series hand probes provide The HP 210T with a high density tungsten a sensitive beta detector featuring a " Pan- shield permits relatively low level beta cake" GM tube with a thin mica window. The monitoring in a gamma background. When open window, which is protected by a sturdy low level beta monitoring is required in a low wire screen, permits useful beta sensitivities background area, the HP 210AL with an down to 40 kev. The detector is alpha aluminum housing may be used. sensitive (above 3 MeV). The HP 210 is designed for contamination surveys on personnel, table tops, floors, equipment, etc. SPECIFICATIONS HP 210T (DT 304) HP 210AL Operating Voltage: 900 250 V 900 2 50 V Plateau Length: 100 V minimum 100 V minimum Plateau Slope: 0.1 percent per V maximum 0.1 percent per V maximum Dead Time: 50 ps maximum 50 ps maximum Temperature Range: - 22 'F to + 167 'F -22 'F to + 167 'F (-30 'C to + 75 'C) (-30 *C to + 75 'C) Mica Window Thickness: 1.4 to 2.0 mg/cm8 1.4 to 2.0 mg/cm8 Mica Window Size: 1.75 inch diameter 1.75-inch-diameter (4.45 cm) 2.4 in' (4.45 cm) 2.4 in8 Series Resistor: 3.3 MD (in probe) 3.3 MD (in probe) Gamma Sensitivity: a3600 cpm /mR/h ('"Cs) a3600 cpm /mR/h ("'Cs) (Into window) Shielding Ratlo: a 4:1 ("Co) a1:1 (window: back)
- Beta Efficiency: a 45 percent "Sr "Y a45 percent "Sr."Y a30 percent "Tc a30 percent "Tc a 10 percent "C a10 percent "O Alpha Sensitivity: 3 MeV at window 3 MeV at window Connector: BNC series coaxial BNC series coaxial Size: 6.5 Inches long x 3.5 Inches 6.5 inches long x 3.5 inches wide x 3.8 inches high wide x 3.8 Inches high Weight: 4.25 pounds (1.9 kg) 1.5 pounds (0.7 kg)
- Efficiencies with screen in place. Screen removal will increase efficiency by a45 percent of stated value. Efficiencies listed as percentage of 2r emission rate from a one inch diameter source.
AVAILABLE ACCESSORIES Instruments Cables E 120 CA 136 E 140 CA136 E 140N CA 18-60 E 520 CA 136 PRM6 CA 16 60 PRS 1/ 2 CA 14-06 RM 14 CA 160 ' *
- eFline ngC'Ildfm0 RM 20 CA 16-60 RM 21 CA 16-60 sectrori MS3 CA 16-60 coaaoaatio~
Post office Box 2108 Sample Holder:SH 4A Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 (505) 471 3232 T\vx: 910 985 0618 7 83
Hand Probe Model HP-260
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Model HP-260, Hand Probe GENERAL DESCRIPTION The Model HP-260 hand probe provides a sen. The HP 260 is designed for' contamination sitive beta detector, featuring a " Pancake" surveys on personnel, table tops, floors, GM tube with a thin mica window. The open equipment, etc. window, which is protected by a sturdy wire screen, permits useful beta sensitivities down The long handle on the HP 260 makes it to 40 kev. The detector is alpha convenient for personnel and table-top sensitive above 3 MeV. surveys. SPECIFICATIONS AVAILABLE ACCESSORIES Operating Voltage: 900 e 50 V instruments Cables Plateau Length: 100 V minimum Plateau Slope: 0.1 percent per V maximum CA1 f,12
) A-Dead Time: 50 gs maximum E 520 CA 136 Temperature Range: -22 'F to + 167 'F MS3 CA 16 60
(-30 'C to + 75 'C) PRM-6 CA-16 60 Mica Window Thickness: 1.4 to 2.0 mg/cm, 1/ 2 CA hR 4 A 6j Mica Window Size: 1.75 inch diameter RM 20 CA 16 60 (4.45 cm); 2.4 in'(15.5 cm') RM 21 CA 16-60 Gamma Sensitivity: a3600 cpm /mR/h ("'Cs) (into window)
- Beta Efficiency:
a45 percent "Sr "Y a 30 percent "Tc a 10 percent "C Alpha Sensitivity: 3 MeV at window Connector: BNC series coaxial Size:10 inches long x 2.75 inches wide x 2.5 inches high (25.4 cm x 7 cm x 6.4 cm) Weight: 1.25 pounds (0.57 kg)
- Efficiencies with screen in place. Screen removal will increase efficiency by a45 percent of stated value. Efficiencies listed as percentage of 2r emission rate, from a one inch diameter source.
A OtveseON OF Thermo Eberi.me F/Esiectron CO Ap0 A ATION Post office Bos 2108 Santa Fe, New Mexico 875c1 (50M 4713232 TWx: 910L985-c678 7 83
Hand Probes Models HP-270 and HP-290 Model HP-270
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Models HP 270 and HP-290, Hand Probes GENERAL DESCRIPTION The HP-270 is an excellent general purpose The HP 290 is a higher range GM probe with GM probe, with energy compensation and a beta shield, making it the choice for most energy compensation, providing reliable ex-posure rate measurement from 0.1 mRlh to health physics applications. The energy com- 10 R/h. pensation permits reliable exposure rate measurement from background to 200 mRlh. SPECIFICATIONS HP 270 HP 290 Operating Voltage: 900 250 V 550 2 50 V Plateau Length: 100 V minimum 100 V minimum Plateau Slope: 0.1 percent per V 0.2 percent per V maximum maximum Dead Time: 100 s maximum 20 ps maximum Temperature Range: - 40 'F to + 167 'F -40 'F to + 167 'F
;-40 'C to + 75 'C) (-40 'C to + 75 'C)
Wall Thickness: 30 mgicm8 (tube only) 90 mg/cm8 (tube only) Wall Material: Stainless steel Stainless steel Gamma Sensitivity: a 1200 cpm /mR/h ("'Cs) a80 cpm /mR/h ('8'Cs) Energy Response: See curve See curve Housing: ABS plastic ABS plastic Connector: BNC series coaxial BNC series coaxial Size: 184 inches in diameter x 1 % inches in diameter x 6 inches long 3% inches long (3.5 cm x 15.2 cm) (2.9 cm x 8.9 cm) Weight: 5 ounces (142 g) 2 ounces (57 g) AVAILABLE ACCESSORIES 2.6 2.4 ^ HP 270 HP 290 2.2 Instruments Cables Instruments Cables 3 / HP 270 0 PEN E 120 CA 136 E 530N CA 1-36 e 1.6 E-140 CA-136 MS-3 I"" CA 16-60 2 1.4 \ E-520 CA 136 MS3 PRM 5 3 CA 14 36 0 ;a;i 1.2 I' d CA-16-60 PRM 6 CA 16-60 E C to I / ' s PRM 5 3 CA 14-36 PRS 1/ 2 CA 14-36 PRM 6 .8 I IL
- I I CA 16-60 RM 20 CA 16 60 @e @e PRS 112 CA 14 36 RM 21
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RM 20 CA-16-60 2 ,/ RM 21 CA 16 60 'O go ion iogo GAMMA ENERGY (kev) Energy Response of Models HP 270 and HP 290 7 83
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Radiation Monitor Model RM-14 l l l , i. ;w~
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l Ci SM; .. @idM, l,54o,( oinfos- l u VARIABLE HIGH LEVEL ALARM u SPEAKER WITH VOLUME CONTROL u TRICKLE CHARGED BATTERY u TIME CONSTANT SELECTION u RECORDER OUTPUT a SCALER OUTPUT l u TILT STAND l
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- Thermo Eberl.ine ://E sectron ca.co 1,0 ~ RM-14 !
Model RM-14, Radiation Monitor GENERAL DESCRIPTION The RM 14 Radiation Monitor is a small, ver- Circuitry in the RM 14 is all transistor and in-satile, alarming count rate meter operated by tegrated circuit mounted on a plug in board. a rechargeable gelled cell battery which is The top cover of the cabinet is easily trickle charged when the unit is plugged into removable, allowing access to all internal the line. Three ranges are provided of 500, Sk, components. and 50k counts per minute (cpm) full scale. A battery check is provided on the meter. A The RM 14 is intended for use with 900 V speaker and volume control are provided for Geiger tube detectors, such as the Eberline auralindication of the count rate. HP 177C, HP 190, HP 210, HP 230A, or HP 270. It can be easily modified for use with detec. The alarm point is adjustable over the scale tors requiring other operating voltages. When of the meter by a rear panel control. When ac- ordered with one of the Geiger detectors, an tuated, the alarm does not affect the meter optional probe holder may be installed on the reading and is indicated by a high frequency instrument, tone on the speaker. Rear panel connectors are provided for an external scaler and a 50 A recorder. SPECIFICATIONS Meter: Scale length 2.37 inches (6 cm), Temperature: The instrument is operational marked 0 to 500 cpm. from 20 'F to + 140 'F ( 29 'C to 60 'C) with Range: Switch controlled X1, X10 or X100 less than 210 percent full scale change in yleiding 500, Sk, or 50k cpm full scale. calibration and less than 2 20 percent full Response Time scale change in alarm point. Fast: Approximately 2 seconds' Size: 5% inches high x 7 inches deep x Slow: Approximately 20 seconds measured to es wWe 03.3 cm x 17.8 cm x W cmb 90 percent of the final reading. Weight: 4% pounds (2 kg). Linearity: Within 2 5 percent of fu'l scale, Finish: Baked enamel paint, brown panels, tan typically within 22 percent of full scale. cover. Battery Dependence: Calibration shifts less than 10 percent with battery between limits o on meter. AVAILABLE ACCESSORIES Alarm Point: Adjustable from 10 percent to Detectors greater than full scale. HP 190 Alarm Indication: Red light on front panel and HP 210T approximately 1 kHz tone on speaker HP 210Al independent of volume control. HP 230A Speaker: Internal 2 inch size. One click for HP 260 each event counted. HP 270 Volume: Varies speaker clicks from maximum Associated Cable: CA 136, CA 160 loudness to zero. Probe Holder for HP 210: Model ZP10534017 Scalor Out: Rear panel BNC connector. One 6 V positive pulse for each event counted. Recorder Out: Rear panel, % inch,3 wire phone plug with 0 50 A de full scale. * * *' *
- Power: 105125 V,50 60 Hz at approximately Battery: Galled cell, approximately 50 hour E e $NECORPORA f SON lifetime between charges. Charging time is Post ollice Box 2108 sania Fe, New Mexico 87501 approximately 50 hours.
(505) 471 3232 Twx: 910 985 0678 5 83
Attachm:nt Q OPIP 4.2.3 Page 1 of 29 OPIP 4.2.3 RECEPTION CENTER ACTIVATION AND OPERATION 1.0 PURPOSE To provide details on the set up and use of LILCO's Bellmore, Hicksville and Roslyn Operations Centers as reception. centers for evacuees in the event of Shoreham radiological emergency. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Health Services Coordinator is res3onsible for the implementation.of this procedure and the coordination of the efforts of the following personnel as outlined in this procedure: Section Title. 5.1 Health Services Coordinator 5.2 Decontamination Coordinator i 5. 3 ~ Reception Center Supervisor
, 5.4 Decon. Leader-Initial Monitoring 5.5 Decon. Leader-Decontamination 5.6 Decon. Leader-Bus .5 . 7 Dosimetry Record Keepers 5.8 Traffic Guides 5.9 Termination of Emergency and Deactivation of the Reception Center 3.0 PRECAUTIONS None 4.0 PREREOUISITES 4.1 Emergency response personnel are mobilized in accordance with OPIP 3.3.2.
4.2 A Site Area or General Emergency has been declared at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Health Services Coordinator 5.l.1 Upon declaration of a Site Area or General Emergency verify the following: Rev. 8
k OPIP 4.2.3 Page 2 of 29
- a. That if during normal working hours the Decontamination Coordinator has alerted the Reception Centers that LERO personnel will be arriving to set up the facility.
- b. The American Red Cross Coordinator has arrived at the EOC and is aware of the emergency status.
Obtain from the Decontamination Coordinator
~
5.1.2 frequent reports on the manning and status of operations at the Reception Center. 5.1.3 Uhen an evacuation recommendation is made to the gen 3ral public:
- a. Vhen the Director of Local Response contacts '
the Nassau County Police Department (Traffi'c Services or Civil Preparedness) provide them with the traffic control assignments detailed in Attachment 1. Inform the police that l traf fic intersection diagrams and traf fic control equipment are available at the Reception Centers from the Reception Center Supervisors.
- b. Instruct the Coordinator of Public s Information to include the following message in the EBS broadcast and Press Release:
Evacuees from the Shoreham Emergency Planning Zone will be traveling to Reception Centers in Hicksville, Bellmore and Roslyn. If you are not an evacuee it is recommended that you avoid driving in these areas to reduce
, traf fic congestion. The locations of the Reception Centers are as follows: LILCO , Hicksville Operations Center located on Old i Country Road in Hicksville; LILCO Bellmore Operations Center located on Sunrise Highway in Bellmore; and LILCO Roslyn Operations Center located on Willis Avenue next to the l I
L.I.E. in Roslyn.
- c. Ensure the Red Cross has designated
- Congregate Care Centers and that their locations have been transmitted to the reception centers. It is advisable that the
! !{icksville Operations Centar be one of the designated Congregate Care Centers, since many of the evacueos will be monitored at this fact 11cy. Rev. 3 1 .
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 3 of 29 5.1.4 Ensure proper manning is maintained at the reception centers. Additional personnel may be requested from INPO by the Director of Local Response. 5.2 Decontamination Coordinator - 5.2.1 Upon declaration of 'a'. Site Area or General Emergency contact the facility managers at Bellmore, Hicksville and Roslyn. (Their phone numbers are in the LERO phone directory.) Inform them of the Shoreham emergency and that LERO personnel will be arriving to set up the facility as a reception center. Note: The Reception Center Supervisors have keys to each of the facilities. 5.2.2 When the Reception Center Supervisors call in, obtain a manning status and find out if any problems exist with facility activation. 5.2.3 Maintain contact with the American Red Cross Coordinator in the EOC. If the Red Cross Coordinator has not arrived, contact the Red Cross in Mineola at 747-3500. Keep the Red Cross informed of the emergency status. 5.2.4 Uhen an evacuation is recommended, use 207. of the population in the evacuated zones shown in Attachment 2 to estimate the number of evacuees needing congregate care. Provide this number to the Red Cross. 5.2.5 Obtain from the Red Cross Coordinator.a list of Congregate Care Centers and in what order they will be activated if an evacuation is recommended. Based upon proximity and capacity determine to which Congregate Care Center each reception. center is to send those evacuees requiring shelter assistance. 5.2.6 Contact each of the reception centers and inform them of the evacuation recommendation, and when they should begin to arrive. (Approxima;ely 2 Hours after the evacuation recommendation). Inform each reception center to which Congregate Care Centers they should send evacuees requiring shelter assistance. Rev. S
1 l l l l OPIP 4.2.3 l Page 4 of 29 5.2.7 Contact the reception centers on a regular basis and request the status of the following information: o Manning o Facility Set Up o Are evacuees backing up onto the public roads o Number of evacuees going to congregate care
- ' centers and status of map distribution o Number of evacuees requiring decontamination and the zones from which they came -
o Any additional support required o Obtain status of LER0 bus arrivals (Hicksville reception center only). Keep the Health Services Coordinator informed of l the reception center status. 5.2.8 When contacted by a reception center Decontamination Leader with a request to assign l an evacuee with contamination to a hospital do I the following: .
- a. Contact the Hospital Coordinator and have him contact hospitals near the reception center and request the placement of contaminated evacuees. Ensure. the hospital understands that the arriving evacuee has fixed contamination and does not present a problem of spreading contamination.
- b. When the receiving hospital has been identi-fled, contact the Decontamination Leader with I the name and location of the hospital.
5.3 Reception Center Supervisors 5.3.1 Upon arrival at the reception center. contact either security or the facility manager and inform him (her) of the Shoreham emergency. 5.3.2 Drive around the f acility and see if there are any impediments to the reception center set up such as a LILCO truck or automobile parked out of place. If necessary have the impediment moved. l l Rev. 8
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 5 of 29 5.3.3 Direct all arriving LERO personnel to the decontamination trailer area or a nearby enclosed area to await initial sign in and dosimetry ' distribution. 5.3.4 Have Dosimetry Record Keepers set up for registration and distribution of dosimetry in the decontamination trailer. When ready have the LERO personnel go through the trailer to sign in and pick up identification and dosimetry. 5.3.5 Using Attachment 2, Reception Center Personnel and Zone' Assignment, assign personnelAssign to thea various reception center positions. Dosimetry Record Keeper to act as a communicator on the phone in the Decnntamination Trailer. 5.3.6 Have the Decontamination Leaders set 'up their areas of the facility as shown in Attachments 3, 4 and 5. 5.3.7 Contact the Decontamination Coordinator regularly and p'rovide him with the information detailed in - Section 5.2. 5.3.8 Provide of f site intersection diagrams and traf fic control equipment to Nassau County Police if they arrive. 5.3.9 Redistribute personnel and equipment among the reception center areas as necessary in order to meet evacueo monitoring demands. 5.3.10 During inclement weather, rotate people out of exposed areas. 5.3.11 'If evacuees need transportation to a Congregate Care Center, arrange for a bus from Hicksville to provide transportation. 5.3.12 Upon termination of the emergency, deactivate the reception center in accordance with Section 5.9. 5.4 Decontamination Leader Assigned to Initial tionitoring 5.4.1 Have personnel obtain equipment and set un the f acility as shown in Attachment 3, 4 and 5. 5.4.2 A craf fic guide will hand an information sheet to every entering vehicle. Rev. 8
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 6 of 29 5.4.3 Two people will man each monitoring station. Each team will scan incoming cars and drivers as detailed in OPIP 3.9.2 within approximately 35 seconds. 5.4.4 If the driver and vehicle do not have contamin-ation above acceptable limits then a ' Clean Tag' will be issued by the monitor taking the swipe of the vehicle. Check on the clean tag the boxes marked person' and vehicle. Also write the number of passengers next to the word ' person'. Initial the tag and put it under the windshield wiper of the car. Direct the d. river to move his car up to the Reception Center Recorder. 5.4.5 A Traffic' Guide will be assigned as a Reception Center Recorder at each monitoring station and will do the following:
- a. As each car completes monitoring write down the license plate number on Attachment 6.
Reception Center Record Form and check off if a clean tag was or was not issued.
- b. If the car was not given a clean tag then direct the veh'icle toward the decontamination area.
- c. If the care was issued a clean tag then ask the driver if (s)he needs directions to a Red Cross Congregate Car Center. If yes, hand the driver a map. Direct the car toward an' exit.
- d. If you begin to run low on maps, request more from the Dosimetry Record Keepers.
5.4.6 Ensure the traffic guides in your area understand their assignments and are handling traffic flow correctly. 5.5 Decontamination Leaders assigned to Decontamination 5.5.1 When directed by the Reception Center Supervisor initiate set up of the vehicle decon area and the decontamination trailer. The layout of the decontamination trailer is shown in Attachment
- 8. One side of the trailer will be designated for women the other side for men. Ensure a female monitor is assigned to the female side of the trailer.
Rev. 8
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 7 of 29 5.5.2 When evacuees requiring decontamination arrive direct them to the vehicle decontamination area. Have the vehicle park in a designated spot. 5.5.3 Have the passengers leave the vehicle and proceed into the decontamination trailer. 5.5.4 While the passengers are in the trailer, monitor and decontaminate the vehicle in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2. If the vehicle cannot be decon-taminated place a contaminated vehicle tag under , the windshield wiper. When the driver returns have a LERO worker in a paper suit drive the vehicle to a contaminated vehicle parking area. Note: Since the vehicle has only fixed contam-ination, there should be no problem with contaminati~on of the driver. Use regular LILCO parking spaces for contaminated vehicle parking. If additional space is necessary park vehicles on the lawns. 5.5.5 Evacuees entering decontamination tra'ilers will be monitored and decontaminated in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2. Issue clean tags to all evacuees with contamination below acceptable limits. 5.5.6 If evacuees cannot be decontaminated below acceptable limits contact the Decontamination Coordinator in the EOC. Request that a hospital be identified to accept a contaminated evacuee. Wh'en a hospital has been identified have the contaminated evacuee (s) drive themselves (if their vehicle is clean) to the hospital. Ensure that the evacues has a copy of the Evacuee Exposure Record Form to take to the hospital. Tell the evacuee to enter the hospital via the emergency room entrance. 5.5.7 Ask the driver of cars issued clean tags if they neod a map to a Red Cross Congregate Care Center. If so, issue a map. Rev. 8 O
1 OPIP 4.2.3 Page 8 of 29 ! 5.5.8 Have evacuees who do not have tr'ansportation to use the LILCO district operations of fice as a temporary shelter until transportation to'a Congregate Care Center can be arranged. Ensure i, the Reception Center Supervisor is aware of evacuees awaiting transportation. 5.6 Decontamination Leader assigned to monitoring evacuees arriving by bus at Hicksville. 5.6.1 Arriving buses will drop off evacuees at the flag pole in front of the Hicksville Operations Center i on Old Country Road. . 5.6.2 As Evacuees leave the bus. direct them into theat Personnel - ' Hicksville office building lobby. this location will perform radiation monitoring checks and issue clean tags in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2.
- 1
' 5.6.3 If decontamination is necessary escort. evacuee (s) to the decontamination trailers.
! 5.6.4 A dosimetry record keeper will have all bus . evacuees sign out on the Clean Evacuee Log Out Form, OPIP 3.9.2, Attachment 4. [
5.6.5 If Hicksville Operations Center has been designated as a Congregate Care Center then direct evacuees with clean tags to the check in area. , 5.6.6 If Hicksville has not been designated as a Congregate Care Center divide the Hicksville l l Operations Center entrance into an entrance for ! . un-monitored evacuees and a clean exit for } evacuees with clean tags. Direct clean evacuees , onto a bus that has been monitored. Give the bus j driver directions to an activated Congregate Care i Center. I 5.7 Dosimetry Record Keepers , i 5.7.1 When directed by the Reception Center Supervisor log in LERO personnel and distribute LERO i identification badges. The LERO reception center j roster is kept in the Decontamination Trailer. 4 Soc up a table in the Decontamination Trailer and route the LERO workers through. 1 ! a. Request LILCO identification. 1 Rev. 8
( l OPIP 4.2.3 Page 9 of 29 l -
- b. Have LERO personnel sign and record the time of entry into the facility next to their name which is located under their LERO job title on the LERO Reception Center Roster. If their name does not appear under their job title, have them fill in the required i information in the space provided under their :
LERO job title on the Reception Center Roster. ;
- c. Issue green'LERO badges to all the LERO Reception Center personnel. Instruct them that the badge is to be worn at all times in a visible place.
5.7.2 Issue dosimetry and Emergency Worker Dose Record Forms to all Reception Center Supervisors, Decontamination Leaders, Monitoring /Decontamina- . tion and Traffic Guide personnel in accordance with Attachment 7, OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure Control. 5.7.3 A Dosimetry Record Keeper will act as a communicator with the EOC and man the telephone in the Decontamination Trailer. , 5.7.4 The Dosimetry Record Keepers (DRK) will handle dispatch to Congregate Care Centers as follows:
- a. The DRK communicator will receive, via phone, from the Decontamination Coordinator, a list of Congregate Care Centers activated by the .
Red Cross.
- b. The DRK's will obtain maps, stored in the trailer, for the identified Congregate Care '
Center and distribute them to the Reception Center Recorders at each monitoring station and the Decontamination Leader at the decon trailer. L ! Note: The number of maps provided is ; l proportional to the capacity of the Congregate Care Center. When all the
- maps to a facility have been
! distributed by the Recorders, the l Congregate Care Center is full. , Rev. 8
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 10 of 29
- c. Regularly check with Recorders to ensure they are not running low on maps. Contact the Decontamination Coordinator if it is necessary to activate additional ~ Congregate i
Care, Centers.
- d. If directing a bus full of evacuees to a Congregate Care Center give a map to the driver. Remove and discard 15 maps from your package to account for the extra people.
- e. If Hicksville is to be used as a Congregate Care Center have evacuees park on the front lawn and rear ball fields if additional space is needed.
5.7.5 When the emergency is terminated, collect all of the Clean Evacuee Log Out Forms and Reception Center Record Forms for transfer to the EOC Dosimetry Record Keeper. 5.7.6 At the completion of the emergency, bring the copies of all the completed Emergency Worker Forms and TLDs to the EOC Dosimetry Record Keeper.
- 5.8 Traffic Guides 5.8.1 Traffic Guides will be assigned to the posts designated in Attachment 3, 4 and 5 to facilitate the flow of traffic through the reception center.
5.8.2 Follow the instructio'ns in your Reception Center Traffic Guide Procedure Attachment 7. 5.8.3 Traffic Guides at the Reception Center entrances will hand out information sheets. 5.8.4 Traffic Guides assigned as Reception Center Recorders will implement Step 5.4.5. 5.9 Termination of Emergency and Deactivation of the Reception Center 5.9.1 If the emergency is terminated without an evacuation recommendation, inventory and repack all the emergency equipment. Notify the Decontamination Coordinator at the EOC and LILCO
. facility management that you are leaving.
Rev. 8 O S
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 11 of 29 5.9.2 If an evacuation has been recommended, contact the Decontamination Coordinator, inform him that the evacuees are no longer arriving at the Reception Center and that you are ceasing monitoring and decontamination operations. 5.9.3 Have all equipment brought to the Monitoring Area. All equipment should be monitored and inventoried prior to repacking. If equipment cannot be decontaminated, le should be packed separately. Arrange for transportation to Shoreham. 5.9.4 Monitor carefully all areas that may have become contaminated. If any radioactive material is found, it should be cleaned up immediately. Do not release any area having radiation above acceptable levels (cee OPIP 3.9.2). Areas that cannot be decontaminated should be roped off. Notify the Decontamination Coordinator
~
Have a Security at the EOC and LILCO facility management. guard limit access until the area is decontaminated. 5.9.5 Have all LERO Emergency Workers at the Reception Center go through monitoring and possible decontamination in accordance with OPIP 3.9.2, Radiological Monitoring / Decontamination of Emergency Workers and Evacuees. 5.9.6 The Dosimetry Record Keepers will collect all ' dosimetry and LERO identification badges, complete the Emergency Worker Dose Record Form and ensure the emergency worker is issued a Clean Tag in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure Control. 5.9.7 It is not necessary for LERO Emergency Workers at the Receptioh Center to report to the Emergency t Worker Decontamination Facility in Brentwood. Dismiss the LERO Emergency Workers at the
- Reception Center only afters
- a. They have been monitored and if necessary decontaminated,
- b. All dosimetry and their LERO identification badges have been returned.
Rev. 8 9
OPIP 4.2.3 Psge 12 of 29
- c. The Emergency Worker Dose Record Form completed.
- d. Dosimetry Record Keepers have been designated to return dosimetry and Emergency Worker Dose Record Forms to the EWDF in Brentwood.
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure Control 6.2 OPIP 3.9.2, Radiological Monitoring / Decontamination of Emergency Workers and Evacuees
-6. 3 OPIP 4.2.2, Handling and Transportation of Contaminated and/or Injured Individuals to Medical Facilities 7.0 ATTACHMENTS -
- 1. Reception Centers Offsite Traffic Control Assignments.
- 2. Reception Center Personnel and Zone Assignments
- 3. Bellmore Reception Center - Traffic Flow and Activation
, Diagram
- 4. Hicksville Reception Center - Traffic Flow and Activation Diagram
- 5. Roslyn Reception Center - Traffic Flow and Activation Diagram
- 6. Reception Center Record Form
- 7. Reception Center Traffic Guide Procedure
- 8. Decontamination Trailer Layout Rev. ! i l
l
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 13 of 29 Attachment 1 Page 1 of 2 o RECEPTION CENTER OFFSITE TRAFFIC CONTROL ASSIGNMENTS Access Recommended Control Number of Traffic Post Location Personnel Strategy BELLMORE RECEPTION CENTER: B-1 Sunrise Highway 2 Facilitate left turns from (Route 27) and westbound Route 27 onto Newbridge Road southbound Newbridge Road. Facilitate right hand turn and through movements of traffic exiting the facility onto eastbound Route 27. .HICKSVILLE RECEPTION CENTER: . H-1 Old Country Road and 2 Prevent all traffic from Jerusalem Avenue traveling east on Old Country Road at Jerusalem Avenue. 3-2 Broadway (Route 107) 2 Facilitate the movement of and Old Country Road traffic from northbound and southbound Route 107 onto eastbound Old Country Road. ! H-3 Broadway (Route 107) 1 Facilitate through and New South Road movements on northbound Route 107 and southbound ; New South Road. L H-4 South Oyster Bay Road 1 Facilitate right turns l and Old Country Road from southbound South i Oyster Bay Road onto westbound Old Country !l Road and through traffic t' on westbound Old Country i Road. I Rev. 3 l 1
OPIP 4.2.3 Pago 14 of 2i Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 RECEPTION CENTER OFFSITE TRAFFIC CONTROL ASSIGNMENTS (Continued) Access Number of Control Traffic Traffic Post Location Guides Strategy I ROSLYN_ R ECEPTION CENTER: R-1 Long Island Expressway 2 Facilitate left turns from North Service Road westbound service road
, (westbound) and southbound onto Willis Willis Avenue Avenue. Provent other traffic from traveling i onto southbound Willis Avenue.
R-2 Long Island Expressway 1 Provent traffic from North Service Road entering the westbound (westbound) and Long Island Expressway Roslyn Road Service Road. R-3 Long Island Expressway 2 Facilitate left turns from South Service Road southbound Willis Avenuo (Eastbound) and onto castbound Long Islani Willis Avenue Expressway South Service Road. Direct all eastbound traffic on the Long Island Expressway South Servico Road onto southbound Willis Avenue. R-4 Northern State Parkway 2 Direct southbound traffic and Willis Avenue on Willis Avenue onto the westbound Northern Stato
. Parkway entrance ramp.
Direct northbound traffic on Willis Avenue onto the eastbound Northern State Parkway entrance camp. Facilitate left turns from the Northern State Parkway westbound oxlt ramp onto northbound Willts Avenuo. Rev. i
l OPIP 4.2.3 l Page 15 of 29 i . Attachment 2 Page 1 of 1 I RECEPTION CENTER PERSONNEL AND ZONE ASSIGNMENTS l l ! i FACILITY t
! I i ! i !
Positions i Bellmore i Hicksville i Roslyn 1 :
! l '
IReception Ctr. Spyr. i 1 1 i l I I i Area A ' Area 51 !' I Decon Lde. Inic. Mon. H 1 ' 1 1 1 Init. Mon. Pers. ' 28 20 28 20 Rec. Ctr. Rcdrs. ' 14 10 14 10- '- l [ ' I , (Decon. Ldr. Decon. I 1 1 l Vehicle Mon /Decon 3 6 2 j Evac Mon /Decon 10 20 8 ! I i l i i i lDecon Ldr. - Bur 1 -- l 1 4 -- I o l Inic. Mon. Pers. I -- l 12 ' 1 I Traffic Guide 1 2 2 Dos. Reed. Keepers 2 1 4 2 i i l Traffic Guide Onsite 10 ' 18 i 7 ; i I l l l ! i TOTAL l 70 l 139 52 i ! I i ' i ! t ' I I t ' I i Zones Assigned to ' K-40,600 i F - 29,000 ' A - 5,400 l l l Each Recepelon Centeel N-LL,500. IG- 8,300 8 - 3,800 I 1 and Total Population 'H- 2,100 i C - 5,300 1 l I of Each Zone !- 1,600 "D- 600 i l l l L- 7,200 E - 4,900 I Note: ' H- 7 600 J-4 Number of evacuees 0- 5,,000 ' Q - 7,600 ,900 i requiring congregate ' P- 5,500 i h care is approximately 3- 6,900 n 20% of zones S- 1,700 I evacuated. ' l l I
^
Rev. 3 i l t
OFIP 4.2.3 Pag e 16 o f 24 Attachment 3 Fage 1 of 4 BELDICRE RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC FLOW
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OPIP 4.2.3 Page 18 of 29 Attachment 3 Page 3 of 4 BELLMORE RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC FLOW AND ACTIVATION DIAGRAM (continued) RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS t I Traffic Number af f Control Traffic Guides Strategy *
. Post Location ,
Bellmore - Onsite 50-1 Access Gate from i Direct incoming traffic Sunrise Highway to straight. Assisc left LILCO Vehicle Parking hand turn movement of Area exiting traffic. Hand out information' sheets to : t incoming vehicles. , BG-2 LILCO Vehicle Parking i Direct incoming vehicles , Area to available monitoring stations. : BG-3 LILCO Vehicle Parking i Direct vehicles without Area clean tags to decontamin- - ation area direct ' vehiclas with clean tags ' toward exits. BC-4 Employee Parking Lot 1 Direct vehicles without t clean tags toward - decontamination ares. I
, Direct vehicles with clean tags toward exit. ,
50-5 Access gate between 1 Direct contaminated employee parking area vehicle to decontamination and LILCO Vehicle area. Ottect vehicle Parking Area with clean tags toward exit. 80-6 LILCO Vehicle Parking i Direct vehicles to decon-Area camination area and coor-dinate parking. Rev. 8 f
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 19 of 29
' Attachment 3 Page 4 of 4 i BELLMORE RECEPTION CENTER
! TRAFFIC FLOW IND ACTIVATION DIAGRAM (continued) RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS (continued) Bellmore - Onsite l Traffic Number of f Control Traffic Post Location Guides Strategy BG-7 Employee Parking Lot 1 Direct incoming into monicoting.lane. traffic Handout information sheet to incoming vehicles. BG-8 Employee Parking 1 Direct vehicles to Lot available monitoring stations. 80-9 Employee Parking 1 Direct vehicles without Lot clean tags toward decontamination area. Direct vehicles with clean tags toward extc. BC-10 LILCO vehicle 1 Direct vehicle to Parking Lot available monitoring stations. t t Rev. 8
OFIP 4.2.3 Page 20 of 29 Attachment 4 Page 1 of 4 HICKSVILLE RECEPTIO!! CE!!!ES TRAFFIC FLO'd I i ggs>*O C en
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- Attachment 4 g Page 2 of 4
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OPIP 4.2.3 Page'22 of 29 Attachment.4 Page 3 of 4-HICKSVILLE RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC FLOW AND ACTIVATION DIAGRAM. (continued) - RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS (continued) Traffic humber of Control Traffic Post Location
- Guides Strategy hicksville - Onsite hG-1 LILCO Employee Parking 1 Direct incoming vehicles.
Lot . handout information sheer to incoming vehicles. HG-1 LILCO Employee Parking 1 Cirect incoming vehicles Lot into available monitoring stations. hG-3 LILCO Employee Parking 1 Assist with merging Lot traf fic leaving moni-toring stations. Cirect vehicles without clean tags toward decontamination area. Direct vehicles with clean tags toward exit. hG-4 LILCO Property Access 1 - Assist exiting traffic. Road HG-5,6 LILCO Vehicle Parking 2 Direct vehicles with clean Area ' tag toward exit. Lirect vehicle without clean tags toward Cecontamina-tion Area. HC-7,8 LILCO Property Access 2 Direct incoming vehicles Road into available access lanes. Hand out information sheets. Rev. 3
OPIP 4.2.3 - Page 23 of 29 Attachment 4 Page 4 of 4 HICKSVILLE RECEPTION CENTER
. TRAFFIC FLOW AND ACTIVATION DIAGRAM (continued)
RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS (continued) Traffic Number of Control Traffic Post Location Guides Strategy HG-9 Vehicle Decontamin- 1 Direct vehicles to decon-ation Area camination area and coordinate parking. HG-10 LILCO Property 1 Assist right hand turn of Access Road vehicles coming from Old Country Road and merge two lanes into one. Iterge I' ~two' lanes coming'from Newi South Road into one lane : i and direct through gate. . HG-il LILCO Property Access 1 Assist exiting traffic. Road i HG-12,13 Hicksville Office Bldg. 2 Direct buses toward drop Visitor Parking Lot off area. Direct evac-uses into the monitoring
> area within the Hicks-ville Office Building. l HG-14,15 LILCO Storage Areas 2 Direct incoming vehicles . coward available monitoring stations.
Maintain separation of traffic heading toward ' decon area. . HG-16 LILCO Employee 1 Direct incoming vehicles Parking Area coward available monitoring stations. Maintain separation with exiti~ng vehicles. ) HG-17,18 LILCO Storage Area 2 Direct vehicles without
, clean tags toward decon area. Direct vehicles g
with clean tags toward exit. Rev. 8
0FIP 4. 2. 3 Page 24 of 29 Attachment 5 Page 1 of 3 ROSLYN RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC FLOW N
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OFIP 4. 2. 3 Page 26 of 29 Attachment 5 Page 3 of 3 ROSLYN RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC FLOW AND ACTIVATION DIAGRAM (continued) , RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS Traffic Number of Control Traffic Guides Post Location Strategy Roslyn - Cnsite RG-1,2 LILCO Employee Parking 2 Direct incoming ' vehicles. Lot Handout information sheets. RG-3,4 LILCO Vehicle Parking 2 Direct incoming vehicles Lot into available monitoring station lanes. RG-5 LILCO Vehicle Parking l' Assist outflowing vehicles Lot Direct vehicles without clean tags toward decon-i tamination area. RG-6 L1LCO Vehicle Parking 1 Lirect vehicles to decon-Lot tamination area and coordinate parking. RG-7 LILCO Property Access 1 Assist exiting vehicles. Road i Rev. 8 6
, n g. -. -
OFIP 4. 2. 3 Page 27 of 29 Attachment 6
~
4 Page 1 of 1 RECEPTION CENTER RECORD FORM hame of Recorder , Location No. Reception Center Late Time Start Time End i l i i il 1 l- I i License l l l Clean ll License l l l Clean Elate I ho. of l Tag ll Plate 1 l ho. of l Tag i i i l Number IStatei Pass. ! Yes/No il Number IStatei Pass. I Yes/No l 1I i l l I l . I i i il i I I I i l I i i 11 I I I i l 1 I I I 11 I I ! I 1 I 11' I 'l
! I If 1 1 ( l i i i in 1 ! I I I I I I I i i i 1 1 1 I I i
I il I I I I I I I 11 1 I I I I I I il i I I l-1 I i i 11 I i ! I I I i 11 I I i i I 11 1 1 1 I 1 i ! i i I I I ! i I I il ' I I i 1 11 I i 1 1 I I I i i i I l l I I I I i 1 I I I i i I ll I l l l l 1 I ' 11 i i I I I I I I 11 i I i i 1 I I I I l l l 1 i i 1 ! I i i 1 11 I I I l ' i 11 I I I l I I I I 11 1 I I I 1 I I i l i l 11 i I I i i I i i 11 1 I I i I il i I i i l I I Rev. 8
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 28 of 29 Attachment 7 Page 1 of 1 RECEPTION CENTER TRAFFIC GUIDE PROCEDURE
- 1. Inventory emergency equipment before going to the traffic control point. Equipment includes:
- a. Packet containing:
- Intersection or Facility Diagram - Su= mary of Traffic Directing Techniques - Traffic Guide Procedure, Attachment 7
- b. Reflective safety vest
- c. Flashlight, flares
- d. Traffic cones / flashing lights /other traffic control equipment if required
- e. Standard rain gear
- f. Whistle
- 2. Ensure that you have:
- a. Received dosimetry equipmen't from the Dosimetry Record-Keeper, consisting of I direct-reading dosimeter (0-200 mR), 1 direct-reading dosimeter (0-5 Don R) and this1equipment thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD).
immediately, Retain a
- b. Completed the Emergency Worker Dose Record Form. ~
c. copy of the completed form. Attended the Traffic Guide evacuation b your traffic post and directions on your assignment.
- 3. Upon notification from the Reception Center Supervisor, proceed to your traffic post.
put on the
- 4. Upon arrival at the traffic control point,Make sure dosimeters are placed on reflective safety vest..
clothing.
- 5. Arrange traffic cones and flashing lights according to the diagram in order to achieve the desired control strategy.
- 6. If Nassau County Police or any other of ficials arrive, direct them to the Reception Center Supervisor.
Tev. 8
OPIP 4.2.3 Page 29 of 29 Attach =ent 8 1 Page 1 of 1 DECONTAMINATION TRAILER LAYOUT e 9 he a e "E c *
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cLarww- g Q g v v " y w - EXIT EXIT FOR CLEAN ENTRANCE EXIT OR EASILY DE- . CONTAMINATED PEOPLE Rev. 8
l Attachment R OPIP 3.9.2 Page 1 of 49 OPIP 3.9.2 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION OF EMERGENCY WORKERS AND EVACUEES i 1.0 PURPOSE I To provide instructions for monitoring and decontamination of ;
' personnel, vehicles and personal belongings / equipment at .
offsite decontamination facilities. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 Decontamination Coordinator directs the efforts of the Decontamination Facilities. 2.2 Decontamination Leaders provide directio'n and coordination of the radiological Monitoring and Decontamination personnel at the facilities. 2.3 Monitoring / Decontamination personnel are responsible for implementing this procedure. , 3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Ad'ditional monitoring personnel may be requested from
- INPO via the Response Manager at the EOF. Additional -
equipment is available in the EOC if required. 3.2 If a radioactive release has occurred, the Radiation Health Coordinator will have the Decontamination Coordinator dispatch monitoring personnel to special --- l facility reception destinations identified by the Special Facilities-Evacuation Coordinator. , 3.3 First aid or other medical treatment initially required
! shall take precedence over the decontamination effort.
If wound is severe, requiring hospital treatment, refer to OPIP 4.2.2. i 3.4 All text references to the RM-14 shall be interpreted to
; mean RM-14 or equivalent count rate meter.
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Rev. 8 I
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OPIP 3.9.2 Page 2 of 49 3.5 Monitoring instrumentation, probe types, shielding configurations and contamination limits for personnel, vehicles ,and equivalent shall be utilized in accordance with Attachment 8. 4.0 PREREQUISITES 4.1 An evacuation has been initiated and the reception centers have been activated in accordance with OPIP 4.2.3, or 4.2 Emergency response personnel have been deployed into the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone. 4.3 Reception Center and EWDF personnel will receive personal dosimetry equipment to monitor their radiation exposure. 4 4.4 The Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility has been, activated in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1. 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 . Decontamination Coordinator . 5.1.1 Upon arrival at the EOC, and periodically thereafter, contact the Decontamination Leaders at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility and when activated, the Reception Center Supervisor. Provide the following information: l 1
- a. Emergency status
- b. Protective Action Recommendations
- c. Radioactive release data 5.1.2 Obtain the following information from each i facility: I
- a. Level of staf fing at their f acility
- b. Equipment availability
. c. Arrival rate of people to be monitored
- d. Number of contaminated people and the zones 1
from which they were evacuated. 5.1. 3 Provide periodic status reports to the Health Ser~ vices Coordinator. 5.1.4 Ensure all completed monitoring, contamination and exposure record forms are returned to the EOC and filed. 5.1.5 When an evacuation is recommended to the public, dispatch monitoring personnel to special popula-tion relocation centers: Rev. 8 r-.-- -- - - , - - - -
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 3 of 49
- a. Obtain a list of the special population re-location centers from the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator. ,
! b. Contact the EWDF Decontamination Leader and i arrange for monitoring personnel to be sent to.the relocation centers in accordance with- 'l OPIP 4.3.1.
- c. Keep the Radiation Health Coordinator i
informed of the status of this operation. ! 5.1.6 If informed by a Decontadination L'eader of the need to transport someone to a hospital, contact the Hospital ~ Coordinator and Ambulance Coordinator i
- to arrange for a facility and-transportation.
5.1.7 The following emergency workers should report to the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility in Brentwood upon completion of-their-duties: i . i
- a. Transfer Point Coordinators
- b. Bus Drivers
]
- c. Traffic Guides
- d. Route Alert Drivers
- e. Route Spotters l
' f. Road Crews
- g. Ambulance /Ambulette personnel
- h. Helicopter Pilots
- i. All other emergency personnel who enter the 10 Mile EPZ
! ~ 5.2 Reception Center Supervisor or Decontamination L'eader .i 5.2.1 Have the Decontamination Facility set up in accordance with the ap'propriate procedure, OPIP 4.3.1, Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility ' activation.or OPIP 4.2.3, Evacuee Reception Center Activation. ! 5.2.2 Contact the Decontamination Coordinator and j obtain emergency status, protective action
- recommendations-and radioactive release data, i-
{ 5.2.3 Maintain and inform the Decontamination Coordinator of the status of: .
- a. Available staff i b. Equipment availability
- c. Arrival rate of people to be monitored Rev. 8 i
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OPIP 3.9.2 Page 4 of 49
- d. Number of people contaminated and the zones from which they w.3re evacuated 5.2.4 Ensure that all Reception Center and Decontamina- l tion Facility personnel receive and uear dosi-meters in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry Exposure Control.
5.2.5 Ensure,that all Decontamination personnel working inside controlled areas wear protective clothing in accordance with Attachment 7. . 5.2.6 Ensure that the decontamination process is performed in accordance with Attachment 3, Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagrams. 5.2.7 Assign monitoring / decontamination personnel to the following tasks as indicated: Approximate Number of Personnel Reception EWDF Center
- a. Monitoring Emergency 34*** See Att 2 Workers / Evacuees - Section- OPIP 4.2.3 5.4
- b. Decontaminating Emergency 4*
Workers / Evacuees - Section 5.5
- c. Monitoring vehicles - 5 Section 5.6
- d. Decontaminating vehicles - 2 Section 5.7
- e. Monitoring equipment /per- 0**
sonal articles - Section 5.8
- f. Decontaminating equipment / 0**
personal articles - Section 5.9
- Ensure that sufficient female Monitoring /
. Decontamination personnel are available for the Decontamination Area. ** Accomplish upon termination of emergency event or as required. *** Twenty-five of the monitors are available for dispatch to the special population relocation centers.
Rev. 8 J
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OPIP 3.9.2 Page 5 of 49 As circumstances warrant, reassign to balance staffing levels with needs. 5.2.8 At the evacuee Reception Center, it is important to monitor all arriving evacuees as soon as possible. 5.2.9 If necessary to transport a contaminated individual to a hospital, con. tact the Decontamination Coordinator at the EOC and , request that he make the necessary arrangements in accordance with OPIP 4.2.2. l 5.2.10 After being found clean'of contamination, l emergency workers will either b'e directed to remain at the facility to await possible reassignment or be released from. duty. 5.2.11 Upon completion of decontamination efforts, dry contaminated material will be gathered and-transported to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station to be disposed of as part of the site's Dry. Active Waste Program. Contaminated liquid wastes will be diluted and dispersed if containment is not possible. Ensure that liquid wastes do not enter surface water source. Lic uid radioactive wastes which have been contained will be l transported to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 1 for disposal. J 5.3 Dosimetry Record Keepers
; 5.3.1 Ensure that all conitoring and decontamination l personnel have been issued dosimetry in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and
) Exposure Control. I 4 Rev. 8
... . - - - - , _ _ .- - _ ____. .. .i _ .- , . . _ -. . _ . - _ . . - _ - - - . . ___
! OPIP 3.9.2 Page 6 of 49 5.3.2 Collect all paper work at the completion of the l emergency for transport to the Dosimetry Coordinator at the EOC.
5.4 Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to Monitor i Incoming Bus Evacuees / Emergency Workers l 5.4.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.2.3 or OPIP
- 4.3.1.
l
; 5.4.2 Obtain your dosimetry and fill out record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1.
i 5.4.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in accordance with Attachment 1. - 5.4'.4 Determine backgrou.nd radiation levels in acc.ordance with Attachment 2.
.i 5.4.5 Wear protective clothing in controlled area at-
- all times in accordance with Attachment 7.
5.4.6 When monitoring for external contamination using . i the RM-14 with the HP-270 probe, ensure :-
- a. range select'or .is on X1 position
- b. response time is fast
.i
- c. volume switch is at maximum position l d. alarm is set at 150 cpm above backgecund.
i" 5.4.7 Monitor each arriving emergency worker / evacuee as follows: i i
; Rev. 8 8
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.9
k OPIP 3.9.2 I Page 7 of 49
! a. Have the individual stand with arms and legs ap art .
- b. Hold the HP-270 probe about a 1/2 inch away from body.
- c. Scan slowly over entire body. This should take abouc 90 seconds, i
' d. Pay particular accencion to: o boccom of shoes l o pant s cuf f s o knees and elbows o hair jl o nose and mouch While scanning individual, if the meter l e. l reading is fluctuacing widely and is difficult to read, switch response cime co l slow and monitor the particular area for 30 seconds.
- f. If reading exceeds 150 cpm above background, l the individual is considered contaminaced.
5.4.8 If individual is not externally contaminated, l proceed to section 5.4.10. l 5.4.9 If individual is contaminated, direct che l contaminated individual to che Decontamina: ion Area and inform che. Decontamination Leader or his designee that a contaminated person has arrived and the zone from which he/she evacuated. If warranted after further monitoring, issue plastic i shoe covers and/or paper coveralls to the contaminated individual. t l l, i 1 i Rev. 6 I 1 -
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 8 of 49 l 5.4.10 If an individual is free of external contamination, perform a thyroid scan using the I following cable: RM-14 RESPONSE MONITORING CONTAMINATION PROBE SETTING TIME LIMIT INDIVIDUAL HP-270 Fast 5 Sec. 150 cpm above Adule backg round shield closed Child, HP-210 Slow 30 Sec. Any reading above -- plastic shield background
.(under 12) in place
- a. Place probe horizontally on neck between adam's apple and top of collar bone.
- b. If adult reading is difficult to determine, switch response time to ' slow' and monitor for 30 seconds. ,
- c. If it will expedite' monitoring operations, designate several monitoring personnel to ---
monitor only children.
- d. If individual's thyroid radiation level is below the cont amination limit , proceed to Section 5.4.14. l 5.4.11 Inform the Decontamination Leader if excessive l thyroid contamination is detected. Tne Decon-tamination Leader will contact che Decontamina-tion Coordinator ac che EOC and request transportation for the individual to a medical facility capable of handling a contaminated Person. If the individual had been found to be free of external contamination initially , direcc the contaminated individual to the Decontamination Area at t his c ima.
5.4.12 Ac the Decontamination Area; remonitor che ' individual's chyroid and complete che necessary information on an Emergency Worker / Evacuee Exposure Report Form (see Accachmenc 5) . for If an exposure record was previsouly filled out the individual being monitored, record the t hyroid scan results on that record. Rev. 6 1 _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . , _ . _ , _ __ - _ . - . - . , _ . . . , , . _ . , _ . ~ , ,
OPIP 3.9.2 Page~9 of 49 5.4.13 Send a copy of the Exposure Report Form with the individual to the medical facility. 5.4.14 If monitoring showed the individual to be free of both external and internal contamination, issue the individual a tag signifying that he is clean (see Attachment 6). Direct the individual to the
; Dosimetry Record Keepers.co record his name, address, and telephone number on a Clean Emergency Worker Monitoring Record Form / Clean Evacuee Log Out Form, see Attachment 4 5.4.15 The EWDF monitoring personnel'will have' LER0/LILCO family members bring their vehicle to the Vehicle Decontamination Area for monitoring prior to going through personnel monitoring.
5.4.16 Emergency Workers will either. remain at the Decontamination' Facility waiting for reassignment or they will be released from duty. 5.5 Initial Monitoring Personnel Assigned to Evacuee neception centers 5.5.1 I Assist in set up of the Reception Center as
~
detailed in OPIP 4.2.3. 5.5.2 Obtain yo'ur dosimetry and fill our record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.5.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in accordance with Attachment 1. 5.5.4 Determine background radiation levels in accordance with Attachment 2. 5.5.5 When monitoring for e'xternal contamination using the RM-14 with the HP-210 probe, ensure: a ., range selector is on X1 position'
- b. response time is fast
- c. volume switch is at maximum position
- d. alarm is set at 360 cpm above background.
5.5.6 Each two man monitoring team will set up at the stations detailed in OPIP 4.2.3. Rev. 8 i . t
OPIP 3.9.2
. Page 9a of 49 5.5.7 Each team will scan incoming cars and drivers as follows:
- a. One monitor will take a smear wipe of the top of the hood, and wheel well of the car, and monitor the cloth with the HP-210 probe.
(The cloth may be reused until contaminated.)
- b. The second monitor with an HP-210 probe will scan the hands o.f driver and area below the driver's feet.
- c. If no contamination is found, issue a clean-tag.
- d. Direct the driver toward the Reception Center Recorder.
5.6- Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to , Decontaminate Evacuees / Emergency Workers 5.6.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facil- l ity in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1 or OPIP 4.2.3. 4 5.6.2 Obtai~n your dosimetry and fill out record forms l in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.6.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in l accordance with Attachment 1. 5.6.4 Determine background radiation levels in l accordance with Attachment 2. 5.6.5 Wear protective clothing, including booties, I overalls and rubber gloves, when working in controlled areas in accordance with Attachment 7. Rev. 8 i I
1 l 1 OPIP 3.9.2 Page 10 of 49 5.6.6 For each person with surface contamination, I remonitor thoroughly and indicate location on an Emergency Worker Evacuee Exposure Record Form, Attachment 5. Complete Parts I, II and III of that form. Attempt to keep the form free of contamination. 5.6.7 Instruct the individual to remove any contamina- I ted clothing. Place the clothing in a' bag. Prop-erly label the bag and place in a controlled area. 5.6.8 Issue a receipt for all confiscated clothing, l Attachment 6 5.6.9 Monitor the skin underneath the contaminated l clothing. 5.6.10. If the skin area is contaminated, instruct the individual to wash the contaminated area. If the contamination is localized, use a sink instead of a shower. Using the following methods listed below, use the first method once and remonitor. If contamination remains above acceptable level, then proceed to the next method, etc.
- a. Wash using a mild soap and soft scrub brush.
Rinse thoroughly with lukewarm water.
- b. Wash using a waterless hand cleaner. Rinse thoroughly using lukewarm water.
- c. Wash using a paste made of a detergent.
Rinse thoroughly using lukewarm water.
- d. Wash using lava soap. Rinse thoroughly using lukewarm water.
5.6.11 If contamination is detected in the area of the nose or mouth, indicate location on the Emergency Worker / Evacuee Exposure Record Form, Attachment 5 and perform a swipe test of both. Using a separate cotton applicator or strip of filter paper, swab the' mouth and each nostril. Place each swab in an envelope labeled with the person's name, the date, the area swabbed, the Decontamination Facility's name, and the name of the person performing the swipe test'. Transmit the samples to the Radiation Health Coordinator at the EOC for evaluation.- 5.6.12 Record the results of each decontamination attempt on the individual's Contamination Report Form, Attachment 5. Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 11 of 49 5.6.13 If the individual is successfully decontaminated, issue clean coveralls if necessary and perform a thyroid monitoring scan. 5.6.14 IF THE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL CONTAMINATED after I four attempts at decontamination, contact the Decontamination Leader. Issue clean overalls to the contaminated individual. The Decontamination Leader will contact the Decontamination Coordinator at the Emergency Operations Center and request assignment of the individual to a l medical facility capable of handling contaminated personnel. 5.6.15 If the individual is found to have a minor l contaminated wound, treat as follows:
- a. Locate general area of contamination in or around wo'und.
. b. Remove all clothing around wound.
- c. Remonitor wound area.
- d. When it is determined that a person has .
radioactive material in a fresh wound, clean the uound in a manner similar to cl'eaning an ordinary dirt-laden wound or removing a foreign body.
- e. Remonitor wound area after washing. If wound is clean,.less than 150 cpm above background, apply light dressing.
- f. If the wound still shows signs of contamination,' record the-locations on an Exposure Report Form, Attachment 5, and inform the Decontamination Leader. He/she will contact the Decontamination Coordinator and request transportation for the individual to a medical facility capable of treating a !
contaminated injury. 5.7. Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to Monitor Incoming Vehicles at the EWDF 5.7.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1. __ Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 12 of 49 I 5.7.2 Obtain dosimetry and fill out record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.7.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in , accordance with Attachment 1. Vehicle monitors l - will use an HP-210 probe for the initial scan. l An HP-270 probe will be used for the inside of vehicles and for the exterior when positive indication of contamination on swipes. 5.7.4 Determine background radiation levels in [ l accordance with Attachment 2. 5.7.5 Confirm location of clean and contaminated l parking areas with the Decontamination Leader before beginning monitoring operations. 5.7.6 If is is not possible to monitor vehicles as they I arrive, park all vehicles in a controlled area before beginning monitoring operations. . Encourage evacuees to leave luggage and other personal articles in their vehicles. Direct emergency workers to leave equipment in a designated area after the vehicle has been issued a Clean Tag. l 5.7.7 If the vehicle was parked before being monitored, l clearly mark the car as contaminated (see l Attachment 6) and restrict access of non-monitoring / decontamination personnel to the vehicle. 5.7.8 Wear protective clothing in accordance with l Attachment 7 when monitoring the inside of a l contaminated vehicle. 5.7.9 Before monitoring for contamination, make sure [ the range selector on the RM-14 meter is in the "X 1" position and that the response switch is set to " fast." 5.7.10 Prevent contamination of the RM-14 or probe. Do l not allow probe to come in contact with any surface (e.g., tires, fenders) suspected of being contaminated. l l 5.7.11 If using the HP-270, hold the probe about 1/2 l inch away from the~ vehicle and scan slowly. Consider the vehicle contaminated when reading of 360 CP:t above background is exceeded. Rev. 8 l
OPIP 3.9.2 Page L3 of 49 5.7.12 Take smear wipe of automobile hood and another l smear wipe of automobile tire / wheel well. Hold the cloth about 1/2 inch away from HP-210 probe. . the automobile is considered contaminated if a reading of 360 CPM above background is found. l 5.7.13 Except for buses, monitor the inside of a vehicle I only if the outside is contaminated. Monitor the inside of all buses. 5.7.14 IF THE VEHICLE IS NOT CONTAMINATED, tag the ( vehicle with a Glean Tag (see Attachment 6). - Direct the driver to the clean parking area if vehicles are being monitored as they arrive. 5.7.15 IF THE VEHICLE IS CONTAMINATED, obtain a Vehicle l Contamination Report Form, Attachment 5, and record the indicated information. Check articles in contaminated vehicle for radiation. 5.7.16 If the vehicle was parked before being monitored,
' contact the owner of the vehicle. Determine by questioning the owner, where the vehicle may have become contaminated. Transmit this information to the Decontamination Leader.
5.8 tonitoring/ Decontamination Personnel Assigned to Decontaminate Incoming Vehicles 5.8.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination 1 Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1, or OPIP 4.2.3. 5.8.2 Obtain dosimetry and fill out record f orms in I accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.8.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in accor- I dance with Attachment 1. Attach HP-270 probe. 5.8.4 Determine background radiation levels in l accordance with Attachment 2. 5.8.5 Wear protective clothing, including booties, l overalls and rubber gloves, when working in controlled areas in accordance with Actachment 7. 5.3.6 Monitor vehicle to determine location of contamination. 5.8.7 Decontaminate vehicles using the following methods, as applicable: l Rev. 8
i
. OPIP 3.9.2 Page 14 of 49 CAUTION ALWAYS CLEAN FROM AREA 0F LEAST CONTAMINATION TOWARDS AREA 0F HIGHEST CONTAMINATION.
- a. For smooth painted surfaces, wipe the surface using a wet soapy sponge or cloth. .
- b. For rough surfaces, such as the plank floor of a truck, carefully sweep the surface,
- c. For upholstery and other similar surfaces, vacuum cleaning should be attempted first, followed by careful cleaning with a mild deteegent or solvent solution.
5.8.8 After completing a de~ contamination cycle on a I vehicle, remonitor the vehicle. Record the results on the Vehicle Contamination Report, Attachment 5. 5.8.9 IF THE VEHICLE IS NOT CONTAriINATED, comp' lete the l Vehicle Contamination Report. Place a CLEAN" tag on the vehicle (see Attachment 6), and release the vehicle for unrestricted use. 5.8.10 IF THE VEHICLE IS STILL CONTAMINATED, inform the l Decontamination Leader. 5.8.11 If the vehicle is an essential vehicle, make a l maximum of three (3) decontamination attempts. , 5.8.12 If the vehicle is not essential, move vehicle to I the Contaminated Vehicle Parking Area after one - decontamination attempt. 5.8.13 Record all monitoring / decontamination information l on the Vehicle Contamination Report. 5.8.14 Report all results from decontamination attempts I to the Decontamination Leader. 5.8.15 .Teansmit all completed Vehicle Contamination l Reports to the Deconta.nination Leader. Rev. 3 i
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 15 of 49 5.9 Monitorinz/ Decontamination Personnel Assigned to tionitor l Equipment / Personnel Articles I 5.9.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1 or OPIP 4.2.3. , I 5.9.2 Obtain dosimetry and fill out record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. I 5.9.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in 4 accordance with Attachment 1. I i 5.9.4- Determine background radiation levels in accordance with Attachment 2. 5.9.5 Wear protective clothing in controlled areas at I all times in accordance with Attachment 7. [ 5.9.6 Monitor all equipment used by emergency workers I in the Emergency Planning Zone. :tonitor an evacuee's personnel effects (e.g. luggage) only 1 if either the evacuee or his/her vehicle is found l to be contaminated. 5.9.7 If an article is found to have contamination in I excess of 360 cpm above background, consider the item contaminated. I 5.9.8 After monitoring e uipment/ personal articles, label items as either clean or contaminated. 5.9.9 Issue the owner or person responsible for the I contaminated article a receipt (see Attachment 5). 5.9.10 Complete an Equipment / Personal Article I Contamination Report Form, Attachment 5, for each contaminated item. 5.9.11 Inform the Decontamination Leader when contam- l
. ination is detected on an item.
5.9.12 Maintain a scanning speed of approximately 8-10 I inches per second. 5.9.13 Release all clean equipment / personal articles for l unrestricted use.
- Rev. 3
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 16 of 49 5.9.14 Move all contaminated equipment / personal articles l into a controlled area to await decontamination. Attach a contaminated tag, Attachment 6. 5.9.15 Forward all Equipment / Personal Article Contamin- l' ation Reports to the Decontamination personnel. 5.9.16 Forward all completed Clean Equipment / Personal l Equipment Monitoring Reports to the Decon-i tamination Leader. 5.10 Monitorinz/ Decontamination Personnel Assigned to 1 Decontaminate Equipment / Personal Articles 5.10.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facil-l icy in accordance with OPIP 4.2.3 or OPIP 4.3.1. 5.10.2 Obtain dosimeery and fill out record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.10.1. ' 5.10.3 Perform a pre-operational check of each RM-14' l ' survey meter in accordance with Attachment 1. 5.10.4 Determine background radiation levels in- 8 accordance.with Attachment 2. 5.10.5 Wear protective clothing when working in the l controlled area in accordance with Attachment 7. 5.10.6 Obtain Equipment / Personal Article Contamination l Report Forms from the Equipment / Personal Article j monitoring personnel ~. 5.10.7 If the item is an essential piece of equipment or I if so ordered by the Decontamination Leader, attempt to decontaminate the item. 5.10.8 If the item is not an essential piece of I equipment, store the item in a controlled area. - 5.10.9 Attempt to decontaminate an item using one or i more of the followins methods as appropriate:
- a. Uipe with damp soapy sponge
- b. Vacuum well, then wipe with damp soapy sponge CAUTION ALWAYS CLEAN FROM AREA 0F LEAST CONTAMINATION TOWARDS AREA 0F HIGHEST CONTAMINATION.
Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Psge 17 of 49 5.10.10 Release item for unrestricted use if I contamination level is brought below 360 cpm above background. 5.10.11 Move item to a controlled area if it is still I contaminated after three (3) decontamination attempts. 5.10.12 Record the results on the Contamination Report l Forms, Attachment 5. 5.10.13 Transmit all completed Equipment / Personal Article l Contamination Report Forms to the Decontamination Leader- .
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure Control 6.2 OPIP 4.2.3, Evacuee Reception Center Activation 6.3 OPIP 4.3.1, Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility Activation 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. RM-14 Count Rate Meter Operating Procedure
- 2. Determination of Background Radiation Level
- 3. Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagrams:
Figure 1 - Emergency Workers / Evacuees Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagrams Figure 2 - Vehicle Monitoring / Decontamination Flou Diagrams Figure 3 - Equipment /Personel Articles Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagram Figure 4 - Evacuee Reception Center Initial Monitocing Flow Diagram
- 4. Clean Monitoring Record Forms:
1 Form 1 - Clean Emergency Worker Monitoring Record Form Form 2 - Clean Evacuee Log Out Form Rev. 8 l .
OPIP 3.9.2 Page ld of 49
- 5. Exposure /Concamination Forms:
Form 1 - Emergency Worker Exposure Record Form 2 - Evacuee Exposure Record ' Form 3 - Automobile Contamination Report Form Form 4 - Truck Concamination Reporc Form Form 5 - Bus Concamination Report Form Form 6 - Van Concaminacion Report Form Form 7 - Mocorcycle Contaminacion Report Form Form 8 - Equipmenc / Personal Articles Contaminacion Report Form
- 6. Clean /Contaminaced Tags, Receipt s and Invencorf Forms :
Form 1 - Clean Person / Vehicle /Arcicle Tag Form 2 - Contaminated Vehicle /Arcicle Tag Form 3 - Receipt for Concaminaced Articles Form 4 - Concaminated Article Invencorf Form
- 7. .
Use of Protective Clothing and Step-Off Pads
- 8. Decermination of Contaminacion Limic s I
1 I I l l Rev. 6 ; e
l l OPIP 3.9.2 - Page 19 of 49 l Attachment 1 ' Page 1 of 4 RM-14 COUNT RATE METER OPERATING PROCEDURE 1.0 PURPOSE To provide instructions for proper operation of the Eberline l Model RM-14 count rate meter. . 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Decontamination and Monitoring Personnel are responsible for implementation of this procedure. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 When using a Geiger-Mueller (GM) Detector, intense fields of radiation may blank out the detector giving a zero or downscale reading. Normally, a background count rate of some magnitude will always be present.. 3.2 Care should be taken not to contaminate the detector. 4.0 PREREQUISITES 4.1 Before using an instrument, assure that the date of use is before the calibration due date (as shown on the side of the instrument) . If the due date has passed, notify the Decontamination Loader, who contacts the l Decontamination Coordinator in the EOC for further instructions. 4.2 Before using an instrument inspect for damage or prob-lems. If damage or a problem is found which may affect instrument operation, notify the Decontamination Coordinator, who reports to the Radiation He.sich Coordinator for further instructions. 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Discussior. 5.1.1 The Eberline Model RM-14 is a small, compact count rate meter operated by AC line voltage or a Ni-Cd battery which is continuously trickle charged while the unit is plugged into the line voltage. R, e v . 5
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 20 of 49 : Attachment 1 - Page 2 of 4 RM-14 COUNT RATE METER (continued) 5.1.2 The radiation count rate (cpm) is read on the front panel meter (0-500 cpm full scale). Switch selected ranges of X1, X10 and X100. ara provided. The response time of the meter can be selected by a " Fast / Slow" response switch. , 5.1.3 Both the HP-210 and'HP-270 probes are used with ! the RM-14 for personnel monitoring at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility and the [ Relocation Center Decontamination Facilities. 5.1.4 Topics covered in the procedure: 5.2 Operational Set-up 5.3 Battery Check 5.4 Range Selection
~
5.2 Operational Set-Up 5.2.1 Place selector switch in "0FF" position. 5.2.2 Connect either the HP-210 or HP-270 detector to ! the instrument as appropriate. 5.2.3 (Optional) Connect the power cable to the l instrument and plug into 115 VAC power supply. 5.2.4 Set the meter alarm knob, located on the back of the instrument, to the desired alarm point. 5.2.5 Turn volume knob to maximum position. 5.3 Battery Check 5.3.1 Turn the selector switch to the "BATT" position; the meter should read in the BATT OK range. NOTE: The instrument does not function properly even when plugsed into 115 VAC, unless I the batteries check O.K. l Rev. 5, 1
i , l 1 ' OPIP 3.9.2 t j Page 21 of 49 ' l Acc achment 1 Page 3 of 4 l } RM-14 COUNT RATE METER i , (conc inued) 5.3.2 If the bacteries check low, notify the Deconcaminacion Leader for further instructions. 1 i 5.4 Range Selection . l 5.4.1 When monitoring with chis inst rument , it may be j necessary to change ranges using the switch on j t he f ace of t he inst rument to bring che indicat- ' ing needle "on-scale". , 3
- NOTE
- If che alarm circuit is actuated, press i che resec buccon.
1 i 5.5 Radiation Response Functional Test i 5.5.1 Perform an upscale response test wit h t he f radioactive check source. Follow insc ruccions j j available with the check source container. i N M0 REFERENCE _! None I 7.0 ATTACHMENTS l i 1. Figure 1, Eberline Model RM-14'and HP-210 and HP-270 Probes 3 t i I i i 1 , t l ! . Rev. 6
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t , i i e
l l OPIP 3.9.2 Page 22 of 49 l Attachment 1 Page 4 of 4 ! OPERATION OF EBERLINE MODEL RM-14 l (continued) FIGURE 1 EBERLINE MODEL RM-14 AND PROBES
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1 OPIP 3.9.2 Page 23 of 49 Attachment 2 Page 1 of 1
-DETERMINATION OF BACKGROUND RADIATION LEVEL
- 1. Set the RM-14 to the 'X1' scale.
- 2. Set the response time to ' slow.'
- 3. Readout will fluctuate slightly; use approximate average of upper bound measurements.
- 4. Use the following table.
I I I i l TYPE OF SHIELD MAXIMUM ALLOUABLE l MONITORING PROBE POSITION BACKGROUND l External HP-270 Open _50 CPM Thyroid-Adult i HP-270 Closed 50 CPM , i l HP-210 Attach Plastic Thy ro id-Child Shield l 150 CPM i Reception Center l l and EUDF Initiall HP-210 l None i 150 CPM i Scan i l I l 1 i I l Vehicle-Interiori HP-270 l Open 50 CPM land Decon. I l
- 5. Ensure background radiation level with HP-270 probe is performed for both shield open and closed.
- 6. Determine background level every 15 minutes.
- 7. If maximum allowable background is exceeded, attempt to find and remove source of radiation. Otherwise move monitoring location.
Rev. 8 l
-OPIP 3.9.2 Page 24 of 49 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 4 MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION FLOW DIAGRAMS Figure Title 1 Emergency Worker / Evacuee Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagram 2 Vehicle Monitoring / Decontamination Flow. Diagram 3 Equipment / Personal Articles Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagram 4 Evacuee Reception Center Initial Monitoring Flow Diagram l
Rev. 8
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1 FIGURE 1 OPIP 3.9.2 Pege 25 of 49 EnERGENCY WORKER / EVACUEE n0NITORING/ DECONTAMINATION Ac t ac hmsnt 3 ; FLOW DIAGRAn Page 2 of 4 I E4fte i T
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FIGURE 2 OPIP 3.9.2 Page 26 of 49 Attachment 3 VEHICLE MONITORING /0ECONTAMINATION FLOW OIAGRAN Page 3 of 4 ACCESS RCAO l i i Y ORivEWAT i 0 O E ARRiv!N EMICLES tohCN SE MON PARMING AREA
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l l OPIP 3.9.2 I FIGURE 3 Paga 27 of 49' Attachment 3 Page 4 of 4 EQUIPMENT / PERSONAL ARTICLES MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION l FLOW OIAGRAM START e m ,,NA,S N 1N IT _EM E NO YES qm.y TES N, _ Y neNifon iTEn e V I 00E5 Q1 8 N N 3 !CT
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I ChRhLbDAREA NO TES SE N EO REV. 5 lites.Est,tts 6
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 27a of 49 Attachment 3 Page 4a of 4 FIGURE 4 EVACUEE RECEPTION CENTER INITIAL MONITORING FLOW DIAGRAM ENTER i
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STOP AT INITIAL MONITORING STATION
& a SMEAR SWIPE MONITOR HANDS ! 0F HOOD AND AND FEET OF WHEEL WELL DRIVER + +
EITHER READING NO ABOVE 360 CPM gg
\/ v OBTAIN PROCEED TO DECON.
CLEAN TAG j TRAILER FOR
, 3 DETAILED MONITORING.
OBTAIN MAP Toil CONGREGATE CARE CENTER IF NEEDED
, /
PROCEED TO FACILITY EXIT i Rev. 8 l
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OPIP 3.9.2 Page 30 of 49 Attachment 5 Page 1 of 9 EXPOSURE / CONTAMINATION FORMS Form Title 1 Emergency Worker Exposure Record - 2 Evacuee Exposure Record 3 Automobile Contamination Report Form 4 Truck Contamination Report Form 5 Bus Contamination Report Form 6 Van Contamination Report Form 7 Motorcycle Contamination Report Form 8 Equipment / Personal Articles Contamination Report Form i I e f a Rev. 5
FORM c1 OPIP 3.9.2 EWERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE RECORD Pago 31 of 49
!. RE0i$tRatt0m (to OE COnetETEC Or rAC!t!Tv rEn0NNELI Attechmsnt 5 Page 2 of 9 OATE f!nt DECONfAn!NAf!ON FACILITY
- 1. NAME (LASil (FIR $ft (n!OOLE INT.I
- 2. AGE 3. SEE C MALE Q FEnALE 4. PREONANT Q TES C NO
- 5. H0nt ADDRESS
- 8. CITY 7. STATE 8. E!P CODE
- 9. TELEPHONE Nun 8ER (HonEl (l l l 1) I i l 1-1 l l l l 1
la. TELEPHONE Nun 8ER 18USINESSI (l l l l} l l l 11 l l l l
- 11. SOCIAL $1CURITY nun 8ER l l l l- W -1 l l l l IE. MI TAMEN O TES C NO 13. TIME IN!?!AL DOSE WAS TAMEN
- 14. DATE IN!!!AL 003E WAS TAMEN 15. NOW nANT CATS R! IAMEN
- 15. MAVE RA0!OPMARnACEuf!CALS SEEN TACMEN f CO TES ftC
!!. SRIEFLY DESCR!8E PERSON'S WHEREA80UTS AND ACT!v!f!ES. !!!. PERSONNEL n0 nit 0BING E TO SE COnPLETED BY F ACILITY PERSONNEL) l BACMGROUNO RA0! Af!ON LEVEL WITN HP E70 PROBES SHIELO OPEN 'P* SM! ELD CLOSED 88
- n @ P ncij @ tounts nthus sacaecuno arfra cEconf AnlN4f ta=
favnoto CLofnE0 UNCLofMEO FIRST nEfM00 SECONO nETM00 "ChlfC88"8 futRO nEin00 l FOURfm nEtwo: Wiw I I n MMOLE 800Y som epd epm tem esm l semil esm FEEI tem oph spm tem tem cpm! MANOS tem spM esm ese tem epm CHECM OECONTAn!Nat!ON nETM00t83 USEDs nEfM00s OWARn WATER ANO n!LO SOAP W/ SOFT BRUSM O wass <!$0 LATED ARtas' O wATERLEs3 nAND CLEANER O Sn0w&R tu!OESPREAO On!LO DETERcENT A40 MATER. wCAvr LAT ER. 8:rt Seusa O LAVA SOAP DECONfan!NAf!0N PER$0NNEL*S INITIALS M ' *** CntCK APPROPRIATE IMOICATE AREAS OF C0fffAMINAT10N/lptmey FINAL ACT!DNs I* INJURY C IN0!V!OUAL DECONTAn!NATED C CONTAn!NAf!CN g, IN0!V!OUAL $ENT TO 4 H0$PITAL Dut toa C INJuRT e e
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OPIP 3.9.2 EVACUEE E SURE RECCRD Pago 32 of 49 Attachment 5
- g. PtsrstRatrQN tt0 et COnettito er FACiLitt PERSON *tti Page 3 of 9 04TE f!ME QECONfAMINAf!0N FACILITY
- 1. NAnE ILAST) (FlRST) In!00LE INT.I
- 2. A0E 3. SEI C MALE D FEMALE 4. PREONANT C YES O NO
- 5. Mont ACORESS
- 6. CITY 7. STAft 8. !!P C00E
- 9. TELEPHONE NunstR t'MonEl (l i I l) l I i l-l 1 l 1 1
- 10. TELEPMONE Nun 8ER 18U$tNESSI (l i I I} l i I l-l i l I I II. SOCIAL SECURITY nun 8ER l l l l- W l l l l l
!!. 8RIEFLY DESCRIBE PttSON'S WHEREA80Uf8 AND ACTIVIf!ES.
It!. PER*0NNEL McNtt0RtwS 8 70 8E ConPLETED 87 F ACILif f PERSONNELI S ACKGRouND wlTH HP-270 PROSE: SMIELO OPEN . epm 5HIELO CLOSER com SACXGROUND WITH MP-210 PRCStr cpm
.@jMS,% COUNTS M(NU$ GACM0POUNO APTER O!CONTAntNAf!ON 7MYR0t0 CL0fME0 UNCLofMED FIR $f MEfM00 SECONO METH00 fMIRO PETH00 FouRIN PETH00 90NIIONIU N !b l wn0Lt 8007 I ,,, ,, l .,. ,,. .,- e,.I eo*
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FORn = 3 OPIP 3.9.2 Page 33 of 49 AUTOMOBILE CONTAWINATION REPORT FORM Attachment 5 Page 4 of 9 LICENSE . STATE OR!vER'S NAME LILCO EMPLOTEE = LERO TITLE /ASSIGNnENT ADCRESS (!F NON-LEROI INITIAL EXTT.RICA SURVEY RESULTS (CPn MINUS BACMGROUNQI A \\ fli % { 1 ( ) ol I o o t l o M = = u U U U LEFT S!OE RIGHT 5!0E FRONT REAR ConnENTS: MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE _ INITIAL. INTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS (CPn n!NUS BACMGROUN01 ConnENTS MONITOR'S INIT!ALS INSTRunENT N00EL NO. S/N PROBE TYPE DECON METN00 (IST. ATTEMPT): RESULTS (CPN n!NUS SACMGROUN01: MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE DECON METN00 IC."D. ATTEMPT): RESULTS ICPM MINUS BACMGROUN01: MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT " n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE OECON nETN0013RO. ATTEnPfle RESULTS (CPM n!NUS BACMGROUN01: MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT N00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE FINAL ACTION VENICLE DECONTAn!NATED. CONTINUED EXTERNAL / INTERNAL CONTAn. 360 CPn OR GREATER A80VE SACMGROUNO.
- INITIALS SENO ConPLETED FORM TO TNE RADIATION HEALIN C00R0!NATOR. PAGE _ OF _
Rev. 5 - Il440.CMT.0? v - r-------im - - - . - - m - - * - w -.
OPIP 3.9.2 FORT! = 4 Page 34 of 49 TRUCN CONTAWINAT10N Attachment 5 REPORT FORM Page 5 of 9 LICENSE e STATE OR!vER'S NAME LILCO EMPLOTEE e LERO TITLE /ASSIGNnENT ADDRESS IIF NON-LER0I INITIAL EXTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS (CPn n!NUS 8ACMGROUN01 I l l _sf l b I l l YP @
@ M u u u u l
LEFT SIDE RIGHT $10E FRONT REAR
! COnnENTS:
l MONITOR *$ IN!T!ALS INSTRUMENT j n00EL No. S/N PROSE TYPE l INITIAL INTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS ( (CPn n!NUS 8ACMGROUN01 l ConnENTS: n0NITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT n00EL NO. 5/4 PROSE TYPE DECCN NETHOD IIST. ATTEMPfle RESULTS (CPn n!NUS SACMGROUN01: nGNITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT MODEL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE DECON NETH00 (2NO. ATTEMPfla RESULTS (CPn n!NUS SACMGROUN01: NONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT MODEL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE DECON nETH00 (3RO. ATTEnPTle RESULTS (CPn n!NUS "ACXCROUND): ! NONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE l FINAL ACTION VEHICLE DECONTAn!NATED. l CONTINUE 0 EXTERNAL / INTERNAL CONTAn. 360 CPn OR GREATER ABOVE SACMOROUNO. _ IN!TIALS SENO COMPLETED FORN TO THE RA0!ATION NEALTH COORDINATOR. PAGE _ OF _ Rev. 5 18800.CMT.98
i
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l FORf1 = 5 OPIP 3.9.2 Page 35 of 49 BUS CONTAMINATION REPORT FORM Attachment 5 Page 6 of 9 i LICENSE e STATE { ORIVER'S NAME LILCO EnPLOYEE = LERO TITLE /AS$!GNMENT ADDRESS IIF NON-LERO) INITIAL EXTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS ICPM n!NUS BACKOROUNO) C i l I e I I i i 1 e il I i e l- j ( go oe_ eu . og_ t , _ LEFT $10E RIGHT SIDE FRONT REAR COnnENTSe NONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT n00EL No. S/N PRC8E TYPE INITIAL INTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS ICPM n!NUS BACKGROUN01 f l CONMENTS: DECON METHOD IIST. ATTEMPTI: IEU$UI'ECMI5lU$SACKGROUN0le INSTRunENT MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE DECON nETH00 (2NO. ATTEMPTit RESULTS (CPn n!NUS SACKGROUN01: MONITOR'S IN!T!ALS .!NSTRUMENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE DECON METHOD (3RD. ATTEMPTI: RESULTS (CPn n!NUS SACKGROUN01s MON! TOR *$ INITIALS INSTRUMENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE FINAL ACTION VEHICLE DECONTAMINATEO. CONTINUED EXTERNAL / INTERNAL CONTAn. 363 CPn OR GREATER ABOVE BACKGROUNO. _., !NITIALS SENO ConPLETED FORn TO THE RA0!ATION NEALTN C00R0!NATOR. PAGE 0F _ Rev. 5. ll800.CMT.99
F03r! o 6 OPIP 3.9.2 VAN CONTAWINATION Pa8e 36 of 49 REPORT FORM Attachmenc 5 Page 7 of 9 LICENSE e STATE ORIVER'S NAME LILC0 EMPLOYEE e LERO TITLE / ASSIGNMENT ADDRESS !!F NON-LER0I INITIAL EXTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS ICPn n!NUS BACMOROUN01 i I - BC 3 m - - .- - 3 i
- g. . C . O LEFT S!OE RIGHT $10E FRONT REAR ConnENTSs n0NITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT INITIA!. INTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS (CPn n!NUS 8ACMOROUN01 COnNENTS n0NITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT MODEL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE DECON METHOD I!ST. ATTEMPT 1 RESULTS (CPn n!NUS BACMOROUN01:
n0NITOR*$ INITIALS INSTRUMENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE DECON ntTH00 12NO. ATTEMPTI RESULTS ICPn n!NUS BACMGROUN01: n0NITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT MODEL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE OECON nETH00 ISRO. ATTEMPTis RESULTS (CPn n!NUS 8ACMOROUN01: n0NITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT MODEL NO. S/N F808E TYPE FINAL ACTION VEHICLE DECONTAN!NATED. l CONTINUCC EXTERNAL / INTERNAL CONTAn. 360 CPn CR GREATER A80VE BACMOROUNO. _ INITIALS SENO COMPLETED FORn TO THE RA0!AT!0N HEAL.TH C00R0!NATOR. PAGE 0F _ Rev. 5 lif00.CMt.100 i l
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OPIP 3.9.2 F a':r1 o 7 Pego 37 of 49 WOTORCYCLE CONTAWINATION REPORT FORW Attachment 5 P e 8 of 9 LICENSE . STATE ORIVER'S NAng LILCO EMPLOTEE e LERO T1TLE/ ASS 10NNENT ADDRESS I!F NON-LEROI INITIAL EXTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS ICPn n!NUS BACMOROUN01
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LEFT $10E RICHT $10E ConnENTSs n0NITOR'S !NITIALS INSTRUMENT n00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE INITIAL INTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS (CPM MINUS BACMOROUN01 COnMENTSs MONITOR'S IN!T!ALS INSTRunENT N00EL NO. 3/N PROSE ffPE CECON METHOD 1137. ATTEMPfle RESULTS (CPM MINUS SACMOROUN0ie MONITOR'S INIT!ALS INSTRuntNT MODEL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE OFCON METHOD 12NO. AffEMPfle l RESULTS (CPM MINUS OACMOROUN0le 1 FONif0R'S INITIALS INSTRUntNT N00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE CECON nETH00 13RO. AfftnPfle RESULTS (CPM MINUS SACMOROUN0le MON!f0R'S (N!TIALS INSTRUMENT N00EL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE FINAL ACTION VtHICLE CECONTAMINAft0. CONF! Nut 0 EXI[RNAL/!NT[RNAL CONTAM. 380 CPM 04 ORCATER ABOVE 8ACM040bNO.
! NIT!ALS SENO COnPLtit0 FORM 70 THE RAQlAf!CN HEALTH C00R0!NATOR. P A0E OF-Rev. 5 ll800.CNT.101
FORn . e OPIP 3.9.2 ! EQUIPWENT/ PERSONAL ARTICLES Page 38 of 49 CONTAWINATICN REPORT Attachment 5 Page 9 of 9 I OWNERSHIP /RESPONSI81LITY INFORWATION LERO: VENICLE'S LICEN$t NO. LERO WORMER'S ?!TLE/ ASSIGNMENT LILCO EMPL0ftt NO. EVACUEE VCHICLE LICEN$t PLAft NO. LAST FIRST n.I. no. STREET Clff STATE ZIP PHONE NO. E EQUIPMENT DCSCRIPil0N l Ilt INITIAL WONITORING RESULTS tCPM nINus eACM0mouNoi MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT M00tL NO. S/N PROBE TYPE COMMENTS: II DECONTAMINATION INFORWATION QECON METH00 flSt. AfftMPfla RESULTS ICPM MINUS BACMOROUN01s MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT n00tL No. S/N P400t ffPt CECON METHOD 12NO. AffEMPfle j RESULTS (CPM MINUS SACMOROUN01s MONITOR'S INtf!ALS INSTRUMENT N00tL NO. S/N PROSE ffPt l QECON METH00 13R0. AfftMPfle l RESULTS (CPM MINUS BACM0400N01: MONif0R'S IN!?!ALS INSTRUMENT n00EL No. 9/N P908t tTPt l I FINAL ACTION EQUIPMENT PER$0NNEL arf!CLE QECONTAMINAftO. CONilNuto CONTAMINAflCN 330 CPM CR OREAftR A80vt SACMOROUNO. I l SENO COMPLtito FORM 70 THE RADIAf!CN HEALIN C00R0!NAT04 PA0t _ 0P _ l l \ Rev. 5
!!R48.CMf,L89 i
OPIP 3.9 2 Page 39 of 49 Attachment 6 Page 1 of 5 CLEAN /CONTAMINATF.D TAGS, RECEIPTS, AND INVENTORY FORMS Form Title 1 Clean Person / Vehicle / Article Tag , 2 Contaminated Vehicle / Article Tag , 3 Receipt for Contaminated Articles l 4 Contaminated Article Inventory Form j l 4 4 4 Rev. 5
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 40 of 49 Attachment 6 Page 2 of 5 FORM 1 CLEAN PERSON /VEHlCLE/ ARTICLE TAG d O """ t C_EA\ 1 4 i DATE I MONITORS INITIALS 3 O PERSON , O vesicle O ARTICLE j 1 C_EA\ ; j j i Rev. 5 i
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OPIP 3.9.2 Page 42 of 49 Attachment 6 Page 4 of 5 FORM 3 RECEIPT FOR CONTAMINATED ARTICLES 1 RECEIPT FOR CONTAMINATED ARTICLE DESCRIPfl0N OF ARTICLES OWN ER'S NAME. ADDRESS. PH O N E NO. . i 5 MONITOWS INITIALS. I DATE. ) _____________ ____.____________ DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLEt OWNER'S N AME. ADDRESS.
! PHONE NO.
MONITOR'S INITI ALS. 0 ATE. RETAIN THl3 STUS FOR f0ENTIFICATION PURPOSES. PRESENT 17 AT SUCH TIME AS ARTICLE IS EITHER mETURNED OR REIMOURSEMENT 13 PROV10 ED. l Rev. 5
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OPIP 3.9 2 Page 44 of 49 Attachment 7 Page 1 of 6 USE OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND STEP-OFF PADS 1.0 PURPOSE To provide instructions on the use of Protective Clothing and Step-Off Pads. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Decontamination Facility Monitoring / Decontamination personnel are responsible for implementation of this procedure. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS l Protective clothing should be in good shape, not ripped or damaged. 1 4.0 PREREQUISITES None f 5.0 ACTIONS i Discussion 5.1 5.1.1 The primary function of protective clothing is to , provide a barrier between skin and loose contamination while working in a contacinated area. 5.1.2 Topics covered in this procedura: 5.2 Protective Clothing Requironents 5.3 Protective Clothing Restrictions 5.4 Donning Protective Clothing ; 5.5 Removing Protective Clothing 5.6 Step-Of f Pad Definition 5.7 Step-Off Pad Use i l l l l Rev. 5
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 45 of 49 Attachment 7 Page 2 of 6 l t USE OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND STEP-OFF PADS (continued) ! l I 5.2 Protective Clothing Requirements - 5.2.1 Wear the protective clothing as specified. I 5.2.2 Plastic protective clothing may be required for I working with liquid contaminants when cotton clothing will not provide adequate protection, i.e., gloves. l 5.3 Protective Clothing Restrictions 5 3.1 Protective clothing shall not be worn in ' unrestricted areas (L.e. , administrative o f fices , lunch room, locker room, EOC, EOF) once the I clothing has entered a potentially contaminated ' area. . 5.3.2 Previously used protective clothing nhall not be ' reused without receiving appropriate decontamination. 5.4 Donning Protective Clothina 5.4.1 Don all protective clothing as required. 5.4.2 Tape openings on protective clothing, i.e., boots to legs, glove to sleava and hood to collar. NOTE: When taping, fold under the end of the , tape to make sure there is a piece to grasp when removing tape. i 5.5 Removina Protective Clothina l 5.5.1 Protective Clothing should be removed from the body in a manner to provent contamination of the skin or articles of clothing worn underneath. 5.5.2 All tape should be removed from clothing and pideed in indicated contaminatnd crash containers. ; Rev. 5 l l
f t OPIP 3.9.2 Page 46 of 49 Attachment 7
< Page 3 of 6 .
USE OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND STEP-OFF PADS (continued) 5.5.3 Clothing should be placed in appropriate containers as it is removed. 5.6 Step-Off Pad Definition 5.6.1 The Step-Off Pad is simply an area (approximately 3 feet by 2 feet) located at the exits from contaminated or possibly contaminated areas. 5.6.2 The pad may be a piece of paper or equivalent. j 5.6.3 This pad, which represents the transition ?oint between the clean and contaminated area, stall be considered part of the area outside the j contaminated area. 5.6.4 Nothina contaminated should be placed on this l : l clean pad. ; 5.6.5 Step-Off Pads may be worded as shown in Figure 1.
! 5.7 Step-Off Pad Use [
5.7.1 One Pad - No Protective Clothing , i ,
- s. This type of pad is used at a monitoring control point at the decontamination facilley.
- b. An individual exiting a restricted area should approach the step-off pad carefully so
~ ' not to spread possible contamination to the , j pad and eventually to other clean areas. . i 4 I i i 1 < ! Rev. 5
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 47 of 49 Attachment 7 Page 4 of 6 USE OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND STEP-OFF PADS , (continued) i NOTE: The probe should not actually touch f possibly contaminated parts of the body, since this might contaminate the - probe, making it useless for further j applications.
- c. The individual should then raise one foot, monitor the bottom of the foot, and if clean, place this foot down on the step-off pad. :
nis should be repeated for the other foot. l 5.7.2 One Pad - Protective Clothing
- a. This tpe of pad may be used at an access control point ,
i
- b. An individual exiting a contaminated area should approach the stop-off pad carefully so as not to spread contamination to the pad and ;
eventually to other clean areas.
- c. Carefully remove coveralls and hood to prevent the spread of contamination that might be present. Place them in the appropriate container on the contaminated side of the pad. ,
- d. The individual should then raise one foot, remove the shoecover and place the contaminated shoecover in the appropriate container on the contaminated side of the pad.
- e. Prior to placing the foot on the step-off pad, ensure that the foot is monitored. The individual should be monitored as per Section 5.7.1. i Rev. 3
v, i OPIP 3.9.2 Page 48 of 49 l Attachment 7 Page 5 of 6 i USE OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND STEP-OFF PADS, (continued) , 1 j f. The individual s.'tould then ple'ce this " clean" ! foot down on the step-off pad. 3 This should be repeated.for the other foot. NOTE: When removing th$ shoecovers should not be held over the s,tep-offthe foot pad. h. 6.0 and place in proper receptacle. Remove g REFERENCES None i 7.0 ATTACHMENTS 7.1 Figure 1 Step-Off Pada L l Rev. 5 t
l OPIP 3.9.2 Page 49 of 49 i Attachment 7 l e Page 6 of 6 l 1 USE OF PROTECTIVE (continued)CLOTHING AND STEP-OFF PAD l { FIGURE 1 STEP-OFF PADS ' e I I Monitor Remove Shoes Before Protective Clothing i , and Stepping Here Monitor Before Stepping Here A s t 6 6 i l I l I Rev. 5
. ,g h " OPIP 3.9.2 - - Page 49a of 49 Attachment 8
- Page 1 of I s3 I' s DETERMINATION OF CONTAMINATION LIMITS
- Contamination is indicated by the following
J l l INSTRUMENT l MINIMUM READING FOR l l TARGET l RM-14 5URVEY l CONTAMINATION I
- l. METER WITH: ) (Above Background) l I . l l l
) Initial I HP-210 Probe 1 360 CPM (Evacuee) i i Monitoring i Shield Open. I 360 CPM (Vehicle Swipe) 1 I I I I l I i L Person - skin l *HP-270 Probe 1 150 CPM i or clothing i Shield Open ) ) I I I Adult Thyroid 1 *HP-270 Probe i 150 CPM l 'l i Shield Closed ) I I I I I 'l I *HP-210 Probe i Anything above background ~
I Child Thyroid I (Under 12) i Shield On i I I l I }
} Swipe from Vehicle ) *HP-210 Probe 1 360 CPM (warrants full i I
Shield Off survey with HP-270)) I ' l i i Equipment or i *HP-270 Probe 1 360 CPM i i Vehicles positive i Shield Open l l ,
) on Swipes } l )
- Nominal sensitivity HP-270 probe @ 1,200 CPM = 1 mR/hr.
Nominal sensitivity HP-210 probe Q 3,600 CPM = 1 mR/hr. NOTE: Background readings must be taken with the same type probe and same shielding configuration as used to measure contamination. , Rev.,8 _-_____.c.. . - , , _ _ _ _ _ .,.
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 1 of 49 OPIP 3.9.2 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION OF EMERGENCY WORKERS AND EVACUEES. 1.0 PURPOSE To provide instructions for^ monitoring and decontamination of
' personnel, vehicles and personal belongings / equipment at offsite decontamination facilities.
2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 Decontamination Coordinator directs the efforts of the Decontamination Facilities. 2.2 Decontamination Leaders provide direction and coordination of the radiological Monitoring and Decontamination personnel at the facilities. 2.3 Monitoring / Decontamination personnel are responsible for implementing this procedure. , 3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Additional monitoring personnel may be requested from INPO via the Response Manager at the EOF. Additional equipment is available in the EOC if required. 3.2 If a radioactive releare has occurred, the Radiation Health Coordinator will have the Decontamination Coordinator dispatch monitoring personnel to special --- facility receptfon destinations identified by the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator. 3.3 First aid or other medical treatment initially required shall take precedence over the decontamination effort. If wound is severe, requiring hospital treatment, refer to OPIP 4.2.2. 3.4 All text references to the RM-14 shall be interpreted to mean RM-14 or equivalent count rate meter. Rev. 8
i OPIP 3.9.2 Page 2 of 49 3.5 Monitoring instrumentation, probe types, shielding configurations and contamination limits for personnel, vehicles and equivalent shall be utilized in accordance with Attachment 8. l 4.0 PREREQUISITES , 4.1 An evacuation has been initiated and the reception centers have been activated in accordance with OPIP 4.2.3, or 4.2 Emergency response personnel have been deployed into the. plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone. 4.3 Reception Center and EWDF personnel'will receive personal dosimetry equipment to monitor their radiation exposure. 4.4 The Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility has been activated in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1. 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 . Decontamination Coordinator 5.1.1 Upon arrival at the EOC, and periodically thereafter, contact the Decontamination Leaders at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility and when activated, the Reception Center Supervisor'. Provide the following information: l
- a. Emergency status
- b. Protective Action Recommendations
- c. Radioactive release data i
5.1.2 Obtain the following information from each i facility: I
- a. Level of staf fing at their facility
- b. Equipment availability
, c. Arrival rate of people to be monitored
- d. Number of contaminated people and the zones from which they were evacuated.
5.1.3 Provide periodic status reports to the Health Services. Coordinator. 5.1.4 Ensure all completed monitoring, contamination and exposure record forms are returned to the EOC j and filed. i I 5.1.5 When an evacuation is recommended to the public, i dispatch monitoring personnel to.special popula- ) tion relocation centers: Rev. 8 )
P OPIP 3.9.2 Page 3 of 49
- a. Obtain a list of the special population re-location centers from the Special Facilities
~
Evacuation Coordinator.
- b. Contact the ENDF Decontamination Leader and
~
arrange for. monitoring personnel to be sent to the relocation centers in accordance with OPIP 4. 3.1.
- c. Keep the Radiation Health Coordinator informed of the. status of this operation.
5.1.6 If informed by a Decontasa'ination Leader of_the need to transport someone to a hospital contact the Hospital Coordinator and Ambulance Coordinator to arrange for a facility and transportation. 5.1.7 The following emergency-workers should report' to the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility in Brentwood upon completion of their duties:
- a. Transfer Point Coordinators
- b. Bus Drivers
- c. Traffic Guides
- d. Route Alert Drivers
- e. Route Spotters
- f. Road Crews
- g. Ambulance /Ambulette personnel
- h. Helicopter Pilots
- 1. All other emergency personnel who enter the 10 Mile EPZ 5.2 . Reception Center Suoervisor or Decontamination Leader
. 5.2.1 Have the Decontamination Facility set up in i accordance with the appropriate procedure, OPIP 4.3.1, Emergency' Worker Decontamination Facility activation or OPIP 4.2.3, Evacuee Reception Center Activation. 5.2.2 Contact the Decontamination Coordinator and obtain emergency status, protective action recommendations and radioactive release data. 5.2.3 Maintain and inform the Decontamination , Coordinator of the status of:
- a. Available staff
- b. Equipment availability
- c. Arrival rate of people to be monitored Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 4 of 49
- d. Number of people contaminated and the zones from which they were eva'uated c
5.2.4 Ensure that all Reception Center and Decontamina- l tion Facility personnel receive and wear dosi-meters in accordance with OPIP 3.9. 1, Dosimetry Exposure Control. 5.2.5 Ensure that all Decontamination personnel working inside controlled areas wear protective clothing in accordance with Attachment.7. 5.2.6 Ensure that the decontamination process is performed.in accordance with Attachment 3, Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagrams. 5.2.7 Assign monitoring / decontamination personnel to the following tasks as indicated. Approximate Number' of Personnel Reception EWDF Center
- a. Monitoring Emergency 34*** See Att 2 Workers / Evacuees - Section OPIP 4.2.3 5.4
- b. Decontaminating Emergency 4*
Workers / Evacuees - Section 5.5
- c. Monitoring vehicles - 5 Section 5.6
- d. Decontaminating vehicles - 2 Section 5.7
- e. Monitoring equipment /per- 0** !
sonal articles - Section 5.8 ) l
- f. Decontaminating equipment / 0**
personal articles - Section 5.9
- Ensure that sufficient female Monitoring /
Decontamination personnel are available for j the Decontamination Area.
** Accomplish upon termination of, emergency event or as required. *** Twenty-five of the monitors are available for dispatch to the special population relocation centers.
Rev. 8 l
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 5 of 49 As circumstances warrant, reassign to balance staffing levels with needs. 5.2.8 At the evacuee Recepti~on Center, it is important to monitor all arriving evacuees as soon as possible. 5.2.9 If necessary to transport a contaminated individual to a hospital, contact the Decontamination Coordinator at the EOC and request that he make the necessary arrangements in accordance with OPIP 4.2.2. l 5.2.10 Af ter being found clean of contamination, l emergency workers will either be directed to. remain at the facility to await possible reassignment or.be released from duty. 5.2.11 Upon completion of decontamination efforts, dry contaminated material will be gathered and transported to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station to be disposed of as part of the site's Dry Active Waste Program. Contaminated liquid wastes will be diluted and dispersed if containment is not possible. Ensure that liquid wastes do not enter surface water source. Liquid radioactive wastes which have been contained will be transported to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station for disposal. 5.3 Dosimetry Record Keepers 5.3.1 Ensure that all monitoring and deconta.nination personnel have been issued dosimetry in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1,-Dosimetry and Exposure Control.. l Tev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 6 of 49 5.3.2 Collect all paper work at the completion of the l emergency for transport to the Dosimetry Coordinator at the EOC. 5.4 Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to Monitor Incoming Bus Evacuees / Emergency Workers l 5.4.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.2.3 or OPIP 4.3.1 5.4.2 Obtain your' dosimetry and fill out record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1.
-5.4.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in accordance with Attachment 1.
5.4.4 Determine background radiation levels'in accordance with Attachment 2. 5.4.5 Wear protective clothi.ng in. controlled area de all times in accordance with Attachment 7. 5.4.6 When monitoring for external contamination using the RM-14 with the HP-270 probe, ensure:-
- a. range selector is on.X1 position
- b. response time is fast ;
- c. volume switch is at maximum position
- d. alarm is set at 150 cpm above background.
5.4.7 Monitor each arriving emergency worker / evacuee as follows: I l Rev. 8 o
,_ ,,.m___ . _ - , - -. _, , , r._, _., . . . , ,
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 7 of 49
- a. Have the individual stand with arms and legs ;
ap art .
- b. Hold the HP-270 probe about a 1/2 inch away from body.
- c. Scan slowly over entire body. This should t ake about 90 seconds,
- d. Pay particular attention to:
o bottom of shoes o pant s cuff s o ' knees and elbows o hair o nose. and mout h l
- e. While' scanning individual, if t he meter reading is fluctuating widely and is difficult to -read, switen response time to slow and monitor the particular area for 30 seconds.
- f. If reading exceeds 150 cpm above background, l the individual is considered contaminated.
l 5.4.8 If individual is not externally contaminated, proceed to section 5.4.10. l 5.4.9 If individual is contaminated, direct t he contaminated individual to the Decontamina: ion
^
Area and inform the Decontamination Leader or his designee that a contaminated person has arrived ' and the zone from which he/she evacuated. If warranted after further monitoring, issue plastic shoe covers and/or paper coveralls to the contaminat ed individual. Rev. 6
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 8 of 49 l 5.4.10 If anamination, con: individualperform is free aofthyroid external scan using the following table: l RM-14 ' l RESPONSE MONITORING CONTAMINATIOd SETTING TIME LIMIT INDIVIDUAL PROBE Fas; 5 Sec. ,150 cpm.above Adult HP-270 i l backg round shield closed l I l HP-210 Slow 30 Sec. Any reading above Child, background (under 12) plastic shield in place l
- a. Place probe horizon: ally on neck be: ween i
adam's apple and top of collar bone. If adult reading is difficul to determine, b. switch response time to ' slow' and monitor for 30 seconds.
- c. If it will expedite monitoring operations, designate several monitoring personnel to ---
moni:or only children.
- d. If individual's t-hyroid radiation level is below the contamination limit , proceed to Section 5.4.14. l ;
l [ 5.4.11 Inform the Decontamination Leader if excessive thyroid con: amination is detected. Tne Decon- l l tamination Leader will contact che Decon:amina-tion Coordinator at the EOC,and request l transportation for the individual to a medical i i facility capable of handling a con:aminated Person. If the individual had been found to be free of ex:ernal contamination initially, direct the contaminated individual to the Decon: amination Area at t his t ime . 5.4.12 At the Decon: amination Area, remonitor the individual's thyroid and complete :he necessary information on an Emergency Worker / Evacuee Exposure Report Form (see Actachment 5). If an for the exposure record was previsouly filled out individual being monitored, record the t hyroid scan result s on that - record. Rev. 6 l l
l l l
.i OPIP 3.9.2 Page 9 of 49 ~
5.4.13 Send a copy of the Exposure Report Form with the individual to the medical facility. 5.4.14 If monitoring showed the individual to be free of both external and internal contamination, issue the individual a tag signifying that he is clean (see Attachment 6) . Direct the individual to.the Dosimetry Record Keepers.to record his name, address, and telephone number on a Clean Emergency Worker Monitoring Record Form / Clean Evacuee Log Out Form, see Attachment 4 5.4.15 The EWDF monitoring personne1'will have LER0/LILCO family members bring their vehicle to the Vehicle Decontamination Area for monitoring prior to going through personnel monitoring.- 5.4.16 Emergency Workers will either remain at the Decont. amination Facility waiting for reassignment or they will be released from duty. 5.5 Initial Monitoring Personnel Assigned to Evacuee Reception Genters 5.5.1 Assist in set up of the Reception Center as detailed in OPIP 4.2.3. 5.5.2 Obtain yo'ur dosimetry and fill our record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.5.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in accordance with Attachment 1. 5.5.4 Determine background radiation levels in accordance with Attachment 2. 5.5.5 When monitoring for external contamination using the RM-14 with the HP-210 probe, ensure:
- a. range selector is on_X1 position
- b. response time is fast
- c. volume switch is at maximum position
- d. alarm is set at 360 cpm above background.
5.5.6 Each two man monitoring team will set up at the stations detailed in OPIP 4.2.3. Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 9a of 49 5.5.7 Each team will scan incoming cars and drivers as follows:
- a. One monitor will take a smear wipe of the top of the hood, and wheel well of the car, and monitor the cloth with the HP-210 probe.
(The cloth may be reused until contaminated.)
- b. The second monitor with an HP-210 probe will scan the hands of driver and area below the driver's feet.
- c. If no contamination is found, issue a clean tag.
- d. Direct the driver toward.the Reception Center Recorder.
5.6 Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to , Decontaminate Evacuees / Emergency Workers 5.6.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facil- l ity in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1 or OPIP 4.2.3. 5.6.2 Obtain your dosimetry and fill out record forms l in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.6.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in l accordance with Attachment 1. 5.6.4 Determine background radiation levels in l accordance with Attachment 2. 5.6.5 Wear protective clothing, including booties, I overalls and rubber gloves, when working in controlled areas in accordance with Attachment 7. Rev. 3 i 1
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 10 of 49 5.6.6 For each person with surface. contamination, I remonitor thoroughly and indicate location on an
- Emergency Worker Evacuee Exposure Record Form, Attachment 5. Complete Parts I, II and III of that form. Attempt-to keep the form free of contamination.
5.6.7 Instruct the individual to remove any contamina- ~!
- ted clothing. Place the clothing in a bag. Prop-erly label the bag and place in a controlled area.
5.6.8 Issue a receipt for all confiscated clothing, l Attachment 6. 5.6.9 Monitor the skin underneath the contaminated l clothing. 5.6.10 If the skin area is contaminated, instruct the individual to wash ~the contaminated area. If the contamination is localized, use a sink instead of a shower. Using the following methods listed below -use the first method once and remonitor. , If contamination remains above' acceptable level, then proceed to the next method, etc.
- a. Wash using a mild soap and soft scrub brush.
Rinse thoroughly with lukewarm water. I
- b. Wash using a waterless hand cleaner. Rinse thoroughly using lukewarm water.
- c. Wash using a paste made of a detergent.
j Rinse thoroughly using lukewarm water.
- d. Wash using lava soap. Rinse thoroughly using lukewarm water.
5.6.11 If contamination is detected in the area of the i nose or mouth, indicate location on the Emergency H Worker / Evacuee Exposure Record Form, Attachment 5 and perform a swipe test of both. Using a separate cotton applicator or strip of filter paper, swab the mouth and each nostril. Place each swab in an envelope labeled with the 4 person's name, the date, the area swabbed, the Decontamination Facility's name, and the name of the person performing the swipe test. Transmit . the samples to the Radiation Health Coordinator l at the.EOC for evaluation. 5.6.12 Record the results of each decontamination attempt on the individual's Contamination Report Form,-Attachment 5. Rev. 8 i
OPIP 3.'9.2 Page 11 of 49 5.6.13 If the individual is successfully decontaminated, issue clean coveralls if necessary and perform a thyroid monitoring scan. 5.6.14 IF THE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL CONTAMINATED after I four attempts at decontamination, contact the Decontamination Leader. Issue clean overalls to the contaminated individual. The Decontamination-Leader will contact the Decontamination Coordinator at the Emergency Operations Center and request assignment of the individual to a l medical facility-capable of handling contaminated personnel. 5.6.15 If the individual is found to have a minor l contaminated wound, treat as follows:
- a. Locate general area of contamination in or around wound.
- b. Remove all clothing around wound.
- c. Remonitor wound area.
- d. When it is determined that a person has radioactive material in a fresh wound, clean the wound in a manner similar to cleaning an ordinary dirt-laden wound or removing a foreign body.
- e. Remonitor wound area after washing. If wound is clean, less than 150 cpm above background, apply light dressing.
- f. If the wound still shows signs of contamination, record the locations on an Exposure Report Form, Attachment 5, and inform the Decontamination Lead'r.
e He/she will contact the Decontamination Coordinator and request transportation for the individual to a medical facility capable of treating a contaminated injury. 5.7 Monitorinz/ Decontamination Personnel Assigned to Monitor Incoming Vehicles at the EWDF i 5.7.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination l Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1.
'Rev. 8
. OPIP 3.9.2 Page 12 of 49 I 5.7.'2 Obtain dosimetry and fill out record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.7.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in ! accordance with Attachment 1. Vehicle monitors will use an HP-210 probe for the initial scan. An HP-270 probe will be used for the inside of vehicles and for the exterior when positive indication of contamination on swipes. 5.7.4 Determine background radiation levels.in l accordance with Attachment 2. T 5.7.5 Confirm location of clean and contaminated l parking areas with the Decontamination Leader-before beginning monitoring operations. 5.7.6 If is is not possible to monitor vehicles as they I arrive, park all vehicles in a controlled area before beginning monitoring operations. Encourage-evacuees to leave luggage and other personal articles in their vehicles. Direct emergency workers to leave equipment in a designated area after the vehicle has been issued a Clean Tag. 5.7.7 If the vehicle was parked before being monitored, I clearly mark the car as contaminated (see Attachment 6) and restrict access of non-monitoring / decontamination; personnel to the vehicle. 5.7.8 Wear protective clothing in accordance with l Attachment 7 when monitoring the inside of a contaminated vehicle. 5.7.9 Before monitoring for contamination, make sure [ the range selector on the RM-14 meter is in the "X 1" position and that the response switch is set to." fast." 5.7.10 Prevent contamination of the RM-14 or probe. Do l not allow probe to come in contact with any surface (e.g., tires, fenders) suspected of being contaminated. 5.7.11 If using the HP-270, hold the probe about 1/2 l inch away from the vehicle and scan slowly. Consider the vehicle contaminated when reading of 360 CP:t above background is exceeded. Rev. 8
~ . . -- .. .
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 13 of 49 5.7.12 Take smear wipe of automobile hood and another ] smear wipe of automobile tire / wheel well. Hold the cloth about 1/2 inch away from HP-210 probe, the automobile is considered contaminated if a reading of 360 CPM above background is found. l 5.7.13 Except for buses, monitor the inside of a vehicle i , only if the outside is contaminated. Monitor the inside of al'1 buses.. 5.7.14 IF THE VEHICLE IS NOT CONTAMINATED, tag the ( vehicle with a Clean Tag (see At.tachment 6) . Direct the driver to the clean parking _ area if 4 vehicles are being monitored as they arrive. ) 5.7.15 IF THE VEHICLE IS CONTAMINATED, obtain a Vehicle l j Contamination Report Form, Attachment 5, and j record th'e indicated information. Check articles in contaminated vehicle for radiation. 5.7.16 If the vehicle was parked before being monitored,
' contact the owner of the vehicle. Determine by 1
questioning the owner, where the vehicle may have become contaminated. Transmit this information to the Decontamination Leader. 5.8 Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to Decontaminate Incoming Vehicles i 5.8.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination l 1 Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1, or OPIP , 4.2.3. l 5.8.2 Obtain dosimetry and fill out record f orms in l l accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.8.3 Perform pre-operational checks .of RM-14 in accor- l dance with Attachment 1. Attach HP-270 probe. 5.8.4 Determine background radiation levels in l accordance with Attachment 2. 5.8.5 Wear protective clothing, including booties, l overalls and rubber gloves, when working in controlled areas in accordance with Attachment 7 5.8.6 Monitor vehicle-to determine location of contamination. 5.8.7 Decontaminate vehicles using the following methods, as applicable: 1 Rev. 8
,. . - _ _ ., , , , . . , . , , . . . , , . . _ . . . _ _ ~ _ , 7 r, .,7-
. OPIP 3.9.2 Page 14 of 49 I CAUTION ALWAYS CLEAN FROM AREA 0F LEAST CONTAMINATION TOWARDS AREA 0F HIGHEST CONTAMINATION.
- a. For smooth painted surfaces, wipe the surface using a wet soapy sponge or cloth.
- b. For rough surfaces, such as the plank floor of a truck, carefully sweep the surface.
- c. For upholstery and other similar surfaces, vacuum cleaning should be attempted first, followed by careful cleaning with a mild detergent or solvent soldtion.
5.8.8 After completing a decontamination cycle on a l vehicle, remonitor the vehicle. Record the results on the Vehicle Contamination Report, Attachment 5. 5.8.9 IF THE VEHICLE IS NOT CONTAMINATED, lete the l Vehicle Contamination Report. Placecomp' a CLEAN" tag on the vehicle (see Attachment 6), and release the vehicle for unrestricted use. 5.8.10 IF THE VEHICLE IS STILL CONTAMINATED, inform the l Decontamination Leader. 5.8.11 If the vehicle is an essential vehicle, make a l maximum of three (3) decontamination attempts. 5.8.12 If the vehicle is not essential, move vehicle to I the Contaminated Vehicle Parking Area after one decontamination attempt. 5.8.13 Record all monitoring / decontamination information l on the Vehicle Contamination Report. 5.8.14 Report all results from decontamination attempts I to the Decontamination Leader. 5.8.15 Transmit all completed Vehicle Contamination l Reports to the Deconta'nination Leader. Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 15 of 49 5.9 Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Aesi_gned to Monitor I Equipment / Personnel Articles I 5.9.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facility in accordance with OPIP 4.3.1 or OPIP 4.2.3. ,. 5.9.2 Obtain dosimetry and fill out record forms in I accordance with OPIP 3.9.1. 5.9.3 Perform pre-operational checks of RM-14 in accordance with Attachment 1. I 5.9.4- Determine background radiation levels in accordance with Attachment 2. 5.9.5 Wear protective clothing in controlled areas at I all times in accordance with Attachment 7. , 5.9.6 Monitor all equipment used by emergency workers I
; in the Emergency Planning Zone. Monitor an evacuee's personnel effects (e.g. luggage) only if either the evacuee or his/her vehicle is found to be contaminate'd.
5.9.7 If an article is found to have contamination in I excess of 360 cpm above background, consider the item contaminated. 5.9.8 After monitoring equipment / personal articles, ! label items as either clean or contaminated. 5.9.9 Issue the owner or person responsible for the I contaminated article a receipt (see Attachment 6). 5.9.10 Complete an Equipment / Personal Article I Contamination Report Form, Attachment 5, for each contaminated item.
, 5.9.11 Inform the Decontamination Leader when contam- 1 ination is detected on an item.
5.9.12 Maintain a scanning speed of approximately 8-10 I inches per second. 5.9.13 Release all clean equipment / personal articles f or l unrestricted use. Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 16 of 49 5.9.14 Move all contaminated equipment / personal articles i into a controlled area to await decontamination. Attach a contaminated tag, Attachment 6. 5.9.15 Forward all Equipment / Personal Article Contamin- l ation Reports to the Decontamination personnel. 5.9.16 Forward all completed Clean Equipment / Personal l Equipment Monitoring Reports to the Decon-tamination Leader. 5.10 Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel Assigned to I Decontaminate Equipment / Personal Articles 5.10.1 Assist in the set up of the Decontamination Facil-l ity in accordance with OPIP 4.2.3 or OPIP 4.3.1. 5.10.2 I Obtain dosimetry and fill out record forms in accordance with OPIP 3.10.1. 5.10.3 Perform a pre-operational check of each RM-14 I survey meter in accordance with Attachment 1.
, 5.10.4 Determine background radiation levels in 8 accordance with Attachment 2.
5.10.5 Wear protective clothing when working in the l controlled area in accordance with Attachment 7. 5.10.6 Obtain Equipment / Personal Article Contamination l Report Forms from the Equipment / Personal Article monitoring personnel. 5.10.7 If the item is an essential' piece of equipment or l if so ordered by the Decontamination Leader, attempt to decontaminate the item. 5.10.8 If the item is not an essential piece of l equipment, store the item in a controlled area. - 5.10.9 Attempt to decontaminate an item using one or i more of the following methods as appropriate:
- a. Wipe with damp soapy sponge
- b. Vacuum well, then wipe with damp soapy sponge i
CAUTION ALWAYS CLEAN FROM AREA 0F LEAST CONTAMINATION TOWARDS AREA 0F HIGHEST CONTAMINATION. I Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 17 of 49 5.10.10 Release item for unrestricted use if I contamination level is brought below 360 cpm above background. 5.10.11 Move item to a controlled area if it is still I contaminated.after three (3) decontamination attempts. 5.10.12 Record the results on the Contamination Report l Forms, Attachment 5. 5.10.13 Transmit all completed Equipment / Personal Article l Contamination Report Forms to the Decontamination Leader.
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure Control 6.2 OPIP 4.2.3, Evacues Reception Center Activation 6.3 OPIP 4.3.1, Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility Activation 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. RM-14 Count Rate Meter Operating Procedure
- 2. Determination of Background Radiation Level
- 3. Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagrams:
Figure 1 - Emergency Workers / Evacuees Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagrams Figure 2 - Vehicle Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagrams Figure 3 - Equipment / Personal Articles Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagram Figure 4 - Evacuee Reception Center Initial Monitoring Flow Diagram
- 4. Clean Monitoring Record Forms:
Form 1 - Clean Emergency Worker Monitoring Record Form Form 2 - Clean Evacuee Log Out Form Rev. 8
OPIP 3.9.2 Page id of 49 5 Exposure / Contamination Forms: Form 1 - Emergency Worker Exposure Record Form 2 - Evacuee Exposure Record Form 3 - Automobile Cont amination Report Form Form 4 - Truck Contamination Report Form Form 5 - Bus Contamination Report Form
- Form 6 - Van Contamination Report Form Form 7 - Motorcycle Contamination Report Form Form 8 - Equipment / Personal Articles Contamination Report Form
- 6. Clean / Contaminated Tags, Receipts and Inventorf Forms:
Form 1 - Clean Person / Vehicle / Article Tag Form 2 - Contaminated Vehicle / Article Tag Form 3 - Receipt for Contaminated Articles Form 4 - Contaminated Article Inventorf Form
- 7. Use of Protective Clothing and Step-Off Pads
- 8. Determination of Contamination Limits i
i f i iI i l i l l I Rev. 6 l l
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 19 of 49 Attachment 1 Page 1 of 4 RM-14 COUNT RATE METER OPERATING PROCEDURE i l 1 1.0 PURPOSE To provide-instructions for proper operation of the Eberline ' j Model RM-14 count rate meter. , 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Decontamination and Monitoring Personnel are responsible for implementation of this procedure. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS 1 l 3.1 When using a Geiger-Mueller (GM) Detector, intense fields i of radiation may blank out the detector giving a zero or j downscale reading. j Normally, a background count rate of some magnitude will
- always be present.
- 3.2 Care should be taken not to contaminate the detector.
l 4.0 PREREQUISITES 1 4 4.1 Before using an instrument, assure that the date of use is before the calibration due date (as shown on the side I of the instrument). -If the due.date has passed, notify the Decontamination Leader, who contacts the l Decontamination Coordinator in the EOC for further r i instructions. , -! 4.2 Before using.an instrument, inspect for damage or prob-lems. If damage or a problem is found which may affect instrument operation, notify the Decontamination i i Coordinator, who reports to the Radiation Health t Coordinator for further instructions.
! 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Discussion ~
t 5.1.1 The Eberline Model RM-14 is a small, compact count rate meter operated by AC line voltage or a Ni-Cd : battery which is continuously trickle charged while the unit is plugged into the line voltage. ' Rev. 5
. , , - ,,-=,-,,,,n-. ---m--,------n---,, . - - , - - , , - - , ,.,,,-,n,,- - - - - - , . .,.--,.--,e r - ,-
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 20 of 49 l Attachment 1 - Page 2 of 4 RM-14 COUNT RATE METER (continued) 5.1.2 The radiation count rate (cpm) is read on the front panel meter (0-500 cpm full scale) . Switch I selected ranges of X1, X10 and X100 are provided.
- The response time of the meter can be selected by a " Fast / Slow" response switch.
5.1.3 Both the HP-210 and HP-270 probes are used with ! the RM-14 for personnel monitoring at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility and the l Relocation Center Decontamination Facilities. 5.1.4 Topics covered in the procedure: 5.2 Operational Set-up 5.3 Battery Check 5.4 Range Selection 5.2 Operational Set-Up 5.2.1 Place selector switch in "0FF" position. 5.2.2 Connect either the HP-210 or HP-270 detector to ' the instrument as appropriate. l 5.2.3 (Optional) Connect the power cable to the l instrument and plug into 115 VAC power supply.
.5.2.4 Set the meter alarm knob, located on the back of the instrument, to the desired alarm point.
5.2.5 Turn volume knob to maximum position. l 5.3 Battery Check 5.3.1 Turn the selector switch to the "BATT" position; the meter should read in the BATT OK range. NOTE: The instrument does not function properly even when plugged into 115 VAC, unless the batteries check O.K. Rev. 5
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 21 of 49 At t ac hment 1 Page 3 of 4 RM-14 COUNT RATE METER (cont inued) 5.3.2 If the batteries check low, no:iff the Decontamination Leader for further inst ruct ions. 5.4 Range Selection 5.4.1 .When monit oring with this inst rumen:, it may be necessarf to change ranges using :ne switen on 1 the face of the instrumen: to bring the indica:- ing needle "on-scale". NOTE: If the alarm circuit is act uat ed, press. the reset but t on . 5.5 Radiat ion Response Functional Test t 5.5.1 Perform an upscale response ces; with the .
; radioactive check source. Follow inscruccions available with the check source container.
4
6.0 REFERENCES
None 7.0 ATTACHMENTS i 1. Figure 1, Eberline Model RM-14 and HP-210 and HP-270 l Probes I I i Rev. 6
, 4 l l l l OPIP 3.9.2 Page 22 of 49 l l AttachmenC 1 I Page 4 of 4 I OPERATION OF EBERLINE MODEL RM-14 (continued) FIGURE 1 EBERLINE MODEL RM-14 AND PROBES W . . . . . . , .~ =-w g.;_ .- .= - 4
., .w _ ^ - " - - ~
HP.270 dY . I I i
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t VARIABLE HIGH LEVEL ALARM j SPEAKER WITH VOLUME CONTROL TRICKLE CHARGED BATTERY TIME CONSTANT SELECTION RECORDER OUTPUT SCALER OUTPUT TILT STAND i
OPIP 3.9.2 Page 23 of 49 Attachment 2 Page 1 of 1 DETERMINATION OF BACKGROUND RADIATION LEVEL
- 1. Set the RM-14 to the 'X1' scale.
- 2. Set the response time to ' slow.'
- 3. Readout will fluctuate slightly; use approximate average of upper bound measurement.s.
4 Use the following table. I i i i I TYPE OF SHIELD l MAXIMUM ALLOUABLE l MONITORING PROBE POSITION BACKGROUND 1 i l
. External l HP-270 I Open I 50 CPM i
Thyroid-Adult I HP-270 Closed 50 CPM l l HP-210 Attach Plastic Thyroid-Child i Shield i 150 CPM i Reception Center l l land EUDF Initiall HP-210 l None l 150 CPM i IScan ! I I i i i Vehicle-Interiorl HP-270 l Open I 50 CPM i land Dacon. I I i i
- 5. Ensure back d round radiation level with HP-270 probe is' performed for both shield open and closed.
- 6. Determine background level every 15 minutes.
- 7. If maximum allowable background is exceeded, attempt to find and I remove source of radiation. Otherwise move monitoring location.
Rev. 8
i OPIP 3,9,2 ! Page 24 of 49 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 4 i
- MONITORING / DECONTAMINATION FLOW DIAGRAMS i
Figure Title 1 EmergencyWorker/EvacueeMonitoring/DecontamknationFlow Diagram i , 2 Vehicle Monitoring / Decontamination Flow Diagram l 3 Equipment / Personal Articles Monitoring / Decontamination
- Flow Diagram I
4 Evacuee Reception Center Initial Monitoring Flow Diagram I i I l 1 f i A i l k 1 i Rev, 8 1 .i
F]GJRE 1 , OPIP 3.9.2 EMERGENCY WORKER / EVACUEE h0NITORING/0ECONTAMINATION Pcgo 25 cf 49 Mecc h m 3 FLOW OIAGRAh Page 2 of 4 tutt.
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FIGURE 2 OPIP 3.9.2 Page 26 of 49 Attach:: lent 3 VEHICLE MONITORING /DECONTANINATION FLOW DIAGRAM Page 3 of 4 ACCESS RCAD i Y ORivEMAY 6 ARRiv!N SE DON EMICLES l hCN k h h PARMING AREA TES " LEAVE VEalC.E IN CCNTRCiLEC AREA A IS THERE YES TIME /PER$0NNEL NC m
, , v Y
n0NITOR EXTERICR OF VEMICLE i OCES A80 SLE ' lev [L5 C(EAN PARKIN AREA YES N Y PRCCEED TO WASN AREA i Y MCNITCR INTERICR NOTE:
- 1. ENERCENCY v!=!C. E! = ave
> WASM VENICLE $$0}g*I'N,yjI0""IO'III +
Y MONITOR vtMICLE 6 NET EAD NO ABOVE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL 3 TES I5 ES E b L M YES v LEAVE VEwlCLE IN CCNtan1NatE0 PARM]NG AREA HAS NO VEMICLE BEEN TES WA$MED 3 tines hl REV. 5
FIGURE 3 OPIP 3.9.2 l Page 27 of 49 Attachment 3 ' Page 4 of 4
-EQUIPMENT / PERSONAL ARTICLES MONITORING /0ECONTAMINATION FLOW OIAGRAM -
i l
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> WA3M ITEM i
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=
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OPIP 3.9.2 Page 27a of 49 Attachment 3 Page 4a of 4 FIGURE 4 EVACUEE RECEPTION CENTER INITIAL MONITORING FLOW DIAGRAM ENTER s
\/
STOP AT INITIAL . MONITORING STATION J, de 4 SMEAR SWIPE MONITOR RANDS OF HOOD AND AND FEET OF WHEEL WELL DRIVER
+ &
EITHER READING NO ABOVE 360 CPM YES
\/ s/
OBTAIN PROCEED TO DECON. CLEAN TAG j TRAILER FOR
, ws DETAILED MONITORING.
SEE FIGURE 1 OBTAIN MAP TO l CONGREGATE CARE CENTER IF NEEDED s/ PROCEED TO
- FACILITY EXIT Rev. 8 1
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OPIP 3.9.2 Page 30 of 49 Attachment 5 Page 1 of 9 EXPOSURE / CONTAMINATION FORMS Form Title 1 Emergency Worker Exposure Record 2 Evacuee Exposure Record 3 Automobile Contamination Report Form j 4 Truck Contamination Report Form ! 5 Bus Contamination Report Form [ 6 Van Contamination Report Form 7 Motorcycle Contamination Report Form ; 8 Equipment / Personal Articles Contamination Report Form Rev. 5
l FORM el OPIP 3*9*~? EWERGENCY WORVER EXPOSURE RECORD Pago 31 of 49
!. RE01stu tteN ITo et CenPLETEc er FAC!t!TY rExsch.Et! Attachment 5 Page 2 of 9 OATE T!nt CECONTAMINAf!ON FACILITY
- 1. NAnt (LAST) (FIRST) .tM! COLE INT.)
- 2. AGE 3. SEI C MALE C FEMALE 4 PREONANT C YES C NO
- 5. Mont ACCRE33
- 6. CITY 7. STATE 8. ZIP CCCE
- 9. TELEPHONE Nun 8ER IMonEl (l I ! l} I i i l-l I i t i
- 10. TELErncNE NureER teusthEssi (l I i l} I f I l-1 ! ! ! l II. SOCIAL SECURITY Nun 9ER l t ! l-l i l-l l l t i
- 12. RI TAMEN O YE5 O NO 13. T!nt INITIAL CCSE WAS TAMEN
- 14. DATE INITIAL CCSE NAS TAnEN 15. MCW MANY CAYS n! TAMEN
- 15. Mayt RAO!OPMARnACEuf!CALS BEEN TACMEN 2 O TES MC !
!!. BRIEFLT CESCRISE PERSON'S WNEREABOUTS AND ACT!v!f!ES. !!!. PERSCNNEL nCNTY0e!=3 ( TO BE ConPLETED BY FACILITY PERSONNEL) l BACMGRQuN3 RAO!Af!0N LEVEL WITM MP 278 PRCEEs SMIELO OPEN com SMIELD CLCSE3 'D*
n$hNckh,$No ll CouNfs nthus sACMRQUNQ AFTER OCCONTAnjNaf!CN l , CLCTMEO UNCL3fME3 ll FIRST nEfMCO l 8ECCN3 MEfmCO fMIRO METMcc FOURTMMETHC3l "C"IIC"I"E SkbNfs l ll l ll wMOLE 80*T l esml enmil epm l som : esml com!l esm FEET l coml comil coml epm com l cod MANO3 l e s-! es=ll comi coml com l es CnCCx CE00NfantNAf!ON nETMCotsi usE:n C mASM ISCLAtt AREA 31 RETMCO: C hARS NATER ANC N!L3 $CA* m/$0FT B W$M C =ATERLES$ PANO CLEa%!R C 5*0a!R ta!0 ESP'EA31 C M!ic CETERGENT A=: =ATER. >EAv' LAf>Ee. s0FT 99.34 O LAVA SOAP OECONTAMINAftCN PEMSCNNEL*S IN!?!ALS 800' # CNECM AP**CPRIATE IMOICATE AREAS OF CONTAMINATION /IPUURY FINAL ACTION:
- 1. INJURT C [Nggyggggt ggggyrangy47gg C- CONTAMINAf!CN gy INO!V!CUAL SENT TO HC$PITAL CUE TQs
, , O INJURY , i O TMvRo!o CCNTintNATICN _ //f ' dt "l O CCNT Nuto w OLE 800f g gg CCNTAntNATION 150com u CREATER f AOCvt 8ACMGR3bhD INit!ALS P A- Ab R ev. $
stess.cnr.sn ses.se
OPIP 3.9.2 EVACUEE E SU E REcc7;o Page 32 of 49 ! !. RE0rsr=At:0N e r0 at CerPLETED Sr raciuty PERs:N=Eu Attachment 5 i , Page 3 of 9 CATE f!nt OECONTAn!Naft N FACILITY
- 1. NAME (LA3fl (FIRST) in! COLE INT.I
- 2. AOC 3. SEX C MALE C FEMALE 4. PRE 0NANT C TES C N0
- 5. Mont ACORE35
- 8. CITY 7. af4ft 8. !!P C::(
- 9. TELEPHCNE NuP8ER IM:FEl (l i i l) I ! I l-l ! ! l l
- 10. TELEPM04E Nur$ER 18ustNE558 (l i I I} I ! ! l-l ! ! I i
- 11. SC0!AL $ECUR!TY NUF*ER l l l l-l ! l=l l I l l
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OPIP 3.9.2 FORM = 3 Page 33 of 49 AUTOMOBILE CONTAWINATION REPORT FORM Attachment 5 Page 4 of 9 LICENSE . STATE OR!vER'S NAME LILCO EnPLOYEE = LERJ TITLE / ASSIGNMENT A00RESS (IF NON-LERO) INITIAL EXTERICR SURVEY RESULTS (CPn n!NU$ BACMGROUN31 l3 i If I!cc :} O 'O @[ O i u u u u' LEFT $10E RIGHT $10E FRONT REAR COnnENTS: MON! TOR *3 !NITIAL$ INSTRunENT N00EL NO. S/N PRCSE TYPE INITIAL INTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS (CPM n!NUS BACMOROUNDI con.".ENT 5 : n0NITCR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT CECON METMOO !!5T. ATTEnPfis RESULTS (CPn n!NUS BACMGROUN01: MON! TOR'S INITIALS INSTRUnENT nc0EL NO. S/N PRCBE TYPE DECON nETH00 (2ND. ATTEMPTis RESULTS (CPM n!NUS 8ACMGROUN01: nCNITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT MODEL NO. S/N PROSE TYPE CECON nETH00 13RC. ATTEMPils RESULTS (CPn n!NU$ BACMGROUN01: MONITOR'S INITIALS INSTRunENT n00EL NO. S/N P"0BE TY*E FINAL ACTION VEHICLE CECCNTAn!NATE0. CONTINUED EXTERNAL / INTERNAL CONTAn. 360 CPM CR GREATER ABOVE SACMGROUNO. _ !NITIALS SENO ConPLETED FORM TO THE RACIAT!CN HEALTH CCOR0!NATOR. PAGE _ OF _ Rev. 5 ll680.CMT.97 n -w -.
OPIP 3.9.2 FORM a 4 Page 34 of 49 TRUCK CONTAWINATION Attachment 5 REPORT FORM Page 5 of 9 LICENSE e STATE ORIVER'S NAME LILCO EMPLOYEE = LERO TITLE /AS$!GNMENT ADDRESS (IF NON-LER03 INITIAL EXTERICR SURVEY RESULTS (CPn n!NUS BACMGROUNDI L J LEFT SIDE RIGHT $!DE FRONT REAR ConnENTS: n0NITOR'S INITIALS INSTRUMENT N00EL NO. 5/N PROSE TYPE INITIAL INTERIOR SURVEY RESULTS}}