ML20205A743

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Summary of 880928 Meeting W/Util Re 880825 Reactor Trip & Followup Actions by Licensee.Viewgraphs Encl
ML20205A743
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/12/1988
From: Paulson W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8810260084
Download: ML20205A743 (40)


Text

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,  %, UNITED STATES

'DocM g, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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'l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20$55 k..../ October 12, 1988 Docket tio. 50-458 LICENSEE: Gulf States Utilities Cortpany FACILITY: River Bend Station, Unit 1

SUBJECT:

SUFF.ARY OF SPETEMBER ?8, 1988 PEETING REGARDING THE AUGUST ?5, 1988 REACTOR TRIP On September 28, 1988, trembers of the NRC staff tret with Gulf States Utilities personnel. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the August PS,1968 reactcr trip and followup actions by the licensee. A list of attendees if enclosed (enclosure 1).

Cn August PS,19EP, the River Bend Station train generator exciter brushes failed which caused a generator / turbine trip, turbine stop valve closure, turtsine control velve fast closure, and a reactor scram from 1005 power. .

Several conplications occurred during the event: ,

1. Fast transfer and slow transfer of switchgear INNS-SWG1A to the alternate power supply did not occur resulting in loss of power to tne high pressure ccre spray (HPCS) bus. HPCS diesel generator initiation occurred on bus undervoltage. Fast transfer was blocked (as designed) due to drop on alternate supply when train ger,erator tripped. Slow transfer did not occur because of a sticking contact on an ur.dervoltage relay.

P. The failure to fast or slow transfer to the preferred Station trans-forrer also caused the loss of the turbine plant component cooling water. Cooling water was lost to the instrunent air compressors which subsequently tripped because of over heating. After about 10 minutes, the instrurent air corpressors were restarted with the conponent cooling water flow reestablished. Air pressure had decayed about 40 psig down to 80 psig.

3. A spurious reactor vessel water level 2 (about 120 inches above the top of the active fuel) occurred durin0 the scram which initiated the HPCS and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. HPCS and RCIC injected for about 30 seconds at which time a high water level 8 signal was received and injection was terminated. The licensee has concluded that the very fast acting Rosenount 1154 transmitters, used in the HPCS and RCIC trip systems, first sensed the transient pressure wave through the reference leg which caused the level transmitter to indicate a lower water level than actually existed. Actual water level es reasured on narrow range instrunentation showed that the water level decreased from +34 inches to +10 inches (level ? is at -43 inches). A sirilar initiation of HPCS and RCIC occurred during a scram following a generator trip on September 6, 1988.

0010260034 G81012 PDR ADOCK 05000458 diY P FDC

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-T-4 Approximately 40 minutes after the HPCS pump motor was turned off, it was noted that a section of the HPCS piping was hot between the HPCS purp and the injection valve indicating that hot reactor coolant had flowed into the HPCS piping. The licensee postulated that this oc o rred when the level 8 signal was reset with the level

? signal still sealed in causing the HPCS insection valve to open again. At this tine the HPCS pump was off. The licensee postulated that the water in the HPCS back flowed out through the rinimum flow line end/or leaked past the t'0V in the test return line to the suppress. ion pool while the injection valve was open. Indications are that the injection valve subsequently reopened again for about 74 seconds; the cause for this repoening is not resolved. The licensee further postulated that a hot water / steam interface existed in this line during the hot water intrusion. There was no indication of hot HFCS piping following the September C, 1900 scram.

Enclosure T is the sequence of events for this scram provided by the licensee. The detailed viewgraphs used by the licensee are also enclosed (enclosure 3).

The licensee actions following the scran, are as follows:

1. Undervoltage relays were replaced. The preventive maintenance frequency was charced from T years to 6 months.
7. An analysis cf the instrutent t.ir systen was already under way in response to Generic Letter 00-14, Instrunent Air Supply Problers Affecting Safety-Pelated Equipnent. This effort is being expanded into a tash force to include inferration fror the August 75,19FP scram,
3. The operators will bc trained regarding the spurious HPCS and PCIC initiation. In the internediate tern., a danpsning cepacitor will be added at the trip unit signal input. The final action will be tc add new anplifier and calibration cards in the 1154 transnitters to darpen the signal.

4 The licensee analyred the hot HPCS pipe event with regard to raterials, pipe stresses, fatigue usage factors, support loads, displacenent of piping and supports, and the penetration. The licensee concluded that all stresses neet allowable limits; all supports reet allowable linits; rargin remains in piping, supports, and other components to accormodate another similar event; and the event did not represent a substantial hardship to the HPCS system based on low calculated stresses and loads.

Fecause of the ingress of high pressure reactor coolant into the HPCS line, the FPC staff requested the licensee to analyre for potential overpressuritation of the low pressure side of the HPCS syster (Event V).

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Because cf the postulated steam / water interface in the HPCS line, the staff also requested the licensee to analyze for a potential water hamer including ,

the situation if the HPCS purrp was restarted.

Sincerely,

/s/

Walter A. Paulsoa, Project Manager Project Directorate - IV Division of Reactor Projects - III.

IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ enclosures:

See next page D RIBUTION_

odet File NRC PCR Local POR P04 Reading J. Calvo W. Paulscn CGC-Rockville E. Jordan B. Grirres T. Collins E. Ford W. Jones ACRS (10)

T. Partin (Region IV)

PO4 Plant File PD fM PDIV:D VP/ulson:kb JCalvo 10/jr'/C8 10/,t/E8

Because of the postulated steam / water interface in the HPCS line, the staff also requested the licensee to analyre for a potential water hammer including the situation if the HPCS purp was restarted.

Sincerely, hva.Y b' "

. Walter A. Paulson, Project Manager Project Directorate - IV i Division of Peactor Projects - III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

Enclosures:

As statcd cc w/ enclosures:

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4 Mr. James C. Deddens Gulf States Utilities Company River EGnd Nuclear Plant CC:

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. Mr. J. E. Booker Conner and Wetterhahn Manager-River Bend Oversight 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW P. O. Box 2951 Washington, D.C. 20006 Beaumont TX 77704 Fr. Les England Mr. William H. Spell, Administrator Director - Nuclear Licensing Nuclear Energy Division Gulf States Utilities Company Office of Environmental Affairs P. O. Box 220 -

P. O. Box 14690 St. Francisville, LA 70775 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70898 Richard M. Troy, Jr. , Esq.

Assistant Attorney General in Charge Mr. J. David McNeill, I!!

State of Louisiana Department of Justice Villiam G. Davis, Esq.

734 Loyola Avenue Department of Justice New Orleans, Louisiana 70117 Attorney General's Office 7434 Perkins Road Resident inspector Baton Rouge, Lcuisiana 7080E P. O. Box 1051 St. Francisville Louisiana 70775 H. Anne P1ettinger 34E6 Villa Rose Drive Gretchen R. Rothschild-Reinike Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 Louisianians for Safe Energy Inc.

P100 Brcadway Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70118-5462 President of West Feliciana Police Jury Regional Adninistrator, Region IV P. O. Box I??)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com ission St. Francisv111e, Louisiana 70775 Office of Executive Director for Operations Fr. Frank J. Uddo '

611 Pyan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Uddo & Porter Arlirgton, Texas 70011 6305 Elysian Fields Avenue Suite 400 Philip G. Harris New Orleans, Louisiana 70122 Cajun Electric Power Cocp. Inc.

10719 Airline Highway P. O. Box 15540 Baton Rouge, LA 70895

  • Enclosure 1

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Enclosure ?

SC30M 88-04 (BGEL SIDEBCE & EVBfFS 12:32:39.8 -GENERA' ICE /'IURBINE TRIP f!CV & TSV FAST CICSUREE)

-RECUC MMP RPT TRAN5FER 'IO I2M3

-IN HCUSE IIAD TRANSFER 'IO PRITERRID TRANSf0ENER IMS-SWG1A,1C

- WS-ACB07 FAII2D 'IO 'IRANSFER. 1E22*S004 IDSS T POWER

-IOSS T TPCIM PtHPS 12:32:39.9 RE7CIOR SCRAM 'IURBINE FAST CI46URE IDSS & A RPS 12:32:40 RECEIVED HPCS IZVEL 2 INITIATICN REIIIVID BCIC IIVEL 2 INITIATICH .

DIV 1 BOP ISOIATICH I SbGT SYSTIM SIARTS APC SYSITM SIOPS ANNUIDS MIXDG SYSTEN SIARTS l'. 12:10.3 HICS DIESEL GEN D.TTIATICH E22*S004 UNDERYULT74E 12:32:40.9 NNS-SWG1B VOLTME WENT 'IO ZERO 12:32:41 NNS-SWG1B TRANSFIPRID 'IO PRE 2DRID TRANS.

RCIC DU VLV OPDiED 12:32:42 5 SRV's LIFTED & INITIATID ICW-I4W SET ITNCTICN - RX PREE.

1102-1117 12:32:43 RPV LEVEL (NR) DOICATED I4W POINT @ + 10 to 11 DCHES 12:32:50.1 HECS DTML GEN CUTPUT BREAKER CIDGES RESIORING VOUIME 'IO E22*S004 BUS 12:32:53 HICS DUDCr VALVE OPDiS - FI4W DCREASES 'IO 3230 GIM 12:33:22 'C' SSW IU'.P SE'tr 12:33:24 HPCS DUErrICN VALVE C14GES 12:33:38 ICIC DU VLV t7mn 12:36:44 TPCCW IIH DISCHMCE PN 12:37:40 'A' IAS CCMPRESSOR TRIPS 12:39:16 'C' IAS CCMPRIESOR 'IRIPS 12:42:44 'B' IAS CCMPRESSOR TRIPS 12:46:58 NNS-1A MO IC RE-DGEIZID MO CCS MMPS RESPNCID 12:55:27 START 'B' AND 'A' IAS CCMPPIESORS 13:30 REIORT THAT HPCS DUIUTICN LINE IS HOT

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. . l Enclosure 3 AGEMA i

  • NRC 9/28/88 ONSITE MEETING scaAM 88-04
  • INTRODUCTION R. King  !

l SCRAM 88-04 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS P. Graham

  • ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DESIGN - AC SOURCES R. Cole

- General Design ,

- FaiTure to transfitr

- Trip of Instrument Air Compressors

- Loss of RPS sus A HPCS/RCIC INJECTION INITIATION .

- ERIS Data D. Hill '

- Root Cause

- Design Review J. Mead

  • HPCS HnT PIPE PHENOMENON .

- Probable Cause J. Hami? ton

- Pipe Stress Evaluation J. West

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  • DATA FROM SCRAM 88-05 R. King L

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4 IAS COMPRESSOR TRIP ANALYSIS INITIAL CONDITIONS CCS-PIA and PIC running, PIB in standby IAS-CIA loaded to approx. 100% .

IAS-CIC manually loaded to 50% ,

IAS-C1B running essentially unloaded ,

Y SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TROM PROCESS COMPUTER e '

Scram-Trip switchgear-NNS-1A and 1C do not 12:32:39.6 NHS transfer (ICCS-PIA & PIC lose power, PIB auto starts) 12:36: 44 Turbine CCW Pump Disch Low ( < 96 PSIG) 12:36: 42 IAS Compressor 1A TRBL 12:37:40 IAS Compressor 1A Auto Trip i

12:37:51 IAS Compressor IC TRBL 12:39:16 IAS Compressor 1C Auto Trip 12:42:08 IAS Compressor 1B TRBL 12: 42: 44 IAS Compressor 15 Auto Trip 12: 43: 41 IAS Header Low (110 PSIG) 12: 46:58 NNS-1A and 1C Re-energized

- CCS-PIA and -PIC restarted (From ERIS) ,

i 12: 47:06 Turbine CCW Pump Disch Not Low 12:55:27 Start IAS-CIS (IAS Header Press approx. 60 PSIG) [

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. SLMIARY 1NNS-SWG1A did not transfer to alternate power supply upon loss of norwel power. This resulted in loss of power to INNS-SWG1C and IE22*S004 (HPCS bus).

- Fast transfer was blocked due to voltage dip on alternate supply.

This was per design. -

- Slow transfer did not occur due to sticking contact on an undervoltage relay.

ACTION TAKEN .

- Relays replaced.

- Circuits for 'A' and 'B' bus tested satisfactorily.

- PM frequency changed from 2 years to 6 months, NOTE: These relays are not used in safety-related applications at ,

River Bend Station. There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. .

Sl8 MARY IAS compressors tripped on high-temperature proti . ion due to loss of cooling water. This was due to loss of CCS which ru ulted from loss of power to INNS-SWG1A and INNS-SWG10.

- System performed as expected for given circumstances.

- No safety implications since IAS is non-safety related system and the plant safety analysis includes an analysis for loss of instrument air.

ACTION TAKEN .

An analysis of the Instrument Air System was already underway headed by the ISEG. This analysis is lieing expanded into a task force to include the information from th's scram.

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SUMMARY

Reactor Protection System bus 'A' lost power due to the trip of M-G set output breaker and the EPA breakers.

- Voltage transients immediately preceding and at time of generator trip resulted in fluctuations on RPS bus 'A'.

- M-G set output breaker and EPA breakers respended properly to interrupt power source when it exceeded setpoints. Output breaker tripped on over-voltage.  ;

- RPS bus power loss resulted in expected "fail-safe" actuations.

- System performed as expected for given circumstances.

ACTION TAKEN Engineering is working with the manufacturer to determine setpoints and their basis to determine if any additional action should be recommended. .

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'1. HPCS and RCIC Systems initiated as a result of a pressure transiant being 4Mately sensed by the four reactor water level reference lines located near the top of the reactor and not inmediately sensed by the variable lines located near the bottcci of the vessel.

2. Actual reactor. water level indicated approximately +4 inches m wide range instneentation and did not approach the Im Isvel 2 set. point of -43 inches.
3. Im Water level trips were not received on the folicwing 1152 trans=itterst a) B21tiOSOB & Di RPS level 3 Scre Signal, b) B21:1081B & Di tiSSSS Level 2 initiation signals.

c) B21!iO99A, d. E, & F: AWS lawl 2 trips, d) C33:;004A, B, & Ci IRIS / Annunciator 9

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HPCS INJECTION, SCRAM 48-04  ;

12:32:39.8 --Generator Turbine Trip (

12:327,39.9 - Reactor Scram - TSV Fast Closure ,

l 12:32:40 - HPCS Level 2 Initiation 12:J2:40.3 - HPCS Diesel Initiation .

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12:32:50 - HPCS Diesel Generator output breaker closes j 4 12:32:52 - HPCS Min Flow nive (F012) off closed seat ,

- 12:32:53' -HPCSInjectionvalve(F004)offclosedseat l RPCS Injection 12:32:58 - HPCS Min Flow valve (F012) closed

- - 12:33:23.1 - HPCS Min Flew valve (F012) off closed seat l

- 12 :3J :23.2 - HPCS Irjection valve (F004) closed [

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t F0li I orty  !?:51:35 - HPCS Pump Motor of.

12:51:37 - HPCS Injection valve (F004) off closed seat I

! 12:51:41 - HFCS Min Flow valve IF0121 closed

! F004 OPEN 12:51: 47 - HPCS fr.jection Valve 'F0041 closed (

r i

12:51:59 - HPCS Level 2 Initiatien reset to nomal r

13
24:08 - HPCS Injection valve IF004\ open r l I 13:?4:3? - HPCS Injection valve IF004) closed (

l-13:24 - HPCS diesel generator par,lleled to offsite power j i

t l'

1 i

i .

f i  !

! f i  !

13:30 - Fire watch Aux Building reports HPCS pipe Elevation 114, Approx. 123 hot, smoke operator Hogan sent to investigate.

Accompanied by Ops QA (Grimes). Found smoke on.1?3 Aux. Bldg. HP placard melted. HPCS pipe hot. Suction pipe cold. Min flow warm. Verified stating of HPCS injection valve (F004) using handwheel.

13:3? to - Engineer IMadisettyi observes HPCS pipe hot 13:48 at Elevation !?3 Aux. Bldg.

17:30 - Engir.eering begins temperature measurements of pipe e

I ig s'

i:

o l

%t

. . l 9

rou.ote4 e r HorctoSED o e e r e r v v e e e e e

! Im-s inJEcreo>1 vat.vF_ PtGir Du v v e 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 & .

cooGro . . .

  1. 4 * *
  • r . . . . _

HPCS Mal FtDas .

VA*NE.

S s

. . . . . *,

  • s *.

. ___ S , S__ __s-3 6

J upc", swr > nrw

  • - s -

i

- s_ ..- . s

_. ~ . . . -

~

. m.-. . --- - . ,

I

_s s s o s _s w.. . -. . - f I

CW 3 D M R PrA .

2

> > > i

. , , , 3 i .

e l

Div 3' D/3 S*~Auf SGNAt. .

> > > > .1 4

3 > I a a r s t 3 s a s s s _

HptS partArcea a r a ,

a a i o . . . .

s o r o i . . .

s a_s a i . .

='- A . _ ._

. __ p e

WM "" ** T/S u>cr - 27 SOC -

s 25 '9&o4Ds J,

r. -M. -r...v -5 s. ....s *? L**4 t. t. .

. _ . C.' t. .

g~ t t t t at t' t ' t^

.........g L.' t.' . . ...

a w i.t E. V. V.. .tL.L. tL . .

. . . . . . . . .......... . .. *.. .,..M.,*.. ....,*...M,..M,....,..,...M..M,. ,..* *...,,..M,...,...M,.. M,.MMM.M,M,M,M,M, C. r. s. 6

s. s. . . . . M... .

6 e.. ... .t T. MMMM MM

....MM..

. . . ... ....................,..,,.........ep. M. . .M.M.

a.

.7. s. s. .

M . , *,

. .. ... . . . . . .. ..... .,.,.M.,M, ... ...........

. M

.. ese.

g. . ..

M .. .. .#

. , . . ,.,.. .M,... .M.,* . , * . , * . , " . . , M..M. . MM.. eye MM M ." WP .

en W e

. .=..M. -. - =

M ..

M M

,. M, M, M, ._.,e_ .,...M.,.

.,e , M M*M .

  • .Me omM M.
  • M. . M.e MED

,. M. M,M, . M,,,M, M., .M.....M. e.*

M M .-

O*OMM

... .M em M.-,..M..M..

er .e .e

.#.e .m.. enMe en

, w M . . MM M e er m

.

  • O.*.

gy.p .* . . .

  • M.. eher M M em M M M.MM M.. M Sp** .*

,,.*.*g>*.e. .. .e .-

I.

4

3 p

Jumus HPCS /MJectiou  ;

1 2 '. 3 2 l 5 3 1e 12: 33: 21 i

i Aov lwovi

',F004 l l F005] p l R 333* o*

  • e p opEd c Psd v' ,

C1 ll 12s'-0*

W l

.cs -c M

,e uo. C cos c 0 r :3

  1. "I' *"
To s,'netss.os po).

mmey ev res t i

N" i-fn ecos t

, n

!, w:n F1.0

  • 1 m,_,,,_

l

~ l h

4-- V S-we:4 g .

r 1

RuV ,

i i

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM n ,

' g ,

O

  • 6

/NJ E c ri o Al STcP 2.

(2'33*.23 fd 12 : 5'l ' 3 5' O JV AOVi ,

fM4  ;

F005]

xI R

135'-o* -

N V-ClOSE ' CPFN I

O N -- 125'-o' s

--. .- . u . :.

,M 1,y,-

s- .

uo' r:23 CtoS6

. tS e r, c n H o GJPPRESS:ON Poo.

L t

i -

-. vt

.co? ,,. f toy g. Fo35 l T

H )\ I- ro,v wo 2

, opsa i

um ,

g FLOW

',s* ~~

Wo24 OPEM -

PuuP Rtw i

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM _

n I

w.

. Pu m p secunea 3 l2: Sl; as to \1: 5I 33 WOV A0V F004 F005 C 135'-o* x N CLOSED OPGhl O

. 22 125'-0*

N ne e

-l ; 106'- 0*

I j RO

, coo-o i

Tei;jccoseo 7157 RETURN l r

l M TO SUPPRESS:ON POO',

._ FE NOo? qv ,

, 00._ ,. ro33  ;

' 1- Vo% apga WIN FLOW m,

/ ~~

sto24 OPEM PuwP OM  ;

(CoASTDoOM) ,

1

, HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM ~

i

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~

Jh)d (EC TIO^J Vhl VG REOPEN ~S R M 10 FLoto V AL UG O PEb) l '2 ; S t .' 37 fo /2 5I:41 MOV A0V F004 F005 O R

8 Acg FLo g/ os: 135'-O' M N P V

CPEM OPEW Hor W A T- E R ,, e a

. 22 12.**- O' q% ~

i I

i .

' j; 106'- 0*

RO 000'-

ifes CesE TEST RtT'JPN l F4 = *O SJDPRcSS ON P00'.

i

-l 1

l o

rc

- N007 qv 3 ,3._ , . r033

$x- ?l,f

-)

O PE rJ W.N FLOW

,m ,

s h

wo24 I

' OPEM PUMP

-+ ,

OFF l

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM -  :

i

. ~ .

lNJ EcT t oM I/ALv'E O PE S) to 12.15l14]

12:st:ql WOV A0V roo4 F005 n R

ur-o-  :: N P OPGd O

HOT hot INA TE R ur-o*

w$tsR d

d 8, y A S, ' o refi c cos E -

. ns actsd to ggppRES$0N P00.

l l

)

1 / rt

- soe? ,,. s

, F035

)[ re C LCS G W:N FLOW V -

wo34 OPP a

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM g

. - o a

lNJ GC TIo M V AL.VG CtoSED G I2. : S l : 47 fo I3: zH 08 wov Aov r004 F005 C 13S*- O'

[

v, N R

P CloSE C

wnree/ .

srea m nor

~

' s'- *' wA TE R

. PR ess a n.e DECREASI4'G .

  • a I
'; 106'- C' i

jrn ccosa

- TQ $gppRC$$h POO.

I i

1 I

Re  ;

1 oy.g. F035

" n- T!d ccose W'N FLOW

,m ,

a- .-

wo24 QPP HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM  ;

1

.- ItJJ Gc rtoW VA L.vE REOPE M S q 13l2H:08 4o 13: 24:32-WOY ADV F004 F0e5 C R

s w-o'  :: N e V

CPfd cwsg Hor _

WATEY .

STE A PA

12r-o d

i I

, ' a 4*. c'

I;Ic2
  • 'iI C C 05E R5* TIP'

. TO SUPPRESSON POCr.

I I

a l ti

- 's007 gg g 3 ; .., g. rc35

%' y - ic8; ccos a W;N

, FLOW svei. g-.

'b Dff HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM g I

0

e o .

CONCLUSIONS The postulated rnechanism best fits the facts available The het pipe phenomena did net occur during stran 88 05 because the Foc4 valve did not reopen, The phenorena did not result in a severe transient The hECS performed its safety functier. as designed

. l 4

PIPE STRESS EVALUATION

  • 1. !NITIAL EVALUATIONS .

A. REVIEWED DESIGN BASIS CALCULATIONS TO DETERMINE AVA!LABLE MARGINS B. REVIEWED PIPE ROUTING AND SUSPENSION TO EVALUATE T'IE AFFECTS OF ADDITIOEL THERMAL EXPANSION C. INSPECTED SUPPORTS AND PIPIMG FOR 51645 0F DAMAGE

1. VISUAL EKAMIETION
2. DYE-PENETRANT ERAMIMTION
3. V0LtMETRIC EIAMIETION D. RESULTS FROM PRELIMI ERY A MLYSIS e

9 q

l 1

4 .

4 i

e e

4 TDFERATURE PROFILE l

I. APPROACH TO DETEMINE TDFERATURE PROFILE A. MEASURED DATA TAKEN AT DIFFERENT P!PE LOCATIONS AND TIMES B. LENST - SQUARES FIT APPLIED TO DETEMINE TDPERATURE PROFILE AT TIME ZERO II. CONFIRMATION 0F TEMPERATURE PROFILE TO OTHER PHENfMENA A. PAINT DISCOLORATION B. CHARRED PlPE MARKERS C. ADIABATIC PIPE WALL TEMPERATURE CALCULATION

!!!. PIPE MARKERS

~

1

. H PC S  ?:PE T E M P E R.' N ; E PROFILE A F TE R e

$($ dM 9:-:+

M r W(u s CO N T AIN M(NT '

c ygg x $ ttlEL O vttvr l

$ eMZELTI0W I V4LVI  ;

& l

.  % reew (L llt' N C ppy h

V _ _ F100 R I . I W a

ytew

  • -D 6*F = > $14'F ..$33'r to 3ggey " Jj ,

g

  • $ 28 *5 _ 2 0g *p _/ 4 jCoop 8.4 Y 4 I
  • \ [L 71'

\ 'es e, CC e, i

WOTES: NOT TO SCALE j NOT Au l50ME TRIC t F

.e e

l I

PIPE STRESS EVALUATION I. FINAL EVALUATIONS A. ANALYSIS TO QUALIFY THE TRANSIENT AFFECTS

1. MATERIALS 1
2. PIPE STRESSES 1
3. FATIGUE USAGE FACTORS
4. SUPPORT LOADS
5. DISPLACEMENTS A. PIPING l B. SUPPORTS  :
6. PENETRATION
8. REMAININ6 MARGINS C. ADO TO DESIGN 8 ASIS p

. .. e.

O-SLM4ARY I. ALL STRESSES MEET ALLOWABLE LIMITS II. ALL SUPPORTS MEET ALLOWABLE LIMITS III. MARGIN REMAINS IN PIPING, SUPPORTS, AND OTHER COMPONENTS TO PERMIT THE EVENT TO RE0CCUR IV. EVENT DID NOT REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL MECHANICAL HARDSHIP TO THE HPCS SYSTEM BASED ON LOW STRESSES AND LOADS CALCULATED l

. .* SCRAM 88-05 St# MARY o On 9/6/88 at 6:06 hours a generator trip occurred from a fault on neutral grounding transformer for 1STX-XNSIA 13.8 KV normal supply transformer, o The transformer differential relaying sensed the high current flow condition resulting in a generator trip causing a turbine control valve fast closure and a suosequent scram, o The generator protective relayi.ig and 13.8 KY and 4.16 KV bus fast transfer schemes operated as designed.

o No loss of power to the TPCCW pump or major voltage fluctuations were sensed by the RPS bus, o HPCS/RCIC injected on spurious Level 2 initiation signal. A RPV pressure transient (1115 psig) was sensed by the fast acting wide range level transmitters. .

o NOUE declared.

o Operations confirmed no HPCS injection Ifne high temperatures existed, o All systems functioned as designed.

2

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